The Israeli Defense Force & the Sabra and Shatila Massacre
"To what extent is the Israeli Defense Force responsible for the massacre at Sabra and Shatila?"
by Steven Li
United World College Costa RicaYear: 2014Month: MayStudent Code: 001415 - 0039Subject: HistoryWord Count: 3998
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements............................................................................................................................. 3
Abstract................................................................................................................................................... 4
Introduction........................................................................................................................................... 5
Investigation.......................................................................................................................................... 8The Phalangists................................................................................................................................................ 8The Israeli-Phalange Relationship..........................................................................................................10The Extent of Israeli Involvement........................................................................................................... 12
The Invasion of West Beirut.....................................................................................................................................12The Terrorist in the Camps.......................................................................................................................................14“The Front Row At The Theater”............................................................................................................................17Israeli Support................................................................................................................................................................ 18
Conclusion............................................................................................................................................ 22
Bibliography....................................................................................................................................... 24
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Acknowledgements
A special thank you to my EE supervisor and EE teacher, Jacob Paulsen. We did this
together!
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Abstract
The research question of this essay is "To what extent is the Israeli Defense Force
responsible for the massacre at Sabra and Shatila?"
This investigation will be based on a wide variety of sources, from a government
report to a film, from an Israeli perspective to a Palestinian perspective. Contrasting
viewpoints and challenges to conventional interpretations are assessed throughout to give
a more complete picture of the massacre.
The structure of the essay will be first to gauge the responsibility of the Phalange.
Then, the nature of Phalange-Israeli relationships such as the degree of control over the
Phalange will be investigated. Lastly, Israeli involvement such the pretenses on which the
IDF allowed the militiamen into the camps and Israeli logistical support to the Christian
militiamen during the massacre will be examined.
The investigation found that, the Israeli Defense Force is responsible for the
massacre at Sabra and Shatila to a great extent, greater than the Kahan Commission’s
delineation of “indirect responsibility”. The IDF took an active role in facilitating the
massacre, not an indirect one, by having planned and allowed the Christian militiamen into
the defenseless refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila. The IDF had a strong degree of control
over the militiamen. The IDF also actively facilitated the massacre, by providing the
militiamen with lighting, ammunition, food and water and also entrapping the residents of
the camps, while doing nothing to stop the massacre. Under international law, the IDF had
a responsibility to keep the occupants of the camps safe, which did not happen.
Word count: 255
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Introduction
Israel entered Lebanon, fighting in the Lebanese Civil War, to drive out the
Palestinian Liberation Organization stationed there. The invasion was successful in the
regard that all the PLO militiamen were evacuated out of the country, leaving the
Palestinian refugee camps defenseless, full of women and children. On September 15th
1982, the Israeli Defense Force invaded West Beirut, a Muslim stronghold, after the
assassination of Bachir Gemayel, Phalange party leader and Lebanese president-elect.
The next day on September 16th near dusk, Christian militiamen stormed the
Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila with IDF authorization, beginning the
infamous massacre. Continuing for 36 straight hours until the morning of the 19th,
Muhammad Faqih, a survivor, says "they didn't spare anyone; they killed everyone they
came across".1 On that morning, journalists arrived at the camps. What they saw shocked
the world. The cadavers of the elderly, women, and children littered the camps. Reports
that ”women and small girls were raped, sometimes half a dozen times, before, breasts
severed, they were finished off with axes," were commonplace. The justification of this
killing was that “women give birth to children and children grow up into terrorists.”
Casualty figures range from 800 to over 5000. A Phalangist commander revealed that only
“if they build a subway in Beirut”, the true figures will be revealed as countless people were
buried underground by bulldozers.2 This massacre was declared as the "worst atrocity of
Lebanon's 15-year civil war and perhaps during the entire Middle East conflict"3 While all
1 “Flashback: Sabra and Shatila massacres,” BBC News: World Edition, Jan. 24, 2002.2 David Hirst, Beware of Small States: Lebanon, Battleground of the Middle East (New York: Nation Books, 2010), 159.3 BBC News: World Edition, Jan. 24, 2002.
