Constabulary and Security Orientated Ship (or Offshore Patrol Vessel “OPV”) solutions are limited in their area of influence in large measure by their onboard sensor range. They depend on supporting maritime information systems providing data from other shore, air and sea based assets for effective Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ) patrol and protection duties. Current OPVs have not been designed to take advantage of the new technologies and sensor systems emerging to enhance these maritime capabilities.
This paper describes innovative technologies, ship concepts and systems implementations that will increase the area of surveillance and influence of individual OPVs, extending their operational effectiveness. Specifically it addresses ship design for coherent exploitation of both remotely deployed and tethered sensor systems in blue waters. These sensor systems extend the utility of OPV solutions while utilising cost effective commercial marine ship design standards. They offer low-level naval patrol capabilities that could work within traditional force structures.
1 INTRODUCTION
Protecting an EEZ is a significant undertaking. Extending up to 200 nautical miles from shore and often hundreds of miles in length, the number of OPVs required to sustain a viable presence far outstretches the resources of many countries. As a result smuggling, piracy and illegal fishing are commonplace and increasing in intensity. Even first world nations have been challenged in protecting their assets in the Horn of Africa.
One way of addressing the EEZ protection challenge with limited assets is to extend the presence and reach of OPVs, making them more effective without increasing their cost significantly. This paper proposes a concept ship design with the ability to see further, to stay at sea longer with a smaller crew, and able to draw fully upon remote information sources to act intelligently and decisively. Further, through effective networking these OPVs would themselves be significant providers to the information sphere of military and civilian agencies.
2 CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT
The Securitor concept is a flexible sea frame, capable of undertaking a number of specific roles in addition to the full spectrum of global peacetime maritime operations. These roles include mine
warfare surveying and rapid environmental assessment, oceanic, offshore and coastal patrol, Maritime Security Operations, and training.
The design optimises these roles thus increasing the vessel cost effectiveness in acquisition and in operation through life. It follows the current global trend towards large and capable patrol and support vessels, which offer greater flexibility at less cost than warships such as frigates.
The vessel is capable of operating globally. It can operate as a self-contained unit but would be integrated within a wider surveillance and intelligence network, which would not be restricted to military systems. The objective of the concept design development has been to significantly extend the ship’s effective operating area, surveillance coverage and sustainability.
Securitor maximises the exploitation of unmanned vehicles. Such vehicles have the capability to remain on station for extended periods and to significantly extend the vessel surveillance. This operational concept requires an approach beyond considering the vessel simply as a mothership.
Figure 1 illustrates how Securitor is envisaged to fit within the range of maritime tasks.
Paper presented at the RINA Warship 2010: Advanced Technologies in Naval Design and Construction in June 2010.
Safety
Defence
Capability
Security
Mission Systems examples lie on a complexity/capability curve
Low
Medium
Surface + limited Air threat engagement
Surface engagement only
Complexity
High
Figure 1 Securitor Mission Capability (Shown in the Red Circle)
Securitor is situated at the higher end of OPV capability providing security management combined with a limited but useful defence role. This requires a large vessel that better supports sustainable EEZ patrol duties. Maritime Surveillance and Control is the primary goal and promotes safety and security at sea. It can also counter potentially catastrophic man-made and natural threats, or mitigate their impact.
However, Maritime Surveillance and Control assets are usually limited by budgets and appropriate manpower. A “systems solution” is required to use these assets in the most effective and efficient way.
The focus in naval procurement is shifting towards enhanced situational awareness. The balance of requirements has shifted from ships expected to conduct an all-out fighting war at sea to those capable of dealing with limited incursions to meet homeland security needs.
Without comprehensive situational awareness information the capability of a single patrol vessel to counter smuggling, piracy and other illegal activities is low. Future ships must receive and provide as much information as possible to civil and military authorities while possessing the means to resolve local situations.
