RISK ASSESSMENT FOR SUN PHARMACEUTICAL...

ENVIRONMENT CONSULTANT ENVIROTECH EAST PRIVATE LTD. KOLKATA PAGE

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RISK ASSESSMENT FOR SUN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES LIMITED BULK

DRUG AND INTERMEDIATES MANUFACTURING UNIT AT PLOT NO. HA-1,

MALANPUR, BHIND, MADHYA PRADESH

Introduction

The main objective of risk assessment study is to propose a comprehensive but simple approach to carry out risk

analysis and conducting hazard analysis study.

Risk analysis and risk assessment provides details on Risk Assessment techniques used to determine risk posed

to people who work inside or live near hazardous facilities, and to aid in preparing effective emergency response

plans by delineating a Disaster Management Plan (DMP) to handle on-site and assist in dealing off-site

emergencies with District Administration. Hence, RA is a site or risk specific assessment which is complex and

needs extensive study, shall involve process understanding, hazard identification, consequence modelling,

probability data, vulnerability models/data, local weather and terrain conditions and local population data.

RA may be carried out to serve the following objectives:

Hazard Identification

Identification of hazardous situations.

Identification of hazard sources

Generation of accidental release scenarios for escape of hazardous materials from the facility

Identification of vulnerable units with recourse to hazard indices

Hazard quantification and Evaluation

Hazard quantification - consequence analysis to assess the impacts by estimation of distances of

occurrences of hazardous events (toxic concentration, heat radiation, pressure wave transmission) due

to process and computation of reliability of various control paths

Suggest risk mitigation measures based on engineering judgement, reliability and risk analysis

approaches.

Disaster Management Plans

Figure 1: Risk Assessment Conceptual Framework


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Methods of risk prediction shall cover all the design intentions and operating parameters to quantify risk in terms

of probability of occurrence of hazardous events and magnitude of its consequence.

Details of Storage Facilities

The raw materials (required for the manufacturing of products) will be stored in Tank farms, drums, containers

(for liquid raw materials) and bags (for solid raw materials) which are in turn stored in the raw materials storage

area.

RISK MODELLING

Simulation of each identified hazardous chemical for consequence analysis has been done by using ALOHA.

ALOHA (Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres) is a computer program designed to model chemical

releases for emergency responders and planners. It can estimate how a toxic cloud might disperse after a

chemical release—as well as several fires and explosions scenarios.

ALOHA is designed to produce reasonable results quickly enough to be of use to responders during a real

emergency. Therefore, ALOHA’s calculations represent a compromise between accuracy and speed. Many of

ALOHA’s features were developed to quickly assist the responder. For example, ALOHA:

Minimizes data entry errors by cross-checking the input values and warning the user if the value is unlikely

or not physically possible.

Contains its own chemical library with physical properties for approximately 1,000 common hazardous

chemicals so that users do not have to enter that data.

In the present case, a prediction has been done assuming most unfavorable meteorological condition like low

wind speed of 1 m/s and stable atmospheric condition F. In case of an accident, the chemicals will spill on ground,

may cause toxic fume dispersion, may catch fire and cause thermal radiation or the vapor cloud may travel and

meeting an ignition source, may explode causing pressure waves and damaging structures. All these possible

situations have been predicted with affected distance of Level of Concern (LOC).

Key Program Features

Generates a variety of scenario-specific output, including threat zone pictures, threats at specific

locations, and source strength graphs.

Calculates how quickly chemicals are escaping from tanks and puddles, and predicts how those release

rates change over time.

Models many release scenarios like:

1. Toxic gas clouds,

2. BLEVEs (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosions),

3. Jet fires,

4. Vapor cloud explosions, and

5. Pool fires.

6. Evaluates different types of hazard (depending on the release scenario): toxicity, flammability, thermal

radiation, and overpressure.

ALOHA is developed jointly by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

ALOHA model needs site specific information to calculate solar insolation like location name, latitude and

longitude of location and its elevation. It can model both light gases using Gaussian Model and heavy gases using


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DEGADIS. It also needs building type, building surroundings, wind speed, direction (from meteorological

measurement), wind measuring heights, ground roughness, cloud cover, stability class, inversion and humidity.

It also needs storage tank type and orientation, tank dimension, state of chemical, temperature inside the stank,

diameter of assumed or actual accidental opening in tank, leak type and assumed or actual height of opening

ALOHA software was used to model the effects of each scenario taking into consideration the usual atmospheric

conditions as well as the worst case atmospheric conditions. ALOHA is a computer program designed especially

for use by people responding to chemical releases when an accident has taken place, as well as for emergency

planning. ALOHA models key hazards - toxicity, flammability, thermal radiation (heat) and overpressure

(explosion, blast force) - related to chemical releases that result in toxic gas dispersions, fires and/or explosions.

