Research Study 2nd Ad in the Drive to the Roer, Part 1

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IN THE

DRIVE TO THE RO ER


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I This report describes the 2-nd Arnred Divisions limited

objective attack from iS to 2g November \^ \ in the BOSR KiverOffensive against a grimly defended segment of the SIEGFftISDIBS.To find an example of a limited objective attack "by armor inWorld War IIis difficult because tanks "by their nature seek al-rways to thrust deep atid "break free in the enemy ls rear areas wherethey can wreak the maximum damage. In this operation the attackwas limited "by the SOM Hiver from any hope or possibility of a

Although the term limited objective is familiar to all> military student*; .no official, printed definition is available,The definition at the beginning of Chapter II that a limitedobjective is normally within the enemy battle po-sition washammered out by our committee with the help of faculty membersof the Command and Staff Department, The Armored School,

In or&etf to present a clear, unbroken narrative of theaction, many interesting sidelights have bee.n omitted, Thosewhich are vital to a thorough understanding of the operationhave been added as appendices. Since this report is a study ofan armored limited objective attack, the tank actions have beenstressed. Although infantry and artillery participation has notbeen described in detail, the vital necessity for combined arms

> teaifsvofk must no-t be overlooked.II


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We are indebted to Major M. J. L . Greene and Mr. Joe M.Hibbs, "both of the Research and Evaluation Department, The ArmoredSchool, for their meticulous editing of our manuscript. Theirhelpful suggestions are responsible for whatever clarity andunitiF the reader may find in our narrative.

Records and accounts of the planning phase are meager,no doubt because they were never written down in permanent formuntil they became decisions and orders. However, Major Greeneprovided us with ample after action reports, unit histories,and documents dealing with the battle.

We were" particularly fortunate in obtaining first handaccounts from members of the 2nd Armored Division who partic-ipated in the events* 3rigadier General John H. Collier, formercommander of CCA; Colonel Paul A, Disney, who commanded the 67thArmored Regi


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page11. G-erman General's Comments. ........... xx ii

: * 'xxxvThe A ir Preparation111.IV. A. Tactical Study of the Terrain .xxxviii3. Layer Tint Map v xaaadiV. Commanders and Personalities A . . xxxxiiiVI. Field Order #3^, 2nd Armd Piv ? xsfatiLogistics and Statistics . . ', 1VII. lviiVIII, Maps ..*....,...\u25a0'\u25a0A. Area of Operations . . lviii3. Boundaries and Front Lines ......... lix

C. Attack Positions and Objectives. , . . . . lx

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> LIST OF PLATESPagePlate

1. MAJOR GMSRAL ESITEST H. HARMOF0(5, 2ND ARMORED DIVISION. ............ .Erontpiece 2 PORTABLE BRIDGE CARRIED BY TAM RECOVERY VEHICLE, 103, 3EIGADISR GOTESAL I.D. WHITE CG, COMBAT COMMAND 3. . 20 v. TAM ASSATJLT OH lOVSRICH. . . 275. LIGHT TAM DISABLED BY MIIE 296. BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHH" H. COLLIER CG, COiaAT COMMAKI) A 7. STREET SCEIE IH EDIES? 6SS. ENEMY 'SAM DESTROYED IF GEREOHSWEIXiER ........ 7^I

VII


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15

LIST OF ILLUSTRIOUSfigure Page1 , Detailed Regimental Organization.

2, Major Attachments. l3. Eaemy Units onlTov , . . 17U. Enemy Defenses onlFov ..... 255. Attack of If1 onlTov ..... 31o6. Attack of TF X and Tf 2onlBbv. ,. 33 7, Attack of APWSILHR onlBbv . , 35 ffg. Attack of rSBIAIiDBNEOVSIT on 19 Hbv 599. Attack of SDEREN" and rHSIALDENIIOTSK' on 20 llov 6U10. Attack of OERBOETSWEILBa 69u2666

1t Defense of SDSH.W Attack of raZSETHA/OSSR . , , 90Seizure of MER2BKHA.TJSSBT ........... 93 13, Attack of BARMM. 103

