Quarterly Chronicle

The Royal African Society

Quarterly ChronicleAuthor(s): Alan GraySource: African Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 233 (Oct., 1959), pp. 268-284Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Royal African SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/719436 .Accessed: 18/06/2014 02:23

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268

Quarterly Chronicle Compiled by ALAN GRAY

DR. NKRUMAH, Prime Minister of Ghana, President Sekou Tored of Guinea and President Tubman of Liberia met at Saniquellie, Liberia,

from 15th to 18th July. At the end of their talks they published a joint declaration calling for a conference to be held in 1960 of the independent States of Africa, and of other African States with a fixed date for independence, with the object of forming "a community of independent African

States". The three leaders agreed on ten basic Black States Confer principles. These included the maintenance by

each member of the proposed community of its own national identity and constitutional structure;

non-interference in the internal affairs of another member; no prejudice to present or future international policies, relations and obligations of members; and a common flag, anthem and motto. The general policy of the community would be to build up a free and prosperous African community for the benefit of its peoples and the peoples of the world and in the interests of international peace and security, while its main objective would be to help other African territories "subjected to domination" with a view to accelerating the end of their non-independent status.

The three leaders also agreed: (a) that they deplored the present situation in the Cameroons, and con-

sidered free elections under United Nations supervision before independence to be the most effective and democratic means of solving

the present crisis; (b) to support the inscription of the Algerian question on the agenda of

the next session of the General Assembly of the United Nations: (c) that they condemned racial discrimination in any form wherever it

exists, and in particular the policy of apartheid practised in South Africa;

(d) to consult together on all international questions and ensure unity of action at the United Nations.

They appealed to all Africans, including those in the French community, and to all United Nations members, to associate themselves with Liberia, Ghana and Guinea in their endeavour to dissuade France from embarking upon her proposed nuclear tests in the Sahara. They also appealed to other nations which produced nuclear weapons to end nuclear tests.

Mr. Ako Adjei, Ghana Minister of Foreign Affairs, who attended the talks. subsequently stated that the Ghana-Guinea union would still remain, and that the special fraternal relations between the two countries would continue as in the past. He added that the general aspect of the Ghana-Guinea declarations in Accra last November and in Conakry in May- the idea of bringing all African States into a union- was now merged with the new idea of a community of independent African States.

A conference of independent African States, held at Monrovia, Liberia, from 4th to 8th August. was attended by representatives of Ethiopia, Ghana,


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QUARTERLY CHRONICLE 269

Guinea, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, the Sudan, Tunisia, and the United Arab Republic. The "provisional Government of Algeria", established last Sep- tember in Cairo, was also represented, and much of the discussion centred on the Algerian question.

The conference adopted seven resolutions, which urged France to nego- tiate with, and all countries to recognise and support, the provisional Algerian government; denounced nuclear tests in the Sahara; deplored the situation in the Cameroons; condemned racial discrimination; called on administering Powers to take into account the political aspirations of depen- dent peoples; urged the Government of the Union of South Africa to imple- ment United Nations resolutions on South West Africa; and called on the United Kingdom Government to end the state of emergency in Nyasaland and release those unlawfully detained there.

OLLOWING the failure of the defence to have its objection to the indictment upheld by the special court at Pretoria, the trial of 30 people

for treason got under way in August. The opening 15,000-word address prepared by Mr. Oswald Pirow, Q.C., principal Crown prosecutor, was read for him by M. G. Hoexter, a member of the prosecuting team. Mr. Hoexter said that the accused had described their aim as the establishment

of a "People's Democracy". The Crown's case Treason Trial would be that the establishment of such a political structure would involve the destruction of

the existing State and its Parliament and judiciary. Mr. Hoexter said that over the period covered in the indictment (and for some time before) there existed a countrywide conspiracy between the accused and persons unknown to the Crown to overthrow the State by violence and to substitute for it another form of State.

"The gist of the Crown's charge is that the accused, acting in concert and through their organisations, prepared to subvert the existing State by illegal means, including the use of force and violence, and to replace it with a State founded on principles differing fundamentally from those on which the present State is constituted," said Mr. Hoexter.

The conspiracy had its origin in the so-called Liberation Movement, an international Communist-inspired and supported movement pledged to overthrow by violence all Governments in non-Communist countries where sections of the population did not have equal political and economic rights. The movement had its counterpart in South Africa. It was inspired by Communist fanaticism, Bantu nationalism, and racial hatred in various degrees. In June, 1955, it led to the holding of a congress of the people which formulated as a programme of action its ostensibly more innocent objects. All the organisations unequivocally and emphatically supported the movement, but the most blatant violent speeches were made by members of the African National Congress, Mr. Hoexter said. The accused participated fully in the activities of their respective associations and associated themselves with the attitude of those associations, in addition to committing overt acts with which they were charged in the indictment.

He would call evidence to show that the African National Congress and the South African Indian Congress "were committed to some form of



270 AFRICAN AFFAIRS

revolutionary activity, revolution not seen as a sudden episode, but as the consummation of a long flexible process involving boycotts, strikes, civil disobedience and stoppage of work." Violence was aimed at all who did not support this revolution. The other organisations mentioned in the statement are the Peace Council, Congress of Democrats, Congress of Trade Unions, the Coloured People's Organisation and the Federation of South African Women.

