Water quality in international river basins

Political Geography 18 (1999) 437–476

Water quality in international river basins

Deborah F. Shmueli*

Department of Geography, University of Haifa, Mount Carmel, Haifa 31905, Israel

Abstract

The major issue of pollution control in water quality management is too often postponedor neglected in treaties concerning international river basins. Deterioration of transboundarywaters cannot be dealt with unilaterally, and is often treated by the affected parties as secondaryto the primary goal of economic development, even in settings conducive to high levels ofpollution. This frequently results in environmental crises.

This paper focuses on the way in which water quality is addressed in seven selected inter-national basin accords. A framework for the structured comparisons of these basins ispresented, based on the following four major forces that were found to influence the extent towhich pollution issues were encompassed within the accords: flash-points, financial capacities,globalization/regionalization, and political windows of opportunity.

The extent to which the above forces were mobilized to influence the water quality aspectsof the treaties that have been studied, varies in accordance with: the severity of the waterquality problem in relation to the basins’ physical and human settings; the level of competitiveuses of basin waters; the level of economic development of each riparian and the co-basinstates as a whole; the locational setting and political power asymmetry among riparian states;and whether or not the institutions or agreements are basin-wide. The forces identified in thisstudy are meant to provide some guidance to the factors conducive to failure or success.1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords:Water quality; International river basins; Water treaties; Water pollution; Transboundary pollution

Introduction

While water quality has recently become a major issue in the management of inter-national river basins, it tends to be ignored in many international water treaties. Suchtreaties deal extensively with issues of allocation, and often with navigation and hydro-

* E-mail: [email protected]

0962-6298/99/$ - see front matter 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.PII: S0962 -6298(98)00106-1

438 D.F. Shmueli /Political Geography 18 (1999) 437–476

electric and flood control developments. However, not only are anti-pollution measuresabsent from older treaties, they are all too often slighted in current agreements, despitethe fact that unilateral efforts to control pollution cannot prevent deterioration of waterquality. Today’s reality is that, even when treaties do include basin-wide regulationson water pollution, for the most part, accords lack the institutional mechanisms tomitigate the impact of unchecked economic development on water quality.

The need for water quality to be included in international treaties reflects theprofound impact of economic, technological and demographic change upon the waterenvironment. Until the modern agricultural, industrial and chemical revolutions, theexplosion of the world’s population and the spread of urbanization, water qualitywas a non-factor in both domestic and international politics. Even after loweredquality became a major hazard, the general public had little awareness of the issue.Monitoring devices were rudimentary and data accumulation was limited.1 Moreover,strongly entrenched agricultural and manufacturing interests disregarded environ-mental consequences in their zeal to use new technologies to maximize profits.

Kovacs (1986) describes river pollution as an integrated, environmental problemresulting, not only from unregulated industrial pollutants and accidental spills, butalso from such factors as airborne and other non-point source pollutants, urbaniz-ation, deforestation, erosion and intensified agriculture.

The combination of scientific findings that have exposed water pollution hazards,and aroused public concern, has now given political prominence to water pollutionissues. Both a cause and a result of this prominence is that pollution measurementhas become more accurate, and the identification of pollution causes has becomemore sophisticated.

Sensitivity to the systemic nature of pollution is greatest in highly developed, post-industrial societies, where anti-pollution measures embrace, not only monitoring andmitigation, but also the beginnings of sustainability policies. As the high-tech, finan-cial service, telecommunications, and recreation and tourist industries outstrip agric-ulture and traditional manufacturing in their economic significance, the major pol-luters have begun to lose much of their traditional political clout. At the same time,throughout the world, environmental movements have become an increasinglypowerful political force. They have orchestrated broad public awareness of environ-mental issues, including those related to water, and placed considerable pressure onoffshore manufacturers to conform to higher environmental standards in those partsof the developing world to which they have shifted operations.

This paper focuses on the way in which water quality is addressed in seven selec-ted international basin accords. A framework for the structured comparisons of these

1 Despite efforts on the part of the United Nations and the European Union, there are no standardizeddefinitions and measurement practices for the concept of water quality. The most quoted summary quo-tation for water quality has been dissolved oxygen content. Other indicators include pH, bacteria counts,temperature, and hardness; more recently concentrations of ammonia, calcium, magnesium, sulfates, chlor-ide phosphates, oil phenols, detergents, heavy metals and certain hydrocarbons (Benedek and Laszlo,1981). These measures do not account for non-biodegradable and persistent toxic pollutants, includingheavy metals and compounds of higher molecular weight, which would render river water undrinkable.

439D.F. Shmueli /Political Geography 18 (1999) 437–476

basins is presented, based on the following four major forces that were found toinfluence the extent to which pollution issues were encompassed within the accords.

O Flash-points—chemical and oil spills, concentrations of dead fish, outbreak of water-borne disease, and the devastating affect of drought and flooding on water supplies.Public attention galvanized by television and news of disaster on other news media,heightening the sense of crisis and spurring calls for governmental actions.

O Financial capacities—prosperity, as in the US, Europe and Japan, enables wealthygovernments to finance water quality projects in their own and neighboring basincountries. Regional agencies and international institutions, like the World Bankand IMF, provide support for projects in poorer countries.

O Globalization/regionalization of industry—offshore operations of firms speedeconomic development and increase pressures on water sources. On the otherhand, these firms are also subject to activist environmental groups within theirown countries, which pressure them to adopt better practices in their foreign facili-ties with regard to the environment.

O Political windows of environmental opportunity—major shifts in national powerbalance or alliances, domestic political changes, new regional frameworks. Inaddition, anti-pollution measures may be used as trade-offs for advancing otherpolitical or economic goals.

The extent to which the above forces were mobilized to influence the water qualityaspects of the treaties that have been studied, varies in accordance with: the severity ofthe water quality problem in relation to the basins’ physical and human settings; the levelof competitive uses of basin waters; the level of economic development of each riparianand the co-basin states as a whole; the locational setting and political power asymmetryamong riparian states; and whether or not the institutions or agreements are basin-wide.

Selecting the basin case studies

The catalyst and background materials for this paper is a recent general study ofinternational river basins, involving the comparative analysis of institutional frame-works for the management of transboundary water resources in 13 river basins inmany parts of the world (Kliot et al., 1997; Kliot and Shmueli, 1997).2

Agreements in 5 of these 13 basins do address transboundary pollution problems tovarious degrees. The lessons learned from the Colorado, Danube, Elbe, Mekong and RioBravo/Rio Grande, are therefore the foci of analysis. The Ganges–Bramaputra is alsoexamined because of its particularly severe environmental degradation, the extreme effectsof pollution on Bangladesh, and, because, now that India and Bangladesh have come toan agreement on water allocation, pollution may be the next focus for negotiations. In

2 The research was funded by the Water Research Institute at the Technion–Israel Institute of Tech-nology during 1994–96, and carried out by Nurit Kliot and Deborah Shmueli of the University of Haifa,and Uri Shamir of the Technion. In the other international basins that were researched—Indus, La Plata,Senegal, Niger, Lake Chad and Tigris–Euphrates, anti-pollution measures have not yet been accorded asignificant place within the agreements, economic concerns remaining primary.


addition, a separate analysis of the Rhine was subsequently made by the author, not onlybecause of the severity of the River’s earlier pollution, but also because of the highlydeveloped, collective and successful anti-pollution measures adopted and implementedby its riparian states and by broader European regional organizations.

There are other basins that might have been studied for their contribution to the waterquality issue, such as the US–Canada Great Lakes. However, that very active waterquality program reflects the unique, bi-national situation of two linked, advanced nationaleconomies, without the political and socio-economic differences that make water treatymaking so much more complex in the cases that are presented here.

These study basins represent a wide spectrum of economic and political conditions,and their water treaties reflect this diversity. The Rhine’s riparians have moved intothe post-industrial age. They are wealthy states, with minimal national income dis-parities among them. They overcome deeply-rooted historical and cultural differencesto forge a structure of unity. More than half of their labor forces are employed inservices. The Elbe basin, in contrast, blends the post-industrial economy of westernGermany with the decaying smokestack industrial economies of eastern Germanyand the Czech Republic. The Danube is divided amongst a wealthy, service-orientedGermany and Austria, the modernizing industrial states in its middle reaches, andthe lower basin’s poorer countries with their mixed agricultural-industrial economies.

The Colorado and the Rio Bravo/Rio Grande embrace one of the most advanced ofthe world’s economies—that of the United States, and Mexico’s robustly developingeconomy that is rapidly industrializing, in considerable measure due to US outsourcing.

The Mekong and the Ganges basins lie within the developing world. In theMekong, which is heavily dependent upon agriculture and export of primary pro-ducts, Thailand stands alone in its fast-growing, modern, export-oriented manufactur-ing, mining and service economy, with limited dependence on agriculture. Vietnamis developing rapidly, but from a much lower economic base level. China, whichcontrols the upper basin, pursues its own development projects, without regard tothe downstream riparians. The Ganges basin, while heavily agricultural, has largeimpoverished urban centers, small-scale industry and pockets of industrial moderniz-ation. Deteriorated urban water supplies are a major health hazard.

