The Parliamentary Reform Movement of the 1780s and the Catholic Question

The Parliamentary Reform Movement of the 1780s and the Catholic QuestionAuthor(s): James KellySource: Archivium Hibernicum, Vol. 43 (1988), pp. 95-117Published by: Catholic Historical Society of IrelandStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25487483 .

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James Kelly

The Parliamentary Reform Movement of the 1780s and the Catholic Question

The bulk of the penal laws against Irish Catholics, introduced in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, were repealed in two short bursts between 1778 and 1782, and 1792 and 1793. For most of the intervening decade-1782 to 1792 - there was no sustained attempt by Catholic interests to build upon the 1778 and 1782

measures, and the Catholic Committee, which had represented and articulated Catholic sentiment with considerable distinction since the 1750s,1-remained quiescent and played little part in political life. The frequent meetings, which were a feature of the early 1780s, were not continued; the committee met only eight times in five years after the election of new representatives in 1784-5, took few political decisions and

studiously avoided controversy.2 There were several reasons for this. First of all, those in power were unamenable. The Irish administration at Dublin Castle was dominated in the 1780s by figures unsympathetic to Catholicism like John Foster, the speaker of the house of commons, John Fitzgibbon, the attorney general, and John Beresford, the chief commissioner of the revenue, and they were afforded a receptive hearing by Thomas Orde, the chief secretary, and by the duke of Rutland, the lord lieutenant, between 1784 and 1787. As well as this, the challenge posed by the Rightboys

-

organised bands of Catholic peasants - in Munster in the mid 1780s to the forces of law

and order and their antipathy to the tithe, raised Protestant apprehensions and put both the Catholic church and the Catholic Committee firmly on die defensive. The church

was posed distinct pastoral problems by these developments, and was kept fully occupied trying to counter the anti-clerical tendencies implicit in the Rightboys' criticism of the level of dues demanded by priests, with countering the attacks made on the church itself by Protestant* propagandists as eminent as bishop Richard

Woodward of Cloyne,3 and with off-setting the damage done to morale by the

embarrassing conformity of Lord Dunboyne, bishop of Cork.4 The impact of the

Rightboy disturbances did not bear so heavily on the Committee, but the hysteria and

suspicion they engendered made the late 1780s distinctly unpropitious for renewed Catholic agitation.5 There was also a third reason, which it is the object of this paper to consider, for Catholic reluctance to embark in the mid and late 1780s on a campaign for Catholic rights: the ill-fated, perhaps precipitous, attempt by the proponents of

parliamentary reform in 1783-4 to secure the extension of the right of suffrage to

Catholics prompted a hardening of Protestant attitudes and disagreement within the

Catholic Committee between conservatives, who had controlled the movement since

1775, and liberals, who were anxious to press ahead with a campaign for political rights, and the Committee was intent on avoiding a recurrence of this.

* The term 'protestant' as used in this article refers to members of the main reformed churches.

'Presbyterian' and 'Protestant' are used to describe the specific denominations. 9H



ARCHTVIUM HIBERNICUM

I

The repeal of the legal inhibitions on Catholic purchasing and leasing land, and the extension to them of the right to found denominational educational institutions and to practice their religion without apprehension was a product of the relief acts secured in 1778 and 1782.6 They represented the breakthrough for which the Catholic

Committee's cautious declarations of the 1760s and 1770s had paved the way, though the measures themselves were a testimony more to the unique circumstances of the time than to effective lobbying. For all that, the Committee could look back in late 1782 with satisfaction on the improvement in the status of Catholics in the previous

decade. The bulk of the most onerous social and economic disabilities had been removed leaving only the political restrictions untouched, and the Committee felt under no compulsion to seek their removal. Certainly, its largely aristocratic

leadership had no intention of pursuing the matter vigorously. Led by the conservative and cautious Lord Kenmare, their strategy since the Townshend administration had been to appeal to the good will of Dublin Castle through moderately phrased petitions. They did not demand the removal of disabilities as a right but rather awaited voluntary and unforced concession. Throughout the patriot agitation of the late 1770s and early 1780s they were conspicuous in their assertions of loyalty and distinctly unenthusiastic about Anglo-Irish nationalist demands for free trade and legislative independence.7 The lengths to which the leadership of the Committee were prepared to go to manifest their loyalty is well illustrated by their offer in November 1781 of a ?40 reward for the apprehension of Mathew Carey, the author of a controversial pamphlet which demanded the 'immediate repeal of the penal code.'8 For their part, the patriots and theirallies, the Volunteers, were visibly unenthusiastic about Catholic calls for the dilution of the penal laws, as was made abundandy clear during the controversial debate on the 1778 relief bill. Attitudes began to soften somewhat thereafter, as more liberal officers, reflecting the broadening of public perceptions, came to prominence in the Volunteers and urged greater toleration. Influenced by this, Catholics began to join and to establish their own Volunteer corps, and by July 1781 they were so far accepted that only the gentlemen of counties Meath and Wexford refused to associate in arms with them.9 By the end of the year a further decisive breakthrough was achieved when a number of 'independent gentlemen', led by Luke Gardiner and Henry Grattan, supported a measure in parliament offering Catholics further relief from the penal laws.10 Within two months, the Volunteer delegates in convention at Dungannon had affirmed their support for 'the relaxation of the penal laws against our Roman Catholic fellow-subjects', and by mid-July the two Catholic relief acts of 1782 were on the statute book.11

The preparedness of the Volunteers at Dungannon and the patriots in parliament to advocate and support Catholic relief, and their expansive assertions of the need to include Catholics in the political nation12afforded the Catholic Committee the option of embracing a more radical alternative to their traditional reliance upon the paternalistic benevolence of the Irish administration and British government for relief. They could ally with the Patriots in the expectation that the force of Patriots

M.P/s in parliament and the Volunteers without would overcome all obstacles to the extension of political rights to Catholics. But this was not an option, which appealed to Lord Kenmare, the earl of Fingall, viscount Gormonston or other leaders of the existing Committee; their address to the duke of Portland on his arrival in April 1782 went no further than to declare their desire 'to participate more amply in the benefits

96



THE PARLIAMENTARY REFORM MOVEMENT

of a constitution we revere', while their address to earl Temple in September, was

similarly obsequious, and merely expressed the hope 'of being recommended in due time to further indulgent and favourable consideration'.13 Not all were willing to be so unassertive, however. Many, with the concessions in the professions and commercial sectors, who were 'thankful [for] but not satisfied'14

yielded in 1782, were eager, like their protestant equivalents, to press ahead with demands for political equality. For both, the next step was parliamentary reform, because both, excluded to a greater or lesser degree from the political process, perceived their recent gains as but a stage on the road to full political participation. Charles O'Conor of Belanagare articulated the point of view of Irish Catholics

impatient to throw off their remaining 'marks of servitude', when he argued that the

loyalty of Catholics justified the removal of the remaining restrictions barring access to the law and army, prohibiting voting and disallowing them become freemen of

corporations.15 The initial exhortions urging the reform of the Irish parliament followed rapidly

on the concession of legislative independence in May 1782. In late June and early July, addresses of loyalty from the Ulster and Connaught Volunteers included resolutions

fayouring 'a more equal representation of the people'.16 About the same time, Richard Lovell Edgeworth, possibly the 'very active emissary... from England' described by the lord lieutenant the duke of Portland,17 called for a reform of die Irish representative system to safeguard legislative independence. His view, which was shared by John

Jebb, a prominent proponent of radical reform in England who was in contact with the

patriot leadership, was that without a reform of the representative system, the small

clique of aristocrats which dominated the boroughs of Ireland could T)y degrees yield everything but the name of freedom, and.,. reduce you to the same subjection... you have so nobly shaken off'.18 This was a potent argument and allied, with the popular distaste for the 'servile tools of venal prostitution' whom it was argued returned and thus controlled 224 of the 300 M.P.'s in the house of commons, it struck a popular cord.19 There was, as yet, no movement and no platform, but the enthusiasm of the

popular press and the interest of the public persuaded the Volunteers of Munster and

Ulster to come out in support of reform. The latter were the more decisive. At a

meeting of delegates of 45 corps at Lisburn on 1 July, it was decided to appoint a

committee of correspondence to 'collect the best authorities and information on the

subject of parliamentary reform' so that a comprehensive programme could be brought before a convention of Ulster Volunteer delegates to be held in Dungannon in

September.20 Pursuant to this, a committee under die chairmanship of Colonel William

Sharman of Moira Castle approached a number of individuals of known liberal views in both Britain and Ireland for their sentiments on a range of matters relating to

reform.21 For present purposes, the most pertinent question concerned the extension

of the franchise because it forced the respondants to address directly what Dr. Richard

Price called Ireland's 'peculiar circumstances' - the fact that the numerically

preponderant Catholic population was governed by a minority whose religious affiliation was protestant and that the reform of this inequitable arrangement would

result in the transfer of political power of Catholics.22 Not unexpectedly, the English

respondants were more disposed to extend the franchise to include Catholics than were

the Irish.

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ARCIflVIUM HIBERNICUM

The 'radical duke' of Richmond, for instance, lived up to his reputation by recommend

ing 'the right of voting universally to every man not incapacitated by nature... or by law'.23 John Jebb and Major John Cartwright were in broad agreement. Jebb, born

and educated in Ireland, justified the extension of the franchise to Catholics on

principle, and argued that it was a logical consequence of the relief extended to them

in the previous years. Moreover, he went on, it would attach them irrevocably to the

state and detach them from Rome. Major Cartwright was less comprehending and,

consequently, more forthright in his advocacy of the same course.24 Others, with a

deeper appreciation of the potential pitfalls, were more circumspect. The earl of

Effingham expressed himself theoretically disposed to favour universal suffrage, but

he accepted it was impossible in Ireland and plumped instead for a moderate extension

of the franchise.25 Richard Price arrived at a recommendation not altogether different:

The principles of civil liberty and all the ideas of legitimate government imply that

the Papists (being the majority) have a right to share in the powers of government and to be chosen into public offices as well as to choose. B ut it cannot be said that

in the circumstances of Ireland, it is prudent or safe to admit them to the exercise

of this right. This therefore makes one instance in which the principles of liberty cannot in practice be carried their full length.