3 SHIP DESIGN DRIVERS
The ship has been designed with sufficient size to offer adequate endurance and to be able to fulfil a global maritime operational role.
The design has the characteristics given in Table 1, where the dimensions have been selected based on
obtaining improved global deployment performance over fashionable OPV sized vessels. Reference [1] includes a discussion on parametric analysis conducted on hulls in this size range. From this work it was concluded that a vessel of 105 to 110 metres length offer significant advantages in seakeeping performance. The beam chosen represents a good balance between stability and resistance characteristics, again drawing on previous analyses.
Waterline Length 108 metres
Beam 15.4 metres
Full Load Displacement 3,500 tonnes
Draught at Full Load 4.5 metres
Range 8,000nm @ 12knots
Maximum Speed 25 knots
Table 1 Design Characteristics
The skill sets required to operate the ship should be as small as possible and lean manning is considered essential to reduce whole life costs. However, reduced manning must not affect the ability of the vessel to conduct operations and therefore the design must account for the available numbers onboard.
Key requirements set for the platform design included:
• 8000 nm range @ 12 knots, 42 day endurance, maximum speed of 25 knots;
• Accommodation space for up to 60 crew (max) plus 20 EMF (Embarked Military Force);
• Lynx sized helicopter landing area with adequate hangar;
• Space for four 9m RHIBs with refuelling capability;
• Ship own sensor fit for surveillance and self defence;
• Tethered sensor and UAV launch/ recovery areas.
Evolutions of these designs could offer role flexibility with the ability to reconfigure the ship for differing roles. This will start to drive aspects of topside design for the naval architect.
Paper presented at the RINA Warship 2010: Advanced Technologies in Naval Design and Construction in June 2010.
Figure 2 Topside Length Drivers
Notable aspects incorporated into the design are:
• Flight Deck and Hangar – offers flexibility through different helicopters and UAVs but this may drive the required length;
• Weather deck space for modular systems and containerised equipments;
• Topside length for sensors including an integrated mast with radar and EO/IR sensors and allowing for separation of multiple comms antenna and other sensors;
• Space for modular weapons or other effectors (which may require suitable arcs of operation and thus may not be in the same location as modular mission spaces);
• Space for unmanned systems and particularly boats which are becoming both larger and more numerous per platform.
In developing the platform, all of the systems required by the original Concept of Operations have been incorporated. However, as shown in Figure 2, the combination of the above factors indicates that the developed design is close to the minimum length for the desired fit.
Although the use of modularity offers the opportunity to exchange systems fits, in theory reducing ship size, this is not observed in practice. This is due to the increasing use of offboard systems to achieve operational effects. The location drivers for the modular systems have resulted in significant length drivers.
Offboard vehicles and especially unmanned vehicles are a key enabler to deliver the desired capability, but they are required in numbers that
particular are typically of 9 metres length and may in the future increase to 11metres or more. With the need to retain ships boats for boarding party and man overboard duties, the number of boats can pragmatically be set as a minimum of four (two “manned” boats plus two USVs to allow redundancy).
utilise significant topside real-estate. USV’s in
Whilst the use of modules is attractive, there is still
Hence, as observed on this design, modularity can
4 DESIGNING FOR UNMANNED
4.1 EXPLOITING UXV’S
manned vehicles
ability to disseminate the information obtained.
an issue associated with correctly locating module spaces to reflect their role. Those requiring “in water” access are located in different regions to those requiring ready access for operational purposes for example.
offer reduced costs by simplifying integration of systems but this drives up ship size. This confirms initial impressions that flexibility requires space above all – not just internal volume but increasing topside length to fit all the required items for the ship.
