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Ruy Lopez

easy guide to the

Ruy Lopez

by John Emms

EVERYMAN CHESS

Everyman Chess, formerly Cadogan Chess, is published by Everyman Publishers, London

First published in 1999 by Everyman Publishers pic, formerly Cadogan Books pic,

Gloucester Mansions, 140A Shaftesbury Avenue, London WC2H 8HD in

association with Gambit Publications Ltd, 69 Masbro Road, London W14 OLS.

Copyright © 1999 Gambit Publications

The right of John Emms to be identified as the author of this work has been

asserted in accordance with the Copyrights, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

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without prior permission in writing from the publishers.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

ISBN 1 85744 220 2

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To Christine

Everyman Chess Series (formerly Cadogan Chess)

Chief Advisor: Garry Kasparov

Series Editor: Murray Chandler

Edited by Graham Burgess and typeset by Petra Nunn for

Gambit Publications Ltd.

Printed in Great Britain by Redwood Books, Trowbridge, Wilts.

Contents

Symbols 4

Bibliography 5

Introduction 6 1 Rare Third Moves for Black 9

2 The Schliemann Variation 18 3 The Classical Variation 29 4 The Berlin Defence 35 5 The Deferred Steinitz and Other Fourth Move

Alternatives 47 6 Moller and Arkhangelsk Variations 55

7 The Open Lopez 69

8 The 8 a4 Anti-Marshall 81

9 Ideas in the Closed Lopez 89

10 Rare Closed Lopez Variations 96 11 The Karpov Variation 99 12 The Zaitsev Variation 107

13 The Smyslov Variation 119 14 The Breyer Variation 122 15 The Chigorin Defence 127

Index of Variations 142

Symbols

+ check

++ double check

# checkmate

x capture

!! brilliant move

! good move

!? interesting move

?! dubious move

? bad move

?? blunder

Ch championship

Cht team championship

Wch world championship

Ct candidates event

IZ interzonal event

Z zonal event

OL olympiad

ECC European Clubs Cup

jr junior event

worn women’s event

mem memorial event

rpd rapidplay game

corr correspondence game

qual qualifying event

1-0 the game ends in a win for White

V2-V2 the game ends in a draw

0-1 the game ends in a win for Black

(n) nth match game

(D) see next diagram

Bibliography

Books

Nunn’s Chess Openings, John Nunn, Graham Burgess, John Emms and Joe

Gallagher (Everyman/Gambit, 1999)

Encyclopaedia of Chess Openings, Volume C (Sahovski Informator, 1997)

The Complete Spanish, Alexei Suetin (Batsford, 1991)

Mastering the Spanish, Daniel King and Pietro Ponzetto (Batsford, 1993)

The Closed Spanish: Zaitsev and Karpov Lines, Anatoly Bykhovsky (Batsford,

1993)

Ruy Lopez Breyer System, Les Blackstock (Batsford, 1976)

Spanish without ...a6, Mikhail Yudovich (Batsford, 1986)

Winning with the Schliemann, Mikhail Tseitlin (Maxwell Macmillan, 1991)

The Open Spanish, Mikhail Krasenkov (Cadogan, 1995)

The Marshall Attack, John Nunn and Tim Harding (Batsford, 1989)

Periodicals

Informator

ChessBase Magazine

The Week In Chess

British Chess Magazine

Chess Monthly

Introduction

1 e4 e5 2 £)f3 £ic6 3 &b5 (D)

The Ruy Lopez (or Spanish Game,

as it’s often called) is a simple open¬

ing, with a simple idea. White’s second

and third moves have both increased

the pressure on the centre, and in par¬

ticular the e5-square. Give or take a

few developing moves, the next stage

of White’s plan is to take control of the

centre and increase the pressure on e5

with the advance d4, which is often

supported by c3. It may be a simple

enough plan, but it can be highly ef¬

fective. Because of this, the Ruy

Lopez has stood the test of time. Other

openings come and go, drifting in and

out of fashion, but the Lopez has al¬

ways been a popular choice for all lev¬

els of player, from novice to World

Champion, and it will continue to be.

Mobile and Little Centres

If Black buckles under the pressure

and relinquishes the centre with

...exd4, then depending on whether

White has played c3 or not. White ei¬

ther obtains a Mobile Centre or a Little

Centre, either of which is generally fa¬

vourable to the one in possession.

This is the Mobile Centre. The pair

of central pawns on e4 and d4 control

many important squares and give White

a space advantage plus more freedom

of movement for his pieces. In addi¬

tion, White has the option of creating a

central breakthrough with a timely e5.

This thrust could provide a platform

for a successful attack on the black

king.

The diagram overleaf shows the

Little Centre. This pawn structure is

Introduction 7

less dangerous for Black than the pre¬

vious one, but it still favours White.

The pawn on e4 is more advanced than

Black’s central d6-pawn, which once

again means that White has more

space to move his pieces. Added to

this is that White also has control over

the important d5- and f5-squares.

How Does Black React?

Of course Black has many different

possible defences against the Lopez,

but in general there are two different

types of strategy. The first is to meet

White’s d4 advance by bolstering the

e5-pawn with pawns and pieces. This

plan is seen in all the closed defences

(Chapters 9-15), the Classical Varia¬

tion (Chapter 3), the Deferred Steinitz

(Chapter 5) and the trendy Mpller and

Arkhangelsk Variations (Chapter 6).

Black’s second strategy revolves

around a swift counterattack against

White’s e4-pawn. This is seen in lines

such as the sharp Schliemann Varia¬

tion (Chapter 2), the Berlin Defence

(Chapter 4) and the Open Lopez

(Chapter 7).

A Real Opening

As a junior player I was quite content

to play openings such as the Vienna

Game, the King’s Gambit and the

Scotch Gambit, obtaining quick victo¬

ries against the unsuspecting oppo¬

nents who did not know their theory.

However, as time progressed and

my opponents became more experi¬

enced, my repertoire of tricky open¬

ings just didn’t seem work any more.

No one was falling for my traps, and

often all I was left with was a sterile

equality, or something even worse.

In 1989 I appeared in the British

Championship for the fourth time.

Keen to make more of an impression

than on my previous undistinguished

attempts, I vowed that as White I

would give up my ‘baby openings’,

take a deep breath and try the Ruy

Lopez. After all, it was time I grew up!

My chance came in round 9, when I

was paired with Scotland’s top player

Paul Motwani, who was a seasoned

l...e5 player. The experience was quite

enlightening.

Emms - Motwani

British Ch (Plymouth) 1989

1 e4 e5 2 £)f3 £ic6 3 &b5 a6 4 £a4

&f6 5 0-0 &e7 6 Eel b5 7 &b3 0-0 8

c3 d6 9 h3 &e610 d4 &xb311 ^xb3

In Chapter 10 I advocate 11 axb3,

but in 19891 was only just learning the

theory. Still 11 ®xb3 is not bad either.

I was already struck by the fact that I

had a perfectly good position, and

even more importantly, one that was

easy to play. This was just the sort of

Easy Guide to the Ruy Lopez

thing I needed when confronting some¬

body rated 200 points higher than my¬

self. Il...d5 12 exd5 £ia5 13 ®c2 exd4

14 £ixd4 £lxd5 15 £id2 &f616 £>2f3

c5 17 £H5 Sa718 l.d2 £>c4 19 Sadi

Sd7 20 &cl £le7 (D)

21 £lg5!

As far as I could see, I hadn’t

played any special moves, only natu¬

ral ones, yet my position was getting

better and better. This was certainly a

good choice of opening.

21...£lg6 22 £le4 Se8 23 £ixf6+

gxf6 24 ,&h6 £lxb2

Actually, I had missed this tactic,

but such is the dire position of the

black king. White is winning in any

case. So Lopez players are even lucky!

25 Sxe8+ ®xe8 26 Sxd7 #'xd7 27

#’e4! #dl+ 28 &h2 #d8 29 Wc6 &d3

30 ®xa6 b4 31 cxb4 cxb4 32 &gl

£ldf4 33 Wb7 £ld5 34 g3 &b6 (D)

35 &e3 £id5 36 &h6+ &g7 37

®xf7+ &h8 38 J^.d4 £k5 39 &xe5

fxe5 40 #'e6 &g7 41 &15+ &f8 42

£ld6 1-0

It goes without saying that after this

little episode, I was converted, and I

haven’t strayed off the path since.

How This Book is Written

Throughout the book I have attempted

to give a concise theoretical overview

of the main lines of the Ruy Lopez,

with a repertoire slant for the white

pieces. In spite of this, I have tried to

remain as objective as possible in my

coverage, although as I mentioned in

my earlier Easy Guide to the Nimzo-

Indian, this can be quite difficult for a

hardened advocate of one side!

1 Rare Third Moves for Black

1 e4 e5 2 £>f3 £k6 3 &b5 (D)

Black has a significant number of

unusual third move alternatives when

faced with the Lopez. After 1 e4 e5 2

£)f3 £3c6 3 ,&b5 we shall look at (in

roughly ascending order of impor¬

tance) the following moves:

A: 3...i.b4 9

B: 3...d6 10

C: 3...£id4 12

D: 3...g6 14

E: 3...£ige7 16

First of all, we should look at some

black moves that are considered even

rarer than rare, and are a mixture of the

bad and the ugly!

a) 3...Sfe7 4 0-0 £)d8!? is an in¬

triguing scheme of development, which

is not easily refuted. Black plans ...c6

and ...d6, while the knight may re¬

enter the game via e6. That said.

White has many ways to achieve an

edge. After 5 d4 c61 like 6 iLd3 d6 7

b3!?, with ideas of icb2 or ,&a3.

b) 3...#16 tries to make it difficult

for White to achieve the d4 advance.

However, the queen can become ex¬

posed on f6. One way to keep a plus is

with 4 £)c3 £)ge7 5 d3 a6 6 ,&c4.

c) 3...f6 was, unbelievably, played

by Steinitz. Almost anything will do

against this. 4 0-0 £)ge7 5 d4 £)g6 6

£)c3 is one way to secure an ample ad¬

vantage.

d) 3.. .a5! ? is a bizarre move, which

does have the point that 4 d3?! £)a7! 5

,&c4 b5 wins a piece, although 6

,&xf7+ &xf7 7 £)xe5+ is still very un¬

clear. White should probably just play

4 0-0, when 4...£ia7 5 &e2 d6 6 d4

leaves the knight looking rather silly

on a7.

A) 3...&b4

This is another odd-looking move

that was once a favourite of the Swed¬

ish grandmaster Jonny Hector. The

best one could say about 3.. JLb4 is

that it’s not quite as bad as it looks!

4 c3

10 Easy Guide to the Ruy Lopez

Why not gain time on the bishop

with this natural Lopez move?

4...JLa5 5 £sa3! (D)

A good move. This knight will ar¬

rive at c4, gaining more time by at¬

tacking the bishop.

5..JLb6 6 &c4 d6

Or 6...£\f6 7 d3 d6 8 a4 a6 (8...0-0?

9 JLxc6 bxc6 10 a5 JLc5 11 b4 wins a

piece) 9 £lxb6 cxb6 10 JLc4, when the

bishop-pair gave White an advantage

in Barlov-Velimirovic, Yugoslav Ch

1994.

7 0-0 £lge7

This knight belongs on e7 in this

system. 7...£lf6 8 d4 exd4 9 cxd4 0-0

10 &g5 h6 11 JLh4 &g4 12 ^.xc6

bxc6 13 e5 dxe5 14 ftcxe5 gave White

a clear plus in Schiissler-Lukez, Hel-

singborg 1990.

8 a4 0-0

At this point there’s a pitfall, of

which White must be very wary. On

first inspection the move 9 a5? seems

to trap the black bishop, but Black has

the neat trick 9...£lxa5! 10 £lxa5

JLxa5 11 Exa5 c6! and it’s Black who

wins material. No better is 9 ,&xc6?!

£lxc6 10 a5, because Black can play

10...Ae6!. 9d3 &e6

9...d5 opens the position prema¬

turely. In Hellers-Hector, Haninge 1990

White got a big advantage after 10

exd5 ®xd5 11 Eel £g4 12 h3 Axf3

13 ®xf3 ®xf3 14 gxf3 f6 15 a5 &c5

16 b4! &xb4 17 &xc6 &xc3 18 &xb7

Eab8 19 a6 Bfd8 20 Ae3.

10 £>xb6 axb6 11 ^g5 &c8 12 f4!

(D)

Hellers-Hector, Stockholm Rilton

Cup 1990/1. White’s two bishops and

extra space give him a clear edge.

B)

Steinitz’s Defence. This has a repu¬

tation of being quite solid, but rather

passive, and it’s not very popular these

days. If Black wants to play lines in¬

volving an early ...d6, it’s more nor¬

mal to use the deferred move-order of

3...a6 4 JLa4 and only then 4...d6 (see

Chapter 5).

Rare Third Moves for Black 11

4d4

White has other moves, but this is

the most direct way to achieve a good

position.

4..JLd7

Not the only move. Others include:

a) 4...exd4 5 ®xd4 &d7 (5...fce7 6 &g5 a6 7 -&xc6+ £ixc6 8 ®d2 £c7

9 £ic3 &xg5 10 &xg5 0-0 11 0-0-0

gave White the usual spatial plus in

Ulybin-Adams, Khalkidhiki 1992) 6

JLxc6 &xc6 7 &c3 (7 &g5 &e7 8

Wxg7 JLf6 9 ®xh8 &xh8 10 £xd8

JLxb2 is not so clear) 7...£lf6 8 JLg5

JLe7 9 0-0-0 0-0 10 Shel Se8 11 &bl

with a slight advantage for White,

Anderssen-Paulsen, Vienna 1873.

b) 4.. JLg4 (Marshall’s idea) 5 dxe5

dxe5 6 ®xd8+ (6 Wd5 Wxd5 7 exd5

JLxf3 8 gxf3 a6 9 dxc6 axb5 10 cxb7

Hb8 11 a4! b4 12 a5 Sxb7 13 a6 Eb8

14 JLe3 was also better for White in

Canfell-Wohl, Australian Ch 1991)

6...Exd8 7 JLxc6+ bxc6 and now not

8 £sxe5?? allowing 8...Edl#, but 8

l5)bd2, which maintains an advantage

for White. One possible continuation

would be 8...£d6 9 £ic4! &f6 (9...f6

10 JLe3 and 9.. JLxf3 10 gxf3 11

JLe3 a6 12 0-0-0 are also slightly

better for White) 10 JLe3 £lxe4 11

£)cxe5 JLxf3 12 £3x13, reaching a po¬

sition which shows us why this line is

not played by Black: everything else is

equal, but Black’s pawn weaknesses

on the queenside are permanent.

5 0-0

This is the main line, but White can

also consider ambitious ideas involv¬

ing queenside castling after 5 £lc3.

Both 5...£lf6 6 JLxc6 JLxc6 7 ®d3

exd4 8 £ixd4 JLd7 9 JLg5 JLe7 10

0-0-0 and 5...exd4 6 £lxd4 g6 7 JLe3

JLg7 8 ®d2 £if6 9 &xc6 bxc6 10 &h6

0-011 JLxg7 4?xg7 12 0-0-0 Ee8 13 f3

are better for White.

5.. .6f6

Once again the main move, al¬

though 5...exd4 6 £lxd4 g6!? is a more

ambitious way of developing. After 7

£sc3 JLg7 8 j£xc6 bxc6 the sequence

9 Eel £se7 10 JLf4 is the most annoy¬

ing for Black. If then 10...0-0 White

presses forward with 11 e5!, for exam¬

ple 11...d5 12 £la4 with a strong bind

on the dark squares. Black can prevent

the advance with 10...f6, but the sim¬

ple plan of exchanging dark-squared

bishops with 11 Wd2 0-012 i.h6 ®b8

13 JLxg7 &xg7 14 b3 was enough to

give White an edge in J.Todorovic-

Yanovsky, Belgrade 1988.

6 £lc3 exd4

After 6.. JLe7 White can virtually

force Black to give up the centre in any

case by 7 Jtxc6 JLxc6 8 ®d3!. Now

8...&d7 9 JLe3 exd4 10 £ixd4 0-0 11

f4 looks good for White, so Black nor¬

mally plays 8...exd4. Following 9

<S)xd4 JLd7 White can develop aggres¬

sively with 10 b3 0-011 JLb2 Ee8 12 f4

it.f8 13 Eael. Hamdouchi-Campora,

Dos Hermanas 1998 continued 13...c5

14 £lf3 JLc6 15 £ld5 JLxd5 16 exd5 h6

17 c4, when Black was struggling to

find breathing room.

7 &xd4 JLe7 8 Eel 0-0

8.. .6xd4 9 Wxd4 ±xb5 10 £ixb5

0-0 11 JLf4 &d7 12 Eadl a6 13 &c3

_£.f6 14 ®b4 left Black without any

prospects in Hracek-Smejkal, Czech

Cht 1997/8.


9 JLxc6 bxc6

If Black captures with 9...jk.xc6,

then White should just proceed with

10 b3 and 11 &b2.

10 ®d3!

More accurate than the immediate

10 b3, which allows Black to break out

with 10...d5! Ile5^.b4!.

10...Se8 11 b3 £f8 12 &b2 g6

In the game Nunn-Portisch, Buda¬

pest Ct playoff (6) 1987, Black di¬

verged with 12...c5, but after 13 £lf3

JLc6 14 Sadi h6 15 e5! White was

still better.

13 Sadi Lgl 14 h3 ®b8 15 £f3

(D)

pm 'i ii in

.um mm i ■ & 0

White prepares the e5 advance. In

Nunn-Portisch, Budapest Ct playoff

(2) 1987, White kept the advantage af¬

ter 15...£e6 16 e5 &d5 17 &e4 M5

18 c4.

C) 3...&d4

This defence was invented in the

nineteenth century by the English

master Henry Bird. The idea is to

leave the Lopez bishop hitting thin air

on b5. Bird’s Defence has never really

caught on, however, probably because

Black moves his knight twice in the

opening, just to see it exchanged.

4 £ixd4 exd4 5 0-0 (D)

Eiii.il* mm

&ifiB B&i At this point Black has two serious

options:

Cl: 5...c6 12

C2: 5..JLc5 13

After 5...4ê7 White should con¬

tinue with 6 d3 c6 7 ,&a4 d5 8 £ld2,

e.g. 8...dxe4 9 £sxe4 £sf5 10 -£b3

11 Wh5, with some advantage, Petros-

ian-Siier, Varna OL 1962.

Cl) 5...c6

Immediately putting the question to

the white bishop. This line is less pop¬

ular than 5.. JLc5.

6 JLc4 d5

Another way for Black to play is

6...£lf6 7 Hel d6 8 c3 £ig4 9 h3 £ie5

10 d3 £ixc4 11 dxc4 dxc3 12 £lxc3

-&e7 13 JLf4 0-014 Wd3, when Black’s


weak pawn on d6 gave White an edge

in Matanovic-Gliksman, Yugoslav Ch

1967.

7 exd5 cxd5 8 Sel+ £ie7

The more natural 8...it.c7 allows 9

■&b5+, when 9...JLd7 runs into 10

®g4! so Black is forced to play the

ugly 9...&f8.

9 &fl M610 c3 ®d7 11 £>a3 £ic6

12®a4^.e7 13 Z&c2M<6

Forced, as 13...0-0 14 <S)xd4 £lxd4

15 Wxd7 &xd7 16 Sxe7 £>c2 17 Ebl

JLf5 18 d3 is clearly better for White.

14 JLb5 dxc3 15 dxc3 0-0 16 ,&e3

Hfc8 17 Sadi (D)

This position arose in Geller-Kla-

man, Moscow 1949. The pressure

against Black’s isolated d-pawn gives

White a very pleasant game.

C2)

5..JLc5

This is the main line of Bird’s De¬

fence. Black develops a piece and

waits for White to commit himself be¬

fore attacking the bishop.

6 d3 c6 7 JLa4

In this line the bishop is better

placed on a4, out of the way of any

...d5 breaks from Black.

7.. .£ie7

More recently. Black has been ex¬

perimenting with 7...d6, giving the

knight the option of going to f6. This

idea works after 8 f4 f5!? 9 l$M2 £)f6!

10 e5 dxe5 11 fxe5 <S)g4, when Black

has succeeded in reaching a playable

position. However, White should play

more craftily with 8 it.b3!, planning to

meet 8...£tf6 with the pinning 9 JLg5!.

If Black reverts to 8. ,.4}e7, then White

also reverts to the original plan with 9

f4!, leading to lines similar to the main

text.

8f4!

This powerful move has done a

great deal of damage to the reputation

of Bird’s Defence.

8.. .f5

This move is virtually forced. Fail¬

ure to prevent White’s f5 thrust can re¬

sult in a grim position, e.g. 8...d5 9 f5

f6 (9...0-0 10 f6! is even worse) 10

«h5+*f8 11 *hl SLA7 12 c3 &e8 13 ®h4 dxe4 14 dxe4 Wb6 15 £b3 Ml

16 <S)d2 dxc3 17 bxc3 and Black is in

big trouble, Kindermann-Tatai, Buda¬

pest 1987.

9 JLb3 d5 10 exd5 fcx d5 11 Eel+

4>f8

1 l...'i>f7 is no better. White contin¬

ues 12 fcd2 Se8 (NCO gives 12...g6

13 £tf3 &g7 14 &xd5 Wxd5 15 Se5

®d6 16 b4! JLxb4 17 JLb2 with a clear

advantage, as 17...c5 18 a3 Jia5 fails

to 19 Exc5!) 13 ®h5+ *f8 14 Exe8+

®xe8 15 Wxe8+ 4?xe8 16 Md5 cxd5

17 £tf3 M7 18 b3 Ec8 19 &b2 &b6


20 Scl and the d4-pawn is ripe for

picking.

12 WhSl (D)

Black’s airy king position is a major

cause for concern. Kamsky-Ivanchuk,

Tilburg 1990 continued 12...g6 13

®h6+ 4?g8 14 £ld2 Af8 15 fh3 £g7

16 £if3 h6 17 ®e5 Sff6 18 &xd5+

cxd5 19 b3! &h7 20^.b2®b6 21 Wf3

Se8 22 ®T2 Axe5 23 Sxe5 Sxe5 24

&xd4 Se2 25 &xb6 Exf2 26 Axf2

and White had achieved a winning

endgame.

D)

3...g6

This quiet positional move has been

favoured by former World Champions

Spassky and Smyslov. White can now

play 4 c3, when Black’s best reaction

would be to transpose to Chapter 5

with 4...a6 5 JLa4 d6 6 d4 JLd7. At¬

tempts to do without ...a6 give White

more options, for example 4...d6 5 d4

M7 6 Wb3! &a5 7 Wa4 c6 8 &e2 b5

9 ®c2 ±gl 10 0-0 £ie7 11 dxe5 dxe5

12 a4, leading to an edge for White,

Dolmatov-Kholmov, Sochi 1988. How¬

ever, as well as 4 c3 White can play in

a more direct fashion with...

4 d4!? exd4

4.. .4kd4 5 £sxd4 exd4 6 ®xd4 ©fS

7 e5 is very favourable for White, e.g.

1.. Mb6 8 #xb6 axb6 9 ^c3 &b4 10

±d2 Ha5 11 a4 c6 12 £se4! -&xd2+ 13

<&xd2 £sh6 14 b4 Ea8 15 £2d6+ &e7

16 ^.d3 with an overwhelming posi¬

tion, Kasparov-Garcia Santos, Galicia

simul 1991.

5 &g5 £e7

Of course, Black cannot continue

5.. .®ge7, due to 6 icf6. The alterna¬

tive to 5...iLe7 is 5...f6, when White

keeps the advantage after 6 JLh4 JLg7

7 0-0 thgel 8 &c4 â5 9 Sfxd4 £iec6

10 Wd5 ®xc4 11 ®xc4 d6 12 £k3

&g4 13 £id4 £ixd4 (not 13...fce5? 14

®b5+!) 14 ®xd4. Now Nunn-Davies,

Hastings 1987/8 continued 14...0-0?!

15 f4 mi 16 h3 &e6 17 f5! gxf5 18

exf5 JLxf5 19 £ld5 and White’s attack

was much too strong. 14...g5 is a more

resolute defence, when 15 JLxg5? fails

to 15...c5 16*fa4+Ad7 17<?2b5 ®b6.

However, White can keep a small plus

with 15 i.g3 h5 16 h3 JLe6 17 f4.

6 Axe7 (D)

Now Black has two options:

Dl: 6..Mxel 14

D2: 6...&gxe7 15

Dl)

6.. Mxel 7 £xc6 dxc6

The greedy 7...Wb4+ is punished

by 8c3 ®xb2 9 ®xd4 ®xal 10 0-0 f6

11 e5! dxc6 12 exf6, when White’s at¬

tack comes crashing through.

8 ®xd4 £>f6 9 £k3 &g4


In Sax-Smyslov, New York 1987,

White built up a menacing kingside at¬

tack after 9...0-0 10 0-0-0 JLe6 11 h3

Efd8 12 ®c3 b5 13 £>e5 i.d7 14 14

JLe8 15 g4 a5 16 g5 £lh5 17 $3g4 b4

18 £la4. In particular, Black suffers

because his queenside pawns are less

mobile, a perennial problem of the

doubled pawn complex.

10 0-0-0 &xf3 11 gxf3 0-0 12 ®e3

&h5 13 f4 b6 14 f5 (D)

Luther-Dautov, Bad Lauterberg

1991. White’s initiative on the king-

side gives him the advantage.

D2)

6...£>gxe7 7 ®xd4 d5

Delaying this for a move with

7...0-0 8 £lc3 d5 doesn’t change the

assessment of the position. White can

keep an advantage after both 9 JLxc6

bxc6 10 ®b3! dxe4 11 £lxe4 and the

simple 9 £ixc6 bxc6 10 JLd3 Eb8 11

b3.

8 £ic3 dxe4 9 JLxc6+ £ixc6 10

£lxc6 ®xdl+11 Sxdl bxc612 £ixe4

M5 13 0-0! 0-0

After 13...^.xe4 14 Efel f5 15 f3

Ed8 16 fxe4 f4 17 Exd8+ 4>xd8 18

&f2 &e7 19 Edl g5 20 4?f3 h5 21

Ed4 Eb8 22 b3 Black’s queenside

weaknesses proved fatal in Wahls-

Zsu.Polgar, Dortmund 1990.

14 Ed4 &g7 15 f3 Efe8 16 Efdl

Eab8 17 b3 (D)

Black’s weak a- and c-pawns make

this endgame rather uncomfortable for

him. Nunn-Salov, Skelleftea World

Cup 1989 continued 17...Eb5 18 Sc4

Ed5 19 Ed3 Ee6 20 *f2 h6 21 Ea4

it.xc4 22 Exe4 &f6 and now 23 &e3

would have kept a clear advantage.


E) 3.. .®ge7

This move was briefly popular in

the late 1980s, when it was used by

grandmasters such as Ivan Sokolov

and Alexei Dreev. Black’s idea is to

follow up with ...g6, ...it.g7 and a later

...d5. Here we look at two alternatives

for White:

El: 4&c3!? 16

E2: 4 c3 16

El) 4 £lc3!?

A tricky move, against which Black

must defend very carefully.

4.. .g6

If 4...4tlg6 White should open the

position with 5 d4 exd4 6 £lxd4. Fol¬

lowing 6.. JLc5 7 JLe3 JLxd4 8 JLxd4

0-0 9 &e3 d6 10 0-0 &h8 11 #d2 f5

12 f4 fxe4 13 £sxe4 We7 14 £ig3

White was better in Barczay-Sydor,

Lublin 1969.

5 d4 exd4 6 £id5! &g7 7 i.g5 h6

Forced, as 8 JLxc6 was threatened.

8 JLf6 -£.xf6 9 ®xf6+ 4?f8 (D)

W

10 £sxd4

Perhaps White should consider the

untried 10 ®d2!? here. The point is to

meet 10...^7 with 11 £ixd4!, trans¬

posing to the next note. 10...£lf5 11

£sd5 £sg7 12 £tf4 £ie6 13 £sxe6+

dxe6 14 0-0-0 favours White, as does

10...d5 11 &xc6 £sxc6 12 £ixd5. This

leaves us with 10...d6, but here 11

&xd4 £lf5 12 £ixc6 #xf6 13 exf5

bxc6 14 JLxc6 may give White an

edge. This line needs a practical test.

10.. .£>f5!

Murey-Dreev, Moscow 1989 con¬

tinued 10...^7, which White met by

the shocking 11 ®d2!. Dreev contin¬

ued weakly with ll...£sg8 12 <Sid5

4if6 13 £ic3 £ih5 14 g4, when White

had an overwhelming position. How¬

ever, grabbing the knight with 11...&xf6

also gives White an irresistible attack

after 12 *fc3, e.g. 12...fce5 13 f4 d6

14 fxe5+ dxe5 15 0-0-0!, or 12...£ixd4

13 ®xd4+ ^>e6 14 JLc4+ d5 15 exd5+

&d7 16 0-0-0 a6 17 d6!.

11 £sh7+l?

Black is fine after 11 exf5 ®xf6 12

.&xc6 dxc6 13 fxg6 ^g7!, preparing

...Sd8.

11.. .5.h7 12 exf5 1T6 13 &xc6

dxc6 14 0-0 c5

Emms-Twyble, London 1998. Now

White should play 15 £sb5!? Axf5 16

£xc7 Hd8 17 1T3 ®xb2 ip Sabi

Wxc2 19 Sxb7 with good compensa¬

tion for the pawn.

E2)

4c3g6

4.. .a6 5 JLa4 d6 6 d4 .&d7 trans¬

poses to Chapter 5.


5 0-0 JLg7 6 d4 exd4

Black gives up the centre, but plans

to strike back immediately. 6...0-0 7

d5 a6 8 JLe2 £ia7 9 c4 is obviously

better for White.

7 cxd4 d5 8 exd5 £ixd5 I'D)

9&g5

In my opinion this is more accurate

than 9 Eel+ &c6 10 JLxc6+ bxc6 11

JLg5, which may transpose, but un¬

necessarily gives Black the added op¬

tion of 1 l...Wb8!?.

9...®d610 Eel+ Ae611 <£>bd2 0-0

12 £ie4 ®b4 13 Axc6 bxc6 14 ®cl!

Efe8 15 Ad2 ®b6

15.. .^ 16 £se5 Af5 17 £sc5

(NCO) also gives White an edge.

16 £sc5 JLf5 17 &e5 Ead8

Giving up the dark squares with

17...JLxe5? is not to be recommended.

After 18 dxe5 £sb4 19 ^.g5 £sc2 20

4M7! JLxd7 21 ®xc2 Black has chronic

weaknesses around his king.

18 a3 £>f6 19 Wc4 Ef8

19.. .6e6? fails to 20 £>xe6 Exe6 21

<^xf7!.

20 b4 (D)

Donchev-Radulov, Bulgaria 1991.1

prefer White’s active knights to Black’s

bishop-pair.

2 The Schliemann Variation

1 e4 e5 2 &f3 <Sk6 3 &b5 f5 (D)

■v \AÂ A .-Â 1

. B&H agA»sg ifa

against, as Black is put under no im¬

mediate pressure and has been able to

‘get away with’ his third move. After,

for instance, 4...fxe4 5 dxe4 4£tf6,

Black already has a comfortable de¬

velopment plan and White no longer

has a d-pawn! Instead of this, White

must try to punish Black for his sins

and thus I’m recommending the criti¬

cal reply 4 £>c3!.

The Theory of the Schliemann

The Schliemann Variation is proba¬

bly the sharpest way of meeting the

Ruy Lopez. Black immediately goes

on the counterattack in the centre, in

King’s Gambit fashion. Most posi¬

tional considerations are overtaken by

tactics and hard variations, so there’s

much more homework for the student

here than in many of the other chap¬

ters. That said, a well-prepared player

on the white side could certainly look

forward to facing the Schliemann. Af¬

ter all, this line is fun for White too,

but only if you know your stuff!

The Schliemann is quite popular at

club level, where many white players

refuse to take up the challenge and opt

out with the passive 4 d3. However,

this is just the type of move Schlie¬

mann players would enjoy playing

1 e4 e5 2 &f3 £sc6 3 &b5 f5 4 £sc3!

(D)

Utl 1 ■ ■

WiAWi W f;

; f w ,§îl At 8 AjBf

jtil Black has three main options:

A: 4...£sf6 19

B: 4...£sd4 19

C: 4...fxe4 21

The Schliemann Variation 19

A) 4 On first impression this looks the

most natural follow-up, but in fact it’s

not very popular due to the strength of

White’s reply.

5 exf5! Whereas 4 exf5?! e4! would have

embarrassed the knight, now 5...e4

can be effectively met by 6 £>h4!. Af¬

ter 6...d5 7 d3 .&e7 8 dxe4 dxe4 9

#xd8+ Axd8 10 £g5 0-0 11 0-0-0

White is simply a pawn to the good. If

5.. .<Skl4 White should simply snatch

another pawn with 6 £lxe5, when

6.. .c6 7 i.d3 d5 8 0-0 ±d6 9 £tf3 &xf5

10 &xf5 Axf5 11 Sel+ JLe7 12 We2

was clearly better for White in Chan-

dler-Hermann, Bundesliga 1995/6,

while 6....&c5 7 0-0 0-0 transposes to

the main line of this section.

S..Ac5 6 0-0 0-0 7 £>xe5 £sd4

Black’s only chance to complicate,

as 7...4ixe5 8 d4 is clearly in White’s favour.

8 JLd3 d5 9 £tf3 c6

White is also a safe pawn up after

9.. .£sxf5 10 AxfS Axf5 11 d4 &d6 12 £ie5.

10 h3! (D)

Stronger than 10 b3?! &xf5 11

&xf5 Axf5 12 d4 Ab4, when Black

has some compensation for the pawn.

After 10 h3!, Ulybin-O.Rodriguez,

Benasque 1992 continued 10...£sd7?!

11 £sxd4 &xd4 12 £ie2 &b6 13 c3

&e5 14 ±c2 d4 15 cxd4 £xd4 16

^xd4 ®xd4 17 d3 Axf5 18 Jis3 ®h4

19 f4! and White held a clear advan¬

tage. The straightforward 10...4ixf5 is

stronger, although after 11 JLxf5 JLxf5

12 d4 £d6 13 £>e5 &e4 14 &c2 Black

doesn’t have enough compensation.

B)

4...£sd4!? (D)

A deceptively tricky move, which

was first suggested by Alekhine.

Black seems to break all the opening

rules by following up 3...f5 with mov¬

ing his one developed piece again, but

4...£sd4 is not as bad as it first looks,

and should be treated with consider¬

able care.

5 JLc4!


Of course White has other playable

moves, including 5 exf5 and 5 Aa4,

but this one asks Black the most ques¬

tions; for example: where will he cas¬

tle?

5...c6

Other moves for Black include:

a) 5...d66d3£)f6(6...Ae77 Axg8

Exg8 8 £ixd4 exd4 9 ®h5+ &f8 10

£kI5 looks good for White) 7 £lxd4!

exd4 8 ®e2 fxe4 9 dxe4 £ixe4 (9...c5

10 0-0 £>xe4 11 &f4 is clearly better

for White) 10 ®xd4 11 Ag5 and

White’s lead in development had

reached nearly decisive proportions in

Abramovic-Kovacevic, Yugoslav Ch

1985.

b) 5...®tf6 6 d3 (6 0-0 £>xf3+! 7

®xf3 fxe4 8 £\xe4 c6 is less clear)

6...£>xf3+ 7 ®xf3 f4 8 g3 g5 9 gxf4

gxf4 10 Axf4! exf4 11 e5 Ab4 12

0-0-0 Axe 3 13bxc3®e7 14 exf6 ®xf6

15 Bdel+ 'i’dS 16 Be4 and White was

clearly better in Tosic-Sahovic, Vrn-

jacka Banja 1982.

6 0-0 d6

Black can also offer to sacrifice ma¬

terial with 6...£¥6. Emms-Tebb, Brit¬

ish Ch (Norwich) 1994 continued 7

d3!? 5)xf3+ 8 ®xf3 f4 9 Axf4!? exf4

10 e5 d5 11 exf6 ®xf6 12 Efel+ &d8

13 £lxd5 cxd5 14 Axd5 Eb8 15 d4 with

a very unclear position. Instead of 7

d3. White should grab the material on

offer with 7 ®xe5 fxe4 8 £¥7 ®c7 9

£lxh8. After 9...d5 10 Ae2 Ad 6 11 h3

Af5 12 d3 it’s difficult to believe

Black has enough compensation.

7 exf5!

Sensibly opening the position up.

Instead 7 Eel £>xf3+ 8 ®xf3 f4 9 d4

®f6 gives Black the type of position

he wants, where the f4-pawn cramps

the white pieces.

7...Axf5

Once more Black has some other

options:

a) 7...d5 8 £>xe5 £¥6 9 Eel Ae7

10 Ad3 0-0 11 the2 thxf5 12 Axf5

Axf5 13 d4 leads to a typically advan¬

tageous position for White, who is a

pawn up and can boast an outpost for

the knight on e5.

b) 7...£lxf5 8 d4 and now 8...exd4

9 Bel+ Ae7 10 £lxd4 is clearly better

for White, while 8...d5 runs into 9

£lxe5! dxc4 10 ®h5+ g6 11 £lxg6

®f6 12 ®c2+ tLe7 13 £ixh8.

c) 7...£>xf3+ 8 ®xf3 ®f6 9 d4

exd4 10 Bel+ &d8 11 £>e4 ®xf5 12

®g3 gives White a clear plus, accord¬

ing to NCO.

8 £)xd4 exd4 9 Eel+ &d7

Black has problems defending his

d4-pawn after 9...Ae7 10 thel.

10 the! ®f6 11 £>g3 (D)

We have been following Timman-

Danov, Wijk aan Zee 1971, which


continued ll...Se8 12 Exe8 &xe8 13

®e2+ &d7 14 c3 dxc3 15 dxc3, when

White had a big lead in development.

C) 4...fxe4 Black’s main continuation. The e-

pawn is eliminated and Black prepares

to occupy the centre, for one move at

least! 5 £lxe4 Now we deal with Black’s two main

choices: Cl: 5...£)f6 21

C2: 5...d5 22

Cl) 5...£>f6 (D)

This line was unpopular for a long

time, as White can virtually win a

pawn by force by 6 £ixf6+ ®xf6 7

®e2. However, ways were then dis¬

covered of drumming up counterplay for Black.

6 &xf6+

When improvements for Black were

being discovered in this line. White

started to try 6 ®e2!?, but my impres¬

sion is that Black’s resources are suffi¬

cient in this line after 6...d5 7 £>xf6+

gxf6 8 d4 Ag7 9 dxe5 0-0! 10 Axc6

bxc6 11 e6 Be8 12 0-0c5.

6.. M\f6

6.. .gxf6? is a mistake. After 7 d4

®e7 (or 7...e4 8 ®g5!) 8 0-0 e4 9 d5!

£>d8 10 Eel Agl 11 ®h4 White had a

crushing position in Emms-Sylvan,

Copenhagen 1992.

7 ®e2 Ae7 8 Axc6 dxc6

8.. .®xc6 9 ®xe5 leaves Black

struggling to castle, but 8...bxc6 is

quite interesting. White should con¬

tinue with 9 £lxe5, when 9...c5 10 0-0

£b7 11 b3 0-0-0 12 Ab2 was better

for White in J.Diaz-Antunes, Santa

Clara 1991, while 9...0-0 10 0-0 £d6

11 d4 c5 12 Ae3 Axe5 13 Wc4+ Ef7

14 dxe5 Wfxe5 15 Wxc5 also leaves

White a clear pawn up.

9 £>xe5 £f5

With this move Black keeps his op¬

tions open regarding which side to

castle. The other main line runs 9...0-0

10 0-0 Ad6 11 d4 Af5 (ll...c5 12

Ae3 b6 13 f4 cxd4 14 £xd4 £b7 15

Wg4 Eae8 16 Badl gave White the

advantage in Kuporosov-Yandemirov,

USSR 1986) 12 c3!? (12 f4 Axe5 13

dxe5 Wg6 14 Ef2 Bad8 leads to the

position after Black’s 15th move in

Marjanovic-Yilmaz, discussed in the

next note) and now:

a) 12...Bae8 13 .&f4 Axe5 (not

13....&d3?! 14 Wxd3 Wxf4, allowing

15 g3! and f4) 14 Axc5 Wg6 15 Bad 1

was clearly better for White in the

game Dervishi-Khachian, Panormo Z

1998.


b) 12...c5 13 £f4 Hae8 14 Sfel

cxd415 cxd4 ile6 16 ilg3 gave White

an edge in Kotronias-Vouldis, Greek

Ch 1992.

10 0-0!?

This move has hardly been seen,

but it could well be the most testing

move-order for Black. After 10 d4

Black obtains sufficient counterplay

with 10...0-0-0 11 £e3 £d6 12 f4

.&xe5 13 dxe5 ®g6. Another com¬

monly played move for White is 10

d3. Now 10...0-0-0 11 0-0 She8 12 f4

Ad6 13 «T2! &b8 14 £e3 gave White

a clear plus in Glek-Arbakov, con-

1985. However, Black can switch

back to 10...0-0!, underlining the flex¬

ibility of 9...ilf5. Following 11 0-0

&d6 12 f4 Bae8 13 d4 Axe5 14 dxe5

®g6 15 2f2 2d8 we reach a position

typical for this Line. Despite White’s

two-pawn majority on the kingside,

the presence of opposite-coloured

bishops makes it extremely difficult

for White to convert his small advan¬

tage. After 16 Ac3 Sd5 17 a4 a5 18

Safi h5 19 <S?hl h4 20 h3 Sfd8 Black

had enough play in Marjanovic-Yil-

maz, Kavala 1985.

The point of 10 0-0!? is to answer

10.. .0-0-0 with 11 d3, as in Glek-Arba¬

kov, and 10...0-0 with 11 d4, leading

to the note to Black’s 9th move. Of

course Black does have another op¬

tion, which is to grab the hot pawn.