The crown contended that it did not need to prove that each conspirator had participated in carrying out each detail, nor that each conspirator was acquainted with every other conspirator, nor that each knew the exact role of every other confederate. It would merely prove that all the conspirators had the same communal plan.

The Congress movement had consistently identified itself with the "liberatory" activities of revolutionaries in China, Korea, Viet-nam, Kenya and Malaya, Mr. Hoexter said. It presented the South African situation as one of oppressors and oppressed, and exhorted the "oppressed" to "break their shackles with violence". Slogans of non-violence were used as mere camouflage or, seen in context, as veiled incitements to violence. He quoted from a speech said to have been made by one of the accused: "If you are a true volunteer and are called on to be violent, you must murder."

The accused propagated the view that the Parliamentary (United Party) Opposition was impotent. The only real opposition to the Government resided in the Congress movement. Mr. Hoexter said: "Violence runs through this case in an unbroken thread. The speeches made by the accused bristle with references to the spilling of blood."

The spearhead of the violence campaign were to be the "freedom volunteers" called into being by ex-Chief Albert Luthuli, Mr. Hoexter said. They were intended to be a semi-military shock brigade in the so-called "Army of Liberation".

The presiding judge at an earlier stage expressed some anxiety about the prospect of the trial being protracted, and appealed to counsel to make some effort to shorten the proceedings. The outcome was thirteen points of admission put in by the defence. Mr. Justice Rumpff greeted the proposed admissions by saying that "so far, you have given precisely what I had in mind". The prosecution agreed to consider the defence admissions to try to shorten the proceedings.

The 13 proposed points of admission put in by Mr. Maisels. Q.C.. leading counsel for the defence, were as follows:

l.-The decision of the African National Congress and the South African Indian Congress on a campaign for the defiance of unjust laws and the carrying out of that campaign;

2.-Support by various bodies for the setting up of a Congress of the People;

3.-The campaign for a freedom charter and the acceptance in principle of the charter;

4.-Participation in or support for a campaign of opposition to the Group Areas Act, the Bantu Education Act, Western Areas removal, and passes for women;

6.-A demand for the substitution of a new and radically different Government;




7.-The acceptance of the view that extra-Parliamentary activity must be resorted to and the advocacy of extra-Parliamentary activity.

8.-The recruitment and existence of a body known as the Freedom Volunteers;

9.-The policy of the organisations' opposition to the apartheid policy and the legislation of the present Government;

10.-The policy of opposing all forms of racial discrimination, especially in the field of franchise;

11.-The organisations criticised the colonial system and sympathised with the effort of colonial countries to obtain self-government;

12.-The expressions by the organisations of their admitted policies were often emotional, angry and repetitive; and that

13.-There was co-operation among the organisations on their admitted policies.

R. LENNOX-BOYD, the Colonial Secretary, addressed the Common- wealth Press Union in London in June and although he covered a

wide field of colonial affairs he devoted a big section of his talk to African nationalism.

He recalled, during his term of office, the emergence of Ghana as an independent member of the Commonwealth, the attainment of self-

government by the three Regions of Nigeria, the Colonialism and arrangements for the achievement of indepen- Nationalism dence by the Federation of Nigeria in October

1960, and recent constitutional progress in Sierra Leone. He pointed out that the problems of West Africa, complex though they were in many ways, had been enormously simplified by certain factors: their long historic association with the United Kingdom; the existence in West Africa of an educated middle-class; and the fact that none of these territories had ever been areas of white settlement. "These various factors," he continued, "have had profound effects on the smooth evolution to full responsibility of the various territories concerned."

Turning to the problems of multi-racial societies in Africa, the Secretary of State said that successive United Kingdom Governments had recognised that the dependence of the East African territories on agriculture; the absence of minerals, except in certain areas; and the fact that they were the homes of significant groups of non-Africans "put a different light upon the future progress of the area" The United Kingdom would not have done its job properly "until it is fully accepted that all the main communities must feel secure and make their full contribution to the future, and until the territories are able to stand firmly on their own feet economically".

The policy of partnership, of non-racialism, which the Government intended to pursue was more difficult than that of a division between Euro- pean- and African-dominated areas. It involved, "at this stage, qualitative franchise, and the permanent need to encourage political rather than communal or racial groupings". The simple racial slogan "Africa for the Africans" had a tremendous appeal to Africans in East and Central Africa, however little it took account of the realities, but it "cuts right across the whole policy of continuous governments here of very different political views, and it cuts across this by exacerbating racial fears and tensions, in-



272 AFRICAN AFFAIRS

cluding uncertainty among investors, and delaying the day when the territories can stand on their own feet . . . The alternative which we offer is that of a non-racial future in which Africans will play their full part, and feelings of race will, as far as possible, be submerged in the main loyalty to a single nation".

Mr. Lennox-Boyd gave some indication of the constitutional progress made in the East African territories during the last five years. "In Tangan- yika there were four Africans in the Legislative Council. Today there are 23 Africans in the Legislative Council, three African Ministers, one Euro- pean Minister and one Asian Minister. All this is new, and the constitutional committee which has now been set up with my full approval has received widespread support in Tanganyika and outside. I believe we are entitled to modest hopes that the policy of non-racialism has a real chance of success in building up in Tanganyika a genuine Tanganyikan nation. In Kenya there were 8 Africans in a Legislative Council of 54, and no Africans in the Executive. Today there are 25 Africans in an enlarged council of 91, and places for two in the Council of Ministers, though up to now, owing to a boycott of the council, only one African Minister has been appointed. Last April I was able to make a statement, well received by moderates of all races, designed to help the emergence of a single nation ..