VII


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I ch&ptm iIIOIR6DTJCTIOIT

A month before the Battle of the Bulge the newspaperheadlines in the United States screamed !tALLlife*STRIKE FOR FIM-1 *'\u25a0VICTOR! I$F THE WEST." The November Offensive on the WesternFront had jumped off Preceded ."by Third Army fs push % Novemberin LORRAINE toward the SAAR, the entire front from the SCHELDTto the VOSGSS drove forward onlNovember toward the RHIIFE.Little wonder that Hanson W. Baldwin, military analyst of the Newtork Times exclaimed exuberantly, "A great Allied attempt to end

*2the war with Germany this year started last week...,. 1But the men of the 2nd Armored Division had a more limitedI objective. Uot. BBHLI3ST, but a slight rise in the muddy ground

north, of GSSSOITSV/EIJEH^ SfflMAsY, was their goal- and they expecteda dogged, desperate battle to get there. They had good reason.Along with the rest of the AlliedArmies they had outrun theirsupply lines in the wild dash from KOHMASBY across FRACB! and.now after a month 1 s delay they faced a reorganized German armysecurely defending the famous SIEGFRIED LUTE area.

To the south the grim battle for .AACHUf just ended haddemonstrated the enemy capability of tenaceous defense. And wenow know from a postwar statement by the commander of the German\u0084SpY11 Corps, which opposed the 2nd Armored Division, that he hadbeen ordered to hold at k%l eosfcft et port^of tHetbounter-offensivewhich Hitler was even then planning, Neither the (German)).

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> troops nor (( the ir) leaders knew at this time that an advance onM&ASTBICH was intended to take place from the bridghead atfiOJSMDND-' in connection with the offensive in the AED2MBS, There-*kfore the unconditional demand that no ground "be given up."

These defenders facing the 2nd Armored Division held adeep -"belt of strongly fortified towns stretching to the EO3RElver, with mutually supporting fields of fire surrounding eachtown. An attacker could find little cover in the gently rollingfields "between these fiercely defended strong points. Besidesthese fortifications a sea of mud covered the entire "battle area,restricting wheeled vehicles to paved roads and making the going,even for tanks, almost impossible. To his staff General Simpson,) the ITinth Army commander, said succinctly, "I expect one hell of\u25a0\u25a0"'\u25a0 - ; \u25a0\u25a0' > ;.u25a0\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0.6. . .a fight.n

In General Eisenhower 1 s overall plan the First , Third,and ITinth Armies were to attack to the SHINS with General Simpson ls

TNinth Army protecting the left flank of the First. Ninth Armyassigned its main effort to XIX Corps, commanded "by Major GeneralHaymond S. McLain. This Corps was composed of three veteran

\u25a0*divisions the 2nd Armored Division commanded "by Major GeneralErnest N. Harmon, the 29th Infantry Division commanded fry MajorGeneral Charles- H. Gerhardt, and Major General Leland S. Hobbs 130th Infantry Division, The 2nd Armored Division1s combat recordwent back to the NOHTH AFRICAN landings a"nd' the SICILIAN campaign,

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> while all three divisions had "been outstanding in the HOHMASBTcampaign and the S$ LO "breakthrough* (See Appendix I~G for bacbground of 2nd Armored Division*)

tIX Corps planned its main effort with the 29th and 30thDivisions making a combined attack on JULICH to establish abridgehead across the BOER. The 2nd Armored^ Division protectingtheir northern flank would drive northeast to two objectives,CrBKffiSTSIHI2BR and BAHMM, from its positions along the lineBWAUHICESKhBIIGGBTDOiIJ1. (See Appendix VIII-Afor map. ) By going

as far as the first objective, Wf(3SffiMjJsB&, the 2nd Armoredthe high ground at hill 9& dominatingDivision would seize

LIKHICH on the ROS& Biver. Then the 102nd Infantry Division) would pass through to reach the river and make a crossing. Thecapture of the second, objective, BAHMM, would deny the enemy hislast north-south communications west of the HOEH, and protect theleft flank of the 29th Division attack on JULICH and its sub-*sequent crossing of the RO23R, Prom an. assembly area in thevicinity of BAfiMSM" the 2nd Armored Division would prepare tofollow the 29th across the HOUR.