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this was happening, Israeli soldiers provided the militiamen with flares and other logistical
support. Finally, the Lebanese Army came on the 19th at noon, closing down the camps.4
Yosef Burg, the Israeli minister of interior and religious affairs, asked if that
“Christians killed Muslims - how are the Jews guilty?” 5 However, the Kahan Commission,
the Israeli state-sponsored commission, declared the Israeli Defense Forces were
“indirectly responsible” for the massacre.6 Many of the Israeli command were
“recommended to resign from their post”. The Kahan commission’s consequences were
clearly not enough. Ariel Sharon, the minister of defense, bore “personal responsibility”,
resigned from his post. He stayed in the government, eventually becoming Prime Minister.
Rafael Eitan, the Israeli Chief of Staff, became minister of agriculture and deputy Prime
Minister. Amos Yaron, Brigadier-General, was promoted, eventually obtaining the highly
prestigious position of military attaché to the US. 7 The militiamen that entered the camps
were granted amnesty by the Lebanese government. Elie Hobeika, a Phalangist leader,
became the Lebanese Minister of Water Affairs.8 Without bringing those responsible to
justice, what will deter events like this from happening in the future? That is why it is
important to discern responsibility for this massacre, leading to the research question “To
what extent is the Israeli Defense Force responsible for the massacre at Sabra and Shatila?"
4 Amnon Kapeliouk, Sabra and Shatila: Inquiry into a Massacre, Trans. Khalil Jehshan. (Washington: Association of Arab American University Graduates, 1984), 37.5 Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: The Abduction of Lebanon, (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press/Nation Books, 2002), 431.6 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 104 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the events at the refugee camps in Beirut- 8 February 1983, by Yitzhak Kahan, Aharon Barak and Yona Efrat, http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/mfadocuments/yearbook6/pages/104%20report%20of%20the%20commission%20of%20inquiry%20into%20the%20e.aspx.7 “Sabra and Shatila: Escaping Justice,” Al-Akhbar English, September 14, 2012.8 Fergal Keane, “Syrians aid ‘Butcher of Beirut’ to hide from justice,” The Telegraph, June 17, 2001.
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This will lead to a cleaner understanding of the untold context of the modern Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. It will shed light on an issue that has been obscured.
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Investigation
The Phalangists
The main party within the Christian military coalition called the “Lebanese Forces”,
the Phalangists had the most powerful Christian militia in Lebanon at the time of the
massacre. They are now generally regarded are the main perpetrators of the massacre.
Eyewitness reports corroborate this.9 The other Christian militia blamed, the South
Lebanon Army, was stationed far from Beirut, south of the Awali River. The relationship
between the SLA and the Phalange was too weak to coordinate a military operation. There
is a possibly of SLA deserters joining, but their numbers would be few compared to the
hundreds of Phalangists.10 Due to the amnesty of war crimes given by the Lebanese
government, some of the Phalange militiamen have now openly confessed to the killings.
They admit that they entered the camps, high on cocaine, hashish and alcohol for courage,
and “conducted a three-day orgy of rape and slaughter.”11 In the Kahan Commission,
instances when Israeli soldiers bore witness to the massacre are documented. For example,
Lieutenant Grawbowski, deputy commander of an Israeli tank company, saw the slaughter
of five women and children.12 The leadership of the Phalange said that the deaths were the
9 Leila Shahid, “The Sabra and Shatila Massacres: Eye-Witness Reports,” Journal of Palestine Studies 32 no. 1 (2002):36-58.10 Linda A. Malone, “The Kahan Report, Ariel Sharon and the Sabra-Shatilla Massacres in Lebanon: Responsibility Under International Law for Massacres of Civilian Populations."Faculty Publications, 587, (1985).11 Franklin Lamb, “Remembering Janet Lee Stevens, martyr for the Palestinian refugees,” Al-Ahram Weekly, May 12, 2010.12 Fisk, Pity the Nation, 444.