VEHICLES
From a capability viewpoint, unpresent major opportunities. They move sensors closer to targets of interest supplementing onboard situational awareness. They extend presence when weaponised and can protect boarding parties. They reduce risk to personnel when approaching suspicious targets. They are limited by the need for two-way high bandwidth communications with the ship, while joint forces are limited by the ship's
Paper presented at the RINA Warship 2010: Advanced Technologies in Naval Design and Construction in June 2010.
led
h ations;
deploy than ticularly
e e
ours uire little maintenance over a 42-
aerial/sensor, which will
s an area of topside free of obstructions and
However, unmanned vehicles bring new problems for ship design. The key design issues are detaiin the following sections and include:
• Avoiding compromising existing ship equipment and spaces;
• Re-fuelling and recovery at sea and witminimal manning implic
• Maximising the UxV capability; • Unmanned vehicles are easier to
recover; USVs and UUVs are parchallenging in recovery in higher sea states.
To fully exploit UxV capabilities a way has to bfound to extend the range of the line of sight of thship for communications and to refuel USVs quickly and efficiently.
4.2 EXTENDING UXV OPERATIONAL RANGE
Typical USVs need refuelling every 6 to 12 hbut otherwise reqday mission. Capable of ranges of hundreds of miles between refuelling the requirement to maintain line of sight communications for surveillance and weapon control limits their useful range from own-ship. UUVs are even more constrained in range due to limited aerial height when on the surface.
Securitor extends communication range by deploying a tetheredtypically operate at 1000 feet. An aerostat displacing 7.25m x 4.7m will lift at least 67.5kg (Reference [2]). A small energy source will provide power for the aerial and IR sensor for up to 24 hours. Data flow is via fibre optics built into the cable.
To deploy an aerostat from the top of the ship requirea handling arm that can hold the balloon clear of the immediate superstructure during deployment and recovery. The nylon tether presents little risk to aviation and this can be reduced to zero by procedure.
1000 ft33nm
8 nm
Aerostat
Ranges shown are to sea level
Figure 3 Extending control of UxVs Using an Aerostat
4.3 INTEGRATING UNMANNED BOATS
The integration of USVs and boats is driven principally by the needs of the launch and recovery systems, and also sufficient space for stowage. Methods for launch and recovery are essentially by a stern ramp or davit. The former offers rapid response as the boat may be launched by gravity with minimal personnel, whilst the latter offers improved sea state operations as a davit can recover a boat in a ship’s lee at greater ship motions than a stern ramp can remain usable.
In the context of Securitor, the concept involves the deployment of unmanned surface vehicles for prolonged periods, exploiting their ability to extend the reach of the host platform. In light of this, the requirements established for the operation of the boats were:
• To be able to transport boats to areas of operation and return;
• To be able to recover the boats should heavy weather close in;
• To be able to refuel, recover data and undertake limited maintenance with ease;
• To maximise the type and number of boats.
The use of a stern ramp for launch and recovery is becoming wide spread, in examples such as the Knud Rasmussen Class Danish patrol vessels, the USCG Bertholf and the Mexican Navy ship, Justo Sierra as examples (refer also to Reference [3]) The addition of a garage area appears to offer a good solution for providing flexibility in the vehicles carried and has been adopted in the US Navy LCS and in a number of other concepts.
However, there remains some uncertainty over the ability to deploy and recover unmanned vehicles from a stern ramp arrangement. This is because the recovery operation requires careful pilot judgement in order to gauge the appropriate part of the ships motion cycle to cross the “threshold” of the ramp
Paper presented at the RINA Warship 2010: Advanced Technologies in Naval Design and Construction in June 2010.
as it moves vertically; this is made more difficult where the pilot is remote from the boat (if unmanned) and cannot sense the motions directly.
This provides a limitation in the maximum sea state in which a stern ramp is operable due to the amount of water emersion achieved at the end of the ramp. As pitch motion increases, so the length of time that this immersion provides sufficient clearance for the draught of the boat decreases. Eventually, it is impractical to recover the boat without significant risk of “grounding” on the ramps sill, although some improvement can be gained by including an extending ramp to increase the immersion.