For the 2nd Armored Division the operation was dividedinto two distinct efforts. Poised like a boxer on the line

~BE&(JEMDOEF first to throw a left jab northAURICHI3HI it plannedeast to GSf^o|S^JL^^ and then a punch with the right due east toBABMM* Brigadier General I. t), %ite f s Combat Command 3 would

) make the left jab to-GE^9$SM$$J& and then turn its sector over3


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to the 102nd Division of XIIICorps which would drive on fromGEJEO2T3KEB toIUSTICE. At that time the Corps "boundary wouldshift to south of SD2R2H. (See Appendix VIII-Bfor map*) Thepunch with the right would "be made "by Combat Command A, commanded"by Brigadier General (then Colonel) John H, Collier, after GCB'eattack and after the 29th Division had cleared SETTKRICH,. Then it

throughould drive SSDTMICH* SDSSU and i^JIALDMHOVSF to seizeWSB&ffItB&SSW and MMM. (For attack order see Appendix 71.)

On the left of the 2nd Armored Division the front curvedhack "beyond WAUHICHMT. CCB1s drive would deepen a salient alreadycreated "by the G-erman possession of G2ILMORCEI'? to the left rearof WAURICrar. The $Hh Division of XIIICorps was placed underBritish JO. Corps for the reduction of (rSIM^IRCHSN to widen thesalient "before XIIICorps passed the 102nd Division through CO Bat GTI&HSOTEa t0 raak:e SHI. Co^ps 1 raailieffort against LIMICH*

n fo sum up, the mission of the XIX Corps was to establisha "bridgehead at JULICH and to advance within striking distance ofLIHNTCH, The mission of British 3^ Corps was to facilitate' themovements of the XIXand XIIICorps "by reducing the GEILSN&IUCHBEFsalient," 9 Xtll Corps had the mission of carrying the "ball beyond CCB's objective at GERSOIJ3(/]EO:^ to seize a "bridgehead atLIIfl?IGH. Thus 2nd Armored Division1s mission was a limited objective attack "between the main effort Of XIX Corps on the rightto JUUCH and XIIICorps' main effort on the left to LIMCH.

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Due to /unfavorable weather the attack originally plannedfor 10 ITov was postponed day by day until 16 ftov. At 12^5 thatday, following an air strike greater than the memorable carpet

K>"bombing at ST 1,0, the armies attacked. In the 2nd ArmoredDivisi6n sector CCB^ initial objectives, IMOTORF and PUFrafDOBFfell the first day, "but the reduction of APW!SIL3R required threedays, IThe 9th panzer Division counter attacked the morning of

1117 Kov in the "biggest tank battle in 2nd Armored experience delaying the capture of Q^WiMM]ss& until20 Fov, Meanwhile CCAattacked 18! Fov through SDBRM and 'PRimLDBRHOVBT to secureMmZMBffISW and B&HMST, which fell 2g Hoy,

This, operation imtrnMtt* above all that AHMDR DEA.WSARMOR* The German commander s considered the presence of 2ndArmored Division such a threat that they drew in all availablearmored units to meet it* The gth Panzer tiivision^ l^th PanzerGrenadier Division and lOth SS Panzer Division were all committedagainst the 2nd Armored Division despite the necessity to hoardevery tank for the AED3NHSS counter-offensive. Yet the 2nd ArmoredDivision was making only a limited objective attack blocked bythe BQER River from any possibility of a decisive breakthrough.On each flank a corps main effort thrust out for a bridgehea


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#drawing enemy strength appears clearly in this action.In referring to the canrpaign, General Simpson said that

heavy weight German armor caused, a high "battle loss rate to ourlighter armored and gunned tanks. However, he added that the

9th panzer andnd Armored Division inflicted heavy losses on the15th Pan&er Grenadier Divisions and diverted this enemy armor fromattack against our infantry divisions^

FOfSS 6F CHAPTSR I1. Few York Times, Sunday 19 Fov UH 2.Ibid.