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result of “heavy fighting against terrorists.” That was clearly false as only two Phalangists
died in the fighting and around a dozen were wounded.13
Despite this evidence, the Lebanese government commission led by Assad
Germanos, the Lebanese military prosecutor, found the Phalange completely innocent.
According to the report, “there would be no prosecutions”.14 Instead, the IDF was blamed
for the massacre. However, the full report has never been published and has disappeared
from the archives of the Lebanese government. This report is described by the Montreal
Gazette as “a religiously partisan act” to evade responsibility15. In the interest of national
unity, the media did not want the Muslims to know that the Christians conducted a
massacre of Muslims.
However, some evidence exists that Phalange leadership may have been clueless
about the massacre. Barret, the charge d’affaires of the US embassy, called Amin Gemayel,
Bachir’s brother and a Phalange leader. Amin seemed clueless on whether the Phalange
was in the camps or not.16 However, it seems unlikely that the leadership of the party
wouldn’t know when over a thousand Phalange men were mobilized. Amin’s brother,
Bachir, had already planned on entering the camps.17
13 Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: a History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001, (New York: Vintage Books, 2001), 548.14 Morris, Righteous Victims, 547.15 Associated Press, “Lebanon’s Christians: Divided They Rule,” Montreal Gazette, September 22, 198216 Thomas Friedman, “The Beirut Massacre: The 4 Days,” The New York Times, September 26, 1982.17 Morris, Righteous Victims, 540.
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The Israeli-Phalange Relationship
The Phalangist has made it clear that they want the Palestinians to be evicted from
Lebanon. Two weeks before the massacre, an article where a senior IDF officer overheard
some Phalangists have a conversation was published in the Bahamane, the newspaper of
the IDF. Statements such as "You have no idea of the slaughter that will befall the
Palestinians, civilians or terrorist, who remain in the city" and "the question we are putting
to ourselves is - how to begin, by raping or killing" were made. Mossad, the Israeli
intelligence agency, reported that if the Phalangists had the “opportunity to massacre
Palestinians, they would take advantage of it.”18 They “heard things from [Bashir] that left
no room for doubt that the intention of this Phalangist leader was to eliminate the
Palestinian problem in Lebanon when he came to power—even if that meant resorting to
aberrant methods against the Palestinians.” 19 Reflecting their animosity, the Christians
wrongly assumed the assassination of their beloved president-elect Bachir Gemayel was
perpetrated by the Palestinians.20 The leadership of the Israeli Defense Force expressed
similar sentiments towards the Palestinians. Begin, Sharon and other members of the
leadership all share the feeling that “a good Arab is a dead Arab”. 21
Israel and the Phalange share very close ties and a very similar attitude towards the
Palestinians at the time. This relationship started at the beginning of the Lebanese Civil
War, where Israel promised to help the Lebanese Christians if they were ever in trouble.22
By 1982, Israeli command exercised significant control over the Phalange. One can define
18 Konrad Ege, “Mossad and the Massacres,” MERIP Reports 115 (1983): 33-3419 Thomas L. Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem, (New York: Anchor Books, 1989), 18820 Hirst, Beware of Small States, 156.21 Kapeliouk, Sabra and Shatila, 52.22 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 104 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the events at the refugee camps in Beirut- 8 February 1983,
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the Phalange as a proxy militia. According to Bachir Gemayel, the leader of the Phalange,
Ariel Sharon, Israeli Defense Minister, treated “[him] like a child”. 23 IDF Chief of Staff Rafael
Eitan said “that we could give them orders whereas it was impossible to give orders to the
Lebanese Army”.24 Since 1975, the Phalange had been receiving direct aid from Israel.25
The Phalangists were on Israel’s payroll. Israel provided the Phalange with weapons and
other military equipment such as uniforms.26 Uniforms given to the Phalangist bore a
striking similarity to the uniforms of the IDF. Only the seals on the uniforms differed.27 was
provided. Phalangist underwent world-class military training. Some Phalangists have even
trained inside Israel.28 In 2002, Elie Hobieka, the leader of the group that first entered into
the camps, wanted to go to court and charge Sharon of war crimes. He was assassinated in
a car bombing two days later after that declaration. Hobeika claimed that he had
“important revelations to make,” as that he was operating under orders during the
massacre. 29 Hobeika’s assassination means that his perspective on the massacre is forever
lost.