The hydrogeopolitics of these basins reflects, for the most part, considerable dis-parities in political power. The US dominates the Colorado and Rio Bravo/RioGrande; India the Ganges; and China and Vietnam the Mekong. Only in Europe isthe exercise of political power relatively evenly distributed, and even in the Rhine,Elbe and Danube this is primarily because Germany’s political weight is offset bythe European Union (EU) and allied regional organizations.

Theoretical context

The complexities that underlie the conduct of hydrogeopolitics encompass a bodyof theory on water distribution and conflict that sets the geopolitical context for inter-national river basin water allocation and management. Much of that theory posits that,as a state reaches and surpasses its hydrologic limits, the impetus toward internationalconflict or cooperation increases. Lack of coincidence between political and natural river


basin boundaries often complicates hydrogeopolitics. Objectively, logic may dictateincorporating both units into a larger framework, such as a joint river commission orsimilar international authority. However, nations are jealous guardians of their perceivedauthority, as defined by their existing political boundaries. While the literature of hydro-geopolitics is rich, very little of it focuses on water quality issues.

The overriding question in hydrogeopolitics is: “how can sovereign states, pursuingnational self-interest and those policies that would best ensure a regime’s survival, copewith the challenge of bi- or multi-national coordination in the use of a common resource?”In addressing this question, I have analyzed river basins in the context of the nationalpolicy-making and the national economic development strategies of the concernedriparians. Since institutional frameworks govern water allocations and other aspects ofthe basin agreements, a key issue for political geographers is how such institutionaldecisions have been made. The structural framework that I have developed for the analysisof the seven basins is based in part, on theories and methods of scholars in the field.3

3 International water politics, or hydrogeopolitics, often revolves around such conflict-laden issues asscarcity, mal-distribution, pollution and security. Population growth and economic development exacerbatethe potential for conflict (Wolf and Dinar, 1994; Frey, 1993).

While economics and ecology are the norms for calculating costs and benefits of river basin agreements,the political power equation is often not considered. When such an equation is factored into an impactstudy, the findings may indicate that it is worth accepting economic-ecologic inefficiencies, if politicaltensions and other costs can be reduced.

Conflict resolution theory and analysis have been applied to hydrogeopolitics by a number of scholars.Several researchers on international water resource conflict have suggested typologies that they find fruit-ful. In 1964, Lowi offered a broadly influential, general conflict typology of distributive and re-distributive,regulatory, and constituent issues (Lowi, 1964). Other authors propose topologies of cognitive, stakeholderand ideological (Vlachos, 1990), or informational, interest, value and relational conflicts (Priscoli, 1990).

Homer-Dixon (1991) selected three theoretical perspectives on “acute conflict” from the general conflictliterature: frustration-aggression theory, group identity theory and structural theory. Frey (1992) puts fortha multi-faceted conflict or issue profile, suggesting that the application of a profile approach to diversewater and other conflicts could help establish common profile patterns and their implications.

Wolf (1995, p. 88) holds that the same characteristics of water resources that fuel conflict, can, ifmanaged carefully, induce cooperation in a hostile environment, and that each reinforces itself. “Compe-tition begets ill-will, which increases competition, while, conversely, cooperation encourages betterrelations, thus creating an environment conducive to increased cooperation”.

As distinct from theory-building efforts, the models used in international water resource conflicts fallinto two categories: process and outcome. An example of a process model, using Catastrophe Theory, isoffered by Zeeman (1976). Examples of outcome models include: Game Theory, Paretian EnvironmentalAnalysis (Rogers, 1991), Pervasive Unidirectional Externalities (Dorfman et al., 1972), Alternative Dis-pute Resolution (ADR) and Processes of International Negotiation (PIN).

Finally, a few political models have been set forth for transnational water situations that are applicable,in a limited way, to theory building. An example of such a model was put forward by LeMarquand(1990). He asserts that five different foreign policy factors influence a nation’s riparian stance: image,international law, linkage of water to other issues, reciprocity and sovereignty. Frey (1993) presents thesimplest effective model for understanding the origins of conflict in transnational river basins. He positsthree main predictors of conflict potential: (1) the importance of water to each actor, (2) the relativepower, primarily military, of each actor, and (3) their respective riparian positions. He points to numerousfactors in the analysis of power: the actors involved; their motivations and cognitions; significant aspectsof their behavior; the issues and activities that are the foci of interaction; the structures of interaction andthe settings in which they occur; and the sources of change or inertia in these power relations/dynamics.


During the past few decades, conflict resolution theorists have applied theirapproaches to hydrogeopolitics, and several researchers on international waterresource conflict have suggested useful models or typologies. Of the literature citedin footnote 3, some of the principles presented in the models offered by LeMarquandand Frey are applicable to the case studies. However, the most useful in this context,are the works of Mandel, Rogers and Westcoat.

Mandel’s (1991) theoretical model for explaining sources of disputes overinternational river basins, incorporates non-cooperative settings, environmentalimbalance and power asymmetry. He assumes that thenon-cooperative settingresultsfrom ethnic/religious/ideological antagonisms in the basin-wide area. Scarcity ofwater and the differential effect on water quality of upstream and downstreamusers, createenvironmental imbalance, and therefore are a constant potential forconflict. Power asymmetries involve three elements: (1) the states’ overallpolitical/military/economic power levels; (2) the states’ technological powers to dis-rupt or alter the river basin, and (3) the states’ geographical powers reflected in amore advantageous upstream position. These last two components frequently inter-relate with one another in enhancing power asymmetries.

In connection with the factors cited by Mandel, Rogers (1991) pointed out thatdownstream parties which are negatively affected by upstream environmental prac-tices, can sometimes balance this asymmetrical water relationship by linking issuessuch as the use or exchange of economic resources from other than water, or thethreat of military power.

Westcoat’s (1995) historical and geographic perspective provides a contextual frame-work for analyzing multilateral water agreements. This framework addresses threeissues: (1) the types of agreements that might be possible in different types of situations;(2) the time and spatial scales which are required for sustainable development; and (3)comparison of the progressive international water policies of the late twentieth centurywith the conservative international water laws established in preceding centuries. Heconcludes that (1) specialized water institutions must have strong leadership and mean-ingful powers (including implementation); (2) that incremental economic, environmen-tal and political steps towards integrated management are pivotal; and (3) that countriesmust be at once open to and wary of the “breakthrough” opportunities (policy windows)that arise in the broader international context and to approach such opportunities in anhistorically informed, critical and yet constructive way.

The objective of this research is not to put forward a new theory of internationalriver basin water sharing, or to offer a particular model for the analysis of sharedwater issues. Rather, it is to draw upon some of this work in applying the materialsderived from the study of the seven basins to develop the framework for a structuredcomparison of the basin agreements. The intent is for that framework to have theor-etical value in the further study of water quality issues.

International law affecting non-navigational uses of international river basins

Brown-Weiss (1996) posits that international law provides the normative frame-work and the procedures for coordinating behavior, controlling conflict, facilitating


cooperation and establishing values among civilized states in relations with oneanother. This body of law arises through explicit and implicit agreement of the parti-cipants. Explicit agreements are termed “treaties” or “conventions”. Implicit agree-ments are termed “custom” or “general principles” (Solanes, 1992).

The international law of water resources is at a relatively early stage of develop-ment—and, despite the intensification of codification efforts in the twentieth century,there is still a lack of binding rules which have been formally codified. Three inter-national bodies have prepared sets of draft rules in the area of water resources, ruleswhich, to a large extent, are based on state practice:

1. The Institute de Droit International, a non-official body established in 1873,offered two resolutions concerning shared water resources. They are:(a) The 1961 Salzburg Resolution, which declares that a state’s right to makeuse of shared water is limited by the right of use of the other riparians.(b) The 1979 Athens Resolutiondeclares that states must “ensure” that activitieswithin their borders cause no pollution to the waters of international rivers andlakes beyond their boundaries. There are also provisions concerning dataexchange prior to potential polluting activities, and consultation concerning pol-lution problems.

2. The International Law Association (ILA)adopted theHelsinki Rulesin 1996 onthe uses of waters of international rivers, reflecting the following principles:(a) The entire drainage basin is an indivisible hydrologic unit. It must be managedas a single unit in development of any portion of its waters in order to ensurethe maximum utilization.(b) Restricted sovereignty through a rule of equitable utilization (Caponera,1995). States are entitled to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficialuses of the waters of an international basin. While an existing use may have togive way to a new use, in order to achieve an equitable apportionment of sharedwater resources; compensation would have to be paid for the impairment of theexisting use.