Kinth United States Army, Operations I? , Offensive inNovember, Uth Information and Historical Service r p. >.XStatement, Gen. d. Pz. Tr, Heinrich Freiherr v.Luettwitz, comdr. XLVII Corps in the Hhineland, Allerdorf, 11June 1 (Translated "by Ohristensen) p. 76. O,P Cit *> ftinth Army, p. Jf

Ibid, p. 8.''Letter of Instruction, !Twelf th Army Group, 21 Oct U^-g*op. Pit,, Hinth Army t -pp. 5-3 and 37 (All facts inremaining portion of chapter are from this document unless other-wise noted).

10. Army, 1eport of Operations, First United States "*"~~" *Aug Fe*b p . 73. ! ?'Op. Pit., Kinth Army, p. 65 and statement Col, Paul A,Disney, former commander 67th. Armored Hegiment, in interview Fort

Knox, Ky Fov Us.'

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12 "Pp < Sit., Niftth Army, p,' 25!. 6


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CFiiPTER ItPLANHIII&A LIMITED 03JSGTIYS ATTACK

The 2nd Armored I)ivision!s limited objective attack re-quired especially careful planning* This type of attack variesfrom the normal armored operation which seeks & break throughfollowed "by exploitation in the eneray rs rear areas. It Is anattaclc in which the objective is within the enemy "battle positionand I;he dommander has no intention of continuing the attackiramediately beyond that point, No plans are made for an exploits**tion and all effort is directed toward taking, securing, and de-fending the objective.

Since the objective is within the battle position, thetactics employed are like those of the penetration rather thanthe exploitation. The objective is relatively close and it isdefended by an organized enemy ., Resistance willbe continuous andimmediate heavy counterattacks may be expected.

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Being close, the limited objective offers fewer avenuesof approach and fewer choices of raaneiiver plans than a. more dis-tant objective. This restriction of maneuver makes detailedplanning more possible than for an attack on a distant objective,which offers infinite variations and" possibilities for maneuver*The deli "berate planning is more necessary because of the heavyresistance which is likely to be encountered. This appliesequally to the 2nd Armored Division1 s objectives of G-ERSDITS^riIILSRand BAEMSBV

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The timely receipt of the XIXCorps order afforded GeneralHarmon and his staff ample time to make complete plans for thislimitedobjective attack against a strongly fortified position.He ordered the division -engineer to construct a large sand tablerepresenting the division zone of attack, !This table proved to bean invaluable training aid during the weeks of preparation whichfollowed. Key personnel from each combat battalion were orientedhereon. lach battalion commander ordered the construction ofsmaller sand tables representing the terrain in their particularzones.

Ij&eh company commander briefed his tank crews on thebattalion table so that when, H-Hour arrived all crew members knewthe part that they would play in the overall plan. This type ofplanning, so necessary in an attack against a strongly organizedposition, paid great dividends because it eliminated a ll hesita-*

1tion and confusion.Because of the flatness of the ground in the division

zone, buiit-axp areas assumed an importance not normally given them,tfhese areas commanded virtual^ all crossroads and bridges. (Seeappendix IV for terrain study.) Around, all these key points theGermans constructed defensive positions in depth all the way backto the HOSE River. . .

In addition the enemy dug extensive anti-tank ditchesbetween these strong points. These ditches were approximatelytsn feet wide and often eight feet deep. Two wee encountered in

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the division sector., o& "beginning northwest of APtfSILUR saw!extending south to a point west of LOVBRICH, with several gapsnear FIOVSRICE.' A more continuous ditch protected the westernapproaches to JBpSRSbT an& FRSIA^DEMHOVHK", Neither of these ditcheshad been completed 'but were tied in with a system of fire trenchesand foxholes*

Added to the obstacles, presented "by natural and prepareddefenses, was the mad. Soil trafficaMlity was the concern ofeveryone from the Army Commainder, Lt, Gen. W. H. Simpson, downto the Sherman tank commanders, who were to make the assault.General Harmon realizing that the condition of the soil was adeciding factor of the date of attack personally checked the soildaily.

