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The Royal African Society Quarterly Chronicle Author(s): Alan Gray Source: African Affairs, Vol. 62, No. 246 (Jan., 1963), pp. 8-19 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Royal African Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/720451 . Accessed: 17/06/2014 13:33 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . Oxford University Press and The Royal African Society are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to African Affairs. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 195.78.108.147 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 13:33:26 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Transcript

The Royal African Society

Quarterly ChronicleAuthor(s): Alan GraySource: African Affairs, Vol. 62, No. 246 (Jan., 1963), pp. 8-19Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Royal African SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/720451 .

Accessed: 17/06/2014 13:33

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Oxford University Press and The Royal African Society are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve andextend access to African Affairs.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 195.78.108.147 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 13:33:26 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8

Quarterly Chronicle

Compiled by ALAN GRAY

CEASE-FIRE agreement in Katanga was signed at Elisabethville on October 16, 1962. The agreement for an immediate cessation of the fighting between Central Government and Katanga troops in North

Katanga was signed by Mr. Joseph Ngalula, representing the Central Gov- ernment, Mr. Joseph Yav, representing Katanga, and Mr. Eliud Mathu, representing the United Nations. It called for the immediate ending to all

Congo Development

troop movements by both the A.N.C. (Congo National Army) and the Katanga gendarmerie in the operational zones in North Katanga.

The agreement said that until the effective integration of the Katanga gendarmerie into a national corps of the army, the A.N.C. and Katangese troops will keep their present positions in North Katanga. The two parties have agreed that A.N.C. and Katangese gendarmerie in the operational zones will not be provided with any more arms and ammunition.

The agreement provided for the return of prisoners held by both sides and for the removal of Congolese and Katangese roadblocks in the north. To ensure implementation of the agreement, a tripartite group of observers was created consisting of seven representatives each of the Central Government, Katanga Government, and the United Nations.

Mr. Adoula, the Congolese Prime Minister was able to rally all provinces of the Congo to the Central Government with the exception of Katanga. His first success was the adherence of the Kasai province following the arrest of Kalonji, the South Kasai leader, who subsequently escaped and is now a refugee in Katanga. Mr. Gbenye, national chairman of the M.N.C. (Lumumba) party, was also arrested and will be charged with a secessionist conspiracy; according to Mr. Adoula, he had planned to detach the Kivu, the Maniema and Northern Katanga from the control of the Central Govern- ment and hand them over to Katanga. No evidence of the alleged conspiracy has been produced, but it had long been known that there were serious differences between Mr. Gbenye and the Leopoldville government and his arrest was looked on as a precautionary measure.

With these and other arrests the effective opposition was reduced to a single leader-Mr. Bolikango, head of the Puna party, who asked for a political amnesty and immunity for senators and deputies. Nevertheless there has been considerable criticism of Mr. Adoula's attitude towards Katanga.

The text of the proposed new federal constitution for the Congo was handed by Mr. Adoula, the Prime Minister, on October 16 to the President or representatives of the 21 new provinces into which the Congo is being divided. A notable absentee when the roll of provinces was called was President Tshombe, who does not accept the subdivision of Katanga into two. He was

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QUARTERLY CHRONICLE 9

expected to raise serious objections to the new constitution, prepared in Leopoldville mainly by Mr. Adoula and his colleagues, and reportedly in closer consultation with American advisers than with the international jurists supplied for the purpose.

The constitution is federal in that it reserves to the 21 provinces those powers which it does not explicitly reserve to the centre or does not place upon " a concurrent list " to be dealt with by both centre and provinces. But all important functions are, in fact, reserved to the central government, and a list of these powers is strikingly similar to that contained in the Loi Fondamentale, which the new constitution is to replace.

The central government is to control foreign affairs, defence, federal police, gendarmerie, public finance, income and company taxes, customs and excise, banking and currency, posts and communications, higher education and transport.

Social and welfare functions will be handled both by the centre and the provinces, with agricultural and scientific matters. To the provinces alone are left their own constitutional laws and procedure, local government, primary education, lower courts, local communications and police, but the federal centre is to decide the size and equipment of the local gendarmerie. It can deploy federal police in provinces at will and move local police forces else- where.

