Shan Drug Watch

A publication of the Shan Herald Agency for News (S.H.A.N.)

Newsletter June 2009 issue 2

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Foreword :This publication is the 5th in the series of the Shan Herald’s drug watch program, following our previousreports:

◆ Show Business: Rangoon's War on Drugs in Shan State (2003)◆ Finding Neverland: The story of Yawngkha (2005)◆ Hand in Glove: The Burma Army and the drug trade in Shan State (2006)◆ Shan Drug Watch: Wa sacrifice at what price? (2007)

A few months after the 4th publication came out, we had a chance to meet Mr Xavier Bouan fromthe UN Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) who had been monitoring annual opium output in Burma,and were pleasantly surprised when he acknowledged that our findings “converged”, to use his ownwords. What he said was significant as the meeting took place only 4 months after the UNODC chiefhad declared the Golden Triangle would be free of drugs soon, contrary to our findings that the outputhad been increasing.

As we see it, provided that both official and independent monitoring stick to the truth, their reports willserve as head and tail of a coin, giving the people a full picture of the situation and a formulation of theright solution to the problem. To paraphrase the Bible, the truth shall certainly make Burma - and theworld - free.

We also take this opportunity to express our sincere thanks to Mr Kevin Simons for compiling the2007-2008 assessment and the evaluation of the State Peace and Development Council’s 15 yeardrug eradication plan. Special thanks also to Ms Nadia Stone for her wonderful editing.

And, last but not least, our warmest thanks to the readers without whose support our project wouldhave been long abandoned.

Mysoong Kha! (May you prosper!)

Khuensai JaiyenEditor in Chief

ContentsTen Years After .............................................................................................................. 3

Evaluating SPDC’s 15-year master drug elimination plan......................................... 7

Update for 2007-2008..................................................................................................... 9

Wa vow to hang on .......................................................................................................12

Want to pluck the moon? Try glue sniffing ................................................................13

Generals’ offspring involved in drug scandal ..........................................................14

Naw Kham - Back in action ..........................................................................................15

This issue is dedicated to: Janda Nanda (1948-2004), Gongur (Sumarn) (1966-2007),Sein Win Naung (1948-2008), Long Nawnghpa (1951-2008)

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Ten Years AfterS.H.A.N evaluates the first decade of the 15-year drug eradication policy undertaken by

Burma’s ruling State Peace and Development Council in 1999.

June 26 marks 10 yearssince the State Peace andDevelopment Council(SPDC) embarked on its 15-year plan to eradicate thecultivation and production ofall drugs in Burma by 2014.

Over the last 10 years, theruling Burmese junta hasclaimed the apprehension ofhundreds of drug dealers, theconfiscation of thousands ofkilos of opium and heroin, andthe destruction of thousandsof hectares of poppy fields.Senior General Than Shwe,head of the military and thestate, points to continuingcooperation with the govern-ments of Thailand, China,and the United States asproof of his regime’s resolveto bring the drug trade to an

end in Burma. The SPDCand its supporters also saythat poppy cultivation hasstopped in at least 13 tar-geted townships since 1999and there has been significantreduction in opiate produc-tion in Burma since the indus-try peaked in the country inthe mid-1990s.

The picture might be one ofremarkable success, but in-formation revealed throughS.H.A.N’s sources paints avery different picture.

According to S.H.A.N’s infor-mation, during the past de-cade the junta has not ar-rested major suppliers, grow-ers or traffickers as claimed,but mostly low-level dealersand users. SPDC might have

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suppressed or eliminatedcultivation in 13 targetedtownships, but has failed inits efforts in some 30 others,and, worryingly, poppy culti-vation and production is in-creasing in villages outsidethe geographical area out-lined for poppy-cultivationeradication.

According to the United Na-tions Office on Drugs andCrime (UNODC), Burma’srole in the world’s opiumtrade is a mere fraction ofwhat it was 10 years ago,when it was responsible forroughly 50 per cent of theworld's illicit output. Now,UNODC says, the figure isaround five per cent, and theamount of opium produced inBurma has dropped fromnearly 1,800 tonnes in 1993to 460 tonnes in 2007.

But Burma’s isolation fromthe international communityand huge censorship of infor-mation allowed from thecountry means it is difficult tocheck the accuracy of state-ments.