The division drew up elaborate plans to overcome expectedobstacles. First the anti-tank ditches had to "be bridged~.~aproblem increased by the anti-tank fire covering these ditches.Included in the plan was the decision to drive certain tanks intothe ditches and quickly doze them over- thereby, forming a bridge.Another method was a bridge, improvised by the 17th ArmoredEngineer Battalion, capable of supporting a medium tank andtransported by a T-2 $ank Retriever (see plate 2), This retrieverwould accompany the leading tanks prepared to bridge any ditchthe.y met. It was expected that, despite the addition of trackconnector extensions (duck bills},., the boggy ground would stillmire the vehicles.

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All l ight and' medium tanks carried logs approximatelynine feet in length and four to six inches in diameter. Theselogs would help increase flotation. Lashed in."bundles they werecarried on the rear decks of the tanks. However, it was seldomnecessary to use them "because the tanks traversed the groundeasily in first and second gear. The area covered "by the. fightingwas dotted "by log piles, after the tank crews decided to cut

2loose their unused "burden.Additional obstacles confronting the division were

minefields and "barbed wire concertenas employed to block avenuesof approach and gaps in the prepared defenses. The numeucrus^minefields, both anti-tank and anti-personnel, which theenemy had prepared were g&pped by the engineer units attachedto each assault battalion.

General Harmon, realizing that secrecy in the attack waspractically an impossibility, devised a very effective plan ofdeception. This was to confuse the Germans as to when the assaultbattalions moved to their attack positions. . Several nights "be-fore the attack tank platoons, first from CCS and later CCA tmovedin and out of WAURICHUT and B3GGSKDOKF 1 during the night.. Thefirst few nights this movement received hostile mortar and artilleryfire and also caused the enemy to discharge flares along his front.Bventually this movement ceased to alarm the Germans;. Except forthe usual amount of harassing and interdiction fire the frontremained quiet. . , ' .

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$> LogisticsThe logistical situation within the division was generally

adequate; however, some problems did arise. Although the tankstrength was almost IQQS, about half of the MMs were of the oldmodel, armed with 75 *4M guns. Track connector extensions forfull track vehicles had not teen received in sufficient quantity"by the division, Therefore the division G\ arranged with a man-ufacturer in LISGrS, BELGIUM, for the production of these attachments. By D-day nearly three~*fourths of the vehicles had "beenequipped. After the installation of these extensions, testsindicated a considerable gain in cross country mobility. Somenew equipment was received and a great deal of maintenance wasperformed on all organizational equipment. Certain ammunitionin short supply was rationed "by Army, The shortage of 105 MM,Si MM and a ll HVAp was especially serious, (For detailed log-istic report see Annex VII.)

Plan Of Fire Support2?he division artillery commander after studying the

terrain and available enemy information devised a plan of firesupport. By utilizing the lHth,7Sth, 92nd, 65th and S3rd Arm-ored Field ArtilleryBattalions (105 MM HOW), and the 258th andthe 557 th Field ArtilleryBattalions (155 MM Gun) he prepared anextensive thirty minute preparation to be fired prior to the timeof attack. In addition to the artillery units mentioned abovethe B>Hth Infantry Division on the north flank agreed to place the

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fire of its "battalions on. the initial oTjjc^tiT&c i..


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Order of BattleThe 2nd Armored Division1 s' lack of armored infantry-

was especially serious in an attack of this kind against afortified position. It was necessary to attach infantry fromother divisions to make up the lack. It must, "be rememberedthat the 2nd Armored Division was one of the old "heavy"armored divisions, which was later replaced "by the presentl ight armored division. In the heavy division there were;two armored (tank) regiments and one armored infantry regiment (see Figure 1 for organization) -* a total of six tank"battalions and three infantry "battalions compared to thefour tank and four infantry "battalions in the present division. In. other words there were roughly sQfo more tanksand 25$ less infantry in the heavy than in the present div-*ision. (However, one of the companies in each tank battalion was a light tank company*)- One "battalion of the Ho6thInfantry Regiment, 102nd Infantry Division which attackedwith CCB on Fov 16, was not sufficient. Therefore*, on

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DETAILED REGIMENTAL ORGANIZATIONFigure i

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gf- fit it wag \u25a0reior


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All this detailed planning paid off in the assaultlTov. !Ehe air preparation followed immediately "by the. execu-tion of a coordinated artillery plan, stunned the defenders.Careful integration of attached infantry units into the divisionassure^ maximum striking power to the assault echelons, Although the measures for "bridging the anti-tank ditches werefound to "be unnecessary, the detailed orientation of each in - \dividual on the sand tables gave the troops a confidence whichalbded to the violence of the if assault, force 1 reached itsobjective within eight minutes and the attack was executed exactly as planned.

