Key words: Danube River, Danube Delta, equitable utilization, sustainable water use, Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, water management, resources disputes, conflict
Much of the world's fresh water is available frominternational drainage basins, which make up almostfifty percent of the earth's land area.1 Because theserivers and basins are not typically contained within asingle border, the need for collaboration andcommunication exists in order to meet current needsand to prepare for future use, as well as to managecompeting interests and resources better. Long-termsustainable development relies on access to and theefficient use of freshwater. Many of the ways in whichrivers are used transcend political and nationalboundaries and affect questions relating to sovereigninterests, thereby contributing to tensions whichinevitably arise over shared resources.
The current use of the Danube River is a good case inpoint. It highlights the fact that the legal principle of
The author is a Ph.D. candidate at the Fletcher School of Law andDiplomacy, Tufts University, and at present a member of the staff atthe Program on International Conflict Analysis and Resolution(PICAR), Center for International Affairs, Harvard University,Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.'international rivers flow through or from the boundary between at
least two countries. There are an estimated 214 international riversin the world today. Some of the largest include the Niger, Nile,Zaire, Amazon, La Plata and Ganges Brahmaputra (Gleick,1993) LIBRARY IRC
PO Box 93190, 2509 AD THE HAGUETel.: +31 70 30 689 80 23Fax: +31 70 35 899 64
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equitable utilization must be applied in concert withsustainable water use both in the resolution ofparticular disputes and in defining a broad frameworkfor the cooperative management of a river. Toillustrate this point the author will examine twoseparate situations. The first is a specific dispute overthe Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project where a narrowlegal ruling that fails to consider broader issues ofequitable utilization as they relate to sustainabledevelopment will not address the long-term questionsat stake and may well lead to further disputes betweenthe parties. The second case is the environmentaldegradation of the Danube Delta, where the potentialfor disputes exists but may well be minimized by theestablishment of an institutional and managementframework that is based on the principle of equitableutilization in conjunction with the goal of achievingmore sustainable development.
In the following discussion, the legal structures inplace which govern international rivers in general andthe Danube River in particular will be briefly reviewed.Then the use of the principle of equitable utilization inlight of the two cases mentioned above is explored.Finally, the implications raised by these cases forresolving disputes and fostering sustainable water use
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24 Reducing conflict over the Danube waters: R. Margesson
are considered. Before beginning this discussion thestage will be set with a review of the geographicalcharacteristics of the Danube River basin.
The hydropolitical setting
The Danube flows west to east from its source in theGerman Black Forest to its outlet in the Black Sea.Covering roughly 1770 miles, it is the second longestriver in Europe (Pringle et al., 1993).2 It is also one ofthe most international, passing through at least ninecountries:3 Germany, Austria, Slovakia, Hungary,Croatia, Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine. Inaddition, small tributaries originating in fourcountries — Albania, Italy, Switzerland and Poland —contribute to the river's flow; thus, the basin as awhole includes parts of 13 countries. Before reachingits final destination, the river empties into a spectaculardelta via three main branches.
The entire Danube river basin is typically described inthree sections — the upper, middle and lowerDanubes — and contains over 300 tributaries (seeFigure 1). With the completion of the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal in 1992, the North Sea and Black Seaare now virtually connected. This is an importantdevelopment as it "opens" the other end of the Danubeand expands its commercial use, enabling ships to crossEastern and Western Europe through a system ofconnected waterways. It may also create the need forgreater regulation, particularly with regard to pollutionand navigation. Taken as a whole, this entire watersystem has a significant impact on the Europeancontinent. Recent figures suggest that close to 86million people live in the drainage area of the DanubeRiver (Pringle et al., 1993).
There are many pressures on the Danube whichreveal the fundamental and often conflicting interestsof its riparian nations. These include:
• Maintaining adequate river flow for electric powergeneration and for the dilution of industrial andurban wastes;
• Maintaining and expanding navigable waterways;• Assuring an adequate supply of water for irrigation,
industry and other economic uses;• Protecting the water quality for drinking, irrigation,
fishing, tourism and nature preservation;• Preventing floods; and• Protecting the river and its surroundings for recrea-
tion, tourism, and conservation of wildlife habitat(Linnerooth, 1990).
The nine riparian countries in the Danube region areall geopolitically and economically diverse, yet mustultimately face these challenges in unison. However,the very differences between the countries create
The Danube River is one of 13 international river basins worldwidewhich is shared by more than five nations. Its total basin encom-passes an area of 817000km2 (Gleick. 1993). With regard tolength, drainage area and volume of water, the Danube is thelargest waterway in Europe to the west of Russia; if Russia isincluded, then the Volga is the largest river (Gorove. 1964).
'Technically, this may vary if nation-state status depends on recogni-tion hv the United Nations
numerous conflicting upstream and downstream uses.Moreover, the costs and benefits associated with thevarious uses of the Danube are not evenly distributedamong the various riparian states and highlight thepower imbalances among them.4 There are manynational actors with differing agendas, laws andresources with which to address their needs. An unevenemergence of public concern over environmental issues(and the impact of water use) is compounded bygovernment reluctance to share information and reachagreement about scientific data, despite a growingconcern about local and transboundary environmentalconsequences.
Regulation of water use: international law
The potential for conflict over finite freshwaterresources like the Danube is ever more likely withincreasing populations, the growing demand for food,and the impact of industrialization, urbanization andagricultural practices. This is true even in non-aridregions where water scarcity is not an immediatelypressing problem. International law provides onemechanism by which to address these conflicts. Whilethe development of international law has not resulted,strictly speaking, in a universally applicable water lawagreeable to all nations, broad agreement neverthelessexists on a number of general principles. Numeroustreaties and conventions have been concludedregulating the utilization of shared water resources,and general principles have emerged from internationalcustom. Each has played an important role inpreventing conflicts over water or resolving existingdisputes. Each has also provided important legalprecedents and guidelines. Treaties typically concern aspecific shared resource; these can be either bilateral ormultilateral agreements, the former being far morecommon (McCaffrey, 1993). Throughout history theyhave addressed a wide range of issues such asnavigation, water rights and shared management.
The evolution of the law of international rivers hasgenerally been characterized by "a clash between twodominant ideas — that of sovereignty of the riparianstates and that of internationalization" (Zachlin andCaflisch, 1981). Within these parameters, four theorieshave evolved over time that illustrate a wide range ofinterpretations regarding rights of water use andallocation, from extreme nationalism to regionalinternational cooperation:
• The "Harmon Doctrine," which supports the notionof absolute sovereignty to upstream riparians;
• "Absolute territorial integrity," which provides
4 For example, the upper riparian countries, which are wealthier andmore developed, use the river for industrial and municipal wastedisposal and energy generation (40 of the 49 planned or existinghydropowcr stations are located in Germany and Austria). Themiddle Danube countries have a more limited potential to developenergy and are also the recipients of much polluted water fromthe upstream countries. Meanwhile, the less developed lowerDanube riparians depend on the river for irrigation, fisheries andtourism, but experience the full impact of poor quality anddecreasing supplies of water as a result of upstream practices(Linneroolh. 19%).
POLAND
* «M V) ^
ALBANIA
g.
§
0 50 100 150 200 km
Figure 1 Catchment of the Danube River.Source: EPDRB, 1993.