10...£.xc2!? 11 d3 (D)

The only game I could find with

10.. .Axc2 ended in a quick win for

White after 11...0-0-0? 12 Bel Ad6

13 ®g4+ ^b8 14 .&g5 and Black was

obliged to resign in Zude-Brehm,

Hessen 1988. ll..Jta4 is a tougher

defence, but White’s initiative still

seems quite daunting, for example 12

b3 (12 £>g4 «T5 13 b3 Ab5 14 Aa3

0-0! shows the defensive resources in

Black’s position) 12..Jtb5 13 Ab2

and now 13...0-0-0? allows 14 ®g4+,

while 13...0-0 runs into 14 £ld7. Per¬

haps Black can play 13...®e6, but af¬

ter 14 Sfel there are still problems to

solve. Certainly, this line could do

with a practical test.

C2)

5...d5 (D)


This move leads to the most heavily

analysed variations of the Schlie¬

mann. Play becomes extremely sharp

and both sides must know their theory.

After 5...d5, White has the option of

retreating the knight with 6 £\g3, a

perfectly playable, though hardly crit¬

ical reply. However, my recommenda¬

tion is to play straight into the main

line with...

6 £)xe5! dxe4 7 £lxc6

Now Black has three possible con¬

tinuations:

C21: 7...bxc6 23

C22: 7..Md5 24

C23: 7...#gS 25

-11 £xa8 ®xa8 12 Wx c7+ &e8 13 0-0

.&e7 14 d3 exd3 15 cxd3, when White’s

rook and three pawns outweigh the

two minor pieces.

Il...exf3

1 l...&h6 12 f5 £>xf5 13 Sfl is very

strong, e.g. 13...#d6 (13...®lh6?? 14 ®c5+ ®d6 15 ®g5#) 14 Wxe4 (14

®xd6+ <4>xd6 15 Axa8 c6 also looks

favourable for White) 14...Bb8 15 2xf5

Bb4 16 d4! ®xd4 17 £g5+ <&d6 18

£f4+ 19 ®xd4 Bxd4 20 £e3

.&xf5 21 Axd4 and White is clearly

better.

12 d4 13 d5 f2+ 14 &e2 £)xd5

(D)

C21)

7...bxc6

The least popular move. White can

achieve a clear advantage in more than

one way.

8 £xc6+ ±d7 9 ®h5+ &e7 10

«e5+ Ae6 (D)

11 f4!?

This is the critical move, although a

safe plus can be achieved by the simple

15 Bdl!

I believe this is the most effective

way to reach a clear plus. 15 Ag5+ is

less clear after 15...$M6 16 Bhdl ®c8

17 Sd7+ (17 £xa8 ®xa8 18 £xf6+

gxf6 19 ®xc7+ &e8 is also a mess)

17...®xd7 18 £xd7 &xd7 19 ®b5+

<&>e7 20 &xf2 <£tf7 and Black was not

worse in Kovalevsky-Lubarsky, USSR

1968.

15...®d6


15.. .6.7 16 £xd5 £xd5 17 ®f5+

*^68 18 2xd5 wins for White, while

15...&C3+ 16 ®xc3 ®xdl+ 17 &xf2

®d6 18 £xa8 ®xh2 19 £g5+ is also

strong.

16 ®xd6+ &xd6 17 £xd5 ±xd5

18 c4 c619 ilf4+ <&>e6 20 cxd5+ cxd5

21 Sacl

This endgame is most unpleasant

for Black.

C22)

7„.®d5 8 c4 ®d6 9 ^xa7+!

White may also play 9 ®h5+ g6 10

Wfe 5+ ®xc5 11 foxe5+ c6 12 Aa4, al¬

though after 12..JLg7! 13 d4 exd3

Black seems to have enough counter¬

chances, e.g. 14 Af4 fof6 15 0-0-0

±f5 16 foxd3 0-0-0 17 Ac2 2d4 18

ile3 2xc4 and Black is fine, or 14 0-0

.£.15 (14...Axe5? 15 Sell is better for

White) 15 2el 0-0-0 16 ±g5 (16 foil

d2 17 £xd2 2xd2 18 2e8+ &d7 19

2ael 2xb2 is better for Black) 16...d2

17 2e3 2f8 and Mikhail Tseitlin fa¬

vours Black.

9.. .£.d7 10 ±xd7+ Wfxd7 11

®h5+!

Much more critical than 11 £\b5

fot'6 12 0-0 Ac5, which gives Black

good play for the two-pawn deficit.

11.. .g6

11 ...‘A'dS favours White after 12

®a5! &e8 13 0-0 fot6 14 d4 exd3 15

&e3.

12 We5+ <&f7 13 £lb5!

Capturing the black rook immedi¬

ately by 13 ®xh8 is dangerous in view

of 13...£lf6 14 £lb5 c6 15 £lc3 2e8,

when White must give up his queen in

less favourable circumstances.

13...C6 14 ®d4 (D)

14.. .®e7

Black chooses complications over

an inferior endgame, which he gets

with either alternative:

a) 14...2d8 15 ®xd7+ 2xd7 16

foc3 £M6 17 b3 favours White.

b) 14...®xd4 15 &xd4 ±g7 16

foe2 2a4 17 b3 2xc4 18 bxc4 Axal

19 0-0 and again White is better.

15 ®xh8

Grabbing the rook must be correct.

Black has enough counterplay after 15

foc3 fol6 16 ®e3 2d8.

15.J£f616 b32d8

16.. .2e8 17 Ab2 Ag7 18 Aa3! c5

19 ®xe8+ £lxe8 20 2dl is much

better for White than the main varia¬

tion, as the d5-square beckons as an

important outpost.

17 &b2 £.g7 18 £a3 ®d7 19

®d6+ &e6 20 ®xd8 ®xd8 21 foxb7

®c7 22 £lc5+ <&f7 23 Ab2

But not 23 0-0 fog4\. After 23 Abl

White’s two rooks and three pawns

should overcome the black queen. In

Todorov-Boudre, Cannes 1997, White


kept the advantage after 23...®f4 24

0-0-0 Wf5 25 Ad4 &h5 26 g4 Wxg4

27 £xg7 &xg7 28 Shel *f5 29

£\xe4.

C23)

7...#g5 (D)

The main line. This move was given

a boost when it was adopted by Jon

Speelman in a 1989 Candidates match

against Jan Timman. Speelman reached

a level position and went on to win the

game. Since then, however, new ideas

have been found for White, and Black

is once more struggling to equalize.

8®e2&f6

8.. .®xg2?? loses to 9 ®h5+ &d7

(or 9...g6 10 ®e5+ &d7 11 £>b8+

*d8 12 ®e8#) 10 *f7+.

9f4

Now we have a further branch:

C231: 9...®h4+ 25

C232: 9...®xf4 26

C231)

9.. Mh4+ 10 g3 ®h3 11 £*5+ c6

12 £c4 M5 13 d3! (D)

13 c3 is also feasible, but I prefer to

prepare queenside castling as soon as

possible.

13.. .®g4

Black has to continue actively. Af¬

ter 13...exd3? 14 £.xd3 0-0 15 Ml,

followed by 0-0-0, White is winning.

14 ®xe4! ®H2 15 Ml+ &d8

15.. .6f8 loses to 16 ®c4 b6 17

Sfl, while White also keeps a clear

advantage after 15,..'4>e7 16 ®c4 Ab6

17 Sfl ®xh2 18 ®b4+ c5 19 ®d2.

16 ®c4 M617 Sfl ®xh218 Wb4

(D)


18.. JLf5 18.. .6C7 won quickly for White in

Konikowski-Roose, corr 1974, after

19 &e3 %4 20 &xb6+ axb6 21 We7+

&b8 22 0-0-0 W\g3 23 Wd6+ &a7 24

Sf3!.

19 Wd6+ &c8 20 ^.e6+ £xe6 21

Wxe6+ &b8 22 We7 a5 23 &e3! (D)

23 Wxgl is not so clear in view of

23...&a7 24 £lxc6+ <&a6!.

NCO stops here with an assessment

of ‘clearly better for White’, but per¬

haps we should look a little further.

After the forced sequence 23....£.xe3

24 £lxc6+ bxc6 25 Wxe3 White has a

strong attack for the piece, for exam¬

ple:

a) 25...£lg4 26 Wb6+ &c8 27

®xc6+ &b8 28 ®b6+ &c8 29 0-0-0

and now 29..Mxg3 loses to 30 #c6+

&b8 31 Ef3 %2 32 d4! and the rook

swings across decisively.

b) 25...£)xd3+ (returning the sacri¬

ficed piece looks to be Black’s best

chance) 26 cxd3 (26 Wxd3 Ee8+ 27

&dl &c7 is unclear) 26...#xb2 and

now 27 ®e5+ ®xe5+ 28 fxe5 gives

White an endgame advantage, while

White could also consider 27 Eel!?.

C232) 9...trxf4 (D)

This is Black’s most popular move.

10£se5+

10 d4!? is an underrated idea.

Kamsky-Piket, Groningen 1995 con¬

tinued lO.-.Wdh 11 £)e5+ c6 12 ,£.c4

&e6 (12...1rxd4 13 &f7+ &e7 14 &f4

looks too dangerous for Black) 13 c3

&xc4 14 £lxc4 We6 15 0-0 (Kamsky

gives 15 .£.14 as a good alternative)

15...1.e7 16 .£.g5 0-0 17 Eael and

White was slightly better. Of course

Black could try to steer the game back

to the main line with 10...^4+ 11 g3

Wh3. Now 12 £le5+ c6 13 &c4 would

transpose to the main line, but White

could also try the little-played 12

£g5 !?(£>).

This move does have some pedi¬

gree, as it was played by Fischer in a

blitz game, and it does seem to cause

Black problems. Fischer-Matulovic,

Herceg Novi blitz 1970 continued


13...Ad7 14 Axf6 gxf6 15 #xe4+

<&f7 16 £te5+ fxe5 17 Efl+ <&e7 18

Axd7 &xd7 19 Sf7+ &e8 20 Exc7

Ad6 21 Exb7 and White went on to

win. It’s possible that there are some

improvements for Black in this line,

but in any case I also like the look of

17 Ac4+ (instead of Fischer’s 17

Efl+), for example 17...Ae6 18 Efl+

^?g8 19 #h4!! and the endgame will

be very nice for White. Food for

thought!

10...c611 d4 Hi4+12 g3 Hi3 (D)

13 Ac4 Ae6

Black mustn’t allow the check on f7.

Emms-Timmerman, Gent 1990 con¬

tinued 13...Ad6?! 14 Af7+ &e7 15

Ab3 Ae6 16 Af4 Ehf8 17 0-0-0 and

White was comfortably better.

14 Af4!?

The alternative 14 Ag5 lost some of

its popularity after the Timman-Speel-

man game, but it should still give Black

problems. After 14...0-0-0 15 0-0-0

Ad6 White can try the interesting 16

g4!? (Timman played 16 £T7 but got

nothing after 16...Axf7 17 Axf7 Ehf8)

16...Axc4 17 Wxc4 and now:

a) 17...Ehe8 18 Edgl! (the point of

16 g4: White plans to trap the black

queen) 18...Axe5 19 dxe5 Exe5 20

Sg3 Wxg3 21 hxg3 Bxg5 22 We6+

&c7 23 Eh5! and White is better.

b) 17...Axe5 18 dxe5 Wxg4 (the

alternative 18...Exdl+19 Exdl #xg4

20 Ae3! £ld7 21 «T7 £lxe5 22 We7

£}g6 23 #xg7 was good for White in

Donchev-Inkiov, Bulgarian Ch 1989)

19 Bdgl Sdl+ (19...Wf5? 20 exf6

gxf6 21 Ae3 was winning for White in

Brynell-Wieweg, Stockholm Rilton

Cup 1993/4) 20 Sxdl Hxg5+ 21 &bl

#xe5 22 *T7 with an edge to White

according to Nunn (NCO).

14...0-0-0

After 14...Ed8 15 0-0-0 Ad6 Bolo-

gan came up with the important nov¬

elty 16 Ag5!, which causes Black lots

of headaches:

a) 16...0-0 17 #fl! wins material

after 17...*h8 18 Wxh3 Axh3 19 £sf7+

or 17...SM5 18 Wxh3 Axh3 19 Axd8.

b) After 16...#f5, Bologan-Chand-

ler, Bundesliga 1993/4 went 17 Axf6

gxf6 18 Bhfl and White was slightly


better, while Bologan suggests 17 h4!

as being even stronger.

15 0-0-0 &d6 16 &bl (D)

16...Ehf8

White also keeps an edge after

16...Ehe8 17 Ehfl, when 17...Ee7 is

better than 17...±xe5? 18 &xe6+!

Wxe6 19 dxe5 Exdl+ 20 Exdl with a

big advantage for White, Popovic-

Inkiov, Palma de Mallorca 1989.

17 Ehfl &b8 18 a4! (D)

White keeps the advantage. Lutz-

Yagupov, Groningen 1995 continued

18...&a8 19 a5 ^.xc4 20 Wxc4, when

the positional threat of a6 caused

Black some aggravation.

3 The Classical Variation

I e4 e5 2 £f3 £c6 3 &b5 &c5 (D)

3....&C5 is a very natural and active

move. However, it has never been re¬

ally popular because it runs straight

into White’s basic plan of c3 and d4.

As this can hardly be prevented. Black

must be prepared to lose time by mov¬

ing this bishop again. Nevertheless,

there is a plus side in that that the

bishop will be actively placed on the

a7-g] diagonal, where it can exert

pressure on White’s centre. Black’s

main problem is that it is difficult for

him to maintain his pawn on e5, where

it comes under considerable attack.

White’s two main options after

3...jLc5 are 4 c3 and 4 0-0. Out of

these two I’m opting for the slightly

more flexible 4 0-0, which also rules

out having to learn the unclear conse¬

quences of 4 c3 f5!?.

The Theory of the Classical Variation

1 e4 e5 2 £f3 £c6 3 £b5 £c5 4 0-0

Black now has three main possibili¬ ties:

A: 4...£ge7 30

B: 4.„£d4 30

C: 4...£f6 31

Other tries which deserve a men¬

tion are:

a) 4...d65c3&d7 6d4i.b67i.g5

£f6 (7...f6 8 &e3 £ge7 9 £Sa3 0-0 10

£c4 £g6 11 £xb6 axb6 was slightly

better for White in Romanovsky-

Kubbel, USSR Ch 1925) 8 dxe5 £xe5

9 £xe5 dxe5 (9...&xb5? 10 £xf7!

&xf7 11 ®b3+ and 12 Wxb5 is good

for White) 10 &xf6 gxf6 11 &xd7+

itxd7 12 ®xd7+ &xd7 13 £d2 and

Black’s pawn weaknesses on the

kingside give White an edge.

b) 4...Wf6 5 d3! (this quiet move is

the best way to exploit Black’s prema¬

ture queen sortie) 5...h6 (a necessary

pawn move because 5...£ge7 6 JLg5

We6 7 £c3 looks ugly for Black) 6

Ae3! Ab6 7 c4 £d4 8 &xd4 exd4 9 e5

ttg6 10 b4 c5 11 bxc5 &xc5 12 £bd2!

Wxd3 13 £b3 Hxdl 14 Saxdl &b6

15 c5 &d8 16 £bxd4 and White’s

pieces totally dominate the board,

Runnby-Ekstrom, Swedish Ch 1979.


A) 4...£lge7

Black wishes to develop quickly

and hit back in the centre with ...d5.

This line has similarities to 3...£)ge7 4

c3 g6 (see Chapter 1, Line E).

5 c3 &b6 6 d4 exd4 7 cxd4 d5 8

exd5 4)xd5 9 Eel+ &e6 10 &g 5 Wd6

ll£lbd2 0-0

Chasing the bishop with ll...h6

runs into 12 ®e4 ®b4 13 ±xc6+ bxc6

14 #cl!, when Black has serious

problems. Ulybin-Gretarsson, Stock¬

holm 1997 continued 14...hxg5 15

#xc6+ ê7 16 a3 #xb2 17 £)exg5

&f4 18 Wc4 £>e2+ 19 ®xe2 Wxe2 20

Exe2 Ead8 21 Eael Ed6 22 ®e5! 1-0.

12 £lc4 Wb4 (D)

13 Jbcc6 bxc6 14 Eel also prom¬

ises White an advantage, but the text-

move is more ambitious.

13.. .£>d8!

13.. .a6?! 14 Jbcc6 bxc6 15 Eel &.a7

16 &d2 Wb7 17 Wc2 £lb4 18 ®b3!

gave White a clear plus in the game

V.Ivanov-Rodin, Russia 1994.13...£kl8

is a suggested improvement, but White

can still keep an advantage.

14 Ea3 f615 &d2 We716 a5 c617

axb6 cxb5 18 Sxa7 4ic6 19 Sxa8

Exa8 20 &a3

Black doesn’t have enough for the

pawn deficit.

B) 4.. .£sd4

Black hopes to ease his problems

with a simplifying move.

5 4ixd4 jLxd4

5.. .exd4 transposes to the Bird’s

Defence (see Chapter 1).

6 c3 &b6 7 d4 c6 8 &a4 d6 9 4)a3

(D)

9...4T6

There are two other tries for Black:

a) 9...£c7 10 d5! &d7 11 dxc6

bxc6 12 £)c4 We7 13 f4 was good for

White in Ljubojevic-Durao, Orense

1974.

b) 9...exd4 10 cxd4 ?hel 11 d5!

(this important move gives White an

edge) 11...0-012dxc6bxc6 13 .&g516

14 &f4 d5 15 Eel &e6 16 &b3 1W

The Classical Variation 31

17 exd5 4}xd5 18 £>c4 Efd8 (not

18...&xf4? losing to 19 ®xd7 &xd7

20 £>xb6+) 19 S.g3 and Black’s weak

pawns gave White something to bite

onto in Khalifman-Montecatine, Se¬

ville 1993.

10 SLgS h6

The usual move. After 10...0-01 like

11 £sc4 &c7 12 &c2! £.e6 13 &e3,

leaving Black to decide how to deal

with the uncomfortable pin on the f6-

knight. 11 ±xf6 Wxf6 12 d5 &d7 13 £lc4

jLc7 14 dxc6 Leaving Black with a vulnerable

d6-pawn.

14.. .bxc6 15 ®d3 0-0 16 Sadi

The sharp 16 f4!? should also be

considered, e.g. 16...exf4 17 e5 JLf5

18 Hxd6! &xd6 (18...1rxd6 19 exd6

ii.b6+ 20 £lxb6 axb6 21 ,&xc6 wins

for White) 19 exf6 ±c5+ 20 <&hl g5

21 £>e5! and White is well on top.

16.. .Efd8 (D)

The pressure on the d6- and c6-

Pawns makes Black’s life rather un¬

comfortable. One possible plan for

White here is 17 £ie3!?, aiming to ob¬

tain the d5-square as an outpost after

playing b4-b5. Also possible is the

more direct 17 Sd2, aiming to treble

on the d-file, although after 17...Eab8

18 Efdl Black can try the complicated

18...d5!?. Then 19 £ie3 d4 20 cxd4

Eb4 21 dxe5! (21 ®a6? exd4 left Black

well placed in G.Todorovic-J.Petro-

nic, Yugoslavia 1992) 21...#xe5 22

Wa6 #xh2+ 23 ^fl leads to a very

messy position, although I still prefer

White.

C) 4...4T6

The main variation. Black counter¬

attacks by hitting White’s e4-pawn.

5 c3 (D)

There are other moves, including 5

C\xc5 and 5 ®c3, but this is the most

logical. White aims to build up the

usual pawn-centre.

Now Black has two possible contin¬

uations:

Cl: 5...&xe4!? 32

C2: 5...0-0 32


Cl) 5.. .£sxe4!?

This move has been surprisingly

neglected. True, it looks very risky to

grab the e4-pawn, but no convincing

refutation has been found.

6 We2!? Also enticing is 6 d4!? exd4 (if

6...&b6, then 7 ®e2 f5 8 dxe5 0-0 9

£ibd2 is good for White) 7 cxd4 &.e7

(7....&b6 8 d5 ®e7 9 £}g5 gives White

a healthy initiative, according to Ken-

gis) 8 d5 £>d6 9 &a4 &a5 10 MA 0-0

11 &bd2 b6 12 Scl &ab7 13 Sel

with a strong initiative for the pawn,

Lanka-Malaniuk, Odessa 1988.

6.. JLxf2+!

The most testing. Some sources just

give 6...f5 7 d3, which of course is

clearly better for White.

7'4?hl!

Things are not so clear after 7 Exf2

£lxf2 8 '4?xf2 f6 (or 8...0-0!?).

7.. .d5 (D)

8 c4!?

I can find no practical examples of

this move, which is a direct attempt at

a refutation of Black’s play. Other

moves include:

a) 8 d3 l$jg3+ 9 hxg3 .&xg3 with a

messy position where the three pawns

and White’s airy king balance the ex¬

tra piece.

b) 8 Sxf2 £ixf2+ 9 Wxf2 We7 10

d4 f6 11 &xc6+ bxc6 12 b3 e4 13 &a3

#f7 with another unclear position,

Boudre-McMahon, Massy 1993.

8...0-0

Black has a long list of alternatives,

but there’s no easy path:

a) 8.. JLd4 9 4hxd4 exd4 10 cxd5

Hxd5 11 &xc6+ Wxc6 12 d3 f5 13

£kl2 wins for White.

b) 8...iLg4 9 cxd5 ®xd5 10 &c4

Wc5 11 Wxe4 f5 12 Wd5 &xf3 13

gxf3 also wins.

c) 8..JLb6!? 9 cxd5 flxdS 10 &c4

&d4 11 &xd5 £ig3+ 12 hxg3 £lxe2

13 &h2, when White’s extra piece

outweighs the two pawns.

d) 8...f5 9 cxd5 Hxd5 10 £ic3!

<S)xc3 11 dxc3 &c5 12 £ixe5 and

again Black is in trouble.

9 cxd5 ®d4

9.. .#xd5 loses a piece to 10 ,&c4!.

With the text-move Black traps the

white queen, but has to give up three

minor pieces in return.

10 ©xe4

Not 10 £lxd4 Wh4!.

10.. .±f5 11 WxeS f6 12 Wf4 g5 13

®xd4 gxf4 14 ^xf5 .&b6 15 d4

White’s three pieces outweigh the

black queen. This whole line could

definitely use a practical test.

C2)

5.. .0.0

The Classical Variation 33

The popular choice. Black gets on

with some necessary development.

6 d4 Ab6

Planning to counter 7 dxe5 with

7.. .£sxc4. Giving up the centre with

6.. .exd4 cannot be recommended. Af¬

ter 7 cxd4 ±b6 8 e5 £id5 9 Ag5 #e8

10 £>c3 4^xc3 11 bxc3 White’s better

development gives him a distinct ad¬

vantage.

7±g5

White’s choice includes 7 Bel, 7

dxe5 and 7 .&xc6, but pinning the

knight is considered the most danger¬

ous continuation for Black.

7...h6 8 Ah4 d6 (D)

White has to be a little careful. At

first sight White can play 9 Axc6 bxc6

10 dxe5 dxe5 and then win a pawn by

11 #xd8 Sxd8 12 £lxe5, but after

12...g5! 13 Ag3 £>xe4 14 £lxc6 Aa6!

Black has a very active position.

Better than 11 #xd8 is the calm 11

&bd2. After ll...Ee8 12 Wc2 g5 13

*g3 ®h5 14 c4! £}xg3 15 hxg3 #e7

16 £ib3 Ac5 17 #c3 Sb8 18 a3 Ag4

19 ^3xc5 #xc5 20 b4 White held a

slight edge in Almasi-Gulko, Pam¬

plona 1996/7. If White wishes to avoid

the complications of the main line,

this looks like the way to play it.

9.. .a5 (D)

9.. .a6? is a mistake due to 10 Axc6

bxc611 a5 Aa7 12 dxe5 dxe5 13 #xd8

Exd8 14 ®xe5 g5 15 Ag3 ®xe4 16

£lxc6 and not only is the knight fork¬

ing rook and bishop, but Black no lon¬

ger has the ...Aa6 resource discussed

in the last note.

10 Sel exd4

10...!fe7 11 ®a3 Ag4 12 &c4 g5

13 Ag3 ®d7 14 ®e3 was better for

White in Spassky-Quinones, Amster¬

dam IZ 1964. Black’s main alternative

is the complicated pawn sacrifice

10...Ag4!? 11 Axc6 bxc6 12 dxe5

dxe5 13 ®xd8 Baxd8 14 ®xe5 g5 15

Ag3 and now:

a) 15...h5 16 &xg4 (16 £>xc6 Bde8

17 £>d2 Ad7 18 e5 &d5 19 c4 Axc6

20 cxd5 Axd5 is less clear) 16...£>xg4

17 h3 h4 18 Axh4 gxh4 19 hxg4 <&h7

20 &fl Sg8 21 f3 Sd3 22 ®a3 h3 23


£lc4 Egd8 (23...h2? 24 &e2 Egd8 25

Ehl led to a winning position in

Shmatkov-Mukhaev, Moscow 1995)

24 £lxb6 cxb6 25 ^f2 with a clear ad¬

vantage to White.

b) 15...£lxe4 16 £lxg4 f5 17 £>a3

£lxg3 18 £ixh6+ &g7 19 hxg3 Ed2 20

£lc4! Axf2+ 21 *fl Axel 22 Exel

Ed3 23 Se6 Edl+ 24 *12 Ehl 25

Exc6 Ef6 26 Exc7+ *xh6 27 Ec5 and

White eventually won the ending in

Anand-Torre, Manila IZ 1990.

11 Axc6 bxc6 12 £lxd4 Ad7

12.. .Ee8 13 £ld2 c5 14 &4f3 Ab7

15 #c2 gave White an edge in

Thorsteins-Spassky, Reykjavik 1985.

13 £>d2 Ee814 *T3 g515 Ag3 (D)

Black has the two bishops, but the

weaknesses created by the ...g5 lunge

give White real hopes of a kingside at¬

tack.

15.. .h5 16 h3!

Stronger than 16 h4 £ig4! 17 hxg5

W\g5 and 16 e5 dxe5 17 Axe5 £>g4,

both of which are fine for Black.

The text-move is a suggestion from

Macieja.

16.. .h4 17 Ah2 g4

Macieja gives 17...Axd4 18 cxd4

Ee6 19 e5 #e7 as equal, but after 20

#dl! (NCO) Black’s weak kingside

still gives him problems.

18 Wf4! gxh3 19 £)2f3! hxg2

19...£)g4 20 gxh3 £lxh2 21 *xh2

leaves the black king horribly ex¬

posed.

With the text-move (19...hxg2), we

are still following Macieja’s analysis,

which stops with 20 e5, claiming a

strong attack for White. This does

seem to be true, e.g. 20...4kl5 21 ©h6

Axd4 22 ®xd4 c5 23 Ee4!, planning

to meet 23...cxd4 with 24 Exh4.

4 The Berlin Defence

1 e4 e5 2 £>f3 £sc6 3 &b5 ®f6 (D)

:X llllli ill

r« „ . a ■ ifoM

ABAR HAS HI

The Berlin Defence is one of

Black’s most solid and reliable ways

of meeting the Ruy Lopez. Recently it

has found its way into the repertoires

of some of the world’s leading young

players, including Alexei Shirov and

Vladimir Kramnik, while it has also

been a long-time favourite of Britain’s

first grandmaster, Tony Miles. Being

such a solid defence, there is the draw¬

back that Black finds it difficult to cre¬

ate winning chances if White is

content to play for a draw, but of

course, this accusation could be lev¬

elled at most black defences.

The Berlin Endgame

The main line of the Berlin Defence

gives rise to an endgame after the

moves 1 e4 e5 2 £if3 £lc6 3 &b5 4if6

4 0-0 £sxe4 5 d4 &d6 6 &xc6 dxc6

7 dxe5 8 Wxd8+ &>xd8. After

White’s most flexible move, 9 ®c3

(D), we reach the following position.

At first glance the pawn-structure

seems to give White a persistent ad¬

vantage. After all. White has a healthy

4-3 majority on the kingside, while

Black should find it difficult to create

a passed pawn from his own queenside

majority, due to the doubled pawns.

However, there are also some factors

favouring Black. For example. White’s

advanced pawn on e5 presents Black

with squares on f5 and d5. The e5-

pawn could actually become quite

weak if it’s not well supported. An¬

other plus for Black is that he pos¬

sesses the bishop-pair.

In fact. White’s best chance for an

advantage lies in the slightly vulnerable


position of the black king, which has

lost the right to castle and prevents the

black rooks from connecting. White

must play actively and attempt to ex¬

ploit this temporary disharmony in

the black position in order to create a

concrete positional or tactical advan¬

tage.

The ...Ab4xc3 Exchange

This surprising exchange is one of

Black’s most potent weapons in the

Berlin Endgame. At first sight, it ap¬

pears a little strange just to give away

the advantage of the bishop-pair, but

following the trade, the presence of

opposite-coloured bishops consider¬

ably eases Black’s defensive task.

Light-square control on the kingside

makes it very difficult for White to

mobilize his pawn majority, while it’s

also possible that White’s pawns can

end up as targets. Witness the follow¬

ing impressive display by Vishy Anand.

m. « Pi*

. ij m a * i %m

a 'MM % I Fritz 5 - Anand

Frankfurt 1998

12...Ab413 Ab2?! Axc3! 14 Axc3

c5 15 Sd2 b6 16 Sadi Ae6 17 a4

£se7 18 £sel g5 19 f3 £sc6 20 *f2

*e7

Black is already very comfortable, if

not better, due to the weak e5-pawn.

21 Ab2 Shd8 22 c4 Sxd2+ 23

Sxd2 Af5 24 *e3 Sd8 25 Sxd8

£sxd8 26 f4 gxf4+ 27 &xf4 Abl 28

£>f3 Ac2 29 ®d2 &e6+ 30 *13 *f8

31 *e3 *g7 32 g4 *g6 33 *13 h5 34

*f2 hxg4 35 hxg4 Adi 36 *g3 *g7

37 *h4 *f8 38 Aal *e7 39 *g3

&f8 40 Ab2 *e6 41 Aal ^g6 (D)

The e5-pawn is lost and White’s

queenside pawns are extremely vul¬

nerable. This opening was an inspired

choice against the computer, which

obviously didn’t appreciate the posi¬

tional subtleties of the endgame. Most

humans would normally meet ...Ab4

with £>c3-e2 or £*c3-e4, in either case

retaining the knight.

White Plays £*g5xAe6

Similarly, this exchange is one of

White’s weapons.

The Berlin Defence 37

J. Polgar - Smyslov

Monaco 1994

Play continued 12 £>xe6! fxe6 13

and we can see that the exchange

has favoured White. Black no longer

possesses the bishop-pair, and White

can still advance his pawn majority on

the kingside. Another point is that

White’s e5-pawn is less vulnerable, as

Black no longer has the long-term op¬

tion of to attack it.

The Main Ideas

Since Black will find it difficult to

connect rooks, he often tries to acti¬

vate them on their original squares. In

such cases it’s common for Black to

play ...a5-a4 to activate his a8-rook.

Sometimes Black may even play

...h5-h4 to give the h8-rook some

scope. It could then go to h5, where it

could attack the e5-pawn. Black nor¬

mally develops his bishops on e6 and

b4 and often leaves the e7-square free

for a possible knight retreat.

White’s main plan will be to try to

activate his kingside pawn majority.

Hence the need for moves such as h3,

which supports a later g4. The f3-

knight will want to move so White can

create a pawn roller with f4. Normally

the bishop goes to b2, but on occa¬

sions it can also go to f4, perhaps

dropping back to g3 or h2, from where

it can support White’s pawn advance.

The Theory of the Berlin Defence

1 e4 e5 2 £>f3 £sc6 3 i.b5 £T6 4 0-0

£*xe4

Other moves usually lead to posi¬

tions discussed elsewhere, e.g.:

a) 4...i.e7 5 &c3 d6 6 d4 i.d7 and

we reach a position discussed in Chap¬

ter 1, Line B.

b) 4...d6 5 d4 i.d7 6 £ic3 and

again we reach Chapter 1, Line B.

c) 4.. JLc5 transposes to Chapter 3.

5 d4! (D)

This is White’s strongest move. The

other attempt at ‘breaking the Berlin

Wall’ is with 5 Sel, but most top


players believe that Black has no

problems after 5...£>d6 6 ®xe5 JLe7 7

&d3 0-0.

I'W mkkkmpMk

, J II S&J ■ ■ .~i%r

Black has two main defences here:

A: 5..JLe7 38

B: 5...®d6 40

Other tries are:

a) 5...exd4?! (too risky) 6 Eel f5 7

£lxd4 £>xd4 (7...jLc5 loses to 8 Bxe4+!

fxe4 9 Wh5+ and 10 Wxc5) 8 Wxd4 c6

9 f3 cxb5 10 fxe4 ®b6 11 exf5+ &f7

12 i.e3 W/xd4 13 Axd4 d6 14 £ic3

Axf5 15 Ee3 <&g8 16 £id5 and Black

was under severe pressure in Rozen-

talis-Kaminski, Polish Cht (Krynica)

1997.

b) 5...a6 isn’t a bad transpositional

move, after which White should play 6

JLa4, reaching the Open Defence (see

Chapter 7).

A) 5...&e7 6®e2&d6

The safest move. Other attempts al¬

low White to achieve a very quick ini¬

tiative:

a) 6...f5 7 dxe5 0-0 8 £sbd2 d5 9

exd6 £*xd6 10 Jixc6 bxc6 11 £*e5 and

White has a clear advantage.

b) 6...d5 is a sterner defence, but

White is still better after 7 £>xe5 &d7

8 &xc6 Jixc6 (8...bxc6 9 Eel &f8 10

£>c3 £)xc3 11 bxc3 ±e8 12 Wa6 with

a clear advantage, Em.Lasker-Scheve,

Berlin sim 1891) 9 Eel i.d7 (9...0-0?

10 f3! wins material) 10 JLf4 c6

(10...0-0!? 11 4M2! {11 f3 Ag5 is not

so clear} ll...£ixd2 12 ^xd7! Ee8 13

Wfb5 &c4 14 Wfxd5 ^xb2 15 Eabl c6

16 ®f5 is good for White) 11 4M2

£>xd2 12 Axd2 and Black has prob¬

lems completing development, as

12.. JLe6 loses to 13 £*xf7! jLxf7 14

±M.

7 Axc6 bxc6

Recapturing with 7...dxc6 allows

White to reach a menacing position af¬

ter 8 dxe5 &f5 9 Bdl i.d7. Here

White can try the enticing 10 e6!? fxe6

11 £se5 i.d6 12 ®h5+ g6 13 £sxg6,

but in fact things are not so easy after

13.. .£ig7 14 Wh6 $3f5 15 #h3 Bg8

16 Wxh7 Eg7 17 ®h5 #f6!. Now 18

®h8+ &f7 19 Wxa8 Wxg6 gives Black

far too much play for the exchange,

while even after the stronger 18 £*e5+

<&e7 19 &g4 Wh4 20 Wxh4+ &xh4 21

h3 e5 Black still has some compensa¬

tion for the pawn. In view of all this,

White should consider the more re¬

strained 10 £*c3 0-0 11 <£ie4, which

certainly keeps a nice spatial advan¬

tage, while Black loses more time un¬

ravelling from the pin on the d-file.

8 dxe5 &b7

Why here rather than the more

active f5-square? Well, after 8...£45


White should play aggressively with 9

We4! g6 10 £>d4 <^xd4 11 #xd4.

Now 11...0-0 12 Ah6 Ee8 13 £>c3 d5

14 exd6 JLf6 15 #a4 cxd6 16 #xc6

J.f5 17 Eael led to a large advantage

for White in Taimanov-Nikitin, USSR

1970. A more recent attempt to im¬

prove on Black’s play is with the inter¬

esting move ll...d5. The point is that

after 12 exd6 0-0! 13 Ah6 i.f6 14

#c5 Ee8 15 #xc6 Ad7 16 dxc7 i.xc6

17 cxd8# Eaxd8 Black’s develop¬

ment advantage balances the two-

pawn deficit. With this in mind. White

should prefer 12 JLh6!, preventing

Black castling kingside. In the game

M.Schlosser-Keitlinghaus, Munster

1992 White kept the advantage after

12.. .Ae6 13 -SM2 c5 14 #a4+ #d7 15

#a6 c6 16 Sadi #c7 17 b3 #b6 18

#e2 0-0-0 19 £tf3 Ehe8 20 £>g5 Ed7

21 £M7!.

9 4k3 0-0

Black can start his knight ma¬

noeuvre straight away with 9...£>c5

(threatening ...jla6), when White

should answer 10 4kl4 0-0 (but not

10.. .JU6? 11 #g4! iLxfl 12 #xg7

Bf8 13 Wxfl, when Black has won the

exchange but his position is a com¬

plete mess) 11 Bdl (11 Bel is also

possible; after ll...<£se6 we reach the

note to White’s 11th move) ll...#e8

12 ®f5 f6 13 #g4 £hc6 14 Ah6, with

the initiative, Vasiukov-Knezevic, Le¬ ningrad 1991.

10 Eel £ic5 (D)

10...Ee8 is inferior. After 11 #c4

^c5 12 fcg5! i.xg5 13 Axg5 #xg514

c5 Black will find it hard to break

White’s grip on the dark squares.

11 JLe3

White continues to develop classi¬

cally, centralizing his pieces. Another

good choice here is 11 £sd4 4ê6 12

JLe3 and now:

a) 12...&xd4 13 i.xd4 c5 14 &e3

d5 15 exd6 i.xd6 16 ê4 Ab7 (or

16...&xh2+ 17 &xh2 #h4+ 18 *gl

#xe4 19 i-xc5 #xe2 20 Bxe2 Bd8

21 Be7 with a very good ending for

White) 17 £sxd6 cxd6 18 Badl «T6

19 f3 Bae8 20 #d2 Be6 21 Af2 and

Black’s weak d6-pawn promises a

small edge for White, Tseshkovsky-

Ivkov, Bled/Portoroz 1979.

b) 12...Eb8 13 £sb3! a6 14 f4 f5 15

exf6 Sxf6 16 &e4 Sf7 17 Efl d6 18

f5 £)f8 19 £\d4 and White’s pieces are

ready for a kingside assault, Nier-

mann-Fecke, Germany 1994.

11...4ê6 12 Eadld5

Similar play arises after 12...Sb8

13 b3 Ab4 14 ±d2 d5 15 exd6 cxd6

16 £ie4!, when White maintains a

grip on the centre. Jansa-Knezevic,

Namestovo 1987 continued 16.. JLxd2

17 #xd2 d5 18 #c3! #66?! (Black

should prefer 18...#c7, allowing White


a bind on the dark squares after 19

£sc5) 19 £sd6! Hc7 20 £tf5 Ab7 (the

alternative 20...Se8? loses brilliantly

to 21 Sxd5! cxd5 22 Sxe6!) 21 We5!

Efc8 22 4M6! Ed8 23 Qxf7 and White

13 exd6 cxd6 14 £>d4 &xd4

Following 14...Ad7 15 ©f5 d5 16

£ixe7+ ®xe7 17 ®d2 ®h4 18 £>e2

Efe8 19 b3 White keeps a slight ad¬

vantage, Karpov-Korchnoi, Merano

Wch (2) 1981.

15 &xd4 Se8 16 #f3 d5 17 <£a4

&f8 18 i.c5! Exel+ 19 Exel (D)

The general assessment is that

White’s dark-square control gives him

an edge. The position has simplified

somewhat, but there are still several

tactics lurking in the background. On

first inspection it looks like 19...®a5

wins a piece, but after 20 b4! Wxa4 21

He8 i.b7 22 We2! White wins the

piece back due to back-rank threats,

e.g. 22...®xa2 23 h3 h6 24 Exa8

i.xa8 25 We8 i.b7 26 #xf8+ &h7 27

W/xfl #al+ 28 &h2 and the a-pawn

drops as well. 19...i.d7 20 Axf8 ®xf8

21 Wc3 is also good for White, while

Tal-Portisch, Brussels World Cup

1988 continued 19...Ag4!? 20 ®xg4

(20 ®c3!?) 20...®a5 21 c3 i.xc5 22

£ixc5 ®xc5 23 Wd7 Ef8 24 h4 h5 and

here 25 Ee8! g6 26 ®e7 ®xe7 27

Exe7 Eb8 28 b3 keeps White’s lasting

advantage into a rook and pawn end¬

ing!

B)

5.. .£sd6 6 i.xc6

Once more White has alternatives

such as 6 dxe5 and 6 JLg5, but the

main line promises most chance of an

advantage.

6.. .dxc6

6.. .bxc6 makes no sense here. After

7 dxe5 £ib7 8 £>c3 £*c5 9 £id4 White

is already in a good position. Sion

Castro-Campora, Leon 1997 contin¬

ued 9...<£e6 10 £sxe6 fxe6 11 Wh5+

g6 12 %4 d5 13 exd6 cxd6 14 ®c4

$Ld7 15 £se4 Ae7 16 Wd4 and Black

was in big trouble.

7 dxe5 (D)


Bl: 7...®e4!? 41

B2: 7...£T5 42

BD 7.. .£ie4!?

Very rarely seen, but although this

is risky, there is no obvious refutation.

8 Wte2

Attacking the knight is the best

way. Going into the endgame with 8

Wxd8+ &xd8 is no longer so appeal¬

ing for White. The knight is better

placed on e4 as it doesn’t block the light-squared bishop.

8.. .1.f5

More of a test than 8...£sc5, which

allows White to obtain an easy advan¬

tage after 9 Edl i.d7 10 £sc3 &e7 11 £e3.

9 Edl Wc8

Given the strength of White’s 11th

move in the main line. Black could

well take a further look at 9...®e7. It

looks rather ugly to block in the f8-

bishop, but White must react quickly.

If Black were able to complete his de¬

velopment he would have no problems

at all. In Jansa-Sahu, Wrexham 1997,

White played energetically with 10

i-e3 Ed8 11 £>a3!? Exdl+ 12 Exdl

and after 12...£ic3? 13 bxc3 Wxa3 14

^d4 jLc8 15 e6! he was able to crash

through the black defences. If 12...g6

White should grab the pawn with 13

■&xa7, as 13...b6 14 4id4 looks good.