WT%S fOH CHAPTER 11.1.Personal interview, Colonel Paul A Disney, formerCommander of 67th Armor&d Regiment^ at Port Kn6x, Kentucky,November 19^8.2.KinthUnited States Ari^y, Operation IT, Offensive in

November (U-fch Information and Historical Service) p . s^*

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> CHAPTER 111

2EHJ ATTACKFIRST' MYIts detailed planning completed, the 2nd Armored Division

attacked illdolumn 3f combat commands, CCB fading. COB had theMission 61 seizing the high ground north of ., GSR3OFSWEILSR. Toeffectively cover the zone, General White fesee Plate 3) organizedhis combat command into three task forces and assigned them thatpart of the zone most favorable for their employment. ColonelPaul A. Disney's tank heavy force struck on the south and captured

>IiCTORICH and PHFF3TOHF with a successive; objective attack.Colonel Hillyard in the center seized FLC7SRICH with his balancedtanb-infantry force. Colonel James C, Beeves 1 infantry heavyforce took IMM3ETDOBF in the north.

Since the tremendous air "bombardment preceeding the Firstand Hinth Armies' attack required favorable weather, D~day andE-hour could not "b e determined definitely in advance. Corps orderset D-day as the first clear day after 10 Uoveiiiber*

In preparation for the all out offensive, plans required unitsto move to attack positions during the period 10-11 November.During daylight on the 10th, assault guns and mortars of the 67th

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Armored Hegiment and the Hist Armored Infantry Hegiment, and thehowitzers of the JSth and 2>3rd Armored Field Artillery Battalionsmoved forward to indirect fire positions prepared to support theattack. Division halted movement of other troops at 2330 ITov 10upon receipt of orders postponing the attack. The units returned

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> 1 to their original positions. . Prom 12 to 15 Hoy the division was

alerted daily. Finally, at OkOQ hours 15 Uov Division receivedinstructions from XIX Corps that IK-day would "b e 16 Hbv, H-hour to"b e announced. General "White moved his combat command into attackpositions "beginning at 0020 onlFov (see Appen&ihc VIII^-C formap), AH uaits closed into their positions "before daylight.

The three task forces of COB attacked on a front of 3200yards (for detailed composition see Appendix I^D), Task Force 1,commanded fty Colonel Paul A, Disney, moved into its attack position in the 33BG&EKDOKF-PRIKHA^SW area, Initiallyit was to.seize JiOYBEICH, PUFIEEDORF, and the high ground to the north.> Task Force 2, under L t, Col, Harry Xv Hillyard, from its attackposition 1,500 yards north of BACH, was to take ILOVSEICH, andstrike for the high ground southeast of ABOTI^R* Task Force X,initially un&er lit. CoJ. James C, Reeves, occupied an area in an d

2around WAURICHW. Its mission the capture and holding ofIMMUNDOSF or the. left flank. These forces planned to work inde^pendently in taking the three initial objectives; then cooperatein attaiaing further gains toward GQSREONSWEILSR.*

The air and artillery preparations the morning oflBbvproved very effective, 12Q1+ American and 11SS British heavyIjom'bers participated. They hit practically all of the townsin the immediate front of the 2nd Armored Division from the line

> Ifof departure to the ROER River, (see appendix XII for detailedstudy of the air strike), The weather did not clear sufficiently21


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for the air mission -until late in the morning, finally, wordoame. at OS^O that B-hour would definitely be at 18^5 and thatthe air strike would precede the attack. The artillery fired a30 minute preparation "beginning at Hminus 30* It included thefires of 2nd Armored Division Artillery, S^th Infantry DivisionArtillery, "battalions of XIX Corps Artillery, and the assaultguns and mortars of the 67th and the i^lst AlE# live "battalionsfired concentrations on known commandj posts and gun positions,then sevejt "battalions massed their fiire on the thr&e objectives,BSMSJDQRtf, ft@W&l($ and tO^HIICH; vfhile S3JT!PI!RSCH and PKtUW - JB2T

\u25a0on each flan.k of the objectives received similar treatment.APWIIL3SR and PtMSKDOBI1- were fired on after the attack jumped off.