26 Reducing conflict over the Danube waters: R. Margesson
downstream riparians the use of the river in an unal-tered condition;
• "Limited territorial sovereignty," (or "equitableutilization" and "equitable apportionment") whichallows the use of a river's waters, provided that theuse docs not harm other riparian states; and
• "Community of interests," which emphasizes themutual and cooperative development of a river by allriparian states (Linnerooth, 1990).
Customary law is typically derived from the generalpractice of states and accepted as law (InternationalCourt of Justice, Article 38 (l)(b)). Equitableutilization is increasingly being established as animportant principle governing water law today. Severalkey organizations contributed significantly to itsinception: the Institute du Droit International, theInternational Law Association (ILA) and the UnitedNation's International Law Commission (ILC)(McCaffrey. 1993). Of particular note in this discussionare the Helsinki Rules on the Uses of Waters ofInternational Rivers put forward by the ILA in 1966and the articles of the Law of the Non-navigationalUse of International Watercourses, drafted by the ILCbetween 1970 and 1994 (McCaffrey, 1993). Withdifferent emphases, these instruments put forward thenotions of
• reasonable and equitable use;• obligation not to cause significant harm to other
nations;• the duty to inform and consult with neighbours
downstream; and• the sharing of water data and related information.
An important difference between the ILA and ILCprinciples and interpretations lies in the priority givento the "'equitable utilization" or to the "no harm"principles. Moreover, as Peter Gleick observes,'"defining equitable utilization of a shared water supplyremains one of the most important and difficultproblems facing many nations" (1994, p. 39). As theneed for a sustainable water supply becomes morecritical, in order to avoid conflict over this resource, itwill be important to look not only at past and presentuse, but at future use as well.
Legal institutions governing the Danube River5
Prior to World War II, the European Commissionadministered the Danube River. It was replaced by theBelgrade Convention on 18 August 1948, which restoredthe river to the exclusive sovereignty of the riparians. TheDanube is currently administered under the legalauthority of the Danube Commission established by thisConvention, which puts navigation under the control ofthe riparian countries (which were at that time Bulgaria,
id the I
f I he pa It
b\ ttnpuri.iiic
nils nl this article an historical account of the legalivcrning the Danube is not possible. However, a review
l some of the significant treaties and conventions,l di
. T i l l l fg
ntially determined how the Danube would be governedmi. emphasizes, particularly in its latest phase, thenl this river's link between East and West and may
\c present anil future policy-bearing significance. See GoroveII 1 >.'(>41
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, the Ukrainian SSR,the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia). Austria was invited ina consultative capacity (and later joined the Convention),and Germany was given observer status. Until recently,the former Soviet Union dominated the Commission,since most of the riparian countries were Sovietsatellites.6 The Danube Commission has quasi-legislativeauthority over river navigation, river inspection andflood control. Under Article 20 of the Convention, theSpecial River Administration (consisting ofrepresentatives from adjacent riparian states— Romaniaand the former USSR) was established in the LowerDanube between the mouth of the Sulina channel andBraila. It was given jurisdiction over the tributaries of theriver, the lateral canals and two of the three mouths ofthe river to regulate hydraulic engineering works andnavigation (Focas, 1987). Over the past 45 years anumber of individual countries along the Danube havealso entered into bilateral agreements with each other(Linnerooth, 1990).
While the Belgrade Convention and DanubeCommission are very much in effect as legal structures,their influence over water-use issues outside ofnavigation and flood control has been minimal.Moreover, the Commission is not — and was notintended to be — a river basin regime covering broaderriver management questions. This has meant littlemultilateral decision making and authority over otherpressing issues relating to water use and development.Thus, when a heated dispute broke out betweenHungary and Slovakia, the Danube Commission coulddo little to mitigate or resolve the conflict.
Equitable utilization and sustainable development
The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros project
In 1977 Hungary and Czechoslovakia signed a treaty7
outlining a plan for the construction and operation ofthe Gabcikovo-Nagymaros (GN) project and use ofthe Danube as a source of hydroelectric power. Since
6John Fitzmaurice (29 March 1994) has observed that "the politicalsituation in the Danube region makes the old 1948 Conventionobsolete." One important question involves that of membership inlight of the political changes that have taken place - who shouldbe members, the riparian nations or others utilizing the resourcesof the river as well'.' The Czech Republic, no longer a ripariannation, is a good case in point. In addition, with the opening ofthe Rhine-Main-Danube canal, German membership, onceexcluded for political reasons, now needs to be addressed. More-over, the war in Bosnia-Herz.egovina has until very recentlypresented difficulties with the UN sanctions imposed against theformer Yugoslavia, which includes Serbia (a riparian nation). Asof October 1996 the sanctions were lifted; however, until the long-term situation in Bosnia-Her/egovina becomes clearer, it is unli-kely that anything very meaningful can be done to work out theterms of another convention. According to Fitzmaurice. in April1993 at the meeting of the Danube Commission in Budapest,Hungary, an agreement was reached on a provisional solution tothe issue of membership. All Danubian states, including Russiaand the Czech Republic will be considered riparian, and all formersignatories of the 1948 Convention will remain.
7"Treaty Between the Hungarian People's Republic and the Czecho-slovak Socialist Republic Concerning the Construction and Opera-tion of the Gabcikovo Nagymaros System of Locks" (16September 1977. Budapest). International Legal Materials. 32.5(September 1993).
Reducing conflict over the Danube waters: R. Margesson 27
Gabcikovo Barrage(power station,
navigation lock,road bridge)
Dunakilitl (Hrusov)Reservoir
Nagymaros Barrage(power station,
weirnavigation lock,
road bridge)
Budapest
. . . . sections of banks or river bedthat would have been affectedby the new construction
Figure 2 General layout of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros project.Source: Fleischer, 1993, p. 431.
then the underlying positions and interests of thesignatory governments8 have changed dramatically,resulting in a bitter dispute over the implementation ofthe dam project and posing a potential threat toregional stability. Slovakia and Hungary share acommon border which runs through the middle sectionof the Danube River. The Danube thus represents aninternational boundary, the alteration of which wasinherent in the implementation of the GN project. It isthe planned use of this part of the river that hasbecome the subject of dispute (see Figure 2). While thelegal dispute centres on whether Hungary was withinits rights in repudiating the 1977 treaty, andsubsequent actions taken by the parties, a significantissue embedded in the conflict is each nation'sperception of its "reasonable and equitable share"(Weiss el al., 1991) of the water resources under thecurrent plan for its development. It also points to arelated principle, the obligation not to cause harm toother nations, and the degree to which each side hascomplied with its obligation to cooperate in good faithover the use of a transboundary resource.
When it was designed (sec Figure 2) the projectinvolved construction of a 17-km diversion canal andthe creation of two hydroelectric power stations along
"Under the Communist regime the original signatory governmentswere Hungary and Czechoslovakia. One of the complicatingfactors taking place during this conflict was the separation ofCzechoslovakia, which was to become the Czech Republic andSlovak Republic on 1 January 1993. This transition created newpolitical difficulties and it appears that some internal confusionensued as to who was in charge (and responsible for) the project.
the Danube River. One was to be constructed atGabcikovo, in the former Czechoslovakia, the other atNagymaros, Hungary. In addition, three dams were tobe built, one upstream of the power stations and one ateach plant site at Gabcikovo and Nagymaros. Theentire plan constituted "a single and indivisibleoperational system of works".9
A dam was to be built at Dunakiliti in order to floodan area of 60 km up to Bratislava. This would causethe water level of the reservoir to rise 6.5 m aboveground at Dunakiliti. From this newly-createdreservoir and dam, an artificial channel runningparallel to the Danube (5 km inside the border ofpresent Slovakia)10 was to flow to a second dam andan electric power station and lock at Gabcikovo. Oncethe water passed through the turbines, it was to betransported back to the original bed of the Danubethrough a channel. From this channel 100 kmdownstream, where the Danube turns southward into asteeper valley, a third dam, with another hydroelectricpower station, was to be built at Nagymaros, Hungaryto counterbalance the fluctuation of water flow causedby the operations upstream, and to produce additionalelectricity (Galambos, 1992).