On October 13, 1962, conventions of co-operation and assistance were signed by President Kayibanda in the name of the Republic of Rwanda and Mr. Spaak, Vice-President of the Council of Belgium and Minister of Foreign Affairs, assisted by Mr. Brasseur, Minister of Foreign Trade.

The terms are: (1) A general convention of co-operation and technical assistance; (2) a covenant specifying the forms and methods of co-operation and assistance in staff; (3) a covenant defining the financial assistance of Belgium for the last six months, and limited to 75,000,000 Belgian francs. A sum of 38,000,000 francs is reserved for payment of the Belgian technicians and 37,000,000 francs to cover the cost of materials, medical, veterinary and agricultural assistance.

For 1963 Belgium will lend 221 technicians for the training of the Rwandese staff. Belgium will also pay the travel charges, estimated at 102,000,000 francs, and the expenses of 160 foundation scholars and 60 probationers.

The financial aid of 75,000,000 francs in 1963 will cover the installation of an airfield for commercial lines, and will enable the Republic of Rwanda to pay its contribution to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

The following is a summary of major events in and relating to the Congo between the Kitona agreement and the presentation of a draft federal con- stitution to provincial leaders by Mr. Adoula on behalf of the central Govern- ment in mid-October.

Although six Katanga representatives took up seats in the central Congolese parliament at the end of December 1961, the Kitona agreement, which con- cluded the December fighting between UN and Katanga forces, did not mean

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10 AFRICAN AFFAIRS

the end of Katanga's secession. After periodic discussion for a month, the Katanga assembly, February 15, 1962, approved the Kitona agreement, while attaching reservations to each of its eight points. The first point, stating that both parties accepted the Loi Fondamentale, was accepted as a 'basis for discussion', and a further observation reserved the right of the Katanga assembly to pronounce on the form of any agreement between Katanga and the central Government. Other reservations expressed the hope that the central Government would despatch no forces to Katanga that would cause 'panic or disorder', or support 'dissidents' (i.e. in North Katanga), and would not oppose the restoration of Katanga authority over the 'whole of the territory of Katanga'. It was hoped that measures would not be taken that would disrupt the economic life of Katanga and that study for a new constitu- tion would be hastened. The assembly also demanded ministries in the central Government consistent with the economic and political importance of Katanga and at least equivalent in importance to those held by former followers of M. Lumumba (at this time, M. Christophe Gbenye, a former Minister of the Interior and leader of the Lumumbist wing in the central parliament since the arrest in January 1962 of M. Gizenga, was a Vice- Premier in M. Adoula's government ; on October 10 1962, there were reports that he had been arrested in Leopoldville). In a broadcast on February 19 1962, M. Adoula described the reservations as nullifying the Kitona agreement.

Further negotiations between M. Adoula and M. Tshombe were held in Leopoldville between March 18 and April 19 and between May 19 and June 26. On April 19 M. Tshombe and his advisers left for Katanga alleging, among other things, that the central Government had unilaterally suspended the talks when it had failed to get its own views accepted. A communique issued by the central Government asserted that M. Tshombe had been handed a draft conclusion to the talks on April 18 and that he had asked for an adjournment in order to study the draft. A few days later M. Adoula accused M. Tshombe of trying to gain time, of having no serious wish for an agree- ment and of building up the military strength of Katanga. When the talks resumed, agreement was reached on the setting up of four commissions pro- posed by the United Nations on military, monetary, transport and communi- cations and economic matters. The commissions were to be composed of UN, central Government and Katanga representatives and were to have the task of examining practical means to bring about Katanga's re-integration in the Congo.

On June 26 M. Tshombe announced that he had to return to Elizabethville. At a press conference on the same day, M. Adoula said that M. Tshombe had refused to sign a communique 'registering the agreements which had so far been reached' and had put forward a counter draft which, if accepted, would have formalised Katanga's independence. Before this, he had sought excuses to cause the breakdown of the talks. The conclusion was, M. Adoula said, that M. Tshombe was not interested in a peaceful solution to the Katanga question.