"In Uganda it was my predecessor, Lord Chandos. who spoke of the aim to build the protectorate into a self-governing State, and said that when that is achieved "the Government of the country will be mainly in the hands of 56 members, of whom only 20 were Africans. Today there are 34 Africans out of a Legislative Council of 62. In Uganda also, a committee is studying the possibility of direct elections on a common roll which it is hoped to introduce the year after next.

Speaking of affairs in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the Secretary of State said that no opportunity was lost by the United Kingdom Government of making it clear that "we stand firmly behind the preamble to the constitution" which endorsed the preservation of the protectorate status of the two northern territories [Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia] the continuation of land questions as a responsibilty of the territorial governments and ultimately of the United Kingdom Government, and the continuation of political advancement in the northern territories as ultimately a United Kingdom responsibility. "No Government," Mr. Lennox-Boyd said, "can allow any section of the people to resort to force or the threat of

it--.let alone force expressed in its most unpleasant form- or to ride

roughshod over the law of the land to get its way. Action to forestall violence often attracts severe criticism, but no Government ought to risk human life through fear of temporary unpopularity. To keep order is in no sense to oppress genuine national aspirations. Our policy is now, as it always has been, to give nationalism a constructive outlet in steady progress towards self-government. But African nationalists will have to accept-as indeed the more moderate ones do-that there are other races who have settled for generations, indeed, in some cases, for hundreds of years, in the various territories and regard it as their home; and that these races provide at the moment by far the most of the skill, the capital and the enterprise required to bring the territories economically to the point where they can be a viable independent unit.."




"Progress towards self-government must go ahead by planned stages, so that each step forward can be tested by time, and there are four essential conditions before successful self-government can be met. The first condition is that we eventually leave behind us the institutions which are best fitted to secure a good government, and that we should be satisfied that power will pass to able and honest people, people able and ready to govern through these institutions, and not abuse them for the sake of their own ambitions. The second criterion is to get everyone to accept generally that the territory is not just the home of one particular race or community, and that the rights and interests of all communities must be safeguarded. The third is that the territory must not only have the material resources to give the inhabitants a reasonable standard of living, but keep the confidence of all on whose capital and skill its future prosperity will depend. Fourthly ienced and educated people to form an efficient and impartial civil service (and as important as anything else), there must be enough skilled, exper- to run the complex machinery of modern government."

A SECOND debate on the tragic incident at Hola detention camp in which 11 Mau Mau detainees died after being beaten by their guards

took, place shortly before the last Parliament rose. The background to the debate was as follows: On March 3, 1959, 10

Mau Mau detainees at the special detention camp at Hola, in the Coast Province of Kenya, died during, or soon after, an operation in which 85

"un-cooperative" detainees were taken to work Hola Tragedy at the Hola irrigation scheme near the camp. An eleventh man died in hospital some days later.

A Kenya Press Office handout, reporting the deaths on March 4, stated that they occurred after the men had drunk water from a water-cart which was used by all members of the working party and by their guards. A further handout on March 12, after autopsies had been completed, said: "The medical reports indicate that there were injuries on the bodies which may have been due to violence", and added that an inquest by a senior resident magistrate would be held as soon as the necessary police investigations had taken place, and that "when the result of the necessary police investigations had taken place, and that "when result of the inquest is known the Government of Kenya will decide whether to hold a further inquiry".

With regard to the cause of death, the magistrate who conducted the inquest found that death was not due to drinking contaminated water, but in every case to "multiple bruising caused by violence", inflicted in the course of an operation "to compel detainees who had refused to work on any work not directly connected with their own well-being" to do manual labour digging an irrigation trench on the Tana River Irrigation Scheme. The results of the inquest were summarised by the Secretary of State for the Colonies in the House of Commons on May 7, when he said: "The coroner found that illegal assaults had taken place against the detainees, but that specific offences by known persons had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt."

Much of the evidence at the inquest hinged upon consideration of the Cowan Plan, under which the operation at Hola on March 3 was launched.

19 Vol. 58



274 AFRICAN AFFAIRS

This plan was drawn up by Mr. J. B. T. Cowan, Senior Superintendent of Prisons in Kenya, after a visit to Hola in February 1959 made at the request of the Kenya Commissioner of Prisons, who had been disturbed at the lack of discipline amongst detainees there, and particularly at the evidence of large-scale malingering and refusal to work.

The plan, which aimed at getting recalcitrant detainees to work, was discussed with Mr. Sullivan, the camp commandant, but it was not committed to paper until after Mr. Cowan's return to Nairobi and, according to the evidence, Mr. Sullivan did not receive a copy of it before the operation took place. It was, however-again according to evidence at the inquest-approved by the Commissioner of Prisons and by the Kenya Minister of Internal Security, and Mr. Sullivan then received a signal to go ahead with it. The magistrate found that the plan, as executed by Mr. Sullivan, differed in essentials from the Cowan Plan but that the Cowan Plan itself was neither clear nor comprehensive. Summarising his findings on this point, he said: " . . . in my opinion there were defects, ambiguities and omissions in the Cowan Plan, the plan was not executed as it had been intended and there was a grave lack of European supervision of the African warders in the main charged with the execution of the plan. The situation created by this lack of supervision was seriously aggravated by the orders given by Mr. Sullivan regarding the use of force which, however, appear to have gone no further than the orders in the plan itself. that the detainees would, if necessary, 'be manhandled to the site and forced to carry out the task'."