3. The International Law Commission, a United Nations (UN) affiliated body desig-nated to codify customary international law, submitted to the UN GeneralAssembly in 1991 the firstDraft Articles on Non-Navigational Use of Inter-national Water Courses(Doman Colloquium on the Law of International Water-courses, 1992). These articles gave greater clarity and specificity to the HelsinkiRules of equitable apportionment (Article 5) and the obligation not to causeappreciable harm to other states (Article 7). In 1994,appreciableharm wasamended tosignificantharm, which was important to upstream states, giving themmore latitude for development, while (hopefully) still guarding the quality down-stream.

National water laws and decisions of international tribunals (i.e. the InternationalCourt of Justice) are also sources from which general principles of water laws ofinternational river basins develop.

All sources generally agree on the following principles:


O International drainage basins or river systems are anaggregate of surface andgroundwatersflowing into a common terminus (Caponera, 1995).

O Equitable use, requiring exchange of data and information, and prior notificationabout future planned uses.

O The obligation not to cause harmincludes the duty of preventive and cooperativeaction. Appreciable harm resulting from water pollution is a violation of the prin-ciple of equitable use. The World Bank requires the assessment of potential sig-nificant harm before approving projects on an international river (Solanes, 1992;Caponera, 1995).

O Joint development of international riversis difficult to achieve because of ques-tions of sovereignty, ownership of waterworks, jurisdiction, financing, definitionsof scope of cooperation, etc.

O The doctrine of territorial sovereignty over international rivershas never been agenerally recognized principle of international law. However, the idea of sover-eignty affects the initiation of basin-wide programs, and is a major obstacle toachieving integrated development of international rivers. Many treaties divideownership of, and jurisdiction over, otherwise indivisible waterworks (Solanes,1992).

Historically, most international water treaties have been based upon the inter-national law doctrine of “equitable and reasonable” use. This reflects the emphasison water quantity allocation. Since 1994, the International Law Commission shiftedthe debate by developing rules that attempt to find a balance between this doctrineand that of “no significant harm”, which has its origins in environmental protection(Utton, 1996).

The case studies

The treaties dealing with basin management that will now be discussed take widelydivergent approaches to pollution problems, with the Ganges–Brahmaputra at oneend of the spectrum and the Rhine at the other.

The treaty on the Ganges–Brahmaputra has no reference to water quality, althoughenvironmental degradation remains a major problem, especially in the downstreamDelta region. The Mekong treaty emphasizes water quality, but has no enforcementpowers. Moreover, the agreement applies within the lower basin only. Increasingpollution generated by China and Myanmar in the Upper Mekong, as well as byThailand, creates serious problems of salinity, chemical contamination and flashfloods. In the Colorado and Rio Bravo/Rio Grande Basins, specific water qualityproblems have been narrowly dealt with through the International Boundary andWater Commission/La Comision International de Limites y Aguas Minutes and haveshown tangible improvement, although water salinity and pollution remain severe.The Commission on Environmental Cooperation and the Border EnvironmentCooperation Commission have broader environmental mandates, however, an inte-grated, comprehensive approach to water quality has not yet emerged. The Elbe and


Danube are cases in which basin-wide treaties arrived at in recent years revolvearound water quality. Programmatic implementation is in progress, but it is prematureto judge the results. The Rhine has had the greatest success, with dramatic achieve-ments in meeting water quality targets set by treaties and other agreements.

The tables that precede the discussion of each basin represent the structured frame-work that facilitates the comparisons among them.

Ganges–Brahmaputra

The Ganges–Brahmaputra accord does not reference water quality (Fig. 1, Table1). Although the physical and human-use setting makes the basin particularly vulner-able to water quality deterioration, the treaty goals for optimizing water resourceshave, until now, avoided the issue of water quality. Physical conditions contributestrongly to water quality deterioration. Deforestation and attendant destabilization ofthe mountain slopes of Nepal, the breadth and flatness of the Ganges flood plain andthe siltation of the river along its lower course in West Bengal are prominentelements of the physical environment. The shifting of rivers due to erosion andsedimentation affects India, but is of particular concern to Bangladesh since so muchof its population is concentrated in the delta. In addition, the constant sinking of theGanges–Brahmaputra delta makes it more vulnerable to tidal waves and cyclones,as well as to flooding conditions which peak during the monsoonal season. Both themoist, temperate upstream basin climate and the subtropical, monsoon lower part,have dry seasons. In this dry season, diversion of water in the middle Ganges andWest Bengal further reduces the water available to Bangladesh (Abbas, 1992; Eatonand Chaturvedi, 1993).

The 400 million people within the basin are highly dependent upon the rivers forirrigation, domestic uses, fisheries, navigation and hydropower. While the majorityof the population is rural, the concentrations in such large cities as Calcutta, Dacca,Varanasi, Allahabad, Kanpur, Agra and New Delhi create particularly heavy strainson an under-developed urban infrastructure. The dangers to public health of polluted,disease-ridden waters is all the more acute because of the use of the Ganges bymillions of worshippers for daily ritual bathing and annual pilgrimages. In order toreduce the siltation in the port of Calcutta and to increase irrigation waters in WestBengal, India built the Farakka Barrage to divert some of the Ganges waters intothe River Hooghly, the major western tributary of the Ganges. This reduces watervolume in the dry season and lowers the Ganges level causing further concentrationsof what is already a high level of pollution caused by human and animal waste,fertilizers and salts. In addition, the periodic flooding that can inundate up to 60%of the land area of Bangladesh, degrades its soils (Asafuddowlah, 1994; Islam, 1995;Nazem, 1994).

Agreements on the basins began in 1972 with a bilateral treaty between India andBangladesh, establishing the Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission (JRC). TheJRC attempted, unsuccessfully, to develop bilateral water sharing schemes. Offersof third party mediation by Pakistan, the UN, the International Court of Justice, theInternational Bank for Reconstruction and Development, were all futile, because


Fig

.1.

The

Gan

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Bra

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utra

Bas

in.


Table 1Ganges–Bramaputra Basin

Flash-points Financial capacities Globalization/ Political windows ofregionalization of environmentalindustry opportunity

Farakka Barrage India is relatively Nepal’s untapped The 1987, 1988 floodconstruction (opened in better off than the hydropower and flash-points led1975) other riparians but still India’s unrealized Bangladesh

among world’s poorest market potential are government to request1987, 1988, 1998 nations basis for attracting thus World Bank toflooding devastated far unrealized foreign coordinate and prepareBangladesh External sources such investment flood control action

as UN regional plan for 1990–95, and1988 earthquake in organizations and led to the 1996 India–India financial NGOs failed Bangladesh water-

in negotiating a basin- sharing treaty, but notwide settlement to a broader frame of

regional cooperation orto further steps toimprove water quality

SAARC studies ofcalamity mitigation ledto Nepal–Indian 1992agreement on UpperGanges damconstruction

India would not accept such mediation (Islam, 1987). The South Asian Associationfor Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was established in 1985 in order to cooperateon non-controversial areas, particularly the mitigation of the effects of calamities,and to pave the way for confidence building. This excluded core economic issuesand environmental concerns. Since the 1987 and 1988 floods, which devastated Ban-gladesh, and the 1988 earthquake in India, studies have been undertaken within theSAARC to find means of calamity mitigation. Bilateral, joint teams amongst Bangla-desh, India, Nepal, Bhutan and China have been established to study catastrophicfloods (Abbas, 1992), and since 1992 India and Nepal have agreed to dam construc-tion on the upper tributaries of the Ganges at Karnali, Pancheswar, Sapt, Kosi andGandak (Islam, 1995). In 1996, Bangladesh and India finally signed a treaty on equalsharing of the Ganges waters that pass the Farakka Barrage. Disputes are to beresolved by a Joint Committee, with appeals to the JRC, and finally to the twogovernments. The treaty makes reference to the goal of optimum utilization of waterresources for flood management, irrigation, river basin development and generationof hydropower, but contains no mechanism for reaching these goals, and fails tomention environmental water quality as an objective.

The political environment in the Ganges–Brahmaputra basin is non-cooperative,


competitive and shaped by the overpowering impact of India. Until the 1996 treaty,India had either refused to enter into agreements with Bangladesh over water sharing,or ignored existing agreements. Bangladesh, which is totally dependent, not only onIndia, but on its upper cobasin partners, Nepal, Bhutan and China, has, in contrast,long sought but failed to achieve basin-wide or even multilateral managementapproaches. Landlocked Nepal, economically dependent on India, has only onestrong card to play—its untapped hydropower potential, which India would like topurchase. Dams in the upper Ganges would also reduce the damaging floods down-stream in both India and Bangladesh. Nepal’s resistance to cooperation relates to itshistoric isolationism and its rising nationalism, as it seeks to offset its dependenceon India with ties to China. In this sense, the pact between India and Nepal on damsalong the Upper Ganges is a political breakthrough.

Jagat Mehta (1992), the former Foreign Secretary of India, noted that “Nowhereis the problem of cooperation between riparian neighbors as critical as in the Ganges–Brahmaputra basin, and nowhere are the benefits of cooperation as spectacular forthe future of the countries involved”.

Despite the flash-points, the interest of international financing organizations, andthe hydropower potential of Nepal, the political windows of environmental opport-unity have thus far been missed.