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QUARTERLY CHRONICLE 11

When he returned to Elizabethville M. Tshombe alleged that the talks had been held in an atmosphere of intimidation and hostility. The interim com- munique registering agreement on the purpose on the four commissions did not bind Katanga, as the central Government had wished, because the Katanga delegation had only agreed to temporary and consultative study commissions and not the permanent and executive ones sought by the UN representatives and the central Government. It had been agreed that only a final joint-communique should be binding ; he had signed nothing at Leopold- ville and the 'rights and cause' of Katanga had been fully defended. Accord- ing to the UN report on the Adoula-Tshombe talks both sides presented drafts which were unacceptable to the other and a routine communique was not signed, because the Katanga delegation insisted that a reference should be made to the subsequent continuation of the talks. The central Government had not acquiesced.

After returning to Elizabethville M. Tshombe nominated Katangan repre- sentatives to the four commissions and made an offer of $2 million, in Congo- lese francs, to the central Government. He declined, however, to nominate two Conakat members to the central Government until after M. Adoula had introduced a federal constitution.

During the first six months of the year relations between the UN and Katangan authorities steadily improved. A UN request, in January, to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, for observers on its border with Katanga (over which it was reported that supplies had been brought for Katangan forces) was not pressed after the Federal Government, although refusing the request, had invited U Thant to Salisbury for discussions. It was understood, at the time, that the United Nations declined the Federal Gov- ernment's offer because of the improvement in the general situation on Kaanga and as there had been no more reports of illegal crossings of the frontier. On January 26 M. Tshombe informed the United Nations that he was determined to expel all mercenaries, and two weeks later the last ' official ' group were reported to have left Katanga. In a report published on October 8 it was alleged that mercenaries had in fact remained in Katanga since the beginning of the year.

During his two visits to Leopoldville M. Tshombe accepted UN protection, and in other ways there was evidence of a cordiality between the UN and Katanga and as there had been no more reports of illegal crossings of the were UN reports of more mercenaries entering the province. On July 17 a crowd of Katanga women attacked a UN road block which had been set up following a Katanga 'independence' day parade in which 2,000 Katangan troops marched past after M. Tshombe had assured the UN authorities that only 300 troops would take part. On July 20, U Thant, the acting UN Secretary General, at a press conference in Helsinki, described M. Tshombe and his supporters as a 'bunch of clowns' who said one thing one day and another the next.

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12 AFRICAN AFFAIRS

In July 1962 discussions between British, French, Belgian and American representatives opened in Washington to consider what steps might be taken in support of the United Nations and the central Congo Government to facilitate reconciliation between the centre and Katanga. Reports from Washington indicated that the possibility of using economic pressures on M. Tshombe was being considered. It was also reported that while it was agreed that violence must be avoided, certain differences were understood to have arisen over the practicability of economic persuasion. On July 19 a US State Department announcement accused M. Tshombe of 'intransigence' and said that 'all possible measures' short of military action would be necessary if he persisted in secession. Referring to' talk of economic pressures ' in the House of Lords on July 25 the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Home, said 'All I can say on that is to emphasise once again that the political settlement and the financial settlement must be simultaneous, and to say that if pressures are to be applied they must be applied equally and fairly to both'.

At a press conference two days before, M. Tshombe denied that Katanga's resources could make the Congo solvent again and proposed instead that Katanga, the United Nations, Europe and America should work together to reconstruct the Congo. At the same time M. Tshombe said that the Adoula Government was a 'mere fiction' which, moreover, was illegal and had no authority in the country.

On July 28 M. Adoula requested the United Nations to arrange for four constitutional experts to assist the central Government in drawing up a federal constitution for the Congo, on the basis of the existing draft constitution (i.e., the Loi Fondamentale). The outline of a federal constitution given by M. Adoula at the time of his request was welcomed by M. Tshombe as 'what we have always wanted'. On the other hand, on August 16 President Nkrumah asked M. Adoula not to allow the 'imposition' of a federal con- stitution which, he considered, would ' act as a permanent bar to the unity of the Congo and militate severely against stability, progress and prosperity'.