The Gabcikovo plant was planned to have a capacity of720 MW. The Nagymaros plant was intended to have acapacity of 158 MW. According to the 1977 Treaty, bothCzechoslovakia and Hungary would share the labour
916 September 1977 Treaty, p. 1249.inThe plan called for 95% of the river to be routed from its natural
course into this canal.
m.28 Reducing conflict over the Danube waters: R. Margesson
and costs of construction and upon completion, bothwould benefit equally from the electricity generated(expected to produce 3775 million kW-hours per year)(Galambos, 1992). In addition to providing a domestic,renewable source of energy, the GN project wassupposed to improve navigation," flood protection andenhance water supplies for irrigation.
The natural course of the river in this section, duepartly to draining of cataracts in the lower Danube andalso to shallows characterizing this section of the river,has historically been problematic. These naturalconditions impact the passage of ships through thetrans-European waterway. Indeed, in order to complywith their obligations under the Danube Convention,Czechoslovakia and Hungary needed to improvenavigation in this section of the river. In addition, dueto the topography in the region, serious flooding in thepast half century has affected the communities on bothbanks of the river, the most recent series of devastatingfloods hit Czechoslovakia in the 1960s.
The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dispute12
Construction at the Gabcikovo dam began in 1978,while the work at Nagymaros did not start until 1988.The parties have been in open disagreement over theGN project since May 1989 when Hungary unilaterallyhalted construction at Nagymaros and later that yeardecided to stop work at the Gabcikovo facility,claiming, in both instances, environmental reasons. 3
Although Hungary abandoned its share of the project,Czechoslovakia, which was much further along in itscompletion of the Gabcikovo facility (and had alreadyspent over $2 billion on it) did not. Instead, it decidedto continue unilaterally with construction of aprovisional solution known as "Variant C" and begandiscussing claims for compensation against Hungary.
The governments pursued bilateral talks to try towork out these differences, but were unsuccessful. TheEuropean Community (EC) offered its "good offices"to help settle the growing conflict, but with thestipulation that technical experts consider the effect ofthe planned dam project on the environment.14. Theseefforts failed as well. In April 1992, Czechoslovakiadenounced the Hungarian request for the cancellationof its unilateral construction work and responded thatwithout a provision for termination, a treaty could not
"The Danube River is currently navigable all year except for threemonlhs when it becomes impassable between Bratislava and Nagy-maros.
'"Due to the limited scope of this article, this complex case ispresented in summary fashion and is not intended to be a legalanalysis of the dispute.
' Ironically, environmental protests over the GN project were influen-tial in bringing an end to the Communist dictatorship in Hungaryand served as a main local point of growing national sentimentduring ihe 1980s.
I lie F-.C Commission slated three conditions for its involvement,asking lhat ihe parlies: (I) request external arbitration in writing:(2) make a commitment to accept the findings of the experts asbinding, and (3) agree that until the completion of the investiga-tions, neither would lake measures that would affect the negotia-tions lin other words. tlie> would suspend construction of the GNproject I. I he t .C\ proposal was an attempt to provide a mechanismso th.it neither party would lake an individual initiative to a pointwhere negotiation under ilns framework would be useless.
be unilaterally terminated. It also made public itsintention to divert the river and block the DanubeRiver bed by the end of October the same year. InMay 1992 Hungary declared that it would terminatethe 1977 Treaty unless the issues could be resolved.15
After an unsuccessful meeting with the EC in whichboth parties expressed opposing positions about theeffects of the project, Hungary announced that itwould invoke the crisis mechanism through theConference on Security and Cooperation of Europe(CSCE); it also filed a complaint with the InternationalCourt of Justice (ICJ), citing the Helsinki Rules. InOctober 1992, a trilateral meeting betweenrepresentatives of both governments and the EC washeld in London and resulted in the London Protocol,16
which among its other provisions required thatconstruction be temporarily halted by all disputants.Several days later, Czechoslovakia began its operationsat the Gabcikovo plant.
In January 1993, Czechoslovakia split into the Czechand Slovak Republiks. The GN project, located in thesouthern end of the former Czechoslovakia, thereforecame under the jurisdiction of the Slovak Republic. On2 July 1993 the Governments of Hungary and theSlovak Republic signed a "Special Agreement"submitting their case over the GN project to the ICJfor settlement. A decision is not expected to beawarded until 1997. In the interim, the parties agreedto "establish and implement a temporary watermanagement regime" (International Legal Materials,1993) for the section of the Danube River in question.When the case goes before the ICJ it will be to decide"on the basis of the Treaty and rules and principles ofgeneral international law, as well as such other treatiesas the Court may find applicable" (International LegalMaterials, 1993) the following main issues:
• whether Hungary was entitled unilaterally to suspendand later abandon the works on the Nagymaros andGabcikovo parts of the project to which it wasattributed responsibility under the terms of the 1977Treaty;
• whether the Czech and Slovak Republics were enti-tled to proceed with the "provisional solution" in
l5This declaration cited the following reasons for termination: "Thebarrage systems is causing ecological and environmental damage;the CSFR "provisional solution" to divert the natural course ofthe Danube is dangerous and violates Hungary's territorial integ-rity. See "Declaration of the Government of the Republic ofHungary on the Termination of the Treaty Concluded Betweenthe People's Republic of Hungary and the Socialist Republic ofCzechoslovakia on the Construction and Joint Operation of theGabcikovo Nagymaros Barrage System, Signed in Budapest on 16September 1977" (25 May 1992). International Legal Materials32.5 (September 1993).
"The Protocol outlined a four-point plan as a basis for settling thedispute. The parties agreed (1) to stop work at the construction sitetemporarily; (2) accept binding arbitration: (3) retain a certainvolume percentage of water in the original Danube River bed: (4)set up a small 5-member group, consisting of three EC expertsand one representative each from Hungary and Slovakia, respec-tively, to examine the consequences of damming. See "Czech andSlovak Federation-Kuropean Commission-Hungary: LondonAgreement on the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project" (28 October1992). International Legal Materials. 32.5 (September 1993): 1291-1292.
i
Reducing conflict over the Danube waters: R. Margesson 29
November 1991 and to put this system into operationin October 1992; and
• the legal effects of Hungary's notification to termi-nate the 1977 Treaty in May 1992.
The ICJ was also asked to decide the overall legal andother consequences arising from its Judgement on theissues in the case {International Legal Materials, 1993).
Although this article is not intended to provide adetailed analysis of the legal issues involved in thedispute over the GN project, it is important to considergenerally the possible outcomes that might result fromthe limited set of questions before the ICJ. Withoutsuggesting what the ICJ might do, it may be helpful toconsider possible outcomes for each side. The questionsbefore the Court concern the legality of specific actionstaken by the parties with regard to the project andTreaty, and ask for consideration of the overall legalimplications and compensatory damages that may havebeen incurred. While it is quite possible that one orboth parties may raise the issue of equitable utilizationin their arguments (and this may be considered by theJudges) the final outcome is limited to a ruling on thequestions put forward and therefore will not addressthe broader issues of sustainable development.