Promptly at 12^5 CCB crossed the line of departure withH three task forces a"breast covering the entire division zone of

attack*Task Force 11

ColonelDisney divided his t4nk heavy force into threeteams "built around Ist -Bn, 67th Armored Regt, 2nd Bn, 67thAdored Hegt^ and 3rd Bn, i+lst-Armored Infantry Eegt respectively*Major Clifton \u2666 Batchelder, commander of the Ist JBn, 6jthArmored Jtegt, commanded the right (south) team. It consisted ofIst Bn, 67th Armored Regt (~), a platoon .of Company B, 17 thArmored Engineer Bn, and a platoon fom Company B, 702 dTankDestroyer Bn (9Gmm),

Batchelder 1s force had on of envelopinghe mission I.OVSEICHB from the south the flank of the left forcend protecting right fli22


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I"by neutralizing enemy fire from, the east and northeast. Havingaccomplished these missions,, it was to be prepared to assist inthe attack on PUE'FEliOil'' and the high ground to the north.

t Col,. Lemuel 1 , Pope commanded the left (north) force which consisted of the 2nd Bn, 67th Armored Regiment reinforced "by Company E, I+lst Armored Infantry Eegiment, and a platoon

each of engineers and tank destroyers* The mission of this foreeto cross the line of departure on order, pass to the north ofLOVSRICH, capture PUFFSJIPOBI 1, and organize it for a ll around

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defense.|jt. Col, Marshall 1^ Crowley, Jr., commander of the Jrd.

Bn, Armored Infantry Begiment, led an infantry force of twocompanies. His mission-- -to assist Batcheldex^s tank force in thecapture of LOVER! CH "by approaching the town from a different

5direction, clear and organize it for defense.Colonel 3)isney f s scheme of maneuver called for an attack

on successive objectives in column of "battalions o His objectivessuccessively; LOVIEICH, PUFFSEDOBJ 1, and the high ground approximately1000 yards northeast pf \u25a0FtfHTEHDOKB 1 (see map ,Apponclix VIII~C). TheIst Bn 67th AH (Batchelder's) planned to lead off and quicklyenvelop LOVSEICE. The infantry battalion (Crowley's) less onecompany, would proceed directly into town so as to arrive shortlyafter the tanks,, . The plan for taking this first objective had

> several advantages, two of which were; the tanks had ample room23


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> for an enveloping maneuver from the south, and the infantryreceived the most direct route,- soon as Colonel Disneysatisfied himself that Batchelder, could handle LOVSRICH("before it was mopped up) he planned to commit Pope T s force to"bypass IjOVSRIOH to the north and Jjuickly seize PtOTSHDOEF. Onthe other hand, if Batchelder coi&d not handle LOTSRICE then

6Pope would be directed, to provide;/ assistance* Batchelder r sforce would next take ELVL 102.6 or assist in PfIOTINDCOT. .Major Batchelder 1 s team crossed the line of departure

promptly at 12^5# "*> Eobert $. Lee f s Company D (medium tanks)led with the Ist and 2nd platoons abreast, ...Thes.6,. two platoonsfanned out to the right and eastward under the direction ofI their platoon leaders as soon as they had crossed over the drainage ditch on the edge of .BEa&BEDOB? (see figure 2he 3dplatoon followed the 2nd on the right to cover the advance. Lt.Lee had placed his strength on this flank "because he expectedserious opposition from the east. The platoons advanced rapidlyover the fairly level terrain just to the right of the coal mine,east of BSGKOTDOBP, Capt Francis S. Pfaff, commanding CompanyA, moved a platoon of his l ight tanks to cover the advance of themediums and to protect their right flank #

!The attack started well. Within three minutes after thejump~*off the first prisoners started coming in. The force crossedseveral trenches protected "by concertina wire barriers withoutincident, At 12^+9 the 2nd platoon reported receiving antitankfire from the vicinity of . SETTER!CH (in the zone of the 29th

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>%The tanks of Company!) 1 s first platoon arrived in the

orchard on the east of -LOVERICH only eight minutes after theyhad crossed the line of departure at BJJSGEIEDGRF (see Plate k)mThis represented a distance traveled of approximately 1200 yards.The speed and violence of the tank assault following closelyon the heels of the artillery fire stunned the enemy in liOVIRICHto such an extent that they gave up in large groups.