Price advocated the extension of the franchise to Catholics of means only, and the cut

off point to be set sufficiendy high to ensure the continued domination by protestants of parliament.26 Christopher Wyvill, the leading figure in the 'association' movement

seeking reform in England, agreed with Price. He recommended that the franchise

should be broadened, but only to 'that degree which may... be safely communicated'.

Anything greater would lead to the transfer of power to Catholic, the establishment of the Roman Catholic religion and, consequently, to religious animosity and

conflict-27

In sharp contrast to the generally useful and sympathetic responses forthcoming from the proponents of reform in England, the replies of the Irish politicians were

evasive and unhelpful. Described by one person close to the Ulster committee as

'poor, trifling, polite, short and unsatisfactory', neither Hood, Charlemont nor Grattan addressed the questions put to them and had nothing to say on the subject of extending the franchise to Catholics to which all three appear to have been ill disposed.28 This

was particularly true of Charlemont and Flood who disliked the suggestion in principle for the reasons identified by Christopher Wyvill: it would amount to 'a transfer of the

power of the protestants, a transfer of the constitution into [Catholic] hands', and any concession in this direction, no matter how small, would be the thin edge of the wedge leading to Catholic domination.29 Grattan's opinions on this subject were not so firmly held, but there is no evidence that his disposition to favour 'the relaxation of the penal laws' was sufficiently broad to embrace Catholic enfranchisement. What can be said of Grattan, can also be said of the body of protestant opinion for, notwithstanding the resolutions agreed at Dungannon in February 1782, it is all to easy to misinterpret protestant commitment to what Patrick Rogers has described as 'liberal sentiments' and M.R. O'Connell as a desire for 'conciliation' by taking events like the Dungannon Convention and the Synod of Ulster at face value.30 There were, indeed, some

protestants who considered further Catholic relief to be morally desirable. But they were overwhelmingly outnumbered by those for whom support for Catholic relief was

98




motivated by the narrow political objective of creating a strong and vocal demand for

parliamentary reform, and whose commitment to Catholic relief, given in the

optimistic conditions of 1782 and early 1783, was to prove very shallow when it became apparent that the further 'relaxation of the penal laws' meant the sharing of

political power.31 .

' ;

The most eminent and controversial advocate of the extension to Catholics of

political rights was Frederick Hervey, the earl of Bristol and bishop of Derry - an

eccentric and heterodox prelate,32 whose distinctive views stemmed from his individu alistic perception of Roman Catholicism. Based upon his experience of continental

Europe, Hervey maintained that there were two strains of Catholicism: there were

Papists who were characterised by their obedience and subservience to Rome, and there were gallicanists whose loyalty to Rome and the papacy was secondary to their commitment to the state. In Ireland, Hervey claimed, the latter predominated and, because of this, that the penal laws were a serious error of judgement:

All the errors in our Papist laws have proceeded from one fatal and > as yet unsurmountable piece of ignorance. The protestants here have universally concluded that every R[oman] Catholic is a papist, that is every man who was fool

enough to believe transubstantiation was wicked enough to hold no faith with heretics and to deny allegiance to his sovereign the moment that sovereign was excommunicated by the pope.

Having established this, Hervey went on to maintain that the religious and related

political cleavages in Ireland could be ameliorated if the penal laws were repealed in their entirety and gallicanism fostered within the Irish Catholic Church by close state

supervision of the appointment of Catholic ecclesiastics.33 This was an original, and

ultimately, influential point of view, but it was greeted with scepticism by protestants and suspicion by Catholics in Ireland in the 1770s and 1780s. Unabashed by this,

Hervey tookadvantage of his residencein Irelandin theearly 1780s to embrace radical

politics and to engage actively in 1783 in the agitation for parliamentary reform.

The earl-bishop of Derry was on his own in terms of what he hoped to achieve

by the repeal of the remaining disabilities against Catholics. Others supported Catholic relief for less ambitious reasons. The most articulate of these was William

Todd Jones, a landowner with a small estate, much reduced by family extravagance, in county Down. Of liberal inclination, Jones was captain of the Lisburn

Fusiliers corps of Volunteers and an activist in the Lisburn Constitutional Club and the

Belfast Freemasons, and it was on the strength of this liberal pedigree that he and

Colonel William Sharman challenged the earl of Hertford's nominees for the borough of Lisburn in 1783, and scored one of the most unexpected and noteworthy victories

of that election.34 Jones' position on the question of conceding the franchise tG

Catholics was an enlightened one, but he was too well aware of Protestant and

Presbyterian apprehensions to rely wholly on the potency of a case founded on 'justice and affection'. He averred in a 1784 pamphlet that 'policy and necessity' also

demanded that Irish protestants supported Catholic relief, because this was the price

of'winning Catholic support; without it there was no possibility of securing

parliamentary reform. What was more, he maintained that an alliance with Catholics

could be forged at a 'moderate' cost to protestants; only Catholics worth ?50 per annum

need be enfranchised, which would mean no more than 1,000 new voters and minimal

disruption to protestant domination of the political system.-35

99



ARCHIVIUM HIBERNICUM

Though Jones' argument was clinical, the minimum franchise he advocated was the utmost Catholics could hope for. 'Catholicus', an anonymous Catholic proponent

of relief, was more ambitious but he, too, accepted there were limits when he justified a ?10 qualification, on the grounds that the individual eligible on these criteria 'would be [as] thoroughly independent... as he of ?50'.36 Others did not want the question of enfranchising Catholics raised at all, because they perceived it would tear the reform

movement asunder.

William Drennan, an acute and perspicacious observer of Ulster politics feared that even to talk of the subject would weaken the movement by diminishing 'the strength of the Volunteers'.37 And his worst fears seemed realised when the proponents of moderate reform at the Ulster convention at Dungannon in September declined to

accept a resolution from the Lisburn corresponding committee asserting that 'the constitution could never be completely settled till the elective franchise was extended to persons of all religions', and insisted the question was left for the Grand National

Convention, which was scheduled to meet in Dublin in November, to decide.38 The Leinster provincial convention proved equally tersgiversatory, and it, too, side

stepped the issue to avoid a rancorous debate.39 This meant the reformers, on the

pretence of unity and the desire for unanimity, had not debated the singlemost contentious issue facing the movement prior to the Grand National Convention. Generalised resolutions, like those produced at Dungannon, ensured resounding acclamations for reform,40 but there was a high price to be paid. As one observant

delegate at Dungannon noted: many viewed with 'some uneasiness... the lengths' to

which 'they were going'.41 If the delegates at the provincial Volunteer conventions were uneasy with the

enthusiasm shown in some quarters for Catholic relief, their apprehensions would have been heightened if they had realised that the bishop of Deny had taken advantage of his visit to Dungannon during the Ulster Convention to initiate contact with the Catholic hierarchy via the local parish priest, James Dillon.

Eager to establish himself in his self appointed role of 'protector' of Catholic interests in Ireland and to secure the backing of the hierarchy, Hervey used Dillon as a channel to communicate his ideas to one of the leading Catholic prelates, John Troy, bishop of Ossory. 42Troy was distinctly unrcceptive, however, and for several reasons. First of all, he was loathe to involve Irish Catholics in support of a cause he expected to be

rejected and against which the Irish administration was resolutely committed, because it would involve Catholics in a potentially counterproductive contretemps with Dublin

Castle. As far as he was concerned, it was in Catholics interest to regulate their conduct

by the resolves of parliament and not to be influenced by 'a mere weather cock . ..

regarded by all parties as a mischief maker'43 Secondly, he was suspicious of Hervey's gallicanist sympathies, which he described to Dillon as 'absolutely irrcconcileable with our belief in the pope's supremacy'. Troy's advice, in short, was against succumbing to Hervey's blandishments and against Catholic involvement with the reform movement. It was his view that Irish Catholics should, 'from prudential circumstances', adopt and adhere to a neutral stance.44

The earl-bishop's overtures represent the sole recorded effort by principals in the reform movement to engage in dialogue with, or to win Catholic co-operation in the summer and early autumn of 1783. Troy's firm refusal to get involved, certainly provided the bishop of Derry with no cause for optimism. The Catholic Committee, too, remained discretely silent, and offered the reform movement no succour. This

100




was not in accordance with an overall Catholic strategy, however, because, the Committee did not meet to discuss the issue.45 The resultant confusion as to the attitude of Catholic opinion was to cause great uncertainty, as Robert Butler, a Committee member, reported to Lord Kenmare on the eve of the Grand National Convention. Unable 'to answer questions put to him . . . about their [Catholic] sentiments towards the ideas of the Volunteers and their delegates', and perceiving just how difficult it would be 'to manage between both parties to avoid offending the

Presbyterians and pleasing the others', he proposed a Committee meeting to discuss the issue.46 But it was already too late.

The participation of the Volunteers in the campaigns for free trade, legislative independence and renunciation between 1778 and 1783 had demonstrated the capacity of extra-parliamentary pressure to achieve legislative changes

- hence the

parliamentary reform movement's resort to the same tactics. The Catholic Committee

traditionally had eschewed such an approach, preferring to rely upon the good will of the British government and Irish administration. The parliamentary reform

movement, made this difficult and made it imperative that the committee should devise a strategy to deal with the preparedness of a largely extra-parliamentary and

protestant pressure group to espouse Catholic relief. Their failure to do this was to contibute directly to the confusion that was to arise about Catholic attitudes to relief, and to the problems that were to beset the Grand National Convention.