The findings of the inquest were submitted to the Attorney General of Kenya, who decided that, on the evidence available, no charge could be framed against identified individuals in respect of identified illegal force used in the incident. The Kenya Government decided, however, that disciplinary proceedings should be taken against the camp commandant, Mr. Sullivan, and his deputy, Mr. Coutts, and also that a Commission of Inquiry should be set up to consider the future administration of the four remaining Mau Mau detention camps in Kenya.

In the course of the Commons debate on June 16, all the circumstances relating to the incident on March 3 were closely scrutinised and the whole history of Mau Mau and of the Kenya Government's rehabilitation programme were discussed.

Among the main contentions put forward by the Opposition in support of their demand for a public inquiry were:

That, although the deaths of the detainees might have resulted from the bungling of the Cowan Plan, that plan was in itself illegal, since it sanctioned a use of force not permitted under the Kenya Prison Code. (This was denied by Government speakers, who maintained that the force envisaged under the plan was only such as might be legally applied.)

That the principal responsibility should therefore lie, not with the camp commandant and his deputy but, ultimately, with the Kenya Administration and the Secretary of State for the Colonies for permitting the plan to be approved.

That the Kenya Administration had attempted to cover up the deaths by issuing a misleading press statement on the day following the incident. (This also was denied, although the Secretary of State for the Colonies agreed that




the first press statement had been "unfortunate" and should not have been issued in that form. There had, however, been no intention on the part of the Kenya Government, he said, to cover up anything, or deliberately give a false impression.)

Moving the Government's amendment, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Lennox-Boyd, spoke of the Hola incident as particularly tragic "because it has come at a time when the political atmosphere in the colony is decidely brighter". The incident, however, could not be isolated from the background of the Mau Mau problem as a whole, nor from the Kenya Government's rehabilitation policy to deal with that problem. He reminded his hearers that "Mau Mau is a conspiracy based on the total perversion of the human spirit by means of the power of the oath and by witchcraft and intimidation", and he reviewed the long and difficult processes by which the Kenya Government over the years had attempted, with outstanding success, to reclaim those subjected to Mau Mau influences and to return them to normal life. These processes had had to be evolved and adapted to meet the needs of a situation in which the numbers of detainees were decreasing rapidly, but those remaining were being reduced to the hard core of fanatical Mau Mau. It was in this final and most difficult phase of rehabilitation that the Cowan Plan had been drawn up, designed to deal with the particular circumstances at Hola Camp, where there was "a large number of exceptionally bad detainees, who were all refusing to work".

Mr. Lennox-Boyd went on to describe how far the operation at Hola Camp on March 3 had diverged from the Cowan Plan as it had been drawn up. "The main proposals," he said, "were not, in effect, carried out. If they had been, this tragedy would not have happened." Things had gone tragically wrong at Hola. Disciplinary and remedial measures were, however, being taken, and the disciplinary inquiry now being held would involve, to a very great extent, the question of who was responsible for the operation as actually carried out.

The Secretary of State closed by paying further tribute to the Kenya Government's rehabilitation policy. "I am sure that the House will be of one mind in thinking that the horror and distress that we all feel at what happened at Hola must not be allowed to cloud our judgment in this House, or to deflect the Kenya Government from their attempts to restore to society even the most hardened of the Mau Mau adherents. I am sure that none of us could contemplate a situtation whereby these men were left to rot away without any positive attempt to rehabilitate them. The process must continue, and further planning and experiment must go ahead. Past experience, including past mistakes, must go on being taken fully into account. I know the House will share our hope that the Kenya Government will be able to move forward to a situation where even the few hundred desperate men who remain can be reclaimed, if necessary one by one, thus bringing to an end the threat which they themselves, by their frame of mind, represent to all the people of the colony. Their release is largely in their own hands-in their desire and ability to prove their willingness to return to society as peaceful and law-abiding people, acceptable to their own people."

The inquiry into the running of the detention camps ended with a number of reforms being introduced shortly afterwards in accordance with the



276 AFRICAN AFFAIRS

commission's recommendations. One innovation was the appointment of a special commissioner to supervise the remaining stages of rehabilitating Mau Mau still detained under emergency regulations.

HE report of the commission of inquiry into the disturbances in Nyasa- land was published on July 23 with a White Paper containing a dis-

patch from the Governor commenting on the report. The terms of reference of the commission (whose chairman was Mr. Justice Devlin) were "to inquire into the disturbances in Nyasaland and the events leading up to them".

The commission was not sitting as a court of law and held hearings in private, and there was

Devlin Report no confrontation of witnesses or right of cross- examination of witnesses. Its report (143 pages) is,

as it says, not written in the form of findings for or against any individual, but as a statement of facts "based on what we believe to be the balance of probabilities and not upon proof beyond reasonable doubt".

The report is divided into six parts. Part I reviews events from 1944 to July 1958. In this part is says that "the Government was a benevolent despotism"; but adds "the despotism" was that of a kindly father and not of a tyrant. Part II covers July 1958 to January 1959, including the return of Dr. Banda from the Accra conference and subsequent incidents. Part III deals with the events of January and February 1959, including the emergency meeting of Nyasaland African Congress leaders in the bush on January 25 and the disturbances which took place in various parts of the Protectorate during February. Part IV discusses the question whether, at the meeting on January 25, the Congress leaders had made a detailed plan of assassination. Parts V and VI deal with the operations by the security forces on and after March 3, following the declaration of a state of emergency.