The Extent of Israeli Involvement
The Invasion of West Beirut
After the assassination of Bachir Gemayel, the Israeli Defense Force invaded West
Beirut, a Muslim stronghold, on September 15th. This was done under the orders of Sharon
23 Hirst, Beware of Small States, 15324 Kapeliouk, Sabra and Shatila, 59.25 Ege, “Mossad and the Massacres,” 33-3426 Fisk, Pity the Nation, 426.27 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 104 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the events at the refugee camps in Beirut- 8 February 1983,28 Amira Howeidy, “Remembering Sabra & Shatila, the death of their world,” ahram, September 6, 2012.29 BBC News, Profile: Elie Hobeika, (September 18, 2013).
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and Prime Minister Begin.30 Philip Habib, an American envoy, negotiated the Habib
Agreement where “the Israelis would not enter west Beirut if the guerrillas left.” Habib
received “specific guarantees on this from Bashir and from the Israelis.”31 With this
guarantee, over 12,000 Palestinian militiamen left Lebanon under international
supervision.32 However, fearing unrest, the IDF entered West Beirut on the “concern of
widespread civil violence.”33 General Eitan said this was “to prevent a Phalangist frenzy of
revenge.” To the US Special Envoy Morris Draper, Prime Minister Begin said invading was
necessary as “otherwise there would be pogroms.”34 Despite that, a pogrom still happened,
the massacre of refugees at Sabra and Shatila.
In the takeover of West Beirut, only a few minor exchanges of fire occurred. No
organized resistance was put up, probably due to the fact that the PLO men left. There were
seven Israeli casualties and a hundred Israelis wounded where there was allegedly two
thousand terrorists.35
The Israelis took control of West Beirut, including the refugee camps of Sabra and
Shatila. Israeli soldiers and tanks surrounded the camps on all sides. Morris Draper said to
Ariel Sharon, Israel’s Defense Minister, “You are in absolute control of the area, and
therefore responsible for the area." Entering and exiting the camps had to be done with the
30 Friedman, “The Beirut Massacre: The 4 Days”.31 Fisk, Pity the Nation, 400-401.32 Bayan Nuwayhed al-Hout, Sabra and Shatila: September 1982, (London: Pluto Press, 2004), 30233 Eqbal Ahmad, “The Public Relations of Ethnocide,” Journal of Palestine Studies 12.3 (1983): 31-4034 Institute for Middle East Understanding, “FACT SHEET: The Sabra & Shatila Massacre: 30 Years Later,” last modified September 16, 2012, http://imeu.net/news/article0023017.shtml. 35 Hirst, Beware of Small States, 154.
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permission of the IDF.36 Under the 4th Geneva Convention, Israel was “an occupying power.”
was obligated to protect the camp residents, “preventing the commission of ‘outrages’ and
barbaric attacks committed against them.” 37 The Israeli Defense Forces confiscated all the
weapons of the Muslim militias in West Beirut.38 This created a power vacuum that the
Israeli-armed Phalange would fill, leaving the Muslims powerless and the Phalange even
more powerful.
Earlier, the IDF asked the Lebanese Army to mop up the camps before they asked
the Phalangists. They didn’t comply, citing that they didn’t want to become an instrument
of Israeli policy.39 However, the IDF, Mossad, and LF command also convened in August to
discuss the “cleanup of the camp.” They decided back that the Phalangists “would take care
of extremist elements.” On September 12 and 13, Sharon and Bachir Gemayel, at a meeting,
"agreed on joint short- and long-term plans of action: Sometime toward the end of the
month, Israel and the Lebanese Christians were to uproot the remaining 'terrorist'
presence in West Beirut”. Even before Gemayel’s assassination, it was already well decided
Israel would invade West Beirut and allow the Phalange to enter the camps. Before the
Kahan Commission, Eitan testified that he and Sharon made the decision to allow the
Phalangist to enter the camps at a meeting on September 14th, two days before the
massacre.40 On the same day, Sharon discussed with the Gemayels about the need to avenge
Bachir’s death 41 Meetings later followed to strategically plan the operations along with
36 Friedman, “The Beirut Massacre: The 4 Days”.37 al-Hout, Sabra and Shatila, 300.38 Friedman, “The Beirut Massacre: The 4 Days”.39 Kapeliouk, Sabra and Shatila, 18.40 Morris, Righteous Victims, 540-54341 Linda A. Malone, “The Kahan Report, Ariel Sharon and the Sabra-Shatilla Massacres in Lebanon: Responsibility Under International Law for Massacres of Civilian Populations."