Perhaps Black should be content with 12...a6!?.

10 &d4 i.c5 11 b4! (D)

A significant move, which takes away the c5-square from Black. This

becomes important when White tries

to trap the knight. A quieter way to

play would be 11 jLe3, although after

11...0-0 12 f3 i.xd4 13 &xd4 ®g5 14

£*c3 Ee8 15 Ed2 Sie6 Black had

equalized in Cu.Hansen-Westerinen,

Nordic Ch (Reykjavik) 1997.

ll..JLb6 Capturing with 11.. Jbcb4 runs into

12 e6!, when Black is forced to give

up material, e.g. 12...fxe6 13 £sxf5

exf5 14 f3. Sulskis-Westerinen, Gaus-

dal 1995 went 12...&g6 13 exf7+ &f8

(13...&xf7 14 Wc4+ &f6 15 f3 wins)

14 ®c4 itd6 15 £se6+ <&e7 16 f8i.+

Exf8 17 £ixf8 &xf8 18 f3 £if6 19

JLa3 and White’s material advantage paid off in the end.

After the text-move, the knight has

no squares to go to from e4, but can

White actually win it? It’s not as easy

as it looks!

12 c4

12 f3 allows Black to escape after

12...#d7 13 Ab2 &g5 14 c4 Axd4+

15 JLxd4 0-0-0 16 ‘Sic3 Sie6 with an

equal position, Wahls-Ekstrom, Dres¬

den Z 1998. However, 12 JLe3!? looks


worth a try, e.g. 12...jLxd4 (12...a5 13

£3 i-xd4 14 Bxd4 c5 15 Ec4! b5 16

Exe4 Axe4 17 fxe4 cxb4 18 Wxb5+

c6 19 ®c5 looks very good for White,

but perhaps the calm 12...h6, prepar¬

ing ...4)g5, is Black’s best idea) 13

Exd4 c5 (once more, I3...h6 should be

considered) 14 Edl! cxb4 15 ®b5+ c6

16 ®xb4 h6 17 <SM2 4)xd2 18 Exd2

and Black’s king is stuck in the centre.

12.. .C5 13 &xf5 ®xf5 14 b5

14 «ff3?! ®xe5 15 Ab2 #xb2 16

#xe4+ <£18 is good for Black.

14.. .£a5 15 f3 £sc316 4)xc3 i.xc3

17 Ab2 i.xb2 18 Wxb2 0-0 19 Ed5

We are following Rotsagov-Sam-

malvuo, Finnish Cht 1996/7. White’s

better pawn-structure gives him a

small edge.

B2)

7.. .6.5 8 0xd8+ &xd8 9 0x3 (D)

Also possible are moves such as 9

b3,9 h3 and 9 Sdl+, but the text-move

is considered to be the most flexible.

Black now has a number of devel¬

opment plans:

B21: 9...&e7 42 B22: 9...&e6 43

B23: 9...h6 44

B24: 9...&e8 44

Yet another idea is 9...a5!?, imme¬

diately trying to gain space on the

queenside. This can often transpose

to other lines. Against such a non¬

developing move it makes sense to

play as actively as possible, for exam¬

ple 10 £e4 h6 11 h3 Ac6 12 g4 i.d5

13 &ed2 4)e7 14 c4 Ae615 £sd4 Ad7

16 theA &g6 17 f4 h5 18 £g5 &c5 19

&e3 &e8 20 Eael hxg4 21 e6! and

White’s initiative told in Blehm-Kar-

patchev, Cappelle la Grande 1998.

B21)

9.. .£)e7

A relatively new plan for Black.

The knight is ready to hop to g6, where

it pressures the e5-pawn.

10 £ld4!?

A logical move, which paves the

way for the advance of the f-pawn. Af¬

ter the slower 10 h3 Black can play

lO.-.'&eS, transposing to Line B24.

Ivanchuk-Shirov, Monaco Amber

blindfold 1998 went instead 10...£lg6

11 i.g5+ &e8 12 Eadl Ae6 13 £d4

jk.b4 14 £sxe6 fxe6 15 4)e4 £)xe5 16

Af4 £)f7 17 &xc7 and White was

slightly better due to the weakness on

e6.

10.. .£lg6 11 f4 AcS 12 Ae3 i.b6

13 Eael 4)h4 14 £e4

After 14 e6, Shirov-Z.Almasi, Til¬

burg 1996 continued 14...fxe6? 15

£lxe6+ Axe6 16 -&xb6 axb6 17 Sxe6

*d7 18 Sfel Sae8 19 Exe8 Exe8 20


Sxe8 &xe8 21 &t7 and White, with a

superior pawn majority, went on to

win the endgame. In his notes to the

game, however, Shirov pointed out

that Black can instead play 14...c5! 15

<£sb3 jLxe6 16 ®xc5 JLxc5 17 JLxc5

JLc4, when White has nothing.

The text-move is Shirov’s sug¬

gested improvement.

14...&f5 15 £sxf5 i.xf5 16 ®g3

&xc2(D)

Shirov comments that after 17 Ef2

JLxe3 18 Exe3 White has good play

for the pawn. Perhaps it’s even stron¬

ger to capture on b6 first. Following

17 JLxb6 axb6 18 Sf2 &a4 19 Ed2+

&c8 20 b3 A65 21 £tf5 g6 22 £)h6

White has a strong initiative. Further

tests are needed in this line.

B22)

9...jLe6 Sensible development, but this al¬

lows White to harass the bishop. 10 Edl+!

Stronger than the immediate 10

^g5, which can be answered by the

unorthodox but effective 10..,&e7!.

Black is ready to recapture on e6 with

the king, where it keeps an eye on the

e5-pawn, and there is no way to ex¬

ploit the king’s position on e7.

10.. .6e8 (D)

10.. .6c8 is also answered by 11

£*g5. Then:

a) ll...Ac4 12 b3 Ab4 13 &b2

&xc3 14 &xc3 Ad5 15 43h3 h5 16

£tf4 Ae6 17 Ed3 b6 18 Ad2! &b7 19

£lxe6 fxe6 20 Ag5 and White’s domi¬

nation of the d-file guarantees him a

large advantage, Dvoirys-Aleksan-

drov, Moscow 1996.

b) ll...Ac5 12£ice4Ab6 13 £jxe6

fxe6 14 *fl Ef8 15 a4! a5 16 Ea3

&b8 17 Ed7 &a7 18 Ead3 and once

again Black is very tied up, Gdanski-

Gretarsson, Stockholm 1997.

11 £sg5 Ae7

ll..JLc4 gives White too many

open lines after 12 b3 JLb4 13 bxc4!

i.xc3 14 Ebl b6 15 g4 43h4 16 f4.

12 ®xe6 fxe6 13 £se4 Ed8

Better than 13...*f7?! 14 g4 <^h4

15 Ed7! £tf3+ 16 &g2 £>xe5 17 Exc7


and the white rook causes Black prob¬

lems on the seventh rank, Benjamin-

Sherzer, New York 1994.

14 Exd8+ &xd8 (D)

We are following J.Polgar-Smys-

lov, Monaco 1994. White has a small

but unmistakable edge. Perhaps the

most active way to continue would be

15 &g5 i.xg5 16 £sxg5 &e7 17 Edl

c5 18 c3.

B23)

9.. .h6

Preparing ...jLe6, without having to

worry about £>g5.

10 h3

White aims for g4.

10.. .ê8

10.. .a5 11 a4!? &e6 12 g4 £se7 13

£>d4 g5 14 f4 gxf4 15 £ixe6+ fxe6 16

JLxf4 led to a small advantage for

White in Djurhuus-Dumitrache, Haifa

Echt 1989, while 10.. JLe6 11 g4 £le7

12 £ld4 c5 13 £lxe6+ fxe6 14 f4 4}c6

15 i.e3 b616ê4 kcl 17 &g2 is also

pleasant for White, Campora-Rubin-

etti, Argentine Ch 1989.

11 JLf4!?

This bishop can drop back on the

kingside and help to organize a pawn

assault.

ll..JLe6 12 g4 &e7 13 <^d4 &d5

14 £ixe6 fxe6 15 £se2 i.c5 16 Sadi

&e7 17 i.cl Ehd8 18 a3 b5 19 &g2

a5 20 Hd3 (D)

Wahls-Smejkal, Bundesliga 1997/8.

White has eliminated one of the black

bishops and his superior pawn-structure

guarantees an edge.

B24)

9...&e8

The most popular move. Black

moves his king to a less vulnerable

square, and waits to see White’s inten¬

tions before committing himself. Here

we will discuss two options for White:

B241: 10 b3 44

B242: 10 h3 45

B241)

10 b3 a511 JLb2 i.b412 £«2 (D)

The other major move here is 12

&e4. After 12...a4 13 a3 i.e7 14 b4


JLe6 15 Efel, Onishchuk-Miles, Biel

1996 continued 15...h6?! 16 h3 Sd8

17 Sadi Ed7 18 Exd7 &xd7 19 g4

&h4 20 ®xh4 Axh4 21 £lc5+ &c8 22

&xe6 fxe6 23 Ee4 Ed8 24 Ad4 b6 25

<4fl Ef8 26 <&e2 and White went on to

win. In a later game Miles improved

on his play with 15...Sd8! 16 Sadi b6

17 h3 h5! (the point - Black hasn’t

wasted a move with ...h6) 18 Sxd8+

<i?xd8 19 Acl Ad5 20 Ag5 i.xg5 21

£}exg5 Be8 and the powerful bishop

on d5 meant that Black was fine in Sedina-Miles, Toscolano 1996.

12.. .a4 13 c4

Playing to restrict the light-squared

bishop, which cannot find a home on d5.

13.. .h5

13.. .Ac5 14 45d2 h5 15 £se4 &e7

16 ®f4 b6 17 Efel Jie6 18 JLc3 gave

White a small plus in Jansa-Plachetka,

Ostrava 1992.

14 i.c3 i.e7 15 Efdl c5 16 £sf4 &e6 17 h3 &h4

After the game Miles suggested

!7...axb3 18 axb3 Exal 19 Exal &d7

as an improvement for Black, but fol¬

lowing 20 &fl &c6 21 &e2. White

still has a minute plus.

18 ®xh4 i.xh4 (D)

Now Emms-Miles, British League

(4NCL) 1997/8 continued 19 £>xe6

fxe6 20 g3 Jkel 21 '4'g2 &f7 and was

soon drawn. A better try for White

would be 19 £d5!?, e.g. 19...Ad8 20

f4 g6 21 &f2 and White still enjoys

any advantage that’s going.

B242)

10 h3 a5

Other moves include:

a) 10...Ae6 11 g4 £>e7 12 £ig5

Ac4 13 Eel £sd5 14 £sdl! h6 15 £>e4

£sb4 16 &e3 Ad5 17 £sg3 Ae6 18 a3

®d5 19 £ig2! a6 20 f4 &c5+ 21 &h2

h5 (de Firmian-Miles, Biel 1990) and

now 22 £*e4 Jte7 23 &g3 keeps the

advantage.

b) 10...£*e7!? (this possibility is

becoming more popular) 11 Eel £ig6

(ll...£sd5!? 12£se4 45b4 13 Be2 Af5

14 £sd4 i.xe4 15 Bxe4 c5 16 a3 cxd4

17 axb4 i.xb4 18 Exd4 Ae7 19 Ae3


a6 led to a draw in Topalov-Kramnik,

Wijk aan Zee 1999) 12 £»e4 h6 (the al¬

ternative 12...JLe7 13 £)d6+! cxd6 14

exd6 f6 15 dxe7 £ixe7 16 b3 *f7 17

&.a3 Se8 18 £»d2 is slightly awkward

for Black) 13 &d4 c5 14 £ib5 4?d7 15

f4 &c6! 16 a4 $Le7 with an unclear po¬

sition, Brodsky-Van den Doel, Wijk

aan Zee 1999.

11 &f4!? ±e6

ll...£b4 12 £ie4 £e6 13 c3 Af8

14 Sfel h5 15 £>eg5 Ad5 16 e6! f6 17

$M7 Eh7 18 .&xc7 was good for

White in Lutz-Korchnoi, Dresden Z

1998, as 18...iLxe6 fails to 19 £id8!,

but Black managed to equalize in

Bologan-Aleksandrov, Kishinev 1998

after ll...a4!? 12 a3 £e7 13 Sadi

£ih4 14 £id4 &£5 15 ^Me2 h5 16

h4.

12 g4 13 £ig5 £)d5

The most prudent course of action.

Maintaining the bishop with 13.,.jLc4

can run into a swift attack down the e-

file, e.g. 14 Efel £)g6 15 .SLg3 .SLb4 16

e6! f6 17 toff Eg8 18 £xc7 £ih4 19

Ee3 £xc3 20 bxc3 £d5 21 Edl b5 22

£g3 £)g6 23 c4 bxc4 24 Ebl £ie5 25

Eb7 and Black was forced to resign in

Luther-Mainka, Bad Zwesten 1999.

14 £sxe6 fxe6 15 £d2 £b4 16

£)xd5 cxd5 17 ,&e3 &d7 18 a4 £ie7

19 &g2 c5 (D)

Galkin-Aleksandrov, Russia Cup

(Krasnodar) 1997. This endgame is

reasonably level, although the pawn

majorities mean that there is still

plenty to fight for.

5 The Deferred Steinitz and Other Fourth Move Alternatives

1 e4 e5 2 £*f3 £>c6 3 £b5 a6 4 £a4

(D)

In this chapter we will look at

Black’s fourth move alternatives to

4...£if6, including the Delayed Schlie-

mann (4...f5), the Norwegian Varia¬

tion (4...b5 5 ,SLb3 £ia5) and, most

importantly, the Steinitz Defence De¬

ferred (4...d6).

The last of these options is basi¬ cally an improved version of the

Steinitz Defence. One of the reasons

for this is that Black is ready at any

moment to escape the pin on the a4-e8

diagonal with a timely ...b5. This can

be seen to the full effect if White tries

to follow the same recipe as against

the Steinitz Defence. After 5 d4 b5! 6

.SLb3 £ixd4 7 £ixd4 exd4 the natural 8

Wxd4? is a mistake which falls into

what’s known as the ‘Noah’s Ark

Trap’. After 8...c5! White cannot avoid

a loss of material, e.g. 9 Wd5 .£Le6 10

Wc6+ £d7 11 Wd5 c4! (D) and the

Lopez bishop is cruelly trapped!

W

White has a few different choices

against the Steinitz Deferred, includ¬

ing 5 0-0, 5 c4 and 5 .£Lxc6+, but I’m

recommending the most popular

move, 5 c3, which immediately goes

about setting up a pawn-centre with

d4. Black can then choose to play


adventurously with the risky 5...f5,

which leads to sharp play reminiscent

of the Schliemann Defence. It’s more

usual, however, for Black to support

the e5-pawn, either with ...£sge7-g6,

or ...g6 and ...$Lgl. Play in these lines

is much slower and of a positional na¬

ture. Black’s position is usually very

solid, if slightly cramped.

White Plays d4-d5

In many variations of the Steinitz De¬

ferred, White has the option of main¬

taining the tension in the centre or

pushing with d4-d5, reaching this type

of closed position.

The strategy then become very sim¬

ilar to lines of the King’s Indian De¬

fence. White may seek to attack on the

queenside by trying to enforce the c4-

c5 advance, while Black will play in a

similar way on the other side with ...f5.

One major difference from the King’s

Indian is that the light-squared bishops

are normally exchanged quite early af¬

ter d4-d5. This difference usually fa¬

vours White, as the pawn-structure

dictates that White has swapped off

his traditionally ‘bad’ bishop, while

Black no longer has his ‘good’ bishop.

The Theory of Black's 4th Move Alternatives

I e4 e5 2 £T3 £ic6 3 £b5 a6 4 £a4

We will now consider three main

continuations:

A: 4...f5 49

B: 4...b5 49

C: 4...d6 50


a) 4...g6 5 d4 exd4 6 £ixd4 (White

can also play as against 3...g6 with 6

JLg5, e.g. 6...JLe7 7 JLxe7 £igxe7 8

£ixd4) 6...Jig! 7 £ixc6 bxc6 8 0-0

£ie7 9 f4 f5 and here Tal recommends

10 e5 0-0 11 We2 with advantage.

b) 4...£>ge7 5 c3 b5 (for 5...d6 6 d4

JLd7 see Line C) 6 iLb3 d5 7 d4! exd4

8 exd5 £ixd5 9 0-0 Ae6 10 Ag5 kel

II £xe7 Wxc7 12 Eel Wd6 13 £sbd2

0-0 14 £ie4 Wf4 15 £ic5 Wd6 16

£ixe6 fxe6 17 £ig5! and White has a

dangerous attack, Kurajica-Klaric,

Yugoslavia 1978.

c) 4..JLc5 isn’t bad. After 5 c3

£»f6 6 d4 (it should also be mentioned

that 6 0-0 transposes to Chapter 6)

6..JLb6 7 0-0 0-0 8 &g5 h6 9 £h4 d6

we reach a position similar to one dis¬

cussed in Chapter 3, Line C, except for

the insertion of ...a6 and JLa4. After 10

,£Lxc6 bxc6 11 dxe5 dxe5 White can

choose between the relatively quiet 12

£ibd2 and 12 ®xd8 Exd8 13 £ixe5 g5

14 .&g3 <£ixe4 15 £»xc6, when Black

The Deferred Steinitz and Other Fourth Move Alternatives 49

no longer has 15.. .iLa6, but even so af¬

ter 15...Se8 there is compensation for

the pawn.

A) 4.. .f5

This delayed Schliemann has never

really caught on. 4 d4 against the nor¬

mal Schliemann is not effective, as af¬

ter 4...fxe4 5 4ixe5 £»xe5 6 dxe5 c6

Black attacks the bishop and threatens

...Wa5+, picking up the e5-pawn. Here,

however, White’s bishop is less ex¬

posed on a4 so...

5 d4! exd4

Now 5...fxe4 6 £»xe5 is quite fa¬

vourable to White.

6 e5! &b4+

6.. .£c5 7 0-0 £ige7 8 c3 dxc3 9

£ixc3 d5 10 Ag5! leaves Black strug¬

gling to complete his development.

10.. .^.e6 11 Scl h6 12 Axe7 &xe7 13

£)d4 &f7 14 £)xe6 &xe6 15 £ixd5!

led to a winning position in Morten-

sen-Lilja, Copenhagen 1998, while

10.. .*f8 11 Scl kal 12 £xc6 bxc6

13 £se2 c5 14 £\f4 c6 15 e6 left Black

with an extremely grim position in

W.Watson-Nunn, London 1984.

7 c3! dxc3 8 £ixc3 £ige7 9 0-0

&xc3

Alternatives do not ease Black’s

problems:

a) 9...d5 10 £ie2 Ae6 11 &f4 ®d7

12 £ig5 Ag8 13 Wh5+ g6 14 Wh6 and

White simply threatens Wg7 followed

by®xh8!.

b) 9...0-0 10 £ie2! d6 11 a3 £c5

12 b4 &b6 13 &b3+ &h8 14 exd6!

®xd6 15 ®xd6 cxd6 16 Sdl £c7 17

^14!, followed by <S7g5.

10 bxc3 0-011 Ab3+ 4?h812 Sell

(D)

Lobron-Bialas, Bundesliga 1986/7.

A pawn is a small price to pay for such

a position. In particular, White’s bish¬

ops are ready to cause havoc on the

open board.

B)

4...b5 5 £b3 £ia5

This is the so-called Norwegian

Variation, Black’s most direct attempt

to hunt down the Lopez bishop. Other

moves:

a) 5..JLc5 6 c3! and now:

al) 6...£if6 7 d4 exd4 (7...&b6 8

dxe5 wins for White after 8...^g4 9

&xf7+! or 8...£sxe4 9 Wd5) 8 cxd4

&b4+ 9 £d2 £xd2+ 10 &bxd2 d5 11

e5 and White’s centre gives him a

Clear advantage. This position can be

compared to one arising from the

Giuoco Piano after 1 e4 e5 2 £)f3 £sc6

3 JLc4 .&c5 4 c3 £»f6 5 d4 exd4 6 cxd4

&b4+ 7 iLd2 &xd2+ 8 &bxd2 d5!,

when Black succeeds in breaking up

the white centre. Here the position of


the white bishop (b3 instead of c4)

makes all the difference.

a2) 6...d6 7 d4 exd4 8 cxd4 &b6 9

h3!, preventing ,.JLg4 and securing

the centre.

b) 5...4)f6 is not a bad trans¬

positional move. 6 £)g5 looks tempt¬

ing, but 6...d5! 7 exd5 £kl4 is fine for

Black. Therefore White should simply

play 6 0-0, transposing to Chapter 6.

6 0-0 d6

6.. .£sxb3 7 axb3 d6 8 d4 transposes

to the main line of this section.

7 d4 &xb3

7.. .f6 8 £ic3 £sxb3 9 axb3 reaches

the same position. Black’s only other

try is 7...exd4. After 8 £sxd4 iLb7

(8...£ie7 9 JLg5! f6 10 &e3 £)xb3 11

axb3 leaves White with the advantage;

the e6-square is quite vulnerable) 9

jLd2! (White has to play carefully; 9

£»c3?? loses a piece to 9...c5 10 £sf5

c4) and now:

a) 9...c5 10 &d5 &xd5 11 exd5

cxd4 12 ®el+! (the point of 9 jLd2)

12.. Mel 13 £xa5 Wxel 14 2xel+

and White has regained his piece,

leaving Black with a wrecked pawn-

structure.

b) 9...£»xb3 is better, but after 10

£ixb3 £)f6 11 Eel kel 12 £)a5! Eb8

13 £ixb7 Exb7 14 Wf3 Wc8 15 £ic3

c6 16 £ie2 0-0 17 £)d4 White still has

a small plus, Smagin-Kupreichik,

USSR Ch 1985.

8 axb3 f6 9 £ic3 &b710 £>h4 Wd7

After 10...£»e7 11 dxe5! dxe5 (or

11.. .fxe5 12 f4!) 12 Wf3 Wd7 13 Edl

We6 14 £>d5 £)xd5 15 exd5 Wfl

(Anand-Agdestein, Baguio City jr

Wch 1987), Anand suggests 16 £>f5!

as a way of maintaining the advan¬

tage.

11 QdS #f7

1 l...£)e7 12 ®h5+ forces the king

to move, as 12...g6 loses to 13 <S)xg6

hxg6 14 £M6+ *f7 15 ®xh8. After

ll...g6 I like 12 f4!, opening up the

position. Then 12...exf4 13 iLxf4 g5?

fails to 14 Wh5+ &d8 15 &xg5!.

12 c4 c6 13 £ic3!

Anand’s suggested improvement

over 13 £»e3, which allowed Black to

equalize after 13...£)e7 14 d5 cxd5 15

cxd5 g6 in Anand-Timman, Linares

1993.

13...b4 14 £)e2 (D)

White’s space advantage outweighs

the latent power of the bishop-pair.

C) 4...d6 5 c3

Now Black can try:

Cl: 5...f5 51

C2: 5...M1 52

The former is ambitious, while the

latter is solid. Other continuations are


less important, but should be men¬

tioned:

a) 5...4M6 6 d4 b5 7 Lc2 LgA 8

i.e3 Lei 9 0-0 0-0 10 h3 Lh5 11

i£sbd2 is better for White, who will

continue with Eel, £>fl and £>g3, ha¬

rassing the bishop.

b) 5...±g4 6h3±h5 7d4b5 8±c2

£if6 9 Le3 Lei 10 0-0 0-0 11 £ibd2

reaches line ‘a’.

c) 5...g6 is a reasonable move. Af¬

ter 6 d4 JLd7 we have transposed to

Line C22.

Cl) 5...f5 (D)

6 exf5 ±xf5 7 0-0 Ld3

The key move in Black’s plans.

Black must stop White playing an early

d4, since otherwise White’s quicker

development and Black’s weaknesses

would soon tell. White must now

spend some time extracting this an¬

noying bishop.

8 Sel Lei

It’s imperative to block the e-file.

No one plays 8...<£sf6 here, and I think

it must be because of the unpleasant 9

&d4! tW 10 tT3, when Black’s po¬

sition is on the point of collapse.

9 Lc2\

The most sensible approach, and the

one favoured by theory. The bishop is

eliminated and White can complete

his development. The more ambitious

9 Se3 leads to very unclear conse¬

quences after 9...e4 10 £>el jLg5 11

£>xd3!? Lxe3 12 &b4 ±xf2+! 13

&xf2 Wh4+ 14 sfrgl 4^h6, when White

has to be very careful, e.g. 15 Wfl?

£>g4 16 «T4 Sf8 17 %3 Sfl+!! 18

&xfl ®xh2+ 19 Wtxh2 Wxh2 0-1 Ad-

ams-Piket, Wijk aan Zee 1991.

9...Lx c2 10 Wxc2 &f6 11 d4 0-0


a) ll...exd4 12 cxd4 0-0 13 &c3

^h8 14 &g5! &xd4 15 Wd3 h6 16

Wxd4 hxg5 17 Lxg5 Wdl 18 £le2!,

planning £sf4, leaves White with an

unquestionable advantage.

b) U...e4 12&g5d5 13 f3 h6 14

£lh3 0-0 (14...exf3? 15 %6+ is very

strong) 15 <bd2 exf3 16 <bxf3 tW

(16...±d6 17 ±xh6! gxh6 18 %6+

Sfrh8 19 Wxh6+ &h7 20 &fg5 Wd7 21

Se6 Sae8 22 Sael Sxe6 23 Sxe6 Sg8

24 £sxh7 Wxhl 25 «T6+ %7 26

Hi4+ *h7 27 Sh6 1-0 A.Sokolov-

Anic, French Cht 1994) 17 %6! %4

18 Wxg4 &xg4 19 Sfd8 20 &e6

Sd7 21 Li4 Sc8 22 Se2! and White’s

initiative persists, Leko-Yusupov, Vi¬

enna 1996.

12 d5! e4

The best move. 12...£>xd5 fails to

13 H)3, while 12...£)b8? 13 £)g5

Wc8 14 c4 is obviously bad for Black.

13 £)g5 <ê514 £se6 Wd715 &d2!


Black’s idea was 15 £>xf8?! Wg4!

with dangerous counterplay, e.g. 16

£)e6? £lf3+ 17 sfrfl Wxg2+!.

15.. .e3

Anand gives 15...£>d3 16 Sxe4!

£ixe4 17 &xe4 £lxcl 18 &xf8 Exf8

19 Excl, when White is a clear pawn

up, while 15...Efc8 16 £>xe4 £sxd5 17

£>4g5 Axg5 18 4lxg5 is slightly better

for White, according to Yusupov.

16 Exe3 4ixd5 17 4ixf8 4ixe3 18

Wxh7+ &xf8 19 fxe3

Grabbing material with 19 #h8+

^17 20 Wxa8 once again grants Black

serious play after 20...4ixg2!.

19.. .Ee8 (D)

In Anand-Yusupov, Wijk aan Zee

FIDE Ct (5) 1994, White played 20 e4

and after 20...d5? 21 £>b3! Black was

already facing big problems with his

airy king. However, 20..JLf6! is a

tougher nut to crack, e.g. 21 Wh8+

*f7 22 Hi5+ &g8 23 £ib3 £}f7 24

JLd2 Wa4 and Black has consolidated

and is ready to pluck off White’s weak

e4-pawn. In the later game Almasi-

Winants, Wijk aan Zee 1995, White

improved with 20 £)e4! and following

20...%4 (20...d5 21 &g3! Af6 22

Ad2 4ic4 runs into the intermezzo 23

Efl!) 21 Ad2 £tf3+ 22 sfrhl &xd2 23

£\xd2 White was still in control.

C2)

5...±d7 6 d4 (D)

Here Black can play:

C21: 6...£lge7 52

C22: 6...g6 53

6.. JLe7 is inferior. After 7 0-0 A16

8 d5 £sce7 9 c4 £sg6 10 £sc3 White

has a space advantage and Black’s

pieces are tangled up on the kingside,

Ivkov-Kolarov, Moscow OL 1956.

C21)

6...£lge7 7 Ae3

This move is more flexible than 7

0-0, although White can still count on

an edge after 7...£>g6 8 d5 £>b8 9 c4

±e7 10 &c3 0-0 11 Axd7 £ixd7 12

Wc2 £lh4 13 &xh4 Axh4 14 b4 Ag5

15 Ebl Axel 16 Efxcl, Van der Wiel-

Short, Amsterdam 1991.


7.. .£sg6 In Anand-Yusupov, Wijk aan Zee

FIDE Ct (3) 1994, Black tried 7...h6

but failed to equalize after 8 £>bd2 g5

(8...<£^6!? may be worth a look) 9

dxe5 dxe5 10 h4 g4 11 <£\h2 h5 12

£>hfl 13 g3 kel 14 i.c2 i.e6 15

i.b3 #d7 16 ±xe6 Wxc6 17 Wb3. In

the endgame Black’s pawn moves on

the kingside will leave serious weak¬

nesses.

8h4!

This is a very useful restricting

move. The white pawns aim to restrain

the black pieces.

8.. .h5

Other moves for Black include:

a) 8...±e7 9 g3! h6 10 d5 £tt>8 11

Shc2 ±g4 12 &bd2 &d7 13 £lfl &f6

14 £>lh2 ±d7 15 &d2 h5 16 a4 and

White has achieved a healthy space

advantage, while Black has no imme¬

diate pawn-break, Milos-Magomedov,

Moscow OL 1994.

b) 8...iLg4 9 JLxc6+ bxc6 10 £>bd2

•&e7 11 Wa4!, attacking the vulnera¬

ble c6-pawn. Stefansson-Gretarsson,

Icelandic Ch 1996 continued ll...exd4

12 cxd4 jLxh4 13 £}xh4 £}xh4 and

now White played the spectacular 14

Sxh4! ®xh4 15 Wxc6+ &e7 16 Wxc7+

&d7 17 £ic4!! Hil+ 18 &d2 tfxal

19 #xd6+ ê8 20 ±g5 f6 21 Axf6!

gxf6 22 Wxf6 ±b5 23 t'xh8+ &e7 24

*xh7+ &d8 25 %8+ &c7 26 WxaS

•&xc4 27 Wa7+, when the extra pawns

proved too strong for the bishop. 9g3

Dolmatov also proposes 9 £>g5 JLe7

10 ,&b3 as a simple way to achieve the

advantage.

9...±e7 10 d5 &b8 11 ±xd7+ <£sxd7

Reaching a typical blocked position

where the exchange of light-squared

bishops has favoured White. Another

factor in White’s favour is that the

knight on g6 is out of play.

12 £tfd2 £)f6 13 f3 0-0 14 c4 c5

Preventing the standard attacking

scheme of £>c3, b4, <£sb3 and c5.

15 £ic3 Wd7 16 a4 (D)

Topalov-Yusupov, Novgorod 1995.

White has more space and can play on

both sides of the board.

C22)

6...g6 7 0-0 ±g7 (D)

8 Eel

This is by no means the only move:

a) 8 d5 &ce7 9 ±xd7+ Wxd7 10 c4

h6 11 &c3 f5 12 exf5 gxf5 (12...<bxf5

13 £le4 £tf6 14 &xf6+ Axf6 15 £ld2

0-0 16 £>e4 and the knight perches

very nicely on e4, Short-Spassky,

London 1986) 13 £>h4 jLf6! (earlier

only 13...4^16 had been played, but 14

f4 e4 15 ±e3 0-0 16 h3 c5 17 dxc6


bxc6 18 ®e2 leads to a pleasant posi¬

tion for White, Fischer-Filip, Curasao

Ct 1962) 14 f4 e4 15 ±e3 &xh4 16

Hi5+ £>g6 17 tfxg6+ «ft7 18 ®xi'7+

&xf7 and Black has equalized. Ye

Jiangchuan-Azmaiparashvili, Erevan

OL 1996.

b) 8 ±e3!? 4tf6 (or 8...&ge7 9 d5

£ib8 10 c4 0-0 11 £>c3 with a slight

advantage for White) 9 £)bd2 0-0 10

dxe5 £>xe5 11 £sxe5 dxe5 12 f3 ,&xa4

13 #xa4 m3 14 Sfel Sfd8 15 WbS

Wb5 16 &c4 &e8 17 Sadi with a

faint edge to White, Topalov-Azmai-

parashvili, Madrid 1996.

8...£ige7

After 8...£)f6 White could continue

9 d5 or try 9 ±xc6!? ±xc6 10 dxe5

<5i\e4 11 exd6, when Black should

sacrifice a pawn with 11...0-0 12 dxc7

®xc7, as 1 l...#xd6 12 Wxd6 cxd6 13

£sfd2! 0-0 14 Sxe4 clearly favours

White.

9d5

9 ile3 is an important alternative.

Then after 9...0-0 10 £>bd2 We8 11

±b3 b6 12 dxe5 dxe5 13 £)c4 ^h8 14

Wei ±g4 15 £>g5,15...h6 16 h3! Ad7

17 £if3 *h7 18 a4 led to a small ad¬

vantage for White in Karpov-Spassky,

Bugojno 1986, but 15...Sd8 16 h3

.&c8, as in Boudy-Smagin, Skopje

1987, looks to be an improvement for

Black.

9.. .£>a5!?

9.. .<bb8 10 ±xd7+ &xd7 11 ±e3

h6 12 £ifd2 0-0 13 c4 f5 14 f3 was

slightly better for White in J.Polgar-

Spassky, Budapest (4) 1993.

10 i.xd7+ Wxd7 11 &bd2 b5 12

b4 4ib7 13 a4 0-0 14 c4 c5! 15 dxc6

£>xc6 (D)

Zso.Polgar-Kamsky, New Delhi

1990. Now White can keep the advan¬

tage with 16 .£.a3.

6 Moller and Arkhangelsk Variations

1 e4 e5 2 £>f3 4bc6 3 i.b5 a6 4 ±a4

£}f6 5 0-0 (D)

The Arkhangelsk Variation (5...b5

6 ilb3 jLb7) and the Moller Variation

(5...Ac5 or 5...b5 6 ±b3 Ac5) repre¬

sent ambitious plans of development

by Black. In particular, the variation

5...b5 6 JLb3 jLc5 has in the last few

years become increasingly popular at

the highest levels, so much so that it’s

even threatening to become Black’s

main reply to the Lopez. The closely

related Arkhangelsk went through a

similar vogue, although on a slightly

smaller scale, in the early 1990s. Both

variations can lead to very sharp play.

Against these lines. I’m recommend¬

ing that White should play c3 and d4,

but care is needed with move-orders.

White Plays d4: Black Reacts with ..JLb6

In this theoretical position, if White

plays 8 d4 Black reacts with 8.. JLb6!,

maintaining the pawn on e5 and keep¬

ing the pressure on d4. If Black were

forced to play 8...exd4, relinquishing

the centre, then his whole strategy

would have been at fault. 8....&b6

works through tactical means, as can

be seen in the theory section.

White Attacks with a4 With Black’s bishop on c5 and knight

on c6 (see diagram overleaf), there is

no real opportunity for Black to link

his pawn-chain with ...c5. This can in

fact leave the b5-pawn rather isolated

and vulnerable to attack. One of White’s


weapons in these variations is to at¬

tack the pawn with an early a4. This

assault can be sustained by moves

such as £>a3 and ®e2.

White Protects d4 with JLe3

In some variations White will try to

negate the pressure from the b6-bishop

by playing &.e3. This protects the d4-

pawn and thus allows White to con¬

tinue to develop smoothly with £)bd2.

Often White will play h3, in order to

prevent ...£)g4. With the white bishop

on e3. Black has to be wary of the

possibility of d5, followed by JLxb6,

which would leave Black with dou¬

bled pawns.

The Theory of the Moller and Arkhangelsk Variations

1 e4 e5 2 4T3 £>c6 3 JLb5 a6 4 ii.a4

5 0-0

We now consider:

A: 5...d6 56

B: 5.Jtc5 57

C: 5...b5 59

A)

5.. .d6

This delayed version of the Steinitz

Defence is not very popular.

6 Eel

Also possible is 6 c3. After 6..JLd7

7 d4 g6 8 Eel Black has two possibili¬

ties:

a) 8.. JLg7 transposes to Chapter 5,

Line C22.

b) 8...1fe7 9 £>bd2 Lgl 10 fcfl

0-0 11 ±g5 h6 12 Ah4 lfe8 13 kcl

£\h5 14 £se3 is slightly better for

White, Jansa-Psakhis, Bor 1985.

6.. .b5

Seizing the chance to exchange the

Lopez bishop. Other tries are:

a) 6.. JLg4 7 c3 £)d78 d4 kel 9 h3

,&xf3 lO^xfS ,&g5 11 £)a3 ^.xcl 12

Eaxcl 0-013 Ecdl Hfe7 14 &c2 b5 15

,&b3 £>a5 16 £>e3 £>xb3 17 axb3 and

White has more central control, plus a

chance to attack Black’s weak a6-

pawn, Gufeld-Bronstein, USSR Ch

1963.

Miller and Arkhangelsk Variations 57

b) 6...Ae7 7 c3 ±g4 8 h3 ±h5 9

£xc6+ bxc6 10 d4 exd4 11 cxd4 0-0

12£ic3 Ee8 13 Af4 tW 14 Eel h6 15

®d3 with a small plus, Tal-Kuijpers,

Moscow 1963.

7 &b3 &a5 7.. JLe7!, transposing to the main¬

line Closed Lopez, discussion of which

starts in Chapter 9, is Black’s best

course. 8 d4 &xb3 9 axb3 ±b7 10 ±g5 h6

11 i.xf6 Wxf6 12 &c3 c6

12.. .Ae7 13 £id5 ±xd5 14 exd5

exd4 15 £)xd4 0-0 16 £\c6 leaves the

knight far superior to the bishop.

13 tti3 We7 14 dxe5 dxe5 15

Sadi Threatening 16 £>xe5; to meet this

Black is forced into an ugly pawn

move.

15.. .f6 16 &h4 Ed8 17 %3 «T7

18 £ig6 (D)

Konstantinopolsky-Efremov, corr

1955. White’s lead in development is

the most important factor in the posi¬

tion, leaving him with a clear advan¬ tage.

B) 5..Ac5

The advantage of this particular

move-order is that the variation 5...b5

6 ±b3 &c5 7 a4 is avoided. On the

other hand. White also has extra possi¬

bilities now.

6 c3 (D)

Other moves are known to be bad:

a) 6...Aa7 7 d4 £ixe4 8 Eel f5 9

&bd2 0-0 10 &xe4 fxe4 11 ±g5 We8

12 Exe4 d6 13 dxe5 %6 (13...Af5 14

Ef4 dxe5 15 Exf5 Exf5 16 Wb3+

wins) 14 Ef4 Exf4 15 £xf4 ±g4 16

«ft>3+ «T7 17 &g5 Wxb3 18 ±xb3+

1-0 Capablanca - Milner-Barry, Mar¬

gate 1935.

b) 6...JLb6 is an improvement, as

the bishop shields the b7-pawn from

attack. Nevertheless, White can still

continue with 7 d4 4}xe4 8 Bel f5 9

&bd2 0-0 10 &xe4 fxe4 11 Exe4 d6

12 ±g5 We8 13 dxe5 Af5 14 Ef4,

when 14...Hi5 15 Wd5+ &h8 16

,&xc6 bxc6 17 Wxc6 is clearly better

for White, while the superior 14...dxe5


15 Wd5+ We6 16 «rXe6+ ilxe6 17

Sxf8+ Sxf8 18 &xc6 bxc6 19 &e3

still leaves Black with many pawn

weaknesses.

7 ±c2!?

7 jLb3 transposes to Line C.

The text-move is an attempt to take

advantage of Black’s move-order. Black

can try:

Bl: 7...d5!? 58

B2: 7...d6 59

Bl) 7.. .d5!?8d4!

Reacting immediately in the centre

steers the game into very tactical wa¬

ters. Less convincing is 8 exd5, when

Black makes use of the bishop’s ab¬

sence from b3 with 8...Wxd5!, followed

by ...0-0, solving all his opening prob¬

lems.

8.. .dxe4 9 £>xe5

9 dxe5 is also interesting, when

9...exf3 10Wxd8+ 4ixd8 11 exf6 ap¬

pears good for White. A stronger pos¬

sibility is Lutz’s suggestion 9...Wxdl

10 Sxdl JLxf2+! 11 ^fl (White can

try 11 &xf2, but after ll...£)g4+ 12

^g3 exf3 13 ±e4 &gxe5 14 ±f4 Eb8

15 gxf3 ,&e6 White has little else but

to regain the pawn with 16 ^.xc6+

£3xc6 17 Axc7 Ec8, with an equal po¬

sition) ll...£lg4 12 ±xe4 ±b7 and

Black seems OK. For example, the

continuation 13 h3 £>e3+ 14 sfrxf2

£lxdl+15 &e2 0-0-016 &bd2 &xc3+!

17 bxc3 Ehe8 leaves Black well coor¬

dinated.

9.. .£ixe5 10 dxe5 ®xdl 11 Sxdl

£>g4 12 jLxe4 £>xf2

Other moves:

a) 12...Axf2+ 13 &fl Eb8 14 h3

£ie3+ 15 <&xf2 £}xdl+ 16 &e2 is

clearly better for White.

b) 12...Eb8 13 ±c6+ sfre7 14 i.g5+

ê6 15 Ah4 £ixe5 16 ±d5+ *f5 17

£id2 &b7 18 £ie4 ±b6 19 £)g3+ &g6

20 JLb3, when Black’s slightly vulner¬

able king is enough to give White the

faintest of edges, Shirov-Ivanchuk,

Monaco Amber rpd 1998.

13 &c6+ &e7 14 Ed5 ±b6 15

±xa8 &d3+

15...Ae6? 16Ed4£sd3 17±g5+f6 18 ±e4 4ixe5 19 ±e3 was winning for

White in Lutz-Onishchuk, Bundesliga

1996/7. The text-move is Lutz’s sug¬

gested improvement.