Should Hungary be granted the relief it seeks, itwould be allowed to dismantle its project atNagymaros, prevent the continuation of theprovisional solution, terminate the Treaty and receivecompensation from Slovakia. On the other hand,should Slovakia be granted the relief it seeks thecircumstances would, of course, be very different.Hungary would not be entitled to stop the project; theprovisional solution might be allowed to continue, or ifthe Treaty were upheld, the project might be endorsed,thereby "maximizing" the gains of both hydroelectricfacilities. Finally, Hungary would owe Slovakiacompensatory damages for its actions.
It is impossible to predict what the ICJ's determinationwill be on these questions, what other legal or technicalissues it might raise and how much each party will win orlose on each point. Both parties are legitimatelyconcerned with actions of the past in order to determinehow to proceed with current use of the river. However,the end result is that the ruling will almost certainlyreflect the "zero-sum" nature of the questions putforward; there is little room to expand options formutual gain in these issues. Neither party is in a positionto pay large compensation for damages to the other, norcan they afford to give up the benefits to be derived fromthe river. Thus, the underlying tensions will likely remain,with neither party completely satisfied with the outcomebecause their long-term interests will not have been met.Moreover, this may lead to other conflicts over shareduse in the future.
All along the parties have perceived their interests in"zero-sum" terms. According to Thomas HomerDixon this often occurs with water systems: "Theserenewable resources seem particularly likely to sparkconflict because their scarcity is increasing rapidly insome regions, they are often essential for humansurvival, and they can be physically seized orcontrolled" (1991). The dispute between Hungary and
Slovakia has similar themes. Moreover, as journalistRobert Kaplan suggests, it is "a classic case of howenvironmental disputes fuse with ethnic and historicalones" (1994). As the lines of the conflict were drawn,the dispute over the GN project escalated andprecipitated other issues between the parties which onlyadded a deeply entrenched, highly-charged layer ofpolitics, nationalism and ethnic tensions to the legaland environmental issues already at stake. A narrowruling on whether the dam project should beimplemented is not likely to resolve these issues, and inall probability they will stand in the way of futurecooperation.
A further exploration of the long-term questionsbetween the parties highlights the need for aconsideration of the broader issue of sustainabledevelopment. Indeed, this element is implicit in theparties' positions: in terms of environmentalconsequences, Hungary has claimed that the GNproject will result in pollution of drinking water formillions of people in both countries, alter water tablesand ruin unique marshlands.17 At the same time itmaintains that the project will only produce a smallamount (three to five percent) of the energy beingsought by the project. Hungary has also objected to theproject because it moves the main Danube stream,currently the accepted international border betweenHungary and Slovakia, and so violates its territorialintegrity.18 Moreover, Hungary is concerned about itsminority in Slovakia, which it claims will be mostaffected by the diversion and the project. Given thatenvironmental demands were a chief part of theHungarian anti-communist opposition, the GN projectis a very important issue politically, to which thegovernment is committed.
Quite apart from its financial investment in theproject, Slovakia perceives Gabcikovo to be of primaryimportance to its energy supply. Otherwise deprived ofhydroelectric power from the Danube, Slovakia hopesthat the project will produce half of its energyrequirements. Anticipating growing power needs andrecognizing a demand that older nuclear and thermalfacilities be retired, Slovakia views Gabcikovo as avital and necessary project, but one that will only bemost productive in conjunction with Nagymaros.Supporters of the project stand in stark contrast to theopposing Hungarian view, insisting it will enable fullutilization of the Danube for all-year shipping andprevent flooding. In addition they claim it will halt thedrying up of marshlands, reduce the fluctuations inaquifer levels and prevent lowering of the water table.
Gabcikovo has also become an important politicalissue, symbolizing national independence — particularlysince the "velvet divorce" of January 1993. Althoughthe Hungarians have argued that the legal implications
l7The Danube currently supplies 60% of Hungary's water, or 1million cm a day. Hungary claims that damage to wildlife as aresult of diverting the river may destroy 80-90% of the 5000species that inhabit the area. The fish population is predicted tofall by 25%: commercial fishing may fall by 90% (Galambos1992).
l8Hungary has claimed that Slovakia is in violation of the Paris PeaceTreaty of 1947.
30 Reducing conflict over the Danube waters: R. Margesson
of this political change imply that a new contract needsto be negotiated, Slovakia perceives the commitment ofboth countries to the 1977 Treaty as absolute andbinding. Furthermore, Slovakia does not believe theGN project entails the harm or risk that Hungary saysit might. It does not accept the view that the allegedenvironmental concerns, which it sees asunsubstantiated in environmental impact assessmentsand studies, should take precedence over a viableproject to meet its need for energy production and selfsufficiency.
Behind the strong disagreements over technologicaldata, environmental consequences and legal principleslie needs for new sources of energy supplies and cleanwater, uninterrupted and improved navigation, floodcontrol, development of water resources andenvironmental protection. When the GN project wasfirst conceived in the 1950s, some of these issues werecentral to the decision to proceed with the project asthe best way of meeting the multiple needs of theparties. Over time, the positions and interests of theparties on how their needs should be met evolved. Thechanging interest in the agreement — the 1977 Treaty— between the two riparians has resulted in a heateddispute that apparently cannot be resolved withoutrecourse to the ICJ. These needs could perhaps beaddressed in a variety of alternative ways — forexample, introducing energy-saving methods, devisingalternative patterns of agricultural production, anddeveloping parks and protected areas. However, thediffering beliefs of the parties have left little room forconsideration of their common needs and the mutualgain that might be derived from addressing theseproblems jointly and cooperatively.
A ruling by the ICJ on the dam and 1977 Treaty maybe effective in the short term to the extent that it mightresolve some of the immediate issues in dispute andsettle specific claims of the past. However, at the heartof this matter is equitable utilization, not only withregard to the current dispute, but for implementingsustainable practices in the future. Simply pursuing thelegal remedies described will not resolve the long-termissues, and may even contribute to further unrest.Thus, a narrow legal ruling cannot be truly effective asa policy tool for resolving this dispute because it willnot enable the parties to move from their statedpositions to the collaborative effort required.
Lessons from the Danube Delta
The degradation of the Danube Delta poses another setof variables, which could potentially give way toconflict. Making up part of the lower Danube, thedelta lies at the end of the river's long journey. Fromthere it empties into the Black Sea via three mainbranches: the Kiliya (Bratul Chilia), the Sulina (BratulSulina) and the St George (Bratul Sfintu Gheorghe).Between these branches are lakes and channels, whichare also divided into three sections: the lake complex,the fluvial zone and the maritime zone (see Figure 3).
As Europe's largest wetland ecosystem, the DanubeDelta is recognized for its wildlife, much of which isthreatened throughout the rest of Europe. Covering
roughly 580 700 ha (80 percent of which is in Romaniaand the rest in Ukraine) the delta is a reserve for rarebirds, fish and plants. Also contained within itsboundaries is perhaps one of the largest expanses ofreed beds in the world (Pringle et ai, 1993). The deltaacts as a filtering system and habitat for many plantsand animal species and is central to the ecologicalhealth of this region.