II The Grand National Convention of Volunteer delegates which meet in the

Rotunda in Dublin from 10 November to 2 December was comprised of delegates, 59 of whom were MJP.s, from all thirty two counties, who had as their goal the

formulation of a plan of reform for presentation of parliament. From the beginning, things did not go as planned, and the primary cause of disquiet was, as Drennan had

apprehended, 'the rock of religion and indulgence to Catholics'*7 The Convention had

just entered on its second day, and was beginning to tease out the implications of

Catholic suffrage, when the question burst into unexpected and controversial promi nence with the communication by George Ogle, a delegate and M.P. for Wexford, to

the assembly of:48 a letter from a Roman Catholic peer expressive of the sentiments of the Catholics

in general.. .that they had relinquished the ideaofmaking any claims further than

the religious liberty they enjoyed. This resounded like a clap of thunder on the assembled body, but since it was presented as an authentic and authoritative expression of Catholic sentiment, the Convention had

little choice but to terminate discussion on the contentious question of Catholic

suffrage. This delighted many in attendance, but for those reformers and Catholics

who had expected differently, this was a dramatic and embarrassing setback and the

only means open to them to get the subject restored to the agenda was to discredit the

message delivered by Ogle, which they sought to do at an emergency meeting of the

General Committee of Catholics that very evening. Chaired by Sir Patrick Bellew, a

landed gentleman from county Louth who was a friend of the bishop of Derry and who

was perceived by some as 'the true prophet1 of Irish Catholic opinion,49 the Committee

ratified three resolutions which aimed to undo the damage of Ogle's communication.

101




The first stated that the message presented to the Convention 'was totally unknown to and unauthorised by' the Catholic Committee, the representative organisation of Catholic opinion. The second affirmed their eagerness for 'the removal of our

shackles', while the third, though acknowledging 'gratitude' to parliament for 'every indulgence that may be extended to us', expressed more general thanks 'to our

benevolent countrymen for their generous efforts in our behalf. The second and third resolutions were not without ambiguity, but the three together invited the Convention to look favourably on the subject of the Catholic franchise, and this was reinforced by the decision that Bellew should present the resolutions to the earl of Bristol for communication to the Convention.50

The events of 11 November galvanized the Catholic Committee, which had been

singularly quiet on the subject of reform up to this, into rapid action. Moreover, its

interposition had been precipitated in a way that handed the initiative within the

organization to those who advocated greater assertiveness and facilitated the

assumption by Sir Patrick Bellew, who was disposed to the bishop of Derry's point of

view, of a leading role. This was confirmed on 15 November when a fuller meeting of the Committee again chaired by Bellew, and with Lords Gormonston and Killeen in attendance, reaffirmed the resolutions of the eleventh and declared that it alone was

'the medium through which the voice of the Roman Catholic's of Ireland has been

conveyed'.51 For Lord Kenmare, the leading Catholic peer, and the man whose opinions Ogle

claimed he was representing, this was an embarrassing time. Of great landed and

personal wealth with an income of well over ?10,000 per annum in 1783, tender

sensibilities, and conservative political beliefs that induced him instinctively to work with rather than against the Castle,52 he had little choice but to disavow the communication transmitted in his name to the Convention because he had not, in fact, written or authorised it This was a delicate task. He did not want to alienate either the administration or the Committee, but his difficulty was eased by the fact that the

guilty party - Boyle Roche -

stepped forward. Roche was Kenmare's cousin and he

normally served the peer in the capacity of go-between with the Casde. He was, in

straitened financial circumstances however, and eager to prove his worth to convince the administration to defray the expense of securing a seat in parliament,53 and this

appears to be the primary reason why he took advantage of his close acquaintance with Kenmare to fabricate the note reflecting his opinions, which he presented to Lord Charlemont and George Ogle

- two prominent members of the Convention hostile to

any suggestion of further Catholic relief. As well as this, Roche was a committed

Protestant, and he was anxious to sunder the alliance he perceived between the bishop of Derry and 'some of the unthinking part of the Catholics'. So, impelled by this dual

purpose, he resolved on his 'bold stroke ... authorised only by a knowledge of the

sentiments' of Lord Kenmare.54 It was, as we have seen, dramatically successful in its

impact on the Convention, and it would not have injured Kenmare's standing with the

Catholic Committee once Roche had confessed his part, had the earl, in denying responsibility, not confirmed that Roche represented his views accurately by affirming the sole right of parliament to decide on matters such as reform55 By

professing this, he excited suspicion among members and supporters of the

Committee, specifically in Dublin and Connacht, of his reliability to their cause.56 With the Convention split on the question of a Catholic franchise,57 the presen

tation on 14 November by the earl of Bristol of the Catholic Committee's resolutions

102




>f the eleventh, with their implicit affirmation of the Catholic desire for concessions, vas unwelcome. An Ulster delegate spoke for a majority when he maintained:58

that the great object was a parliamentary reform; he wished that religion had not been mentioned; from the papers on the table there was a difference of opinion in the Roman Catholics on the subject. How can we decide when they themselves are divided.

Recognizing the inevitable, the bishop of Derry accepted that for the moment it was better that the question of Catholic enfranchisement was dropped and referred back 'to the four provincial conventions for their further consideration'.59 With Henry Flood in the ascendant in the Convention, this was a wise decision because Flood had already affirmed his conviction, before the Convention's sub-committee, that to grant the right of suffrage to Catholics would be to undermine the constitution.60 As a result, the bill for a reform of parliament presented to the house of commons on 30 November included no reference to Catholic enfranchisement. It made no difference, however, as even this essentially moderate measure of 'protestant' reform proved unacceptable, and it was convincingly and intemperately rejected by parliament.

Ill For Irish Catholics, and specifically the Catholic Committee, the events of late

1783 had proved particularly stressful because they challenged directly the unity of

purpose which had, for some years past, been the hallmark of the Committee, and drove a wedge between conservatives and the rest. Much of the criticism that resulted was directed at Lord Kenmare, who was perceived in some quarters, as' a false prophet* whose 'false and insidious suggestions' had threatened the very issue of reform until

they were revealed for 'the fraud' they were by Sir Patrick Bellew, their 'trueprophet'.61 Bellew's own view was that the Catholics had behaved in a 'decent' and 'manly manner' and that this would be to their long term advantage,62 though there was little indication

of this on 2 December when the Committee met and engaged in a contentious debate on a motion, proposing that Catholics should withdraw from the Volunteers. Those

disposed to the motion who were on the conservative wing of the committee, seemed about to carry the day when John Keogh, a wealthy merchant of more radical views,

successfully countered with a call for an adjournment for a week. This gave sufficient

time for the opponents of the motion to rally support to reject it when it was re-raised.63

The subject seems to have been dropped at this point, but it illustrated once again that

there were two tendencies within the Catholic Committee: one content to rely on the

administration for relief and anxious to prove their loyalty at every opportunity; the

other wanting to take advantage of current circumstances and, specifically, the

Volunteer-led demand for reform to achieve further civil and political rights as

quickly as possible. As it happened, there was no place for Catholics of any hue in the reform

movement in the winter and spring of 1783-84. Dominated by moderates, most of

whom were hostile to conceding the franchise to Catholics, the reformers pressed ahead with a petitioning drive aimed at convincing parliament of the general public's enthusiasm for their cause. They proved unable to do this to any significant degree and

this phase of reform ended quite as ignominously in defeat in March as had the former

in December.64 Leading Catholics meanwhile, found themselves increasingly subject to overtures from Dublin Castle seeking their support. In December, John Keogh was

urged to co-operate with the Castle to detach Catholics from the Volunteers.65 He took

103




the contrary view, but others were not so unhelpful. Fr. Arthur O'Leary, a priest with a long record of co-operating with the administration,66 was reputedly responsible for the report that the bishops of Munster were planning an address to the king on the style of Sir Boyle Roche's communication to the Convention. This was not the case, but the

Munster bishops were generally recognized to be in the Kenmare mould and

James Butler, archbishop of Cashel, did, in a letter to Troy, in January express his

agreement with Kenmare's argument that 'the present was not a seasonable juncture for our people to be solliciting new favours from legislature1. This did not induce him to row in behind the administration, however, and he informed Troy, who was one of the firmest advocates of Catholic 'neutrality', that the bishops of Munster were as anxious as he 'to keep aloof from all intermeddling', and that it was his personal wish that the Catholic Committee refrained from 'interfering in the least' with the Conven tion.67

Non-intervention had much to recommend it to Catholic opinion in the tense days of 1783 and 1784, but it proved remarkably difficult to sustain as the reform pendulum oscillated between radicals and moderates. When the radicals effectively gained the initiative in April 1784, partly as a result of the administration's insensitive rejection

of Rood's second reform bill, and there was the prospect once again, as elements in the Catholic leadership quickly realised,68 of the reform movement advocating the extension of the franchise to Catholics, intense pressure was brought to bear on conservative Catholic opinion to rally behind the Castle. The advocacy by the

outspoken Volunteer Journal, a newspaper edited by Mathew Carey, who had been forced to flee the country in 1781, of Catholic enfranchisement, parliamentary reform and protecting duties, made it more difficult for Catholic leaders to resist rowing in behind the administration when parliament responded in a forceful fashion. With threats of violence, and rumours of assassination plots against members of the

administration, in which Catholics were reputedly involved, commonplace,69 elements of Catholic leadership felt obliged, to come out against disturbance and disorder.

