THE RISE OF THE NEW LEFT

“OLD” v. “NEW” LEFT

Old Left (1940s-1980s): sought to seize power through armed revolution; adhered to Marxist ideology; sought to impose radical social programs; most successful against retrograde dictatorships (Batista in Cuba, Somoza in Nicaragua)

New Left (1990s-present): seeks to win power through democratic elections; promotes a vague agenda of “social justice” and radical reform (not revolution); most successful under conditions of glaring social inequality (e.g. Venezuela, Brazil)

THE NEW LEFT: ORIGINS

Economic—lack of growth (through 2003), poverty and inequality, frustration with Washington Consensus

Political—weakness of representative institutions, inattention to poor, persistence of corruption; possibility of victory

International—war in Iraq, opposition to Bush policies and growing distaste for American society

MEMBERSHIP

Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela (1998, 2004, 2006, 2011, 2014) Lula, Brazil (2002, 2006) and Dilma Rousseff (2010, 2014) Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández, Argentina (2003, 2007, 2011) Evo Morales, Bolivia (2005, 2009, 2014) Daniel Ortega, Nicaragua (2006, 2011) Manuel Zelaya, Honduras (2006)* Rafael Correa, Ecuador (2006, 2010) Fernando Lugo, Paraguay (2008)* Mauricio Funes and Salvador Sánchez Cerén, El Salvador (2009, 2014) José Mujica, Uruguay (2010) Ollanta Humala, Peru (2011)

Near-Miss: Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Mexico (2006)

*ousted by “constitutional coup”

THE NEW LEFT: GOALS

Domestic—winning power, rearranging electoral alignments; overturning status quo, possibly through institutional reform; changing policy direction

Hemispheric—gaining support throughout Latin America (invoking “Bolivarian dream”), reducing U.S. hegemony (and opposing FTAA)

Global—challenging international order, forging alliances with developing world and non-aligned nations

CLARIFICATION

Disenchanted masses in Latin America ≠Voters for pink tide candidates ≠Leftist candidates for office ≠Leftist winners of presidential elections ≠Pro-Chávez chief executives ≠Hugo ChávezNotes:

Tidal swell is spontaneous, not organized Rivalries and defections

THE PROBLEM WITH HUGO

Used language of the street (including the Arab street)—e.g., the “devil” speech

Sat atop petroleum Put money where his mouth wasBroke established rules of the gamePlayed off resentment of Bush, U.S. powerChallenged Washington Consensus Went for high stakesSought rearrangement of prevailing world orderAnd now…? With changes in leadership?

U.S. VISIONS FOR LATIN AMERICA

Democratic—with tilt to right or center-rightProsperous—with commitment to free-market policies

and ties to United StatesUnified—under U.S. leadershipPeaceful—in view of unanimityDeferential—following U.S. lead in global arena

REALITY CHECK

Democracy = broad ideological spectrum, from “left” to “right”

Prosperity = mixed economies; rejection of Washington Consensus, FTAs, and FTAA

Ideology = diversity rather than unityOutlooks = anti-U.S. attitudes strong among large share

of population (slight improvement with Obama)Alliances = rejection of U.S. leadership and rules of the

game

CHALLENGING AMERICAN MYTHS

The Cherished Assumption—freely elected leaders will support U.S. policy

The Western Hemisphere idea—the new world is distinct from old, will forge common front in international arena

Democracy rationale for “regime change”—free elections as protective shield

The hegemonic presumption—the United States can dictate political life in Latin America

The End.