The commission concludes that a policy of violence was adopted, and the Government had either to act or abdicate; and since with the forces at its disposal the maintenance of order could not be achieved within the ordinary framework of the law, it had to resort to emergency powers. The more extreme leaders had by the beginning of 1959 "made up their minds that they would get Congress to adopt a policy of violence". The commission dismisses the suggestion that the Governor had acted under pressure from the Federal Government.

The commission concludes that a policy of violence was adopted, and beating and killing certainly discussed, at the meeting on January 25, but did not find any detailed plan for massacre and assassination. The commission formed the view that Dr. Banda "would never have approved a policy of murder, and that he would have intervened decisively if he had thought that it was so much as being discussed". However, he had come to regard some degree of violence as inevitable, and he never condemned it categorically. It was Dr. Banda's inaction which made the meeting on January 25 possible. The commission reports that the Nyasaland Govern- ment regarded the "murder plot" (i.e. a detailed plan for assassination) as "a possibility rather than a probability, but something which had to be treated seriously"; and that even "if the Government had had no informa-




tion about a murder plot, they would still have declared a state of emergency on or about March 3". It says that the effect of the publicity for the alleged murder plot has been unfortunate, that Africans are incredulous, and that "the attempt to involve Dr. Banda in massacre and assassination is generally thought by those who have seen or heard him to be ridiculous". The commission adds that "the publicity given to the murder plot has distracted attention from the real strength of the Government's case against Congress".

Parts V and VI deal in detail with the disturbances which it construes as chiefly occasions involving the use of firearms and the measures taken to restore law and order and break the Congress organisation after it had been declared illegal. It is critical of methods used to disperse meetings and render Congress ineffective and of the extent of the force and measures of restraint used in certain cases. In particular it was satisfied that illegal use of force in villages where Congress was strong was "expressly or impliedly authorised from the top". But the commission found that in the incidents recorded in Part V no one had been "trigger-happy" and was satisfied that "each man did what he did because he honestly felt that he could not dis- charge his duty in any other way".

The Governor records his satisfaction that the two most important con- clusions of the commission "fully vindicate my Government's action", i.e. that "in the situation which existed on March 3, the Government had either to act or to abicate"; and that that situation was the result of the adoption of a policy of violence, to which the Nyasaland African Congress leadership generally was a party.

As the protecting power, responsibility rests with the United Kingdom. The commission itself stressed the relatively primitive form of African society and the political immaturity of Africans in Nyasaland. Against such a background the United Kingdom Government believe that "the conse- quences of an immediate abandonment of our trust would be chaos and disaster for those in the territory".

The commission's use of the phrase "police State" in connection with the emergency "will be quoted out of context and misused throughout the world". Such a phrase is not true of Nyasaland. Leading Africans evennow freely express vigorous opposition to Government policy, for example, on federation, but they condemn violence, whereas violence was the adopted policy of Congress.

The Governor denies that private hearings by the commission were necessary for the sake of witnesses because they were afraid of the Govern- ment. The commission gave assurances of immunity to them on his behalf. The commission found that Congress was using intiinidation and cites the decision of the Congress conference of January 25 to keep a black list of "stooges and quislings", suggestions for dealing with whom ranged from deportation, when self-government arrived, to killing.

The Governor rebuts detailed criticism made in certain passages in his dispatch of March 18 by reference to other passages in the commission's own report. He deals in detail with the commission's statement that it did not find "any detailed plan for massacre and assassination". It found that there was talk at the conference of January 25 of beating and killing Euro- peans. The Governor draws no distinction between talk of beating and killing on the one hand and talk of massacre or assassination on the other.



278 AFRICAN AFFAIRS

"Massacre may be a matter of numbers but murder is murder whether you call it killing or assassination." The Government's subsequent actions were dictated by the real threat to life resulting from the Congress policy of violence. The Governor quotes a document which was accepted by the commission as giving "as good an impression as can be got of what went on" at the conference. In this these words appear: "If our Doctor [Dr. Banda] were caught what would be (sic) do:

(a) Word will issue from the central body telling all; (b) People to start war after two days; (c) Digging up roads, destroying anything belonging to Europeans; (d) Not to pay taxes; (e) To hit Europeans or cut throat". The Governor gives facts and figures derived from the commission's

report to show that many of the decisions recorded in this document were subsequently implemented locally by Congress, sabotage being launched even before Dr. Banda was detained. In view of the importance attached to this document and subsequent events he cannot treat the statement beside (e) as "anything less than a record of a decision to resort to personal violence and murder, and as anything else than an essential part of a general scheme". Special Branch reports of the meeting came from seven independent sources from different parts of Nyasaland, each ignorant of the other's existence. The Governor's assessment was based on these reports, which mentioned bloodshed and murder.

On Dr. Banda's complicity in the decisions of the Congress conference, the Governor quotes Dr. Banda's statement after the date of the conference to the effect that "moderate leaders were no use", and his failure to speak publicly against violence. He notes that the commission seems to have given great weight to reports of Dr. Banda's character and to its own impression of him as a witness. He cannot acquit Dr. Banda of responsibility for the policies of violence adopted at the meeting.