ALOHA allows for the specification of concentration limits for the purpose of consequence assessment (e.g.,

assessment of human health risks from contaminant plume exposure).

Damage Criteria used in the project

The hazardous categories is modeled in Table 1.

Table 1: Hazard categories modeled in ALOHA

Scenario\Source Tank Puddle

Vapor cloud (flash fire) Flammable area Flammable area

Vapor cloud (explosion) Overpressure Overpressure

Vapor cloud (Dispersion of Toxic vapor) Toxic vapors Toxic vapors

Pool fire Thermal radiation Thermal radiation

BLEVE (fireball) Thermal radiation NA

(A) Thermal Damage

The thermal radiation effects on people depend upon the length of time they are exposed to a specific thermal

radiation level. ALOHA uses three threshold values (measured in kilowatts per square meter) to create the

default threat zones:

Red: >10 kW/ m2. -- potentially lethal within 60 sec;

Orange: >5 kW/ m2 -- second-degree burns within 60 sec; and

Yellow: >2 kW/ m2 -- pain within 60 sec.

Longer exposure durations, even at a lower thermal radiation level, can produce serious physiological effects.

The threat zones displayed by ALOHA represent thermal radiation levels of certain hazardous chemicals in the

environment in case it is under fire.

(B) Overpressure:

This is a case of explosion due to overpressure in tank or a vapour cloud explosion when it meets a spark on the

way. The threat zones are as follows:

Red: 8.0 psi (Destruction to Buildings)

Orange: 3.5 psi (Serious Injury Likely)

Yellow: 1.0 psi (Shatters Glass)

(C) Toxic release:

For toxic release, there are several hazard classification systems in use. Some chemicals have not been classified

in every system. ALOHA determines its default toxic Level of Concern (LOC) values based on the following:

PACs: Protective Action Criteria


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This dataset combines all three common public exposure guideline systems (AEGLs, ERPGs, and TEELs) and

implements a hierarchy-based system. (AEGLs are used preferentially, followed by ERPGs, and then TEELs.) If

ALOHA is defaulting to the PAC values, it means that there are no AEGL or ERPG values in the ALOHA chemical

library for that substance. In this case, the PAC values will be the TEEL values. TEELs are derived using existing

LOCs and by manipulating current data. This process is less intensive than the AEGL or ERPG process, and

TEELs have been defined for more than 3,000 chemicals.

1) Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGLs)

Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGLs) are Toxic Levels of Concern (LOCs) that is used to predict the area

where a toxic gas concentration might be high enough to harm people. The guidelines define three-tiered AEGLs

as follows:

AEGL-1: The airborne concentration of a substance above which it is predicted that the general population,

including susceptible individuals, could experience notable discomfort, irritation, or certain asymptomatic non-

sensory effects. However, the effects are not disabling and are transient and reversible upon cessation of

exposure.

AEGL-2: The airborne concentration of a substance above which it is predicted that the general population,

including susceptible individuals, could experience irreversible or other serious, long-lasting adverse health

effects or an impaired ability to escape.

AEGL-3: The airborne concentration of a substance above which it is predicted that thegeneral population,

including susceptible individuals, could experience life-threatening health effects or death.

2) The Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPGs)

The American Industrial Hygiene Association (AIHA) has issued three levels of ERPG values based on toxic

effect of the chemical for use in evaluating the effects of accidental chemical releases on the general public. The

Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPGs) are Toxic Levels of Concern (LOCs) that is used to predict

the area where a toxic gas concentration might be high enough to harm people. The ERPGs are three tiered

guidelines with one common denominator: 1-hour contact duration. Each guideline identifies the substance, its

chemical and structural properties, animal toxicology data, human experience, existing exposure guidelines, the

rationale behind the selected value, and a list of references.

ERPG 1: The maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that nearly all individuals could be

exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing other than mild transient adverse health effects or perceiving a

clearly defined, objectionable odour.


exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing or developing irreversible or other serious health effects or

symptoms which could impair an individual's ability to take protective action.


exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing or developing life threatening health effects.

The most important point about the ERPGs is that they do not contain safety factors usually incorporated into

exposure guidelines. Rather, they estimate how the general public would react to chemical exposure. Just below

the ERPG-1, for example, most people would detect the chemical and may experience temporary mild effects.

Just below the ERPG-3, on the other hand, it is estimated that the effects would be severe, although not life-

threatening. The ERPG should serve as a planning tool, not a standard to protect the public.