S.H.A.N has long believedthat the 1993 figures ofBurma’s extensive opiatesproduction (1,800 tonnes)were grossly inflated, andPoppy field in central Shan State (2008)

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consequently the much-bal-lyhooed reduction of drugproduction through 2006 wasillusory.

In 2007, Xavier Bouan, fromUNODC, was forced toagree. Speaking with ShanDrug Watch at a drugs forumorganized by the ForeignCorrespondents Club ofThailand (FCCT) on Septem-ber 12, Bouan conceded thatthe official estimates in the1990s were based on U.S.satellite intelligence, andwere probably not reliable.He went on to say: “Westarted to do our own surveyonly after 2000. Naturally, wemade a few mistakes atfirst… [Now, most of] ourfindings converge with thoseof S.H.A.N.”

His words are a heavy blowto the regime’s claim thatBurma is reducing its opiumtrade. Instead, it is possiblethat production is as high nowas it was 10 years ago.Khuensai Jaiyen, Director ofS.H.A.N, has stressed thispoint over the years. In hispresentation at the sameFCCT forum, he said: “Webelieve that the official fig-ures of 10 or more years agoare overestimated… perhapsall that has happened is thatin recent years figures havebecome more realistic, andthere has been no real dropat all.”

(Japanese journalist HideyukiTakano and Rutgers Univer-sity Ko-Lin Chin, both ofwhom had stayed in the Wahills for months have alsoargued against the UN andUS figures.)

ern Shan State (NDAA-ESS).

Phase 2, from 2004 to thepresent, saw 20 townships -16 in Shan State, four inKachin - targeted for drugeradication. Currently, onlysix make any claim of suc-cess. And the truth of theclaims is tenuous. All six arein Wa areas in northern ShanState under the control of theUnited Wa State Army(UWSA), whose leaders arereputedly among the world’smost notorious drug traffick-ers.

The Wa territories might bepoppy-free, but it is believedthat traffickers instead importraw opium from neighbouringtownships in order to con-tinue the trade. S.H.A.Nsources say “townships sur-rounding the United Wa StateArmy’s territory, [Hsenwi,Lashio, Tangyan, Monghsu,Markmang and Mongkhark]except those under the con-trol of Kokang and Monglaceasefire groups, have re-ported increased output.”

With the focus primarily onnorthern Shan State duringthe first decade of the drugcrusade, poppy farming hasmerely shifted to easternShan State and southernShan State. Townships inthose areas report 20-40 percent increases in lands un-der poppy cultivation over the

Ko-Lin Chin, Rutgers Universityprofessor

S.H.A.N believes that both ofthe first two phases of theSPDC's drug reduction planhave failed. The first phase,which ran from 1999 to 2004,targeted 22 townships inShan State, yet to date onlyseven of those can claim tobe drug-free. Of the sevendrug-free townships, threeare under the control ofceasefire groups. These arethe Kokang townships ofKunggyan and Laokai innorthern Shan State, con-trolled by Myanmar NationalDemocratic Alliance Army(MNDAA); and Mongla ineastern Shan State, con-trolled by National Demo-cratic Alliance Army - East-

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last two years, and official fig-ures show nationwide inputincreased more than 20 percent in 2007 and 2008.

sugar, and rubber tree failedand consequently communi-ties have turned to danger-ous, unsustainable, or illegal

Tatmadaw - is complicit in thedrug trade. The Tatmadawmight account for more than40 per cent of GOB’s budgetbut this is mostly spent onweapons systems and thelavish lifestyle of officers.Soldier pay remains hazard-ously low, and so many areforced to find other ways tosupplement their income.They are also required to con-tribute to the welfare fund ofthe unit to which they belong.Reasons for military involve-ment have been confirmedby Bouan, who said: “Every-body is involved in this tradein one way or another. Insur-gents, militia, government,cease-fire groups; for all ofthem… it’s one of the onlyways to survive and getcash.”

Testimony in 2003 had in-criminated at least 93 of the128 Infantry Battalions andLight Infantry Battalions oper-

It has also been reported thatUWSA forces used the drugeradication policy to shutdown rival heroin refineries -at times by means of armedcombat - in order for greatercontrol of the local drugtrade.

Production of amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) and Ice(crystal methamphetamine)is also increasing.

Meanwhile, the north’s poorfarmers, who depended onpoppy cultivation for their live-lihood, are suffering becauseneither the regime nor theceasefire armies imple-mented viable alternatives topoppy cultivation. Poorly-planned efforts to replacepoppy cultivation with tea,

industries like logging andprostitution.

