THE HUMAN ASPECT OF THE FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI ACCIDENT · 2016. 3. 3. · 設計圧力（0.49MPa abs）...

THE HUMAN ASPECT OF THE FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI ACCIDENT

Takafumi ANEGAWA

Tokyo Electric Power Company

MagnitudeofEarthquakeandTsunami

震源

原⼦⼒発電所

Seismic intensity distribution of present earthquake

Source area of present earthquake (Created by Earthquake Research Institute, University of Tokyo)

Source of present tsunami (Created by TEPCO)

Earthquake time: Match 11, 2011 (Friday), 2:46 PM •  Site of occurrence: Off the Sanriku coast (lat. 38º 06.2′N, long. 142º 51.6′ E.), Focal depth: 24 km •  Magnitude of earthquake: 9.0 •  Intensity at each location: Kurihara City, Miyagi Prefecture - Intensity 7 •  Intensity 6 Upper: Naraha, Tomioka, Okuma and Futaba town in Fukushima Prefecture •  Intensity 6 Lower: Ishinomaki City and Onagawa town in Miyagi Prefecture, Tokai village in Ibaraki

Prefecture

©Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

DamagetoFukushimaDaiichiNPS(1)

FloodedAreasatFukushimaDaiichiNPS©Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved.


Confirmation result for the main flooding route by on-site confirmation surrounding the building (1) Building entry/exit (2) Equipment hatch (3) Emergency D/G air supply louver (4) Trench, duct (penetration of cables) etc. ⇒ Flooding of D/G, electric panel room etc. through these. Unit 1 containment seawater cooling system pump

Unit 1 D/G (1B)

Unit 1 power panel at turbine building level 1

Unit 5 sea side seawater pump area


MCRLayoutattheCmeoftheAccident

4 to 5 auxiliary equipment operators

MCRforUnit1

MCRforUnit2

Shi>supervisor

deputysupervisor

senioroperator

SeniorOperator

auxiliaryoperator

auxiliaryoperator

auxiliaryoperator

auxiliaryoperators

operator

operatordeputysenioroperator


IsolaConCondenser(IC)


OperaDngStaffhadtoworkatMCRswithverylimitedlightning

TsunamithathitthepowerstaDon


ICoperaConaIertheEarthquake

①

②

③ ④

⑤

0 2 4 6 8

MPa ① Scrambytheearthquake 14:46 ②  PressureincreaseduetoMSIVclosure ③  DepressurizaDonduetoICoperaDon 14:52 ④  PressureincreaseduetostopofIC ⑤  pressurechangerelatedtoICoperaDon(esDmaDon)

around 15:30: end of data recording

RPVpressurechart

Unit1MCR

3A4A

1A 2A


OrganizaConchartofsiteERC

R/B4F　　　　　ICVentpipe

R/B

C/B

InformaDonTeam

1.Send/receive informaDon with the Headquarter inTokyo2.GatherinformaDonfromeachteam

NoDficaDon

Team1.NoDce&Liesonw/externalrelatedorganizaDons

PRTeam 1.Respondtomassmedia Engineering

Team

1.Assesstheaccidentstatus2.EsDmatescopeoftheimpact3.Studymeasurestopreventspreadofaccident

SafetyTeam1.StatuscheckofradiaDoninandoutofthesite2.ExposureandcontaminaDoncontrol3.EsDmatethecopeofimpact

HQ(GeneralManagement)

GeneralManager:

NuclearSafetyManager(Site

Superintendent)

R e c o v e r y

Team

1.Form&implementemergencyrestoraDonplan2.Createplantorestorefromtheaccident3.FirefighDngacDvity

P o w e rGeneraDonTeam

1.Graspthestatusoftheaccident2.Take measures needed to prevent the accident fromspreading3.MainDansecurityofthesitefacility

M a t e r i a l

Team1.Procure&transportmaterials2.Procuremobileresources

W e l f a r e

Team1.Procurefoodsandclothes2.ArrangeaccommodaDons

M e d i c a l

Team1.Medicalsupport

G e n e r a lAffairsTeam

1.ShareinformaDonwithinthesite2.Establsih&OperatetheCounter-measureHeadquarter3.Gatherandmoveresources4.Otheritems

Patrolling /

G u i d a n c eTeam

1.On-sitepatrolling2.EvaluaDon/guidanceofvisitors3.OperatephysicalprotecDvefacility ©Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

　Deputydirector

　　　

SRE(5-6U)DisasterprevenDonandsafetyGrmanager

SeniorReactorEngineer(1-4U)

２４

１３１４

１５

１６

１７

１８

１９

２０

２１

２２

２３

１

２

３

４

５

６

７

８

９

１０

１１

１２

Safetyteamleader

Deputydirector

Welfareteamleader

GeneralAffairsteamleaderResourceteamleader

Security/guidanceteamleader

ExternalCommunicaDonteamleader

NoDficaDonteamleader

Medicalteamleader

Director

InformaDonteamleader

Deputydirector

Deputydirector

Deputydirector

　Deputydirector

SeniorDirector

PowergeneraDonteamleader

RestoraDonteamleader

２５

Qualityandsafetyseniormanager

Engineeringteamleader

DisasterprevenDonseniormanager

FloorplanatthesiteERC


SPDSinformaDon(safetyparameterdisplaysystem)isdisplayedinlarge-sizedscreens,roundtableandsmallmonitorsforeachteam.Staffcancheckandmonitorthelateststatusoftheplant.