An appeal by the acting UN Secretary-General issued on August 1, asked all UN members to use influence and exert pressure-including, if necessary, economic pressure-on Katanga ' to achieve a reasonable and peaceful settle- ment in the Congo'. U Thant continued 'I have in mind economic pressures upon the Katangese authorities of a kind that will bring home to them the realities of their situation and the fact that Katanga is not a sovereign State and is not recognised by any government in the world as such. In the last resort, and if all other efforts fail, this could justifiably go the extent of barring all trade and financial arrangements '. It was understood that the gist of the appeal was conveyed to U Thant by his 19-nation Congo advisory committee which had been meeting to consider the advisability of convening a meeting of the Security Council to consider the Congolese situation since the suspension of the Adoula-Tshombe talks.

In a review of the Congo situation on August 20, U Thant put forward what he described as 'a general basis for reconciliation '. After referring to

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QUARTERLY CHRONICLE 13

the preparation of a federal constitution for the Congo he said that, in addition, a new law was required for the division of revenues between the central and provincial governments, as well as for the use of foreign exchange. In the meantime, Katanga and the central Government should agree to share on a fifty-fifty basis revenues from taxes on imports and exports, and royalties from mining concessions, and to pay to a monetary council all foreign exchange earned by any part of the Congo. The council should make available to Katanga at least 50 per cent of the foreign exchange generated in the pro- vince. A three-member commission of UN, central Government and Katangan representatives should be set up to prepare, within 30 days, a plan to bring about the integration of the Congolese Army within two months.

Other aspects of reconciliation were, U Thant said, the re-constituting of the central Government to give representation for all political and provincial groups; a general amnesty for political prisoners; and the acceptance of the principle that only the central Government should have representation abroad. U Thant continued 'I believe that the Katanga authorities must consider these proposals and respond to them affirmatively within a quite brief period so that concrete steps can be taken '. If Katangan agreement was not forthcoming the United Nations would appeal to member States to take 'immediate measures ' to ensure that their relations with the Congo were in conformity with the laws and regulations (see below) of the central Government. U Thant then quoted the passage from his appeal of July 31 (quoted above) and said 'In pursuance of this a firm request would be made by me to all member governments to apply such a ban, especially to Katangese copper and cobalt'. He also said that, if progress towards a solution should not come quickly, he believed that the United Nations, both because of 'the virtually inevitable deterioration in the Congo and of its own financial limitations' might soon be confronted with the necessity of either withdrawing its military force from the Congo or authorising it to seek, 'by all necessary measures', to end Katanga's secession.

Before describing his proposals U Thant listed a number of measures which had been taken during the previous three weeks to end Katanga's secession. They included a letter from him to the Belgian Foreign Minister requesting that certain measures be taken with regard to the payment of taxes by the Union Miniere and a letter from him to the Universal Postal Union (UPU) supporting a central Government request that UPU members should cease to recognise the validity of Katangan postage stamps. Other measures taken during this period by the central Government included a ban on aircraft flying to Katanga without first having obtained permission from the central aviation authorities; an order that telecommunications between Katanga and the outside world be suspended and be passed through Leopoldville; and a warning that action would be taken against commercial firms operating both in Katanga and other parts of the Congo.

In London, on August 21, a Foreign Office spokesman said the proposals (subsequently known as 'the plan') had Britain's full support and that Britain

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14 AFRICAN AFFAIRS

would use all its influence to persuade MM. Adoula and Tshombe to accept it. Shortly afterwards the central Government indicated its support for the plan. It was formally presented to the Katanga authorities on August 24, and was accepted by them, on September 3, as ' the basis of an acceptable settlement'. The Katangan statement deplored that the plan' tends to have the character of an ultimatum ' but 'welcomed with enthusiasm the decision to give the Congo a federal constitution' and expressed the wish to be kept informed of the preparatory work on the constitution in order that Katanga might make observations. Two days later U Thant asked his representative in the Congo to express his gratification to MM. Adoula and Tshombe that the plan had been accepted and to request them to take immediate steps to implement its provisions.