To accommodate the number of boats, a large garage area will be required, which will need to be extended over two deck heights to provide sufficient height to stow and move the boats. This results in a number of issues:
• When arranged above the strength deck, the garage would result in a high superstructure block, which can be difficult to integrate with the primary ships structure – (Reference [1]). This is especially difficult to arrange if there is a flight deck above;
• When arranged below the strength deck, the large size of the garage will have a significant detrimental effect on damage stability performance of the ship. Analysis indicated that with a large garage incorporated aft, it was not possible to achieve accepted (naval) damage stability requirements.
When consideration is given to the requirements, it was questioned whether stern ramp operation was necessary. An alternative arrangement has been developed in which the boats are carried in davits for launch and recovery, thus maximising the sea state for deployment and recovery. Incorporation of a stern berthing area would allow a variety of support functions for an individual boat, such as refuelling, to be conducted without the need for regular recovery.
Stowing the boats on side davits also has the advantage that any boat could be launched or recovered without needing to handle the boat to a single launch point (i.e. a ramp).
Figure 4 View of Stern Berthing Area
Figure 4 illustrates the stern berthing area; features include:
• Sufficient size (length and width) to accommodate up to an 11m RHIB to accommodate not only the boats carried on the davits, but additionally allowing the berthing of larger USVs;
• A walkway around the berthing area at a height that will allow personnel to access the recovered boats;
• A stern door to keep the area watertight when not in use (as the berthing area extends below the normal ship operating draught).
The berthing area is open to the quarterdeck specifically to allow for refuelling operations as this eases safety consideration due to the build up of fuel fumes.
The berthing facility allows for a depth of 0.9 metres when in use, compared to a maximum assumed boat draught of 0.75 metres. To increase the window of operation in weather, the depth at the sill could be increased at the transom to 1.8 metres by incorporating a ballasting system. Ballast tanks of approximately 465 tonnes are provided which would increase the trim of the vessel to achieve this.
Paper presented at the RINA Warship 2010: Advanced Technologies in Naval Design and Construction in June 2010.
Figure 5 Geometry of Stern Berthing for
Trimmed Vessel
When recovering a boat the clearance to the floor of the berthing area and also the overhead clearance to the flight deck above the boats would limit the sea state for berthing operations. This would occur in circa Sea State 3 in this size of vessel for a larger USV.
4.4 INTEGRATING LONG ENDURANCE UAV PLATFORMS
Fixed wing UAVs can be deployed and recovered without compromising the use of the flight deck and hangar provided appropriate mechanism are built into the ship.
An assisted launch system to accelerate the UAV to an adequate speed can be provided and such systems have been trialled on naval ships. Typically, a portable system launching from the flight deck has been used. For Securitor, the launch system has been provided at a dedicated position, chosen to minimise its interaction with the flight deck. This allows UAV operations to have minimal affect on helicopter operations and to allow the aircraft to operate in conjunction with each other. Storage and assembly space for UAVs is provided within close proximity to the launcher, Figure 6.
Figure 6 UAV Launch and Recovery system
Recovery is a more difficult aspect for fixed wing UAV operations. Most systems rely on flying the UAV into a net or wire, or recovering on to the water surface (this is less preferable for operations in higher sea states due to potential damage to the UAV and the difficultly in recovering it). The design incorporates a vertical wire to capture the UAV. It is located at the aft end of the flight deck such that the UAV is flown away from the superstructure and sensors to avoid potential damage to the ship. It would be designed to retract along the edge of the flight deck into a channel to minimise obstruction to flight deck operations.
5 ENHANCING MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS
5.1 EXTENDING THE LOCAL OPERATIONAL PICTURE
The aerostat is fitted with an IR sensor capable of producing a surface and low altitude air picture. Assuming a two metre high target this gives a potential coverage of 36.4 nm in range and a coverage area of over 4000 square miles, visibility permitting. Given the pressures on manufacturers to produce low weight, low power sensors for UAVs other advanced sensors will be available for the aerostat in the time frame of this ship. Technologies in development include, EO, IR, LIDAR, Acoustic Detection, SAR, ESM and ECM.