Damage to the delta is extensive and varied. One of theprimary causes has been excessive pollution. Drinkingwater resources in the region have been adverselyaffected as large groundwater aquifers located in thedelta have become degraded. The delta is especiallythreatened as it is the outlet of the entire basin and isimmediately downstream of the most highly pollutedsub-basins (Pringle et al. 1993). Many of its problems arenegative effects of distal use and development, whichdecreases the river's purifying capacity, increases itspollution and causes a decline in overall water quality.Specific examples of the environmental problems include:
• Highly polluted loads in the Danube River upstreamof (as well as from sources close to and within) theDelta.Significant contamination comes from agriculturalrun off, municipal waste, copper, mercury, lead,detergents and oil products. Many cities and townsbordering the river lack sewage treatment facilitiesfor waste disposal;
• Decreased retention, nutrient cycling and purifica-tion capabilities of the wetlands.This is a result of increased use of engineering workssuch as dikes, dams, cut-offs and channelization, anddevelopment practices such as the creation of polders(areas drained for agriculture). These activities haveaffected the river's self-cleaning capacity and reducedits retention capability by 25%, forcing water filledwith nutrients to now directly into the Black Sea withharmful consequences to aquatic ecosystems;
• Changed hydraulic practices in the Danube River.As a result of these practices, flood peaks have beendecreasing; the loss of the flood plain in the lowerDanube (by at least 290 000 ha, resulting in a loss of4.3 km3 of water retention) in particular has reducedthe water-holding capacity of the river system, caus-ing a decline in water circulation and increasedcoastal erosion (up to 17 m per year). Siltation andseparation of lakes have accelerated eutrophication;
• Disturbed aquatic ecosystems, biodiversity and habitat.Primary causes stem largely from human activities andinclude mechanized and intensive agriculture, fishfarming and other aquaculture, and reed harvesting.These practices require the use of nutrients and pesti-cides and impoundments of certain areas in the delta,which ultimately impact the food web of the entireecosystem.19
The environmental deterioration has, in broad terms,compromised the delta's aquatic ecosystems, increasedcoastal erosion and eutrophication. posed healthhazards and contributed to economic decline. Although
|l)I-'or greater detail and explanation about these effects, please seeDDRG. 1991: IUCN, 1992: and Prinelc et ai. 1993.
Reducing conflict over the Danube waters: R. Margesson 31
B L A C K S E A
Reed cultivation and fisheries
N Nature reserves
Figure 3(a) Map of the Danube Delta: Land use.Source: IUCN, 1992.
some of the delta has been protected seriousenvironmental problems remain.
For the countries within or adjacent to the Delta a"reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses"(Weiss et ai, 1991) of the river have been greatlyminimized. Moreover, it could be argued that theimpact of upstream users has caused "significantharm" (Weiss et al., 1991) to these states. To date,conflicts over water use have not erupted intohostilities and the provisions of equitable utilization
20There are several areas in the Danube Delta which are now protectedunder the Danube Delta Biosphere Reserve. Although this will notbe the focus of this article, for further details about this managementprogram see IUCN (1991). The Danube Delta Research and Designinstitute and the Braila Research Station for Aquatic Ecosystems ofthe University of Bucharest have been monitoring the water of theDanube River and Delta (see IUCN, 1992). While Romanian scien-tists have been gathering and analyzing data in the last decade, theirwork has not been published outside Romania. Recent researchcollaborations between the U.S. and Romania (such as the DanubeDelta Research Group) show promise of greater sharing of informa-tion in this region.
32 Reducing conflict over the Danube waters: R. Margesson
\)
B L A C K S E A
Fluvial zone
Transitional zone
Marine zone
Figure 3{b) Map of the Danube Delta: physiographical, pcdological and ecological zones.Source: IUCN, 1992.
outlined by the ILA and ILC have not been cited.Nevertheless, the potential for dispute remains.
The delta is an excellent example of the benefitsprovided by using the principle of equitable utilizationm conjunction with the goal of achieving moresustainable development. This has been very effective asa policy tool for addressing the deteriorating conditionol the Danube Delta and river basin in two ways. First,it has established the Convention on Cooperation forthe Protection and Sustainable Use of the Danube
River, the legal instrument which speaks directly tosustainable and equitable water management. Second, ithas formed a cooperative regional arrangement thatbuilds on these principles. The main purpose of theConvention and the Environmental Programme for theDanube River Basin (EPDRB) is to protect the Danubeand control its negative effect on the Black Sea.Determining how to remedy existing damage and at thesame time to deter future harm requires not only anexamination of the causes that lie within the Delta
Reducing conflict over the Danube waters: R. Margesson 33
ecosystem itself, but those that are external to it. In orderto achieve this goal, the political cooperation of allriparian nations is necessary. The combination of aregional environmental treaty, supervised by its owncommission and supported by effective national andregional programs to explore the necessary technicalaspects, has resulted in a comprehensive framework forplanning and managing this resource.
The EPDRB was put into effect in September 1991when environmental officials from several Danubenations met in Sophia, Bulgaria to begin planning thereclamation of the Danube Basin. This meeting was co-sponsored by the Global Environment Facility (GEF)and the European Community.21 The EPDRB isdesigned to provide the plan for strategic action whichis to be implemented under the new environmentalConvention and its Commission.22 Until the newConvention is in place, the Program will functionwithout any legal (institutional) basis. It is beingcoordinated and giving priority to the coordination ofinterests (EPDRB, 1993) with a parallel unit set up inIstanbul called the Programme for the EnvironmentalManagement and Protection of the Black Sea. WhileEPDRB's focus is on the delta region, it is stronglycommitted to working on the transboundary issuesalong the river as well. The significant links betweenthe river, its delta and the Black Sea (EPDRB, 1993)make this program "a truly regional one in which itwas foreseen that a high level of coordination andcooperation between all parties concerned is vital"(EPDRB, 1993).
The EPDRB's initial work, to be developed over athree-year period, is focused on setting up thecoordination plan required to address immediate needsand to establish the basis upon which long-term strategicaction can be implemented. These efforts includedeveloping a process for environmental managementthrough review of administrative practices, legislativeplanning and environmental policies; conducting a seriesof diagnostic missions to identify key pollution sourcesfrom which potential investment projects will be selected;documenting national reviews from the ripariancountries to ascertain their overall water environmentsituation; and setting up an emergency warning alarmsystem for the Danube and its major river tributaries tohelp control or prevent pollution as a result of accidents(EPDRB, 1993).
The long-term strategic plan will be an ongoing effort togather information as the basis for a multi-year programof work in order to "coordinate the activities of local andnational authorities, international financial institutionsand regional and nongovernmental organizations (NGO)towards a set of common goals" (EPDRB, 1993). AnIntegrated Regional Study produced from surveys,
2 'This program will receive funding from both multilateral and bilat-eral sources. Initial funding commitments equal $50 million. Theoverall clean up effort will involve financing from the EC-PHAREprogram, the World Bank, the UNDP, the UNEP and the EBRD.The Task Force (composed of roughly 50 participants who meetonce a year) has developed a work plan, the day-to-day responsi-bilities of which are run by a coordination unit (Rodda, 1993).