Mekong

The Mekong, the world’s tenth longest river, flows through a basin that is physi-cally diverse, with riparians which are at different stages of political and economicdevelopment, and seeking to emerge from grinding rural poverty (Fig. 2, Table 2).Its headwaters are in the deeply dissected highlands of China, Myanmar and Laoswhere the climatic regime is moist and temperate, with dry winters, and where soilerosion is heavy, much of it due to slash and burn agriculture or to forestry. Chinaand Myanmar, the two main upper basin countries, are physically removed from thelower basin, whose broad flood plain enters the South China Sea via its extensivedelta. There the climate is sub-tropical monsoon, with dry winters.

Most of the lower Mekong basin is rural, with a population of 55 million (1/4 ofthe total population of Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Laos and the upper basin coun-try of Myanmar). The major urban centers, Ho Chi Minh City and Phnom Penh,border the heavily-farmed delta. In the dry season, the river’s flow is sometimesinsufficient to flush out its sluggish waters. Elsewhere, urban concentrations are rela-tively small and scattered. Until now, low levels of economic activity have limitedthe amount of damage to the environment of the Lower Mekong Basin (Chomchai,1995). The present rapid pace of economic development, however, has already ledto undesirable environmental effects.

Deforestation, particularly in Myanmar and Thailand, has accelerated erosion. InThailand, salinization of farm land is increased by runoff from rock salt mining andby the application of irrigation waters upstream from dams. Where dams trap silt,fewer nutrients are available for fishing (Chomchai, 1995). Paper and pulp mills andmining in Thailand add to this pollution. In the Lower Mekong, and especially in


Fig. 2. The Mekong Basin.


Table 2Mekong Basin


1988 Thailand floods 1957—UN, Asian Thailand—rapid China–US detente andDevelopment Bank, the development of pulp Soviet withdrawal from

China dam building— World Bank and donor and paper, and mining Vietnam leads tofirst hydroelectric dam countries (including the relations with US,Man Wan, operational US, UK, Canada, Opening of China to Japan and Europe,in 1993 France, Netherlands, outside investment providing international

Australia, New political leverage forSeven large dams are Zealand, Germany and higher environmentalplanned or under Japan)a standardsconstruction for theriver, and another nine 1990s—scarcity of Elimination of Khmerfor the river’s investment funds in Rouge in Cambodiatributaries both foreign and

domestic currencies Elections andconstitute obstacles for Cambodia’s outreachdevelopmentb efforts enhance

regional cooperationprospects

aKirmani (1990) contends that the donor countries’ assistance was primarily to finance their own expertsand consulting firms, while the UN funds were applied mainly to support the administrative costs of theMekong secretariat which was managed by foreign experts.bHori (1993, p. 112).

the delta, agriculture and canning contribute to pollution. Heavy metal, nitrate andphosphate levels are increasing, as is salinization due to sea water intrusion.

The use of pesticides (some of which are banned elsewhere) in the Mekong basinis increasing year by year and affects fishing, as well as drinking water. Pollutionin the Mekong tributaries is also increasing at a steady rate, its water quality nearurban centers and densely populated settlements deteriorating, and often unsuitablefor human consumption (Matics, 1995).

In Thailand, thanks to the remarkable growth of the national economy, the govern-ment has been able to allocate resources to promote agricultural-industrial develop-ment in the drought-prone northeast through large-scale inter-basin transfers ofMekong waters via a series of dams, reservoirs, canals and pumping stations.

In Cambodia, where water, a source of political power, is tightly controlled bycompeting ministries and agencies, there is considerable international support forconstruction of a series of hydroelectric plants whose output could be exported toThailand, thus serving the economic development needs of both countries(Bakker, 1998).

The difference in priorities of the basin states has been widened by the processof separate development of the lower and upper basins. For the most part, inter-


national water treaties have encompassed the Lower Basin only, where Vietnam ispolitically dominant but impoverished, and Thailand is by far the most powerfulriparian economically. Emphasis has been on economic development and navigation,although management issues and environment were mentioned as early as 1957,when the Mekong River Committee (comprised of Lower Basin states only) wasestablished. A water quality monitoring network among the Lower Basin states wasestablished in 1985. In 1995, the Mekong Commission succeeded the Mekong RiverCommittee as part of the Agreement on Cooperation for Sustainable Developmentof the Mekong Basin. This agreement was a direct result of severe deterioration inwater quality. Although the Commission’s mandate emphasizes sustainable develop-ment, it does not have enforcement powers, and combating pollution remains theresponsibility of the riparian states (Matics, 1995; Chomchai, 1995; Savasdibutre,1988).

The Upper Mekong states of China and Myanmar are not part of the Commission.China’s building of dams and its industrial and mining activities, as well as Myan-mar’s industrial waste dumping, therefore, takes place independently of any LowerBasin monitoring or coordination. China, the primary power in the Upper MekongBasin, has rejected invitations to join the new Mekong River Commission. There islittle likelihood that it will join in any basin-wide accord to improve water qualityor to change its plans for the Lancang, the Chinese name for the upper part ofthe river.

The Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) was established in 1992 to coordinateoverlapping development projects in the Lower basin. Although its aims do notdirectly target the basin as a whole, it was hoped that the “Mekong spirit” wouldbridge the psychic and political gap between the Upper and Lower Mekong. A bodythat does link the upper and lower riparians is the Mekong Development ResearchNetwork (MDRN), which fosters technical and scientific cooperation among the sixcobasin states. It is only consultative in nature, and thus far has led to no commonagreements on environmental issues. In the absence of a supra-national body for theMekong Basin, environmental protection is left to individual states, and the prospectsfor water quality improvement are still dim.

Colorado and Rio Bravo/Rio Grande

While the Colorado and Rio Bravo/Rio Grande are two, separate river basins, theinternational treaties concluded and institutions established to manage their watersare joint (Figs. 3 and 4, Table 3). The Mexican government insisted on linking thetwo rivers in the negotiations that led to the 1944 Water Treaty, so that Mexicocould be in a better position to trade some of its water rights in the Rio Grande forgreater access to Colorado waters, most of which are in the United States(Meyers, 1967).

The Colorado is divided physically into the upper and lower basins. Its headwatersrise in the mountains and high plateaus of Colorado and Wyoming, with their coldand relatively dry, continental climate, then flow through Utah. In the lower basin,which includes Arizona, parts of Nevada and California, the river courses through


Fig. 3. The Colorado Basin.

dry and desert landscapes into Mexico, where it discharges barely a trickle of brack-ish water into the Sea of Cortez at the head of the Gulf of California.

The source of the Rio Bravo/Rio Grande in the State of Colorado, is close to thatof the Colorado River, the former rising on the east side of the Continental Divideand the latter on the west side. In its middle and lower courses, the Rio Bravo/RioGrande passes through dry lands in New Mexico and West Texas before emptyinginto the humid, temperate areas affected by the Gulf of Mexico. By the time itreaches Brownsville-Matamoros, so little remains in it that the Gulf’s salty waterswash into its channel (Barry and Sims, 1994).


Fig. 4. The Rio Bravo/Rio Grande Basins.


Table 3Colorado and Rio Bravo/Rio Grande Basins


1961–73 Colorado 1994 US rescue of US outsourcing of Alliance of USRiver salinity crisis in collapsed Mexican components for environmental andMexicali Valley— banking and financial assembly in Mexico’s labor groups inArizona began draining system maquiladores connection withsaline groundwater into NAFTA negotiationsthe Colorado River Mexican robust

economic recoveryIndustrial and urbanwastes from Mexican NADBANKborder cities affectingUS border cities

1998—urban watershortages

The Colorado serves as an international boundary between the two countries foronly a 38-km (24-mile) stretch south of the Imperial Dam. The Rio Bravo/Grande,on the other hand, serves as the US/Mexico border for 2022 km (1264 miles).

Both basins have major reservoir and hydroelectric power systems to serve theheavy agricultural needs all along their courses, as well as the municipal and indus-trial uses which are most pronounced in their lower basins. In addition to meetingthe water demands of fast-growing Tucson and Phoenix, the lower Colorado alsomeets most of the water needs of the great urban centers of Los Angeles and SanDiego. Water is also diverted out of the upper basin to Denver and other Front Rangecommunities. The upper Rio Bravo/Rio Grande includes Santa Fe and Albuquerque,two of the fastest growing metropolitan centers in the United States. The lower basinhas a greater number of urban concentrations on both the US and the Mexican sidesof the border (Utton, 1994; Williams, 1995) where growth has been stimulated bythe North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). For example, the two millioncombined population of Juarez and El Paso is the largest urban trans-border popu-lation in the world.

The environmental crisis along the US/Mexico border affects water, air, and wild-life habitats. Intensive irrigation agriculture on the US side of the two rivers hasincreased water salinity, and caused contaminated chemical runoff. Over-exploitationof aquifers along both sides of the Colorado and Rio Bravo/Rio Grande borders hasled to a shortage of supply and consequent decline in water quality, mostly throughsalt contamination (Szekely, 1993).