16 &fl £>xcl 17 &a3 ±e6 18

Excl Exa8 19 Ed3 (D)

Black’s two bishops and the pawn

weaknesses on a2 and e5 give Black

some compensation for the exchange,

although it’s questionable whether

this is enough. In his analysis Lutz

gives 19...iLxa2 20 c4 b4 21 c5 ^.a7

22 £k4 ±xc5 23 4ia5 ±b6 24 &c6+

&f8 25 &xb4 ±c6 26 £ic6, with a

M0ller and Arkhangelsk Variations 59

clear advantage to White. Onishchuk

was not sufficiently put off the line,

however, and later repeated it. He pre¬

ferred 19..JLf5 20 Sddl i.g4 21 Sd3

jLf5 22 Sddl JLg4, when the players

agreed to a draw in N.Mariano-Oni-

shchuk, Jakarta 1997. Of course White

could try to continue, by moving his

rook off the d-file, but this would give

Black counterchances with ...Sd8. It

seems that more practical examples of

7...d5 are required before any real as¬

sessment can be given.

B2)

7.. .d6 8 d4 &b6 9 h3

It’s worth expending a tempo to

prevent ...JLg4, so that White’s pawn-

centre can be kept intact.

9.. .0.0 10 ±e3!?

One advantage of having the bishop

on c2 is that the e4-pawn is protected.

Thus White need not rush to play

£>bd2, but can develop this bishop

first, lending crucial support to the

d4-pawn.

10.. JLb7 11 &bd2 Se8 12 Sel exd4

The critical test of White’s play, al¬

though it may not be best. Alterna¬ tives:

a) 12...h6 13 a3 ±a7 14 b4 £kI7 15

£Jb3 is better for White, RotSagov-

Ziegler, Gothenburg 1998.

b) 12...Eb8 13 a3 h6 14 *e2 and

now 14...d5?! 15 &xe5 dxe4 16 &g4

®h7 17 ±xe4 2xc4 18 £)xe4 f5 19

d5! gave White a very strong attack in

Nunn-Hector, Oxford 1998. Nunn

suggests 14...^7 as being a more

cautious way for Black to play, giving

15 d5 £se7 16 a4 ±xe3 17 Wxe3 c6 18

axb5 cxb5 19 b4 with a small plus to

White.

13 cxd4 £>b4 (D)

14±g5!

Of course it would be nice to retain

the bishop with 14 jLbl, but Black

seems to be able to grab the e-pawn

with 14...±xe4. Nunn then gives 15

£)xe4 £>xe4 16Wb3 c5 17 ,&xe4 Exe4

18 &g5 (18 a3 c4! 19 Wxb4 ±a5 is

one of Black’s defensive resources)

18...Ee7 19 dxc5 dxc5 20 Sadi tfe8

and Black defends.

14.. .£\xc2 15 Wxc2 h6 16 ±h4

Black has obtained the two bishops,

but has been forced to relinquish the

centre and in addition faces a nasty

pin on the h4-d8 diagonal. The game

Jansa-Martinovsky, Wrexham 1998

continued 16...g5 17 ±g3 £>h5 18

±h2 ®tf4 19 ixf4 gxf4 20 e5 dxe5 21 dxe5 and Black was already in serious

trouble.

C)

5.. .b5 6 i.b3 (D)


Now:

Cl: 6..JLc5 60

Cl: 6...±b7 64

Before moving on to the main lines,

two other very natural moves must be

considered:

a) 6...d6 attempts to steer the game

into a closed defence, but with Black

still having the option to fianchetto his

f8-bishop. Now 7 £>g5 looks very ap¬

petizing, but after 7...d5! 8 exd5 £>d4

9 Sel (or 9 c3 &xb3 10 «bcb3 ±d6

11 d3 Af5) 9..±c5 10 Sxe5+ *f8

Black’s counterplay cannot be under¬

estimated. White should probably be

content with 7 c3, when 7.. JLe7! trans¬

poses to the main-line Closed Lopez,

while 7...£>a5 8 JLc2 c5 9 d4! (no need

to waste a tempo on h3) 9..Mcl 10

&bd2 g6 11 b4 cxb4 12 cxb4 &c6 13

±b2 ±g7 14 Scl 0-0 15 ±b3 was

better for White in Suetin-Ragozin,

USSR Ch 1954.

b) 6...iLe7 is another attempt to

channel the game into a normal

Closed Lopez. The idea of this move-

order is to deny White the possibility

of playing the Delayed Exchange

Variation Deferred (which arises after

5...iLe7 6 JLxc6). White can either re¬

turn to the main line with 7 Sel or at¬

tempt to punish Black’s move-order

with 7 d4!?:

bl) 7...£\xe4 transposes to the Open

Defence.

b2) 7...exd4?! 8 e5! £)e4 (or 8...&g4

9 ±d5 ±b7 10 h3 £fli6 11 &xd4) 9

±d5 &c5 10 £sxd4 ±b7 11 £tf5 gives

White a large advantage.

b3) 7...d6 8 c3 and now Black has

two moves:

b31) 8...Ag4 9 h3! Axf3 (9...Ah5 10 d5 £)a5 11 &c2 c6 12 dxc6 0-0 13

£\bd2 ®c7 14 Sel Wxc6 and now 15

£)fl, with the idea £>g3, gains useful

time on the bishop) 10 Wxf3 exd4 11

%3 0-0 (or ll...g6 12 ±d5 #d7 13

Ah6 Sb8 14 f4 &d8 15 £id2 with a

strong attack, Tal-Teschner, Vienna

Echt 1957) 12 ±h6 &e8 13 ±d5 tW

14 #g4 lfxg4 15 hxg4 gxh6 16 i.xc6

dxc3 17 £ixc3 Sb8 18 £id5 ±d8 19 f3

and White has a massive bind, Gli-

goric-Rossetto, Portoroz IZ 1958.

b32) 8...0-0 9 E\bd2 (attempting to

gain on normal Closed lines by doing

without h3) 9...Se8 (or 9...iLg4 10 h3

±h5 11 d5 £)a5 12 ±c2 c6 13 dxc6

Wc7 14 Sel, intending £>fl-g3) 10

a3!? ±f8 11 Sel g6 12 ±c2 ±g7 13

d5 £)a5 14 b4 fob! 15 c4 ±d7 16 &b2

and White was slightly better in Hjar-

tarson-Adams, Munich 1993.

Cl)

6..JLc5 7 c3

Move-orders are very important

here. Another major line begins with 7

Miller and Arkhangelsk Variations 61

a4. Then 7...Eb8 8 c3 d6 transposes to

Line C12, leaving 7....&b7 as Black’s

main other move. After 7....&b7 White

may proceed with the restrained 8 d3

followed by 4ic3, leading to a system

which I’m not advocating for White.

Instead White can also play the tricky

8c3!?(£>).

Then 8...d6 leads to Line Cl 1 (this

in fact was the actual move-order of

Emms-Godena). So it seems that 7 a4

avoids the popular 8....&g4 variation,

yet I can find hardly any examples of

this move-order, which is very puz¬

zling. The only question is whether

Black can exploit the move-order him¬ self.

As well as 8...d6 Black can try:

a) 8....&b6 9 d4 £>xe4 10 dxe5

looks good for White, e.g. 10...£>a5 11

&d5!, 10...£>e7 11 <S)g5 and 10...0-0

Hi.d5 - in each case White has the

initiative.

b) 8...0-0 9 d4 Jib6 10 dxe5 £ixc4

11 .&d5 transposes to line ‘a’.

c) 8...£ixe4 (the critical test) 9 We2

d5 (9...£ia5 10 &c2 and 9...f5 10 d3

.&xf2+ 11 &hl are favourable to

White) 10 d3 &xf2+ (10...<S)f6 11 d4

.&b6 12 dxe5 is clearly better for

White) 11 <&hl £>g3+ (or 11...£ic5 12

#xf2 £>xb3 13 £>d4!) 12 hxg3 &xg3

with a critical position where Black

has three pawns for the white piece.

However, it seems that White can con¬

tinue to attack with 13 £>g5!, ready to

meet 13...h6 with 14®h5!.

Practical tests are needed, but it

seems that 7 a4 ,&b7 8 c3 is a very

playable alternative for White.

7...d6

Reinforcing the e5-pawn, thus al¬

lowing the bishop to retreat when at¬

tacked by White’s d4 advance. Other

moves give White more options:

a) 7...0-0 is hardly ever seen. One

line that looks good for White is 8 d4

-&b6 9 £>xe5 £>xe5 10 dxe5 £>xe4 11

&d5 #h4 12 &e3! &xe3 13 fxe3 c6

14 Ef4! and the best Black can do is

14...£>f2 15#e2#g5 16&xf7+Exf7

17 #xf2, with £>d2-e4 to follow.

b) 7...£>xe4 8 d4 ,&b6 and proba¬

bly the simplest here is 9 dxe5 0-0 10

ii.d5 with a clear plus.

8 a4 (D)

An active waiting move. I imagine

it should be asked what’s wrong (if

anything) with the most natural move

here. Things may always change, but

currently 8 d4 is not the most popular

move. After 8....&b6 White can choose

from:

a) 9 &g5 h6 10 &h4 g5! 11 &g3

and now both 1 l...^.g4 and 11...0-0

are fine for Black, according to theory.

b) 9 h3 &b7 10 Eel (10 &e3 is

impossible here owing to the simple


10...£>xe4!) 10...0-0 11 &g5 h6 12

,&h4 Ee8 13 dxe5 £>xe5 14 £>xe5 dxe5

15 £sd2 #d6 with an equal position,

Zapata-Godena, Erevan OL 1996.

c) 9 dxe5 £>xe5 10 £>xe5 dxe5 11

#xd8+ &xd8 12 Axf7 Ef8 13 ±d5

£>xd5 14 exd5 &b7 15 l.c3 l.xc3 16

fxe3 Exfl+ 17 *xfl -&xd5 with a

level endgame, de Firmian-Tkachev,

Biel 1995.

d) 9 a4!? (a new attempt) 9...^.g4

10 axb5 axb5 11 Exa8 #xa8 12 h3

&h5 13 d5 £>e7 14 &c2 &g6 15 W/e2

c6 16 dxc6 #xc6 17 Eel and White

was a shade better in Leko-Adams,

Dortmund 1998.

Black now has three main replies:

Cll: 8...&b7 62

C12: 8...Bb8 62

C13: 8...^.g4 63

C11)

8.. 6b7 9 d4 &b6 10 &g5

10 Bel would transpose into the

Arkhangelsk Defence, but perhaps

White can do without this move.

10.. .exd4

This is probably the most accurate

defence. After 10...h6 11 &xf6 #xf6

12 JLd5 0-0 13 £>a3 White has the op¬

tion of recapturing on d4 with a knight.

Wahls-Stern, Binz 1995 continued

13...Efb8 14 £sc2 bxa4 15 Exa4 a5 16

Eel Ee8 17 4£>c3 with a plus to White.

11 cxd4 h6 12 l.xf6 #xf6 13 l.d5

0-0 14 £>a3

14 £>c3 b4 15 £>e2 £ia5 16 &xb7

thxb7 was OK for Black in Movses-

ian-Malaniuk, Elista OL 1998.

14.. .Efb8

14.. .b4 can be answered with 15

£>c4.

15 £>c2 bxa4 16 Exa4 £>e7 17

&xb7 Exb7 18 #d3 (D)

Emms-Godena, Andorra Z 1998.

The centre and extra space gives White

a small plus.

Cl 2)

8...Eb8

A non-committal move. The c8-

bishop keeps its options open on where

it will be developed. Black usually

sacrifices the b5-pawn in this line.


9 d4 ,&b6 10 <Sia3! &g4 11 axb5

aXb5 12 £>xb5 0-0 13 Eel!

This seems to be White’s best try

for the advantage. Other moves in¬

clude: a) 13 &.e3 exd4 14 cxd4 £)xe4! 15

£.d5 ®e8 with an equal position, Nijboer-Piket, Wijk aan Zee 1998.

b) 13 &c2 &xf3! 14 #xf3 exd4 15

£g5 h6 16 ih4 dxc3 17 bxc3

and Black is fine, J.Polgar-Shirov,

Linares 1997.

13...1.xf3 14 gxf3 <Sih5

Black hopes for play against White’s

weakened kingside. 14...exd4 15 £>xd4

£}xd4 16 cxd4 ^.xd4 doesn’t regain

the pawn, as White can play the des¬

perado 17 ^.xf7+!.

15 &hl Wf6 16 Egl £sf4

Perhaps Black’s best chance lies in

the complicated 16...exd4 17 &g5

We5 18 Ad5, when Wedberg suggests

18...dxc3!? 19 &xc6 Axf2 20 Eg2

cxb2 21 Ebl Exb5 22 i.xb5 #xb5, al¬

though even this line should favour

White.

17 &e3 (D)

We are following Svidler-Shirov,

Linares 1998. White has secured his

position and is still a pawn to the good.

C13)

8„.&g4

A natural move, developing the

bishop, connecting queen and rook and

preventing d4. Later on. Black can of¬

ten try to exploit the slight weakness

in the white camp due to the move a4.

On the minus side, this bishop can also

be attacked in the usual way (h3 and

£>bd2-fl-g3) and Black may have to

prepared to exchange it for the knight.

9 d3 0-0 10 h3 &xf3

The other main option is to keep the

bishop with 10.. JLh5!?, when White’s

most logical idea is to begin the usual

Lopez knight manoeuvre, viz. 11 Eel

Eb8 (tempting White to open the a-

file; otherwise Black might play ...b4)

12 axb5 axb5 13 £>bd2 and now:

a) 13...b4!? 14 &a4 bxc3 15 bxc3

£>e7 16 £)fl £>d7 17 &g3 £g6 and

now 18 &b3 h6 19 Ebl <4?h8 20 <Sih4

&h7 21 #f3 4id5 was unclear in

Almasi-Shirov, Dresden rpd 1997. 1

prefer 18 £>h4, grabbing the bishop-

pair.

b) 13...Ea8!? and now after 14

Exa8®xa8 15£>fl #a7 16®e2?! (16

.&e3 is equal) 16...b4 17 g4 ,&g6 18

£>e3 Bb8 19 &c2 #al! Black had

taken over the initiative in Kovace-

vic-Anand, Belgrade 1997. Perhaps

the paradoxical 14 Ebl!? is a better try

for White. With the rooks still on the

board Black finds it more difficult to

arrange counterplay on the queenside.

14...#d7 15 £ifl £sa5 16 &c2 b4 17


£ig3 looks nice for White, while White

may also keep an edge after 14...^b8

15 #b6 16 &e3 £xe3 17 £>xe3.

11 #xf3 £ia5 12 i.c2 b4

Black tries to exploit the negative

side of White playing a4.

13 £>d2

After 13 &g5!7 Eb8 14 £id2 bxc3

15 bxc3 Eb2 16 Efcl h6 17 i.h4 #e7

Black has enough queenside play.

13.. .Eb8 14 Eel

After 14 #e2 Ee8 15 £)f3 bxc3 16

bxc3 'Sib3 17 ^.xb3 Exb3 18 d4 exd4

19 cxd4 Exf3! 20 #xf3 i.xd4 Black

has dangerous compensation for the

exchange, Anand-Karpov, Lausanne

FIDEWch (2) 1998.

14 Ebl is an interesting alternative

to the text-move, immediately putting

the plan of Sib3 into effect (see note to

White’s 15th move).

14.. .h6?l

15 £>fl would now allow 15...bxc3

16 bxc3 £lb3, so it looks as if Black

can play a waiting game. However,

White’s next move is a very good one.

Black should prefer the more active

14...c6!? or 14...#d7!?, planning to

meet 15 Ebl? with 15..,b3 16 &dl

®xa4.

15 Ebl!

A very deep idea. If Black does not

play ...b3 then White stops this with

£>b3, exchanges knights and gains

control of the important a2-g8 diago¬

nal with the Lopez bishop. Therefore

Black plays...

15.. .b3 16 &dl #d7 17 Eal! (D)

White has expended two tempi, but

the result is that the queenside is suffi¬

ciently blocked, leaving White free to

concentrate on the other wing. Leko-

Gild.Garcia, Yopal 1997 continued

17...£tfi7?! 18 #g3 &h8 19 &g4! #d8

20 £sf3 £sc6 21 £sh4 £ic7 22 Edl <S)f6

23 d4 i.a7 24 #d3 a5 25 &c3 exd4 26

cxd4 £)xg4 27 hxg4 #d7 28 £tf5 £)xf5

29 gxf5 and White converted his clear

positional advantage into victory. Nat¬

urally Black’s play could have been

improved upon, but in any case White

is better after 17 Eal.

C2)

6..JLb7 (D)


7 Eel Ac5

For 7...Ae7 see Chapter 8, note to

Black’s 7th move.

8 c3 Black has two possible replies:

C21: 8...0-0 65

C22: 8...d6 66

C21) 8...0-0

This tricky move-order has recently

become more fashionable. Black tries

to avoid the critical lines where White

plays Ac3. However, White can also

make use of Black’s early castling.

9d4Ab610&g5

The point of Black’s move-order is

seen if White plays 10 Ae3, hoping to

reach Line C22 after 10...d6. How¬

ever, Black need not be so accommo¬

dating. Instead of moving the d-pawn,

he can use the extra tempo to attack

White’s centre. After 10...exd4!? 11

cxd4 &a5! 12 ilg5 £>xb3 13 axb3 h6

14 Ah4 g5 15 £lxg5 £sxe4 16 £lxe4

®xh4 Black reached a very comfort¬

able position in Anand-Ivanchuk, Bel¬ grade 1997.

10...h6 11 Ah4 d6

11—g5 hopes to drive the position after 12 Ag3 d6 to Dolmatov-Beliav-

sky in the note to White’s 10th move in

Line C22. However, White shouldn’t

miss the chance to play 12 £>xg5!

hxg5 13 Axg5, when Black’s survival

is doubtful, e.g. 13...<&g7 14 Ee3 ®c8

15 Sg3 and it’s all over. This line high¬

lights the drawback of Black’s move-

order involving an early ...0-0. The

•■•g5 lunge can often be met by this ef¬ fective sacrifice.

ll...Ee8 is a safer move. White

should continue with 12 #d3, for ex¬

ample 12...d6 13 £>bd2 £ia5 14 Ac2

c5 15 d5 c4 16 ®e2 g6 17 &fl &g7 18

#d2 Eh8 19 h3 Wcl 20 £ig3 Ac8 21

Q\b2 with an edge to White, Beliav-

sky-Dorfman, USSR Ch 1975. 12 #d3 (D)

Supporting the d-pawn, so that

£sbd2 can be played. This position can

also be reached via 8...d6 9 d4 Ab6 10

Ag5 h6 11 i.h4 0-0 12 Wd3, although

that move-order allows ll...g5! (see

Line C22, note to White’s 10th move).

12.. .£ia5

12.. .g5 once again runs into the

piece sacrifice 13 £lxg5! hxg5 14

Axg5:

a) 14...*g7 15 Ee3 Wdl 16 Eg3

£>h5 17 Wf3 &g6 18 Adi! £>xg3 19

Wf6+ &h7 20 ®h6+ <4?g8 21 Af6 and

Black is mated.

b) 14...exd4 15 e5! £lxe5 16 Exe5

&g7 17 &xf6+ <&xf6 18 Wf5+ «&g7

19 #g4+ 1-0 Diaz Perez-Valdes, Cuba

1988.

13 &c2 c5 14 d5 c4 15 We2 g6


After 15...g5 White can play 16

£>xg5!? hxg5 17 &xg5 <S?g7 18 ttf3, as

in Hiibner-Beliavsky, Munich 1990,

or the more restrained 16 .&g3!? £ih5

17 b4 cxb3 18 axb3 £>xg3 19 hxg3 f5

20 exf5 i.xd5 21 £)bd2 Sc8 22 #d3,

with an advantage to White in both

good. One example from here is 13

#d3 £sh5 14 £)bd2 Wf6 15 &d5 Sae8

16 a4 £>xg3 17 hxg3 exd4 18 axb5

axb5 19 ,&xc6 .&xc6 20 £>xd4 ,&d7

and Black had nothing to worry about

in Dolmatov-Beliavsky, Moscow GMA

1990.

cases.

16 £>bd2 Ec8 17 Eacl &g7 18 b4

cxb3 19 axb3 Wc7 20 c4 (D)

Mecking-Planinc, Mar del Plata

1971. White’s extra space guarantees

an edge.

C22)

8...d6

The most common move.

9 d4 i.b6 10 £e3 (D)

Defending the d-pawn, thus prepar¬

ing the development of the knight on

d2. White has other moves here, but

this method of development causes

Black most problems. In the early

days of the Arkhangelsk. 10 ^.g5 was

very common, but after 10...h6 11

.&h4 g5! 12 .&g3 0-0 was discovered,

Black’s practical results became very

The e-pawn is indirectly protected:

10...£>xe4? loses a piece to 11 d5 fol¬

lowed by 12 ^.xb6.

Il£lbd2h6

This move, preparing ...£>g4 with¬

out allowing JLg5, is Black’s most

common here, but there are alterna¬

tives:

a) ll...^d7 12 &g5 £>e7 13 £lfl

^hS 14 £>g3 16 15 ^.e3 is a little

better for White, Khalifman-Mikhal*

chishin, Kuibyshev 1986.

b) ll...exd4!? 12 cxd4 £)b4 13

'i'bl! c5 14 a3 £>c6 (Enders-Mainka,

German Ch (Binz) 1994) and now I

like 15 dxc5 .&xc5 16 ^.xc5 dxc5 17

e5 £)d5 18 £>e4 c4 19 &c2, with

chances of a kingside attack.

12 h3 (D)


Now Black has a sizeable choice of

ideas:

C221: 12...Ee8 67

C222: 12...exd4 67

C223: 12...Eb8 68

Less important tries are:

a) 12...#b8 13 d5 £>e7 14 &xb6

cxb6 15 &c2 £sd7 16 <5)h4! WdS 17

£ifl (Anand-Kamsky, Las Palmas

PCA Ct (3) 1995) and now best for

Black seems to be 17...b4! 18 cxb4

£lxd5, although White can keep an

edge with 19 £>g6! fxg6 20 £b3.

b) 12...®d7 13 a3 £>e7 14 &a2

*h8 15 b4 a5 (Short-Kamsky, Linares

PCA Ct (6) 1994) and now Hiibner

suggests 16 dxe5 i.xc3 17 Exe3 £sxc5

18 £>d4 with a slight advantage to White.

C221)

12.. .Ee8 13 WbV.

This is the only decent way to cover

the e4-pawn. Both 13 &c2 and 13 Wc2 would allow Black to reply 13...exd4 14 cxd4 £fo4L

13.. .®h5

Black can attempt to strike back in

the centre by means of 13...£)a5 14

&c2 c5, but after 15 d5 c4 16 b4! cxb3

17 axb3 White still held the upper

hand in Rowson-Emms, British League (4NCL) 1997/8.

14 <S)fl #f6 15 £>lh2 (D)

In Becerra Rivero-Nguyen Anh

Dung, Erevan OL 1996 Black now

went astray with 15...£>f4? 16 £>g4

Wg6 17 ,&xf4 exf4 18 jLd5!, when

White had a big advantage. More re¬

silient is 15...exd4 16 cxd4 #g6, al¬

though White can still retain the

advantage after 17 e5 ®xbl 18 Eaxbl

dxe5 19 dxe5 £>a5 20 ,&xb6 cxb6 21 &c2.

C222)

12.. .exd4

Black immediately relinquishes the

centre in order to obtain play on the

queenside. Play in this line can be¬ come quite sharp.

13 cxd4 £>b414 #bl c515 a3 4k6

15.. .cxd4 16 £)xd4 £)c6 17 £)f5.

16 e5 dxe5 17 dxc5!?


Also possible is 17 dxe5, for exam¬

ple 17...£)d5 18 £se4 c4 (18...£)xe3?

19 £lf6+!! gxf6 20 %6+ <4?h8 21

®xh6+ &g8 22 Sxe3 and White has a

mating attack) 19 &.xb6 #xb6 20 &.c2

tdccl (20...Sfd8 looks stronger) 21

£>d6 £c8 22 &e4 &e6 23 ®dl and

White’s pieces are well placed, Scu-

deri-Karlsson, corr. 1987.

17.. .6c7

After I7....&a7 White proceeds with

18 &xh6! gxh6 19 %6+ &h8 20

1i,xh6+ £sh7 21 £le4, with a fearsome

attack.

After 17..JLc7, 18 .&xh6 isn’t so

effective as the black bishop is more in

the game on c7. After 18...gxh6 19

Wg6+ &h8 20 #xh6+ <S)h7 21 £>e4

£id4 22 £>xd4 exd4 Black was able to

beat off the attack in Khalifman-Mal-

aniuk, Minsk 1985. In the later game

Psakhis-Volzhin, Metz 1994, White

improved with 18 JLc2 £>e7 (18...b4,

preventing White’s next, should be

considered) 19 b4! £>fd5 20 #b2 #b8

21 &b3 £>g6 22 Sadi and White’s

pieces were more active.

C223)

12.. .5b8

Preparing to answer 13 d5 with

13.. JLxe3, as after 14 dxc6 ,&xd2 15

cxb7 the black rook is no longer at¬

tacked.

13 &c2 Se8 14 a3

Eliminating ...£sb4 ideas and so

preparing £>fl-g3. We have now

reached a position that was discussed

in Line B2 (note ‘b’ to Black’s 12th

move). The only difference here is

that Black has the move, as White has

played .&a4-b3-c2, rather than just

.&a4-c2. This extra tempo gives Black

better chances of equality.

14.. .£>a7

Once again, adding more pressure

to e4.

15 a4

Perhaps White should consider keep¬

ing the tension with 15 'i'bl!?.

15.. .£>c6!

Now the b4-square is once again

available, the knight is not slow in

hopping back. Note that 15...exd4 16

cxd4 £sxe4? loses a piece to 17 £sxe4

±xe4 18 a5.

16 axb5 axb5 17 £d3 b4 (D)

si IWM. i±ai mtM

* i

M "MSS. Ki.Georgiev-Beliavsky, Yugoslavia

1996 continued 18 d5 bxc3 19 bxc3

±xe3 20 Exe3 £lc7 21 c4 c6 22 &fl

#c7 with an equal position. White can

also consider 18 JLb5 bxc3 19 bxc3

exd4 20 i.xd4 <5)xd4 21 cxd4 c6, al¬

though this also looks fairly level.

7 The Open Lopez

1 e4 e5 2 £>f3 £lc6 3 iLb5 a6 4 ,&a4

£if6 5 0-0 &xe4 (D)

With 5...£>xe4 Black basically

chooses dynamic counterplay over

solid defence. He makes space for his

pieces to develop onto active posts and

squashes any thoughts White might

have of applying the ‘Spanish Torture’

so often seen in the closed defences.

However, there’s a certain price to pay for all this activity. The position

becomes open quite quickly and in or¬

der not to suffer a quick onslaught

down the e-file. Black is forced to

compromise his pawn-structure some¬ what, leaving White with potential tar¬

gets to exploit in the middlegame.

evertheless, the Open Defence has

fair share of supporters. Viktor

orchnoi is probably its most famous

a erent, while of the new generation

of top players one could point to Vishy

Anand, who employed it in his 1995

World Championship clash with Kas¬

parov and has continued to use it since.

The Strategic Starting Position

This is the typical position, which

is reached after 8 moves of the Open

Lopez. The first thing to notice is that

Black’s pieces occupy active squares.

Given a few free moves. Black would

probably continue with ...,&c5, ...0-0

and perhaps ...f6, to create a semi¬

open f-file and attack the f2-square. It

goes without saying that White must

act energetically in the diagram posi¬

tion, else Black could easily take over

the initiative once he has completed

his development. Here I’m advocating

the move 9 £)bd2, which was made


popular by Anatoly Karpov. One of

White’s main ideas is to put immedi¬

ate pressure on Black’s strong knight

on e4. This pressure can be enhanced

with such moves as c3 and JLc2. Black

is asked very early on what to do with

this knight.

Black Supports the Knight with ...f5

Black has just played ll...f5, lend¬

ing support to the under-fire knight.

White now has a big decision to make:

whether to capture en passant, or to

play around the knight and concen¬

trate on the weaknesses in the black

camp. On this occasion the main theo¬

retical move is 12 £>b3 (instead of 12

exf6). After 12...®d7 White can use a

tactical trick to justify the move 13

£>fd4. Now 13...£>xe5? 14 f3 &c5 15

Bel £ic6 16£ixc6 Wxc6 17 &d4 tW

18 b4 drops a piece, so the normal

continuation is 13...£lxd414 £>xd4 c5

15 £sxe6 Wxe6 16 f3 £ig5 17 a4,

when White is slightly better (see the

theory section for more on this posi¬

tion).

Black Moves the Knight

On this occasion Black has re¬

treated his knight to c5, where it con¬

trols some important squares. One of

White’s major plans in this position

involves the usual knight manoeuvre

with (after Sel) £>fl-g3/e3. White’s

pieces would then point impressively

at the black kingside. In addition,

White has the e5-pawn as a spearhead,

so it’s easy to see that White can often

build up a menacing attack against the

black king. White also often plays

£>b3, challenging the c5-knight. If this

is exchanged, it clears the way for the

white queen to go to d3, where it sets

up a powerful battery with the bishop

against the h7-pawn.

For the reasons outlined above,

Black often delays castling in favoui

of first improving the position of his

pieces. For example, Black often plays

the move ...Ji.g4, giving White a pin to

think about. This bishop can also be

re-routed via h5 to g6, in order to blunl

White’s attack along the bl-h7 diago¬

nal. This also leaves the e6-square

The Open Lopez 71

vacant for the knight to hop back and

completely block the e5-pawn. An¬

other common feature is Black dou¬

bling behind the d-pawn with ...Wd 1

and ...Sd8. The idea of this is not only

to add extra support to the often-

vulnerable d5-pawn, but also to facili¬

tate a possible ...d4 advance. Of

course the strength of this advance is

always dependent on the placing of the

various pieces, but a successful ...d4

will completely free Black’s position.

The Theory of the Open Lopez

1 e4 e5 2 ®f3 £ic6 3 ±b5 a6 4 ±a4

£T6 5 0-0 £)xe4 6 d4 bS

This is by far the most common

move, but White must be aware of two

other possibilities:

a) 6...exd4 gives us the so-called

Riga Variation. This line is very rare,

chiefly because the endgame arising

from the sequence 7 Sel d5 8 £)xd4

i.d6 9 £ixc6 ±xh2+ 10 *hl! (10

4,xh2 Wh4+ leads to perpetual check)

10...«h4 11 Sxe4+ dxe4 12 Wd8+

Wxd8 13 £ixd8+ &xd8 14 &xh2 has

been known for many years to favour White.

b) 6...jce7 isn’t seen very often, but in fact it’s quite a playable move.

White should continue 7 Sel f5 (after

7-b5 8 Sxe4 d5 9 £ixe5 £ixe5 10

Sxe5 bxa4 11 c4 dxc4 12 #xa4+ kdl

13 #xc4 0-0 14 £ic3 ±d6 15 £g5

«b8 16 Se2 White had a healthy extra

Pawn in Smirin-Piket, Wijk aan Zee

!994) 8 dxe5 0-0 9 &b3+ <4>h8 10

£ic3! £ixc3 11 bxc3 h6 (11...^8 is

probably stronger, although I still pre¬

fer White after 12 £)d4 Wg6 13 Wf3)

12 a4 a5 13 Sbl b6 14 ±d5 ±b7 15

<£d4 Sb8 16 £ib5 1x5 17 Wh5 with a

clear advantage, Geller-Kurajica, Wijk

aan Zee 1977.

7 ±b3 d5

After 7...exd4?! 8 Sel d5 White

plays the surprising 9 £)c3!, after

which Black has no good way through

the tactics. Following 9...dxc3 10

±xd5 ±b7 11 ±xe4 ±e7 12 We2

Black is struggling to castle, while

9..Jte6 10 <£sxe4 dxe4 11 Sxe4 ±e7

12 ±xe6 fxe6 13 ®xd4! 0-0 14 Wg4

®xd4 15 Sxd4 Wc8 16 Se4 Sf6 17

Ae3 left White clearly on top in

Fischer-Trifunovic, Bled 1961.

8 dxeS Ae6 9 £ibd2 (D)

The move which Karpov popular¬

ized. It’s basically a refinement over

the old main line, 9 c3. Black’s most

active move against that is 9...icc5.

However, in the current position

(after 9 <£sbd2), 9..JLc5 is less entic¬

ing, as White can immediately head


off into a slightly better endgame.

Black’s only real attempt to make use

of the move-order is with 9...£)c5 10

c3 d4!?, as in Line C. Anyway, I’ll

start by listing Black’s three main re¬

plies:

A: 9...AcS 72

B: 9...Ael 73

C: 9...£ic5 75

A)

9..Jtc5

The move that 9 £lbd2 had been de¬

signed to prevent!

10 £ixe4

This line seems to give White a

comfortable endgame, with a ‘risk-

free’ but very small advantage. If

White wants to keep more pieces on

the board, then he should try a queen

move, viz.:

a) 10 We2 gives Black two possi¬

ble replies:

al) 10..Jtf5 11 a4 b4 (ll...Sb8 12

axb5 axb5 13 £)xe4 dxe4 14 £)g5 0-0

15 Jce3 Wei 16 e6! Jcxe3 17 exf7+

<&h8 18 Wxe3 h619 Sa6 ®e5 20 &e6

Sxf7 21 <5M4 AcS 22 Axil Axa6 23

Wxe4 gave White an extra pawn in

Tkachev-Karolyi, Oakham 1993) 12

£)xe4 ,&xe4 (12...dxe4 13 £)g5 looks

quite unpleasant for Black) 13 Jce3

Axe3 14 Wxe3 0-0 15 4Dg5 Ag6 16

Sadi and the pressure on d5 proves

troublesome for Black, Emms-Gret-

arsson, Kopavogur 1994.

a2) 10...£)xd2 (the safest move) 11

Axd2 0-0 12 Sadi and now:

a21) 12...1.g4 13 Wd3! ±xf3 14

Wxf3 £sxe5 15 Wf5 Se8 (15...£ig6?!

16 Axd5 the! 17 ±xf7+ Sxf7 18

Wxc5 is clearly good for White,

Wahls-A.Mikhalevski, Berlin 1994)

16 Ag5 Wc8 17 Wxc8 Saxc8 18 Sxd5

and the bishop-pair gives White the

edge in this ending.

a22) 12...£ie7!? 13 Ae3 Axe3 14

Wxe3 c6 15 h3 £if5 16 Wf4 (perhaps

16 Wc5!?) 16...Wcl 17 Sfel Sae8 18

c3 f6 19 Ac2 g6 20 Se2 (20 £id4!?)

20...fxe5 21 Wxe5 ^d6 22 Wg3 A(5

and Black has just about equalized,

Jansa-M.Pribyl, Czech Ch 1996.

b) The strange-looking 10 Wei!?

also deserves some attention. The idea

is that on el the queen is less vulnera¬

ble to attack by ...4ud4. Thus 10....&f5?!

11 £)xe4 ±xe4 12 £)g5! would be in

White’s favour. Once again the safest

way is 10...£)xd2 11 ,&xd2 0-0. Lu¬

ther-V.Mikhalevski, Turin 1996 con¬

tinued 12 Sdl Wd7 13 Ag5 d4?!

(13...h6 looks stronger) 14 c3 h6 15

^xd4! £ixd4 16 Ae3 £if3+ 17 gxf3

Wc6 18 Axc5 Wxc5 19 We4 Sad8 20

Sd4 and White converted his extra

pawn into victory.

10.. .dxe4 11 Jbte6

11 Wxd8+ Sxd8 12 £ig5 Ad5 13

e6 fxe6 14 Jcxd5 exd5 15 £)e6 .&b6 16

<£ixd8 &xd8 gives Black good com¬

pensation for the exchange, Stisis-

A.Mikhalevski, Israeli Cht 1996.

11.. .Wxdl

After ll...fxe6,12 £lg5 Wxdl leads

to the same thing, but White could

also consider 12 ®d2!?.

12 Sxdl fxe613 5 0-0 14 £ixe4

Ab6 15 &fl

White kept a minute advantage af¬

ter 15 b3 £ixe5 16 <&fl ®g4 17 f3 ®f6 (17...£ixh2+ 18 <&e2 is clearly better

The Open Lopez 73

for White) 18 £)g3 <£M5 19 c4 bxc4 20

fXc4 in Topalov-Leko, Cap d’Agde

rpd 1994. 15...£*e5 16 <£>e2 £ig4 17 f3 ®f6

(D)

This is Adams-M.Pribyl, Bundes-

liga 1995/6. Black has one prominent

weakness, the e6-pawn, which is iso¬

lated and on a semi-open file, but the

activity of his pieces may be just

enough to maintain the balance.

B)

9...±e7 10 c3 £ic5


a) 10...Wd7 11 1x2 ±f5 12<£M4!

■&g6 13 a4! and now after 13...0-0? 14

&xe4 lxe4 15 axb5 axb5 16 Exa8

Sxa8 17 lxe4 dxe4 18 e6! fxe6 19

^xb5 Black’s wrecked pawn-structure

gave White a clear advantage in Lu-

iher-Krasenkow, Asti 1996. Stronger

is 13...£ixd2, although White still

keePs a plus after 14 lxd2.

b) 10...0-0 11 1x2 f5 12 £ib3 Wdl

13 &fd4 £ixd4 14 <£xd4! (14 cxd4 a5 15 f3 a4 16 fxe4 axb3 17 lxb3 fxe4

was equal in Griinfeld-Tal, Riga IZ

1979) 14...c5 15 £ixe6 ®xe6 16 f3

£lg5 17 a4 g6 (or 17...Sad8 18 axb5

axb5 19 We2 c4 20 1x3 with an edge,

Beliavsky-Tarjan, Bogota 1979) 18

*hl Wc6 19 l.xg5 -lxg5 20 f4 1x7

21 Wf3 and White’s protected passed

pawn gives him a nice plus, Ricardi-

Sorin, Buenos Aires 1996.

Ill.c2l.g4

In these positions Black has many

chances to advance the d-pawn, and

here is one of the occasions. After ll...d4!? we have:

a) 12 £ie4 d3 13 £ixc5 dxc2 14

l?xd8+ Sxd8 15 ^xe6 fxe6 16 1x3

Ed5 17 Sacl £)xe5 18 £lxe5 Exe5 19

Exc2 <&f7 and White has just a tiny

edge, Akopian-Daniliuk, St Peters¬

burg 1993.

b) 12 £ib3 d3 13 Abl £ixb3 14

axb3 li5 15 1x3 0-0 16 Ad4 Wd5 17

Eel and now 17...Bfd8 18 Ee3 £ixd4

19 cxd4 c5 20 !.xd3 cxd4 21 Be2 was

better for White in Topalov-Piket,

Antwerp 1997, but 17...d2!? deserves

attention, e.g. 18 Se2 !.xbl 19 Bxbl

£ixd4 20 ®xd4 -lg5 21 £¥3 Af4 with

an equal position.

The simple 11...0-0 is not seen very

much. In Am.Rodriguez-Todorovic,

PanCevo 1987 White kept the advan¬

tage after 12 £ib3 Wdl 13 <£bd4

^xd4 14 cxd4 £ie4 15 £iel f6 16 f3

&g5 17 £id3 fxe5 18 £ixe5 Wd8 19

1x3.

12 Bel (D)

Black now has two main continua¬

tions:

Bl: 12...0-0 74

B2: 12...Wd7 75


The advance 12...d4 is not so effec¬

tive here. After 13 £)b3! d3 (after

13.. .dxc3 14 £ixc5 ±xc5 15 ±e4 #xdl

16 Sxdl ±d7 17 bxc3 White’s pieces

are very active) 14 ±bl ®xb3 15 axb3

Af5 16 ±e3 0-0 17 ±d4 Wd5 (after

17.. .£lxd4 18 ®xd4 ±g6 White wins

the pawn with 19 ±xd3 ±xd3 20

Qc6!) 18 Se3 Sad8 19 ±xd3 £ixd4

20 cxd4 and Black has nothing for the

pawn, Geller-Anand, New Delhi 1987.

Another plan for Black is to re¬

route his bishop to g6. The exchange

of the light-squared bishops blunts

White’s attacking potential. On the

other hand the manoeuvre is rather

time-consuming and White maintains

some advantage after 12..Jth5 13

Qfl 0-0 14 £ig3 ±g6 15 ±e3 Wdl 16

h4! £ie6 17 h5 ±xc2 18 Wxc2 f6 19

exf6 ±xf6 20 h6!.

B1) 12.. .0-0 13 £sb3

13 <£sfl and 13 h3 are other moves,

but I believe that this is the most se¬

vere test of 12...0-0.

13.. .6e4

After 13...&e6 14 Wd3! g6 15 ±h6

Se8 16 Sadi Af5 17 Wd2 ±xc2 18

Wxc2 Wdl 19 h4! the pressure against

the d5-pawn, coupled with the weak

dark squares around the kingside,

leaves Black with a miserable position.

Emms-Rutherford, Hastings 1995 con¬

cluded 19...Sad8 20 h5! Af8 21 Wd2

<£ig7 22 hxg6 hxg6 23 ,&g5 ,&e7 24

<£lbd4 ®xd4 25 cxd4 £)e6? 26 Jtf6

Sc8? (26...±xf6 27 exf6 Wd6 28 Se5

£tf8 29 Sdel Ee6 30 Wh6 Sxf6 31

£sg5 Wdl 32 Ele3 wins for White) 27

#h6 1-0.

14 ±f4 f6

A more recent try is 14...Ee8 15

,&xe4 dxe4 16 Exe4 Wxdl+ 17 Exdl

Jcxf3 18 gxf3, as in Kuczynski-Marin,

Budapest Z 1993, but of course, only

White has winning chances in this

endgame.