The Governor has had no time to deal with the detailed incidents in the commission's account of events after March 3. On its general observations, Congress policy, involving violence and killing if Dr. Banda were arrested, made it necessary to act with speed, secrecy and maximum available strength once his detention had been decided on. In the original operations up to March 5, 263 arrests were made, of which in seven cases evidence was that the force used had inflicted injuries. Crowds had to be dispersed because of the background of experience that they had, on the occasions quoted by the commission, resorted to violence. Forces had to be guided by special circumstances and could not afford to take chances. Sixty crowds on and after March 3, 1959, were dispersed without resort to firearms: the commission itself found in the incidents it recorded no one who was "trigger happy".

The commission also alleges that illegal force was used in villages where Congress was strong and this was authorised expressly or impliedly from the top. The Governor repudiates any allegations that he did so. Illegal force has never been condoned. The commission's observations seem to rest on the phrase in the instructions to the security forces observations referring to "tough punitive action in areas where lawlessness and acts of violence are perpetrated and planned". This should be read with another




sentence in the same instructions, that these areas "will be dealt with firmly but without brutality". The Governor concludes that a serious threat was averted by prompt action, and pays tribute to all ranks and all races who took part.

The report was debated by the House of Commons on July 28.

THE Government proposed before Parliament rose for the summer recess that a Central African' Advisory Commission of 26 should be

appointed .The commission, which is being set up to carry out a fact- finding survey of the Federation before the constitutional conference in October next year, is expected to start work this autumn. Lord Monckton, a former Government Minister has been appointed chairman.

Thirteen members of the commission will be Rhodesian drawn from Central Africa. Five of this number

Commission will be Africans. None of the Federation's representatives will be drawn from the Governments

or Legislatures of the three territories or from the Federal Government or Parliament. There will be eleven United Kingdom representatives on the commission. The British delegation will include the chairman, six Privy Councillors from the House of Commons and House of Lords, and four independent members. It is proposed that three of the Privy Councillors should be drawn from the Opposition parties.

In addition to these two big delegations there will be two members drawn from Commonwealth countries with special experience of working a federal type of constitution.

Details of the commission were given to the Federal Parliament by Sir Roy Welensky, Federal Prime Minister, at the same time that Mr. Mac- millan, the British Prime Minister, announced them in the House of Com- mons. Sir Roy emphasised the advisory character of the commission. He stressed that it would advise all five Governments concerned. "It will not make decisions binding on these Governments," he said. He believed the commission would be "an imaginative and constructive step". He said they welcomed the opportunity of bringing the members of the commission in closer contact with the actual facts of the situation "to show them our considerable achievements and demonstrate the sincerity of purpose of the four Governments of the Federation. Those participating in the 1960 conference can derive nothing but benefit from the advice of able and eminent men, half of them from the Federation," Sir Roy said. If new ideas could be produced it would be to the advantage of all, he added.

The nomination of the 13 Central African members of the commission will be divided in the following way between the four Governments: Four will be put forward by the Federal Government, three by the Southern Rhodesia Government, and three each by Northern Rhodesia and Nyasa- land.

The commission is to be given complete freedom to obtain information. But its terms of reference clearly limit it to an advisory role. Its task is to advise the five Governments in preparation for the 1960 conference "on the constitutional programme and framework best suited to the achievements of the objects contained in the Constitution of 1953, including the preamble.



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Mr. Macmillan said that the commission was expected to hold its first meeting in London. He did not give a definite date for the meeting, but indicated that it would be in the autumn.

In explaining the functions of the commission, Mr. Macmillan said: "We think that a comprehensive commission of this kind will enable Govern- ments to approach the conference with the best possible advice at tleir disposal: promote greater public understanding of the issues involved; and do something to create a common approach to these very difficult problems among all concerned. Our paramount object, in considering this matter, has been to try to create, both here and in Africa, a common mind on the next stages of the political evolution of the Federation. This seems to us the imaginative and creative course.

"We have thought it right that Europeans and Africans who live in Rhodesia and Nyasaland should have a part in the consideration of matters so vital to their future. For this is not an academic exercise. It concerns the lives and homes of all the population of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, of whatever race. At the same time, we are anxious to have a broad cross-section of opinion and knowledge from this country, and entirely independent advice from elsewhere in the Commonwealth."

Mr. Macmillan explained that the Government would be willing to consult with the Opposition on such matters as the choice of the chairman, and would also be willing to modify the requirement that the six members of the United Kingdom Parliament should be privy councillors or to adjust their proportions of Commonwealth and non-Parliamentary United King- dom members, if this would secure Opposition support for the proposal as a whole. The leader of the Opposition, Mr. Gaitskell, said that, although the Opposition agreed that the conference to review the constitution of the Federation was certainly one of the very greatest importance, and that there was much to be said for preparatory work being done before the conference met, they had very serious objections to the particular form of commission proposed by the Government. In the first place they doubted whether a commission with half its membership nominated by the four central African Governments would have the confidence of Africans. Secondly, there seemed to be a danger that the commission would, with its terms of reference, anticipate the 1960 conference; this was undesirable, because it was important that, at that conference, African opinion should be properly represented through the Governments of the territories concerned. Thirdly, the Opposition did not feel that six members out of a total of 26 adequately reflected the great responsibilities of the United Kingdom Parliament in the matter.