Paper presented at the RINA Warship 2010: Advanced Technologies in Naval Design and Construction in June 2010.
The sensor will be used to enhance the wide area picture and will contribute significantly to the intelligence available. Vessels detected that are not visible on the AIS picture would be immediately suspicious and this sensor will prove invaluable in detecting pirates, smugglers and other illegal operations, covering an area eight times greater than the ship's radars.
UAVs can be deployed to investigate suspicious activity, identifying the vessel and recording its activities. The USVs will provide presence, and might use organic weaponry to engage or disable the vessel until Securitor or a boarding party arrives.
The UAVs provide comprehensive video coverage of a small area. It is necessary to know where to send them to use them effectively. The combination of aerostat and intelligence data increases their effectiveness significantly.
12.5 nm
15 nm
USV #1
15 nm
USV #2
Aerostat Optical Surface Coverage
UAV Optical Coverage
UAV #1 UAV #2
Figure 7 USV Deployment Showing 30 Minute Engagement Range Zones
The deployment shown would allow Securitor to exert direct influence over more than 1,400 square miles concurrently. (The areas within the red and blue circles above.)
In the mine warfare role, USVs could be loaded with a range of specialist systems including towed vehicles or autonomous UUVs for mine detection and classification with sidescan or SAS capability, and one-shot UUVs for mine identification and disposal. The USVs could also deploy multi-influence mine sweeping systems. The ship would depend on these remotely deployed systems to
detect mines at a safe range from the ship to protect itself and crew. (References [4], [5]).
Such systems are currently under development but expected to be fully realisable and practical in the next decade. They will however need specialist trained operating personnel.
Radar Range
Aerostat
1000 ft
MCM USV
Deployed UUVs
Figure 8 Clearing Mined Areas Remotely
5.2 LEVERAGING ALL AVAILABLE ASSETS
Awareness consists of two elements, the information the ship is able to obtain through its sensors and the information provided by networked civilian and military databases of its country and its allies. This ship is both a supplier and consumer of such information and the databases it will interact with at any given time are determined by its role. Many government agencies will need to interact with the ship on a near real time basis. As examples, the coastguard for rescues, customs and excise for smuggling activities and the police for other illegal activities.
Securitor must piece together disparate information for its own missions while sharing such information with other deployed assets and shore stations. Domain awareness is a dynamic process not confined to the Bridge or Operations Room. Systems must link seamlessly to the embarked military force. The commander of a boarding party needs to be aware of the changing local picture at the same time as calling up schematics and bills of loading for the vessel he is investigating.
The requirement can be broken down into the following areas:
• Information Management (IM) captures, organizes and publishes information to increase awareness and the effectiveness of operations;
Paper presented at the RINA Warship 2010: Advanced Technologies in Naval Design and Construction in June 2010.
assessment, situation analysis and anomaly detection;
• Operations Management (OM) in complex operations involves handling multiple assets and large volumes of information that require comprehensive mission preparation and operational planning;
• Action Support (AS) tools assist operators for action preparation and execution;
• Communication (C) remains the backbone of operations. The ship must be capable of maximizing communication performance through dynamic adaptation to the available network service or bandwidth;
• Training & Simulation (T&S) facilities. Securitor provides a network node for the reception, analysis and dissemination of information. The Aerostat and UxVs supplement the information provided by conventional sensors and external data sources to enable control of a large area of the EEZ.
Figure 9 Securitor in its Context
6 MISSION SYSTEMS ON LOW CREW SHIPS
6.1 INTEGRATING SYSTEMS TO REDUCE MANPOWER
Complement numbers on naval vessels have seen a continuous reduction through time due to personnel and training costs and available technology. This trend is likely to continue. This will require future reduced crew ships to develop safe operating and accredited practices with low watch numbers.