15 exf6 £ixf6 16 Wd3 Wdl 17

<2)g5! (D)

Now 17...g6? 18 £ixh7! <&xh7 19

Wxg6+ <4>h8 20 Ee3 left Black in big trouble in Am.Rodriguez-Milos, Bo¬

gota 1991. More resilient is 17.. ho

The Open Lopez 75

18 ©h7 Sf7 (Large-Flear, British Ch

(Eastbourne) 1990) and here I like the

continuation 19 ©xf6+ Exf6 20 Wh7+

<4>f7 21 -&g3!, with the idea of dou¬

bling on the e-file. All in all, Black’s

position looks rather shaky.

B2) 12.. .Wd7

This queen move is the most popu¬

lar response. Black delays castling in

favour of improving the positioning of

his pieces. In particular the rook moves

from a8 to d8 to lend further support to

the d5-pawn and facilitate its advance.

13 ©fl Sd8 14 ©e3 £h5

Grabbing a pawn by 14...^.xf3 15

WxfB ©xe5 runs into a fearsome at¬

tack after 16 Wg3 ©g6 17 ©£5!.

15 b4!

White must play aggressively to

maintain the initiative. 15 ©f5 0-0 16

©xe7+ ©xe7 17 ±e3 ©a4! is known

to be OK for Black.

15.. .©e6

15.. .©e4 walks into 16 ©xd5!. 16 g4

The immediate 16 ©f5 is also inter¬

esting. After 16...0-0 17 a4, Am.Ro-

driguez-Marin, Novi Sad OL 1990

continued 17...Sfe8 18 axb5 axb5 19

*d3 iLg6 20 Wxb5 ©xe5 21 Wxd7

^xd7 22 ©xe7+ Exe7 23 Jtxg6 hxg6

24 ©d4 Eee8 25 ©c6 and White had

a better endgame. 17....&g6 may be

stronger, when White should trans¬ pose into the main line with 18 g4.

16.. .6.6 17 ©f5 0-0 18 a4 d4

After 18...Sfe8 White bombards

*e b-pawn with 19 axb5 axb5 20 ±d3

and now both 20...Sb8 21 We2 ©cd8

22 Sa7 d4 23 cxd4 ±xb4 24 Edl, as in

Shabalov-Vucic, New York 1993, and

20...©b8 21 Jce3, as in Galkin-Soro-

kin, Russia Cup 1997, are very favour¬

able for White.

19 axbS axb5 20 ,&e4 (D)

We are following the game Haba-

Marin, Budapest Z 1993, which con¬

tinued 20...Sfe8 21 Wd3 ©b8 and

now White’s most effective way for¬

ward is 22 cxd4! ±xb4 23 Edl c6 24

-&e3, when White’s centre looks very

powerful indeed.

C) 9.. .©c5

This is Black’s most principled

choice. He hopes to exploit White’s

temporary lack of control over d4 and

push his d-pawn forward.

10 c3 (D)

10.. .d4

This is the critical move, but there

are many other choices here:

a) For 10...Ae7 11 J&.c2 see Line B.

b) 10...©d3 11 We2©xcl 12Baxcl

is good for White since Black has


spent too many moves with his knight

just to exchange it for an undeveloped

piece.

c) 10...£sxb3 11 £sxb3 &e7 12

£sfd4! <£sxd4 (snatching the pawn with

12...£)xe5?! is too risky; after 13 Eel

£sg6 14 £sxe6 fxe6 15 &d4 White had

a strong initiative in G.Kuzmin-

Beliavsky, USSR 1977) 13 cxd4 0-0

14 jLd2, followed by Eel, and White

can attack down the half-open c-file.

d) 10..,g6 11 »e2 &g7 12 £sd4!

£sxd4 (I2...£ixe5 13 f4 £sc4 14 f5

gxf5 15 £sxf5 Eg8 16 £)xc4 dxc4 17

jLc2 £sd3 18 iLh6 led to a crushing

win for White in Karpov-Korchnoi,

Baguio Wch (8) 1978) 13 cxd4 £sb7

14 &c2 c5 15 f4 cxd4 16 £sb3 Wb6 17

®f2 0-0 18 £sxd4 with an edge to

White, Fishbein-Murey, Moscow 1989.

e) 10...jLg4 (this is the most im¬

portant of Black’s alternatives) 11 Jic2

and now:

el) ll...^.e7 transposes into Line

B on page 73.

e2) ll...£ie6 12 Eel &c5 13 £sfl

&h5 14 £sg3 &g6 15 &b3 ®e7 16 h4

gave White a useful initiative in the

game Kovaliov-Kaidanov, Blagove¬

shchensk 1988.

e3) ll...*d7 12 Eel Ed8!? (once

again, 12...jLe7 is Line B, while in

Leko-Anand, Linares 1999, Black

tried another lunge with 12...d4, but

was worse after 13 £sb3 dxc3 14

»xd7+ Jkxd7 15 bxc3) 13 £sb3! ®e6

14 a4 Jke7 15 axb5 axb5 16 Wd3 and

now Am.Rodriguez-Kharitonov, Bay-

amo 1989 continued 16...Eb8?! 17

£sfd4 £scxd4 18 cxd4 with a clear plus

for White. Stronger is 16...i.h5 but af¬

ter 17 *xb5 Axf3 18 gxf3 £ixe5 19

#xd7+ £)xd7 the bishop-pair grants

White an edge.

e4) ll...d4!? led to an equal posi¬

tion after 12 £sb3 d3 13 Jkbl Wd5 14

®xc5 Jixc5 15 fcd3 ®xd3 16 jLxd3

0-0-0 17 &e4 Jkxf3 18 gxf3 £sxe5 in

Leko-Anand, Tilburg 1998. This line

needs further tests, perhaps with 12 h3

or 12 Eel!?.

After 10...d4 White has two main

alternatives:

Cl: ll®g5!? 76

C2: 11 jLxe6 79

The former is the tactical option,

whereas the latter leads to more posi¬

tional play.

Cl)

11 £sg5!? (D)

This staggering move, which sim¬

ply leaves a knight en prise, is an

invention of Karpov’s trainer Igor Zai¬

tsev. It caused a sensation when Kar¬

pov unleashed it against Korchnoi in

game 10 of their 1978 match. Now

Black has:

The Open Lopez 11

Cll: ll...dxc3 77

02: ll...^.dS!? 78

C13: ll...lrxgS 78

C11)

11.. .dxc3

This move requires some heavy re-

pair-work after Kasparov’s crushing

win over Anand in their 1995 World

Championship match.

12 £)xe6 fxe6 13 bxc3 fti3 14 1x2!

This move is the prelude to a spec¬

tacular rook sacrifice.

14.. .11fxc3 15 £)b3!! £ixb3

Black can decline the rook, but

15...Sd8 161x12 Exd2 17 &xd2 £)xe5

(or 18 Eel 1T6 19 £sb3) 18

^b3 gave White the advantage in

Khalifman-HraCek, Parnu 1996. 16 lxb3 £sd4

After ^...©xal White replies with

n«h5+!and now: a) 17...*d7 18 l.xe6+ &xe6 19

Wg4+ <&f7 (i9...<^d5 20 fti7+ Ad6

21 %7+ 4?xe5 22 #xg7+ &e6 23

®xal wins) 20 fT3+ &e6 21 fcc6+

*d6 22 exd6 We5 23 l.b2 ®xb2

(23...1fxd6 24 Eel+ *f7 25 fT3+

&g6 26 %4+ *f7 27 ®xg7#) 24

Eel+ &f6 25 «T3+ &g6 26 %4+

&h6 27 Ee6+ ®f6 (or 27...g6 28

iT4+ &h5 29 g4+ <4'h4 30 ®h6+

&xg4 31 Ee4+ &f5 32 fT4#) 28 h4!

and Black must give up a whole queen to avoid mate.

b) 17...g6 18 fT3 and now:

bl) 18...0-0-0 19 *xc6 *xe5 20

Wxa6+ &b8 (or 20...&d7 21 !.b2!) 21

1x3 and White’s attack is decisive.

b2) 18...£sd4 19 ®xa8+ *f7 20

Edl £sxb3 21 fT3+ &g8 22 Aa3! wins the queen.

b3) 18...®d8 19 fT6 Eg8 20 !.xe6 (D).

Now 20...1.e7 21 !.d7+! &xd7 22

e6+, 20...£sxe6 21 Wxe6+ Jke7 22

^xgS-t- and 20..±gl 21 Af7+ £sxf7

22 1^6+ &f8 23 &a3+ win for White.

Tougher is 20...Eg7, but 21 i.a3 #xfl+

22 ‘fe’xfl still leaves Black without a

good defence.

17^4^x3118 &xe6Ed8

Black’s most resilient defence is

18...ft3! 19 &d7+ &f7 20 &e3 &c5.


when White has many promising con¬

tinuations, but I haven’t yet found a

clear win.

19 iLh6 ®c3 20 iLxg7 ®d3 21

&xh8 %6 22 Jkf6 3ie7 23 &xe7

Wxg4 24 Jkxg4 &xe7 25 Eel (D)

Kasparov-Anand, New York PCA

Wch (10) 1995. The endgame is win¬

ning for White.

C12)

11.. JLd5

This is a relatively new idea, found

by the Bosnian grandmaster Ivan Sok¬

olov.

12 £sxf7!?

This flamboyant move is the criti¬

cal test. 12 £xd5 fcd5 13 £>b3 £xb3

14 axb3 &cl 15 £)f3 d3 16 &c3 0-0 17

ii.d4 fifd8 was equal in Onishchuk-

I.Sokolov, Wijk aan Zee 1997, while

aggressive moves such as 12 ®g4 and

12 ®h5 are worth investigating.

12.. .6xf7 13 Wf3+ &e6 (D) 14£se4

The latest twist in this variation was

seen in Svidler-Anand, Dos Hermanas

1999, where White came up with the

stunning idea 14 ®g4+ êl 15 e6!

and following 15...jLxe6 16 Eel Wd7

17 jLxe6 £ke6 18 £sf3 Ee8 19 £ig5

<£sd8 20 jLd2! Black was in big trou¬

ble, despite his extra piece.

14.. .£sxb3

14.. .^xe4 15 ®xe4 £)e7 16 f4

&xb3 17 f5+ &f7 18 axb3 Wd5 19

#14 gives White a strong attack for

the sacrificed piece.

15 %4+ <&f7 16 fT5+ &g8

Not, however, lh.-.'&’eS? 17 e6!

-fi.xe6 18 ®xe6+, which was winning

for White in L.Dominguez-Rios, Cuba

1996.

17 e6 h6 18 fT7+ &h7 19 £sg5+

hxg5 20 #h5+ 4?g8 21 Wf7+

With a draw by perpetual check.

The last word has not been spoken on

this line.

C13)

11.. .®xg5 12 Wf3 0-0-0 Returning the piece is Black’s best

idea. Instead:

a) 12...*d7 13 &d5 &xd5 M

®xd5+ jLd6 15 cxd4 4)xd4 16

The Open Lopez 79

left Black in trouble in the game Br0ndum - Brinck-Claussen, Den¬

mark 1979. b) I2...i.d7 13 &xf7+ &e7 14

£d5 £>xe5 15 We2 d3 16 Wei c6 17 f4

#h6 18 iff3! led to victory for White

in Wolff-Flear, London 1990.

13 &xe6+ fxe6 14 ®xc6 t^xeS 15

b4! ®d5 16 WxdS exd5 17 bxc5 dxc3

18&b3d4 19 Jka3 (D)

Black has two connected and ad¬

vanced passed pawns for the piece. No

real conclusion has been drawn as to

whether this gives Black enough com¬

pensation.

19...g6!?

The older line runs 19...^.e7 20 ■&b4 &f6 21 a4! bxa4 (2l...&d7 22

a*b5 axb5 23 Ea6 c6 24 Sdl &e6 25

Sxc6+ &d5 26 Exf6 <&c4 27 Ed6!

gave White a winning position in Mc-

Donald-Morris, London 1994) 22 c6

d3 23 Sxa4 d2 24 Exa6 4?b8 25 £ixd2

E*d2 26 Sdl Ehe8 27 &fl Eel+ 28 Sxel dxel W+ 29 &xel and White has

S°me chances to make his extra pawn c°unt, Ninov-Dimov, corr 1995.

20 &b4 JLg7 21 a4 4?d7 22 axb5

axb5 23 Sadi &e6 (D)

This position was reached in the

game Shirov-Timman, Wijk aan Zee

1996. Play continued 24 Efel+ <^5

25 ifxc3 <4'c4 and Black was just

holding on.

C2)

11 &xe6

The safest continuation. After this

move White can play for a small posi¬

tional advantage.

11.. .£ixe6 12 cxd4 <£3cxd4 13 a4!?

13 43e4 is also seen quite often, but

13 a4 poses Black some serious ques¬

tions and has achieved good practical

results.

13.. .6e7

Black has two other sensible possi¬

bilities:

a) 13...Eb8 14 axb5 axb5 15 £se4

£e7 16 iLe3 £sf5 17 iLa7! Wxdl 18

Efxdl Ed8 19 g4 Exdl+ 20 Exdl

£sh4 21 £ixh4 Jkxh4 22 Jke3 and

White is ready to push on the kingside,

Smirin-Hubner, Polanica Zdroj 1995.


b) 13...£c5 14&e4.$.b6(14...0-0

15 £sxc5 £sxf3+ 16 Wxf3 £xc5 17

axb5 axb5 18 jLg5! Exal 19 &xd8

Exfl+ 20 4>xfl Exd8 21 g3 was

slightly better for White in Topalov-

Anand, Dos Hermanas 1996) 15 £rfg5

®xg5 16 iLxg5 Wd7 and now instead

of 17 axb5, as in the game Am.Rodri-

guez-Korneev, Barbera del Valles

1994, Rodriguez suggests 17 Sel 0-0

18 Ea3!, planning to swing the rook

into a kingside attack.

14 £ixd4 £sxd4

14...1ifxd4 15 axb5 ®xe5 16 bxa6

0-0 17 WzA leaves Black struggling to

eliminate White’s extra pawn, e.g.

17...&C5 18 ®c4 Efb8 19 Ea5 ttd6

20 £se4 <£ixe4 21 *xe4 and White is

better, Topalov-Korchnoi, Madrid 1996.

15 £se4 0-0

The stem game with 13 a4 contin¬

ued l5...Qe6?! 16 £e3 0-017 f4 fcdl

18 Efxdl Efb8 19 Ed7 and White

converted his endgame advantage into

victory in Karpov-Korchnoi, Merano Wch (18) 1981.

16 axb5 &xb5 17 Jke3 ®c8 18

ftiS!? (D)

Now Chandler-Yusupov, Hastings

1989/90 continued 18...Ed8? 19 #06!

and Black was rather tied down.

Yusupov suggests lS-.-^fS 19 £>g3

Wg6 as Black’s best chance to equal¬

ize.

8 The 8 a4 Anti-Marshall

I e4 e5 2 £sc6 3 Jkb5 a6 4 i.a4

5 0-0 £e7 6 Eel b5 7 Jkb3 0-0 8

a4 (D)

When Vasily Ivanchuk lost a recent

game as White in the Marshall Attack

against the Dutchman Jan Timman,

the Ukrainian grandmaster went as far

as saying that 8 c3, allowing the Mar¬

shall (8...d5), is a mistake, after which

White has to fight for the draw! Of

course this is a very over-the-top con¬

demnation of 8 c3, but given that even

the world’s top players have trouble

keeping up with the breakneck speed

°f Marshall theory. I’m quite pleased

to be advocating an anti-Marshall system in this book!

. ^ 8 a4 White brings his al-rook

lnt0 the game and immediately puts Pressure on the b5-pawn. Thus Mar-

s all-style gambits are more or less

avoided (Black can still try his luck,

but by comparison to the real Mar¬

shall, ...d5 lines against a4 just don’t

have the same bite). In this chapter

White develops in a more restrained

fashion with d3 and £sbd2-fl. Notice

that White need not hurry to play c3,

as ...£sa5 can be answered by jLa2, re¬

taining the bishop along the a2-g8 di¬

agonal. Because White does not play

an early d4 advance. Black is under

less immediate pressure in the centre.

He can use this extra freedom to de¬

velop in a number of ways.

The Lopez Knight Manoeuvre

The arrows show the typical paths

available to the bl-knight. The impor¬

tance of this plan cannot be over¬

emphasized. When the knight reaches

either e3 or g3, it not only influences


the struggle for the centre, it is also

ready to hop into more advanced

squares such as d5 and f5. In conjunc¬

tion with White’s other pieces, this

knight can help White set up attacks

on the kingside. Once the knight has

moved from d2 to fl, the dark-squared

bishop is no longer blocked and is

ready to join the action.

Black Plays ...b4

Here’s a typical position that can

arise if Black plays an early ...b4.

White’s last move was 10 a5!, fixing

the a6-pawn and also isolating the one

on b4. These weaknesses could prove

important later on in the game. For ex¬

ample, White often plays jLc4 to pres¬

surize the a6-pawn. However, it’s not

all one-way traffic, as the pawn on a5

is a little weak in itself, and so it needs

constant attention. Naturally, White

can continue with the usual plan of

£ibd2-fl, although the c4-square can

also be a useful place for this knight.

Later on, of course. White may pro¬

ceed in the centre with c3 and d4.

For Black’s part, he must choose

where to place his c8-bishop. The nor¬

mal squares are e6, where it opposes

the Lopez bishop, and g4, pinning the

knight. Black also strives to play the

freeing ...d5 advance. If White an¬

swers this with exd5, then Black

achieves the ‘Little Centre’, but in

compensation White has possession

of the c4 outpost.

Black Plays ...£b7

Here’s a typical starting position

for the 8...jLb7 line. White has already

begun the Lopez knight manoeuvre

and can hope to profit from the fact

that Black’s bishop is on b7 by using

the f5 outpost for this knight. In con¬

junction with the Lopez bishop. White

can often build up a menacing attack

on the kingside like this. Once again

White will eventually step up the pres¬

sure in the centre with c3 and d4. Black has many different ways to

combat White’s strategy. The first is to

opt for the usual queenside counter-

play with ...£ia5 and ...c5. In some

The 8 a4 Anti-Marshall 83

lines Black can attempt to block out

the Lopez bishop with a timely ...c4.

Together with this idea. Black can

bolster his kingside with moves such

as ...Ee8, ..JLf8 and possibly ...h6

(preventing £ig5 or iLg5). A different

plan consists of ...£kl7-c5, putting

pressure on b3 and a4, while allowing

Black to overprotect d4 with .. JLf6.

The Theory of the 8 a4 Anti-Marshall

1 e4 e5 2 £ic6 3 Jkb5 a6 4 £a4

&f6 5 0-0 Jke7 6 Eel b5

For 6...d6 7 c3 see Chapter 6, Line

A.

7 £.b3 0-0

For the main-line Closed Lopez

starting with 7...d6, see Chapters 9-15.

As well as 7...0-0, Black can prepare

to play another Marshall-style gambit

with 7...^.b7, intending to meet 8 c3

with 8...d5!?. After l..Abl 8 d3 0-0

White can transpose into the Anti-

Marshall with 9 a4, but can also try an¬

other approach with 9 ®c3 d6 10 a3! ?.

White preserves the bishop on the a2-

g8 diagonal and Black can no longer

challenge it with .. JLe6. Meanwhile,

the knight may go straight to d5, or

move to g3 via el (this line can be

compared favourably to another anti-

Marshall which has become popular

recently, that is 7...0-0 8 h3!? &b7 9

d3 d610 a3, as White hasn’t expended

a tempo on h3). One possible continu¬

ation after 10 a3 runs 10...£id4 11

£ixd4 exd4 12 £se2 c5 13 £sg3 d5 14

e5 £)e8 15 c3 f5 (15...dxc3 16 bxc3 g6

17 d4 Ihgl 18 .&h6 favoured White in

Leko-Am.Rodriguez, Havana 1997)

16 cxd4 cxd4 17 Wf3 and Black’s

weak pawns give White a clear plus,

Emms-Hebden, British Ch (Plymouth)

1992.

8 a4 (D)

There are three main possibilities: A: 8...Eb8 83

B: 8...b4 84

C: 8....&b7 85

I should say at this point that Black

can also be really stubborn by continu¬

ing in Marshall style with 8...d5?!, but

it’s quite clear that against this 8 a4 is

far more useful than 8 c3. Most moves

give White the advantage here. 9

jLxd5 ®xd5 10 exd5 £ld4 11 £lxd4

exd4 12 axb5 jLb7 13 c4 dxc3 14 dxc3

axb5 15 Exa8 Jkxa8 16 fU3 £.xd5 17

Wxb5, with a clear extra pawn, de

Firmian-I. Sokolov, Amsterdam 1996,

looks convincing enough.

A)

8...Sb8


This is not a very common move.

Black still harbours thoughts of play¬

ing a Marshall Attack. However, the

opening of the a-file means that White

gets a far better version than normal.

9 axb5 axb5 10 c3 d5

After I0...d6, White need not pre¬

pare the central advance with 11 h3,

but can go ahead immediately with 11

d4!. The point is that the standard re¬

ply ll..JLg4 can be met by 12 d5!,

winning the knight. Black can ex¬

change on d4 first, but after ll...exd4

12 cxd4 Jkg4 13 4k3 tUl 14 Jke3

White’s central control gives him an

ideal position, Kindermann-Liubar-

sky, Hamburg 1993.

11 exd5 4)xd5 12 £sxe5 £sxe5 13

Exe5 4T6!

The main ‘Marshall’ move here

would be 13...c6, but after 14 d4 ^.d6

15 Eel 1ifh4 16 g3 to 17 &e3 &g4

18 ®d3, the opening of the a-file gives

White an important advantage over

the normal Marshall lines. In particu¬

lar, Black has to watch out for a timely

Ea6, attacking the vulnerable c6-pawn.

14 d4 £d6 15 Ee2! (D)

15 Eel? gives Black unnecessary

chances after 15...4}g4!, e.g. 16 h3

to 17 to 4kf2!.

After 15 Ee2 Black has the follow¬

ing possibilities:

a) 15...b4?! 16 &A2 Eb5 17 £>fl

and White is clearly better.

b) 15...C5!? (Wolff-Fang, New York

1994) and now the simplest solution

for White looks to be 16 dxc5!? iUc5

17 *xd8 Exd8 18 Af4 £g4 19 Eel

Ebc8 20 Qd2 b4 21 h3 bxc3 22 bxc3,

when White has good chances to

convert the extra pawn into a full

point.

c) 15...£>h5 16 £e3 &b7 (16...^.g4

17 f3 ®h4 18 g3 £ixg3 19 Eg2! &h3

20 &f2! &xg2 21 &xg2 wins for

White) 17 £id2 to 18 4tfl and, with

h2 safely protected. Black doesn’t

have enough play for the pawn.

B)

8„.b4

This move is much less popular

than 8...^.b7, but it’s not easy for

White to prove any advantage against

it, as Black does remain very solid.

9d3

9 d4 is also possible, but the text-

move is the most popular.

9.. .d6 10 a5! Preventing ...4)a5 and fixing the

a6-pawn, which could become a weak¬

ness later on.

10.. .6e6 A more ambitious alternative for

Black is 10..JLg4, preparing ...®d4

and ...d5. Now White has: a) 11 4)bd2!? £id4 12 &c4 c6 13

h3 4)xf3+14 £sxf3 Jkh5 was played in


Hracek-I.Sokolov, Parnu 1996 and

now, according to Hracek, White can

keep a small advantage with 15 jLb3! ?

£d7 16 &e3 &h8 17 g4 &g618 fti2.

b) 11 .&e3 d5 12 £sbd2 h6 (threat¬

ening ...d4) 13 h3 and now 13.. JLh5

14 exd5 £ixd5 15 We2 (or 15 ®bl!?)

is enough to give White a slight edge,

while 13...d4!? 14 hxg4 dxe3 15 fxe3

£xg416 <^h2 £sxh2 17 &xh2 i.g5 18

ld5 Wdl 19 Wh5 Hae8 20 £tf3 gave

White good attacking chances in

T.Ravi-Chatterjee, Indian Ch (Kasar-

agod) 1996. The bishop on d5 is a par¬

ticularly strong piece.

11 £ibd2 &xb3

After 1 l...Sb8 12 &c4 ft8 13 £tfl,

13...Se8?! 14 £te3 £id4 15 £ixd4

exd4 16 £sd5 £ixd5 17 exd5 £d7 18

i.d2 was clearly better for White in

Kasparov-Short, London PCA Wch

(1) 1993. The a6-pawn here is a real li¬

ability. Black can improve on this se¬

quence with 13...jLxc4 but after 14

dxc4 the simple plan of <£se3-d5 still

gives White an edge.

12 £}xb3 d5!? (D)

This position occurred in Speel-

man-Smyslov, Biel IZ 1993. After 13

®e2 Ee8 14 iLg5 h6 15 iLh4 ^h5 16

&g3 ®xg3 17 hxg3 Jkf8 18 £tfd2

®d6 Black had equalized. White has

other tries, including 13 iLg5, but in

any case, this seems to be a relatively

underrated line for Black.

C)

8...&b7

The most natural and also the most

popular choice.

9d3

This move is all part of the re¬

strained approach. If 9 c3 Black

shouldn’t hesitate to play in Marshall

fashion with 9...d5!.

After 9 d3 we now have another

major crossroads. Black can play:

Cl: 9...Ee8 86

C2: 9...d6 86

Other moves pose fewer problems:

a) 9...£sd4?! 10 £ixd4 exd4 11 c3

dxc3 12 £ixc3 b4 13 £se2 and White

will follow up with £}g3.

b) 9...d5?! is far too optimistic.

White simply grabs the pawn with 10

exd5, e.g. 10...£id4 11 c4 £ixb3 12

®xb3 Sb8 13 axb5 axb5 14 ftil and

White is clearly better, Tal- Kuzmin,

USSR Ch 1972.

c) 9...4â5 has the idea 10 £sxe5?

£lxb3 11 cxb3 d5!, when the centre

opens up for the black bishops. How¬

ever, there is no need to be so accom¬

modating. The natural 10 iLa2! is far

stronger. Following 10...d6 White can

play 11 &d2! c5 (after ll...£sc61 like

12 £}a3, when 12...bxa4 13 c3 and


12.. .b4 13 £>c4 look promising) 12

Axa5 ®xa5 13 axb5 ®xb5 (13...Wb6

14 bxa6 Exa6 15 fta3! ®xb2 16 i.c4

Eaa8 17 Sbl and the rook invades on

the seventh rank, Matulovic-Velimir-

ovic, Belgrade 1977) 14 ftbd2 ®xb2

15 Axf7+ Sxf7 16 Sbl ®a2 17 Sxb7

and Black has big problems defending

all of his light-squared weaknesses.

Cl) 9.. .5.8

Delaying the advance of the d-

pawn, in the hope that it can later be

moved to d5 in one go.

10 £ibd2!?

I should also mention that 10 £ic3

promises White a small edge, e.g.

10.. .b4 11 £kl5 fta5 12 ftxe7+ ®xe7

13 Aa2 d5 14 i.g5 dxe4 15 dxe4 Sad8

16 We2 h6 17 ilh4 and the two bish¬

ops are worth a slight pull, Hiibner-

Zso.Polgar, Biel 1987.

10.. .Af811c3h6

Black has other options:

a) 11 ...d6 transposes to Line C2.

b) ll...d5 is the most consistent

follow-up to Black’s play, but after 12

axb5 axb5 13 Sxa8 jLxa8 14 exd5 nei¬

ther 14...£ixd5 15 d4! nor 14...£ia5 15

Sxe5 Sxe5 16 £>xe5 looks satisfac¬

tory for Black.

12 Aa2!

A very subtle move. The main point

is that it eliminates ideas of a tempo-

gaining ...£ia5. 12.. .d6

Finally settling for just the one

square forward. Lunging with 12...d5

only runs into trouble after 13 exd5

£ixd5 14 d4!.

13 4Ti4! Wd7

Black can also prepare ...d5 with

13...£ie7!?, but after 14 £>fl! d5 15

Wf3! fth7 16 ftg3 Wd7 17 ftgfs

White’s kingside attack is starting to

become quite menacing.

14 ftg6 fte7 15 ftxf8 4?xf8 16 f3!

ID)

This position was reached in Kas¬

parov-Short, London PC A Wch (3)

1993. White has a small but persistent

advantage. At the moment Black’s po¬

sition looks quite secure, but White

possesses the latent power of the

bishop-pair, which will become more

important as the position opens up.

C2)

9...d6

The most popular move.

10 ftbd2 (D) 10 £ic3 is the old main line, but

Kasparov was successful with 10 ®bd2

in his World Championship match

against Short, and since then other top

players have followed his lead. White

delays the c3 advance so that he can


complete the knight manoeuvre more

quickly.

Once again Black has a choice of

moves:

C21: 10...£ld7 87

C22: 10...£la5 88

Other, less important, tries for Black are:

a) 10...£lb4!? was played once by

Hebden, who is an expert on the black

side of the Anti-Marshall. After 11

£)fl c5, as played in Nunn-Hebden,

Hastings 1993/4, I like the move 12

&d2!, e.g. 12...&C6 13 £ie3 c4 14 Aa2

and Black will have problems main¬

taining the blocking pawn at c4, while

the knight is ready to hop into f5.

b) 10...Ee8 11 c3 h6 (for ll...®a5

12 Aa2 c5 see Line C22) 12 £tfl i.1'8

13 4je3 £>e7!? 14 fth4 Wd7 and now,

instead of 15 h3, as in Waters-Hebden,

British League (4NCL) 1997/8,1 pre-

er 15 <£ief5!, planning ®f3, with a Powerful attack.

C21)

l0-£M7 Ilc3ftc512 axb5 axb5

12...£kb3? 13 bxc6! £lxal 14cxb7

Eb8 15 ®a4 wins material for White.

13 Exa8 i.xa8

After 13...Wxa8 14 i.c2, 14...i.f6

15 b4 £ie6 16 <bfl g6 17 £ie3 Ag7 18

Ab3 ®d8 transposes to the main line,

while Kasparov gives 14...b4 15 d4

bxc3 16 bxc3 £id7 17 £rfl as better

for White.

14 Ac2 &f6

Continuing to strong-point the e5-

square and preventing White’s d4 ad¬

vance. Opening the position with

14...d5? is an instructive mistake. Af¬

ter 15 exd5 ®xd5 16 d4! exd4 17 cxd4

^d7 18 i.e4 m6 19 ®c2 White wins

material following either 19...£ib4 20

£xh7+ 4?h8 21 Wf5 or 19...h6 20

Axc6! i.xc6 21 Exe7.

15b4£te616£tfl£b7

Black plans to bring the bishop

back into play via c8. Both 16...£le7

17 £ie3 £ig6 18 £ig4 and 16...d5!? 17

exd5 ®xd5 18 ftc3 ®d8 19 ftg4 fail

to alter the general assessment of the

position.

17 fte3 g6 18 i.b3 i.g7 (D)


This position was reached in Kas¬

parov-Short, London PCA Wch (7)

1993. Kasparov kept an edge with 19

h4!?, planning to soften up the black

kingside with h5. In his notes to the

game, however, Kasparov felt that 19

£ic2!, planning d4, was even stronger.

C22)

10.. .£&5 11 i.a2 c5 12 £sfl

12 c3 is also important due to trans¬

positions. Following 12...Ee8 13 £tfl

we have:

a) 13...C4!? 14 Ag5 h6 15 Axf6

jLxf6 16 fte3 Ec8 17 axb5 axb5 18

dxc4 £lxc4 19 Axc4 bxc4 20 ftd2

jLg5 21 £lexc4 d5 and the bishop-pair

gives Black some compensation for

the pawn, Klinger-Nunn, Biel 1986.

b) 13...h6 14 £te3 and now:

bl) 14...^.f8 15 b4 cxb4 16 cxb4

£k;6 17 ftd5 £ixd5 18 i.xd5 ®d7 19

®b3 bxa4 20 ®xa4 Eed8 21 ±d2 fte7

22 ®xd7 Exd7 and now 23 i.xb7

Exb7 was equal in Kindermann-

Adams, Garmisch 1994, but 23 Ac4!

keeps pressure on the black position.

b2) 14...®d7 15 b4 cxb4 16 cxb4

&c6 17 i.d2 i.f8 18 £kl5 (18 axb5!?

axb5 19 £id5 ftxd5 20 jLxd5 Exal 21

Wxal Ea8 22 ®c3 may give White an

edge) 18...ftxd5 19 Axd5 £}e7 20

jLxb7 Wxb7 21 d4 bxa4 22 Wxa4 exd4

23 ftxd4 ftg6 with equality, Oni-

shchuk-Adams, Bundesliga 1996/7.

12.. .b4 13 £}e3 i.c8

This line can be compared quite fa¬

vourably with 10 ftc3 fta5 11 jLa2 b4

12 £te2 Eb8 13 &g3 c5 14 £tf5 4c8

15 £te3 JLc6, as played in Anand-

Short, Amsterdam 1992. Here White

is two tempi ahead, having taken only

three moves to plant the knight on e3.

In a semi-closed position the loss of

time is not a disaster for Black, but it’s

still enough to give White a persistent edge.

14 c3 Eb8 (D)

Now 15 cxb4 Exb4 16 $Ld2 Eb8

17 jLc3 £>c6 18 4M2 i.e6 was equal

in Ivkov-Xie Jun, Vienna 1993, so

maybe White should try 15 ftc4!?,

e.g. 15...^xc4(15...Ae6?! 16£lxa5!

®xa5 17 i.xc6 fxe6 18 cxb4 ®xb4 19

ftg5 and the e6-pawn drops) 16 Axc4

a5 17 d4 bxc3 18 bxc3 cxd4 19 cxd4

Ab7 20 d5 and White keeps a small

advantage.

9 Ideas in the Closed Lopez

Before moving on to the individual

variations of the Closed Lopez, we

should take a brief look at some of the

more important positional ideas for

both White and Black. Although the

variations can lead to a diversity of

different types of positions, there are

still many familiar motifs running

through all the lines.

The Lopez Knight Manoeuvre

The above position is from the

Smyslov Variation (9...h6). Without a

doubt White’s most popular continua¬

tion here is to play 11 £ibd2!, fol¬

lowed by 12 £tfl and 13 ftg3. We

have seen this before, and we’ll see it

again! On g3 the knight gives valuable

support to the e4-pawn and is ready to

assist in a later kingside assault by moving to f5.

This position can arise from the

Chigorin Defence. Here White plays

15 £le3!, protecting the c2-bishop and

eyeing the important f5 and d5 posts.

Black's Offside Knight

The problem of the offside knight

arises chiefly in the Chigorin Defence

(9...£la5). Black originally plays the

move to gain a tempo on the Lopez

bishop and to enable him to make the

advance ...c5. However, Black often

has to spend several tempi reintroduc¬

ing the knight into the action. Worse

still, the knight may become areal lia¬

bility, achieving nothing in itself and

also getting in the way of Black’s

other pieces. White can sometimes in¬

vest lots of time just to make sure the

knight remains inactive. Here’s an in¬

structive example of White adopting

this policy.


Geller - Mecking

Palma de Mallorca IZ1970

Here Geller started the restraint

procedure with 14 b3!, not allowing

the a5-knight to jump into c4 once the

d2-knight has moved to fl. After

14.. .1.d7 15 £lfl Mecking tried to ac¬

tivate his knight another way with

15.. .£lb7 16 £lg3 c4, only to be foiled

again by the excellent move 17 b4!

(D).

Now the knight remains a misera¬

ble piece on b7. Its only route to any

activity would be via d8 to f7, but to

do this Black would have to move his

f6-knight and his f7-pawn, so this ma¬

noeuvre needs lots of preparation and

is rather cumbersome.

The knight can remain a liability

right into the endgame. Here’s a par¬

ticularly shocking example.

Andorra Z1998

Not only does the black knight have

no future, it also has to be protected by

Black’s only other piece. After 44

£lbl!, intending £la3 and £lxb5, my

opponent found no reason to continue

the struggle.

White Uses the a-file

After an initial a4 advance, White can

sometimes benefit by a direct assault

down the a-file. This can be particu¬

larly effective if the position remains

blocked elsewhere. The position on the following page

arose from the Smyslov Variation. Here

the computer shows it has positional

Ideas in the Closed Lopez 91

EH $ EH#!! IBIS **■ !;;S Vi 11% w m ktik k m Una m m mm

>' - A; A iH Hf IffAII AHI 1! cm, "i 15 A IP A |§P |§p

S B ^ Esa;

WHS AM'k'& mlmms Deep Blue - Kasparov Karpov - Unzicker

New York (2) 1997 Nice OL 1974

subtlety to go with its awesome calcu¬

lating ability.

24 Sa3! Hec8 25 Seal!

Black will always have to be con¬

cerned about White opening the a-file

and penetrating with his rooks. Even

Kasparov could not come up with a

suitable defensive plan.

25...®d8 26 f4 £if6 27 fxe5 dxe5

28 Hi fte8 29 Wl2 ftd6 30 Ab6

®e8 31 S3a2 Ae7 32 Ac5 Af8 33

£sf5 Axf5 34 exf5 f6 35 Axd6 Axd6

36 axb5 axb5 37 Ae4 Sxa2 38 ®xa2

®d7 39®a7Sc7 40®b6

The computer has comfortably ar¬ rived at an overwhelming position.

The following position arose from

the Chigorin Defence. Black would

like to relieve the pressure by multiple

exchanges down the a-file. Karpov

came up with an inspired way to pre-

vent this. After the clever blocking

wove 24 Aa7! Black remains forever

cramped and White can build up on

the a-file at leisure. The rest of the

game is quite instructive, with Karpov

combining potential threats down the

a-file with opening another attacking

front on the kingside. After 24...fte8

25 Ac2 £ic7 26 Seal ®e7 27 Abl

Ae8 28 fte2 4kl8 29 £ih2 Ag7 30 f4!

f6 31 f5 g5 32 Ac2 Ml 33 £lg3 ftb7

34 Adi h6 35 Ah5 ®e8 36 ®dl 4kl8

37 Sa3 4?f8 38 Sla2 &g8 39 ftg4

4?f8 40 fte3 4?g8 41 Axf7+ £sxf7 42

Wh5 £id8 43 ®g6 4?f8 44 fth5

Unzicker threw in the towel. Black’s

position at the end is a rather sorry

sight!

Black Reinforces the e5-pawn

The theoretical position at the top of

the following page arises in the

Zaitsev Variation. Black’s most popu¬

lar continuation here is 10...Se8! 11

£lbd2 Af8. Now the e5-pawn has

added protection and the black rook

also bears down on White’s e4-pawn.

The f8-bishop may be reintroduced


via a fianchetto with ...g6, which would

help to bolster Black’s king position.

Black also often plays ...h6, to prevent

any annoying 4hg5 and Ag5 ideas

from White.

In the Karpov Variation Black rein¬

forces e5 in a different way. After

9...ftd7 10 d4 i.f6 it’s the dark-

squared bishop that does the work, de¬

fending e5 and also putting pressure

on the d4-pawn, thus attempting to re¬

solve the tension in the centre. White

may relieve the pressure by playing

d5.

Black Breaks with ...d5

Not a common occurrence, but if

White neglects to keep sufficient con¬

trol over the central squares then Black

can sometimes react aggressively.

Smirin - Beliavsky

USSR Ch (Odessa) 1989

Here White has gone for a crude

kingside attack. Beliavsky retaliated

in classical style with 18...d5! 19 exd5

exd4 20 £)xd4 (20 h5! is more consis¬

tent) 20...£ie5! 21 fte6 ®xd5 22 £)f4

Wc6 and Black went on to win in fine

style.

White Plays an Early d5

This idea (see diagram on following

page) is frequently seen in our study

of the Zaitsev and Karpov systems.

White deliberately blocks the centre,

leading to a phase of slow manoeuv¬

ring. Just concentrating on the pawn

breaks. White may try a4, increasing

the pressure on Black’s queenside

pawns. Black’s two possible pawn

breaks are ...c6 and ...f5. The former is


by far the most popular option, as it’s

usually far easier to carry out.

Black Breaks with ...c6

Here’s a typical position, which

could arise after Black answers White’s

early d5 with ...c6 and White ex¬

changes on c6. The following play is

based very much around the central

squares, and in particular, the e4- and

<J5-squares. White will attempt to

dominate the d5-square with moves

such as jLb3, jLg5, £ie3 and even

£i3h2-g4. Black meanwhile will also

try to control d5, and at the same time

keep White busy defending the 64-

pawn. This can be achieved by moves

such as ...£>c5/b6, ...®c8/c7-b7 and

...h6 (preventing jLg5). If Black gains

enough control over d5, he may con¬

template opening the position with

...d5. On one hand this liberates the

bishop on f8, but on the other hand it

also frees White’s c2-bishop.

Often after White plays d5, the tim¬

ing of Black’s response ...c6 is crucial.

Short - Timman

El Escorial Ct (10) 1993

Here Black is in a prime position to

play 15...c6 and in fact this is the theo¬

retical move. Instead Timman delayed

with 15...a5 16 4Ti2 g6 17 Wf3 h5 18

Ae3 &fd7 19 Sadi ®e7 20 ftgfl

i.g7 21 i.cl. Here Black should prob¬

ably continue with 21...a4. After Tim-

man’s 21...c6?, however. Short showed

he was ready for the break. The game

continued 22 b4! axb4 23 cxb4 £ia4

24 dxc6 i.xc6 25 i.b3! Sad8 26 ®g3

&f8 27 £tf3 fte6 28 ftg5 ftxg5 29


i.xg5 i.f6 30 Axf6 ®xf6 31 Ed3 and

White had won the battle of the central

squares. Following 31...h4? 32 Ef3!

hxg3 33 Exf6 gxf2+ 34 &xf2 Ee7 35

Exg6+ Short won a pawn and very

soon the game.

Black Plays ...c5

This important advance is mainly

seen in the Chigorin and Breyer Varia¬

tions. Black simultaneously exerts

more pressure on the d4-pawn and

harmonizes his own pawn-chain,

making more space for his pieces to

move from the kingside to the queen-

side and vice-versa. Apart from keep¬

ing the tension, there are two possible

ways that White can react to this ad¬

vance. He can exchange with dxe5 or

dxc5 or he can push with d5.