During September discussions on the implementation of the plan continued while relations between Katanga and the United Nations and the central Government showed signs of worsening. Central Government representatives to the economic, fiscal and military commissions went to Elizabethville, with some 20 UN advisers, and the three commissions began their work. Only slow progress was made, however, and at the beginning of October Mr. McGhee, a deputy Under-Secretary in the American State Department, flew to Leopoldville and Elizabethville where it was reported that he urged M. Tshombe to agree to practical measures for the implementation of the plan. Among evidence of worsening relations during this period was an accusation by M. Tshombe, on September 13, that the United Nations had violated the 'neutrality' of the Kamina base by landing a contingent of central Govern- ment troops there (this action followed an offer by M. Adoula in December 1961 that a contingent of Congolese troops be added to the UN Force under the orders of the UN Commander) and that the United Nations had pursued a provocative policy in continuing armed patrols in Elizabethville and, on September 12, of attacking Katangan gendarmerie. A UN spokesman, in New York, said that the incident of September 12 had been prepared by Katangan officials for propaganda purposes and had, in fact, been an attack by Katangan gendarmerie on UN troops, who had succeeded in dispersing them. After making similar charges a few days later, M. Tshombe asked whether such incidents created an atmosphere of detente favourable to peaceful solution of the Congo's problems. He also accused the central Government of refusing all discussions on constitutional questions.

The constitutional question was the subject of a letter from M. Tshombe to Mr. Gardiner, the UN chief representative in the Congo, on September 18, in which he asked that the jurists engaged in the preparation of the federal constitution should go to Elizabethville for consultation with the Katangan authorities. Unless it was known, he said, what type of federal constitution was being prepared, the submission of observations on it was ' impracticable' and the procedure would be a' sham '. It was, however, reported that Katanga did subsequently submit what were described as 'First Remarks' on the

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QUARTERLY CHRONICLE 15

elaboration of draft federal constitution. The attitude of the central Govern- ment regarding consultation during the preparatory stage of the draft con- stitution was understood to be that, under the Loi Fondementale, the Govern- ment's actions could only be referred to the people's representatives sitting in the Legislative Assembly and that, therefore, there was no question of sub- mitting the constitution for the approval of provincial presidents.

In a letter to M. Tshombe on September 26, Mr. Gardiner said that, in spite of repeated affirmations that there were no more mercenaries serving in the Katangan gendarmerie, bodies of Europeans had been found after clashes between the Congolese Army and the gendarmerie, that there was information that mercenaries had arrived in Katanga in recent months and that a recruit- ment campaign for mercenaries was in operation, particularly in south-west France. He also said that air reconnaissance photographs had revealed the presence of camouflaged Fouga Magister and Harvard aircraft in Katanga. In his reply IM. Tshombe compared the ' affair of mercenaries' to stories of sea- serpents or the 'abominable snowman' and said that, from experience, they knew that mercenaries were used as a pretext to be invoked as a prelude to new 'attacks '. Regarding information on the equipment of the gendarmerie, none could be given except within the framework of an agreement 'to ensure national Congolese reconciliation in a fully de-centralised federation '.

Following the conversations in the three commissions, M. Tshombe announced, on October 11, that he had put $2 million at the disposal of the central Government, that the Lubilash bridge, damaged in the 1961 fighting, would be re-opened and a token shipment of copper would be sent over it to Matadi, via Leopoldville. Two days later telecommunications were re-estab- lished between Leopoldville and Elizabethville, and on October 16 an agree- ment was signed for the cessation of the sporadic fighting between central Government and Katanga forces which had been going on for several months in North Katanga. On October 17 M. Adoula, who was reported to be under pressure from his cabinet to demand greater concessions from Katanga, repudiated the cease-fire agreement on the ground that it was inconsistent with the conciliation plan. He subsequently announced, however, that negotiations would be continued in Elizabethville.

U GANDA became an independent nation and a full member of the Commonwealth on October 9, 1962. The Duke of Kent, accompanied by the Duchess, acted as the Queen's personal representative at the

independence celebrations, and carried out a full programme of engagements. Independence came at midnight on October 8 when, in a ceremony at Kololo stadium in Kampala, the Union Flag of Britain was lowered and the flag of the

Uganda Independence

new Uganda nation raised in the presence of a gathering of more than 60,000 people. The cere-

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16 AFRICAN AFFAIRS

mony was attended by the Duke and Duchess, by the new Governor-General of Uganda, Sir Walter Coutts (formerly the Governor) and Lady Coutts, by the Prime Minister of Uganda, Mr. Obote, and Mrs. Obote, and by the Kabaka of Buganda and his sister, the Nalinya.