Water quality concerns and sanitation had been treaty negotiation issues betweenthe US and Mexico as early as the 1940s, but they were localized. However, theflash-point of the “salinity crisis” occurred during 1961–73, in which the extreme


salinity of the Colorado River water flowing into the Mexicali Valley just south ofthe Mexican border proved disastrous to the Valley’s agricultural production. Riverwater shortages focused attention on groundwater contamination, and led to a 1972codicil to the 1944 Water Treaty (Minute 242), which limited groundwater with-drawals on both sides of the border (Mumme, 1988). The problem of water salinityhas remained a source of major and chronic diplomatic tension between the twocountries, to be joined in recent years by sewage and air pollution complaints.

Untreated urban wastes, the heaviest recent contribution to contamination, andindustrial pollution from refineries, and mining and manufacturing operations, notonly in Mexico, but on the US side of the border, have caused radical deteriorationin surface and ground water quality. It was NAFTA, however, that propelled theenvironmental crisis, including water pollution, to became a full-blown foreign policyissue (Barry and Sims, 1994).

There are examples of pollution going in both directions. Ciudad Juarez, the Mex-ican city across the Rio Bravo/Rio Grande from El Paso, Texas, lacks a sewagetreatment plant although there is one in the planning stage. Meanwhile, Ciudad Juarezproduces 75 million gallons of raw sewage per day, much of which flows throughirrigation ditches into the river (Verhovek, 1998). In Tijuana, Mexico, near SanDiego, California, a sewage treatment system is in the planning stage, but as of mid-1998, the city continues to discharge sewage into the Colorado and the Pacific.

The International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC)/La Comision Inter-national de Limites y Aguas (CILA)—is the joint international body established in1889 to manage water and land boundary issues between the US and Mexico. Itsfunctions have steadily broadened, developing from a single purpose boundary man-agement commission in the early years to a multifunctional boundary and watermanagement agency after 1944. This Commission may well represent the best currentexample of functional cooperation—joint management and operation of transbound-ary resources between two highly dissimilar countries (Mumme, 1993).

Through IBWC/CILA, the US and Mexico, otherwise divided for over a centuryby a history of past antagonisms, as well as differing culture and wealth, have man-aged to find cooperative, diplomatic solutions for three major international issues:the allocation of water, division of disputed territories, and the management of arange of problems arising from contiguous development along their common bound-ary. Initially, the focus of US-Mexican treaties was on water allocation, in responseto the pressures on Washington of US ranchers and farmers and of Southern Califor-nia urban centers. As both the upstream and the dominant power, the US was ableto shape the treaties to meet local and regional US interests, with little regard forthe impact of its water practices on Mexico. The water quality issue was one whichMexican negotiators tried unsuccessfully to include in the 1944 treaty, but the attemptwas frustrated at higher political levels (Meyers, 1967).

Since the mandate of the IBWC/CILA does not include the resolution of environ-mental pollution issues, the problems of water salinity and pollution have been leftto be resolved through other joint efforts between the two countries. Nevertheless,the IBWC/CILA played an important role in the Colorado River Salinity dispute(1961–73), and again in 1980 in addressing the problem of Mexicali industrial waters


flowing into the New River and across the boundary into the US (Minute 264,August 1980).4

Where the IBWC/CILA has dealt with shared water quality problems of salinityand industrial waste, its approach been successful (Glickman, 1985). However, itsMinutes address very narrow issues, their terms worked out during long negotiationsbetween US and Mexican experts. It is this narrow focus, which has drawn criticismfor lacking a comprehensive ecological or environmental approach to water manage-ment, framing its agenda on an ad hoc, crisis basis (Eaton and Hurlbut, 1992;Mumme, 1995).

In the area of sewage, the problem is different national treatment standards. TheMexican standard falls below that of the US, and their ability to pay for the levelof treatment to meet US standards is limited. Here, also, the IBWC/CILA serves asa vehicle for addressing water quality issues. A solution reached on water qualitythrough the Commission in the Tijuana area, for instance, is that the US is buildingthe treatment plant for both the US and Mexico, and Mexico will contribute part ofthe cost. The Nogales area needed a small international sanitation plant. The plantwas sited downstream, with Mexico paying 30 percent of the real cost (I. ArturoHerrera, 1994).

More recently, NAFTA changed the perceptions of both countries towards trans-border issues, bringing to the forefront the need to link environmental with tradematters. NAFTA’s economic policies, calculated to stimulate growth and manufac-turing in Mexican border areas (maquiladores) and to increase bi-national trade, arepolicies that have been initiated in Washington and Mexico City. However, theimpact of urban and industrial growth in Mexico, and attendant pollution problems,affect people on both sides of the border. Moreover, trans-border diplomacy is nowinfluenced by environmental action groups in the US which are concerned aboutMexico’s lack of investment in environmental controls, acting in concert with USlabor unions disturbed about the loss of manufacturing jobs to low-wage Mexican

4 Beginning in 1961, the Wellton Mohawk Irrigation District of Yuma County, Arizona began drainingsaline groundwater into the Colorado River and charging it against Mexico’s 1944 Treaty allotment. Theimpact on agriculture in the Mexicali Valley was swift and severe. In order to reduce consumption ofsaline Colorado River water, Mexican officials undertook a crash program of groundwater developmentalong the border near San Luis, Sonora and Algodones, Baja California to compensate for the loss ofsurface water.

Arizona farmers near San Luis, Sonora were afraid that Mexico was about to deplete Arizona’s waterstock and further claimed that the groundwater withdrawals should be assessed against the 1944 Treatyallotment. Mexico pointed to similar operations in Arizona, and the two governments designated theIBWC/CILA as the forum for dispute resolution (Mumme, 1988). In Minutes issued between 1965 and1973 (IBWC Minute 218, 22 March 1965; Minute 241, 14 June 1972; Minute 243, 30 August 1973), theIBWC/CILA outlined specific measures for the US to undertake to reduce the salinity in the waters ofthe Colorado reaching Mexico. This was the first effort of the IBWC/CILA to address issues relating towater quality rather than quantity.

This was repeated in 1979 when Presidents Jimmy Carter and Lopez Portillo instructed the IBWC/CILAto find a solution to the water sanitation along the border. An interim solution was reached in Minute264, August 1980 addressing the industrial waste waters from Mexicali flowing in the New River acrossthe boundary to the US.


companies. Thus, hydrogeopolitics is increasingly dictated by national, not local con-cerns, although in the US the clash between local farm and urban interests certainlyis also played out on the Congressional scene.

In the absence of an expanded mandate by IBWC/CILA to treat emerging environ-mental conflicts comprehensively, another three institutions have been formed toaddress these changes: the Commission on Environmental Cooperation (CEC), andthe Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC), the latter funded by thethird institution, the North American Development Bank (NADBANK). CEC has abroad mandate to deal with transboundary environmental issues, including pollution,and to impose sanctions for non-compliance with national environmental laws. Itscooperative activities focus increasingly on the impact of joint economic programs,including trade, on the environment (Mumme, 1995). BECC, a binational agencylocated in Ciudad Juarez, generates environmental infrastructure proposals and certi-fies cleanup projects, and has received a $450 million commitment from both nationsfor NADBANK to finance its work. The Bank is to use its lending authority toleverage up to $8 billion for the projects. But the devaluation of the peso in 1994forced many Mexican communities to curtail plans for landfills and sewage treatmentplants, even with low-interest loans available. In other cases, Mexican officials havedisagreed over what technological steps are necessary. As of 1998, BECC has certi-fied 21 environmental projects costing $473 million, including the sewage treatmentplants in Tijuana and Ciudad Juarez. But NADBANK has provided only a fractionof the money so far, and no project is operating yet (Verhovek, 1998).

One of the flaws of NAFTA’s environmental side accords seems to be that theydo not provide a specific method for Mexican or US cities to separate out the taxrevenue generated by new industrial and commercial activity resulting from thepact’s removal of trade barriers, and dedicating that revenue to environmental pro-jects (Verhovek, 1998).

Danube

The first of these case studies in which water quality is emphasized in basinaccords is the Danube (Fig. 5, Table 4). Europe’s longest river, it originates in theBlack Forest of Germany and empties into the Black Sea. Its cool, temperate, mari-time climate’s rainfall is heaviest in spring and summer, although the lower basinis sometimes affected by drought. Irrigation is extensive, especially from Hungary ondownward, and the river is a major source of drinking water for most of its riparians.

The physiography of the basin gives the Danube significant energy potential. In theUpper Danube, the river skirts the Bavarian Highlands and then flows through theBohemian Massif before cutting through the Lower Carpathians to enter the MiddleBasin east of Vienna. The gradient and drop in elevation provides for over 40 hydro-power stations on the Upper Danube (Linnerooth, 1990). The flood plain along themiddle and lower portions of the river is broad, especially below Budapest and informer Yugoslavia. It then narrows at the Iron Gate, where there are two very largehydroelectric projects, one in Romania and one in F.R. Yugoslavia, to broaden againin the Lower Basin, and expand into the Danube Delta—a large, natural wetland, which


Fig

.5.