The l ight ta.nks and infantry soon arrived to completethe task of clearing the town and making it secure. The shockaction provided "by the tanks made the job of the infantry easyas they advanced into town from BEQOTIDOBJ1, Two companies of armored infantry, Company G- on the rightand Company Ion the left, arrived at the town shortly after thetanks, killing 20 to 3;Q Germans and capturing about 100 who wereflushed out "by the tanks. Company A (light tanks) reorganizedon the eastern edge of town after aiding the infantry in themop-up. Company G- (infantry) secured the right flank for defenseagainst possible counterattack from SETEBQELICH, to the southeast.

As soon as the l ight tanks and infantry arrived inLOVSRICH, lit. Lee moved his company of medium tanks to the highground north of LOTERICE. This move provided security for thetown. . From this position he could see the next objective for his

> force, HILL 102>6, .north of FOOTUTOOHE. The suspected presence of minefields around LOV33BICH didnot deter Colonel Disney from using tanks for the assault. Some

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Itanks were lost to mines but enough got through to accomplish themission. The tanks which were blown-up "by.mines, for the mostpart, merely lost tracks and were returned to unit in about 2^hours.

Colonel Disney, realizing that Bat chelder !s force couldhandle liOVERICE without assistance, moved -Pope out. Pope f s forcecrossed the line of departure and moved between LOYERICH andBiOYSBIQH in the direction of POTENPOKSV The battalion attackedcross country, in a column of companies with Company .B!s lighttanks leading. The infantry followed with Company ls 11 mediumtanks bringing up the rear, Pope's troops bypassed LOVERICH atIUOO and secured POOWDQKF at 1^55. g This force encountered verylittle opposition (see Fig. 5, second phase),aking FOT2KPCWlour tanks mired in the soft ground and six others were blown upby mines, (see Plate 5.)

Major Batchelder received orders from Colonel Disney toattack: his next objective, HILL 102.6, at lUoo hours, Theattack proceeded in a similar manner to the assault of LOVERICE.Boggy ground made the advance difficult, but the battalion soonoccupied the hill.

The enemy reacted strongly and his heavy artillery firemade it impossible for the battalion to hold the top of thehill. Major Batchelder pulled his tanks and infantry back tothe draw just south of HILL 102,6. From here he could command

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Ithe hill "by fire and at the same time have his troops in defil-ade (see Fig, 5, third phase).

After Pope*s force took HOTENDQKT, the enemy plasteredthe town with artillery and mortar fire. This fire came in almostcontinuously throughout the afternoon and night. Colonel Popereceived instructions from Colonel Disney to dig in for the night

at OgQO day.nd resume the attack on GEREONSWEIL3R the nextTask Force 2

Colonel Hillyard T s Task Force 2 attacked on the left ofand simultaneously with Task Force 1. Task Force 2 consisted ofthe 3rd Bn 67th AR (Hillyard!s Battalion), Ist Bn 41st AIR, andI supporting engineers and tank destroyers. The force contained afairly well "balanced ratio "between tanks and infantry. The tankbattalion was minus Company I, held in com'Oat command reserve.

Colonel Hillyard planned for Task Force 2 to make a frontalassault on FIQVSRICH at E-hour with a medium tank company leading.The infantry would follow at 200 yards with light tanks andengineers in support. The tank destroyers received the missionof silencing any direct fire from IMMMDOBF, APWULKEt, orFLCVUKICH. With the capture of FLOTEEICH the force would continueon to the high ground south of APWEILER.

Captain James L. White, commanding Co G- 67th AR, movedhislmedium tanks (one under normal strength) through the JtcL

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Research Study 2nd Ad in the Drive to the Roer, Part 1

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