White Exchanges on c5 or e5

This particular strategy was a favour¬

ite of Bobby Fischer’s. After the ex¬

change of pawns Black has just as

much space as White, but White can

hope to profit by making use of the

d5-outpost. This plan can prove very

powerful if Black does not respond

precisely.

Fischer - Keres

Curasao Ct 1962

In this position 13...f6 is probably

Black’s best move. Instead Keres played

the plausible 13...®c7? and following

14 £ifl £lb6 15 £ie3! Ed8 16 #e2

Ae6 17 £id5! £ixd5 18 exd5 i.xd5

19 £ixe5 the potential in White’s posi¬

tion was released. Following 19...5a7 20 i.f4 ®b6 21 Sadi Fischer had


built up an irresistible attack, against

which the Estonian grandmaster was

unable to defend.

Fischer - Kholmov

Havana 1965

Here Fischer’s opponent is better

prepared to defend the d5-square. Af¬

ter 17 ftg5 h6! 18 ftxe6 fxe6 Black’s

doubled e-pawns protect some vital

squares and give Black a fully equal

position.

White Pushes with d5

By waiting for Black to play ...c5 and

only then advancing with d5. White

avoids the possibility of an attack at

the head of the pawn-chain with ...c6.

Play now revolves around various sub¬

tle piece manoeuvres and pawn moves.

For example. Black will often attempt

to play ...c4, in order to obtain a post

for a knight on c5, which from there

could even hop into the d3-square.

White may try to deny Black this idea

with an earlier b3, planning to answer

...c4 with b4. As we saw earlier, this

can be a particularly effective plan if

Black has a knight on b7.

As we have seen before, White may

also attack on the queenside with a4. If

Black answers this with ...b4, then

White can either exchange on b4 and

try to take control of the c-file, or else

block the queenside completely with

c4 and turn his attention to the other

wing.

As far as play on the kingside goes.

Black can attack the base of the

pawn-chain with ...f5, although usu¬

ally this requires a great deal of prepa¬

ration. Likewise, White may himself

attack with f4. If Black exchanges

with ...exf4, then he obtains the e5-

square as an outpost, but the backward

d6-pawn could be subject to attack. If

Black has pushed with ...c4, then

White would also have use of the d4

outpost.

10 Rare Closed Lopez Variations

1 e4 e5 2 £ic6 3 &b5 a6 4 &a4

£)f6 5 0-0 jLe7 6 Eel bS 7 &b3 d6 8

c3 (D)

Black can aim immediately for a

Chigorin set-up after 8...4)a5 9 jLc2

c5, but the drawback of this move-

order is that Black has less pressure on

d4, so White can do without the usual

h3. After 10 d4! Wc7 11 a4! b4 (if

ll...Eb8, 12 axb5 axb5 13 dxe5 dxe5

14 4)xe5! wins a pawn, while 11...0-0

12 axb5 axb5 13 b4 wins even more)

12 cxb4 cxb4 13 £)bd2 0-0 14 b3 &g4

15 &b2 £ic6 16 h3 Axf3 17 £ixf3.

White has a very pleasant position.

9h3

This modest move is an important

link in White’s plans, and has been

considered the main line for a very

long time. White rules out the pinning

move that would be effective after 9

d4, viz. 9...jLg4! (although this re¬

mains a playable line for White).

In this chapter we will deal with

two of Black’s less popular replies to 9

h3:

A: 9...a5 96

B: 9..JLe6 97

Note that 9...He8 is also possible, as

after 10 d4 jLb7 we have reached the

Zaitsev Variation (see Chapter 12).

A)

9...a5 (D)

This unusual move was briefly pop¬

ular in the late 1980s. Black is ready to

Rare Closed Lopez Variations 97

exchange the Lopez bishop if White

carries on as normal with 10 d4, but

White can keep the advantage by play¬

ing in a more restrained manner.

10 d3 10 d4 allows Black to carry out his

idea. After 10...exd4! 11 cxd4 a4 12

J.c2 £ib4 13 £ic3 £ixc2 14 #xc2 c6

the position is roughly level, Kronig-

Gostisa, Finkenstein 1994.

10...a4 11 &c2 (D)

U..Ad7

Black has to be careful with his

far-flung a-pawn. After the casual

1 l...Se8 Black is punished by 12 c4!,

when suddenly Black is in trouble, e.g.

12.. .bxc4 13 jLxa4 jLb7 14 dxc4 or

12.. .^b4 13 cxb5 £ixc2 14#xc2^.d7

15 £te3. In either case White is a pawn to the good.

12&bd2Ee8

12...#b8?! is too slow. After 13 d4

®b7 14 £T1 exd4 15 cxd4 <£ib4 16

&bl Had8 17 £ig3 Hfe8 18 &d2 £ia6

19 e5 White had a very potent attack in

Ehlvest-P.Nikolic, Reykjavik 1988. 13 £ifl h6

White also keeps an advantage after

13...^.f8 14 £)g3 g6 15 d4 &g7 16

jLg5 h6 17 iLe3 followed by #d2.

14 a3 £ia515 £)g3 £f8 16 £)h2 d5

17 exd5 £sxd5 18 <£sg4 (D)

Smagin-Hebden, Hastings Masters

1990 continued 18...^.xg4 19 Wxg4

Ha6 20 ^.d2 £if6 21 #f3 Hae6 22

Hadl with a small plus for White.

B) 9...JLe6

Black offers the exchange of the

light-squared bishops, hoping that this

will reduce White’s attacking capabil¬

ities.

10 d4 £xb3 11 axb3 exd4

This is the modern way to play the

position. Older tries grant White too

much space, e.g.:

a) ll...Ee8 12d5 £ib8 13 c4 c6 14

#d3 b4 15 &d2!? c5 16 &e3 £)bd7 17

^bd2 was better for White in Psa-

khis-Smagin, Protvino 1988.

b) Il...lfd7 12d5^d813c4c614

<£jc3 cxd5 15 <£ixd5 <£lxd5 16 #xd5

thc6 17 jLd2 and Black has various


weaknesses, Aronin-Kholmov, USSR

Ch 1957.

12 cxd4 d5 13 e5 £>e4

After 13...£>d7 the spearhead e5-

pawn gives White an excellent attack¬

ing platform. Smirin-Stempin, Polanica

Zdroj 1989 went 14 £>c3 £h4 15 £ic2

He8 16 £ig3 c5 17 £)f5 Af8 18 £>g5

h6 19 £M7! &xf7 20 #h5+ &g8 21

#g6 with a decisive attack.

14 £ic3 f5

14.._4.b4? runs into 15 £ixe4! &xel

16 £ieg5, e.g. 16...h6 17 Wc2 hxg5 18

4)xg5 g6 19 #xc6 iLb4 20 e6!, when

Black is in big trouble.

15 exf6 &xf6

This pawn sacrifice is Black’s sharp¬

est try. 15...4)xf6 16 jLg5 gives White

a safe advantage, with Black having

many weak squares on the c- and e-

files.

16 £ixe4 dxe4 17 Hxe4 Wd5 18

Eg4 h5


a) 18...£)b4 19 &g5 Bad8 20 ®d2

c5 21 Wc3 and White is just a clear

pawn up, J.Howell-Bjornsson, Reyk¬

javik 1990.

b) 18...£ie7 19 Ah6! &f5 20 &g5

h5 (20...jLxg5 21 Bxg5 h6 22 Eg4 is

better for White) 21 Ef4 iLxg5 22

£}xg5 4)xd4 23 Exf8+ Bxf8 24 #xh5

Kf5 25 #h4! ^c2+ and now 26 &h2?

allows Black a neat trick leading to a

draw, i.e. 26...#e5+ 27 *hl Exf2!! 28

Edl! Bfl+!! 29 Bxfl £)g3+ 30 *gl

#e3+ 31 Ef2 #el+ 32 *h2 £ifl+!.

but 26 &hl! leaves Black just a pawn down.

19 Ef4 Ead8

19...g5? 20 ^xg5! &xg5 (20...#xg5

is met by 21 Bg4!) 21 #xh5 leaves

Black with no good defence.

20 jLe3 ^b4

Or 20...g5 21 Exf6! Exf6 22 _&xg5,

winning back the exchange with an¬

other pawn to boot.

21 «bl «xb3 22 Ef5 (D)

Black’s weak kingside offers White

very good chances, e.g.:

a) 22...g6 23Eg5!. b) 22...#c223lfxc24)xc224Exa6

Bfe8 25 &g5 &xg5 26 Exg5 ^xd4 27

£}xd4 Exd4 28 Ec6! and White went

on to win this endgame in Anand-

Adams, Linares PCA Ct (3) 1994.

c) 22...4)c2!? (probably best) 23

Exa6 £ixe3 24 fxe3 Wxe3+ 25 *hl

and White’s active rooks give him the

advantage.

11 The Karpov Variation

1 e4 e5 2 £)f3 £ic6 3 &b5 a6 4 &a4

&f6 5 0-0 &e7 6 Eel bS 7 &b3 d6 8

c3 0-09h3îd7('D<)

This move has been known for a

long time and was recently brought

back into the limelight when it was

employed four times by Anatoly Kar¬

pov in his 1990 World Championship

match with Kasparov. One of Black’s

main ideas is to support the e5-pawn

with .. JLf6, which at the same time

puts pressure on White’s d4-pawn.

Meanwhile the d7-knight may move to

b6, where it discourages White from

playing a4 and may help Black to start

operations on the queenside. 10 d4

Now we will look at two continua¬

tions for Black:

A: 10...£ib6 99

B: 10...jLf6 101

A)

10...4ib6 (D)

Championed by Borislav Ivkov,

this move can also be found in the

games of Boris Spassky, and, more re¬

cently, Michael Adams. By immedi¬

ately transferring his king’s knight to

the queenside. Black dissuades White

from playing the a4 break. Moreover,

Black is now ready to start operations

himself on this wing. On the other

hand, with both knights on the queen¬

side, Black’s king has less defensive

cover, and therefore White should

concentrate his forces on the relatively

undefended kingside.

11 £>bd2

At this point Black has two major

options:

Al: ll...exd4 100

A2: ll..JLf6 101


A1) 11.. .exd4

With this move Black gives up his

foothold in the centre in exchange for

immediate queenside counterplay. Play

can now become extremely sharp.

12 cxd4 <S)b4

12.. .d5 is not so effective. After 13

jLc2 JLe6 14 e5 #d7 15 £)b3 &f5 16

jLg5 White offers an exchange of

bishops that would highlight Black’s

problems on the dark squares, Fischer-

Reshevsky, Santa Monica 1966.

13 £ifl c514 a3 &c615 £e3 £>a5

A more recent (and perhaps more

critical) try is 15...c4!? 16 jLc2 d5, ob¬

taining a serious clamp on the queen-

side. This puts some pressure on

White, who cannot afford to delay ac¬

tions on the kingside. Topalov-Peng

Xiaomin, Elista OL 1998 continued

17 <S)e5 Wc7 18 £)g3 g6 19 Wf3 &e6

20 £ixc6 #xc6 21 £h6 Hfe8 22 e5

and we are in the middle of a typical

asymmetrical battle.

16 JLc2 £ibc4 17 i.cl

At the moment it looks as if the

black knights are having more fun

than the white bishops, but in reality

the knights are struggling to find suit¬

able outposts and White is ready to

kick one out with a timely b3.

17.. .cxd4 18 £>xd4 &f6 19 Sbl

Elegant prophylaxis. After the im¬

mediate 19 b3, 19...Hrb6! puts White

in a rather awkward situation.

After the text-move. White is ready

to meet ^...©bb with 20 £if3, e.g.

20...Ab7 21 b3 £)e5 22 &e3 #c7 23

£>d4! Sac8 24 £)g3 Hfe8 25 Scl and

the white pieces are more alive.

19...d5 20 exdS &b7 21GX5 KxdS

22«g4 (D)

22 Wxd5 is also not bad, but it

seems sensible to keep the queens on

the board when there are so many at¬

tacking possibilities.

Looking at the diagram, we can see

that both sides can boast about dy¬

namic piece-play, but the key here is

the position of the knights. Since

White will be attacking the black king

with queen, rook and all four of his

minor pieces, Black will sorely miss

the defensive powers of his own

knights, the ones grazing on the queen-

side. Adams-Ivkov, French Cht 1991

proves the point quite effectively. Af¬

ter 22...h5 23 Wg3 Hfe8 24 &g5 &e5

25 f4 &d4+ 26 &h2 £>c6 (the offside

knight hurries back to the action, but

it’s too late for Black’s beleaguered

defences) 27 Sbdl g6 28 &f6! White’s

kingside attack quickly became quite

overwhelming. Black has to look for alternatives

here and a good start would be with

15...C4!?.

The Karpov Variation 101

A much more solid continuation

than ll...exd4. Now that Black has

prevented a4, he sets about bolstering

the kingside and putting pressure on

the d4-pawn. 12 £>fl Se8 13 £>lh2!

I like this move. From h2 the knight

is ready to hop to g4, when Black will

be forced to concede one of his bish¬

ops. As 13...g6 14 &g4 Ag7 15 Ag5

is hardly appealing. Black is forced

into immediate central action.

13.. .exd4 14 cxd4 £)a5 15 &c2 c5

16 b3 16 ^g4 is also good, e.g. 16...iLxg4

17 hxg4 cxd4 18 g5 ^.e5 19 £>xd4 g6

20 f4 jLg7 (Smirin-Balashov, USSR

Ch (Odessa) 1989) and now I approve

of the simple 21 b3, intending jLb2.

16.. .£k6

16.. .cxd4 17 <S)xd4 d5 can be an¬

swered effectively by 18 e5! jLxe5 19

•&xh7+ &xh7 20 Wh5+ &g8 21 Hxe5,

when White has virtually a free hand

on the kingside. Notice how redundant

the black knights are looking - it sure

is a long way back to the other wing.

17 jLb2 (D)

White is all set up for some weighty

central thrusting. All lines give White

at least a small advantage, e.g.:

a) 17...cxd4 18 £>xd4 £ixd4 19

&xd4 jLb7 20 £)g4 &xd4 21 Wxd4

and the isolated d6-pawn will soon

come under heavy fire.

b) 17...g6 18 e5 dxe5 19 dxc5 £id7

20 ^.e4 jLb7 21 b4 and, amongst other

lhings, the protected passed pawn on

c5 causes Black major problems.

c) 17...Sa7!? 18 e5! dxe5 19 dxc5

£)d5 20 £ig4 £xg4 21 hxg4 g6 22

£M2 ^db4 23 £>e4 £)xc2 24 »xc2

and White’s pieces are more harmoni¬

ously placed, Popovic-Salov, Manila

IZ 1990.

B) 10...iLf6

The main move. Black immediately

bolsters the e5-pawn and at the same

time exerts pressure on d4. Indeed,

normal development with 11 £ibd2?

would now simply lose a pawn.

11 a4! (D)


Immediately putting the question

to Black about what to do with the b-

pawn. There are three possible an¬

swers:

Bl: ll...Sb8 102

B2: ll...£)a5 102

B3: ll...^.b7 103

Bl) ll...Eb8

Protecting the b5-pawn, but giving

up the a-file. This move is not seen

very often, but it’s not bad, just a little

passive.

12 axbS axbS (D)

13 Ae3

13 d5 is also possible, e.g. 13...£)e7

14 4)bd2 4)g6 (14...c6?! is too early,

as after 15 dxc6 £ixc616 £)fl £ic5 17

jLd5 ^hcl 18 the3 the d5-square is

firmly in White’s possession; how¬

ever, 14...4)c5!? 15 jLc2 b4 or simply

14...b4!? is worth a look) 15 £T1 4)h4

16 £>lh2 £M3+ 17 £>xf3 and White

has a characteristic space dominance,

J.Polgar-Van der Sterren, Wijk aan

Zee 1990.

13...£>e7 14 £)bd2 &b7 15 &c2

Ha8 16 We2 c6 17 dxeS dxe5 18 b4

Wc7 19 £>b3 Oig6 20 £ia5 £a6 21

&d3 (D)

Ki.Georgiev-Karpov, Reggio Emi¬

lia 1989/90. White’s position is easier

to play, and Black must be wary of the

cramping effect of the white knight on

a5. Trying to break out with 21...£>f4

backfires after 22 jLxf4 exf4 23 e5!

Hfe8 24 #e4, hitting h7 and c6.

B2) ll...£ia5 12 £c2 £ib6

Black’s problem is that the natural

12...c5 runs into 13 axb5 axb5 14 b4,

exploiting the pin on the knight and

winning a piece. Also good for White

is 12...jLb7 13 d5 £ic4 14 b3 £icb6 15

a5 £ic8 16 b4 c6 17 dxc6 &xc6 18

£>bd2, when Black’s numerous knight

moves have just left the knights on very passive squares, Balashov-Furman,

USSR Ch 1976.

The text-move deals with White s

threat of 13 axb5, but allows White

some queenside expansion.


13 b4! £iac4 14 aS £)d7 IS &b3

exd4 16 cxd4 cS 17 jLf4! cxb4

Play now becomes very sharp, but

the two central pawns give White the

trump cards. 17...cxd4 18 jLxc4 bxc4

19 &xd6 d3 20 e5 .&e7 21 £>a3 is

good for White according to Fischer.

After 21...c3 22 Be3! the black pawns

drop off.

18 £ibd2 dS

After 18...^xa5 the simple 19 jLxd6

looks good, while White can also con¬

sider 19 Bxa5! ? Wxa5 20 iLxd6, when

Black is faced with an awesome at¬

tack, for example 20...Ee8 21 e5 jLe7

22 e6!.

19 exdS ^xa5 20 £d6 ^xb3 21

«xb3 Ee8 22 £c7! Exel+ 23 Exel

«f8

The stem game in this line was

Fischer-Matanovic, Vinkovci 1968,

when Black played 23...®xc7, but af¬

ter 24 Ee8+ £T8 25 Wxb4 &c7 26

Sxe7 WdS 21 ê5 £}g6 28 £ic6 Wf8

29 #c5 a5 30 Ec7 ®e8 31 d6 White’s

d-pawn was just too strong.

24 £le4 a5 (D)

Black has three dangerous-looking

passed pawns on the queenside, but

even so, White’s active pieces and

central dominance are the most impor¬

tant factors. Fischer gave 25 £M6 a4!

26 #xb4 jLe7 27 ê5 £ixe5 28 dxe5

■&d7 with equality, but in Chandler-

P.Nikolic, Linares 1988, White came

up with the powerful novelty 25 #d3!.

Now lines such as 25...^.b7 26 Wxb5

and 25.. JLa6 26 jLxa5 just go to show

what a bind Black finds himself in.

Nikolic tried 25...a4, but following 26

&d6 WdS 27 &xb4 jLa6 28 £>d6 Wcl

29 Wf5 White’s initiative proved too

much. Black urgently requires some¬

thing new here; otherwise ll...£ia5

looks distinctly unplayable.

B3) 11.. .1Lb7

The most popular reply. Black de¬

velops and connects his queen and

rook. White’s basic plan is to assault

the b5-pawn, but first he must choose

whether to close the centre or keep a

fluid structure.

B31: 12 d5 103

B32: 12 £ia3 104

B31) 12 d5 £k7

12.. .£)a5 13 jLc2 transposes to Line

B2, note to Black’s 12th move.

13 axb5 axb5 14 Sxa8 ®xa8

This is the most natural recapture.

After 14...^.xa8 15 £ia3 Black has

problems keeping hold of the b5-pawn, e.g.:

a) 15...Wb8 16^xb5! c6(thenone too subtle point behind White’s last


move is 16...#xb5 17 jLa4!, while

16...£>c5 17 jLc4 Hd8 18 4)a3 c6 19

jLa2 cxd5 20 exd5 left Black without

enough compensation for the pawn in

Mokry-Votava, Czech Cht 1994/5) 17

dxc6 jLxc6. This was seen in Kinder-

mann-Sturua, Biel 1991 and after 18

£ia3 £ic5 19 &c2 d5 20 exd5 ^xd5

21 <S)c4 e4 22 4)d4 jLa8 Black had

some (although probably not enough)

compensation for the pawn. It also has

to be mentioned that 18 4)xd6 looks

good, as after 18...4)c5 19 jLxf7+!

Exf7 20 £>xf7 *xf7 21 4)g5+ &xg5

22 jLxg5 White’s rook and three

pawns should be stronger than the two

minor pieces. It’s true that Black can

snatch a pawn back with 22...4)xe4,

but then 23 &xe7 &xe7 24 Wh5l

looks very dangerous.

b) 15...£>c5 16 &c2 c6 17 b4 £ia6

18 dxc6 &xc6 19 #d3 ^c7 (White

can meet 19...Wb8 with 20£td4! exd4

21 e5) 20 Edl #a8 21 #xd6 £ie6 22

Wd3 and White can attack the weak

pawns on b5 and d6, Hiibner-Short,

Skelleftea World Cup 1989.

15 £)a3 JLa6 16 &e3

White can also begin kingside ma¬

noeuvres with 16 4)h2, e.g. 16...4)g6

17 £)g4 &e7 18 £ie3 Eb8 19 &d2

£ic5 20 JLc2 &c8 21 £)f5 &f8 22 Wf3

with an edge to White, Popovic-Blag-

ojevic, Niksic 1997.

16...£ic5

Sensibly kicking the bishop back to

c2. Breaking with 16...c6? is a move

too early, as after 17 dxc6 Wxc6 18

£)c2! Black will be embarrassed by

£)b4.

17 jLc2 c6 (D)

Black has achieved the desired ...c6

break, but once again this only signals

the start of the real middlegame ac¬

tion.

18 b4 £id7 19 c4!? bxc4 20 &a4

Svidler-Gabriel, Bad Homburg 1998

now continued 20...jLb7?! 21 <S)xc4

cxd5 22 £ixd6 dxe4 23 £>h2 and

White built up a dangerous initiative

(Svidler also gives 23 <S)xb7 #xb7 24

#xd7 #xd7 25 &xd7 exf3 26 gxf3,

when White’s passed b-pawn provides

him with excellent winning chances in

the endgame).

According to Svidler, Black should

sacrifice a piece with 20...cxd5! 21

jLxd7 d4!, when 22 &cl c3 23 b5

jLb7 leaves Black with an impressive

pawn phalanx, while bailing out with

22 4)xd4!? exd4 23 Axd4 &xd4 24

«xd4 &c8! 25 &xc8 #xa3 26 &g4

Wxb4 27 Eel leads to equality.

B32)

12 £ia3 This move became popular after

Kasparov chose it in his 1990 World

Championship clash with Karpov. By


refusing to close the centre immedi¬

ately, White keeps more options open,

although Black too has more ways to

generate counterplay.

12.. .exd4

12.. .4.b6 has been played a few

times, chiefly by Varavin. The idea is

that after 13 d5 4)e7 14 axb5 axb5 15

J.e3 Black sacrifices a pawn with

I5...c6!?. It seems to me that Black has

reasonable play after 16 dxc6 jLxc6

17 &xb6 #xb6 18 Wxd6 Bfd8 19

#b4 #b7, and certainly Varavin has

repeated this line on several occa¬

sions, so it must be treated with some

respect. In Dolmatov-Varavin, Rus¬

sian Ch 1996, White tried an interest¬

ing new approach with 16 #e2!?,

refusing the pawn and adopting a

more strategic plan. The immediate

idea is that 16...cxd5? can be an¬

swered by the powerful 17 #xb5. In¬

stead, the game continued 16...Bb8 17

dxc6 jLxc6 18 Badl and Black had

some problems dealing with the sim¬

ple plan of £ic2-b4. After 18...£)a4?!

19 jLxa4! bxa4 20 &c5 £)c8 21 &b4

the weakness of the black pawns was

becoming more and more apparent.

Wedberg suggests 18...£)bc8, protect¬

ing b5 and d6, as an improvement, but

after 19^.c5! Wcl 20 ^.b4 Bd8 Black

is somewhat restricted.

13 cxd4 (D)

13.. .Be8

Black continues to put pressure on

both centre pawns. Other lines in¬ clude:

a) 13...£ib6?! 14 &f4! bxa4 15

■&xa4 T^x'dA 16 #xa4 a5 17 Ad2! Be8

18 d5 £lb4 19 iLxb4 axb4 20 #xb4

Bb8 21 #c4! gave White a clear ad¬

vantage in Kasparov-Karpov, New

York/Lyons Wch (18) 1990.

b) 13...£ia5 14 jLa2 b4 15 £ic4

<S)xc4 16 jLxc4 and now 16...Ee8 17

Wb3 Exe4 18 Exe4 ^.xe4 19 &xf7+

^h8 20 jLd5 iexd5 looks slightly

better for. White, but 16...d5 seems

reasonable, e.g. 17 exd5 4)b6 18 jLd3

4)xd5 and Black had a playable posi¬

tion in Ivanchuk-Xie Jun, Monaco

Amber blindfold 1996. We await to

see if anyone will repeat this with their

eyes open!

14 &f4 £)a515 &c2 b416 £ibl c5

With this move Black begins his

counterattack on the white centre.

However, there are some important al¬

ternatives:

a) 16...b3!? 17 &d3 c5 18 4)bd2

cxd4 19 jLxd6 Wb6 20 e5 i.e7 21

ê4 Ead8! 22 Wcl (22 Eel .&xe4 23

&xe7 Exe7 24 Exe4 £ic6 25 a5 ^xa5

26 Exd4 also looks good) 22...iLxe4

23 &c7 Wb4 24 ^.xe4 £)c5 25 ^.xd8

Exd8 26 Wf4 and White’s material ad¬

vantage told in Ernst-Tisdall, Gausdal

1991.


b) 16...g6!?, blunting White’s king-

side offensive, deserves some consid¬

eration. After 17 £ibd2 £if8 18 e5

£}e6 19 jLh6 dxe5 20 dxe5 ,&e7 21

kcA Axe4 22 Exe4 ®d5 23 Wc2 Eed8

Black had succeeded in equalizing in

Ernst-Barkhagen, Haninge 1997.

c) 16...^18!? is another enticing

idea. Black plans to re-route this knight

to the more active e6-square before

starting central operations. After 17

£ibd2 (17 ®d3!?) 17...4k618 Ae3 c5

19 d5 £if8 20 Ebl c4 21 We2 Ec8 a

Benoni-type structure is reached in

which Black’s queenside counterplay

compensates for White’s solid centre,

Svidler-Smagin, Russian Ch (St Pe¬

tersburg) 1998.

17 £ibd2

The d-pawn is hot. After 17 Axd6?

b3!, 18 &xb3? runs into 18...Wb6!,

while 18 ,&d3 allows 18...c4, picking

up the e-pawn.

After the text-move, the d-pawn is

attacked in earnest.

17..Mc7 (D)

In Onishchuk-Piket, Wijk aan Zee

1997, Black defended with 17...C)f8,

but after 18 e5! dxe5 19 dxe5 kc7 20

We2 Wb6 21 Ad3 Ead8 22 £ic4 ^xc4

23 -&xc4 White had a very pleasant

position. Black’s queenside majority

is going nowhere, giving White a free

hand for operations on the kingside.

The position after 17..Mc7 arose in

Luther-B.Lalic, Hastings 1995/6. White

continued with 18 Eel Ead8 19 -£.bl

g6 and Black was allowed to consoli¬

date his position. In his notes to the

game, Lalic comes up with the far

more critical 18 e5! dxe5 19 dxe5 and

a) 19...0xe5? 20 £ixe5 &xe5 21

®h5 wins for White.

b) 19...Ead8 20 £ig5! &xg5 21

Axg5 Ea8 22 A14 and White not only

possesses the bishop-pair, but also

dangerous attacking chances on the

kingside.

c) Lalic gives the prophylactic

19...g6 as Black best defence, but after

20 £te4 £xc4 21 &xe4 Ead8 White

has the powerful 22 -&d5!, threatening

23 e6. 22...£ixe5 fails to 23 £ixe5

iLxe5 24 Axc5 Exe5 25 Exe5 Wxe5

26 ±xf7+, while after 22...Ee7 23

Ag3 White keeps all the threats.

These lines all look quite danger¬

ous for Black, so perhaps he could do

worse than seek alternatives at moves

13 and 16.

12 The Zaitsev Variation

1 e4 e5 2 ^c6 3 &b5 a6 4 Aa4

£jf6 5 0-0 Ae7 6 Eel b5 7 Ab3 d6 8

c3 0-0 9 h3 kbl 10 d4 Ee8 (D)

In the last twenty years the Zaitsev

Variation has sprung from virtually

nowhere to being perhaps the most

important variation of the entire Ruy

Lopez. Previously it was thought to be

dubious on account of 11 £ig5, attack¬

ing f7, but then Karpov’s trainer Igor

Zaitsev showed that Black could

calmly retreat with ll...Ef8! and that

12 f4 came to nothing. Indeed it was

discovered that White had nothing

better than to go back with 12 £if3.

This was the turning point for the

opening. Karpov himself employed it

in many classic World Championship

battles with Kasparov and today it re¬

mains the choice of many top grand¬

masters.

The main advantage of the Zaitsev

is that Black can exert very quick pres¬

sure on the e4-pawn, and this prevents

White from carrying out the usual

£ibd2-fl-g3 knight manoeuvre until

the tension in the centre is resolved.

This is a major plus-point as White

finds it harder than usual to develop

smoothly. On the other hand. White

still has many ways to try to keep an

opening advantage. It must also be

said that from a practical point of view

the Zaitsev has the disadvantage that

White can simply repeat moves start¬

ing, as described above, with 11 £}g5.

As the Zaitsev is such a tough nut to

crack. I’ve decided to advocate two

quite different systems for White after

the standard moves 11 £>bd2 Af8.

The first is 12 d5, which has become

quite popular recently. After this move,

the play is quite positional in nature,

with both sides battling over key cen¬

tral squares. The other line we will

study is 12 a4, which is the traditional

main line. Unlike 12 d5, this usually

leads to ultra-sharp play, where White

will try to land a knockout blow on the

kingside. Sometimes White’s attack

can be ferocious, with all the pieces

taking part, but Black’s defensive re¬

sources cannot be underestimated, and

if Black survives then his superiority

on the queenside can often be a decid¬

ing factor.


The Theory of the Zaitsev Variation

1 e4 e5 2 3 &b5 a6 4 &a4

£if6 5 0-0 &e7 6 Eel b5 7 &b3 d6 8

c3 0-0 9 h3 khl 10 d4 (D)

ie i n m AA Alii

|A. 4i

A .

10...Ec8

This continues the theme of pres¬

surizing the e4-pawn. Other ideas:

a) 10...exd4 gives up the centre

prematurely and with accurate play

White can hope for a substantial ad¬

vantage, e.g. 11 cxd4 d5 12 e5 £>e4 13

&c3 £ia5 14 &c2 f5 (14...Ab4 15

£>xe4! dxe4 16Exe4! Axe4 17 icxe4

Eb8 allows White to initiate a stan¬

dard ‘Greek Gift’ sacrifice with 18

-&xh7+ &xh7 19 £ig5+, when both

19...&g8 20 Wh5 and 19...&g6 20

®g4 f5 21 exf6 Wc8 22 £ic6+ &xf6

23 d5 are devastating) 15 exf6 Axf6

16 £ixe4 dxe4 17 £xe4 &xe4 18

Exe4 c5 19 Eg4 cxd4 20 &g5 d3 21

Axf6 ®xf6 22 ®xd3 ®xb2 23 Wd5+

<ih8 24 Bel and White has a strong at¬

tack, Tal-Lehmann, Hamburg 1960.

b) 10...£>a5 is a reasonable trans¬

positional move. Following 11 JLc2,

11...C5 gives us a Chigorin, while

Black can also continue with 11 ...£ic4

12 b3 £>b6 13 4T>d2 and now:

bl) 13...£lbd7 reaches a type of

Breyer position where Black has lost

time, as it has taken the knight five

moves to reach d7 rather than three. In

Fischer-Stein, Sousse IZ 1967, White

continued powerfully with 14 b4! and

after 14...exd4 15 cxd4 a5 16 bxa5 c5

17 e5 dxe5 18 dxe5 £>d5 19 £>e4 4lb4

20 Abl Exa5 21 «fe2 Black was fac¬

ing a menacing attack.

b2) After 13...Ee8 White’s sim¬

plest plan is to continue with 14 £>fl

■£.18 15 *hg3, when 15...h6 reaches the

Smyslov Variation while 15...c5 16 a4

c4 17 a5 exd4 18 cxd4 cxb3 19 Axb3

gave White an edge in Beliavsky-

Klovan, USSR 1977.

c) 10...£ld7 has been seen a few

times, although a significant propor¬

tion of these occasions have been pre¬

ceded with 10...Ee8 11 £ig5 Ef8 12

4£lf3, when Black decides to avoid rep¬

etition. After 10...£id7 White has the

option of transposing to the Karpov

Variation with 11 a4 Jk.f6, or begin¬

ning the knight manoeuvre with 11

4^bd2 and now:

cl) ll...±f6 12 £ifl Be8 13 £lg3

g6 14 &h6 £la5 15 &c2 c5 16 d5 with

an edge to White, Ljubojevic-Karpov,

Turin 1982. c2) ll...exd4!? 12 cxd4 £ib4 13

£tfl c5 14 a3 (or 14 £ig3!?) 14...£)c6

15 d5 4ke5 16 ^xe5 dxe5 again with a small advantage, Ehlvest-Karpov,

USSR Ch (Moscow) 1988.

The Zaitsev Variation 109

ll£>bd2 £f8 (D)

We will now study the two most im¬

portant moves in this position:

A: 12 d5 109

B: 12 a4 113

A) 12 d5

Black is faced with a decision about

where to move his knight:

Al: 12...£le7 109

A2: 12...£ib8 110

12.. .£ia5 cannot be recommended.

After 13 &c2 c6 14 b4! *hc4 15 £)xc4

bxc4 16 dxc6 Axc6 Black has prob¬

lems regarding both the light squares

and his loose c4-pawn. Am.Rodri-

guez-Suarez, El Vendrell 1994 contin¬

ued 17 &g5 h6 18 £xf6 ®xf6 19

&a4! &xa4 20 ®xa4 ®e6 21 Eadl

Sab8 22 &d2 WcE 23 £tfl Eb5 24

ê3 and White’s domination was very

apparent.

Al)

12.. .£se7 13 £>fl

Transferring the knight to the

kingside is pretty standard, but given

that Black’s knights are also heading

in that direction it’s worth considering

a change of tack with 13 c4, e.g.:

a) 13...&d7 14 &c2 c6 15 b3 Ec8

16 4lfl Wc7 17 £le3 left White with a

pleasant space advantage in Anand-

Deshmukh, Calcutta 1992.

b) 13...C6 14 £c2 bxc4 15 dxc6

£lxc616 £ixc4 £ld4! 17 £ixd4 exd4 18

Ag5 (18 1i,xd4 d5! gives Black good

counterplay) 18...d5 19 Axf6®xf6 20

e5 «fti6 21 £id2 Ab4 22 Ee2 £xd2 23

®xd2 ®xd2 24 Exd2 Exe5 with an

equal position, Topalov-Piket, Amster¬

dam 1996.

13...&g6 14 &3h2 £>d7

14-^7 15 Q±g4 allows Black the

possibility of 15...£>xe4!? 16 Sxe4 f5,

although after 17 Eel fxg4 18 1i,xg4

®xg4 19 hxg4 Q±c7 20 Edl White’s

position is still more pleasant and he

can increase the pressure further with

£ig3-e4.

15 a3 £ic516 Aa2 £>f4 17 c4 c6 18

cxb5 cxb5 19 Abl a5 20 h4! (D)

no Easy Guide to the Ruy Lopez

Planning to meet 20...Wxh4 with 21

g3 4^h3+ 22 ^>g2, when Black loses

the knight. We are following a heavy¬

weight manoeuvring contest, Topa-

lov-Piket, Wijk aan Zee 1996, which

continued 20...g6 21 g3 £lh5 22 £>g4

®e7 23 £c2 &c8 24 b3 and White

kept a small advantage.

A2)

12...£ib8 13 £ifl £ibd7 (D)

The immediate 13...c6 is too hasty

and only wakes up White’s bishop on

b3. After 14 dxc6 ,&xc6 15 £ig3 Ea7

(15...£ibd7 runs into 16 4lg5!) 16 a4

Ed7 17 axb5 axb5 18 £g5 h619 &xf6

®xf6 20 $Mi2 Ec8 21 £ig4 ®d8 22

£>e3 White is ready to occupy the

juicy outpost at d5, Wang Zili-Henao,

Thessaloniki OL 1988.

Now White has two different ap¬

proaches:

A21: 14£>3h2 110

A22: 14 £>g3 111

A21)

14 £>3h2

Beginning the fight for the d5-

square. This knight will come to g4,

where it will exchange a protector of

the d5-square.

14.. .41c5

Black can also play more directly

with 14...c6, but this is certainly more

risky. After 15 dxc6 £lxc6 16 £Lg5,

Short-Beliavsky, Groningen FIDE KO

Wch 1997 continued 16.. .Wc7 17 Wf3

Wb7 18 4ig3 d5 19 £ig4 dxe4 20 Wf5!

£ld5 21 4bxe4 Ee6 22 Eadl and Black

was under severe pressure. The game

concluded 22...h5?! 23 £ie3! £tf4 24

&xf4 Axc4 25 Exd7! ±xf5 26 Exb7

exf4 27 Bxf7! 1-0. No doubt Black

has some improvements here, but his

position does look difficult to defend.

Short points out that 16...h6 17 Axf6

4£lxf6 also does not solve all Black’s

problems, due to 18 £lg4!. White is

winning the battle of the d5-square,

because 18...£>xe4? 19 Wff3 d5 loses

to 20 Exe4 dxe4 21 ®xf7+. It cer¬

tainly looks more sensible to chase the

bishop off the important a2-g8 diago¬

nal before proceeding with the ad¬

vance ...c6. 15 Ac2 c6 16 b4 4icd7 17 dxc6

iLxcfi 18 £>g4 After this move Black achieves the

...d5 advance and the game fizzles out

to equality. Another method is 18

Ag5, which led to an unclear position

after 18...#c7 19 &xf6 £ixf6 20 ®g4

£id7 21 ®f3 &b6 22 &b3 Wb7 23

*hg3 d5 in Korneev-Ibragimov, Russia

Cup (Ekaterinburg) 1997.

18.. .£ixg419 hxg4 4fb6 20 £ie3 d5

21 exd5 4fxd5 22 4fxd5 WxdS 23

®xd5 £xd5 24 &b3 (D)


In the game Kasparov-Ivanchuk,

Linares 1998, Black now played the

inaccurate 24...iLe6?! and after 25

Axc6 Sxe6 26 a4! White was still

slightly better. 24...Bad8! looks like the

easiest way to reach a level endgame.

A22)

14 £lg3

White’s most popular move. Black

must now choose between breaking in

the centre immediately or trying to im¬

prove his position first:

A221: 14...£)c5 111

A222: 14...g6 112

A221)

14...£lc5 15 £c2 c6

Once Black has committed himself

to ...£lc5 it makes sense to break im¬

mediately with ...c6, as any delay

could prove to be costly. For example,

after 15...a5 16 &h2 g6 17 Wf3 h5 18

&e3 £tfd7 19 Eadl !fe7 20 £igfl

&g7 21 &cl White is perfectly ready

to meet Black’s ...c6, Short-Timman,

El Escorial Ct (10) 1993. See Chapter

9 for more of this game.

, 16 b4 Skd717 dxc6 £xc618 &b3

h6

Correctly preventing the pin of the

f6-knight. After 18...£lb6 19 Ag5! h6

20 &xf6 ©xlh 21 4fh2 £)c4 22 4fg4

We6 23 <S3e3 Ead8 24 Wc2 d5 25 Sadi

Ed7 26 exd5 &xd5 27 Exd5! Exd5 28

£ixc4 bxc4 29 Axc4 White has won

the battle of the d5-square and gained

a pawn, Tseshkovsky-Timoshchenko,

Sverdlovsk 1987.

19 £ih4 &b6

The 19...£lxe4 trick, unleashing an

attack on h4, doesn’t work because of

the powerful reply 20 WhS!.

20 4M5 £)c4

20.. .d5!? led to some fireworks in

Wells-Acs, Budapest 1997 after 21

&h5 4lxh5 (21...Ee6!?) 22 Wxh5 4id7

23 £lxh6+!? (23 Wg4 also looks inter¬

esting) 23...gxh6 24 Be3 £if6 25

Eg3+ *h8 26 Wxfl Wei 27 Wg6

Wgl 28 Wf5, although with 28...&d7!

Black was able to steer the position

into a level endgame after 29 Exg7

&xf5 30 Ef7 4fxc4 31 Exf5 £ixc3.

2l£ih5£lxh5 22Wxh5g6

An improvement over 22...Ad7 23

Axc4 bxc4 24 £3e3 ii.e6 25 a4, when

the d5-square is firmly in White’s pos¬

session, Hjartarson-Gligoric, Reykja¬

vik 1995.

23®g4

If 23 £}xh6+?, Black has 23...&h7!

24 «Pf3 £xh6, when 25 &xh6 4?xh6

26 Wxfl Ef8 wins for Black, while

after 25 Axc4 bxc4 26 ®xf7+ JLg7 27

1i,xc4 Ab5 Black’s piece is worth

more than White’s three pawns.

23.. .6d7 24 Wg3 *h7 25 £>e3

Ae6 (D)


Almasi-Ibragimov, Vienna 1996.

Now White should play 26 Axc4 bxc4

27 Edl, maintaining a grip on d5.

A222)

14.. .g6 15 £>h2

Planning £}g4. Also possible is 15

£e3, e.g. 15...&C5 16 £c2 c6 17 b4

£>cd7 18 dxc6 i.xc6 19 £b3 &b6 20

Wd3 and now:

a) 20...Ea7 21 a4 (21 c4!? may be

stronger) 21...bxa4 22 ±xa4 J.xa4 23

-£xb6 Wxb6 24 Exa4 Ec7 was equal

in Anand-Ivanchuk, Monaco Amber

rpd 1994.

b) 20...Eb8 21 Eadl Eb7 22 £ih2

&d7 (22...h5 23 <Sif3 Ed7 24 Ag5! is

slightly better for White) and instead

of 23 £xb6?! Exb6 24 £)gfl &h6,

which was equal in Short-Ivanchuk,

Amsterdam 1994, White should play

23 f4! exf4 24 Axf4 ±e6 25 £>f3, with

a small plus.