The

Dan

ube

Riv

erB

asin

.


Table 4Danube Basin


1977–present Access of Middle and German and US Collapse of Soviet(discussions began in Lower Danube states investment in Communist Empire1950s)—dispute to potential investment Hungarian industries—between Hungary and petrochemicals, food Inclusion of EuropeanSlovakia over Ability of Germany and beverages and Commission, UNDPGabcikovo– and Austria to pay for tourism and other internationalNagymaros project upstream pollution agencies in Danube

control Facilitation of inter- EnvironmentalProliferation of other country movement and Programme, 1991water development UN agencies commerceprojects (49 planned or Environmental partiesexisting power plants European Union in Germany andas of 1990)a Austria and nascent

European Commission movement in Hungary1977 WHO warning onwater pollution European Bank for

Reconstruction and1986 toxic waste Developmentrelease on the Rhine—reaction by Danube European Investmentriparians Bank

Nordic InvestmentBank

World Bank

aLinnerooth (1990, p. 635).

is an ecologically rich and diverse habitat. Fishing is important in the Lower Basin, andtourism in the Black Sea, where Romania, Moldova and Ukraine are basin members.

Mining of bauxite, gold, copper and lignite takes place, especially in Hungary andSerbia. However, most of the river’s pollutants come from upstream dams, from oilrefineries scattered along the river, or from large, industrialized urban centers likeLinz, Vienna, Bratislava, Budapest, Belgrade and Constanta.

The most urgent issues relating to water quality are differing standards for waterquality among cobasin countries; competing demands created by the exploitation ofthe river for the generation of electric power and for transportation and rapid urbandevelopment; and potential for the accidental releases of toxic chemicals. With regardto dissolved oxygen content, the river is generally classified as Class II.5 Evidently,

5 European rivers are often classified on a scale from I to IV. Class I denotes excellent quality withhigh oxygen content sufficient to support trout; Class II has sufficient oxygen to support fish; Class III


the Danube has a good capacity for self purification with respect to biodegradablepollutants. However, dissolved oxygen does not account for non-biodegradable andpersistent toxic pollutants, including heavy metals and compounds of higher molecu-lar weight. This toxic pollution threatens the use of the river as a potable watersource and is of substantial concern to the cobasin countries, since the river is amajor source of drinking water in Hungary, F.R. Yugoslavia, and Romania, andsupplies an important part of the drinking water in Austria, Slovakia and Bulgaria(Linnerooth, 1990).

The pollution problem was recognized as early as 1977, when the World HealthOrganization warned that pollution controls on the Danube were inadequate (WorldHealth Organization, 1977). Rapid economic development requiring large volumesof water used for hydroelectric and industrial purposes has accelerated the deterio-ration of the river’s water quality. Only in the 1990s have some urban centers,especially in those countries in the upper reaches of the Danube, begun to constructsewage treatment plants.

Danubian hydrogeopolitics reflects the constantly shifting balance of power withinthe basin. Prior to World War II, the administration of the river was controlled bythe European Commission of the Danube (The Treaty of Versailles, 28 June 1919),which established an international regime for free navigation of the Danube for allEuropean countries from Ulm in Germany to Braila in Romania at the head of theDanube Delta. Germany repudiated internationalization in 1936 and forced the dis-solution of the navigation (1939) and international commissions (1940), as it did forthe Rhine, Elbe and Oder.

The Belgrade Convention has governed the river since 1948, and remains in force.During the period of Soviet dominance, free navigation was eliminated and itsexclusive control placed with the cobasin countries, most of which were Soviet satel-lites. The Convention set up the Danube Commission with quasi-legislative powersover navigation and river shipping inspection. Austria joined the Commission in1959 and West Germany in 1963.

There have been several agreements and treaties (mostly bilateral) on the Danube,some of the early ones touching on issues relating to water quality. For example: in1950, Hungary and the USSR signed a convention to prevent floods and regulatethe River Tisza; in 1957, Hungary and Yugoslavia signed an agreement concerningfishing in frontier waters; Czechoslovakia (CSSR) and Poland (a source of Danubetributaries) signed an agreement concerning use of frontier water resources in 1958;in 1967 Austria and the CSSR signed a treaty relating to management of frontierwaters;6 and most specifically, in 1971, West Germany and the CSSR formed a local

denotes water with little oxygen as a result of biological pollution; Class IV denotes extreme organicpollution (Linnerooth, 1990, footnote 69).

6 The workings of the Austrian–Czechoslovakian Border Commission in an agreement within this Com-mission on common definitions and testing protocols for measuring the water quality of the frontier waters,present a good example of the incremental procedures set out in the Danube Declaration (Linnerooth,1990). This could now provide a model for basin-wide agreement on data collection for water qualitymeasurements.


(nongovernmental) commission dealing with pollution and management of frontierwaters (World Health Organization, 1982).

All of the cobasin countries took the next step in Bucharest in 1985, when theyaddressed the water quality issue in the non-binding Declaration of the Danube Coun-tries to Cooperate on Questions Concerning the Water Management of the Danube(known also as the Bucharest or Danube Declaration).7 This set the stage for achiev-ing collaboration, at first through mainly bilateral agreements.

At Sofia in 1991, after the collapse of Soviet communism, the parties movedbeyond bilateralism with a program including not only all riparians, but internationalorganizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The Environmental Pro-gramme for the Danube River Basin is an integrated program for basin-wide manage-ment, improvement and control of water quality, including the reduction of pollutionloads entering the Black Sea. Unlike the Danube Commission established in 1948,whose membership was limited to riparian states, the Programme’s membershipincludes the cobasin states, the European Commission, the United Nations Develop-ment Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP),the World Bank, the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and other NGOs andinvestment banks (Bingham et al., 1994). However, the regional coordinating mech-anisms of the Programme are ad hoc in nature and without enforcement mechanisms.

The large number of Danube riparians makes for complex hydrogeopoliticalrelations. The upper and most prosperous cobasin states, Germany and Austria, andto a lesser extent, mid-basin Slovakia, use the Danube essentially for industrial andwaste disposal purposes and benefit greatly from its hydroelectricity. The less-developed, lower cobasin countries—Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova and theUkraine—are more dependent on the river for drinking water, irrigation, fisheriesand on the tourist industry at the Black Sea into which the river flows. Hungary, amiddle cobasin state that receives little exploitable energy from the Danube, isrequired to make large investments in adapting its wetlands to a navigable channel,and is concerned with the pollution that originates primarily upstream and threatensthe large quantities of water it uses for drinking and irrigation (Benedek and Laszlo,1981; Linnerooth-Bayer and Murcott, 1996). Thus, there is a considerable mismatchbetween countries at the lower reaches, which would benefit from pollution control,and polluters like Germany and Austria, with the resources for providing this control,but with the least to gain economically from improved Danube water quality.

With the region’s political turbulence and fragmentation brought about by theretreat of East European communism, new frameworks for basin-wide cooperationare being sought, and long-restrained environmental concerns have been unleashed.Agrarian and “green” movements in Hungary are free to challenge the pollutingpractices of Slovakia’s antiquated military heavy industry, a challenge being takenup also by Slovakia’s own environmental groups. Downstream countries, which are

7 It provided that, “The governments of the Danube states will endeavor to solve, stepwise, throughbilateral and multilateral agreements, the concrete problems of the Danube, especially with respect to itswater quality, which is of life-giving importance to the Danube countries” (Danube Declaration, cited inLinnerooth, 1990, pp. 645–646).


interested in building up their tourist industries, are now politically free to pressureupstream states to reduce pollution loads that enter the Black Sea. All along theriver, riparians voice their concerns about oil spills and chemical runoffs.

A factor which helps to explain regional cooperation is the activity of European,international and non-governmental agencies within the region. The Middle andLower Danube states have opted for a free market economy and open political sys-tem. In so doing, they need considerable aid from the European Union (EU), fromthe World Bank, from United Nations agencies and from NGOs. These, in turn, havestrong environmental concerns and exercise pressure on Danubian states to developcooperative policies in the sphere of unified river management and control.

Regional compacts have not displaced bi- and multilateralism. For example, theconflict over the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros (G/N) project between Hungary and Slo-vakia came before the International Court of Justice because there is no region-widemechanism with jurisdiction. In September 1997, the Court ruled that the 1977 treatybetween Czechoslovakia and Hungary was valid. Hungary, therefore, had to sign anaccord with Slovakia on 27 February 1998 to complete its part of the Gavcikovoelectric project (the Slovakian part having been completed) and to construct a damat either Nagymaros or Pilismarot. Although the Court ordered that the plan of oper-ation should take into account environmental, as well as economic, factors, Hung-arian environmental groups remain strongly opposed (New York Times, 1998). Oneof the Hungarian environmentalists’ complaints was that Slovakia’s shifting of theriver in 1992 into a sealed canal as part of the project, endangered the rare anddelicate species of the ecosystem of an ancient Danube delta (formed by the PannonSea that used to fill the Carpathian Basin (Columbia Gazetteer, 1998, p. 789).