On the morning of October 9, Independence Day, at a further ceremony in Kololo stadium, the Constitutional Instruments embodying the indepen- dence of Uganda were handed over to the Prime Minister by the Duke of Kent. The Duke read a message from the Queen, which said :

'My thoughts are with you all on this memorable and historic day, on which Uganda has reached her independence and taken her place among the nations of the world. Uganda has forged a common unity out of the diverse traditions of her people. In so doing, her people have shown mutual understanding and respect for the cherished ideals of freedom-qualities which offer the promise that she will have her distinctive contribution to make in world affairs. I pray that God may bless and guide your country in all the years that lie ahead.' In his reply, Mr. Obote spoke of the joy felt by all in Uganda at the achieve-

ment of independence. 'But particularly we rejoice', he said, 'because this great revolution has been achieved in peace and goodwill.'

He went on to pay tribute to Britain and to the many expatriates who have helped the country's progress: 'To the British Protecting Power, whose devoted guidance has proved so wise and so manifestly successful, I wish now to pay public tribute and to express our gratitude. Nor do we forget the selfless missionaries who have played such a vital role in this land and in the education of our people. Nor the traders, farmers, pioneers-all of whom made their contribution to our development.'

In conclusion Mr. Obote turned to the future and to the tasks facing the new nation. 'Now it is for us, the people of Uganda, to turn to the task ahead, the mighty task of building a nation in which all men shall be equal sharers in opportunity and in the things which give meaning to life. We need unity of purpose, mutual understanding and respect, and a resolve to place our country above tribe, party, or self. I ask the people of Uganda to pledge their efforts this day for a peaceful and united future. It is to the future of this country that I now dedicate myself.'

The following messages were delivered to Mr. Obote in Kampala on October 8.

From the Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan: 'I am delighted to send you by the hand of Lord Carrington, who is

leading the British delegation to the Uganda independence celebrations, this message of goodwill from my colleagues in the British Government and myself.

'We rejoice with you on this happy day when Uganda achieves her independence; and we most cordially welcome your country as a fellow Member of the Commonwealth. It gives me the greatest pleasure to extend to you and to your Government our warmest good wishes for the future

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QUARTERLY CHRONICLE 17

peace and prosperity of your country. We look forward with confidence to the continuation and development in new fields of the friendship and understanding which have marked the association of Uganda and Britain in the past.'

From the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Mr. Sandys : 'It is exactly one hundred years since the explorers Speke and Grant

reached Uganda and the association between our two countries began. As Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and for the Colonies I am glad to send you today my warm congratulations on Uganda's achieve- ment of independence as a sovereign state in the Commonwealth family.

'I look forward with pleasure and confidence to working with you in our new relationship.' On October 10 the Duke of Kent formally opened the first Parliament of

independent Uganda and read the Speech from the Throne on behalf of the Queen. The Speech outlined broadly the policy of the Uganda Government.

With regard to external relationships, Uganda was, it said, proud to be a member of the Commonwealth, and was seeking membership of the United Nations. It would seek to live in harmony with all the freedom-loving peoples, and would do its utmost to establish fraternal connections with other Govern- ments in Africa, and especially to strengthen the close links binding the East African countries.

Within Uganda, the Government's first aim would be to foster the spirit of tolerance and goodwill between the peoples, stimulating confidence in a united country, bound together in common nationhood. At the same time, it would pay due heed to traditional beliefs and customs and would recognise the special status and dignity of the rulers and heads of districts.

In its plans for economic and social development, the Government's first objective would be the raising of living standards. The development pro- gramme would be pursued vigorously in spite of present financial stringency, and the orderly development of the educational system would be continued. The Government pledged itself to respect the independence of the judiciary and the equality of all persons before the law. It aimed at an efficient, im- partial and contented civil service and, while Ugandisation would be imple- mented as fast as possible, the Government would continue to employ those expatriate officers whose services the country needed.