There were well established precedents for this. The Whiteboys had been

publicly condemned from the altar on several occasions in the 1760s and 1770s, and as recently as 23 November 1783, Catholics in Dublin had been warned 'against joining in any tumultuous meetings or disorderly assemblies' following sometimes violent protests in the city about the state of industry.70 In 1784, the bishops of Munster were the first to come out against disorder when they exhorted 'their people to industry, sobriety and peaceable demeanour' at a meeting in Limerick on 1 May. If such a course

was followed, they were confident it would 'entitle them to further marks of the

legislature's kindness and protection'.71 This was hardly the explicit affirmation of the

supremacy of parliament the administration desired, but this declaration by the Munster bishops was but one of a number of initiatives taken by conservative Catholics in the early summer that dovetailed with the administration's efforts to restore order and to eclipse radical activists. Even the papal nuncio advised to that 'moderation' was more likely than 'uproar' to secure 'the best advantages1.72

The most overt attempt to rally Catholic opinion behind the administration was made by Lord Kenmare on 6 May when, at a specially convened meeting of the Catholic Committee, he informed the assembled representatives that the Castle 'ex

ceedingly disapproved of several late publications in the public prints which tended to spread the alarm of hostile intentions against the peace of this country and invite the natural enemies of the kingdom to invade the land'. This was a much more serious 104




allegation than had been made up to this and, to allay Castle fears, Kenmare proposed an address disavowing any Catholic complicity. He met with a hostile reception from those in attendance who perceived his suggestions as mere 'artifice'. The real purpose of his proposal, it was suggested, was 'to revive the old English cant of -

protestant interest - and Catholic interest - to divide and to destroy in this trying moment, when our country's all is at stake, to play off the Catholic of the south against the protestant of the north'73.

The Committee's disinclination to co-operate with the Castle, manifest in their rebuttal of Kenmare, was affirmed when they opposed the publication of the declaration of the Munster prelates of 1 May on the grounds that there was 'no foundation for suspecting their loyalty'.74 When Archbishop Butler was informed of

this, he apprehended that the efforts of the bishops of Munster to manifest Catholic

loyalty and to disavow disturbance were being stifled. He remonstrated forcefully with Troy about his and Archbishop Carpenter's support for the committee's decision on the grounds that it would, he alleged, re-establish 'the... discordance' which had existed in the 1770s between the Munster and Leinster hierarchies on the oath of

allegiance, and prove embarrassing in their future dealings with the Castle because die chief secretary, Thomas Orde, had already commented approvingly on a copy of the

Munster bishop's address he had received from Lord Kenmare.75 Evidendy, taken aback by the vehmence of Butler's attack on those 'hot-headed people' opposed to the

Munster address, and his fear that he would be perceived as approving 'inflammatory

proceedings', Troy felt obliged to justify the position taken by the Leinster bishops and the Committee. The recommendation that the Munster bishops' declaration should not be published, he explained, rested solely on grounds of'expediency'. Ther

was no question of any bishops in the kingdom not agreeing 'zealously' with th sentiments therein, but the current situation was such, that it was liable to' be construed

in^o a condemnation of a numerous and powerful party in the three kingdoms, with

which it is our interest to be on good terms, while their mode of asserting their civil

rights does not clash with the allegiance and rspect due to... government'. Moreover, it publication would, 'alarm and irritate theR[oman] Catholic laity, thro 'the kingdom1 and produce 'encreasing division' within die Catholic community which it was the

object of the Committee to prevent.76 With the Committee, and the majority of bishops for the moment at least, resolved

to steer an independent course between the administration and the reform movement,

prudence and caution became the watchwords of Catholic opinion.77 The reason for

this was a desire to check and heal the divisions highlighted by the Kenmare letter.78

This proved no easy task because neither die administration nor the parliamentary re

formers were prepared to assent to this attempt at disengagement, and both persisted with their efforts to secure Catholic support in the belief that it would decisively

strengthen their position. The initiative, such as it was, lay with the advocates of reform in the summer of

1784. They had revitalised the movement at the end of May with die publication of a

requisition calling for a 'general meeting of the freemen, freeholders and inhabitants

of the city' of Dublin on 7 June.79 Though the meeting and its outcome was determined

by Napper Tandy and William Todd Jones, the resolutions ratified by the meeting

represented a forthright restatement of the need for parliamentary reform and a

reaffirmation of the radicals commitment to Catholic suffrage. The resolution urging the enfranchisement of Catholics was the only one at the meeting not carried

105




unanimously, however, and as ratified was not without ambiguity, since it proposed on the one hand 'to extend the right of suffrage to our Roman Catholic brethern' and on the other, to preserve

' in its fullest extent the protestant government of this

country'.80 It is not clear what precisely was meant by this, but it was probably couched in these terms to minimise protestant apprehensions. It certainly did not scare off

Catholic participation as no less than four of the more radical spirits on the Catholic Committee - John Ball, Richard McCormick, John Keogh and Ignatius Weldon - were active reformers. Indeed, Ball and Weldon were members of the committee of thirteen which had responsibility for ensuring delegates were elected to the Reform Congress which was scheduled to meet on 25 October in Dublin.81

Though the radical reformers perceived obvious tactical merit in advocating Catholic suffrage, the experience of 1783 had convinced them of the merits of

circumspection. This was warranted because influential figures in the movement like

Henry Joy and William Drennan were unwilling to cede the franchise to any Catholic worth less than ?50.82 There is, indeed, evidence of greater discretion on this issue all round, as the address to the king and people of Ireland approved in Dublin on 21 June illustrates, it contained no explicit reference to the franchise -

merely to 'constitutional rights and privileges' and to 'emancipation from restraints'.83 Because

of this deliberate masking of differences, many contemporaries, especially those who were hostile, and some historians, notably Patrick Rogers, have been mislead into

interpreting events in 1784 as manifesting a grand alliance of Roman Catholics and

Presbyterians working in tandem to achieve reform.84 There is no hard evidence for

this, and such that points in that direction is insufficient to substantiate even an ad hoc

arrangement between these two religico - political ethoi. The Catholic Committee -

the representative voice of Catholic opinion - preserved a discrete distance between

it and the reform movement though individual Catholics did participate actively, while

Presbyterian support for the extension of the franchise to Catholics was too tactical to attest to any union of hearts or intellect, though here again individuals, both clerical and lay were active in the movement

The advocacy by the radical reformers in 1784 of a moderate extension of the franchise to Catholics, though cautiously espoused, did not shelter the movement

from harsh and often unfounded criticism. The Irish administration signalled its disap proval with a barrage of hostile comment in its subsidised press. The Volunteer

Evening Posty one of the leading Castle papers maintained that if Catholics were

yielded the right to vote, parliament, too, would become Catholic. The same paper was less sensitive in assessing the motive of the reformers, which was it alleged to

introduce Catholics to power at any cost, if necessary, 'over the slaughtered carcasses of the most loyal and peaceable class of people in the British empire'

- Irish Protestants.85 By way of contrast, the comment directed at Catholic opinion was moderate in tone, reflecting the desire of the administration to persuade the Catholic

leadership to support it against the combination of 'faction, tradesmen and needy adventurers' that constituted the reform movement.86 It seems, indeed, as Thomas

Barnard, bishop of Killaloe pointed out, that the administration was more alarmed by the 'cool policy of the Roman Catholicks' at this point than the public activities of the

reformers, because they perceived Catholic 'forbearance' to be a tactical device 'to further other pretensions, including admission to the army, revenue and law".87

This was the hope of some Catholics, indeed, but these expectations and the reform demand itself were dealt a 'serious blow' when Lord Charlemont, at a Volunteer

106




review in Belfast on 12 July, rejected an address moved by Todd Jones because it included an expression in favour of the extension of the franchise to Catholics. Such

a suggesion, the earl argued, was counter-productive; it would 'fatally clog and impede the favourite purpose

- a reform in parliament' and could 'plunge this county into the most serious calamities'.88 Charlemont's rejection of reform, as espoused by the radicals, was unexpected and it represented a serious setback to the movement, It all but silenced the advocates of radical franchise reform in Ulster, inhibited Volunteer

participation, and brought to a dramatic halt the impetus in the province favourable to the resolutions of the Dublin Aggregate Committee which had seen them accepted at a public meeting in Belfast four days earlier.89 To make matters worse, Charlemont was not content to utter his warning at Belfast. Aided by William Campbell, the

Presbyterian minister at Armagh, who strongly disapproved of the 'wild heads' among his co-brethern active in the reform movement,90 and William Brownlow,who was

M.P. for county Armagh, the 'Volunteer-earl' went from one review to another

rallying support for his position and detaching the Volunteers from the cause. He was

enormously successful; his warnings activated deeply held Presbyterian suspicions of Catholicism and he was triumphant at every meeting.91

The radicals tried to counter Charlemont's message, but they possessed little of the 'Volunteer-earl's' eminence or authority. Todd Jones and the liberal Dublin

attorney Peter Burrowes drafted replies strongly asserting the right of Catholics to

participate in political life.n The bishop of Derry weighed in with a 'flagitious address' to the Newtownards Reform Club, but he was a spent force in Irish politics,93 and

besides, nothing the reformers could do could compensate for the loss of the Volunteers or restore their dissipating momentum. The persistence of disturbance in the city of Dublin, which the Castle attributed to the reformers and their Catholic allies

whom they alleged were engaged in negotiations with the French to foment a

rebellion,94 also took its toll. Indeed, the movement lumbered from crisis to crisis in the late summer and autumn as Charlemont's warnings stimulated further importan and embarrassing defections: Sir Edward Newenham, M.P. for county Dublin abandoned reform because of its promotion of Catholics demands,95 while Richard

Griffith, M.P. for Askey ton, declined to accept a nomination to the Reform Congress from the people of Lisburn on the grounds that if he agreed, he would be committed to support Catholic enfranchisement, and he could not do this because he perceived it

as the first step towards Catholic domination.96

Their hopes dashed by their inability to convince moderate protestant opinion to

support the enfranchisement of Catholics, andby theirfailure to persuade theCatholic Committee to commit itself publicly either way,97 the leaders of reform began to have

second thoughts about their strategy. William Bruce, minister atLisburn and a leading proponent of reform in Ulster articulated the feelings of many when, in early

September, he confessed himself sickened by:98 the approaching disunion and disagreement among protestants, or rather the

irreconcileable animosity of protestants and Papists, for nothing will be done for

the Roman Catholics, and their conduct at present signifies that the consequence of the dissappointment will be deadly hate and rerum novarum cupido.