A drawback of this type of bilateral negotiation is the use of overly intricateprocedural mechanisms, too complex for the less developed parties and not suitablefor application beyond the specific problem. The need is for basin-wide compactson water quality and sustainable use. Ultimately, an overall Danube-wide politicalcompact that will link together the various ecological issues is the only guarantee forreaching the goal of regional cooperation and coordination on environmental quality.

Elbe

In its upper basin, the Elbe (or Labe) rises in the Sudeten Mountains to be joinedby its main tributary, the Vltava, the source of which is in the Czech Forest, justsouth of Prague (Fig. 6, Table 5). The river cuts through the high Bohemian Plateau,and then, in the Middle Basin, through the Saxon Uplands, before winding throughthe North European Plain. The ice-free Elbe is navigable for 940 of its 1165-kmlength. It is a superb waterway for transporting goods which, historically, supportedthe largest river craft fleet in Germany (Rauschning, 1992; Schumann and Simon,1994). Berlin, too, is situated within the Elbe’s catchment basin, being connected tothe main river by the canalized Havel (the Mittleland Canal).

Lignite and metallic minerals in Bohemia and Saxony provided an early basis formanufacturing, and the rise of an uninterrupted string of urban centers from Pragueto Dresden to Leipzig, Halle and Magdeburg. From there to Hamburg, industrializ-


Fig. 6. The Elbe Basin.

ation gives way to agriculture on the arable, but infertile, podsolic soils of the NorthGerman Plain. The basin’s cool, temperate, maritime climate provides year-roundrainfall, but because of acidity and leaching, the soils require heavy applicationsof fertilizers.

Reunification of Germany in 1990 and the Czech Republic’s desire for goodrelations with a unified Germany, have provided a political opening for the raisingof an Elbe issue that had long been dormant—pollution. The outdated heavy indus-trial centers of former East Germany, with emphasis on chemicals and steel products,


Table 5Elbe Basin

Flash-points Financial capacities Globalization/ Political windows ofregionalization of environmental opportunityindustry

1989 Public Western German German and other 1990—reunification ofdiscovery that Elbe investment in foreign investment Germany—West Germanwater quality rebuilding Eastern in modernizing standards applied to Eastdegradation matched Germany Czech industries Germanythat of the Rhinebefore its cleanup EU financing Inclusion of East Germany

within EU framework

1990—EU membership inInternational Commission forProtection of the River Elbe

Emergence of Czechenvironmental movement

1998—German Green Partyjoins Socialist Governmentcoalition

paid little attention to the pollution caused by their smokestack factories. The Elbe’sCzech portions also contributed to a good share of the problem because of the indus-trial waste and untreated sewage from Prague and other Czech cities. Fish takenfrom the river are mostly inedible, and mercury, copper, phosphates, nitrates andammonia are among the pollutants discharged into the North Sea (Cole and Cole,1993). To enable the Elbe to reach EU standards, Germany has committed 211 billionDM by the year 2000 (Schumann and Simon, 1994), two-thirds of which is for wastewater treatment.

The international institutions that have been established to act with regard to theElbe have dealt with two sets of concerns—navigation and water management. In1815, The Act of the Congress of Vienna created institutions to assure free, non-discriminatory navigation of the River. In 1919, the Treaty of Versailles establishedthe International Commission of the Elbe, which newly-created Czechoslovakia wasable to join. Three years later, the Act of Navigation of the Elbe was signed, whichincluded, not only Germany and Czechoslovakia, but also Great Britain, France, Italyand Belgium. The Convention regulated the principles for free navigation, the cus-toms regime for transit, and ports and navigation permits, with special courts to dealwith controversies concerning navigation (Rauschning, 1992). In those times pol-lution was not a problem and no mention of it was made in the Treaty.

Seizure of the Sudetenland in 1938, and, in the following year, establishment ofa German Protectorate over Bohemia and Moravia, made a “German” river of theElbe. With the defeat of Germany in 1945, no international attempt was made to


return to thestatus quo anteand reestablish the River’s international regime. Whileduring the Communist period the Elbe became heavily polluted, West Germany andthe EU had little influence on lack of water quality standards within East Germanyand Czechoslovakia.

The reunification of Germany and the overthrow of the Czech communist regimechanged the situation abruptly. Public interest groups within the former FederalRepublic of Germany (FRG) could now bring pressure upon upstream water manage-ment practices, and a Czech environmental movement has been able to emerge. Thequestions of water quality were widely discussed, and FRG environmental concernsbecame priorities for former East Germany as well. Expansive goals for improvingthe water quality of the Elbe were realistic because West Germany had assumed theheavy burden of rebuilding the East, modernizing it and helping it to achieve thehigher environmental standards which the FRG had already attained. In 1989 theElbe’s water quality was comparable to the quality of the Rhine River in the early1970s, during its period of maximum pollution (Schumann and Simon, 1994).Because the Rhine had been successfully cleaned up, it was politically expedient forBonn to seek no less for the Elbe.

As a consequence, and nearly two centuries after the Act of the Congress ofVienna, the International Commission for the Protection of the River Elbe (ICPE)was established and has shifted its emphasis to the improvement of water quality.ICPE was signed in October 1990 by Germany, the then Czechoslovakia and theEU. Its purpose is to enable the Elbe to be used for drinking water supply andirrigation, for restoring the natural ecosystem and for reducing the waste load carriedby the Elbe into the North Sea.

Acceptance of recommendations of the working groups is at the ministerial level(Ministers of Environment for both States) and by a representative of the EU.Implementation has been slower than anticipated due to lack of money and, in Ger-many in particular, changes in administration and legal regimes which accompaniedthe reunification and extended the planning stages. Thus, of the 62 waste treatmentplants targeted by the Action Program group to be constructed by 1993, only 15 hadbeen built (Schumann and Simon, 1994). Nevertheless, significant reductions in theElbe’s industrial discharge have been achieved in Germany, and more incrementalimprovements can be found in the Czech Republic. A Water Quality network hasbeen established, and a warning system is in existence. A strong research programhas been initiated in both countries.

A unified water management policy for the Elbe has become a realistic goalbecause of the fundamentally changed geopolitical setting. The Elbe is now a “west-ern” basin in a rapidly uniting Western Europe. What is instructive about the ICPEand what augurs well for its long-term success, is that the three participants haveinterests in common. Germany needs Czech upstream cooperation to reduce pol-lution. The Czech Republic needs German financial and technological help to meetits responsibilities in building treatment plants, reducing industrial waste loads anddeveloping measurement networks and warning systems. Both countries need the EU.

The EU is committed to regional standards, including improvement of North Seawaters, for all of the coastal states. Its presence as an equal within ICPE provides


political reassurance to the Czechs against domination of the Commission by thelarger German partner, as well as an important financing stream. For the CzechRepublic, strong economic and political relations with a unified Germany, includinga cooperative framework for the Elbe, are a key to its hopes for joining the EUsoon—a hope that has been fanned by its recent admission to NATO.

Rhine

Measures dealing with water quality in the Rhine are among the most rigorous inthe world (Fig. 7, Table 6). The river rises in the glaciers of the Swiss Alps, cuttingits way through the Black Forest and the Vosges Mountains in its upper course,where it serves as the boundary between Germany and France. Below Strasbourg,the valley broadens and then, entering the Middle Basin, narrows once again beforeentering the North German Plain at Bonn and Koln. From here it forms the LowerBasin and Delta, a broad flood plain enlarged by the junction of the Meuse with theRhine at its North Sea estuary. There, the port of Rotterdam, or Europort, has becomethe largest in the world.

Few rivers in the world are as heavily populated and urbanized as the Rhine,which is 1326 km in length and home to many inland ports, like Basel, Strasbourgand Dortmund. To facilitate navigation, the river, Europe’s busiest waterway, hasbeen straightened over the centuries and regulated by dikes, dams and parallel canals.In addition, the Rhine–Main-Danube canal in Bavaria links Europe’s two great rivers.

The early basis for industrialization of the Rhine was the coal of the Lower Basinand the Ruhr. The steel industry grew up around it. Oil refineries were then developedfrom the Delta through the Lower Basin to the Middle Basin, becoming the basisfor large petrochemical and pharmaceutical industries. Potash at Mulhouse and saltat Basel supported the growth of chemicals in the Upper Rhine.

While large cities, like Basel, Strasbourg, Karlsruhe, Mannheim, Mainz and Kob-lenz dot the Upper and Middle Basin, the greatest densities are achieved in the LowerRhine connurbation that binds Bonn and Koln to Dusseldorf, Duisburg, Essen andWesel, and in the Delta, where it bifurcates into the Waal and the Lek at Nijmegen.There the Dutch cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Haag form the greatmetropolis known as Randstad.