In particular, consideration has been given to how a small number of personnel may operate all of the ship systems.
The ship contains an integrated network for the command system, platform management system and navigation system. This will be fully compliant with current marine standards with appropriate levels of redundancy. Common consoles will provide key interfaces to all the ship systems. However, low cost dedicated systems such as Autopilot, Depth Sounder, WECDIS1 and so on will retain their displays/ control panels and interface to the primary systems by NMEA2 or equivalent.
Securitor does not possess a warship Combat Management System. Management of its gun and offboard systems is handled through independent modular software using common hardware interfaces.
The primary role of the “command system” is to fuse organically obtained intelligence and surveillance data with data from military and civilian databases to provide a wide area picture against which tasks can be undertaken.
To enable action to be taken effectively, data and voice communications must reach from shore base to boarding parties seamlessly.
Table 2 illustrates the initial estimates of the complement for the Securitor concept.
Role CO Officer SR JR Totals
Executive and Navigation
1 2 2 2 7
Warfare (inc Mine Warfare)
2 4 6 12
Engineering 2 2 6 10
Flight 2 1 3 6
Logistics 1 2 3 6
EMF 2 4 14 20
Totals 1 11 15 34 61
Berths Provided 1 11 16 52 80
Table 2 Crew and Available Berths
1 WECDIS = Warship Electronic Chart Display And Information System 2 NMEA = National Marine Electronics Association electronic communication standard
Paper presented at the RINA Warship 2010: Advanced Technologies in Naval Design and Construction in June 2010.
The ready use ammunition for the medium calibre gun is sufficient for any operation and so a dedicated gun crew is unnecessary. Launching and recovering UAV's requires 30 minutes at most and those operations can be done during quiet periods.
Labour intensive tasks include launching and recovering manned RHIBS and USVs. Refuelling will not be labour intensive due to the adoption of the stern berthing approach, though in the case of MCM operation additional highly trained effort will be required to operate the systems and to fit sub munitions/UUVs onto the MCM USV.
6.2 INTEGRATING COMBAT AND PLATFORM SYSTEMS
Physical integration of command and marine engineering systems is possible through the use of common consoles, common fibre (using VPN) and systems virtualisation to employ a common COTS computing infrastructure. There will be an integrated single network for the command system, platform management system and navigation system.
Common consoles using COTS components will provide the primary interfaces to all the systems. However, low cost dedicated systems such as Autopilot, Depth Sounder, etc. will retain their displays/ control panels.
There is no great advantage in connecting systems that are unrelated just because it can be done. For example, the platform management and the command system do not require to exchange data, though there is a strong advantage to be able to display information from either of the two systems on consoles of the operator’s choice.
Securitor will be fitted with a fully Integrated Communication System (ICS) to provide the ship with all communication facilities required to carry out her tasks of surveillance and enforcement of maritime law.
The ICS comprises of:
• An internal distribution system, separated into Black and Red for unclassified and classified material, with cryptos for encryption / decryption of tactical voice and data communications;
• An external communications system to provide transmission and reception of radio traffic for voice and data;
• Communication Control and Management System;
• Tactical Data Links & Tactical WAN; • Message Handling System; • A Global Maritime Distress Safety System; • Radio Direction Finder; • Public Address & Telephone System; • Self Powered Telephone System; • Closed Circuit Television System.
6.3 THE IMPACT OF A REDUCED COMPLEMENT ON THE DESIGN
During operations a crew may become dispersed around the ship to provide systems repair or fire fighting, while manning systems locally in compartments, which are dispersed according to the layout.