With so little money and sofew options, it will be moredifficult to motivate peopleaway from opium production.Burma’s military - the

A Wa village on the Sino-Burma border (2008)

Digging a fish pond in Wa territory (2008)

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ating in Shan State in facili-tating the drug trade. Theirinvolvement includes provid-ing loans and seeds to villag-ers to grow opium; allowingor ordering farmers to growopium; taxing the poppy har-vest; transporting opium pow-der to heroin refineries; ac-cepting bribes to allow deal-ers through governmentcheckpoints; providing secu-rity for refineries; transportingmethamphetamine pills toThai dealers at the Thai-Burma border; and allowingArmy personnel to sell meth-

amphetamine to supplementtheir income.

If SPDC was to implementits drug eradication programsuccessfully, it would have tofind alternative livelihoods fora significant proportion of itspopulation. The fact that a2007 report by the Interna-tional Institute for StrategicStudies showed that GOBspent just 0.4 per cent of itsbudget on health and 0.5 percent on education showsthere is currently little invest-ment in the country’s future.

Ten years into the 15-yearplan, the ruling party remainsnotorious for drug dealing.Highly publicized reductionsin the opiate trade are nowacknowledged to be an illu-sion based on faulty esti-mates from the 1990s, andrecent figures show nation-wide increases of poppyfields and the production ofsynthetic drugs. Evidencesuggests that the junta doesnot intend to eradicate drugsfrom Burma at all, until andunless it suits the generals'agenda. ❑

Present Burma Army units in Shan State

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Evaluating SPDC’s 15-year masterdrug elimination planAfter ten years, according to S.H.A.N research, the regime has failed to eradicate opium in29 of the 51 targeted townships

Phase One (1999-2004) 22 townships

SHAN STATE TOWNSHIP FREE/NOT FREE REMARK

North Mongkoe NFKunggyan F MNDAA(Kokang)* territoryLaokai F MNDAA (Kokang) territoryKunlong FHopang FMongyai NFTangyan NFLashio NFNamtu NFMantong NFHsenwi NFKutkhai NFNamkham NFMuse FPanghsai F

East Mongla F NDAA-ESS ** territory

South Kunhing NFMongpan NFLangkher NFHsihseng NFFaikhun(Pekhon) NFMongkeung NF

STATE TOWNSHIP FREE/NOT FREE REMARK

Kachin Karmaing NFWaingmaw NFMoemauk NFMoehnyin NF

Shan North Pangwai F UWSA territoryManphang F UWSA territoryNapharn F UWSA territoryMongmai F UWSA territoryPangyang F UWSA territoryWiangkao F UWSA territory

Phase Two (2004-2009) 20 townships

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STATE TOWNSHIP FREE/NOT FREE REMARK

Shan East Mongyang NFKengtung NFMongyawng NFMonghsat NFMongton NFMongpiang NFMongkhark NF

Shan South Hopong NFMongnai NFPanglawng NF

STATE TOWNSHIP

In Phase Three (2009-2014) there are 9 townships

Total townships targeted : 51Number of townships free/almost free : 13Number of townships not free : 29 (Phase Three townships not included)

Reports from both Shan Herald and other news agencies also indicate that at least 14 townships nottargeted in the 15 year plan are growing poppies:

Northern Shan State : Mongmit, Namhsan, Kyaukme and HsipawSouthern Shan State : Loilem and MawkmaiEastern Shan State : Markmang (Metman)Kachin State : Sumprabum, Tanai and PutaoKayah State : ShadawChin State : Likha, Tiddim and Pletwa

Reports from western Burma also indicate that poppy cultivation has spread across the border intoBangladesh's Chittagong hill tracts - Editor

Shan State South KehsiMonghsuNamzangYawnghweLaikha

Kayah (Karenni) LoikawDimawso

Chin TonzangFalam

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Update for 2007-2008S.H.A.N summarizes developments in Burma’s drug trade from June 26, 2007 to June 26,2008 so as to provide an update to our 2007 Drug Watch newsletter.

Opium cultivation and pro-duction in Burma increasedsubstantially after a decadeof reported declines. TheUnited Nations Office onDrugs and Crime's 2008World Drug Report esti-mated an increase of 29% intotal acreage planted and anadditional 46% opium pro-duced in 2007 over 2006 to-tals.