Within a few weeks his position had hardened. He informed George Tandy at the end

of September that he could only countenance conceding the franchise to those

Catholics 'whose fortune... afford a reasonable security for thepurity of their political conduct and a strong presumption that they are... free from such vulgar prejudices

107




as are inconsistent with a free and independent constitution'. He could not, he asserted,

support anything less than this, because he would 'never ... consent to subject the friends of his country to . . . risk even to secure a parliamentary reform'.99 The

controversy over votes for Catholics dragged on, and the longer it did the more eager Bruce became to get rid of the issue. On 7 October, he opined that the only way to revitalise reform was to disembarrass it of the Cathohc question:100

The Popish question has been [given] a fair trial; its friends have made a vigorous experiment. They now find that it cannot be carried. It must not therefore clog our refom any longer. We must occupy our old ground and protestants will be unanimous again.

Drennan, who was a close correspondent of Bruce, was in broad agreement with this, while in Dublin, the indominitable Napper Tandy reluctantly accepted that there was no alternative but to convince 'the Roman Catholics to renounce their pretensions to a right of suffrage' if the reform movement was to survive.101

The administration, meanwhile, observed the reform movement wrestling with its difficulties with ill-disguised satisfaction. They were aware that it was Catholic policy to 'take no part either way in this contest between the government and the people'

because they reckoned they 'always gained something in the end by such contests' but

they remained anxious to win them to their side.102 Nothing had come of their earlier

soundings of Catholic opinion or of their efforts to impress their disquiet on the Catholic leadership during the summer,103 but undaunted Orde tried once again in

September. This time his object was to secure the signatures of prominent Catholics for an address of loyalty to the king in order to emphasize the distance between

Cathohc opinion and Presbyterian radicalism, and there were no scarcity of individuals willing to lobby leading Catholics. Few were successful, however. Lord

Dunsany, who had already sought to persuade Lord Killeen (son of the earl of Fingall) to abandon Volunteering,104 was unable to convince either Fingall or Killeen to sign the

address. This was in accordance with Catholic Committee policy and a meeting at Sir Patrick Bellew's home in county Louth in September attended by Lords Gormonston,

Fingall and Killeen reaffirmed 'the determined resolution of the Roman Catholicks not to declare their sentiments upon this or any subject that may regard government..; they resolved early in a body, not to medle (sic) one way or the other'.105 Judge Baron

Hamilton was more successful. He sought to convince Denis Thomas O'Brien, a

prominent industrialist and Catholic Committee member, and Robert Caddell, a landed gentleman from Balbriggan who was also on the Committee, 'of the policy and

prudence of their renouncing the Presbyterians and disavowing any share in their

proceedings' and was certain he had persuaded both by early October.106 The ever

willing Boyle Roche easily divined Lord Kenmare's hostility to the 'insignificant desperadoes', he maintained, constituted the reform movement,107 while Charles Val

lancey tried to win over Charles O'Conor who was loquacious on Catholic 'loyalty to a monarch who restored them to privileges which before the late emancipation they had not enjoyed in any period for two hundred years'.108 The figure of greatest concern to the administration, was Sir Patrick Bellew. Characterised in one hostile report as

'quite over-run with bigotry and superstitions*,109 Bellew was perceived by the

administration, which was anxiously gathering information on him, as a restless,

grasping Cathohc. The duke of Rutland, the lord lieutenant, was of the view that he carried 'his ideas of mischief as far as any Catholic in Ireland',110 while John Foster, the chancellor of the exchequer, attributed Bellew's transformation from 'as contented

108




a subject as any of Ireland..' into' a zealous wisher for a changer in our constitution', eager to secure Catholics access to the army, the law and the franchise, to the bishop of Deny.111

Prospects for administration's diplomatic blitz on the leaders of Catholic opinion seemed promising in early October. Hamilton's efforts to win over the manufacturers and gentry in north Dublin offered especial hope. The nucleus of Committee members he had established contact with - Denis Thomas O'Brien, Robert Caddell and John Comerford, O'Brien's business partner

- were agreed that Catholics should disassociate formally from Presbyterian reformers.112 They were so convinced by reports emanating from die Castie that it was 'unable any longer to resist the

importunate alarms of the principal Protestants', as a consequence of Catholics

permitting 'improper use ... to be made of their names for extremely offensive and unwarrantable expectation', that they promised at one point in early October that Lords

Fingall and Gormonston and Sir Patrick Bellew 'would act properly'.113 Some of Orde's informants believed so too.114 But it transpired that Caddell, who had succumbed to Hamilton's blandishments more completely than any of the others, was unable to deliver for at a meeting attended by Fingall, Bellew and Wogan Browne of

Mount Browne, as well as O'Brien and Comerford, he had to argue the case for Catholic co-operation with the administration on his own and he 'had not eloquence enough to persuade'. Instead, the meeting reaffirmed, once again, Catholic commitment to non-intervention on the grounds that since it was agreed 'not to meddle with a constitutional question', even adeclaration of loyalty would T)e taking a part',115

With the failure of this initiative, the administration's switched it's focus to the more amenable figures of Lord Kenmare and Archbishop Butler, but they were not

forthcoming either. Butler, in particular, was angered by the allegations currently being levelled at Catholics in the Castie press which equated their conduct with the activities of the Dublin mob and, specifically, with disorder and unruliness.116 Was

not, he argued passionately, the oath of allegiance of 1774 sufficient proof of the

loyalty of Catholics.117 Lord Kenmare made the same point, but he was more

contemptuous of the Dublin mob. Speaking on behalf of Lord Cahir, Robert Butler and many other 'gendemen' opposed to reform, he dismissed the proposal to grant Catholics the vote 'as a bait laid by our enemies to embroil us with government' and he went on, in his characteristically disparaging fashion, to derogate those disposed to

reform in Dublin as 'liscentious scribblers' highly meritous of punishment, and their actions as 'the irregular conduct and impertinent resolves of many shopkeepers'. All this was sweet-sounding in the administration's ear, but Kenmare's criticisms of die

misrepresentation of the motives of Catholics by Protestants 'very near to his grace' [Rutland] was so startlingly direct that it bode ill for close co-operation along the lines

desired by the administration. Respectable Catholics were not, Kenmare insisted, either 'connected with the factious and democratical leaders' who directed the reform

movement, or 'aiming ... to subvert government', and those who made such

allegations could only be motivated by desires of'resentment and opposition' activated

by their regret at 'the loss of [the] unbridled tyranny' they could exercise over their

neighbours and tenantry while the penal laws were on the statute book.118

Though they had again failed to convince the leaders of Catholic opinion to

manifest their disapproval of the reform campaign and related civil disturbances in

Dublin, the Castle still did not give up. If anything, their anxiousness was intensified rather than lessened by these recent contacts with Catholic leaders. The chief

109




secretary, Thomas Orde, was especially surprised to divine from Boyle Roche's

correspondence with archbishop Buder and Lord Kenmare, whom he had firmly categorised as representing the conservative, co-operative and undemanding wing of Catholic opinion, that they were not content with the concessions yielded in 1782. He concluded that Kenmare was 'by no means free from expectations' in the realms of the

law, army and medicine, and his opinion of him disimproved significanUy. He now described him as of'the same mould as Bellew only less exigent'.119 Orde was rapidly coming round to the view that with the challenge of the 'nonsensical assembly calling itself a congress' firmly dispatched, the major danger to the establishment was no

longer the reformer's demands but Cathohc pretensions, and this perception was reinforced by reports of a substantial and growing Catholic presence in the

Volunteers.120 A secret, but incomplete, return of the Volunteers made in November

put the Catholic element at between 33 and 44%, 121while reports from worried

gentlemen in south Ulster of attemps to arm Catholics in county Armagh and of wholly Catholic corps being formed in county Monaghan convinced the administration that the time had come to press for their disbandment.122 More perturbing still were rumours linking Catholic infiltration of the Volunteers with the Castle's bete noir -

Sir Patrick Bellew.

Spurred on by this, and perturbed by their failure to secure adeclaration of loyalty from Catholics or to divine precisely their objects, the administration's suspicions of

Bellew continued to grow in the early winter of 1784. By the end of October, Orde had concluded, on the basis of information received, that Bellew's object for Irish

Catholics was no longer simply the vote but 'full participation of every right of

citizenship', and that he was a menace because of 'his great influence among those of that religion'.123 Within two weeks, even this was a relatively mild assessment for the current rumour was that Bellew, having placed 'himself at the head of the Popish interest', was the eminence grise behind their supply with arms, reports of which were

prolific, if unsubstantiated, in November.124 Because of these rumours and reports, the administration persisted in its efforts

to secure a declaration of loyalty from the Catholic leadersip. In his response to

Kenmare's forceful letter of 23 October, Orde referred specifically to the 'uncautious

expression of some of the Roman Catholic gentry' and to the 'uncertain motive to

continuing or increasing of armaments', and requested a declaration from Catholics of:125

their sense of satisfaction in the release which they have experienced from many restrictions and their resolution to depend solely upon the favour of that

benevolent spirit to which they have already been so much obliged. This overt attempt to consign Catholics firmly to an inferior position relying on the

good will of the Irish administration and parliament was frostily received, and there was no early response from Kenmare. The chief secretary was persistent, however.