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3) Temporary Emergency Exposure Levels (TEELs)

There are three TEEL levels that are important for responders to consider:

TEEL-1: Maximum concentration in air below which it is believed nearly all individuals could be exposed without

experiencing other than mild transient health effects or perceiving a clearly defined objectionable odour.


experiencing or developing irreversible or other serious health effects or symptoms that could impair their abilities

to take protective action.


experiencing or developing life-threatening health effects.

4) Immediate Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH)

Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH) level is a limit originally established for selecting respirators for

use in workplaces by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). A chemical's IDLH is an

estimate of the maximum concentration in the air to which a healthy worker could be exposed without suffering

permanent or escape-impairing health effects. It was recommended that appropriate respirator (as per NIOSH)

be kept handy/easily available.

The IDLH was not designed to be an exposure limit for the general population. It does not take into account the

greater sensitivity of some people, such as children and the elderly.

For AEGLs, ERPGs and TEELs, the rank number increase with the hazard level, so that AEGL-3 is more

hazardous than AEGL-1. Typically, the “3” values are used for the most hazardous (red) threat zones because

they represent the threshold concentration above which health effects may be life threatening.

INPUT USED FOR ALOHA MODELLING

SITE DATA

Location: GHIRONGI INDUSTRIAL AREA, BHIND DISTRICT, MADHYA PRADESH.

Wind Speed: 1m/s Stability Class: F

Air Temperature: 29.60C Relative humidity: 50%

CONSEQUENCES ANALYSIS FOR FAILURE SCENARIOS OF HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS

(A) ACETONE

CHEMICAL DATA:

Chemical Name: ACETONE CAS Number: 67-64-1

Molecular Weight: 58.08 g/mol AEGL-1:: 200 ppm

AEGL-2: 3200 ppm AEGL-3: 5700 ppm

LEL: 26000 ppm UEL: 130000 ppm

Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: 0.37 atm Ambient Boiling Point: 56.3° C

Ambient Saturation Concentration: 370,756 ppm or 37.1%

SOURCE STRENGTH:

Leak from hole in vertical cylindrical tank Circular Opening Diameter: 10 centimeters


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Opening is 0.7 meters from tank bottom Flammable chemical escaping from tank (not burning)

Release Duration: ALOHA limited the duration to 1 hour

Max Average Sustained Release Rate: 249 kilograms/min (averaged over a minute or more)

Total Amount Released: 10,368 kilograms The puddle spread to a diameter of 60 meters.

Note: The chemical escaped as a liquid and formed an evaporating puddle

PART I: TOXIC AREA OF VAPOR CLOUD

THREAT ZONE:

Model Run: Heavy Gas Red : 196 meters --- (5700 ppm = AEGL-3)

Orange: 254 meters --- (3200 ppm = AEGL-2) Yellow: 1 Kilometer --- (200 ppm = PAC-1)

Figure 2: Toxic Area of Vapor Cloud - Acetone

PART II: FLAMMABLE AREA OF VAPOR CLOUD

Model Run: Heavy Gas

Red : 128 meters – (15600 ppm =60% LEL = Flame Pockets)

Yellow: 280 meters --- (2600 ppm = 10% LEL)


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Figure 3: Flammable area of Vapor Cloud - Acetone

PART III: BLAST AREA OF VAPOUR CLOUD

Threat Modelled: Overpressure (blast force) from vapour cloud explosion


Type of Ignition: Ignited by Spark or Flame

Red: LOC was never exceeded --- (8.0 psi = destruction of buildings)

Orange: 103 meters – (3.5 psi = serious injury likely)

Yellow: 150 meters --- (1.0 psi = shatter glass)

Figure 4: Blast area of Vapor Cloud - Acetone

CASE B: LEAKING TANK, CHEMICAL IS BURING AND FORMS A POOL FIRE

THERMAL RADIATION FROM POOL FIRE

Red : 17 meters --- (10.0 kW/(m2) = potentially lethal within 60 sec)

Orange: 25 meters --- (5.0 kW/(m2) = 2nd degree burns within 60 sec)

Yellow: 41 meters --- (2.0 kW/(sq m) = pain within 60 sec)


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SOURCE STRENGTH Leak from hole vertical cylindrical tank Circular Opening Diameter: 10 centimeters

(Assumed)

Opening is 0.7 meters from tank bottom (assumed) Flammable chemical is burning as it escaping from tank

Burn Duration: ALOHA limited the duration to 1 hour Max Burn Rate: 362 kilograms/min

Total Amount Burned: 21,295 kilograms The puddle spread to a diameter of 12.4 meters.