Shan State also witnessed asimilar spike despite beingthe focus of the government’sdrug eradication policy. Cul-tivation was up 24% in ShanState, and opium addictionrose 25% among Shan resi-dents since 2006.

These figures dovetailed wellwith our own estimates,marking the first time in adecade that UNODC andS.H.A.N agreed on the extentof Burma's drug trade. Ac-cording to our data, the 2007-08 harvest exceeded that ofthe previous winter, withgains of up to 40% in ShanStates east and south Pro-duction stayed relatively flatin Shan State north, althoughthe three townships beyondthe scope of the eradicationpolicy - Mongmit, Namhsanand Hsipaw - were sources

of increased production.

These developments werefurther evidence of the “bal-loon effect” of the junta's ap-proach to fighting the drugtrade in Burma: productionfell where policy was strictlyenforced, but it was merelyreplaced or surpassed bynew production in other ar-eas.

Cultivation was up in otherstates as well. Kachin NewsGroup (KNG) reported thatpoppy cultivation was on therise in Sumprabum andPutao townships. Observersin Kachin State attributed therecent surge in opium pro-duction to new governmentpolicy banning cross-bordertimber trade.

S.H.A.N. reporter Hawkeyereported from the Sino-Bur-mese border that loggers hadbeen shot and logging com-panies forced to close. As aconsequence, cash-strapped ceasefire groupshad turned to the drug trade.Poppy fields sprang upthroughout the townshipscontrolled by the Kachin In-dependence Organization(KIO) and the Kachin Demo-cratic Army (KDA), and reli-

able sources claimed thatseveral new heroin refinerieswere newly operating in thearea. As one ceasefire officernoted, “It looks as if theSPDC (the ruling StatePeace and DevelopmentCouncil) do not want us to befree from drugs. They tell usto do away with drugs, butoffer us no alternatives in re-turn.”

In the Wa areas of ShanState, opposition to the drugeradication policy remainedso strong that internationalobservers openly questionedwhether such an unpopularpolicy could endure. TomKramer of the East-WestCenter in Washington, D.C.,for one, argued persuasivelythat the ban was not sustain-able among the Wa for manyreasons: Poppy cultivationhad been an essential part oftheir culture for over 100years; the Wa lacked alterna-tive sources of income; theirhomeland was remote anddifficult to monitor; efforts toengage the Wa in communitydevelopment had failed; edu-cation was lacking; and theban was unpopular.

Indeed, United Wa StateParty (UWSP) vice chairman

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Xiao Minliang was moved tocomment, “Frankly speaking,if you say to the farmers,‘Raise your hands if you

agree with the poppy ban,’none of them will.” The surgein poppy production andopium prices in areas sur-

rounding the impoverishedWa townships only served tocast further doubt on thesustainability of the ban on

Poppy growing areas

Opium poppy growing areas inShan State during 2002-2003 cultivation period

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Wa poppy farming.

The past year also witnessedcontinuing reports on military

corruption and complicity inthe opium trade in Burma.Xavier Bouan of the UNODCwent so far as to publicly

state that in Burma “everyoneis involved in the drug trade,

Opium poppy growing areas inShan State during 2008-2009 cultivation period

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Wa vow to hang onAccording to a Shan DrugWatch interview on 18 April,2009, the Wa are finding itincreasingly difficult to returnto poppy cultivation.

leader, in his keynote ad-dress on the day marking the20th anniversary of the found-ing of the United Wa StateArmy (UWSA), an event thatwas conducted with muchpomp and fanfare.

Now with the growing tensionwith the Burma Army that hasplaced all its available troopsaround the Wa territory, con-tinued Chinese goodwill ap-pears to be the only way forthe Wa to get out of the messin one piece.

Indeed, alongside the motorroads inside the Wa domain,visitors no longer see poppyfields, in contrast to pre-2005poppy seasons. Bao, in alllikelihood, appears to bekeeping his word given be-fore the ban: “If any poppyplants are still seen after

2005, you can chop my headoff.”

At least one story seems toquestion the sustainability. Amonk from the Thai-Burmaborder, during a visit toPanghsang last year, askedif they still were any poppyfields, to which a monk re-plied, “There are still a fewand I can escort you there.Even the Wa police rarely gothere. But the one closest isa two day walk from here.”The source said he declinedthe offer. “To this day, I'm notstill sure whether he was se-rious or just making a joke.”