"The details of this program are put forward in several reports; one ofthe most comprehensive is the Environmental Programme for theDanube River Basin Annual Report (EPDRB, 1993).
diagnostic missions and national reviews to form thebasis of a series of recommendations on the regionalaction to be taken and strategy to be developed forprotection and sustainable development (EPDRB, 1993).Because of the wide variety of pollution to be assessed,the integrated approach will provide an analysis of thepriorities and uses of the Danube catchment, such asdrinking water supply, fisheries and sensitive ecosystems;the effects of pollution on the environment, such aseutrophication, hazardous pollution of soils,contaminated sediments and groundwater, and disposalof wastes; and the factors contributing to these effects,namely agriculture, transport, industry and thepopulation (EPDRB, 1993). For consistent qualityassurance, the main activities will be to develop improvedlab and inventory capabilities. This will includeestablishing monitoring and data management systems;updating equipment, and training manpower.23 Long-term plans to improve the regional network includedeveloping greater public participation, conductingworkshops for governments and NGOs, building oninvestment opportunities in the region and harmonisinglegislation and standards (Rodda, 1993).
The new Convention (signed by riparians24 in Sophia,Bulgaria in June 1994) establishes the institutional, legaland technical framework for cooperation in order toaddress some of the Danube region's water pollutionproblems. A number of key environmental agreementsprovided important historical and legal precedents.25
These multilateral agreements not only speak toenvironmental protection, but address broaderconcerns relating to equitable and sustainable water use.
As the first regional agreement to deal with these issuesspecifically in the Danube region, this 1994 Convention isstriking in its implications for multilateral cooperation.Furthermore, it sets up the environment as the
23Researchers and scientists gathering data face varying standards ofrecord keeping, data analysis, etc. from individual countries. Oneway this is being addressed is through the efforts of the EuropeBureau of the USAID, which has begun to institutionalizecomputer country databases and software through DEMDESS, acomprehensive water pollution data management system. Theprogram has been used in water quality pre-investment studies infour Danube River tributary basins in Bulgaria, Romania,Hungary and Slovakia (USAID, 1993).
24Currcnt signatories include Austria, Germany, Croatia, SlovakRepublic, Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and theEC. Ukraine is expected to endorse the Convention. Serbia hasnot been a party to the discussions since the onset of the war inthe former Yugoslavia.
"These include the December 1985, Bucharest Declaration; theDecember 1987 agreement between the Federal Republic ofGermany, the Republic of Austria and the European EconomicCommunity on Cooperative Management of Water Resources inthe Danube Basin; and the March 1992 Convention on the Protec-tion and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and InternationalLakes signed by ECE states, under the United Nations EconomicCommission for Europe. Interview with Vittoria DiBucci,European Commission Legal Counsel, 23 March 1994. For a fullreview of these texts, please see Official Journal of the EuropeanCommunities, "Agreement Between the Federal Republic ofGermany and the European Economic Community, and theRepublic of Austria on Cooperation of Management of WaterResources in the Danube Basin", Council Decision of 22 March1990, L90, 5 April 1990, and United Nations, Economic andSocial Council, Economic Commission for Europe, Conventionon the Protection and Uses of Transboundary Watercourses andInternational Lakes (E/ECE/1267). 17 March 1992.
m
34 Reducing conflict over the Danube waters: R. Margesson
ideological framework or principle which requirescollective action for it to be effective. The politicalcommitment to this agenda by the riparian nationsrepresents a new phase of ordering in the region whichgoes far beyond the past power struggles for control ofthe river. The environment has now become thecontrolling factor through which mutual benefit may bederived as a result of cooperation.
It is the combination of law and politics that hasproduced a comprehensive management program forthe delta. While it is unrealistic to assume that thisarrangement will avert every conflict over water use inthe future, it will go a long way towards reducing thepotential for conflict between upstream anddownstream countries, and between riparians in thedelta and along the Black Sea.
studies were conducted and there were opportunities forexchange of data. Even though these provisions existed, adispute arose and quickly escalated, and the mechanismsfor reaching a resolution before submitting the case to theICJ did not work. The Treaty did perhaps reflect theefforts of both parties to achieve an equitable allocationof the uses and benefits of the river, but over time, it failedto continue to meet their changing needs, interests andconcerns in light not only of equitable use but of theprinciple of sustainable development as well.Furthermore, a narrow legal ruling is unlikely to satisfythese broader questions. The hope is that the DanubeConvention represents a more adaptive system that canrespond to changes in river flow regimes and incorporatenot only the principle of equitable utilization, but the goalof sustainable development practices as a model forfuture water resource management.
Conclusion
The two cases involving the current use of the DanubeRiver serve to illustrate the limits of the principle ofequitable utilization alone in resolving or preventingwater disputes. As this discussion has shown, itsapplication together with sustainable water use is criticalto long-term cooperation between parties. Law andinstitutions will continue to play an important role inthe development of broad international agreements andprinciples. The effectiveness of these legal guidelinesremains dependent upon many factors, such as nationalpolitics, social forces and economic realities. They musttherefore be adapted to the unique characteristics of aparticular region and accepted by its riparian nations.However, the broader principle of sustainabledevelopment must also be applied in order for particulardisputes to transcend "zero-sum" win/lose solutions.
Consider for a moment how differently the dispute overthe GN project might be resolved if it had arisen under the1994 Sofia Convention. The goal of the Convention is toimplement preventive rather than reactive solutions. Theprocess of resolving the dispute over the GN projectwould, under the Convention, involve scientific research,exchange of data and consultation among the parties —as well as other affected nations — and consider the long-term implications of the project. A likely result would bemuch better communication and understanding of, if notagreement about, the environmental consequences atstake weighed against the costs and benefits ofdevelopment for domestic purposes. Utilizing theInternational Commission (a body made up of memberstates and created through the Convention) wouldprovide an opportunity for negotiation. Thus, instead ofthe opposing positions taken by Slovakia and Hungary,a collaborative approach might instead have beenpossible, bringing some rationale to the demands eachcountry placed on the river and providing a forum forcreating efficient use of the supplies already available tothem.
Hypothetical settings aside, the new Convention couldnot in all probability change a treaty in force. It could beargued that the methods outlined above were not onlystated in the 1977 Treaty but utilized as well. During theplanning and implementation of the GN project, scientific
Abbreviations
DDBRA Danube Delta Biosphere ReserveAuthority
DDRG Danube Delta Research GroupDEMDESS Danube Emissions Management
Decision Support SystemEBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and
DevelopmentEU European Union (formerly EC,
European Community)EPDRB Environmental Programme for the
Danube River BasinGN Gabcikovo-NagymarosGEF Global Environmental FacilityICJ International Court of JusticeI LA International Law AssociationILC United Nation's International Law
CommissionIUCN International Union for Conservation of
NatureOSCE Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (formerly CSCE,Conference on Security andCooperation in Europe)
PHARE Program of Assistance for EconomicRestructuring in the Countries ofCentral and Eastern Europe
UNDP United Nations Development ProgramUNEP United Nations Environment ProgramUSAID United States Agency for International
Development
Appendix A
Detailed chronology of significant events surrounding theGabcikovo-Nagymaros project
1910-19881910Plans for the utilization of the hydroelectric power of the Danubeemerge.
1920Treaty of Trianon, through which Hungary lost territory toCzechoslovakia, including the territory in Slovakia.
Reducing conflict over the Danube waters: R. Margesson 35
1948The Danube Convention signed by riparian nations, requiringsignatory countries to maintain their sections of the river navigablefor big ships, in order keep the river navigable throughout itslength.