Figure 5: Thermal Radiation from Pool Fire- Acetone

CASE C: BLEVE, TANK EXPLODES & CHEMICAL BURNS IN A FIREBALL

THREAT ZONE

Threat Modeled: Thermal radiation from fireball Red: 315 meters --- (10.0 kW/(sq m) = potentially lethal within 60 sec)

Orange: 449 meters --- (5.0 kW/(sq m) = 2nd degree burns within 60 sec)


SOURCE STRENGTH

Leak from hole vertical cylindrical tank Circular Opening Diameter: 10 centimeters (Assumed)

Opening is 0.7 meters from tank bottom (Assumed) BLEVE of Flammable liquid in vertical cylindrical tank

Fireball Diameter: 183 meters

Burn Duration: 12 Seconds


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Figure 6: BLEVE- Acetone

SUMMARY FOR ALOHA RESULTS

Situation Affected Distance (m)

Red Orange Yellow

Leaking Tank,

Chemical is not

burning &forms an

evaporating puddle

Toxic Area of Vapour Cloud 196 254 1000

Flammable Area of Vapour

Cloud 128 - 280

Blast: Vapour Cloud Explosion - 103 150

Leaking Tank,

Chemical is burning &

forms a pool fire.

Thermal radiation

17 25 41

BLEVE, tank explodes

& Chemical burns in a

fireball.

Thermal radiation 315 449 704

(B) ETHANOL

CHEMICAL DATA:

Chemical Name: ETHANOL CAS Number: 64-17-5

Molecular Weight: 46.07 g/mol ERPG-1: 1800 ppm

ERPG-2: 3300 ppm ERPG-3: 3300 ppm

IDLH: 3300 ppm LEL: 33000 ppm

UEL: 190000 ppm Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: 0.10 atm

Ambient Boiling Point: 78.1° C Ambient Saturation Concentration: 102,227 ppm or 10.2%

SOURCE STRENGTH:

Leak from hole in vertical cylindrical tank Circular Opening Diameter: 10 centimeters (Assumed)

Opening is 0.7 meters from tank bottom (Assumed) Flammable chemical escaping from tank (not burning)


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Max Average Sustained Release Rate: 93.2 kilograms/min (averaged over a minute or more)




THREAT ZONE:

Model Run: Heavy Gas Red: Not Applicable

Orange: 154 meters --- (3300 ppm = ERPG-2) Yellow: 217 meters --- (1800 ppm = ERPG-1)

Figure 7: Toxic area of vapor cloud - Ethanol



Red : 47 meters – (19800 ppm =60% LEL = Flame Pockets) Threat zone was not drawn because effects of near-field patchiness make dispersion predictions less reliable for short distances.


Figure 8: Flammable area of vapor cloud - Ethanol


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Orange: LOC was never exceeded – (3.5 psi = serious injury likely)


Figure 9: Blast area of vapor cloud - Ethanol







(Assumed)

Opening is 0.7 meters from tank bottom (Assumed) Flammable chemical is burning as it escaping from tank




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Figure 10: Thermal Radiation from Pool Fire - Ethanol


THREAT ZONE




SOURCE STRENGTH





Figure 11: BLEVE- Ethanol



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Red Orange Yellow

Leaking Tank,

Chemical is not

burning &forms an

evaporating puddle

Toxic Area of Vapour Cloud - 154 217


Cloud 47 - 154

Blast: Vapour Cloud Explosion - - 34

Leaking Tank,


forms a pool fire.

Thermal radiation

17 25 39



fireball.


(C) ETHYL ACETATE

CHEMICAL DATA:

Chemical Name: ETHYL ACETATE CAS Number: 141-78-6

Molecular Weight: 88.11 g/mol PAC-1: 1200 ppm

PAC-2: 1700 ppm PAC-3: 10000 ppm




SOURCE STRENGTH:








THREAT ZONE:

Model Run: Heavy Gas Red: 115 meters --- (10000 ppm = PAC -3)

Orange: 245 meters --- (1700 ppm = PAC-2) Yellow: 287 meters --- (1200 ppm = PAC-1)


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Figure 12: Toxic area of Vapor Cloud –Ethyl Acetate



Red : 104 meters – (13080 ppm =60% LEL = Flame Pockets


Figure 13: Flammable area of Vapor Cloud –Ethyl Acetate






Orange: 85 meters – (3.5 psi = serious injury likely)



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Figure 14: Blast area of Vapor Cloud –Ethyl Acetate







(Assumed)




Figure 15:Thermal Radiation from Pool Fire–Ethyl Acetate



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THREAT ZONE




SOURCE STRENGTH





Figure 16: BLEVE–Ethyl Acetate



Red Orange Yellow

Leaking Tank,

Chemical is not

burning &forms an

evaporating puddle



Cloud 104 - 218


Leaking Tank,


forms a pool fire.