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Phalangist commanders.42 Eitan at one point told Sharon that “They’re thirsty for revenge.
There could be torrents of blood.” Later in front of the Kahan Commission, Sharon called
that “not one officer or intelligence official warned him at the time that sending the
Phalange into the refugee camps would result in a massacre.”43 Concerning civilians, the
Kahan Commission admits that they knew the Phalangist “battle ethics” were much more
barbaric than the IDF, especially with the history of massacres perpetrated in the Lebanese
Civil War.44
The Terrorist in the Camps
The Phalange was granted permission to enter the camp under the pretenses of
terrorists lurking within Sabra and Shatila. The supposed terrorists, the Palestinian
Liberation Organization militants, had left Beirut weeks ago. In a response to a complaint
from the Israeli government about these terrorists, the US government noted that there
were around a hundred PLO officials, assisting Palestinian families and transferring
Palestinian weapons to the Lebanese Army. There were a few dozen armed Palestinians in
the camps, but they were there for protection, allowed under the Habib agreement.45 Even
an intelligence officer told Yaron "terrorists don’t exist in the camp. The Sabra camp is
empty".46
42 Ahmad Al-Tal, “The Massacre of Sabra and Shatila in 1982,” Accessed September 21, 2013, http://www.mundoarabe.org/sabra_y_chatila_4.htm.43 Morris, Righteous Victims, 543.44 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 104 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the events at the refugee camps in Beirut- 8 February 1983,45 Fisk, Pity the Nation, 54746 Uri Avnery and Ha’olam Hazeh, “The Commission and the Evidence,” MERIP Reports 115 (1983), 28-32.
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A Phalangist soldier said, “We have waited for years to be able to enter the camps of
West Beirut. The Israelis chose us because we are better than they at this kind of house-to-
house operation."47 The IDF choose Elie Hobeika to lead this operation as a
counterterrorism expert. Hobeika has a personal vendetta against the Palestinians as they
murdered his family at the massacre of Damour. Hobeika was notorious for his atrocities
against Palestinians at Tet al-Zaatar and in South Lebanon. The Israelis trained him and
used him for missions. However, he began to receive a reputation for barbarism and the
Israelis dropped him, keeping him in reserve, until they called him for this operation. 48 The
IDF allowed this person who has a decorated history of atrocities against Palestinians into
the camps as a counterterrorist expert.
Furthermore, Elie Hobeika led only a few hundred militiamen into the camps
against the 2,000+ supposed terrorists with “modern and heavy weapons.”49 This number
discrepancy may suggest that the terrorists were a false pretense to allow the Phalange in.
Robert Fisk, a journalist that was on the scene, now compares these alleged terrorists to
the WMDs that were in Iraq.50 In contrast, the Kahan report repeatedly emphasized the
2,000 terrorists in the camps but there was no substantiated evidence that these terrorists
actually existed. 51Sharon declared that he had the terrorist’s names.52 American diplomats
assert that Israeli diplomats were deceptive and bullied them about these terrorists,
47 Kapeliouk, Sabra and Shatila, 40.48 Kapeliouk, Sabra and Shatila, 20.49 al-Hout, Sabra and Shatila, 304.50 Robert Fisk, “The Forgotten Massacre,” The Independent, September 15, 2012.51 Fisk, Pity the Nation, 54752 al-Hout, Sabra and Shatila, 304.