1950OctoberSuggestion at the meeting of the Hungarian Academy of Science thatcontact be made with Czechoslovakia to examine the possibility ofbuilding a power plant together.
1958A Hungarian-Czechoslovakian joint expert Committee recommendsbuilding a system comprised of two dams, one with an elevated sidechannel.
1963Intergovernmental committees approve the two-dam system agreeingto a completion date of 1975.
1964-73Project designs and programs are developed.
197715 SeptemberLeaders of the communist parlies in each country announce thedecision to go ahead with the project.
16 SeptemberThe Prime Ministers from Czechoslovakia and Hungary sign the"Treaty Concerning the Construction and Operation of the GNSystem of Locks," an interstate agreement outlining a plan for twostages, one at Gabcikovo and the other at Nagymaros.
1978Documents of ratification of the 1977 Treaty exchanged between theparties.
Construction begins on the Gabcikovo power station, with acompletion deadline of July 1990.
1981SeptemberFollowing criticism from various professional engineers and biologists.an agreement is reached with the Czechoslovak governmenttemporarily halting construction work on their side (which is moreadvanced than work on the Hungarian side).
1981NovemberThe environmental movement in Hungary sees its true beginnings withthe publication of the influential article written by Janos Vargha.which strongly criticizes the GN project.
198310 OctoberThe parties modify the 1977 Treaty by signing a protocol in Praguewhich postpones the operation of the power generators by 5 years.Deadline for completion is moved to 1995.
20 DecemberCouncil of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences completes its reportand calls (or a halt to construction, pending an investigation ofenvironmental consequences.
1984Growing public concern in Austria and Hungary over theenvironmental impact of the GN project.
Danube Circle (Duna Kor), an unofficial pressure group opposed to-in r ;M nrniPf'T U fnimcHthe GN project, is formed.
1985Hungary concludes a private contract with an Austrian company forfinancing the construction. The dam at Dunakiliti is to be builtmainly by Austrian companies. Another contract is concluded with aYugoslavian company for the dredging of the downstream channel.Ignoring growing protests, Hungary reaffirms that construction willcontinue.
1986Environmental groups apply further pressure in Hungary.
28 MayHungarian and Austrian companies sign four contracts committingAustria to both finance and execute the bulk of construction work atNagymaros in return for electricity deliveries starting in 1996.
1987AugustThe parties sign a statement pledging to speed up construction.
1987International protest actions take place which influence the Hungariangovernment.
198812 SeptemberFirst mass demonstration against the GN project in Hungary.
6 7 OctoberThe first Hungarian Parliament debate over GN project places strictenvironmental protection conditions on further construction work atand operation of the GN project.
19896 FebruaryThe parties sign another protocol to speed up construction.
13 MayThe Hungarian government suspends the works at Nagymaros (about30% complete) with a two-month moratorium.
24 MayThe Hungarian and Czechoslovak Prime Ministers negotiate in Pragueon amending the project. The Czechoslovak government insists oncompleting the GN project according to the terms of the originalTreaty — no agreement is achieved.
2 JuneThe Hungarian government is authorized to enter into negotiations onthe modification or termination of the 1977 Treaty.
20 JulyThe prime ministers from each country meet. Hungary announces itwill extend the suspension of the Nagymaros construction until 31October and offers alternatives for joint revision. It decides againstallowing diversion of the Danube to a new canal built on Slovakterritory, thereby preventing the filling of the Dunakiliti Reservoir,the main source of water for the Gabcikovo plant. Czechoslovakiarefuses the Hungarian proposals.
18 AugustOfficial note of protest from Czechoslovakia, which also threatens todemand S2 billion in compensation.
31 AugustThe Czechoslovak Prime Minister rejects the Hungarian proposal andoutlines a provisional solution, proposing to unilaterally divert theDanube on Czechoslovak land (described as the "C Option"); thiswould involve a smaller reservoir and allow the entire project tooperate within Slovak territory. This is seen by Czechoslovakia asprotection in case Hungary decides to suspend the construction forever.
I SeptemberThe Hungarian government responds, justifying its own position andwarning that the proposed action might hurt the relations betweenthe two countries.
SeptemberFollowing the agreement of deputy prime ministers, technical andlegal experts of the two countries meet without success to overcomethe controversies.
22 SeptemberThe Hungarian government decides to end work at Nagymaros, whichincreases the hours to almost continuous operation at Gabcikovo.
4 OctoberHungary protests against the unilateral provisional solution fromCzechoslovakia.
I1 OctoberThe two prime ministers meet to settle the issue. Hungary stresses theenvironmental arguments, Czechoslovakia disapproves of thememphasizing possible claims for compensation and threateningunilateral diversion.
t
36 Reducing conflict over the Danube waters: R. Margesson
31 OctoberThe Hungarian Parliament adopts a resolution to abandon the peakoperation mode of the Gabcikovo dam and the construction of theNagymaros dam. The Hungarian parliament passes a resolutionauthorizing the government to renegotiate the 1977 Trealy guided byan ecological approach, solid scientific findings and priority ofnational interests.
NovemberHungary terminates its agreement with the Austrian contractor.
A mass demonstration is held at Gabcikovo with Czech and Slovakorganizations.
30 NovemberThe Hungarian government proposes a new internationalgovernmental agreement retaining part of the dam system withecological guarantees prior to putting the plants in operation.Czechoslovakia never formally responds.
19901990-92A number of negotiations between the two countries take place butwith no progress. Hungary aims at an agreement to abandon or atleast suspend the project until the ecological risks arc sufficientlyinvestigated; Czechoslovakia wants the project to be completedstating that for economic reasons it cannot afford suspension.
10 JanuaryHungary sends a letter to the new Czechoslovak Prime Minister,revoking the Hungarian proposal for treaty modification andannouncing that Hungary will stop any activity directed at thecompletion of the system, including the Hungarian engagementon Czechoslovak territory and suggesting that the other partyshould follow suit. He refers to the radical changes of the recentperiod and proposes that the final decision be left to the newgovernments to be formed after the free elections in bothcountries. The Czechoslovak Prime Minister's response isnegative, demanding that the entire system be set to operation in1991.
5 FebruaryA large group of protesters express their sentiments against the projectin Czechoslovakia.
22 MayThe new Hungarian government publishes its general politicalprogram, which disapproves of the project and states it will startrestoring the site at Nagymaros.
31 MayThe Hungarian government submits details of the governmentprogram relating to the GN project.
JuneHungary terminates its agreement with the Yugoslavian contractorand reaches a compensation arrangement.
For the rest of the year practically no major move on the issue. TheMinister for Environment of Czechoslovakia submits a proposal ofseven alternatives ranging from the execution of the original plan, tothe demolition of all the new structures and restoration of theoriginal situation to the maximum extent possible. Negotiationsresume on a low-level of government commissioners for the project,leading to the transmittal of scientific reports justifying the decisionof the Hungarian government to withdraw from the plan.
14 NovemberThe Hungarian government agrees to recompense the Austriancompany contracted to build the dam at Nagymaros.
DecemberUnpublished decision of the Hungarian government to startnegotiations with the Czechoslovak government in order to terminatethe Treaty concluded in 1977 on the establishment and operation ofthe GN project.
1991
JanuaryTrilateral consultations of ministers for foreign affairs ofCzechoslovakia. Hungary and Poland take place in Hungary, but noagreement seems to have been achieved.