Thermal radiation

15 24 38



fireball.


(D) HEXANE

CHEMICAL DATA:

Chemical Name: HEXANE CAS Number: 110-54-3

Molecular Weight: 86.18 g/mol AEGL-1: N/A




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SOURCE STRENGTH:








THREAT ZONE:

Model Run: Heavy Gas Red: 144 meters --- (8600 ppm = AEGL –3)

Orange: 227 meters --- (2900 ppm = AEGL-2) Yellow: Not Applicable

Figure 17: Toxic area of Vapour Cloud - Hexane






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Figure 18: Flammable area of Vapour Cloud - Hexane






Orange: 126 meters– (3.5 psi = serious injury likely)


Figure 19: Blast area of Vapour Cloud - Hexane






SOURCE STRENGTH


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Figure 20: Thermal radiation from Pool fire - Hexane


THREAT ZONE




SOURCE STRENGTH






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Figure 21: BLEVE- Hexane



Red Orange Yellow

Leaking Tank,

Chemical is not

burning &forms an

evaporating puddle

Toxic Area of Vapour Cloud 144 227 -


Cloud 155 - 337


Leaking Tank,


forms a pool fire.

Thermal radiation

20 30 49



fireball.


(E) ISO PROPYL ALCOHOL

CHEMICAL DATA:

Chemical Name: ISO PROPYL ALCOHOL CAS Number: 67-63-0

Molecular Weight: 60.10 g/mol PAC-1: 400 ppm

PAC-2: 2000 ppm PAC-3: 12000 ppm




SOURCE STRENGTH:








THREAT ZONE:

Model Run: Heavy Gas Red: 57 meters --- (12000 ppm = PAC 3)

Orange: 177 meters --- (2000 ppm = PAC-2) Yellow: 424 meters --- (400 ppm = PAC-1)


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Figure 22: Toxic area of vapor cloud – Isopropyl Alcohol





Figure 23: Flammable area of vapor cloud – Isopropyl Alcohol







(Assumed)


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Figure: 24: Thermal Radiation from Pool Fire – Isopropyl Alcohol


THREAT ZONE




SOURCE STRENGTH





Figure: 25: BLEVE– Isopropyl Alcohol



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Red Orange Yellow

Leaking Tank,

Chemical is not

burning &forms an

evaporating puddle



Cloud 57 177 -

Blast: Vapour Cloud Explosion - - -

Leaking Tank,


forms a pool fire.

Thermal radiation

18 27 42



fireball.


(F) METHANOL

CHEMICAL DATA:

Chemical Name: METHANOL CAS Number: 64-56-1

Molecular Weight: 32.04 g/mol AEGL-1: 530 ppm





SOURCE STRENGTH:








THREAT ZONE:

Model Run: Heavy Gas Red: 134 meters --- (7200 ppm = AEGL -3)

Orange: 279 meters --- (2100 ppm = AEGL-2) Yellow: 621 meters --- (530 ppm = AEGL-1)


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Figure: 26: Toxic Area of Vapor Cloud - Methanol





Figure: 27: Flammable Area of Vapor Cloud - Methanol







(Assumed)


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Total Amount Burned: 20,399 kilograms The puddle spread to a diameter of 21 meters.

Figure: 28: Thermal radiation of Pool Fire- Methanol


THREAT ZONE




SOURCE STRENGTH






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Figure: 29: BLEVE- Methanol



Red Orange Yellow

Leaking Tank,

Chemical is not

burning &forms an

evaporating puddle



Cloud 30 - 134

Blast: Vapour Cloud Explosion - - -

Leaking Tank,


forms a pool fire.

Thermal radiation

16 22 34



fireball.


(G) TOULENE

CHEMICAL DATA:

Chemical Name: ETHANOL CAS Number: 64-17-5

Molecular Weight: 92.14 g/mol AEGL-1: 67 ppm





SOURCE STRENGTH:





Total Amount Released: 211 kilograms The puddle spread to a diameter of 14.2 meters.



THREAT ZONE:

Model Run: Heavy Gas Red: 17 meters --- (3700 ppm=AEGL-3)

Threat zone was not drawn because effects of near-field patchiness make dispersion predictions less reliable for short distances.

Orange: 50 meters --- (560 ppm = AEGL-2) Yellow: 170 meters --- (67 ppm = AEGL-1)


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Threat zone was not drawn because effects of near-field patchiness make dispersion predictions less reliable for short distances.