15.. .h5!?

This move prevents £>g4, but also

weakens g5, and the white knight,

quickly returns to f3 to eye this square.

Other possibilities for Black:

a) 15...c6 is premature here. After

16 dxc6 Axc6 17 JLg5! White has the

advantage.

b) 15...*h8!? 16 &g4 &g8! (pre¬

paring ...h5 followed by ...Ah6) 17 a4

h5 was Mencinger-Ibragimov, Gron¬

ingen 1994. Here White should play

18 £lh2, preparing to come back to f 3.

c) 15...&C5!? 16 &c2 c6 17 b4

&cd7 18 dxc6 ±xc6 19 ±b3 £>b6 and

here either 20 Ag5 or 20 £ig4 should

be enough for an edge.

16 4)c5 17 &c2 c6 18 b4

£ted7 19 dxc6 &xc6 20 Ab3 £ib6 21

£g5 ±d7 Black must be careful not to open

up the centre too early. If 21...Ag7 22

£ih4 d5 23 ®f3! White’s initiative

starts to assume menacing propor¬

tions.

22 &h4 Ae6 23 Wt3 &bd7 24

Eadl (D)

We are following Anand-Ivanchuk,

Dos Hermanas 1996. The game is del¬

icately balanced. Black is under some

serious pressure on the kingside, but

all his pieces are contributing towards


defence, and he can hope to exploit the

weak c3-pawn later on.

B) 12 a4 (D)

The traditional main line of the

Zaitsev.

12...h6

This move, preventing £}g5 once

and for all, is Black’s most popular

choice. Another method is 12...#d7,

when Black can meet £>g5 with ...£ld8.

White should claim a space advantage

with 13 d5 £>e7 14 c4 £ig6 15 Ac2 c6

16 b3!, when the pawn-chain is fully

supported, giving White an edge. One

possible continuation is 16...Wc7 17

£ifl bxc4 18 bxc4 a5 19 £lg3 Aa6

20 Ad3 Eec8 21 Ae3 Eab8 22 Eel

^<17 23 £if5, when Black is slightly

cramped, Smirin-Goldin, Novosibirsk 1995.

13 Ac2 exd4

This move initiates Black’s most

ambitious and aggressive plan. He

presents the centre to White, but in re¬

turn for this Black will gain serious

queenside counterplay. Even so, more

conservative ideas also deserve some

attention:

a) 13...£lb8!? (Black attempts to

steer the game into Breyer channels) 14

Ad3 c6 15 &fl £>bd7 16 £ig3 g6 and

now 17 b3 Ag7 18 ®c2 ®c7 19 Ae3

d5! led to unclear complications in

Rechlis-Kraidman, Jerusalem 1986.

Instead, White could consider 17 h4!,

preparing to soften up the black

kingside with h5.

b) 13...Eb8 lends indirect support

to the b-pawn, but looks a bit passive

to me. Sensible play with 14 axb5

axb5 15 Ad3 Ac8 16 £tfl Ad7 17

£}g3 ®c8 18 Ad2 Wb7 19 b4 was

enough to give White a significant

plus in Geller-Gligoric, Sochi 1986.

c) The non-committal 13...g6!?

looks like the best of Black’s alterna¬

tives. 14 4T1 exd4! 15 cxd4 £lb4 gives

Black lots of counterplay, so White

should once again block the centre

with 14 d5. Following 14...£>b8, Black

succeeded in obtaining a roughly level

position in the game Ivanchuk-Lju-

bojevic, Monaco rpd 1993 after 15 b3

c6 16 c4 bxc4 17 bxc4 a5, so perhaps

White could consider 15 Ad3!?, exert¬

ing immediate pressure on the b5-

pawn.

14 cxd4 £ib4 15 Abl c5!

Mobilizing the queenside pawn

majority is obviously the most natural

course for Black, but there are also

some important alternatives in this po¬

sition:

a) The slightly illogical-looking

15...bxa4 has been used by Karpov,

but not since he was soundly beaten in


Kasparov-Karpov, New York/Lyons

Wch (2) 1990, which went 16 Exa4 a5

17 Ea3 Ea6 18 &h2 g6 19 f3! (bol¬

stering the centre and thus denying

Black any counterplay against e4)

19...1^7 20 £ic4 ®b5 21 Ec3! £c8

22 £e3 c6?! 23 W/cl &h7 24 £)g4!

and White was in firm control.

b) 15...g6 keeps Black’s options

open, but also gives White extra time

to begin operations in the centre. In

Anand-Kamsky, Las Palmas PCA Ct

(1) 1995 White kept the advantage af¬

ter 16 Ea3 ,&g7 17 e5! dxe5 18 dxe5

&h5 19 axb5 axb5 20 ®b3 c5 21 £se4

&xe5 22 £)xc5! iixf3 23 ®xf3 Ec8

24 £le4 and the game had opened up

nicely for the bishop-pair.

c) 15...®d7 was tried in Anand-

Kamsky, Las Palmas PCA Ct (9) 1995.

After 16 b3 g6 17 £b2 &g7 18 Wcl

Eac8 19 ii.c3 c5 20 d5 the game

reached a Benoni-type set-up which is

favourable to White, due to Black’s

poor bishop on b7, which is simply

biting on White’s granite centre.

16 d5 £>d7 17 Ea3 (D)

A crucial position in the 12 a4

Zaitsev. Black has to choose between

two distinct courses of action:

Bl: 17...C4 114

B2: 17...f5 116

Bl)

17.. .C4

In the late 1980s this move was

much more fashionable than 17...f5,

but for some reason it has now taken

more of a back seat. Nevertheless, it is

fully playable and perhaps more logi¬

cal than 17...f5. Black is certainly sec¬

ond best on the kingside, so he refuses

to make a weakening pawn move and

concentrates immediately on queen-

side counterplay. White must play

very actively, as given another couple

of moves. Black will entrench a knight

on d3 after ...4^c5.

18 axb5

I’m endorsing this move rather than

18 £ld4, as the theoretical position

arising after 18 £ld4 ®f6 19 <Si2f3

£>d3! 20 Axd3 b4 appears fine for

Black. 21 Eal cxd3 22 Wxd3 £ic5

gives Black plenty of counterplay,

while 21 Axc4 bxa3 22 b3 £k:5 affords

White compensation for the exchange,

but no more than that. Anand-Kam¬

sky, Las Palmas PCA Ct (5) 1995 con¬

tinued 23 W/c2 Wg6 and here Anand

could find nothing better than to re¬

peat moves with 24 £lh4 Wf6 25 £)hf 3

Wg6 26 £ih4.

18.. .axb5 19 4kl4 (D) Now we will consider two main

lines for Black:

Bll: 19...Exa3 115

B12: 19...theS 116


19.. .15'b6 20 Cif5 ^c5 21 Eg3 g6 is

also not bad, when White’s attack

looks dangerous, but Black has threats

of his own, including ...£ied3. Yang

Xian-Lin Ta, China 1988 continued 22

£sf3 £scd3 23 iic3 ®d8! (23...Wc7?

24 £)3h4 looks strong for White) 24

£xh61i'f6! (24...£)xel 25 Wxel £ixd5

26 ffcl! ®c7 27 Axf8 Exf8 28 ®h6

gives White a winning attack) and af¬

ter 25 &xf8? &xf8. White suddenly

had too many pieces en prise. 25 Ee2

is stronger, when 25...Exe4!? 26 Exe4

®xf5 can be answered by 27 Ef4!, so

perhaps Black should play 25...Eal

instead. In any case, it’s quite sur¬

prising that we have seen so little of

19...®b6.

Bll)

19.. .Exa3

In this line Black obtains a passed

pawn on d3, which is usually quite dif¬

ficult to keep hold of. However, Black

can hope that the inconvenience White

experiences in extracting the pawn

will give him time to organize effec¬

tive counterplay.

20 bxa3 &d3 21 £xd3 cxd3 22

Ee3 (D)

22...Qe5

The other way to defend d3 is with

22.. .£>c5 23 &b2:

a) 23...Hra5 24 £>f5 g6 25 £>g3 &g7 26 iixg7 &xg7 27 <Sib3 ®xa3 28

£ixc5 Wxc5 29 Exd3 left White with

the advantage in Kotronias-Gligoric,

Yugoslav Cht (Niksic) 1997, because

Black’s bishop is out of play and his

kingside dark squares are very weak.

In fact the end was not long in coming:

29.. .b4 30 Eb3 Ec8 31 #al+ &g8 32

1T6 &a6 33 Ef3 Wc7 34 e5 &b7 35

exd6 1-0. There is no defence to £lh5.

b) 23..JLc8 24 £>c6 Wh4 (initiat¬

ing active play against the white cen¬

tre; this is the most logical way to

continue, as Black must try to disturb

White’s position as much as possible)

25 &d4 f5 26 £>f3 ®h5 27 e5 f4 28

Eel dxe5 29 £icxe5 ®f5, Anand-Bel-

iavsky, Madrid 1998, and now Anand

suggests 30 ®bl, keeping an eye on

b5 and d3, as a way to keep the advan¬

tage.


23 £)4f3 f5!

The only way! 23...£)c4 24 Exd3

fti7 25 <£xc4 bxc4 26 Ee3 left Black

with no compensation for the pawn in

Ivanchuk-Kruppa, Frunze 1988.

24 £)xe5 Exe5 25 i.b2 2e7 (D)

The d3-pawn is doomed, but Black

has succeeded in creating some coun¬

terplay against White’s centre. Glek-

Kharlamov, corr 1988 continued 26

exf5! Exe3 27 fxe3 jLxd5 28 Wg4

Wc8 29 Wd4 i.c4 30 £>xc4!? bxc4 31

f6 with a highly complex position,

where White’s threats on the kingside,

coupled with the passed a-pawn, out¬

weigh Black’s far-flung passed pawns.

B12)

19...£)e5 20 Exa8 Wxa8 21 <&xb5

Ec8

This is better than 21...®a5 22 £)a3

&a6 (both 22...£)ed3? 23 £)dxc4 and

22...4ibd3 23 £)axc4 £)xc4 24 ,&xd3

favour White) 23 Ee3 Wc5 24 Ec3,

when Black doesn’t quite have enough

play for the pawn, Anand-Kamsky,

Las Palmas PCA Ct (7) 1995.

22 £)a3 i.a6 (D)

We are following de Firmian-

A.Ivanov, USA Ch (Parsippany) 1996,

which continued 23 Ee3 £)bd3 24

jLxd3 cxd3 25 b3 iLe7 26 £)dc4 and

after 26...i.g5 27 <£xd6 2d8 28 £)dc4

jLxc4 29 £)xc4 jLxe3 30 jLxe3 £)xc4

31 bxc4 Wa3 32 c5, the white pawns

looked very dangerous. Instead, the

clearest route to equality looks to be

26...£)xc4! 27 bxc4 iLxc4 28 <^xc4

Exc4 29 Exd3 Wal 30 i.e3 Wxdl+ 31

Exdl Exe4.

B2)

17...f5 Currently the main line of the 12 a4

Zaitsev. Black ambitiously breaks open

the white centre, but in doing so he

weakens his kingside.

18 £)h2!? (D)

Other moves, such as 18 Eae3 and

18 exf5, exist, but I believe the text-

move presents Black with at least as

many problems. The knight move

opens the way for both the queen and

the a3-rook to join the attack, while


after ...fxe4 the knight can be very

powerfully posted on g4.

18.. .£)f6

18.. .C4 19 exf5 £)c5 20 2xe8 Wxe8

21 2g3 £>bd3 22 f6 g6 23 b3, as in

Ivanchuk-Karpov, Monaco Amber rpd

1993, presents us with a crazy position

typical for the 12 a4 Zaitsev. The

whole board is on fire, but somehow I

would prefer to be White, as you get

the impression that one slip from

Black would end up with his king be¬

ing checkmated!

L8...&h8 looks a bit too slow to me.

In Dovzhik-Hedman, Budapest 1993,

White built up an enormous attack af¬

ter 19 2g3 £)f6 20 <SM3! fxe4 21

&xe4 iLxd5 22 £)xf6 Wxf6 23 J.d2!.

Here Black tried 23...®xb2 but after

24 &xb4! Wxb4 25 Wxd5 2xel+ 26

^xel Wxbl 27 Wxa8 Wxel+ 28 &h2

&g8 29 2e3 tal 30 Wd5+ &h7 31

2f3 White had come out firmly ahead

in the complications.

19 2f3

Trying to force Black to capture on

e4. An even more direct attempt at this

is with 19 g4!?. Now Black has to be

quite careful. For example, 19...£)xe4?

20 £)xe4 fxe4 21 iLxc4 gives White a

dream position, as Black’s minor

pieces are firmly cut off from the

kingside action, of which there’s

bound to be plenty. 19...fxe4! is much

stronger, planning to meet 20 £)xe4

with 20...Axd5. Leko-Almasi, Dort¬

mund 1998 continued 20 g5!7 hxg5 21

£>xe4 £)bxd5! (getting this knight back

into the defence is very important; both

21...Axd57! 22 &xg5 and 21...£)xe4

22 jLxe4 look very promising for

White) 22 ilxg5 Wd7 23 Axf6 £lxf6

24 £M6+ gxf6 (D).

Now, instead of the game continua¬

tion 25 £)g4 iLg7, Almasi recom¬

mends 25 Sg3+ iLg7 26 iLg6 Sxel+

27 Wxel ^>f8 with a very unclear po¬

sition. Black’s queenside pawns will

roll down the board, but White can

commence a dangerous attack with

Wdl-h5 and £)g4.

19.. .Ee5

19.. .fxe4?! falls in far too easily

with White’s plans. After 20 ^xe4


£sxe4 21 iLxe4 the b7-bishop and the

b4-knight struggle to get back into ac¬

tion and 21...Exe4? 22 Exe4 jLxd5

fails to 23 Sxf8+! Wxf8 24 Exb4!

cxb4 25 Wxd5+.

Black has also tried 19...jLc8, but

removing the bishop from attacking

d5 looks a bit artificial to me. Pupo-

Rivera, Havana Capablanca mem 1992

continued 20 exf5 Exel+ 21 ®xel

£)bxd5 22 £)e4 Ea7 23 £)g4, when all

of White’s pieces were storming the

black king.

20 Exf5

Preparing a fianchetto with 20 b3!?

also poses Black some problems, e.g.:

a) 20...£)xe4 2l£)xe4fxe4 22Eg3

h5 23 Exe4 £ixd5 24 &b2 £if6 25 Ef4

and Black is getting totally overrun on

the kingside, Griinfeld-Kraidman, Tel-

Aviv 1992.

b) 20...fxe4! 21 Exf6!? Wxf6 22

£ig4 tf7 23 £)xe5 dxe5 24 £lxe4

iLxd5 25 ®fg4 gives us another typical

position. White’s queenside is about

to disintegrate, but Black will have to

stave off quite a few mating threats be¬

fore he can hope to cash in.

20...Exf5 21 exf5 iLxd5 22 £sg4

This is stronger than 22 £>e4 jLxe4

23 ^.xe4 d5 24 &f3 c4 25 Ee6 £id3, as

in Khalifman-Karpov, Reggio Emilia

1991/2, when we see an example of

White’s position going wrong. The

kingside attack has been blocked and

Black is ready to mow White down

through pushing his powerful central

pawns.

22...&f7

Coming back to defend the shaky

light squares. This is better than the al¬

ternative 22...£>xg4 23 hxg4 jLf7, as

after 24 £sf3 White threatens to do

some damage with g5, and 24..._£Lc7

walks into a double attack with 25

We2.

23 £)xf6+ Wxf6 24 £)e4 1U8 25

tg4 d5 (D)

Black begins the central pawn-

roller. This position, which occurred

in Wahls-Enigk, Berlin 1993, is beau¬

tifully poised. White will obviously

have lots of dangerous attacking ideas,

but Black is reasonably well protected

and can take heart from the fact that

most endgames will give him good

winning chances due to the passed d-

pawn.

13 The Smyslov Variation

1 e4 e5 2 £*f3 £sc6 3 &b5 a6 4 iLa4

®f6 5 0-0 iLe7 6 Sel b5 7 &b3 d6 8

c3 0-0 9 h3 h6 (D)

Black prepares to bolster the e5-

pawn with ...Ee8 and ...iLf8. The idea

of 9...h6 is to execute this plan without

having to worry about 4&g5. However,

as we see in the Zaitsev Variation,

Black need not worry about this move.

Indeed, the Smyslov Variation has

much in common with the Zaitsev, but

with the important difference that

against the Smyslov, White has time to

carry out the <SSbd2-fl-g3 manoeuvre,

thus solving all his development prob¬

lems. For this reason, the Smyslov is

far less popular than the Zaitsev, but it

must be respected as a solid, if some¬

what passive, defence. White has a

few different ways to play, but once

again I’m advocating the main line.

The Theory of the Smyslov Variation

1 e4 e5 2 £sf3 £)c6 3 iLb5 a6 4 &a4

£sf6 5 0-0 iLe7 6 Eel b5 7 jLb3 d6 8

c3 0-0 9 h3 h6 10 d4 Se8 11 £)bd2

iLf8 12 £>fl (D)

Black now has two main options:

A: 12...ji.d7 119

B: 12...±b7 120

A)

12.. .±d7 13 ^g3 â5 14 i.c2 c5

15 b3!

Preparing to develop the bishop on

b2, should Black exchange pawns with

...cxd4.

15.. .£k6

After 15...cxd4 16 cxd4 £)c6 White

can slowly improve the position of his


pieces, knowing that his central supe¬

riority will be sufficient for an advan¬

tage. Gufeld-Savon, Vilnius Z 1975

continued 17 jLb2 Hc8 (17...g6 18

®d2 jLg7 19 Sadi is even stronger for

White as the d6-pawn is very weak) 18

Wd2 Wb6 19 Sadi and White was

very comfortable indeed.

16 d5 £*7 17 iLe3 (D)

Also possible is 17 c4, for example

17...£)g6 18 £)f4 19 td2 £)6h5

20 Adi £>xg3 21 fxg3 £sh5 22 g4

with a slight advantage for White,

Popovic-Djuric, Sarajevo 1984.

17...£)g6

After n..Mcl 18 Wd2 <S)g6 White

should slowly build up a kingside at¬

tack, e.g. 19 Sadi Seb8 20 <$M'5 a5 21

g4, as in Stull-Augustin, PulaZ 1975.

18 Wd2 £sh7 19 a4 ±e7

Exchanging pieces is generally a

good policy in a cramped position, but

here 19...£)h4 loses too much time.

After 20 £)xh4 Wxh4 21 Wc2 td8 22

b4 Wc7 23 Seel White had a clear ad¬

vantage in Deep fi/we-Kasparov, New

York (2) 1997.

20 Sa2!

I like this move, which threatens a

gradual increase in pressure on the

queenside. 20 £)f5 itxf5 21 exf5 <S)h4

22 £)xh4 iLxh4 was not so clear in

Lobron-Short, Brussels 1983.

20...ffc7 (D)

White has a small plus. Tosic-Ab-

ramovic, Yugoslav Cht 1997 contin¬

ued 21 Beal bxa4 22 b4! cxb4 23 cxb4

<S)h4 (or 23...a5 24 jLxa4 axb4 25

&xd7 Sxa2 26 Exa2 Wxd7 27 Wxb4,

with £)f5 to follow) 24 £)xh4 iLxh4

25 EM5 &xf5 26 exf5 &g5 27 &xg5

£)xg5 28 JLxa4 Bf8 29 Ac6 and

White picked up the a6-pawn.

B)

12.. .±b7 13 £)g3 <S)a5

13.. .g6 14 a4 £)a5 15 &c2 trans¬

poses to the next note.

14 Ac2 £ic4

Black re-deploys his knight to a

more influential square. Refraining

from this doesn’t really help Black.

For example, 14...g6 15 a4 Wd7 16 b3

Ag7 17 &d2 %2c6 18 &d3 £)a7 19 d5

The Smyslov Variation 121

Beb8 20 c4 and White’s space advan¬

tage is quite evident, Korchnoi-Smys¬

lov, Rovinj/Zagreb 1970.

15 b3 £)b6 16 a4

Simple development with 16 jLd2

also promises White an edge, for ex¬

ample 16...C5 17 d5 g6 18 «fe2, as in

Gheorghiu-Gligoric, Teesside 1972.

16...bxa4

Here Black has a couple of impor¬

tant alternatives:

a) 16...c5 17 d5 c4 18 b4 ±c8 19

iLe3 iLd7 20a5!^c8 21 1H2 £sh7 22

&h2 iLe7 23 £>f5 ±g5 24 £>xg5 hxg5

25 g4 g6 26 £)g3 f6 27 Shi Sf8 28

4’g2 Sf7 29 f3 and the simple plan of

h4 proved to be decisive in Fischer-

Gligoric, Rovinj/Zagreb 1970.

b) 16...d5!? 17 £lxe5 dxe4 18 &b2!

(after 18 £)xe4 iLxe4 19 iLxe4 Black

has the tactical trick 19...Sxe5!, when

20 jLxa8 Sxel+ 21 ®xel £)xa8 is in

Black’s favour) 18...c5 19 £)xe4! (19

£>h5 cxd4 20 cxd4 £)bd5 was unclear

in Borocz-Lukacs, Budapest 1998)

19...£>xe4 20 jLxe4 iLxe4 21 Bxe4

bxa4 and now Scholl-Gligoric, Am¬

sterdam 1971 fizzled out to equality

after 22 bxa4 f6 23 <^c6 Wd5 24 Exe8

Sxe8 25 dxc5 Wxdl+ 26 Bxdl £ixa4.

In my opinion. White can keep things

going with 22 fT3!, e.g. 22...f6 23

£>g6 axb3 24 £)xf8 Bxf8 25 dxc5

£d7 26 Sd4 te8 27 Wd5+ Bf7 28

Sb4 and White’s c5-pawn will prove

very dangerous.

17 bxa4 a5 18 iLd3 iLc6

Again Black has other options:

a) 18...d5 19 exd5 exd4 (19...£)fxd5

20 £)xe5 £)xc3 21 ®g4 gives White a

menacing kingside initiative) 20 Bxe8

Wxe8 (or 20...£>xe8 21 c4 c5 22 dxc6

Axc6 23 £)e5! iLb7 24 &b2, when

24...Ac5 can be powerfully met by 25

Wh5) 21 &b5! Wd8 22 c4 and the d4-

pawn is ready to be plucked.

b) 18...±a6!? 19 ^.xa6 Bxa6 20

dxe5 dxe5 21 Wxd8 Bxd8 22 <£ixe5

.£Ld6 (Winsnes-Balashov, Stockholm

1992/3) and now 23 &f4 g5 24 £>g4

iLxf4 25 £>xf6+ &f8 26 e5 keeps a

small advantage.

19 d5 jLd7 20 iLb5 (D)

This position arose in Anand-Kam-

sky, Linares 1991. Here Black went

wrong with 20...itxb5? and after 21

axb5 £Td7 22 tc2 £ic5 23 c4 Wd7 24

Jke3 a4 25 Ba3 Black’s a-pawn was

under heavy pressure. 20...£)c8 is a

more resilient defence, although White

still holds a significant space advan¬

tage.

14 The Breyer Variation

1 e4 e5 2 £sf3 £sc6 3 &b5 a6 4 &a4

£)f6 5 0-0 &e7 6 Sel b5 7 ^.b3 d6 8

c3 0-0 9 h3 £>b8 (D)

White can play on both the kingside

and queenside, and has a comfortable

space advantage.

This knight retreat may look rather

odd, but this is merely the first move

of a logical regrouping plan. Black’s

idea is to bring his knight to d7 where

it supports the e5-pawn and frees the

c-pawn so that it may advance to c5

and challenge the centre. In addition

Black can post his bishop on b7 where

it directly attacks the e4-pawn. This

pressure can be enhanced by the ma¬

noeuvre ...Ee8 and .. JLf8.

If Black’s plan has a weakness, then

it’s the relative slowness of the idea.

This gives White ample time to bolster

the e4-pawn and carry out the normal

knight manoeuvre £)bd2-fl-g3. The

line I’m recommending for White is

the most popular one at master level.

The Theory of the Breyer Variation

1 e4 e5 2 £>f3 £k6 3 ±b5 a6 4 iLa4

£3f6 5 0-0 jLe7 6 Sel b5 7 &b3 d6 8

c3 0-0 9 h3 £)b8 10 d4 £sbd7

10.. .jLb7 is a move-order trick from

Black to avoid lines beginning with

10.. .£)bd7 11 c4!?, which was once

quite fashionable for White. After

10.. JLb7 White can simply transpose

with 11 £)bd2 £lbd7, but 11 dxe5! is

much stronger:

a) ll...^xe4 12 e6 fxe6 13 jLxe6+

■4?h8 14 ^.d5 £)c5 15 &xb7 £ixb7 16

a4 leaves Black woefully weak on the

light squares, Gligoric-Benko, Yugo¬

slavia Ct 1959.

b) ll...dxe5 12 ®xd8 ±xd8 13 £lxe5 £>xe4 14 &e3 &f615 £ig4 <&d7

16 £)d2 £lxd2 17 iLxd2 Sfe8 18 M4

and now the game Keres-Benko, Yu¬

goslavia Ct 1959 ended 18...Sxel+?!

19SxelSc8 20±c2g6?2lSdl! 1-0.

18.. .c5 would have offered more resis¬

tance, but White’s pieces are still fat

better coordinated after 19 Bxe8+

Exe8 20 Bdl.

11 £sbd2 (D) 11.. .1Lb7

The Breyer Variation 123

11.. .Ee8?? 12 £sfl?? Ab7 13 &c2

transposed into the main line in J.Pol-

gar-Spassky, Budapest (10) 1993,

with neither player noticing that after

12 &xf7+! &xfl 13 £sg5+ &g8 14

®e6 Black can resign! This is all the

more shocking given that Spassky is a

renowned expert in the Breyer from

both sides of the board.

12 jLc2

Supporting the e4-pawn, so that

White can carry out the knight ma¬

noeuvre to g3.

12.. .Ee8

Preparing to bolster the kingside

with ...jLf8 and ...g6. Black can also

expand on the queenside with 12...c5,

when 13 <&fl Se8 14 <&g3 &f8 15 d5

g6 16 a4 reaches the main line, but

White can also delay the knight ma¬

noeuvre, e.g. 13 b3!? (preventing a

later ...c4) 13...Ee8 14 d5 g6 15 a4

Sb8 16 b4! c4 17 £)fl .&f8 18 jft.g5

■&g7 19 ®U2 <£b6 20 a5 £ibd7 21 g4

&h8 22 ^g3 2g8 23 &g2 *T8 24

Shi and White has reached an ideal

position, Kavalek-Gligoric, Nice OL

1974. The queenside is completely

blocked, leaving White a free hand to

build up a gradual attack on the other

wing.

13 £sfl (D)

13.. .jLf8

Smashing open the centre with

13...d5!? is an interesting idea, but

White can remain on top after 14

£)xe5! £)xe5 15 dxe5 £)xe4, when the

position is more reminiscent of the

Open Lopez. After 16 f3 Black has

two options:

a) 16...£)g5 17 £ig31x5+ 18 &h2

f6 19 JLxg5 fxg5 20 Wbl h6 21 ®dl!

(it’s worth expending two tempi to

force Black to weaken his light squares

so badly) 21...Ee6 22 £f5 h5 23 Wd2

and White enjoys a big positional ad¬

vantage, Lobron-Portisch, Wijk aan

Zee 1985.

b) 16...£)c5 17 b4 £id7 18 f4 c5 19

Wd3 £if8 20 bxc5 &xc5+ 21 &e3 and

White retains excellent attacking pros¬

pects, Greenfeld-Shvidler, Israel 1984.

14 £)g3 g6

14.. .c5 15 d5 g6 16 a4 comes to the

same thing.


15a4c5

It’s important for Black to claim

some space on the queenside. After

the plausible 15..JLg7 it’s now the

right time for 16 d5!. Black wishes to

break with ...c6, but with the bishop on

g7, this leaves the d6-pawn weak. In

fact Black can force through ...c6 with

lb.-.'ffbS, but then White has enough

time to support the pawn-chain with

17 b3 c6 18 c4, with a space advantage.

Griinfeld-Lev, Tel-Aviv 1990 contin¬

ued 18...bxc4 19 bxc4 a5 20 jLe3 ®c7

21 Wd2 ±a6 22 Sacl Eeb8 23 c5!

cxd5 24 exd5 dxc5 25 d6, when the

passed d-pawn was very powerful.

16 d5 c4

This is the logical follow-up to

Black’s last move. The c5-square is

vacated for the knight, where it can

eye the outposts at b3 and d3. The only

important alternative is 16...£)b6,

when 17 We2, pressurizing the b5-

pawn, is the most testing response.

Now 17...c4 looks rather silly with

knight on b6, so Black should play

17...£)xa4 18 jLxa4 bxa4 19 Exa4,

when we reach a position where Black

has the bishop-pair, but the position is

quite closed and Black’s queenside

structure is compromised. Here are a

couple of lines:

a) 19...£sd7 20 Ea3 £)b6 21 £)h2

&g7 22 £)g4 iLc8 23 c4 &xg4 24

hxg4, when White has more space and

the better minor pieces, Torre-Gli-

goric. Bad Lauterberg 1977.

b) 19...&C8 20 &g5 h6 21 ±e3

Bb8 22 Beal £)h7 (22...£)d7 looks

stronger) 23 Wc2 h5 24 £>d2 &e7 25

£)c4, and the knight has found a

wonderful outpost on c4, Geller-Rom-

anishin, USSR 1978.

17 ±g5 (D)

White develops his last minor piece

and sets about trying to control some

dark squares on the kingside.

17...h6

Gaining time on the bishop, al¬

though White will later regain a tempo

by attacking h6 with Wd2.

Black has many alternatives at this

point:

a) 17...±g7 18 Wd2 We7 (alterna¬

tively, 18...£sc5 19 £)h2 h5 20 &hl

tc7 21 &h6 iLh8 22 f4 exf4 23 Wxf4

Bab8 24 axb5 axb5 25 £)f3 Bbd8 26

Badl with an edge for White, Bala-

shov-Baikov, USSR 1974) 19 Ea3 fT8

20 Beal <&c5 21 Wcl Eec8 22 ±e3

£)fd7 23 £)d2 and White has a slight

advantage, Geller-Abramovic, Mos¬

cow 1982.

b) 17...£)c5 18 Wd2 19 ^.h6

<SM'd7 20 £lh2 Bb8 21 Bfl iLc8 22 axb5

axb5 was Kavalek-Spas sky, Montreal

1979 and now 23 £sg4 looks promis¬

ing, e.g. 23...£T6 24 £ixf6+ ±xf6 25

The Breyer Variation 125

f4 exf4 26 Wxf4 <SM7 27 e5!, freeing

the e4-square and creating a danger¬

ous attack.

c) 17...Sb8 18 Wd2 ±c8 19 £sh2

(the simple plan of 19 axb5 axb5 20

Ba2 iLg7 21 Seal also gives White an

edge, Spassky-Karpov, Leningrad Ct

(10) 1974) 19...±e7 20 axb5 axb5 21

■4?hl £>xd5!7 22 ±xe7 Tlxel 23 Wxd6

Sb6 24 Wd2 £ic5 25 We3 «fc7 26

Bedl and the weak dark squares on the

kingside cause Black some concern,

Popovic-Gligoric, Yugoslavia 1980.

d) \l...Ael 18 Ae3 Wcl 19 Ba3

£sc5 20 We2 iLf8 21 Beal once again

gives White a typical small advantage,

Ciocaltea-Spassky, Dortmund 1973.

18 Ae3 £ic5 19 Wd2 (D)

If Black defends with 19..,&h7,

then the most promising plan is a di¬

rect kingside attack involving f4. For

example, 20 £)h2 iLg7 21 Bfl and

a) 21...£)xa4 22 iLxa4 bxa4 23

Sxa4 a5 24 f4 h5 25 fxe5 dxe5 26 &g5

Aa6 (Timman-Portisch, Reggio Emilia

1984/5) and now Simic’s suggestion

of 27 Wf2 looks good for White.

b) 21...h5 (it looks rather illogical

to play ...&117 and ...h5, since, with the

g5-square available to White, the

black king can be exposed) 22 £)f3!

£)fd7 23 £)g5+ *g8 24 f4 f6 25 f5!

fxg5 26 fxg6 Sf8 27 &xg5 We8 28

£)f5 and White’s attack is very strong,

Zagorovsky-Diaconescu, corr 1988.

20 jLg5 Ael 21 Ba3

White continues to combine play

on both sides of the board. 21 jLh6

used to be quite common, but it seems

that after 21.. JLf8! White’s best move

is to retain the bishops with 22 jLg5!,

as 22 jLxf8 Bxf8 23 Wh6 £sh7! ap¬

pears to defend for Black.

21...Eb8

After 21...£)fd7, 22 Axel Wxel 23

Beal &g7 24 axb5 axb5 25 Bxa8 Bxa8

26 Bxa8 iLxa8 gave Black equality in

Tatai-Dorfman, Texta 1988, but of

course White should keep his bishop

with 22 Ae3!.

22 Beal (D) 22 We3 £)h7! allows the exchange

of bishops, which eases Black’s de¬

fence, but 22 axb5 is another promis¬

ing option. After 22...axb5 23 Ae3 .&f8 24 We2 i.c8 25 £>d2 ild7 26

Beal White’s control of the a-file

gives him a slight edge, Dimitrov-

Gullaksen, Debrecen Echt 1992.

After 22 Beal White’s chances to

play on both sides of the board give

him a modest but persistent advan¬

tage. Nevertheless, Black remains

very solid, if a little passive, and many

players are willing to defend this posi¬

tion. Here are some sample lines:


a) 22...£tti7 23 Ae3! (naturally.

White keeps this bishop) 23...Af6 24

£le2 25 £lcl £¥d7 26 axb5 axb5

27 b4 cxb3 28 £lxb3 Wc7 29 £lxc5

&xc5 30 We2 Ac8 31 2a7 Wd8 32

2la5 puts Black under great pressure.

Topalov-Van der Sterren, Antwerp

1997. b) 22...h4!? 23 Axh4 £tfxe4 24

£ixe4 ^xe4 25 Axe4 Axh4 26 axb5

axb5 27 2a5 Ac8 28 2a7 Af6 29 h4!

2e7 (29...Axh4 loses to 30 Axg6!

fxg6 31 Wh6) 30 h5! was Adams-

G.Georgadze, Groningen FIDE KO

Wch 1997. Now the most resilient de¬

fence for Black is 30...2xa7 31 2xa7

Wb6 32 2al Af5, although after 33

Wc2 Black’s weakened kingside still

gives White some advantage.

c) 22..JLc8!?23 axb5 axb5 242a7

(24 We2 allows 24...£lxd5!) 24...2b7

25 2a8 £lfd7 26 Ae3 Wc7 27 2f 12a7

28 2xa7 Wxa7 29 &g5 Ad8 30 &hl

Ab6 and Black has equalized, Svid-

ler-Piket, Wijk aan Zee 1999.

15 The Chigorin Defence

1 e4 e5 2 £tf3 £lc6 3 i.b5 a6 4 i.a4

£T6 5 0-0 i.e7 6 Sel b5 7 i.b3 d6 8

c3 0-0 9 h3 â510 i.c2 c511 d4 (D)

The Chigorin Defence (9...£la5) is

the traditional way for Black to defend

the Closed Lopez. Black gains time by

attacking the Lopez bishop and uses

this tempo to connect his queenside

pawns with ...c5. Since the emergence

of the Breyer and the Zaitsev Varia¬

tions, the Chigorin has declined in

popularity, but it remains a very well

respected line and over the years it has

built up a significant body of theory.

If the Chigorin set-up does have a

weakness, then it’s the offside posi¬

tioning of the knight on a5. Often

Black has to expend several tempi to

get it back into play. On the plus side

for Black, many lines offer counterat¬

tacking chances, especially when the

c-file is opened with the pawn ex¬

change ...cxd4.

The Theory of the Chigorin Defence

1 e4 e5 2 &f3 £lc6 3 i.b5 a6 4 i.a4

£*6 5 0-0 i.e7 6 Sel b5 7 i.b3 d6 8

c3 0-0 9 h3 £la5 10 i.c2 c5 11 d4

Now we will consider Black’s four

main moves:

A: ll..JLb7 128 B: ll...£ld7 130

C: ll...£lc6 132

D: ll...Wc7 133

Firstly, here are a couple of less fre¬

quently played ideas:

a) 1 l...Be8!? 12 dxe5 dxe5 13 £lxe5

&d6 (13.. JLb7 14 1T3 &d6 15 &g4

^xg4 16 Wxg4 ^c4 17 f4! was good

for White in Smirin-Gofshtein, Israel

1991) 14 £>xf7! &xf7 15 e5 We7 16

&f4! &c7 (16...i,b8 17 £ld2! £ld5 18

Wh5+ 4r>f8 19 J-g5 gives White a very

strong attack) 17 Be3 Wd7 18 e6+

Bxe6 19 Wxd7+ i.xd7 20 i.xc7 and

White has a healthy extra pawn, Sax-

Hebden, London ECC 1993.

b) ll...cxd4 12 cxd4 &b7 13 d5!?

(13 £T>d2 transposes to Line A)

13...&c8 14 &d3 &d7 15 &e3 g6 16

b4 thbl 17 £k3! favoured White in

Leko-L.B.Hansen, Copenhagen 1995.


A) ll...^.b7 (D)

A favourite of the Ukrainian grand¬

master Oleg Romanishin.

12 £sbd2

Continuing with classical develop¬

ment. It should be pointed out that 12

dxe5 dxe5 13 £}xe5?! ©xdl 14 Axdl

£}xe4 15 Afi f5 leaves Black with no

problems at all. However 12 d5, block¬

ing the centre and the b7-bishop, is an

important alternative. Play continues

12...£3c4 (improving the position of

the knight) 13 b3 £ib6 14 a4 (14£ibd2

g6 15 £tfl £ih5 16 &h6 Se8 17 Wd2 Af8 was equal in Vasiukov-Roman¬

ishin, Vrsac 1989) 14..JLc8! (the

bishop has no future on b7, where it’s

simply biting on granite) and now:

a) 15 £ibd2 g6 16 i.d3 i.d7 17 a5

£ic8 18 £tfl £ih5 19 i.h6 Se8 20

Wd2 i.f6 21 b4 c4 (the queenside is

closed, leaving both sides to concen¬

trate on the other wing) 22 jLc2 £tf4!?

23 2a3 g5 24 *hl &h8 25 h4 g4 with a

very unclear position, Wahls-Roman-

ishin, Biel 1995.

b) 15 &e3 bxa4 16 bxa4 £ic4 17

&cl £3a5! (an incredible piece of pro¬

phylaxis; the knight will be attacked

on c4 in any case so it moves away

now) 18 %3bd2 (after 18 Wd3, Black

shouldn’t play 18...c4?! 19 Wei Wcl 20 ila3!, when he has some problems

down the a3-f8 diagonal, Anand-Rom-

anishin. New York PC A Ct (2) 1994,

but instead 18...^3h5 19 c4 2b8 20

£.d2 g6 21 Wc3 2b4!, with substantial

counterplay for Black, Fogarasi-Rom-

anishin, Balatonbereny 1995) 18...Wc7

19 c4 2b8 20 2a2 g6 21 &b2 <^h5 22

ild3 i.d8 23 ilc3 f6 24 ilfl Wgl 25

Wcl 2f7 with a level position, Anand-

Romanishin, New York PCA Ct (4)

1994.

12...cxd4 13 cxd4 exd4 14 <^xd4

2e8 (D)

This is one of the main ideas of the

Romanishin Variation. Black gives up

the centre and sets about assaulting

White’s e4-pawn, which in many lines

proves to be just as vulnerable as the

more outwardly weak d6-pawn. Black

can also contemplate a timely ...d5 in

The Chigorin Defence 129

order to liquidate the centre entirely,

although he must be careful that this

break cannot be answered by a favour¬

able e5 advance.

15 b3

Preparing the queenside fianchetto

and preventing any thoughts of ...£k4.

A slightly more active plan is 15 b4!?

£ic6 (15...£>c4? 16 £ixc4 bxc4 17

i.a4! 2f8 18 i-g5 2c8 19 £tf5 is very

strong for White) 16 £ixc6 J.xc6 17

J.b2, when White has the a2-g8 diag¬

onal available for his light-squared

bishop. On the other hand, the c4-

square is now a potential outpost for

the black knight, and this fact should

dictate Black’s coming moves. Now:

a) 17..JLf8?! (the plan of attacking

the e4-pawn is not so effective here)

18 fT3! 2c8 19 &b3 We7 20 2adl

.&b7 21 Wf5 and the white bishops

point menacingly at the black king,

Xie Jun-Chiburdanidze, Manila worn

Wch (3) 1991.

b) 17...£ld7! 18£}b3JLf6 19jLxf6

Wxf6 20 £d4 ê5 21 £ixc6 £xc6 22

Wd2 2ac8 23 Ab3 4id4 with an equal

position, Popovic-Romanishin, Novy

Smokovec 1992.

Another possibility for White is to

continue the usual knight manoeuvre

with 15 £lfl. This is actually another

main line, but it allows Black to carry

out his plan and practical results have

been very reasonable for the second

player. One sample variation is 15.. JLf8

16 £ig3 g6 17 b3 d5!? 18 e5 £ie4 19

£ixe4 dxe4 20 .&xe4 2xe5 21 Axb7

2xel+ 22 Wxel <^xb7 with a com¬

pletely level endgame.