Anxious to isolate the 'Bellew faction' in the Catholic Committee, he utilized Boyle Roche once again to inform Lord Kenmare and archbishop Butler of the 'unpleasant

symptoms' emanating from the Bellew camp, while Daniel McNamara, the

Committee's representative in London, informed Lord Gormonston, who was more

moderate than Kenmare, that Bellew was officially considered 'amongst those of the

persons non grata'.127 This pressure to disown Bellew had some effect, but it did not

result in either a declaration of loyalty or the eclipse of Bellew. As far as the Committee was concerned the administration was exaggerating Bellew's radicalism. Lord

no




Gormonston, his neighbour, had no doubts that the allegations were unfounded and

the Committee, as in previous instances, found no difficulty in closing ranks and

presenting a united front Some moderates, led by Viscounts Dillon and Fingall and

Lord Killeen, were willing to meet the administration's request for an address to the crown and, according to one report, did make a proposal to this effect to the General

Committee but it was opposed by the majority,who were described by Dillon as 'hot headed violent men'.128

The Committee thus adhered to its resolution not to intervene on the issue of

parliamentary reform. Not everybody could go along with this, however. Myles Keon,acountry gentleman 'of somebutnotmuch property in county Leitrim'who was

identified as having 'great weight with those of his persuasion' in Connacht, attributed Catholic 'hesitation' to address the crown to the delicacy of their situation. He sought to secure a suitable formula for presentation to a provincial meeting of Connacht

Catholics, but made little progress. Part of the reason for this was Charles O'Conor's dismissal of the proposed address as sychophantic, but the decisive factor was

reluctance to infringe the authority of the Committee. Indeed, despite the administration's best efforts, the only body of Catholics to come forward with an

address along the desired lines were the Catholics of Dundalk. They alone accepted

publicly that parliament should be the source of future indulgence to Catholics.129

IV With the failure of its efforts in the winter of 1784 to secure the requisite

declarations of loyalty, Dublin Casde ceased to lobby for Catholic support against reform. They no longer feltitnecessary,as the poor attendanceat the Reform Congress and the evident fall-off in public interest, together with the cessation of disturbance in

Dublin, greatly reduced their apprehensions. For their part, elements of the reform

leadership remained defiant in defeat and, as the administration turned its attention tc

Pitt's commercial arrangement, sought to relaunch the movement minus the

controversial proposal for Catholic enfranchisement. This subject was barely considered by Congress, where attention was concentrated on uniting 'the great body of the protestants without offending any description of the inhabitants of Ireland'.130 It was by no means successful, and the movement would in all probability have faded

quickly from view had it not been given a final and brief fillip by a remarkable

pamphlet written by William Drennan in which he persuaded and cajolled Protestant

sympathisers into activity by arguing that the reform demand could now be pursued without reservation because Catholic enfranchisement was no longer an issue.131 In

Drennan's estimation, it had been a mistake to propose voting rights for Catholics in

1784 because this 'supplied the enemies of reform with the means of warding off the

otherwise irresistible impulse of public opinion'. Furthermore, in a classic illustration

of just how deep-seated was anti-Catholic prejudice among Irish Presbyterians in the

1780s, he maintained Catholics needed 'time to enlarge their minds and meliorate their

hearts into a capability of enjoying the blessings of freedom'132 - an inherently

protestant perception which illustrates the deep gulf in understanding between the two

ethoi at a time when their enemies perceived them to be in alliance.

For the Catholic Committee, this last fitful stage of the reform movement posed no problems. Ignored by the reformers and Castle alike, they found no difficulties in

pursuing their now established policy of non-intervention. This was undoubtedly welcome relief, for the reform issue had exposed strains and highlighted differences

in




within Catholic opinion the Committee would have preferred to have kept concealed.

Essentially, these differences centred on whether Irish Catholics should continue to follow the policy evolved in the early 1770s of supporting the administration and of

relying on its goodwill for relief, or whether it should adopt a more populist approach of the kind so successful in achieving free trade and legislative indpcndence between 1779 and 1782.

Torn between the traditionalists', as illustrated by Kenmare, reliance on the benevolence of the administration and the more restless and primarily middle class desire for involvement, the Committee compromised with non-intervention because it was the only alternative to a split. It was, in many ways, a good choice and it served the Committee well. It certainly facilitated the Committee's recovery from the

embarrassing debacle of November 1783 when both the spurious message attributed to Kenmare and his actual sentiments delivered on 20 November, asserting that

Catholics would rely on the good will of parliament for further relief from the penal laws, and the resolutions of the Committee of 11 and 15 November chaired by Sir

Patrick Bellew, which took a more forceful view, highlighted important differences. These differences should not have became public and would not have, had a

Committee meeting threshed out a Catholic position on reform prior to the Grand National Convention, but once it had been decided not to intervene, the Committee adhered steadfastedly and successfully to this policy. It was able in this way to ensure

its survival, pretty much unaltered, as the representative body of all Catholics. The

great merit of this stance was its flexibility: individual Committee members could

support or oppose reform without involving the Committee. Thus one finds figures like Weldon, Keogh, Ball and McCormick active in the reform movement in mid 1784,

and Lord Kenmare, a short time later, aiding the Castle interest in county Kerry resist the nomination of delegates for the Reform Congress.

But if the Committee successfully staved off the nightmarish prospect of schism, it did so at the cost of distancing itself from the Irish administration. This was

important, for in the absence of popularly based agitation, it reduced the prospects of relief and it was no coincidence that there was no measure for Catholic relief between 1782 and 1792. A combination of factors, as explained at the outset, account for this,

but disaffection with Catholic conduct in 1783-4 was very significant. In order to

appreciate this fully, it is important not to confuse the Catholic position in 1784 of non

intervention with neutrality. It is not always easy to distinguish the difference,

especially since one of the best sources of Catholic strategy - bishop Troy of Ossory

- was an avowed proponent of 'neutrality', but they clearly mean different things.

Neutrality meant treating the reformers and the Castle equally, which is what the

Committee did do in so far as it declined to come out publicly in favour of either side. On the other hand, Catholics were not neutral in their attitude to the reformers'

advocacy of their enfranchisement; they wanted further relief, even the most

conservative of them as Orde gathered in October 1784, and they were not prepared to discourage individual Catholics from advancing this cause if they did so outside the

Committee. As a result, the failure of reform did not leave Irish Catholics unscathed. There was to be precious little good will shown them by the administrations of either the duke of Rutland (1784-7) or the marquis of Buckingham (1787-90) and no

improvement of their civil liberties until the 1790s. What is more, the differences within the Committee between those who favoured relying on the good will of the

administration and those who were disposed to agitate for Catholic rights did not go away. In March 1785, a proposal by archbishop Butler to the effect that Catholics

112




should leave the Volunteers but also calling for further relief 'consistent with the

constitution' was supported tjy ali the men of landed property', including, it should be

noted, S ir Patrick Bellew, but was defeated 28 to 25 by the advocates of more forthright

political involvement led by John Keogh.133 This division, like the differences manifest in 1783-4, foreshadowed the split in 1791 when Kenmare and his followers seceded because of their opposition to a forceful line. This did not immobilise the

movement, as feared in the 1780s; Catholics secured major advances in their civil and

political rights in the 1790s not just because they resorted to pressure group politics, but it is unlikely that they would have achieved so much if they had not engaged in such actions.

Notes 1. See Maureen Wall, The activities and personnel of the General Committee of the Catholics of

Ireland, 1757-84' (U.C.D., M.A.thesis 1952) passim 2. R.D. Edwards, ed., 'Minute book of the Catholic Committee, 1773-92', Archivium Hibernicum,

ix(1942) pp. 92-113.

3. IS. Donnolly 'The Rightboy movement, 1785-88', Studia Hibernica, 17 & 18 (1977-8)pp. 120-202.

4. See John Kingston, 'Lord Dunboyne', Reportiwn Novum, iii (1963-4) pp.62-82. 5. The Whiteboy disturbances of the 1760s had the same effect on the fledgling Catholic Committee,

Wall, op.cit., p.xvi. 6. For this see R. Burns, The Catholic Relief Act in Ireland, 1778', Church History, xxxii(1963); E.

O'Flaherty, The Catholic question in Ireland, 1774-1793* (U.C.D., M.A. thesis, 1981) chapters I(iii) and m (i).

7. Wall, op.cit., pp.22-3, 63-4, 66-70, 115-8.

8. Wall, op.cit., pp.135-40. 9. J.P. Day, 'The Catholic question in the Irish parliament, 1760-82' (U.CD,, M.A. thesis, 1973)

pp.157-8; R.E. Bums, op.cit., pp. 181-206; Wall, op.cit., p. 132 note 2.

10. Wall, op.cit., p. 141; Day, op.cit., pp. 159-61.

11. The 1782 Catholic relief acts can be followed in detail in Day, op.cit., chapter 6; Wall, op.cit., chapter 10; and O'Flaherty, op.cit., chapt Ii(iv).

12. As exemplified by the Dungannon resolution and statements like that of Grattan in which he argued that: 'so long as the penal code remains, we can never be a great nation', The Parliamentary Register, or history of the proceedings and debates of the House of Commons of Ireland, 1781-97 (17 vols,

London, 1782-1801) i, 251, 258-9, 264-5.

13. Edwards, ed. 'Minute book', pp.68-9, 81-2.

14. 'Catholicus' to bishop of Deny, [Nov. 1783?] (P(ublic).R(eoord).0(ffice). N(orthern)I.(reland).,

Hervey-Bruce papers, D2798/5/17. 15. O'Conor to O'Rourke, 4 Feb.1783, B.C. Ward et.al. eds., Utters of Charles O'Conor of

Belanagare (2 vols.,Ann Arbor, 1979) ii,no.365. 16. The resolutions of the Volunteer corps are in P(ublic)R.(ecord).0(ffice).,

H.O., 100/2 ff.160, 250.

17. Portland to Shelburne, 25 June 1782(P.R.O? H.O., 100/2 ff.157-8). 18. Jebb to Dobbs, 27 Jan. 1783 (N(ational).L(ibrary).I(reland), Dobbs Papers, Ms.2251 ff.138-41);

Maria Edgeworth, ed., RL. Edgeworth, memoirs of his own life (2 vols., Lndon, 1820) ii, 48-50.

19. D(ubtin)?(vening)JP(ost).t4Feb.tIM*T.m3. Z0 A consideration of the early stages of the reform movement can be found in James Kelly,The Irish

parliamentary reform movement: the administration and popular politics, 1783-5' (U.C.D., M.A.

thesis, 1981) pp.18-30; the proceedings of the Volunteer meeting at Lisburn can be followed in

Proceedings relative to the Ulster assembly of Volunteer delegates (Belfast, 1783) pp 1-4.