Nevertheless, the fire thatbroke out on 18 April, the dayafter the anniversary, had re-portedly destroyed thousandsof tons of teak logs, and alsohundreds of barrels of pre-

“Some Burma watchers maystill think we are returning topoppy cultivation,” said a Waofficer who requested ano-nymity. “They certainly haveno idea that our continuedsurvival depends almost to-tally on the goodwill of China.Under this circumstance, wehave very little opportunity tolift the ban (imposed in2005).”

“We are making relentlessefforts to realize the ultimategoal of ‘No poppy cultivation,No drug production, trade orabuse in Wa’,” declared BaoYouxiang, supreme Wa

Bao Youxiang,Wa supreme leader

Fire in Panghsang, 18 April 2009

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Want to pluck the moon?Try glue sniffingGlue sniffing has been be-coming a new phenomenonamong youth in Shan Statereplacing other drugs, ac-cording to several sources.

In the northern Shan Statecapital Lashio, young peoplefrom all 12 quarters of thetown are sniffing glue. Univer-sity students as well as chil-dren as young as 15 yearsold are also using it, said alocal source.

“There are tens of thousandsof people sniffing it. Becauseit is better to use than Yaba,and the price is also cheaperthan a pill of Yaba,” he said.

The price of glue is betweenKyat 200-300 per can and isnot only easily available butis also legal and thereforecan be purchased at anyshops at a low cost. How-ever, the price has now dra-matically increased to Kyat500- 600 as more peoplehave come to use it, said thesource.

“Each can is enough forabout 4 people,” said anothersource. “Some people useas many as about 4 cans aday.”

Some people are using it asa substitute for warding offsuffering, stress and hunger,according to a resident inTachilek, eastern Shan State.

“After using it, the feeling islike being able to achieve any-thing in life, even plucking themoon from the sky,” he said.

Users may feel sleepy afterusing it and slowly lose theirconsciousness sometimesleading to death, accordingto him.

“There are many people in-cluding students sleeping onthe roads after using it. Noone comes and arreststhem.”

Some students' families areworried their children will useit and are afraid such abusewill be on the rise.

People are using it in manyways depending on the ap-petite of the users. Some ruba pinch of it into a bag of plas-tic and sniff it while somepeople rub it in their handsand sniff. Another way is toburn the glue and sniff. ❑

cursor chemicals used inproducing heroin such asEther and Acetyl Anhydride(known as acid to the locals).

The site of the inferno report-edly belong to Wei Xuegang,a drug fugitive from Thailandand currently serving as thecommander of the 171stMilitary region, oppositeThailand’s Mae Hong Son,Chiang Mai and Chiang Raiprovinces.

It remains to be seen whatfuture Wei has with theUWSA. But it was he whohad reportedly come to therescue of the UWSA, duringits early days, with B 40 mil-lion ($40,000) in cash whenit was still struggling to sur-vive following its mutiny on 17April 1989 which toppled un-til-then-Beijing backed Com-munist Party of Burma(CPB). ❑

Wei Xuegang

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Generals’ offspring involvedin drug scandalWhile the rest of the worldlast year was in a state ofshock by the news of devas-tation in lower Burma causedby Cyclone Nargis that left atleast 130,000 dead and miss-ing and millions homeless,the ruling generals were hav-ing a problem of their own.

Late in May 2008, two promi-nent businessmen were ar-rested by the authorities:Maung Weik, reputedly one ofthe richest man in Burma andAung Zaw Ye Myint, owner ofYetagun construction com-pany and son of the Lt-GenYe Myint, then chief of Bureauof Special Operations #1.

Maung Weik, according to aninformed source in Rangoon,is “just a big hearted million-aire” who loved to use drugsfor himself and “to entertain

his friends”, while Aung ZawYe Myint was a “transporter”,whose vehicles were im-mune from inspection by gov-ernment checkpoints.

One of their clients was noneother than Nay Shwe ThweAung aka Po La Pyay akaMyauk Moo Ley, favoritegrandson of Senior Gen Than

Shwe. Furious with hisgrandson’s involvement, thesenior general had issuedorders to launch an out-and-out crackdown, according toMizzima and Irrawaddy.

The result was the arrest ofsix other associates of MaungWeik and Aung Zaw Ye Myint,one of whom was a Malay-sian national.