EmergencyResponseCenter

ShareinformaDonvialargescreens

(RoundTableandTeams)ShareinformaDonviasmallmonitors

Reference)communicaConduringnormaloperaCon


ICoperaConaIertheTsunami


FloorplanofUnit1RectorBuilding

Ｒ／Ｂ

Doubledoors

Ｃ／Ｂ

Ｔ／Ｂ


LogicsequenceofICoperaCon

◆AutomaDcStart

CSlocaDonAUTO

RPVpressurehigh(A)

OutersidecontainmentisolaDonvalveMO-3A　OpenMO-3B　Open

◆AutomaDcShutdown

RPVpressurehigh(C)RPVpressurehigh(B)RPVpressurehigh(D)

7.13MPa

7.13MPa7.13MPa

7.13MPa

ConDnuefor15sec.

CSlocaDonAUTOPipingdifferenDalpressurehigh(subsystem-A)STEAMdPS-1349-A,C

ContainmentisolaDonvalvesinsidePCVMO-1AClosed

ContainmentisolaDonvalvesoutsidePCVMO-2AClosed

OutersidecontainmentisolaDonvalveMO-3A

IsolaDonvalvesinsidecondenserMO-4A

MO-17AClosedMO-20AClosed

PipingdifferenDalpressurehigh(subsystem-A)WATERdPS-1350-A,C

62.27kPa

31.87kPaCSlocaDonAUTO

PipingdifferenDalpressurehigh(subsystem-B)STEAMdPS-1349-B,D

ContainmentisolaDonvalvesinsidePCVMO-1BClosed

ContainmentisolaDonvalvesoutsidePCVMO-2BClosed

OutersidecontainmentisolaDonvalve MO-3B

IsolaDonvalveinsideIC MO-4BClosed MO-17BClosed MO-20BClosed

PipingdifferenDalpressurehigh(subsystem-B)WATERdPS-1350-B,D

62.27kPa

49.82kPa？


AlternaCvewaterinjecConlines

FilteredWaterTank

CondensateStorageTank

FireexCnguishingsystemElectricpump

D/Gpump

Electricpump(stand-by)

ElectricpumpCondensateWaterMakeupSystem

CoreSpraySystemCVCoolingSystem

PV

Drywell

Suppressionpool

MO

MO

MO

MO

FireEnginesSourcesback-c leaningvalvespits,etc.(seawater,etc.)

AlternaDvewaterinjecDonfromCSTAlternaDvewaterinjecDonlinefromFP

AlternaDvewaterinjecDonlinefromfireengines


DesigndocumentandTrainingmaterialforOperators

Design documents and training manuals for operators


ICoperaCon

Movie when IC is activated


ImprovedoperaCngcrewstaffing

JudgeoperaDonInstruct/ordertooperators

Oversight&operaDon

ApairofworkersformateamtorespondthefieldbasedontheinstrucDonofthedeputyshi>operator.

Oversight/operaDon/instrucDon

Shi>supervisor

deputysenioroperator

deputysenioroperator

senioroperator mainequipmentoperator

Senioroperator mainequipmentoperator

auxiliaryequipmentoperator


Senioroperatorordeputysenioroperator




Senioroperatorordeputysenioroperator


OperaDontorespondthefield

OperaDontorespondthefield

StructureofUnit7duringtheevent

StructureofUnit6duringtheevent

Liaison/coordinatewithEMRCoordinateamongunitreactorsMonitordeputysenioroperator

FieldSupport(IniDalfireexDncDon,etc.)



Staffinchargeoffieldsupport

Field

MCR

Unit7underoperaCon Supportshi>supervisoroperaDonCoachingandskilltransfertooperatorsGrasptheplantstatus

（when2plantsareinoperaCon:18crew+1STA)

Unit6underoperaCon

Oversight/operaDon/instrucDon

JudgeoperaDonInstruct/ordertooperators

Oversight&operaDon


IntroducConofICSconcept

(Before)Build12funcDonalteamsinparallelundertheDirector. (A>er)NarrowtheDirector’sspanofcontrolandstraDfygroupsbyfuncDon

PRteam Director

thenucleardisasterprevenDonmanager(sitesuperintendent)

NoDficaDonteam

InformaDonteam

Engineeringteam

RestoraDonteam

Securityteam

PowergeneraDonteam

Resourceteam

Welfareteam

Medicalteam

GeneralAffairsteam

Patrolling/guidanceteam

SRE

SafetyAuditor

U1-5Controller

Unit7Controller

RestoraDonteamU1-5)

GeneralAffairsteam

Resourceteam

Site/PRteam Externalresponsecontroller

NoDficaDonteam

PlanningteamU1-5

PlanningteamU6-7

Securityteam

Planning/

InformaCon

Director DisasterPrevenDon

Controller(SiteSuperintendent)