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allowing the IDF to enter into West Beirut.53 Furthermore, the Israelis were allegedly
"thwarting" the efforts of the Lebanese Army to take control of West Beirut.54
These terrorists didn’t exist. A nurse working at the Red Crescent said, “If we’d had
weapons, we would have resisted.” The wife of a PLO fighter testified that “If there’d been
fighters, all those things, which wouldn’t happen even in the jungle, wouldn’t have
happened”55 The number of Lebanese forces wounded or dead in the operation speaks to
the fact that there weren’t terrorists, as there was no significant resistance put up. 2
Phalangists died and around 12 were wounded during the massacre.56 The International
Commission, lead by Sean MacBride, found that the IDF could not “have estimated in good
faith that such a large number of fighters remained” and they had no reasonable grounds to
enter the camps.57
The Phalangist attitude towards the Palestinians and Elie Hobeika’s bloody history
against Palestinians has already been established. The Israeli command had full knowledge
of these two things. An Israeli soldier later admitted “some of them [Phalangists] affirmed
that they were planning to replace the camps with a zoo.”58 An Israeli proposal to second a
liaison office to the Phalange was turned down with the fear that “the Israeli army should
not get itself mixed up in atrocities”. General Yaron said, “we knew that they wanted to
destroy the camps.59 Despite that, Sharon testified to the Kahan Commission that “no
intention existed on the part of any one who acted on behalf of Israel to harm the non-
53 Seth Anziska, “A Preventable Massacre, The New York Times, September 16, 2012.54 Kapeliouk, Sabra and Shatila, 27.55 al-Hout, Sabra and Shatila, 42.56 Morris, Righteous Victims, 548.57 al-Hout, Sabra and Shatila, 307.58 Kapeliouk, Sabra and Shatila, 33.59 Hirst, Beware of Small States, 156.
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combatant population”60 In contrast, Morris Draper, the US envoy, said that it was
“complete utter nonsense” that the IDF were not able to predict that the atrocities of the
massacre would happen.61 This was a statement made by a representative of Israeli’s
closest military ally, a country that supplies Israeli with copious amounts of foreign aid.
Despite the possibility of pogroms, the IDF allowed the Phalangist into the camps.
IDF Brigadier General Yaron executed Order Number 6: “refugee camps [Sabra and Shatila]
are not to be entered. Searching and mopping up the camps will be done by the Phalangists
and the Lebanese army.”62 Eitan then “ordered the Phalangist commanders to effect a
general mobilization of all their forces, impose a general curfew on all areas under their
control, and be ready to take part in the fighting.”63 This statement reflects the extent of
control Eitan and the IDF held over the Phalangists.
“The Front Row At The Theater”
Instead, the Israeli soldiers watched. An Israeli soldier described the view from the
Israeli’s command post as like the “front row at the theater.”64 Israeli troop saw garbage
trucks filled with dead bodies.65 Thomas Friedman, judging from their reactions of disgust
to the massacre, says that some of the Israeli soldiers did not know the full extent of what
was going on in the camps.66 However, many of the foot soldiers had a clear view of the
60 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 104 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the events at the refugee camps in Beirut- 8 February 1983,61 The Accused, dir. by Fergal Keane (2001; BBC-1)62 Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem, 182.63 Linda A. Malone, “The Appointment of General Yaron: Continuing Impunity for the Sabra and Shatilla Massacres,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 32, (2000).64 Hirst, Beware of Small States, 157.65 Fisk, Pity the Nation, 450.66 Friedman, “The Beirut Massacre: The 4 Days”.
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massacre occurring, hearing gunshots and screams. The command was aware of the
massacre occurring. “Death pits” filled with bodies were clearly within the sight of some
Israeli soldiers. The first statement from the Israeli government was “As soon as the Israeli
Army realized what was happening, it called a halt to the killing of innocent people.”67 In a
press release, the Israeli government asserted “it is regrettable that the reaction by IDF
soldiers to such deeds was not always forceful enough to bring a halt to the despicable
acts.”68 However, Eitan on the 18th commanded the massacre to go on, as they would
continue "mopping up the empty camps south of Fakahani until tomorrow at 5:00 a.m., at
which time they must stop their action due to American pressure." 69
Israeli Support
There is a case to be made that the IDF actively aided the Phalangist in their
rampage through a number of ways, not just standing by and watching.