Figure: 30: Toxic area of vapor cloud- Toulene




Yellow: 34 meters --- (1100 ppm = 10% LEL) Threat zone was not drawn because effects of near-field patchiness make dispersion predictions less reliable for short distances.






Orange: 51 meters -– (3.5 psi = serious injury likely)



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Figure: 31: Blast area of vapor cloud- Toulene







(Assumed)



Total Amount Burned: 22,493 kilograms The puddle spread to a diameter of 10 meters.

Figure: 32: Thermal radiation from Pool Fire- Toulene


THREAT ZONE


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SOURCE STRENGTH





Figure: 33: BLEVE - Toulene



Red Orange Yellow

Leaking Tank,

Chemical is not

burning &forms an

evaporating puddle



Cloud 10 - 34


Leaking Tank,


forms a pool fire.

Thermal radiation

20 31 50



fireball.


Interpretation & Conclusion: It has been interpreted that the worst case scenario will be toxic gas spread from

leakage of acetone from tank and the travel distance will be upto 1000m. The maximum distance till where the

effect of accident can be seen, will be up to a distance of 1000m.

Therefore it requires immediate evacuation of population up to 1000m and provide immediate medical facilities

for injured persons as mentioned in Disaster Management Plan.


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Figure 34: ALOHA Source Point for worst case scenario of Acetone

PRACTICE TO BE FOLLOWED FOR HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS, HANDLING, STORAGE,

TRANSPORTATION AND UNLOADING.

The safe practices for handling, Storage, Transportation and unloading of Hazardous Chemicals are given in

Table 2.

Table 2: Safe practice to be followed for handling, storage, transportation and unloading of Hazardous Chemicals

S.No Activity Scenario Mitigation Measures

1. Unloading and storing of drums Leaks, splash or fire

Unloading ramp Drum cushioning Trained operators Sorbent pads Respirator with face shield and chemical clothing. Fire extinguisher and hydrant Checking compatibility before storing. Availability of eye wash/shower facility

nearby

2. Charging to reactors and service

tanks Leaks, splash or fire

Precautions against ESD Leak containment facility Trained operators Sorbent pads Respirator with face shield and chemical clothing. Fire extinguisher and hydrant Availability of eye wash/shower facility


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Nearby.

3. Unloading to storage tanks Leaks, splash or fire

SOP for activity Tanker loading and unloading permit. Precautions against ESD Leak containment facility Trained operators Sorbent pads Respirator with face shield and chemical clothing. Fire extinguisher and hydrant Availability of eye wash/shower facility

nearby.

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

Disaster

A disaster can be defined as an "occurrence of such magnitude so as to create a situation in which normal pattern

of life within a facility is suddenly disrupted, adversely affecting not only the personnel and property within the

facility but also in its vicinity."

Emergency planning is an integral part of the overall loss control program and is essential for any well run

organization. This is important for effective management of an accident / incident to minimize losses to people

and property, both in and around the facility. The important aspect in emergency management is to prevent by

technical and organizational measures, the unintentional escape of hazardous materials out of the facility and

minimize accidents and losses. Not only are unrecognized hazardous conditions which could aggravate and

emergency situation be discovered, the emergency planning process also brings to light deficiencies such as lack

of resources necessary for effective emergency response. Emergency planning also demonstrates the

organizations commitment to the safety of employees and increases the organizations safety awareness.

The objectives of the emergency planning are to describe the facility’s emergency response organization, the

resources available and applicable response actions. Thus, the objectives of emergency response plan can be

summarized as follows:

Rapid control and containment of the hazardous situation;

Minimizing the risk and impact of an event/accident; and

Effective rehabilitation of the affected persons, and prevention of damage to property.

In order to effectively achieve the objectives of emergency planning, the critical elements that form the backbone of the plan are:

Reliable and early detection of emergency and careful planning.

The command, Co-ordination, and response organization structure alone with efficient trained personnel.

The availability of resources for handling emergences.

Appropriate emergency response actions.

Effective notification and communication facilities.

Regular review and updating of the plan.


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Proper training of the concerned personnel.

Declaring Fire Emergency

Any one discovering a fire shall attempt to put out the fire by using the first aid firefighting appliances.

Simultaneously, he would shout FIRE, FIRE, FIRE/THEE, THEE, THEE (in local language) till the

assistance arrives.

Any one or his colleagues who hears, shall immediately inform the Shift In-charge and Control Room

over phone or in person giving the exact location of the emergency.

The Incident Controller on hearing the incident of emergency, would proceed to the scene of emergency

and assess the situation and decide whether a major emergency exists or is likely to escalate into major

one.