1. The original correspondence is to be found in the Joy Papers on temporary deposit in the P.R.O.N.I.

Henry Joy was secretary to the Lisburn corresponding committee. Much of the correspondence has

been published in Proceedings relative to the Ulster assembly of Volunteer delegates p.26 ff.

Christopher WyviU published his correspondence with the committee in C, Wyvill, Political Papers

(6 vols. York, 1794-1802) voliii. 1. Price to Joy, 23 Sept., 1783 (P.R.O.N.I., Joy papers, Ms. 11/5); Jebb wrote of the 'difficulties ...

peculiar to your country', Jebb to Sharman, Proceedings ... Ulster assembly ,.., p.69

113




23. Richmond's reply can be found in the original in Joy Papers, Ms.l 1/38. it was published in

Proceedings... Ulster assembly .. pp 49-63 and Letter from the committee of the Ulster Volunteers

to the duke of Richmond and the ... answer (Dublin, 1783).

24. Jebb to Sharman, 13,14 Aug., Cartwright to Sharman, 26 Aug., Proceedings .. . Ulster Assembly,

pp 3642, 82; Jebb to Sharman, 25 Oct. 1783, J.Disney, ed., Works of John Jebb (3 vols.JLondon,

1787) ii, 534-53.

25. Effingham to committee, 18 Aug.1783, Proceedings . .. Ulster assembly, pp 73,79.

26. Price to Sharman, 7 Aug., Proceedings .. . Ulster assembly , pp 29-30; Price to Joy, 23 Sept.

1783(P.R.O.N.L, Joy Papers, Ms.l 1/5) 27. Wyvill to Sharman, [12 Aug], Proceedings

.. . Ulster assembly, pp 36-42; WyviU to Joy, 11 Oct,

Postscript to Mr. Wyvill's answer to the queries etc. on Catholic suffrage, WyviU, ed., Political

papers, iii, 78,79-84. 28. McTier to Drennan, ca.Sept. 1783, D.A. Chart, ed..Drennan Letters (Belfast, 1931) no.96. Their

responses are considered in Kelly, 'Parliamentary reform .. .' pp.32-3. 29. The quote, attributed to Rood, is from the V(olunteer) J(ournal). (D(ublin). 22 July 1784. For

Charlemont's view generally see H.M.C., Charlemont, i, passim, and for Flood see his correspond ence with Sir Laurence Parsons in the Rosse Papers at Birr Castle, county Offaly, C/8/14 and 15

in P.R.O.N.I., calendar.

30. Patrick Rogers, The Irish Volunteers and Catholic emancipation (London, 1934) p.78; M.R.

O'Connell, Irish politics and social conflict in the age of the American revolution (Philadelphia,

1965) pp. 357-8.

31. This was the informed view of the reverend William Campbell, Campbell's Journal, cited in Rogers,

op.cit., p.133. 32. There is no satisfactory life of Hervey, but see W. Childe-Pemberton, The earl-bishop: the life of

Frederick Hervey, bishop of Derry and earl of Bristol (2 vols, London, 1924) which prints a

considerable body of original corrspondence; J.R. Walsh, Frederick Hervey, fourth earl of Bristol and bishop of Derry (Maynooth, 1972) is scholarly but brief and not always perceptive, while B.

Fothergill, The mitred earl: and eighteenth century eccentric (London, 1974) is a popularised account.

33. Hervey to J.L. Foster, 29 Nov. 1779, Vere Foster, ed., The two duchesses (London, 1896) pp 75-6: See also Hervey's correspondence with Foster in R.I.A., J.L. Foster papers.

34. P. Rogers, 'A Protestant pioneer of Catholic Emancipation', Down and Connor diocesan archaeo

logical magazine (1934) pp 14-22; Jones to Hillsborough, 29 Dec. 1784 (P.R.O.N.I., Downshire

papers, D607/250); E.M. Johnston, Great Britain andlreland, 1760-1800 (Edinburgh, 1963) p. 186. 35. William Todd Jones, A letter to the electors of the borough ofLisburn (Dublin, 1784) pp 48-55. 36. 'Catholicus'to bishop of Derry, [Nov. 1783] (P.R.O.N.I., Hervey-Bruce Papers, D2798/5/17).

'Catholicus' perceived the only way Catholics would be treated equitably with protestants was if the 40 shilling freehold franchise was abolished and a ?10 qualification put in its place.

37. Drennan to Bruce, 30 Oct. 1783(P.R.O.N.L, Drennan-Bruce Letters, D553 no. 16). 38. H.M.C., Charlemont, i, 117-8; A collection of letters . ..

p.l 13. 39. History of the proceedings and debates of the Volunteer delegates of Ireland (Dublin, 1784) ppl 6

24). 40. Sharman to Jebb, 11 Oct. 1783, A collection of letters ...

pp 108-11. 41. RJ.fackson] to [Thomas Pelham], 30 Sept. 1783 (B(ritish). Library)., Pelham Papers,

Add.Ms.33,l00ff.344-5). 42. Dillon to Troy, 10 Sept.1783 (D(ublin), D(iocesan) .A(rchlves)., Carpenter-Troy papers, no. 128.). 43. Charles O'Conor, too, was concerned that parliament received 'no spur from the National

Association' (sic), O'Conor to O'Gorman, 8 Oct. 1783, Wards, eds., Utters of Charles O'Conor ofBelanagarelii,no31%.

44. Troy to Dillon, 18 Sept. 1783 (D.D.A., Carpenter-Troy Papers, no.129). 45. Edwards, ed/Minute book ...' pp 82-6. 46. Butler to Kenmare, I Nov. 1783, RMcLysaght, ed. The Kenmare Manuscripts (Dublin, 1943) p.80. 47. Drennan to McTier [1 Nov.1783], DA Chart, zd.JOrennan Letters,no. 17; Drennan to Bruce, 30 Oct

(P.R.O.N.L, Drennan-Bruce Letters, D553 no. 16). 48. History of the proceedings of Volunteer delegates, p,30. 49. Bellew had known Hervey since 1780 (Agar to Macartney, 17 Feb. 1780, T. Bartlett ed

Macartney in Ireland, 1768-72 (Belfast, 1979) p.330. 'Catholicus' to bishop of Derry '[Nov. 1783] (P.R.O.N.L, Hervey-Bruce Papers, D2798/5/17.

114




JO. Edwards, 'Minute book ...', pp. 86-7.

Jl! Ibid, pp 87-8. 52. There is a sympathetic character sketch in Thomas Wysejlistorical sketch of the late Catholic

Association ( 2 vols., DubUn, 1829) i. 102-03. for an indication of his income, see E. Wakefield, An account of Ire land statistical and political (2 vols., London, 1812) i, 261; Rentals for 1783 and

1795 (Grosvenor (Kenmare) Papers). 53. For evidene of Roche's financial need and relationship with Kenmare see Lady Roche to Bernard,

2 May (P.R.O.NX, Scrope Bernard Papers, T2627/6/1/32); Roche to North, 14 June (B.L, North

(Sheffield Park) Papers, Add. Ms. 61,862 f.84); Roche to Kenmare, 2 0cl[1783], Mclysaght, ed., Kenmare Mss, p.79.

54. Roche's account is in Roche to [ ], 14 Feb. 1784, T.R. England, Life of Arthur O'Leary (Dublin,

1820) pp.110-4. 55. Kenmare's reply of 20 November is printed in England, O'Leary, p. 109 and VJ. (D)., 28 Nov. 1783.

56. Day to Glandore, 11 Nov. 1783 (N.L.L, Talbot Crosbie papers, Ms. 2054). Kenmare was burned in

effigy in Navan, VJ. (D., 21 Nov. 1783.

57. D?J>.,1 1,15,22 Nov, 1783.

58. Proceedings of Volunteer delegates ... pp 43-5.

59. Draft resolutions, 14 Nov. [1783] (P.R.O.N.L, Babington and Croasdaile Papers, D1514/I/5/30

A-C). 60. Volunteer Evening Post, 22 July 1784.

61. As note 14.

62. Patrick BeUew to Michael Bellew, 22[Nov.?] 1783 (N.L.I., Bellew papers, Report on private collections no.436 p.2965).

63. There is no record of this subject being discussed at the Committee meeting of 2 December

(Edwards/Minute book..' p.89) but it is described in Mathew O'Conor's manuscript continution of

the history of the Irish Catholics, cited in Wall, op.cit., 173-4.

64. Kelly, 'The Irish parliamentary reform movement..' pp 124-32.

65. Rogers, op.cit., p. 133; Wall, op.cit, p. 171.

66. Edward Cooke described him as 'well disposed' on 17 July 1781 (B.L., Auckland Papers, Add

Ms.34,417 f.392). 67. Butler to Troy, 2 Jan.,1784 (D.D.A., Carpenter-Troy papers, no.140), 68. Sir Patrick Bellew to Michael Bellew, 28 Mar.1784 (N.L.I., Bellew papers, Report on private

collections no.436 p.2965). 69. VJ. (D)., 13 Feb. and ff. For Carey and the press in 1784 see B, Inglis, Freedom of the press in

Ireland, 1784-1841 (London, 1954). 70. MJ. Curran, ed., Instructions, admonitions etc. of archbishop Carpenter, 1770-86', Reportium

Novum, ii (1957-8) p. 170.