To the surprise of many, whileMaung Weik got a 15-year jailsentence, Aung Zaw Ye Myintmanaged to get away withbeing sent to the Wettikandrug rehabilitation center. Heeven managed to get back tohis home long before theprison sentence was passedby the court for his erstwhilecolleague in November. ❑

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Maung Weik

including the government.”Farmers from Loilem districtalleged that the Burma Armycommanders order the localfarmers to grow poppies,which the army then taxed.This practice, common sincethe junta imposed a self-suf-ficiency policy on Army unitsin 1996, persisted through2007 and early 2008. . Some

From page 11 of the more notorious militaryoffenders include Light Infan-try Battalions 553 and 554,which taxed poppy farmers inMongtoom, a village tract inMonghsat township, and In-fantry Battalion 245, whichhas been taxing farmers inMongkeung Township.. Ac-cording to one source,“many farmers are movinginto Burma Army-controlledareas to grow opium, be-

cause the United Wa StateArmy, based in Sankarng andKhailong [opposite Thailand’sMaehongson Province], havebanned it this year.”

Finally, international observ-ers and local residents alikewere expecting an even big-ger opium haul from the up-coming 2008-09 planting sea-

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Naw Kham - Back in actionOn 18 February 2009, a Chi-nese cargo ship on theMekong was shot up and oneof its crew members killedand at least three otherswounded: The blame wasplaced on Naw Kham, 48, aformer Mong Tai Army (MTA)officer, who has been runninga protection racket in theGolden Triangle, whereBurma, Laos and Thailandmeet.

He first came to the attentionof the media when a groupof gunmen believed to beunder his authority fired upona Chinese patrol boat on 25February 2008, wounding 3Chinese officers.

Until the international uproarcaused by the shooting inFebruary, the Burma Armyhad bothered him very little,thereby lending credence toreports that he had been pay-ing kickbacks to local authori-ties up to the regional com-mand in Kengtung.

A protest by Beijing was be-lieved to have led to the mili-tary campaign against himand his men the day after the

incident. According to thesources, some 34 peoplesuspected of having connec-tions with him were detainedtogether with an unspecifiedamount of drugs and cash.

However 4 months later, NawKham, who reportedly hashomes in all three countriesbordering the triangle, is stillat large.

Sources have agreed thathis untouchability had noth-ing to do with miracles but theundercurrent of resentmentby people in downstreamMekong countries againstChina:

Until 2007, the Burmese sideof the Triangle was an opera-tional area of the anti-Naypyitaw Shan State Army(SSA) “South”. But during theyear, the SSA was chasedout by the Burma Army. Theresultant vacuum was filledup by Naw Kham, who hadbecome a pro-junta militiachief, and later went under-ground in 2006.

Naw KhamP

hoto

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etty

Imag

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Chinese patrol boat shot up by gunmen believed to be followers ofNaw Kham, 25 February 2008

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Previous SHAN publications on the drug trade in Shan Stateavailable at www.shanland.org

◆ For the people on theLao side of the Triangle, feel-ings against the Chinesewere high after locals weremoved out of their lands andhomes following a contractwith Vientiane to build a ca-sino complex there

◆ For those on the Thaiside, the feeling of exaspera-

tion was over the allegedChinese monopoly over theuse of water in the Mekong(“When the Chinese boatscome down, there is water.But when our boats go up,there is no water,” com-plained a Thai businessmanfrom Chiangkhong, Chiang-rai province)

From page 14

son. Two critical factors atwork were the increasedgrowing season and higheryields owing to better pro-duction techniques. As oneShan Drug Watch observernoted, “In a number of areas,we saw poppies being grownall year round, two crops insome places and three in oth-ers. So far as farmers thereare concerned, the word

Naturally, Naw Kham hasbeen back in action in thearea, after the Burma Armyrecalled its troops in prepa-ration for the worst with theWa ceasefire group, whichhas flatly rejected the rulingjunta’s demand to transformitself into a pro-junta bordersecurity force. ❑

‘poppy season’ is rathermeaningless now.” In addi-tion, ceasefire groups, mili-tias, and the Burma Armyexpanded their production ofcrystal methamphetamine(“Ice”) and amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS)through June of 2008. Effortsto develop alternatives topoppy farming income wereroundly condemned as half-hearted, ill-conceived, andunsuccessful. The period

from June 2007 to June 2008represented a substantialstep backward for Burma inits war on drugs and its ef-forts at gaining internationallegitimacy. Indeed, it was theworst of all possible results:Burma’s drug trade wasbooming, military complicitywas as bad as ever, and thelocal farmers were still suf-fering. ❑

From page 15