Among other official engagements carried out by the Duke of Kent was a ceremony, on October 8, at which he presented to the Mayor of Kampala a Royal Charter conferring City status. The Mayor, Mrs. Saben, accepting the Charter, asked the Duke, in return, to accept the highest honour which the City could offer-the first Freedom of the City of Kampala.

During their stay in Uganda the Duke and Duchess were received by the traditional rulers of the kingdoms which are united in a federal relationship with Uganda. On October 8 they attended a reception given by the Kabaka and Government of Buganda, the largest of the kingdoms, at the Bulange (the Buganda Parliament building) in Mengo, on the fringe of Kampala. On

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18 AFRICAN AFFAIRS

October 15 they visited Western Uganda, where they met, and exchanged greetings with, the Omukama of Toro, the Omukama of Bunyoro and the Omugabe of Ankole.

One of the last engagements of the royal tour, on October 16, was the opening, by the Duchess of Kent, of the new Mulago Hospital in Kampala. The hospital has been built at a cost of ?2.3 million, about two-thirds of which was given by Britain. It has nearly 900 beds and, as well as being a general hospital for the Kampala area, it is the teaching hospital for the medical school at Makerere University College.

To mark Uganda's independence, the leaders of the three main political parties (the Government coalition of Uganda People's Congress and Kabaka Yekka and the opposition Democratic Party) have jointly sponsored an appeal for ?3 million, with the object of awarding scholarships, to be known as Independence Scholarships, at university level. The Prime Minister, Mr. Obote, launched the appeal in a broadcast over Radio Uganda a few days before independence.

HE United Nations General Assembly adopted by 67 votes to 16, with 23 abstentions and four absentees, the Afro-Asian resolution of the special political committee recommending member States to break off

diplomatic relations with South Africa and to apply economic sanctions against it. This was the first time in the history of the United Nations that the necessary two-thirds majority in favour of sanctions and other punitive

U.N. Move Against Republic

measures has been taken by the General Assembly. After the vote a British spokesman made it clear

that although Britain abhorred apartheid like other member countries, it could not comply with the

request to take sanctions against South Africa.

The resolution specifies that if sanctions fail the Security Council should take appropriate measures, including sanctions, and if necessary, should take action under that part of the Charter which allows the expulsion of member States. Similar sanctions and expulsion provisions were deleted from a resolution on the same subject the previous year when the majority fell short of the required two-thirds. The new resolution also proposes the establish- ment of a special committee to keep under review the racial policies of the South African Government and to report back to the General Assembly.

Mr. Eric Louw, the South African Foreign Minister, who did not take part in the debate in the political committee, opened the debate in the General Assembly with a vigorous defence of South Africa's racial policies. He claimed that the African population of the Republic was provided with educa- tion, health services, ample opportunities, and deeply appreciated the separate Bantu States that were being created. Only a minority was discontented,

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QUARTERLY CHRONICLE 19

encouraged in their complaints by outsiders whose own Governments had nothing to boast about.

South Africa considered apartheid to be a purely domestic issue, of no concern to the U.N., since the Charter did not permit interference with the domestic affairs of member States. By way of explanation he added that apartheid was part of the white South African population's bid to survive in the country which had now become its irrevocable home.

He warned member States against " creating a very dangerous precedent which may at some time in the future react on them." Mr. Louw concluded : " Once the United Nations starts expelling member States, that will be the beginning of the end of the United Nations. The position of the organisation is not so strong that it can afford to take such risks."

Several African spokesmen replied to Mr. Louw's arguments, including Chief Adebo of Nigeria. Colombia and Sweden attempted to have the Assembly vote separately on the clauses concerning sanctions and expulsion. An objection to this course by Senegal and Ghana was sustained by 52 votes to 49 with five abstentions.

The result of the voting was achieved by a combination of the Afro-Asian countries with the Communist group, combination which effectively prevented any attempt to vote separately on the more contentious amendments of the resolution. Such separate voting might have gained more support for a reasonable compromise formula.

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