71. Declaration of the Roman Catholic prelates of Munster, 1 May 1784 (Cashel Diocesan Archives,

Butler Papers, 1784/3)_. 72. Nuncio to Troy, 9 May 1784 (D.D.A., Carpenter-Troy papers, no.135). 73. DEJ*., 8 May. Favourable administration comment on Lord Kenmare indicating

that what they wanted was a "hearty concurrence in the measure of his majesty's ministers in this

kingdom' can be found in the Volunteer Evening Post, 11 May. See also Troy to Butler, 23 May 1784

(D.D.A., Troy-Carpenter papers, no. 138). 74. Carpenter to Troy, 15 May 1784(D.D.A. Carpenter-Troy Papers, no. 143). 75. Butler to Troy, 20 May 1784 (D.D.A., Carpenter-Troy Papers, no.137). 76. Troy to Butler, 23 May 1784(D.D.AM Carpenter-Troy Papers, no.138). 77. Charles O'Conor to Denis O'Conor, 8 June 1784, Ward, et al., eds., Letters of Charles O'Conor,

ii, no,386.

78. As note 76.

79. This can be followed in greater detail in Kelly, 'Parliamentary reform. / pp 180-192.

80. Handbill of resolutions of the aggregate committee of the citizens of Dublin (Oireachtais Library, Ms.8 H 10).

81. Biographical detail on Ball, McCormick, and Weldon can be found conveniently in Wall, op.cit.,

pp. 178-9. 82. Joy's notes for a history of Belfast (P.R.O.N.I., Joy Papers, Ms.4 p.264); Drennan to McTier, [early

July, 1784], Chart, ed., Drennan Letters, no. 152.

83. F. Plowden, An historical review of the state of Ireland (2 vols, London, 1803) ii, 101-02,

115




84. Rogers, op.cit., chap iv; see Orde to Rutland, 24 June, H.M.C., Rutland, iii, 113; Clements to Temple, 16 Aug. 1784 (B.L., Buckingham Papers, Add.Ms 40, 179 f.l 17).

85. V.E.P., 8,10,12,15,17 June and following 1784.

86. Barnard to Buckinghamshire, 7 July 1784(N.L.L, Heron papers, Ms. 13,047/3). 87. Ibid; Orde to Rutland, 9 July 1784, H.M.C., Rutland, iii, 122-3.

88. The fuUest account of the Belfast review can be found in [H. Joy, ed.], Historical collections

relating to the town of Belfast (Belfast, 1818) pp 298-311.

89. Ibid., pp 297-8; D.EJ>., 10 July; Belfast Mercury, 9 July 1784.

90. Campbell to Charlemont, 9 Oct. 1784 (R.I.A., Charlemont Papers, Ms. 12 R14/21). 91. KeUy, Parliamentary reform . . . pp 212-4.

92. Jones' argument is printed in Transactions of the General Committee of the Roman Catholics of Ireland during the year 1791 (Dublin, 1792) pp. 19-32 and Burrowes' in Plain arguments in the

defence of the peoples absolute domination over the constitution, in which the question of Roman

Catholic enfranchisement is fully considered (Dublin, 1784). 93. Rutland to Pitt, 24 July 1784, duke of Rutland, ed., Correspondence between William Pitt and

Charles, duke of Rutland, 1781-87 (London, 1892) pp 24-8.

94. KeUy, 'Parliamentary reform . . .' pp 225-30.

95. Newenham to Miles, 3 July 1784, H.M.C., Rutland, iii, 117-8.

96. Report on Meetings . . . Antrim - Lisbum (Oireachtais Library, Ms, 8 H 10). 97. Edwards, 'Minute Book ..' pp 91-103 passim. 98. W[iUiam] B[ruce] to [Henry Joy] 9 Sept. 1784 (P.R.O.N.I., Joy Papers, Ms. 14/18) 99. Extract from Tandy's correspondence on Roman Catholics, George to Napper Tandy, Sept./Oct.

1784 (N.L.I., Bolton Papers, Ms. 16,350/21). 100 W[illiam] B[ruce] to [Henry Joy], 7 Oct. 1784 (P.R.O.N.I., Joy papers, Ms. 14/19). 101 D[rennan]] to McTier [mid Oct.] 1784, Chart, ed., Drennan letters, no.l 13; Napper to George

Tandy, 2 Oct. 1784 (N.L.I., Bolton Papers', Ms. 16,350/21). 102 Mornington to GrenviUe, 5 Sept. (B.L., Dropmore Papers, Add.Ms. 58,910 ff. 54-7); see Orde to

Rutland, 9 July 1784, H.M.C., Rutland, iii, 122-3.

103 On 14 August Orde wrote Kenmare expressing the administration's concern about Catholic

participation in the Volunteers and his desire that the Munster bishops' declaration of I May should

be published (N.L.I., Bolton Papers, Ms. 16,350/37-8). 104 Dunsany to Orde, 27 Aug.l784(N.L.I., Bolton Papers, Ms. 16,350/12). 105. Dunsany to Orde,22 Sept, 22 Sept.1784 (N.L.I., Bolton papers, Msl6,350/13). 106 Hamilton to Orde, 26,29, Sept.,5 Oct., 1784 (N.L.I., Bolton papers, Ms. 16,350/14,18; P.R.O.,

Chatham Papers, 30/8/329 ff.67-8). 107. Kenmare to Roche, 30 Sept.1784 (P.R.O., Chatham Papers, 30/8/326 ff.225-6). 108 VaUancey to Orde, 1,16 Oct.(N.L.L, Bolton Papers, Ms. 16,350/19, 40); O'Conor to VaUancey, late

Sept; 13 Oct., 1784 (P.R.O. Chatham Papers, 30/8/330 ff.289,292-3). 109 Extract of a letter from Baron Hamilton, 29 Sept., 1784 (P.R.O., Chatham Papers, 30/8/329 ff.65

6). 110 Rutland to Sydney, 12 Oct., 1784, H.M.C., Rutland, iii, 141-2.

111 Extract of a letter from Mr. Foster, 3 Oct. [1784] (P.R.O., Chatham Papers, 30/8/329 ff. 67-8). 112 Hamilton to Orde, 29 Sept, 5 Oct., 1784 (N.L.I., Bolton Papers,Ms. 16,350/18,27). 113 Orde to Pitt, 4 Oct., 1784 (N.L.I., Bolton Papers, Ms. 16,358 ff.15-37). 114. Clarke to Orde, 11 Oct., 1784 (P.R.O., Chatham Papers, 30/8/330 ff.280-81). 115 CaddeU to Baron [Hamilton], 15 Oct. 1784 (P.R.O., Chatham Papers, 30/8/330 f.283); Hamilton to

Orde, 18 Oct.(N.L.L, Bolton Papers, Ms. 16,350/42-3); Orde to Sydney, 16 Oct. (N.L.I., Sydney papers, Ms.51/F/5.

116 This point had also been made by Denis Thomas O'Brien, Hamilton to Orde 26 Sept. (N.L.I., Bolton

Papers, Ms. 16,350/14); examples can be found in VE.P., 2,4,25,28,30 Sept.1784. 117 Butler to Roche, 22 Oct 1784 (N.L.I., Bolton Papers, Ms. 16,350/50-1). The administration used

Boyle Roche as an intermediary with Butler and Kenmare.

118 For Kenmare's sentiments see Kenmare to Roche, 30 Sept.; to Orde, 23 Oct. 1784 (N.L.I., Bolton

Papers, Ms 16,350/16-7,52). 119 Orde to Piu, 24 Oct., 1784 (N.L.I., Bolton Papers, Ms.16,358 ff 47-55). 120 Ibid.; Rutland to Pitt, 14 Nov., 1784, H.M.C., Rutland, iii, 147-8.

121 The return is of 29 counties (Mayo, Fermanagh and Monaghan are not included) and puts the total

Volunteer strength at 18,469 (N.L.I., Bolton Papers, Ms. 15,891/30) There is another copy in the

National Museum, Ms.22A-1938.

116




[22 Dean of Armagh to Hamilton, 20 Oct. (N.L.I., Bolton Papers, Ms. 16,350/47); Extract of a letter from Colonel Dawson, I Nov.1784 (P.R.O., Chatham Papers, 30/8/330 ff. 302-05).

[23 Orde to Pitt, 24 Oct. 1784 (N.LX,, Bolton Papers, Ms.16,358 ff.47-55).

[24 Archbishop of Cashel to Orde, 6 Nov. (N.L.I., Bolton Papers, Ms.16, 350/59-60); Rutland to

Sydney, 25 Oct. 1784 (P.R.O., H.O., 100/14 ff 195-7).

[25 Orde to Kenmare, 28 Oct.1784 (P.R.O., Chatham Papers, 30/8/329 ff. 175-8).

126 Orde to Rutland, 2 Nov. 1784 (N.L.I., Bolton Papers, Ms. 15,877/1).

[27 Gormonston to Bellew, 6 Nov. 1784 (N.L.I., Bolton Papers, Ms. 16,350/57).

128 Extract of a letter from Mr, Hamilton, 15 Dec.1784 (N.L.L, Bolton Papers, Ms., 16,350/67). There

is no corroborating evidence in the Committee's minute book.

129 Keon to Latouche, 6 Dec, O'Conor to Latouche, 11 Dec, Keon to Orde, 21 Nov., extract of a letter

from Mr. Hamilton, 15 Dec. (N.L.I., Bolton Papers. Ms. 16,350/67-70); O'Conor to Ryan, 22

Dec.1784, Ward, et. al. eds. Letters of Charles O'Conor, ii, no. 397; Rutland to Sydney, 25 Nov.

(P.R.O., H.O., 100/14 ff 246-8).

130 Extract of a letter from Dublin, 26 Oct. 1784 (P.R.O., Chatham Papers, 30/8/328 ff.221-2).

131 Letters ofOrellana, an Irish Helot to the seven northern counties not represented n the National

Assembly of delegates held at Dublin in October 1784 (Dublin, 1785).

132 Ibid., pp.38-9, Letter V deals with the question of the Catholic franchise.

133 S, Hamilton to Orde, 18 Mar. (N.L.I., Bolton papers, Ms. 15,879/9); Troy to Butler, 4 Mar,, Butler

to Troy, 18 Mar. 1785 (D.D.A., Carpenter-Troy Papers, Nos. 148,150).

117



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The Parliamentary Reform Movement of the 1780s and the Catholic Question

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