If a major one, he would activate the on-site emergency plan by sounding the siren to code and informs

the Store Controller.

The key personnel would report to the emergency control centre and take respective charge.

Firefighting Plan/Arrangements

The Project Site will have well-developed Onsite Emergency Plan for handling Fire emergencies. The firefighting

arrangements proposed for project site are mentioned below and given in Table 3.

Engineering & Administrative Controls: Sufficient engineering controls will be provided in

manufacturing unit to avoid any fire incident like interlocking, earthing and grounding etc. Proper

supervision and employee’s awareness are at top most priority.

Fire Detection System: At places smoke detectors and manual call points will be provided.

Core Group: Plant will have a core group especially for firefighting and emergency handling.

Training: Core group members will be regularly trained on firefighting.

Mock Drill and Fire Drills: Mock drills and Fire drills will be carried out regularly in plant.

Fire Hydrant System: Fire hydrant system will be provided

Table 3: Details of Fixed Fighting Systems

Fire Safety System

Sr. No.

Description Type of Pump Capacity Remark

1 Fire Pump house no-1

Jockey Pump 10.8 m3/hr Reservoir capacity-

600KL with auto feeding through bore-

well pump

Diesel Pump 273m3/hr

Electrical Pump 273 m3/hr

2 Fire Pump house no-2 Electrical Pump 273 m3/hr

Reservoir capacity-350KL with auto

feeding through bore-well pump

3 Fire Pump house no-3

Jockey Pump 10.8 m3/hr Reservoir capacity 650KL with auto

feeding through bore-well pump

Diesel Pump 273 m3/hr

Electrical Pump 273 m3/hr


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Fire Safety System

Sr. No.


4 Fire Tender

Water 4000L -

AFF Foam 1000L (3%) -

CO2 Fire extinguishers 6 no. 22.5kg Each -

DCP Fire extinguishers 2 no. 75 Kg each -

Hose Pipes 8 no. 30 M each -

Hose Pipes 2 no. 15 M each -

Fire Proximity Suit 2 no. - -

SCBA Set 3 no. 300bar each -

Emergency torch (Chargeable) 2 no’s in Tender and one spare in Safety office

-

5 Self-Contained breathing

apparatus (SCBA) At entrance of each module 49

no.

10 no’s of 200 Bar and 39 no’s of 300Bar

-

6 CO2 Fire Extinguishers 582 no. 2.0Kg, 3.2Kg, 4.5Kg, 6.8Kg, 9.0 Kg,22.5 Kg

-

7 DCP Fire Extinguishers 181 no. 10.0Kg, 25.0Kg, 50.0Kg, 75.0Kg

-

8 ABC Powder Stored Pressure

Extinguisher 480 no. 9.0Kg,10.0 Kg -

TEC Powder Stored Pressure Extinguisher

26 9.0Kg -

9 Mechanical Foam 70 no. 9.0Ltr, 50Ltr -

10 Spray Systems 53 no. - -

11 Fire Suit Proximity 9 no. and Fire entry suit 3 no’s

- -

12 Wind Sock 11 no. - -

13 Sluice Valve 103 no. - -

14 Foam Trolley 22 no. -

Total Foam 13470 L 15 Foam Flooding System 20 no.

20 no’s in Warehouse(Tank

farm Area)

16 Hose reel 86 no. - -

17 Hydrant System Total Hydrant points= 355 no., Hose Box=299, hose pipes= 524

- -

18 Monitors 41 no’s 31 fixed and 10

portable -


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Fire Safety System

Sr. No.


19 Safety Shower 109 no. - -

20 High Expansion foam

generators 2 no.

300L/min and 100L/min

-

23 Heat Detection System 2 no. Non Bulk Drum

Shed area Warehouse

-

24 MCP (Manual Call Point) 140 no. In All Modules -

25 AFFF Foam compound 7930 L -

26 AR-AFFF Foam compound 4110 L - -

26 HAZMAT Foam compound 420 L - -

Figure 35: Proposed Fire Safety Layout

Declaring Chemical leakage or fire in the Storage Area

Any person discovering Chemical leakage or fire will immediately inform the control room giving the exact

location of leakage or fire.

The Incident Controller will proceed to the storage to assess the situation. Meanwhile, the person

discovering fire shall try to extinguish it, if it is safe to do so, using suitable fire extinguishers.

If the leakage could be attended safely, he will call the maintenance and get it attended


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Chemical leakage from storage Drum shall be collected and not allowed to spread.

If the leakage is very heavy, the Store Controller shall be informed and on his confirmation, he will take

suitable action.