These criticisms had been made when the Prime Minister, in their private talks, had first put forward a proposal on much the same lines, and when the Opposition had put forward the counter-proposal of a predominantly parliamentary commission. The inclusion of African and Commonwealth members showed that Opposition views had been taken into account to a limited extent, although the number of African members was too small and it was not clear whether India would be asked to nominate one of the Commonwealth members.

In a debate in the United Kingdom House of Commons on July 22 on Central African affairs the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for




the Colonies emphasised the advances that had been made since the incep- tion of Federation in 1953. In the economic field great progress had been made. The national income of the three component territories had risen from ?150 million in 1950 to ?325 million in 1957. In all three territories the effect of federation had been to broaden and steady the economies, and to make possible capital investments from outside for Kariba and other projects which would otherwise not have taken place. The advantages of a unified economic structure had been shown at the time of the fall in the price of Northern Rhodesian copper, when the joint economy was steadied by the effect of Southern Rhodesian industrialisation and cash crops. Nyasa- land gained about ?4 million a year from the economic link through federation, and expenditure on health and education in the Protectorate had trebled. In the Federation as a whole, African earnings since federation had increased by 66 per cent. and there was some ?50 million of African money in the banks of the Federation. Socially there had been striking changes in the position of Africans in Southern Rhodesia; the pass laws had been relaxed in that territory and suspended in various Northern Rhodesian municipalities. There were multi-racial trade unions, apprentice- ship and workmen's compensation Bills, and the opening of all branches of the Federal and territorial civil services to Africans. There had been African advancement on the Copperbelt and it was hoped this would soon be fol- lowed on the railways. In Nyasaland European-owned land had been halved since Federation.

The Federation had also succeeded in developing, if on a limited scale, a multi-racial political life. There was an African minister. There were 12 African members in the Federal House of 59, and what was important, they did not sit as an African group but belonged to different, multi-racial, political parties. In Northern Rhodesia there were 9 African members of the Legislative Council out of a total of 24, again sitting as members of political parties. The basis of the common roll franchise arrangement was that, as the numbers of European and African voters became more nearly equal, the parties would have to court electors of both races and would have to adopt non-racial policies. There were two African ministers in the Executive Council.

Mr. Macmillan said that, notwithstanding this record of achievement, it would be foolish to deny that there was great opposition, great doubt and uncertainty about the Federation in many quarters. This had been confirmed by the tragic events in Nyasaland, and there was at present a current of opinion, particularly evident in the African Congress, against federation as such. This made the task of the constitutional review the more important. its purpose was to review the constitution in the light of the experience gained, to agree on any changes that might be desirable, and to consider the ultimate problem of the position of the Federation in the Common- wealth. At the same time, the Government of the United Kingdom had always made it clear that, if there were proposals which involved the two Northern Territories ceasing to be under the direct protection of the United Kingdom Government, it would be necessary to ascertain whether the peoples of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland desired the change, in accordance with the pledges in the preamble to the 1953 federal constitution. Mr. Macmillan emphasised that, whatever the method adopted for consultation,



282 AFRICAN AFFAIRS

the two legislatures of the Northern Territories (qualified though they were to do their ordinary work) would not in the present state of development- or in any immediate stage of development-be more than one element in the machinery that might be devised for obtaining the views of the inhabitants.

The review had to come within nine years from the establishment of the Federation, and Mr. Macmillan said that he had considered whether it should be postponed until 1962 as had been suggested. He had decided against this course, on the ground that this would mean three years of inaction and uncertainty which would damage confidence and encourage those who wished to break up the Federation. It would not be possible for sufficient constitutional advance to take place in the Northern Territories in that time materially to alter the situation.

However, Mr. Macmillan was in agreement that constitutional advance should take place as rapidly as possible in the territories for which the United Kingdom was responsible. He said: "We have to think of increasing the constitutional responsibilities of the Territorial Governments, as distinct from the Federal Government, so that the position of each component Government can gradually approximate to that of the Federation itself, and as this determination becomes known it will do a great deal to remove the fears, suspicions, and uncertainties in Africa . . . In other words we want to make it, abundantly clear that the purpose of our policy is, as soon as possible and as rapidly as possible, to move towards self-government in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. This was publicly accepted by Sir Roy Welensky and welcomed by him . . . We therefore hope to see a broaden- ing of the electorate, and the functions of self-government exercised on normal party political lines."

The Prime Minister then referred to the question of amendments, changes or alterations in the Federal powers visa vis the territorial Governments. It might be that in some spheres they would be reduced and in others increased, and the advisory commission would direct its preliminary work to these and other aspects. With regard to the position of the whole Federa- tion in the Commonwealth as an independent unit, the Prime Mimnister said: "I fear that the word 'independent' has acquired many shades of meaning. The British Government will certainly not withdraw its protection from Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia in the short run, and in the long run our object is to advance these territories to fully responsible government. Then they will be able to dispense with our protection and stand entirely on their own feet as components of the Federation. When all the units are in a position to agree, and are agreed that British Govern- ment protection is no longer needed--then, and only then--can the whole Federation go forward to full independence and full Commonwealth membership. Meanwhile, for practical purposes, there can be independence in the Federal sphere, as such, and in respect of the Federal functions trans- ferred to the Federal Government."

Mr. Lennox-Boyd said that he and his colleagues had for a long time been giving a great deal of thought to proposals for changes in the Nyasa- land constitution which they were anxious should be acceptable to all concerned. The Minister of State had been about to leave for Nyasaland in February for talks, but these had to be cancelled owing to the Emergency.