Decisionmaking/command

LogisDcs/resourcemanagement

InternalcommunicaDon

ExternalcommunicaDon

DatacollecDon/planning

Unit6Controller

Unitteam(U1-5)

RestoraDonteam(U6)

Unitteam(U6)

RestoraDonteam(U7)

Unitteam(U7)


ImprovedcommunicaContools

TSCMCR

Plant data transmission

system

（Wireless network）

Wired network (existing since

before the accident)

Safety Related Parameter

Display system

Satellite phone system

Radio communication

tool

Satellite phone system

Radio communication

tool

Enhanced diversity of communication tools between MCRs and TSC


HPCIdatachartatUnit3

21

-4000

-2000

0

2000

4000

6000

3/12 6:003/12 9:003/12 12:003/12 15:003/12 18:003/12 21:003/13 0:003/13 3:003/13 6:003/13 9:003/13 12:003/13 15:00

原子炉水位（燃料域※１)(A)（mm）

原子炉水位（燃料域※１)(B）（mm）

当直引継日誌別紙水位※２（mm）

0.00

2.00

4.00

6.00

8.00

10.00

3/12 6:003/12 9:003/12 12:003/12 15:003/12 18:003/12 21:003/13 0:003/13 3:003/13 6:003/13 9:003/13 12:003/13 15:00

A系原子炉圧力（MPa abs）

当直引継日誌別紙原子炉圧力（MPa abs）

運転中（7.1MPa abs）

逃がし弁機能設定圧力（7.54,7.61,7.68MPa abs）

設計圧力（8.7MPa abs）

運転圧力（7.1MPa abs）

0.000

0.200

0.400

0.600

0.800

1.000

3/12 6:003/12 9:003/12 12:003/12 15:003/12 18:003/12 21:003/13 0:003/13 3:003/13 6:003/13 9:003/13 12:003/13 15:00

S/C圧力（MPa abs）

D/W圧力（MPa abs）

当直引継日誌別紙 S/C圧力（MPa abs）

当直引継日誌別紙 D/W圧力（MPa abs）

運転中（0.11MPa abs）

設計圧力（0.49MPa abs）

１号機原子炉建屋爆発（15:36）TAF到達<地震発生後約42時間>（9:10頃）

炉心損傷開始［水素発生開始］<地震発生後約44時間>（10:40頃）

＜MAAP解析＞

TAF

L-0（-1220mm）

L-1（450mm）

L-2（2950mm）

L-8（5655mm）

NWL（5327mm）

S/C

, D/W

pressu

re

［M

Pa abs］

RP

V pre

ssure

［M

Pa abs］


RP

V w

ater le

vel

［m

m］

HPCI(HighPressureCoreInjecCon)systematUnit3CondensateStorageTank

RPV MO

MainSteamTube

MO

FIC

MO

StreamVolumeControl

Turbine

MO

MO

MO

WaterSourceSwitchLineMO

PressureControlRoom

MO

HO

HO

AO

WaterSup

plySystem

TurbineStopValve

RegulatorValve

RCV

MO

MinimumFlowBypassValve

MinimumFlowLine

InjecDonLine

SteamTube

MO

TestLine

MO

TestBypassValve


Filtered Water Tank

Condensate Storage Tank

E l e c t r i c a l Pump

Electrical Pump(Standby)

Electrical PumpCondensate Water Makeup System

S u p p r e s s i o n Pool

DrywellCondensate Water Makeup System

L o w P r e s s u r e Water Injection

RCV Cooling

Pressure Vessel Head Spray 消火系

Con

den

sate

Water

Makeup

System

Fire Extinguishing System

C o n d e n s a t e Water Makeup System

Pr

es

su

re

Vessel

Condensate Water Makeup System

Suppression Pool Spray

D/G Pump

MO MO

MO

MO MO

MO

MO

MO

MO MO

Fire Engines

WaterinjecConbyfireengines


【HPCI Shutdown and Responses Afterwards】

n  Operators thought they could manually open SRV only with the light of the indicator lamp. The status should have been carefully checked,

n  They should have prepared necessary gas (nitrogen cylinder) to start-up and D/C power to drive the solenoid valve in advance.

n  Depressurizing should have been conducted with keeping HCPI’s operation, and then inject cooling water via D/D FP.

n  Similar to the situation we had with IC, risk analysis of the HPCI shutdown was not sufficient.

【On information sharing before HPCI shutdown】

n  The idea to stop HPCI was shared among shift team and TSC Power Generation team, while it took one hour for the entire TSC to recognize it .

⭕It is necessary for the site to have a structure that can endure simultaneous events in multiple units and continuous response for the long term.

LessonsfromHPCIoperaConatUnit3


Conclusions

Our Resolution: We will never forget the Fukushima Nuclear Accident. We will　increase the level of safety today more than yesterday and　tomorrow more than today, and we will become a nuclear　operator that continues to create unparalleled safety.


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THE HUMAN ASPECT OF THE FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI ACCIDENT · 2016. 3. 3. · 設計圧力（0.49MPa abs）...

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