If the leakage has caught fire, the Incident Controller will initiate the On-site Emergency Plan by operating

the siren to emergency code. The Site Controller will be informed.

Recovery Procedures

The procedures outlined in this section are intended for re-establishing normal operations at the earliest

after an emergency. In addition, the procedure also provides for determining the cause of the accident,

so that such incidents can be prevented in future.

The following are the requirements of a recover procedure :

a. Incident investigation

b. Establishing a recovery team

c. Damage Assessment

d. Clean-up and restoration

e. Post-Emergency and Recovery Reporting.

Store Controller will arrange to organize suitable teams for the above tasks.

Incident Investigation

Incident investigation should be taken up to determine the cause of the emergency and the means of preventing

any such occurrences again.

Procedure

The investigation team should immediately seal off the incident scene and commence its investigation to

minimize the loss of any physical evidence.

The investigation of the scene should include:

a. Photographing the area.

b. Determining the point of origin of the fire/leak/explosion, if applicable.

c. Nothing any unusual items in the area or any damage that is in consistent with the type of incident.

Written or recorded statements will be taken from all store keeper involved, potential witnesses and others

who might have pertinent knowledge about the incident.

Report

A final report will be prepared to include the most probable cause(s) and recommend corrective

measures.

The report should consider:

a. Failure of Storage container

b. Failure of maintenance

c. Failure of procedures

d. Inadequate training

e. Human error etc.

Corrective Actions

a. The investigation team will be responsible for conducting a review of response activities during the

emergency to evaluate the adequacy of training, equipment and procedures.


36

b. The Store Controller will be responsible for ensuring that all corrective actions are taken to ensure

better responses to emergencies to prevent recurrence of the incident, if any in future.

Recovery Team

Purpose

In order to facilitate the restoration of the company after an emergency, a team known as Recovery Team is

to be constituted by Store Controller to manage recovery activities, including damage assessment.

Organization

The number of persons in the Recovery Team will vary depending on the nature of the incident and the

extent of recovery operations. As a general rule, however, individuals representing Maintenance, Production,

Safety, Quality Control, Personnel, Accounts, Engineering etc. should be involved.

The recovery team will be responsible for damage assessment, clean up and salvage operations and the

restoration of the storage activities. A primary function of the recovery team will be to assess the damage to

structures, equipment and materials.

Clean-up and Restoration Operations

As soon as incident investigations are completed and restoration plans have been made, clean up and

restoration activities should commence.

Post-Emergency Recovery Reports

The Officer-in-charge of Safety will hold review sessions with emergency response personnel to

evaluate the following:

a. The adequacy of emergency response procedures.

b. The adequacy of the investigation of the cause of the incident.

c. Summaries the post-emergency activities.

A full report will be prepared and copies given to all persons concerned. The final report will summarize

all previous reports and reviews as mentioned in this section


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Figure 36 Management Hierarchy

Safety Precautions for Storage and Handling of Chemicals/ Solvents

For handling chemicals/solvents, the management of SPIL will adopt various practice of preventive and predictive

maintenance. Some of them ae mentioned below:

Precautions for storage and handling of Chemicals/Solvents:

Storage with proper enclosures and markings

Proper ventilation will be provided.

Sufficient fire extinguishers and PPE will be made available at project site.

Flame proof fittings will be provided wherever, required at project site.

Smoking will be prohibited.

Protection against lightning will be provided.

Precautions against ignition sources will be arranged.

Sufficient access for firefighting will be provided in the unit.

All employees will be provided with adequate and appropriate PPE like masks, gloves, helmet,

chemical suits, and safety shoes.

Safety Precautions for Handling of LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas)

Storage, transfer, and transport of LNG may result in leaks or accidental release from tanks, pipes, hoses, and

pumps at land installations and in LNG transport vessels and vehicles. The storage and transfer of LNG also

poses a risk of fire and, if under pressure, explosion, due to the flammable characteristics of its boil-off gas (BOG).

Precautions for storage and handling of LNG:


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Storage tanks and components should undergo periodic inspection for corrosion and structural integrity

and be subject to regular maintenance and replacement of equipment (e.g., pipes, seals, connectors,

and valves).

A cathodic protection system should be installed to prevent or minimize corrosion, as necessary.

LNG handling/loading/unloading should be conducted by properly trained personnel.

Material selection for piping and equipment should be according to approved standards.

In case of a gas release, allow safe dispersion of the released gas, maximizing ventilation of areas and

minimizing the possibility that gas can accumulate in closed or partially closed spaces.

Design the facility drainage system such that accidental releases of hazardous substance are collected

to reduce the fire and explosion risk and environmental discharge.

Date post:	23-Apr-2018
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