Despite the continuing state of emergency the United Kingdom Govern- ment was anxious that Africans should be more closely associated with the Government of the Protectorate and it had accordingly decided to increase by nomination the number of African seats on the Legislative Council; in order to maintain the official majority, there would be an equivalent increase in the number of official members. It was also proposed to appoint to the Executive Council two African members taken from the Legislative Council. There would be interim arrangements which would, Mr. Lennox- Boyd hoped, be later replaced by the non-racial constitutional approach which had been adopted in Northern Rhodesia. It would be necessary to extend the life of the present Legislative Council beyond May 1960, when it would normally come to an end.

Mr. Lennox-Boyd enumerated the principles of those who are confirmed believers in federation: "First, to build up the economic strength of the Federation, without which political or social advance is impossible. Secondly, to create a new kind of race relationship which would be something quite different from either apartheid or the conception of a dominant racial group. The name that we all agreed to give to this new kind of relationship was partnership, which implies a gradual breaking away from all forms of discrimination based on race, and the creation of conditions in which ability and character, not colour, should decide what a man could be or could do. Our third principle was to lay the foundations for the creation of a strong, new member of the British Commonwealth, dedicated to the preservation of these principles, but, in so far as this might involve a change in the Protectorate status of the Northern Territories, we have throughout made it clear that we stand firmly behind the pledges in the preamble."

Mr. Gaitskell said that the Opposition were not opposed to federation as such and they still recognised its potentialities in Central Africa. But it would never succeed except on the basis of consent by the African peoples. Instead, the Government in the Federation and the three territories rested today even more upon force and less upon consent than in 1953; and African opinion was even more strongly opposed to Federation than ever. There were a number of reasons for this. One was the fact that Federation had been imposed against African opinion, another was the absence of political progress in the Federation and the Northern Territories, and a third was the rapidity of advance in other parts of Africa during recent years. Economic development was necessary but African confidence could only be won by rapid political advance ii the Northern Territories. By this he meant early changes in the franchise, a majority of elected Africans in the Nyasaland Legislative Council and the appointment in Nyasaland of African ministers equal at least in number to those of other races. In Northern Rhodesia there should be parity of representation at least between Africans and other races on both the Legislative and Executive Councils. Since the review conference was between governments and since it was essential that Africans should be properly represented there, it was necessary for political advancement to come before the holding of the conference, and if necessary this should be postponed. Political advancement was at present obstructed by the dentention of the politically active and best educated Africans; African spokesmen, both at the review conference and



284 AFRICAN AFFAIRS

on the preparatory commission, must be the acknowledged leaders of African opinion and not those who would be considered by African opinion as being "stooges".

To increase the chances of African consent being won, the United King- dom Government should reaffirm their adherence to the words of the preamble in the constitution. Secondly, there must not be any change in the powers of either the Federal Government or of the territorial governments as against the United Kingdom Parliament unless and until there are democratic constitutions and franchises established in these territories. Thirdly, it should be made plain that any idea of Dominion status as a result of the 1960 conference must be excluded.

Mr. Macmillan said that he regretted that the Leader of the Opposition had taken so firm a position at this stage. He had hoped that the importance of this question would have led to greater effort to reach a degree of har- mony in the House. Mr. Macmillan said that the African representatives on the commission would be appointed finally by the United Kingdom Government on the advice of the Governors. Mr. Macmillan added that he had in mind one African from Southern Rhodesia, one from Northern Rhodesia, and perhaps two from Nyasaland. The fifth would be a Federal nomination.

Asked whether the possibility of secession by individual territories would come within the bounds of the commission, Mr. Macmillan said the commission would be free to hear all points of view from whatever quarter and on whatever subject. But they had thought it right to give it terms of reference that accorded with what they regarded as the objectives of the 1960 conference.

Mr. Stonehouse said there would be general dissatisfaction in the country at the composition of the commission. Why had the Prime Minister decided to undermine the authority of the House, which was primarily responsible for the review of the Federal Constitution next year? Mr. Macmillan denied that this was the commission's effect. The responsibility of the United Kingdom Parliament remained unchanged by any advisory commission that might be set up. Mr. Callaghan asked if the Government would consider postponing the conference to review the Federal Constitution. Mr. Macmillan said that he thought that would be a mistake. It would add to Sthe uncertainty.



Article Contentsp.268p.269p.270p.271p.272p.273p.274p.275p.276p.277p.278p.279p.280p.281p.282p.283p.284

Issue Table of ContentsAfrican Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 233 (Oct., 1959), pp. 268-354Volume InformationFront MatterQuarterly Chronicle [pp.268-284]An African Looks at Federation [pp.285-292]The Economic Problems of the Belgian Congo [pp.293-299]The Society's Activities [pp.300-301]Half a Century Ago [p.301]African Affairs at Westminster [pp.302-310]The Sudanese Troops in Uganda [pp.311-328]The Need for Co-operation in the Sahara [pp.329-333]The British Consulate at Lake Chad: A Forgotten Treaty with the Sheikh of Bornu [pp.334-339]Book Reviewsuntitled [pp.340-341]untitled [pp.341-343]untitled [pp.343-344]untitled [pp.344-345]untitled [p.345]untitled [pp.345-346]untitled [p.347]untitled [pp.348-349]untitled [pp.349-350]

Bibliography [pp.351-353]Back Matter [p.354]

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