Furthermore, the IDF had orders to keep the refugees inside the camps, not allowing
them to escape. An Israeli field officer said, “I forbid any of you to intervene in what is
happening in the camps.”70 This reflected the official policy towards the events occurring
even with the knowledge that innocent civilians, not “terrorists, were being massacred.71
However, not all Israeli soldiers stood by watching the massacre. On an individual level,
some Israeli soldiers did help the residents of the camps. For example, one witness said, “If
67 al-Hout, Sabra and Shatila, 289-297.68 Morris, Righteous Victims, 549.69 Institute for Middle East Understanding, “FACT SHEET: The Sabra & Shatila Massacre: 30 Years Later,” http://imeu.net/news/article0023017.shtml.270 Hirst, Beware of Small States, 157.71 Richard Arens, “Israel's Responsibility in Lebanon,” Journal of Palestine Studies 12 no.3 (1983):102-108.
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it hadn't been for the Jews who came in here, all the women, girls and children would have
been killed.”72 This however, was the exception, not the rule.
Phalangist reinforcements were allowed into the camps by the IDF despite orders
barring so. Abu Nader, the Lebanese Forces chief of operations, was let in along with more
militiamen, allegedly to replace the first force that entered. However, both Hobeika’s group
and Nader’s group stayed in the camps, continuing the massacre.73 The peak number of
militiamen was 400.74
The Israelis also gave the Phalangists inside significant logistical support. The most
visible form of support was the illuminating flare. At the request of the Phalange, 81mm
mortars were sending illuminating flares to light up the way as the massacre began around
dusk. As the night drew on, Israeli Air Force airplanes would send even brighter flares.75
Ellen Siegel, a witness, described the sky with the flares to be like “noon in Arizona.”76
Supplies such as food, water and ammunition were given to the Phalange.
Journalists arrived on the scene, finding used-up boxes of Israeli M-16 bullets. US Army C
ration wrappers and chocolate wrappers with Hebrew markings were scattered over the
camps.77 Tired Phalangists would go to IDF posts for ammunition, water and food, with the
Israelis obliging.78
72 Fisk, Pity the Nation, 435.73 Morris, Righteous Victims, 545.74 Aude Signoles,”Sabra and Chatila - Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence”, Sciences Po Paris, accessed February 15, 2014, http://www.massviolence.org/Sabra-and-Chatila, 75 Morris, Righteous Victims, 543.76 Ellen Siegel and Barbee Lynne, "Inside and Outside the Hospital, People were Screaming: `Haddad, Kataeb, Israel-Massacre." Journal of Palestine Studies 12 no. 23 (1983):61-71.77 Friedman, “The Beirut Massacre: The 4 Days”.78 Leila Shahid, “The Sabra and Shatila Massacres: Eye-Witness Reports”.
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The IDF loaned the Phalangist bulldozers. These were lent on the request to destroy
roadblocks and barricades within the camps. The IDF knew that no roadblocks or
barricades existed within the camps as they had aerial photographs of the area.79 Instead,
they would be used to bulldoze down homes and create cemeteries for the refugees. The
Phalange attempted to cover up the Hebrew markings on the sides of the bulldozers.
Cadavers would be bulldozed into massive piles of sand with limbs sticking out. One pile of
around 90 bodies in Shatila was clearly visible with the naked eye from the Israeli post
near the Kuwaiti Embassy.80 The Kahan Commission said that only one bulldozer was lent
out but that was not true. 10 bulldozers later were used that night.81
Zaki, a witness, said that “'When we got near the Kuwaiti Embassy we were very
relieved because we saw Israeli soldiers and knew we would not be killed.''82 The refugees
were told to go to Sport City. At Sport City, the Israelis threatened the refugees, saying, "If
you don't cooperate with us, we will hand you over to the Phalangists."83 Mossad and Israeli
military intelligence helped the Phalangists interrogate men living within the camps.