With advances in automation and equipment control in the commercial marine, and significant investments by various navies into automated damage control, the arrangement of the ship needs to reflect the much-reduced complements likely in the future. In particular, a small complement will be unable to maintain adequate internal communications (Reference [6]). It will therefore become more important that personnel are kept together in localised regions of the vessel rather than being widely spread. The concept of Securitor has been to focus on an arrangement that logically seeks to arrange the ship based on special utilisation by the complement:
• Mission area: Always manned and the key focus for all aspects on the ships control, management and operation;
• Living area: The hotel function which would always have personnel within;
• Support to missions area: The area where mission support equipment, principally the off-board vehicles would be stowed, maintained and operated, which would be manned when conducting operations but not otherwise;
• Machinery: Propulsion, power generation and auxiliary systems spaces which would operate unmanned and would be accessed when required and therefore would rely on remote systems for firefighting and damage control;
• Stores: as for machinery these spaces would be accessed when required (with the exception of provisions which are within the living area).
Figure 10 illustrates the concept of the arrangement and indicates how under normal conditions, significant volumes of the design (essentially
machinery and stores) are envisaged as being unmanned and only accessed when required.
Command, Control and Mission Spaces
Living Spaces
Off‐board Vehicles Interfaces
“Unmanned” Machinery Spaces and StoresFigure 10 Ship Arrangement
This approach is only practical with adequate systems redundancy. If an unmanned compartment were damaged, then the objective would be to prevent the spread of fire and / or flooding but not to recover the systems within that compartment. Whilst this would result in some increase in systems costs, this would be traded against the manpower cost savings through a reduced complement.
6.4 COMBINED COMMAND ROOM
One key feature of this approach to localise the manned areas of the ships is the introduction of a Command Room, which incorporates, along with the Bridge, all of the control functionality of the ship.
As systems computerise the differences between operating combat and marine systems have largely disappeared and this change is beginning to affect the functionality of the Bridge and Operation Room. Crews need to be integrated in the same way as their equipment. Automation and duplication of critical equipment, coupled with remote monitoring, removes any requirement for manned engineering spaces. There is no technical justification for physical separation of crew while there are good communications and safety reasons for the crew to work in the same spaces.
In Securitor, the crew will work in the Bridge and Command Room with the Bridge as the primary location. The Command Room is connected to the Bridge via an open stairwell to allow a free flow of
personnel. This arrangement removes the need for a complex internal communications network.
Not all console positions require manning depending on the mission. Positions such as Gun Control and the Unmanned Vehicle Control are only manned when required. The Bridge would provide sufficient operational control for most missions.
Typical operations will involve watches of seven in the Bridge and Command Room, which may rise to a peak of twelve in exceptional circumstances.
6.5 INTERCHANGEABLE MISSION SPACES
In order to provide flexibility in operational roles, not only will off-board vehicles and top side equipments require exchange, but mission spaces will also need to be adaptable. Whilst some flexibility would exist in the multi-use consoles, there are always likely to be systems which require their own mission and control spaces to be hosted on board. This could include:
The most flexible method of achieving this is through the use of containerised systems, using the 20ft equivalent unit (TEU) as a basis. TEU is becoming widely used already for modular systems
Paper presented at the RINA Warship 2010: Advanced Technologies in Naval Design and Construction in June 2010.
and therefore represents a robust assumption readily supported by international transport infrastructure.
Key features for incorporating a containerised mission area are:
• Provision of adequate weather deck area to embark the containers;
• A location that provides ease of access from the existing commands spaces to the mission containers;
• Protection from the elements and heavy seas; • The ability to maximise the containers utility,
for example combining the containers together to make larger spaces.
The design has three such container spaces, which are located immediately aft of the Command Room. The containers are linked into the ship via large doors in the aft end of the superstructure which allow the containers to be opened directly into a passage, accessed from the Command Room, Figure 11 and Figure 12. This approach allows the modular mission packages to be “integrated” in terms of personnel location and movement into the wider mission area of the vessel.
The modules would be provided with power and data-links from standardised connection points located adjacent to the openings. Where possible the modules should be self-contained to minimise the impact on the ship, for example they may be provided with local air conditioning fitted within the module.
The location is also well protected but would be open above to allow the containers to be lifted on board. The later is essential as it allows rapid embarkation without the need for specialist handling gear to be carried on board.