22-23 AprilThe two parties meet again at the inter-governmental level in order todiscuss the official standpoints of their governments. The standpointsdiffer significantly. No written documents are exchanged.
15 JulyThe parties meet in Bratislava each restating their positions.
23 JulyFollowing further bilateral meetings, the Slovak governmentannounces its decision to proceed with Option C to divert theDanube, which the Hungarian government claims would be aviolation of the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty's ruling of the Danube'smain shipping lane as the border between the two countries. Slovaklegal experts respond that the 1977 Treaty had itself envisioneddiverting water from the Danube.
24 JulyA decision to prepare plans for construction according to Option C, tobe effective starting in October 1992, is made formally by the Slovakgovernment.
July and AugustA number of local people organize demonstrations on both sides ofthe conflict.
NovemberCzechoslovakia begins construction of Option C.
DecemberAn intergovernmental meeting takes place in Budapest. The partiesagree that the GN project involves a complex technical-scientificproblem and that a joint expert committee should be convened toreview it. Both parties agree to include an expert from the EC as athird party. The parties cannot agree on the issue of suspension ofthe construction, highlighting the gap between the two sides: theSlovaks will only consider options which will allow the power stationat Gabcikovo to function, while the Hungarians threaten unilateralannulment of the 1977 Treaty.
1992
24 MarchSecond resolution by the Hungarian parliament authorizing thegovernment to renegotiate the 1977 Treaty.
AprilAn Austrian company agrees to lend to the Slovak state constructionfirm to complete the project, which leads to protests by theHungarian government and demonstrations outside the AustrianEmbassy in Budapest.
13 AprilThe EC Commission offers its "good offices" to provide a committeeof experts in order to settle the growing conflict. The Vice Presidentof the EC expresses the readiness of the EC to take part in theresolution of the dispute.
23 AprilDenouncing the Hungarian request aiming at the cancellation ofunilateral construction work, Czechoslovakia announces it will startits operation on 31 October 1992.
4 MayThe EC Commissioner responds to calls from both sides for an outsidecommittee of experts by stipulating three conditions to be met beforethe EC can become involved: a letter requesting external arbitration:a commitment to accept the findings as binding, and promises not toprejudice the outcome of the enquiry in any way (which would meansuspending the work on the project on the Slovak side) until thecompletion of the investigations.
7 MayThe Hungarian government announces that unless the issue can beresolved beforehand, it will unilaterally annul the 1977 Treaty on thebuilding of the GN project on 25 May.
9 MayCzech and Slovak governments reject the Hungarian decision. Agovernment official admits that the dispute is having a "disturbingeffect" on a new Hungarian Czechoslovak Friendship Treaty, whichhas been approved by both sides but still awaits signing.
Reducing conflict over the Danube waters: R. Margesson 37
19 MayHungary submits its declaration on the termination of the 1977Treaty.
25 MayHungary sends a report with an explanation for the termination toPrague.
8 JuneHungarian parliament approves the decision.
12 AugustHungary reaffirms its position over the termination of the Treaty butshows willingness to conclude another agreement; it also emphasizes thatif Option C is pursued, Hungary wil! consider this a border violation.
20 OctoberEC invites Hungary and Slovakia to talks on 22 October to try to endthe dispute over the dam by offering its "good offices" and technicalexpertise.
22 OctoberMeeting in Brussels between the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs forboth countries and senior officials from the EC Commission.Hungary states the project is too dangerous from an environmentalpoint of view; Czechoslovakia contends that serious problems willoccur if the dam is not built. Talks break up with Czechoslovakiarefusing to accept the basic conditions proposed by the EC.Hungary announces it will invoke the crisis mechanism of theCSCE.
23 OctoberThe Slovak project operator decides to block the Danube river bed.
24 OctoberThe water is diverted into the storage lake and the Gabcikovo canal.Hungary files a complaint with the ICJ.
28 OctoberThe "London Protocol" is signed by Czechoslovakia, Hungary andthe EC Commission, in which Czechoslovakia agrees to maintain atleast 95% of the water in the original river bed, to stop all works onOption C until the 20 November 1992 and refrain from operating thepower plant.
2 NovemberThe Gabcikovo plant starts "test operations" and begins diverting 80-90% of the water into the canal.
24 NovemberA mediocre Danube flood cannot be held back by the dikes of theCuonovo diversion weir which is still under construction.
27 NovemberA working group of experts nominated by the EC, Hungary andCzechoslovakia produce a report on their on-site inspection.
10 DecemberHungarian-Czechoslovak EC talks held in Brussels are unsuccessful.
DecemberThe Gabcikovo project operator starts construction of a giantirrigation project which aims at diverting some water from the canalinto a modified drainage system in the dried-out wetland on theSlovak side. The artificial irrigation/drainage system is expected tooperate in late spring 1993.
1993
JanuaryThe former Czechoslovakia splits up and the Czech Republic and theSlovak Republic are formed.
19 JanuaryTalks between the EC, Hungary and Slovakia end inconclusively withthe parties agreeing only to set a date for future negotiations. Theaim of the meeting is to resolve temporarily issues tied to navigationand water levels before the ICJ hears the case.
FebruaryConstruction of an operation road along the Danube river bed isstarted. Works at Cuonovo weir are interrupted.
16 FebruaryTrilateral negotiations on a joint Slovak Hungarian agreement tosubmit the dispute to the International Court of Justice and on aninterim water management for the Danube end without result. TheEC compromise proposal is accepted only by Hungary.
24 FebruaryThe Slovak Premier reports from his visit with the EC President thatthe non-solution might affect the voting on the association contractwith the EC.
2 MarchA Slovak state attorney states it will investigate the actions of theGabcikovo operator company.
12 MarchThe European Parliament votes on a resolution urgently asking theSlovak government to become more flexible and to cooperate in thesearch for solutions to open questions, asking the EC to explorespecific options concerning financial compensation, a comprehensiveenvironment impact assessment by independent experts, and topropose the creation of an international nature reserve in the uniquefloodplain forests bordering Hungary and Slovakia.
7 AprilSlovakia and Hungary sign the Special Agreement submitting the GNproject case to the ICJ.
23 AprilThe Slovak parliament ratifies this Agreement.
28 JuneThe ratification documents are exchanged in Brussels.
2 JulyThe parties inform the ICJ of the Special Agreement.
JulyA group of three experts is appointed by the EC(EU) Commission,plus one Slovak and one Hungarian, its work to be funded by theCommission.
DecemberThe group of experts submits its final report. Bilateral consultationtake place between the Commission and the Slovak and HungarianForeign Ministers. The final proposal is largely accepted by Hungary,while the Slovaks request more time for internal consultations.
1994
8 FebruarySlovakia gives its final answer to be assessed by the Commissionexperts. The Commission to then inform the Member States of theparties' responses.
Source: The preceding dates and descriptions which make up thischronology of events is compiled from: "Damning Evidence?" EastEuropean Reporter, September October 1992, pp. 76-82; Interviewwith Dennis Bowdoin, Secretary of Politics, Hungarian ForeignRelations, US Embassy, Budapest, 23 March 1994; Interview withH.E.P. Tomka Deputy Permanent Representative to the UnitedNations, Permanent mission of the Slovak Republic to the UnitedNations, New York, 14 March 1994; general information obtainedfrom news articles, all of which confirmed the same basic data.
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