During this time in Sport City, Israelis helped the Phalange execute some refugees and
hundreds of people mysteriously disappeared.84
Israeli support of the massacre can be summarized in 3 ways: the entrapment of the
refugees, logistical support, and interrogation/execution of the camp residents.
79 Kapeliouk, Sabra and Shatila, 33.80 Friedman, “The Beirut Massacre: The 4 Days,”81 al-Hout, Sabra and Shatila, 212.82 Friedman, “The Beirut Massacre: The 4 Days”.83 Nour Samaha, “Survivors recount Sabra-Shatila massacre,” Al-Jazeera English, September 12, 2012.84 Robert Fisk, “At Last the Truth About Sabra and Chatila Massacres,” CounterPunch, November 28, 2001.
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Conclusion
With regards to answering the question “To what extent is the Israeli Defense Force
responsible for the massacre at Sabra and Shatila?”, much evidence has disappeared,
obscuring the truth. The Germanos report has never been released. 3 separate Palestinians
investigations are nowhere to be found. The Kahan Commission has an unrevealed secret
annex.85 Elie Hobieka never got to testify to The Hague. Still, it is beyond reasonable doubt
that the Phalange played the greatest role in the massacre. A massive body of evidence
supports the assertion that the Phalange committed the overwhelming majority of the
violence. With the evidence available, Israel played a very significant role in facilitating the
violence.
The IDF is responsible to a greater extent than the “indirect responsibility”
delineated in the Kahan report. Planning days before in coordination with the Phalangists,
the IDF allowed them to enter Sabra and Shatila on the premises of non-existent
“terrorists”, with knowledge that the massacre could occur. Ze’ef Scheef, Israeli military
analyst, said “Whoever allowed the Phalangists to enter the refugee camps on their own
can be compared to one who allows a fox into the chicken coop and then wonders why the
chickens were all eaten.”86 Yet, the IDF leadership insisted on letting the militiamen into
the camps, leading to the massacre. From multiples levels of command, from foot soldiers
to the Minister of Defense, the Israeli Defense Force had full knowledge that the massacre
was happening. Instead of stopping it, they further facilitated the massacre by preventing
the residents of the camps from escaping.
85 Rosemary Sayigh "Seven Day Horror," AL-MAJDAL, March 2001.86 al-Hout, Sabra and Shatila, 314.
22
Furthermore, the Israelis offered all kinds of logistical support. Since 1975, the
Phalange has been suckling on the teat of Israel with Israeli salaries, and training. During
the massacre, the Israelis gave food, water, ammunition, flares and bulldozers with full
knowledge that the massacre was going on. Israeli intelligence helped execute and
interrogate camp residents. That is not “indirect” responsibility. That is an active role in
facilitating the massacre. Even Ronald Reagan, president of Israel’s closest military ally,
blamed the massacre on Israel.87 An international commission lead by Sean McBride agrees
with the fact that “Israel was involved in the planning and the preparation of the massacres
and played a facilitative role in the actual killings.”88
Allowing a massacre to happen in front of one’s own eyes and supporting it goes
beyond just mere negligence or “indirect responsibility”. Israel exercised a high degree of
control over the Phalangists in such a way that the IDF is in somewhat responsible for the
Phalangist’s actions. At this point, there is no distinction between direct and “indirect”
responsibility. The Israelis were in complete control of the occupied area. Under military
law and the Geneva Convention, they had to look out for the welfare of the occupied
citizens. They had a responsibility to the camp residents. That obligation was clearly not
met, as a massacre occurred. Declaring “indirect” responsibility seems like a way to evade
true culpability for the IDF’s actions. Instead, the IDF is clearly more than “indirectly
responsible.” The IDF is responsible for the massacre at Sabra and Shatila to a very
significant extent.
Word count: 3998
87 Shahid, “The Sabra and Shatila Massacres: Eye-Witness Reports”. 88 Edward Said, “Permission to Narrate,” Journal of Palestine Studies 13 no. 3 (1984):27-48.
23
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