15..JLf8 16 iLb2 g6 17 Wf3

The paradoxical 17 b4!? is also quite

tempting. White loses a tempo, but

Black has already committed himself

to ...jLf8 and ...g6. Following 17...4)c6

18 Zhxc6 £xc6 191T3 kgl 20 Ab3,

Milos-Spangenberg, Buenos Aires

1998 witnessed the strategy working

to perfection after 20...d5? 21 exd5

2xel+ 22 2xel 4lxd5 23 i.xg7 &xg7

24 2c 1! and White gained material.

20...We7! is significantly stronger for

Black, continuing to pile up on the

e4-pawn.

17.. .Jkg7 18 2adl 2c8 19 &bl

We7

19.. .b4!?20 ^fl d5 is thought to be

risky after 21 e5!? £ie4 22 4lg3 2xe5

23 £W5! (D), but in fact things are not

nearly so clear.

a) 23...£id2? 24 1T4 2xel+ 25

2xel i.xb2 26 ^h6+ &g7 27 £ih5+!

wins for White, as 27...gxh5 leads to

mate after 28 Wxf7+ <4>xh6 29 Wxh7+

&g5 30 Wg6+ &f4 31 %3#.

b) 23...£lg5! 24 fT4 and now:

bl) 24...£te6? 25 &h6+ &xh6 26

®xe5 was clearly better for White in


the game Velimirovic-Romanishin,

Vrsac 1989. b2) 24...Sxel+! 25 Exel &xb2 26

£ie7+ (26 &g7 leads to noth¬

ing) 26...'S?f8 27 Wxg5 (or 27 £lxc8

&c3!) 27...£lc6 28 £lgf5 &g7 29

£lxg7 &xg7, when 30 £lf5+ &g8 31

£}h6+ <&g7 is a draw by repetition,

while 30 Ad3! ? keeps the game going,

although Black does have an extra

pawn to counterbalance White’s activ-

ity.

20 We3 20 Se3 £lc6 21 £lxc6 jLxc6 22

Sdel £lh5 was also slightly better for

White in Akopian-Motwani, Gronin¬

gen 1990.

20...£lc6 21 £)fl (D)

We are following Short-Thipsay,

British Ch (Torquay) 1998. White kept

a small advantage after 21...£lxd4 22

&xd41T8 23 f3 £ld5 24 fT2 £>c3 25

&xg7 &xg7 26 Sd3 £ixbl 27 Exbl

Ee6 28 Ebdl.

B) ll...£id7 (D)

mM .......1*JS* m m m m mm m m

%Ek m&MlM '

Paul Keres first came up with this

move in the 1960s. Black defends his

e5-pawn, but also prepares to exert

pressure on the white centre, and in

particular the d4-square. This can be

augmented (usually after ...cxd4) by

...£ic6 and ...J.f6.

12£lbd2

12 dxc5!? is interesting, cutting

across Black’s basic plan. White will

try to use the d5 outpost, which has be¬

come even more enticing since Black’s

knight has moved away from f6. Fol¬

lowing 12...dxc5 13 £lbd2 we have:

a) 13...#c7? (this move falls in

with White’s plan) 14 4lfl £lb6 15

£le3 Ed8 16 We2 i.e6 17 <SM5! ^xd5

18 exd5 i.xd5 19 ^xe5 and Black

faces a very nasty kingside attack.

Fischer-Keres, Curasao Ct 1962.

b) 13...£b7 14 We2 Wc7 15

£ic4 16 b3 £)d6 17 c4! Sfe8 18 Lbl

Af8 19 Sadi with an edge to White,

Short-Portisch, Tilburg 1988.

c) 13...f6 14 £lh4 £lb6 15 £tf5 Ef7

16 #g4 &h8 and now Fischer recom¬

mends 17 h4, intending h5 and £lf3-

h4, with chances of a kingside attack.


12.. .cxd4

Recently the alternative capture

12...exd4!? has been seen quite a bit.

After 13 cxd4 £k6 we have:

a) 14 £tfl cxd4 15 ^xd4 ^xd4 16

*Txd4 ®e5 17 f4 &c6 18 Wdl i.f6

looks OK for Black, Yurtaev-Nena-

shev, USSR Ch 1991.

b) 14 d5 &ce5 15 £ixe5 looks a

better bet. After 15...dxe5?! 16 b3!,

White can set about attacking the b5-

pawn with a4, Ad3 and #e2. More re¬

silient is 15...£}xe5 16f4£lg6 17 £rf3,

when 17. ..f5 18 e5 looks critical.

13 cxd4 4)c6

This is stronger than 13_S.f6 14

$tfl £ic6 (or 14...£ic4?! 15 b3 ^cb6

16 &b2 g6 17 4te3 &g7 18 Wd2 &b7

19 Sadi and White is beautifully co¬

ordinated, Timman-Magomedov, Elista

OL 1998) 15 &e3 exd4 16 <^xd4

£Me5 17 Ab3 and White is better,

Tal-Johannsson, Reykjavik 1964.

14 £ib3

This move is currently thought to

be White’s best chance for an advan¬

tage. 14 d5 £ib4 15 Abl a5 16 a3 £)a6

17 b4 £ib6 18 ©b3 i.d7 gave Black

equality in Suetin-Tal, USSR Ch

1964, while 14 5)fl exd4 transposes to

note ‘a’ to Black’s 12th move.

14.. .a5 15 &d3

15 jLe3!? also promises an edge to

White, e.g. 15...a4 16 &bd2 exd4 17

£kd4 ^xd4 18 Axd4 £}e5 19 5)fl

&e6 20 4te3 £k:6 21 &c3 b4 22 Ml

a3 23 b3 i-f6 24 Sbl i-d4 25 £M5 and

Black’s queenside pawns could actu¬

ally become quite weak, Gligoric-

Reshevsky, Tel-Aviv OL 1964.

15.. .jLa6

15.. .a4 is met by 16 jLxb5! when

16...axb3 17 &xc6 Sxa2 18 Sbl

leaves the b3-pawn ready to be taken,

while 16...#b6 17 &xc6 Wxc6 18

£ibd2 i.f6 19 b3! exd4 20 i.b2 £e5

21 Axd4 M6 22 Se3 afforded Black

no compensation for the pawn in Tal-

Romanishin, Jurmala 1987.

16d5^b417^.fla4

Delaying this move is asking for

trouble. After 17...Sc8 White can play

18 £ixa5! as 18...Wxa5 runs into 19

M2, followed by 20 a3, winning the

piece back while keeping an extra

pawn.

18 £ibd4!?

This is a very clever move. Previ¬

ously the main line ran 18 a3 £}xd5 19

#xd5 and now:

a) 19...axb3 20 Mb5 £tf6 21 Wd3

&xb5 22 Wxb5 Wb8 23 Wxb8 Saxb8

24 Ag5 with a slight edge to White, as

the b3-pawn is quite weak, Sax-

Am.Rodriguez, Subotica IZ 1987.

b) 19...£fo6 20 Wdl axb3 21 Wxb3

Wd7 was roughly level in Hellers-

Timman, Amsterdam 1986.

18.. .exd4 19 a3 (D)


This is a crucial position in the eval¬

uation of Keres’s Variation. Let’s look

at some of Black’s possibilities:

a) 19...£>c2? 20 ®xc2 &f621 MA

Bc8 22 Wd2 gave White a clear plus in

Lau-Toshkov, Skien U-18 Wch 1979.

b) 19...jLf6 20 axb4 Wb6 21 b3

axb3 22 Wxb3 £)e5 23 ®xe5 dxe5 24

2a5 was also good for White in Sham-

kovich-Benjamin, USA 1976. The a6-

bishop is a very poor piece.

c) 19.. ,£lxd5 (a recent try) 20 exd5

Af6 21 ^xd4 £k5 22 £lc6 Wb6 23

Af4 Sfe8 24 Wc2 £lb3 25 Sadi! and

White was on top in Anand-Piket, Wijk

aan Zee 1999.

d) 19...4lc5!? is an untried sugges¬

tion from NCO. Now 20 £}xd4 jLf6 21

axb4 jLxd4 22 bxc5 dxc5 looks quite

unclear, but 20 axb4 £T)3 21 Sbl Af6

22 Ad3, preparing £kl2, may still give

White the edge.

C) 11...&C6 (D)

iba.II B ■ m*:

It MlM JMi I

4'"'

AHA

Immediately putting pressure on

d4, and inviting White to close the

centre with a gain of time. Once again,

you’ll find lots of Romanishin games

in the notes. Nowadays this line has

gone out of fashion but it still remains

a sound option.

12 d5

If 12 £lbd2 Black does best to re¬

lease the tension in the centre with

12...cxd4 13 cxd4 exd4 After 14 £)b3

£lb4 15 i-bl d3! 16 £ibd4 i.b7 17 a3

£}c2 18 £lxc2 dxc2 19 jLxc2 Be8,

when Black was equal in Abramovic-

Romanishin, Stara Pazova 1988.

12...£la5 Black’s two other knight moves are

not so good:

a) 12...®lb8 13 a4 &b7 14 £lbd2

^bd7 15 ®tfl and now if Black con¬

tinues naturally with 15...Be8 16 £lg3

Af8 he is merely two tempi down on

the Breyer Variation.

b) 12...£ia7 13 a4 £ld7 (13...i,d7

14 £lxe5! dxe5 15 d6 is good for

White) 14 &e3 Wc7 15 ^bd2 £T)6 16

a5 ^d7 17 b4 led to a significant ad¬

vantage for White in Nunn-Van der

Wiel, Brussels 1988.

13 £ibd2

13 b3!? is a serious alternative to

the text. White prevents ...£lc4 and

keeps the option of developing the

cl-bishop before the bl-knight. Black

can reply:

a) 13...g6 14 a4 &d7 (ECO sug¬

gests 14...4}e8 as an improvement,

which is fine until you see 15 axb5

axb5 16 b4!) 15 axb5 axb5 16 &xe5

dxe5 17 d6 £lh5 18 dxe7 ®xe7 19

Ae3 and the bishop-pair gave White

an edge in Benjamin-Romanishin,

Moscow 1987.


b) 13...i.d7 14 £ixe5! dxe5 15 d6,

again with a small plus.

c) 13...£}e8 14 a4 &d7 15 axb5

axb5 16 &e3 g6 17 £ibd2 £)g7 18 b4

cxb4 19 cxb4 £lc4 20 £lxc4 bxc4 21

Wd2 f5 with an unclear position, Psa-

khis-Romanishin, Moscow 1986.

13...g6

Preparing ...£lh5, which at the mo¬

ment would fail to 4iixe5. Black’s other

plan here is 13...c4, preparing ...|Si)b7-

c5. After 14 £lfl ^hbl White has two

ways to achieve the advantage:

a) 15 g4!? h6 16 £lg3 £lh7 17 <4>h2

i.g5 18 4ixg5 hxg5 19 i.e3 Se8 20

Wd2 f6 (Chandler-Romanishin, USSR

vs Rest of the World, London 1984)

and now I like the idea of 21 <4>g2, fol¬

lowed by f3, Shi and h4.

b) 15 b3 Wc7 16 £b2 cxb3 17

axb3 £ic5 18 £)3d2 i.d7 19 b4 £ia4

20 i.xa4 bxa4 21 c4 and White will

push through with c5, Hulak-Roman-

ishin, Yugoslavia-USSR 1976.

Note that !3...Wc7 transposes to

Line D.

14 a4 i.d7 15 b4 £ib7 16 £ifl ©c7

(D)

mm ■ mm, mm, % n*i

Alla! an ■ ■B| ■||aj mdwtia&ut

Black seems to be close to equality

here, e.g.:

a) 17 &h6 Sfc8 18 axb5 cxb4 19

bxa6 £lc5 20 cxb4 £lxa6 21 ia4

£)xb4 22 &xd7 Sxal 23 Wxal &xd7

was level in Geller-Romanishin, Mos¬

cow 1985.

b) 17 a5 Sac8 18 i.d3 £)h5 19

i.h6 Sfe8 20 Scl &f8 21 Ml i.g7 22

c4 £>f4 was unclear in Psakhis-Roman-

ishin, Sochi 1984.

D) ll...Wc7

Defending e5 with the queen is

Black’s most common choice.

12 £lbd2 (D)

Mm mm mm..,, M W JUBA mm m m

a Bis m a mm e

Now Black has many different ways

to proceed:

Dl: 12..JLd7 134

D2: 12...Se8 134

D3: 12...^c6 135

D4: 12...cxd4 136

Other moves often transpose, e.g.:

a) 12...Bd8 and now 13 £)fl cxd4

14 cxd4 gives us Line D41, while


White can also consider 13 b3!?, e.g.

13.. .jLd7!? (13...cxd4 14 cxd4 is also

Line D41) 14 d5 (keeping the tension

with 14 £lfl also looks good) 14...g6

15 £)fl c4 16 b4 £)b7 (Brodsky-Piket,

Wijk aan Zee 1995) and now the best

chance to keep the advantage is proba¬

bly 17 a4!?.

b) 12...&b7 13d5(13£)flcxd414

cxd4 gives us Line D4) 13..JLc8 and

we have transposed to Line D3.

D1) 12.. JLd7

This is a rather passive system

where Black just contents himself with

the completing the mobilization of his

forces and consolidating his kingside.

This is achieved but only at the cost of

reducing his chances of counterplay.

13 £ifl Efe8

13.. .cxd4 14 cxd4 would give us

Line D43.

Black can also improve his knight’s

position by 13...£)c4. Then Topalov-

Frolov, Biel IZ 1993 continued 14

©e2 Sfe8 15 b3 16 dxe5 dxe5 17

c4 £)h5 (17...bxc4 18 bxc4 £)a4 19

Axa4 Axa4 20 £le3 followed by £)d5

is good for White) 18 Ad2 Eab8 19 a4

bxc4 20 bxc4 and now according to

Frolov Black should play 20...^c8 21

£)e3 £T4 22 Wfl £)e6, although after

23 £)d5 White still retains a slight

edge.

14 b3 g6 15 i.g5! £ih5 16 i.xe7

Exe7 17 £ie3 £T6

If 17...£lf4?, White can chase the

knight immediately with 18 g3, as

18.. .£)xh3+ 19 &g2 Eee8 20 dxe5

dxe5 21 Ehl gives White a very large

advantage. After the captures on h3

the rook will be no match for the two

minor pieces, especially as White has

the inviting d5 outpost.

18 Eel!? £)b7 19 b4 c4 20 a4 (D)

White has the advantage in every

sector of the board, holding the key

pawn-breaks in both the centre and the

queenside, and having chances to ex¬

ploit the weak dark squares on the

kingside. Stein-Matanovic, Tel-Aviv

OL 1964 continued 20...Eae8 21 axb5

axb5 22 Sal &c6 23 Ea6 Wc8 24 d5

&d7 25 £)h2 &g7 26 ©f3 Ef8 27

Beal and White was in total control.

D2) 12...Be8 (D)

This is similar to the last line, ex¬

cept Black doesn’t commit the c8-

bishop so soon.

13£)fl This is the most obvious response,

but there’s something to be said about

the ambitious 13 b4!?, which was int¬

roduced by Mikhail Tal. Play can con¬ tinue 13...cxb4 14 cxb4 £lc6 (14...£sc4


15 4^xc4 bxc4 16 a4 is good for White

as the c4-pawn could become exposed

after Scl) 15 jLb2 (15 a3 is also not

bad, but this pawn sacrifice looks

quite promising) 15...£lxb4 (Black

can refrain from taking the pawn, but

15.. .exd4 16 &xd4 &xd4 17 i.xd4

Ab7 18 Eel is a bit better for White)

16 &b3 £)d3 (16...£kI7 17 Bel Wb6

18 a3! £>d3 19 i.xf7+ &xf7 20 Wb3+

&f8 21 ©xd3 is better for White) 17

&xf7+ <4>xf7 (not 17...&f8? 18 &xe8

£ixb2 191^1^34 20Eel with a win¬

ning position, Tal-Gurgenidze, USSR

Ch 1961) 18 Wb3+ £)d5 19 ©xd3 £tf4

20 Wb3+ &e6 21 d5 &d7 22 &xe5!

with a clear advantage for White,

Jansa-Kostro, Vrnjacka Banja Z1967.

13..JLf8

Pressurizing the e4-pawn like this

is more accurate than 13...g6, which

allows White to achieve a significant

advantage after 14 £le3 JLf8 15 b4!

cxb4 16 cxb4 £k6 17 i.b2 i.b7 (or

17.. .5)xb4 18 ^.b3 with excellent play

for the pawn) 18 Eel Wb6 19 i.b3,

Tukmakov-Smyslov, USSR Ch 1973.

14 &g5 &d7 15 ê3

15 b3 £lb6 16 Bel £lc6 17 Abl

£)e7 18 £lg3 a5 gave Black enough

counterplay in R.Byrne-Ivkov, Skopje

OL 1972.

15...£lb616 b3 f617 i.h4 ^c6 (D)

W

Yanofsky-Kraidman, Tel-Aviv 1966

now continued 18 dxc5 dxc5 19 £)d5

©d8 20 a4 with a small plus to White.

D3)

12...£lc6

This line is similar to, but more

popular than 11 ...£ic6 (Line C). Again

Black puts pressure on d4 and asks

White to make a decision about the

centre.

13 d5

Blocking the centre with the text-

move has become the main choice,

rather than White’s other plan starting

with 13 dxc5, which was popularized

by Fischer during the 1960s. After

13...dxc5 14 £)fl White has a straight¬

forward plan of trying to occupy the

d5-outpost. This idea claimed quite a

few victims until a successful antidote

was found. After 14...Ae6 15 <S)e3


2ad8 16 We2 c4! 17 4if5 (17 4ig5 can

be met by 17...h6! 18 4)xe6 fxe6, when

the doubled e-pawns protect many

squares, in particular d5, while White

has to be wary of the pseudo-sacrifice

...£>d4) 17...Efe8 18 &g5 £>d7 19

IsLxel 4ixe7 20 4)g5 £>f8 21 4ixe6

£)xe6 22 g3 Wc6 Black is extremely

solid, Rubinetti-Filip, Palma de Mal¬

lorca IZ 1970.

13.. .£)d8

This is the most popular knight

move here. Black hopes to reactivate

this knight via the f7-square. The

other choices include:

a) 13...£ia7 (this looks too cum¬

bersome) 14 £)fl jtd7 15 g4 4ic8 16

£>g3 g6 17 <&>h2 £>e8 18 &h6 £>g7 19

Bgl and White has already built up a

menacing kingside initiative, Klovans-

L.Schneider, Jurmala 1978.

b) 13...£)a5 14 b3! (preventing

...£ic4 before playing 4ifl) 14..Jtd7

15 £>fl £>b7 16 £>g3 (16 c4 bxc4 17

bxc4 2fb8 18 jtd2 #c8 19 a4 is also

better for White, Balashov-Kholmov,

USSR Ch 1969) 16...c4 17 b4! (again

restraining Black’s problem knight)

17...2fc8 18 &f5 Af8 19 £)h2 with a

clear advantage for White, Geller-

Mecking, Palma de Mallorca IZ 1970.

14 a4

White’s future lies in a kingside at¬

tack, but it’s worth flicking this move

in, as the a-file could also prove to be a

useful asset.

14.. .2b8 15 axb5 axb5 16 b4 c4

Or 16...£ib7 17 £>fl &d7 18 &e3

Ba8 19 Wd2 Bfc8 20 &d3 g6 21 £>g3

iLf8 22 Ba2 and White was better in

Karpov-Unzicker, Nice OL 1974.

17 £>fl £>e818 4i3h2 f619 f4 exf4

Black must get a bit of air for his

pieces. 19...£>f7 20 £>f3 g6 21 f5!

4lg7 22 g4 gave Black no breathing

space in Karpov-Spassky, USSR Ch

1973.

20 &xf4 £>f7 21 £>f3 g6 22 £>d4

&d7 (D)

Black’s position remains very solid,

but White’s space advantage guaran¬

tees a slight plus. Ernst-Brandl, Hart-

berg 1991 continued 23 £le3 4)g7 24

Ba5 Wbl 25 £>c6!? &xc6 26 dxc6

Wxc6 27 Wd5 #xd5 28 £>xd5 and

White had excellent play for the pawn.

D4) 12„.cxd4

Black’s most popular and active line.

Black immediately seeks counterplay

down the open c-file.

13 cxd4 (D)

Now:

D41: 13...Bd8 137

D42: 13...&b7 137

D43: 13...£d7 139

D44: 13...£>c6 140


13.. .5d8

A sneaky move, which is part of a

plan to surprise White with ...d5.

14 b3

After 14 £)fl Black puts his plan

into operation with 14...exd4. Now 15

£)xd4 d5 looks fine for Black, while

15 jtf4!? leads to the following lines:

a) 15...£>c4 16 b3 £>a3 17 &d3

®b6 18 £>g3 b4 19 ®d2 d5 20 Sacl!

and White was better in Korneev-Fer-

nandez Garcia, Saragossa 1996.

b) 15...£)c6!? 16 ^31^6 (the al¬

ternative 16.. Jte6 also looks OK) 17

Scl jtd7 18 £}g3 Bac8 19 Ee2 and

now White was slightly better after

19.. .d3 20 #xd3 £>e5 21 &xe5 dxe5

22 Sxc8 &xc8 23 £e3 Bxd3 24 ilxb6

Bd7 25 £>1'5 in Popovic-Zsu.Polgar,

Novi Sad tt 1990, but 19...h6!, plan¬

ning to meet 20 2d2 with 20...g5,

looks stronger.

14.. .£>c6 15 &b2 exd4 16 £>xd4

£ixd4 17 &xd4 ±e6

White maintains a small plus after

17.. .jLb7 18 Bel lfa5 19 &bl Eac8

20 Exc8 Exc8 21 £>fl.

18 Eel #a5 19 £bl d5 20 &c3

(D)

Black has achieved the desired ...d5

break, but there is still plenty to play

for, e.g.:

a) 20...b421&xf6&xf622e5.&g5

23 ®e2 #b6 24 Bcdl gave White a

small edge in Popovic-Hellers, Thes¬

saloniki OL 1988.

b) 20...SW 21 e5 d4 and now, in¬

stead of 22 jtal £)d5, which was un¬

clear in the game Ernst-Wedberg,

Lugano 1989, 22 exf6 deserves atten¬

tion. After 22...dxc3 23 ®c2! (not 23

fxe7? cxd2) 23...g6 (or 23...jtxf6 24

#xh7+ <4>f8 25 £>e4) 24 £>c4! bxc4

25 fxe7 #xe7 26 bxc4 #g5 27 #xc3

White is a pawn to the good.

D42) 13...&b7 14 d5

Nowadays this move, which gains

space and blunts the b7-bishop, is

more popular than the older 14 £tfl.

One sample line after 14 £)fl is

14...Eac8 15 Ee2 d5'.? 16£>xe5 dxe4

17 £>g3 (or 17 JLg5 Bfd8 18 £ig3 h6


19 jth4 £lc6 20 4)xc6 jtxc6 21 £}f5

Wd7 22 £)xe7+ Wxe7 23 Wd2 Sd7

and Black was equal in Murey-Pinter,

French Cht 1994) 17...Efd8 18 £>f5

&d6 19 &xd6 #xd6 20 &e3 h6 21

®d2 £lc6 22 £>xc6 &xc6 and White’s

bishop-pair is compensated by pres¬

sure on the d4-pawn, Stefansson-Pin-

ter, Lyons ECC 1994.

14...Eac8 (D)

Black logically puts his rook on the

open c-file and attacks the c2-bishop.

The only problem with this plan is

that the b7-bishop may wind up being

blocked out of the game for a long

time. To deal with this. Black will try

to arrange a timely ...f5 to blow open

the centre and weaken the d5-pawn.

Of course, this is much more easily

said than done.

Another possibility is the immediate

re-routing of the bishop with 14.. .jtc8.

White can then continue in the classi¬

cal manner with 15 £)fl, but 15 b4!?

also looks good. After 15...£sc4 16

£ixc4 both 16...bxc4 17 Ee3! &d7 18

a4 and 16...»xc4 17 Ebl &d7 18 &d3

lfc7 19 jte3 favour White.

15 &bl!?

This move is prophylaxis against

Black’s ...f5 break. On bl the bishop is

less prone to an attack from ...4)d7-c5

or ...4)h5-f4. Nevertheless, the more

active 15 jtd3!? is a fully playable al¬

ternative, e.g. 15...£>d7 16 £}fl f5 17

&g3!? (17 exf5 &xd5 18 &g5 &xg5

19 &xg5 &a8 20 ®g4 £>f6 21 ®g3

may also be a bit better for White, al¬

though Black does have central pawns

in compensation for the bishop-pair)

17.. .f4 18 &f5 and now:

a) 18...&d819b3g620£>h6+<&>g7

21 4)g4 h5 22 £»gh2 is clearly better

for White according to Leko. This po¬

sition is a bit deceptive, as Black has

managed to gain quite a bit of space on

the kingside. However, with his bishop

totally redundant on b7. Black will find

it very difficult to arrange the desired

...g5-g4 push, while White’s queen-

side attack should run reasonably

smoothly.

b) 18...Sxf5!? 19 exf5 £>c5 20 b3

jtf6! 21 Ebl and Black doesn’t have

quite enough for the exchange, Leko-

Gomez Esteban, Pamplona 1993/4.

15...£ih5

Arranging a quick ...f5 is not so ef¬

fective when the bishop is on bl. After

15.. .£>d7 16&fl f5?! 17 exf5! £if6 18

£)g5 &xd5 19 £>e3 ®b7 20 b3 Efe8

21 &d2 £d8 22 Ab4 White was

clearly on top in Shirov-Adla, Bor¬

deaux rpd 1998.

16 £ifl &f4 17 <&h2! @d7 18 £)gl

4ic4 (D)

The diagram looks rather amusing,

with the black pieces seeming rather

active, while the white ones are huddled


1 * X* , ^jLP'f'AA i A

[&b-b*b1si Igi-afaâ''

on the back rank. However, if you

were able to shuffle your pieces at the

start of the game, I imagine White’s

set-up would be a very popular one. In

fact, this is as good as it gets for Black,

as the next couple of moves see his

knights driven back into defence. Af¬

ter 19 g3 £g6 20 b3 £b6 21 £e3 &d8

22 £e2 £e7 23 g4 £g6 24 £f5 White

held the advantage in Van Riemsdijk-

Matsuura, Curitiba 1992.

D43) 13.. JLd7

Once again, Black prepares to put a

rook on c8. Compared to 13....&b7

(Line D42), Black puts less immediate

pressure on the centre, but on the other

hand, if White advances d5, it doesn’t

leave the black bishop hitting a brick

wall. Because of this, it makes more

sense for White to keep the central

tension.

14 £fl Eac8

14.. .Efc8 is an interesting attempt

by Black to improve on the main line. Then:

a) 15 £e3 £c6 and now:

al) 16 d5 £b4 17 £bl a5 18 a3

£a6 shows the main point of Black’s

idea; his rook is well placed on a8. For

example 19 b4? would now simply

lose a pawn.

a2) 16 a3 and now Fischer-Bis-

guier, US Ch (New York) 1958/9 con¬

tinued 16...a5 17 d5 £d8 18 £d2 a4

19 &b4 Af8 20 &d3 with an ad¬

vantage to White. However, 16...£xd4

17 £xd4 exd4 18 #xd4 d5! must be

critical, reaching a position very simi¬

lar to the note to White’s 16th move,

the only difference being the placing

of the black rooks. This little differ¬

ence helps White, but Black’s position

is still fully playable, e.g.:

a21) 19 b4 dxe4 20&xe4 £xe4 21

£d5 i.f6 22 ®xe4 lfd8 looks pretty

equal.

a22) 19 e5 £c5 20 Vf4 Ee8 21

£f5 £h5 22 ®f3 &xf5! (22...Exe5 23

Exe5 ®xe5 24 Wxh5 ®el+ 25 <4>h2

&xf2 26 &e3! Wxal 27 Axf2 »xb2

28 &d4 Wxc2 29 ®g5 wins for White)

23 Axf5 g6 24 £g4 Sxe5 25 Ad2,

when White has some compensation

for the pawn, but is it enough?

b) Given all of this, the most accu¬

rate move for White may well be 15

Se2!?, leading to play similar to the

next note.

15 £*3

This is the main move here, but 15

2e2!? is also appealing, for example

15...Efe8 16 b3 £c6 17 &b2 jfcfB 18

Eel Wbl 19 jfcbl g6 20 dxe5 dxe5 21

£e3 &g7 22 Sd2 £e6 23 £d5 with

an edge to White, Chandler-Thipsay,

London Lloyds Bank 1989.

15...£c6 (D)


■ -miMkwm m,ML. ■ . mm- w. ■ ■ fii£B

An instructive mistake is 16 a3?!

£>xd4 17 £*d4 exd4 18 ltxd4 d5! 19

e5 (19 exd5 &c5! 20 #c3 &xe3 21

Exe3 ®xc3 22 Exc3 Exc3 23 bxc3

4ixd5 favours Black) 19.. Jtc5 20 #f4

Sfe8 21 £¥5 £ih5 22 ®f3 £xf2+! 23

#xf2 ®xc2 24 ®xc2 Exc2 25 4ie3

Ec6 26 ^xd5 Ec5 and White is strug¬

gling to draw, Hartman-L.B.Hansen,

Copenhagen 1996.

16.. .£ib4 17 &bl a5 18 a3 £)a6 19

b4!

This is an important move. White

uses a little trick to gain valuable space

on the queenside and fix the black

pawn on b5, where it can be attacked.

19.. .Ea8

Black has other possibilities in this

position:

a) 19...axb4 20 axb4 ®b7 (cer¬

tainly not 20...£)xb4? 21 jtd2! trap¬

ping the knight - this is the trick) 21

&d2 &d8 22 JLd3 &b6 23 ®e2 4ic7

24 £)dl Ea8 25 4ic3 Exal 26 Exal

Ea8 27 Eel and the pressure on the

b5-pawn assures White the advantage,

Hellers-Howell, Reykjavik 1990.

b) 19...g6 20 &d2 £ih5 (20...axb4

21 axb4 ®b7 22 £d3 4ic7 23 4ic2

was slightly better for White in Tal-

Hjartarson, Reykjavik 1987) 21 jtd3

£¥4 22 &fl f5 23 exf5 gxf5 24 Eel

®b7 25 Exc8 ®xc8 26 bxa5 £>c5 27

jtb4 e4 28 £)d4! and Black has many

weaknesses, Leko-Lukacs, Budapest

1993.

20 &d2Efc8 (D)

White has a slight plus, although, as

always, Black’s position is very diffi¬

cult to break down. Here are two pos¬

sible continuations:

a) 21 g4!? g6 22 jtd3 #b7 23 <4>g2

iLd8 24 £)gl, planning to continue

with 4£ie2 and f4, de Firmian-Piket,

Amsterdam 1996.

b) 21 &d3 axb4 22 axb4 Wb7 23

4ih2 £k7 (Anand-Piket, Amsterdam

1993) and now Anand recommends

24 £k2, preventing ...£sh5 and pre¬

paring to recapture on al with the

knight, followed by £sb3-a5.

D44)

13...£>c6


Immediately asking White ques¬

tions in the centre. On this particular

occasion. White is served best by

over-protecting the d4-pawn.

14 £>b3 a5

Black begins the logical plan of at¬

tacking the b3-knight and gaining

space on the queenside.

15 &e3 a4

15...£>b4 16 JLbl a4 17 &bd2 leads

to the same position.

16 £>bd2&d7

Black also has two alternatives:

a) 16...&e6 17 a3 £>a5 18 &d3

#b8 19 #e2 b4 20 axb4 ®xb4 21

Sebl exd4 22 &xd4 £b3 23 &xb3

i.xb3 24 Ac3 Wbl 25 £>d4 Sfc8 26

£)f5 with a dangerous kingside attack,

R.Byrne-F.Olafsson, Reykjavik 1984.

b) 16...£)b4!? 17 &bl £d7 18 a3

£)c6 19 &d3 £>a5 20 We2 (20 Sell?

#b8 21 ®e2 Se8 22 Sc2 &d8 23

dxe5 dxe5 24 &c5 gave White a slight

edge in the game Tal-G.Kuzmin, Le¬

ningrad 1977) 20...Srb8 21 Seel!?

Se8 22 Sabi £f8 (22...h6 23 b4 axb3

24 £>xb3 £)xb3 25 Sxb3 leaves the

b5-pawn very weak). The position af¬

ter 22..~&f8 arose in Klovans-Bel-

iavsky, Groningen 1992. Now instead

of 23 b4?!, which allowed Black to

equalize with 23...axb3 24 £>xb3 £\xb3

25 Exb3 exd4! 26 &xd4 #d8, Bel-

iavsky suggests 23 jtg5! and only

then 24 b4.

17 Eel ltb7 18 Efe8 19 £d3

Eab8 20 dxe5

20 a3 exd4 21 £)xd4 £ie5 22 ilbl

&d8 23 £>4f3 and now 23...^.a5 24

£)xe5 dxe5 25 Sedl ,&c6 26 b4 jtd8

27 jtc5 was good for White in Rotsa-

gov-Gausel, Gothenburg 1998, but

Black should keep the pressure on e4

with 23...£>g6!.

20...dxe5 21 £c5 (D)

This is Ljubojevic-Timman, Bugoj-

no 1982. After 21...£ih5 22 g3! &xc5

(22..Jtxh3 23 &xe7 foxel 24 &g5!)

23 Exc5 #b6 24 Seel White kept a

small advantage.

Index of Variations

Ie4e5 2£>f3£>c6 3&b5

Chapter 1: Without 3...a6, 3...£)f6, 3.. Jtc5 or 3...f5

Chapter 2: 3...f5 4 £ic3!

Chapter 3: 3..Ac5 4 0-0

Chapter 4: 3...£)f6 4 0-0

3...a6 4 jta4 Chapter 5: Without 4...4if6

Chapter 6: 4...£)f6 5 0-0

Chapter 7:4...£)f6 5 0-0 £}xe4 6 d4

Chapter 8: 4...£if6 5 0-0 &e7 6 Sel (6...b5 7 &b3 0-0 8 a4)

Chapter 10: 4...£>f6 5 0-0 &e7 6 Sel b5 7 &b3 d6 8 c3 (8...0-0 9 h3)

4...£>f6 5 0-0 &e7 6 Sel b5 7 &b3 d6 8 c3 0-0 9 h3

Chapter 11: 9...&d7 10 d4

Chapter 12: 9..Abl 10 d4

Chapter 13: 9...h6 10 d4 Se8 11 &bd2 &f8 12 £>fl

Chapter 14: 9...©b8 10 d4

Chapter 15: 9...&a5 10 &c2 c5 11 d4

1: Rare Third Moves for Black

1 e4 e5 2 £if3 &c6 3 &b5 9

A: 3...&b4 9

B: 3...d6 10

C: 3...£>d4 12 4 £>xd4 exd4 5 0-0 12

Cl: 5...c6 12

C2: 5..Ac5 13

D: 3...g6 14 4 d4!? exd4 5 &g5 &e7 6

±xe7 14

Dl: 6...®xe7 14

D2: 6...£}gxe7 15

E: 3...£>ge7 16

El: 4 £ic3!? 16

E2: 4 c3 16

2: The Schliemann Variation

1 e4 e5 2 £if3 £ic6 3 &b5 f5 4 £ic3!

18

A: 4...£>f6 19

B: 4...£id4 19

C: 4...fxe4 21 5 £ixe4 21

Cl:5...^f6 27

C2: 5...d5 22 6 £>xe5! dxe4 7 £>xc6

23

C21: 7...bxc6 25

C22: 7...Srd5 24

C23: 7...@g5 25 8 !fe2 £>f6 9 f4 25

C231: 9...®h4+ 25

C232: 9...®rxf4 26

Index of Variations 143

3: The Classical Variation

1 e4 e5 2 &f3 &c6 3 &b5 £c5 4 0-0

29

A: 4...£)ge7 50

B:4...£id4 50

C: 4...£>f6 57 5 c3 57

Cl:5...£)xe4!? 52

C2: 5...0-0 52

4: The Berlin Defence

1 e4 e5 2 4T3 £>c6 3 &b5 £>f6 4 0-0

57 4...£ixe4 5 d4! 57

A: 5..Jte7 38

B: 5...£)d6 40 6 £xc6 dxc6 7 dxe5 40

Bl:7...£>e4!?47

B2:7...£if5 42 8 ®xd8+ &xd8 9 &c3

42

B21:9...£>e7 42

B22: 9...£e6 45

B23: 9...h6 44

B24: 9„.&e8 44

B241: 10 b3 44

B242: 10 h3 45

5: The Deferred Steinitz and

Other 4th Move Alternatives

1 e4 e5 2 £>f3 £ic6 3 &b5 a6 4 &a4

48

A: 4...f5 49

B: 4...b5 49

C: 4...d6 50 5 c3 50

Cl: 5...f5 57

C2: 5...£d7 52 6 d4 52

C21: 6...£ige7 52

C22: 6...g6 53

6: Mailer and Arkhangelsk

Variations

1 e4 e5 2 4tf3 £>c6 3 £b5 a6 4 &a4

&f6 5 0-0 56

A: 5...d6 56

B: 5..AcS 57 6 c3 b5 7 £c2!? 58

Bl: 7...d5!? 58

B2: 7...d6 59

C: 5...b5 59 6 &b3 59

Cl: 6...&C5 60 7 c3 d6 8 a4 67

Cll:8...£b7 62

C12: 8...Sb8 62

C13: 8...&g4 63

C2: 6...&b7 64 7 Sel &c5 8 c3 65

C21: 8...0-0 65

C22: 8...d6 66 9 d4 &b6 10 £e3 0-0

11 &bd2 h6 12 h3 66

C221: 12...Ee8 67

C222: 12...exd4 67

C223: 12...Eb8 68

7: The Open Lopez

1 e4 e5 2 &f3 £k6 3 £b5 a6 4 &a4

£>f6 5 0-0 &xe4 6 d4 77 6...b5 7 &b3

d5 8 dxe5 i.e6 9 &bd2 77

A: 9...&c5 72

B: 9...&e7 73 10 c3 &c5 11 &c2 &g4

12 Eel 73

Bl: 12...0-0 74

B2: 12...®d7 75

C: 9...£>c5 75 10 c3 d4 75

Cl: 11 &g51176

Cll: ll...dxc3 77

C12: ll..Jtd5!? 78

C13: ll...#xg5 78

C2:11 &xe6 79

8: The 8 a4 Anti-Marshall

1 e4 e5 2 £T3 £>c6 3 &b5 a6 4 &a4

&f6 5 0-0 iLe7 6 Eel 83 6...b5 7 &b3

0-0 8 a4 85

A: 8...Eb8 83 B: 8...b4 84

C: 8...£.b7 85 9 d3 85

Cl: 9...Ee8 86

C2: 9...d6 8610 &bd2 86


C21: 10...&T7 87

C22: 10...£fc5 55

10: Rare Closed Lopez

Variations

1 e4 e5 2 £>f3 &c6 3 &b5 a6 4 &a4

£>f6 5 0-0 £e7 6 Sel b5 7 &b3 d6 8

c3 96 8...0-0 9 h3 96

A: 9...a5 96

B: 9.. JLe6 97

11: The Karpov Variation

1 e4 e5 2 £>f3 &c6 3 &b5 a6 4 &a4

£>f6 5 0-0 &e7 6 Sel b5 7 &b3 d6 8

c3 0-0 9 h3 &d7 10 d4 99

A: 10...£>b6 99 11 £>bd2 99

Al: ll...exd4 100

A2: ll...jfcf6 707 B: 10...&f6 707 11 a4! 707

Bl: ll...Sb8 702

B2: ll...&a5 702

B3: U.JLb7 103

B31: 12 d5 103

B32: 12 £>a3 704

12: The Zaitsev Variation

I e4 e5 2 £>f3 £ic6 3 &b5 a6 4 &a4

4T6 5 0-0 &e7 6 Sel b5 7 &b3 d6 8

c3 0-0 9 h3 £b7 10 d4 705 10...Se8

II £>bd2 £f8 709

A: 12 d5 109

Al: 12...£>e7 709

A2:12...£>b8 770 13 £>fl £>bd7 770

A21: 14£>3h2 770

A22: 14 £>g3 111

A221: 14...&C5 111

A222: 14...g6 772

B: 12 a4 775 12...h6 13 &c2 exd4 14

cxd4 &b4 15 &bl c5! 16 d5 &d7 17

Sa3 774

B1:17...C4 77418 axb5 axb519 &d4

774

Bll: 19...Sxa3 775

B12: 19...&e5 116 B2:17...f5 77618 £>h2!? $$611719

Sf3 Se5 20 Sxf5 775

13: The Smyslov Variation

1 e4 e5 2 ©f3 &c6 3 &b5 a6 4 &a4

£>f6 5 0-0 &e7 6 Sel b5 7 &b3 d6 8

c3 0-0 9 h3 h6 10 d4 Se8 11 &bd2

&f8 12 £>fl 779

A: 12...jfcd7 779

B: 12...jfcb7 720

14: The Breyer Variation

I e4 e5 2 £>f3 £>c6 3 &b5 a6 4 &a4

£if6 5 0-0 &e7 6 Sel b5 7 &b3 d6 8

c3 0-0 9 h3 &b810 d4 72210...£>bd7

II £>bd2 &b7 12 &c2 725 12...Se8

13 £>fl Af814 &g3 g615 a4 c516 d5

724 16...C4 17 £g5 h6 18 &e3 £>c5

19 ®d2 725

15: The Chigorin Defence

1 e4 e5 2 &f3 £k6 3 &b5 a6 4 &a4

£tf6 5 0-0 &e7 6 Sel b5 7 &b3 d6 8

c3 0-0 9 h3 £>a510 &c2 c511 d4 727

A: ll.JLb7 725

B: ll...&d7 130

C: ll...&c6 752

D: U..Mc7 133 12 £ibd2 755

Dl: 12...&d7 754

D2: 12...Ee8 754

D3:12...£>c6 755

D4: 12...cxd4 75613 cxd4 756

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Ruy Lopez - Internet Archive Guide... · 2019. 4. 9. · All other sales enquiries should be...

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