Figure 11 Access Arrangement for Modules
Figure 12 Mission Modules – A Typical Arrangement (from BMT Venator design)
6.6 INTEGRATED MASTS
The advantages of using an integrated mast in the design are:
• Reduced footprint, freeing topside space for the aerostat and UAV launch;
• Single sensor operator with modern data fusion technologies and no dedicated maintainers are required;
• Maximises multi- sensor and integrated communication performance.
This ship needs to be simple to operate and robust. The integrated mast fulfils both these objectives for sensors and communications without compromising performance. Sensor performance of the mast meets the needs of the ship whilst allowing potential growth of other systems without major refit.
Phased array radar sensors are robust in that many elements can fail without significantly affecting performance. The lack of moving parts greatly increases mean time between failures and built in alignments are highly unlikely to change as a result of severe weather.
Figure 13 A Typical Integrated Mast (Reference [7])
7 CONCLUSIONS
We live in an age in which remote control and monitoring are becoming the norm. In our ships, marine equipment no longer requires a man beside it and this allows us to reduce crews and centralise operations, simplifying the ship. Remote control vehicles allow us to gather data and exert presence over a vast amount of ocean provided they can be deployed and controlled optimally.
Securitor is a design that maximises these opportunities. Its Aerostat extends control and surveillance, its integrated mast minimises top side footprint and maximises reliability, the dock minimises USV turn round time and manpower while its UAV facilities do not compromise helicopter operation.
Securitor is a provider, disseminator and consumer of information. Designed for the information age, a single operator can fuse data from on and offboard sources into his wide area picture suitable for his mission while information from the ship's information network can be disseminated automatically to other users wherever needed.
These changes in how the capability will be delivered will also have an impact on the design of the platform. The designer must contemplate how reduced levels of manning require the layout to be altered to enable the safe operation of the ship when numbers do not allow the complement to be dispersed throughout the ship; how changing sensors and ship length drivers must be accommodated in the weatherdeck arrangement; how unmanned vehicles can be incorporated in such a way as to maximise their ease of exploitation; and finally how to address flexibility of fit given the fast pace of such innovations compared to ship design life.
8 REFERENCES
Ref 1. The globally deployable minor warship - A conceptualisation of future solutions, A Kimber, W Giles, T Dinham-Peren, INEC 2008.
Ref 3. Worldwide Assessment of Stern Launch Capability, Rubin Sheinberg, Christopher Cleary, and Thomas Beukema.
Ref 4. The Navy Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV) Master Plan. USA Dept of the Navy – 23rd July 2007.
Ref 5. FY2009–2034 Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap, DOD USA, March 2009.
Ref 6. Enhanced C2 through Wireless Onboard Services, A Smallegange, MAST 2009.
Ref 7. I-MAST 100 product launch: a paradigm shift in warship design. Thales Press brief, DSEI, September 2009.
9 AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY’S
Andy Kimber is a Senior Manager at BMT Defence Services, where he is responsible for a team of Naval Architects engaged in a variety of surface ship design tasks. He has undertaken a variety of auxiliary ship and warship design studies including the joint BMT - Skipskonsulent AEGIR family of replenishment ships and the BMT Venator reconfigurable small warship. Previous to his current role, he held the position of Platform Architecture Manager for the CVF for three years and was a member of the UK MoD’s Sustained Surface Combatant Capability Pathfinder Project. Andy joined BMT Defence Services after completing a degree in Naval Architecture and Ocean Engineering at University College, London.
John Booth is a Principal Consultant at Thales Consulting UK where he develops future combat system designs. He has undertaken studies for the NDP and was Systems Engineering manager for Thales’ FSC bid. In his previous roles he has been mission system capability manager for the CVF Alliance, combat system performance expert for Project Horizon and product development manager for Ferranti Computer Systems. He has also been the mathematical design authority on a variety of command and weapon systems.
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