Intensive industrialization, urbanization, agriculture and navigation over manydecades have endangered the river’s use for drinking water, fishing and tourism.

Until the 1950s, the riparian states had primarily confined their operations to singleissues, especially navigation and electric power.8 In 1950, the riparians—France,Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Luxembourg—created, on an informalbasis, the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine against Pollution(ICPR), in order to study the river’s water quality. There was no legal commitmentto follow its recommendations, and therefore its effectiveness was limited (De Vil-

8 There are a few earlier bilateral treaties concerning transport of hazardous wastes.


Fig. 7. The Rhine Basin.


Table 6Rhine Basin


1986 Chemical fire near High level of European Transnational 1976—decisive role ofBasel—200-km stretch prosperity petrochemical and the EC/EU in joiningof the Rhine became pharmaceutical ICPRecologically dead EU cost sharing in ICPR industries

Threats of law suits by European commonEuroport currency

Dutch farmers’ lawsuit Eurport’s importanceagainst France for to all of the ripariansrefusal to ratify 1976agreement on chloridepollution from Alsatianpotash mines (ratified1985)

leneuve, 1996). At the same time, agreements were being concluded for the protec-tion against pollution of some of the Rhine’s tributaries.

In 1963, the ICPR member states decided to strengthen the Commission by for-malizing its existence through the Berne Convention. Its mandate includes the studyof the origins and magnitude of Rhine pollution and proposals to the national govern-ments of measures to control it, preparation of further agreements, implementationof projects assigned to it by member governments, and annual reporting. Decisionsmust be agreed upon unanimously. The urgency of ICPR’s work was highlightedby the fact that, in the 1970s, oxygen saturation was sometimes as low as 40%because of untreated waste water with high levels of phosphates and nitrogen. Thisled to the construction of a number of waste water treatment plants by Germany.

In 1976, the ICPR agreement was amended to enable the European Communities(EC)—now the European Union—to join. The focus of ICPR was on chloride andchemical pollution. France’s Alsatian potash mines contributed more than half ofthe Rhine chlorides, the greatest impact of which was on the Netherlands. Dutchfarmers brought suit against France because of this chloride damage. In addition,Lake Ijssel, a major source of drinking water for the Dutch, suffered from an unac-ceptable level of salts. A major dispute between France and the Netherlands tookplace when the French parliament refused to ratify the 1976 agreement on chlorides,and did not do so until 1985.

Another focus for Dutch resentment was the pollution suffered by Rotterdam’sEuroport from sediments generated by the upstream industrial users. The Dutch thre-atened to sue for damages, and even negotiated separate agreements with industriesalong the Rhine to meet pollution reduction targets. In most cases, these were met


by 1992 (De Villeneuve, 1996), as upstream riparians have become increasinglydependent on the world’s largest port.

Implementation of the agreement on chemicals was slow until 1986, when adangerous chemical fire broke out at Schweizerhalle near Basel and a 200-km stretchof the Rhine became ecologically dead. This catastrophe served as a flash-point, andthe political reaction was the initiation of the Rhine Action Programme (RAP) atthe ICPR’s Conference of Ministers. RAP is intended to achieve by the year 2000(a) the return of species, (b) the use of Rhine water for drinking, and (c) clean-upof the sediment of harmful substances (ICPR, 1987). The Programme has proved adecisive success, and its targets are well on the way to being met. By 1994 theoxygen level had again reached over 90 percent (ICPR, 1994a). However, althoughcoal mining has almost disappeared and steel manufacturing has declined signifi-cantly, increasing amounts of contaminants remain a matter of concern, with themain sources being the waste water treatment plants, motor vehicles, power plants,and above all, agriculture. The ICPR also adopted, in 1991, an Ecological MasterPlan (ICPR, 1994b) encompassing a program for the return of long-distancemigratory fish, such as salmon, with targets that are even more challenging.

The hydrogeopolitics of the Rhine Basin has a unique dimension—the decisiverole of the EC/EU. Its joining ICPR in 1976 to focus on water pollution was inevi-table because of its broader environmental legislation mandates (De Villeneuve,1996). The six EU member states of the Rhine Basin (Switzerland is not a member)can no longer conclude agreements with non-EU states on matters falling within EUcompetence. On such matters, the EU exercises the exclusive right to vote by castingthe aggregate number of votes held by its member states (Meibner, 1992). The EU’sfull partnership in the ICPR involves its sharing the costs of implementing anti-pollution measures.

The historic tendency of upstream polluters, like Switzerland, France and Ger-many, to ignore the concerns of the delta riparian, the Netherlands, has been over-come in great measure by the active role of the EU which has emerged as a strongdefender of both urban consumers and farmers in their struggle against the river’spollution.

Conclusions

Analysis of the impact of the four forces on each of the river basins presentedillustrates the utility of a comparative structured framework. In the Ganges, despitethe severity of the flash-points, the lack of financial resources and the regional/globalindustrial influences, have made it impossible to take basin-wide advantage ofNepal’s hydropower potential and of those political windows of environmentalopportunity that have thus far presented themselves. Perhaps the devastating floodof 1998 will prove the catalyst for building on the recent accords to develop a com-prehensive flood control and other anti-pollution programs. When the Ganges andother rivers burst their banks as a result of heavy monsoonal rains, the flood claimedthe lives of over 1000 people in India.


In Bangladesh, the consequences were even more catastrophic as two-thirds ofthe country was flooded, over 700 people killed and 22 million people made homelessor marooned. Estimated costs for both emergency aid and reconstruction for Bangla-desh alone are $880 million (The Economist, 1998). As international and other donoragencies organize their long-range aid, they may be in a position to use this assistanceto pressure the Ganges riparians to build on recent accords and institute a basin-wide program to mitigate future disasters.

The Mekong basin has not made much more progress than the Ganges, despiteThailand’s burst of economic development due to global industrialization, and therelatively rapid rates of economic growth of China and Vietnam. China has minimalregional concerns and Vietnam is just beginning to break out of its regional andglobal isolation.

China’s overwhelming power in the region drowns out reactions to its dam-build-ing flash-points by the other Mekong riparians. Thailand’s floods were exacerbatedby deforestation, and led to a nationwide ban on commercial logging. The environ-mentalists have been highly active in opposing the government’s large dam projects,but four have already been built. In addition, the momentum of economic develop-ment leads the Thai government to support proposed dam building near their bordersin Cambodia, since the dams would provide power for Thailand as well. Here Thaienvironmentalists have been silent on the negative environmental consequences ofsuch dams (Sneddon, 1998).

Early international interest in the development of Southeast Asia was side-trackedby the Vietnam and Cambodian wars. Availability of capital since then, has stimu-lated hydro-electric dam building, especially in Laos, the power from which has beenexported to Thailand. However, most foreign investment capital has been concen-trated in Thailand—the region’s largest economy by far, and in such industries asmining, lumbering, paper and pulp, tin smelting, oil refining, electronics and canningwhich produce considerable pollution. International financing of agricultural develop-ment throughout the Mekong has led to heavy pesticide and fertilizer pollution.

While the purpose of the Mekong Commission is to encourage China and/orMyanmar to join, only the Lower Basin countries are members. Even as a member,Thailand has been increasingly reluctant to cooperate in anti-pollution mattersbecause of its own economic development priorities.

While the end of conflict in the Lower Mekong has opened political windows ofenvironmental opportunity, such opportunities have yet to be seized. The 1998 fin-ancial upheavals in Southeast Asia (Thailand was the first to experience this) andJapan’s deep recession, reduce the prospects even further.

Progress in combating pollution in the US–Mexican shared basins is slower thanmight be expected, given the seriousness of the flash-points and the financialresources of the US. Regional economic interaction is of prime importance to bothcountries and layers of institutions and agencies have been established. However,because of the piece-meal nature of this bureaucratic growth and the narrow focusthat they have thus far taken, the full potential for water quality improvement hasyet to be realized. Another basic problem is the incompatibility between Mexico’s


centralized system of water law and administration, and the decentralized nature ofthe US system (each of the four US border states have different regulatory tools).

The salinity crisis in the Colorado basin, and urban/industrial wastes from Mexicancities along both rivers, especially the Rio Grande, have been environmental actioncatalysts. However, it is NAFTA which now provides the unique window of environ-mental opportunity to develop a comprehensive plan. Negotiations over NAFTAbrought long-standing water quality issues to the forefront, as US environmentalgroups found a ready ally in American trade unions concerned over the loss ofmanufacturing jobs. NAFTA’s environmental side accords were the result of thisjoint political pressure. Since then, NAFTA’s success in creating Mexico’s maquilad-ores has also brought about the rapid expansion of Mexican border cities. Uncon-trolled industrial and urban wastes has aroused the concerns of cities on the US sideof the rivers. These have increased the pressures on Washington to seek environmen-tal remedies for the pollution, outweighing the lobbying efforts of US farm intereststhat for so many decades had been responsible for so much pollution.

The financial ability of the US makes implementation of environmental measureseconomically feasible. Moreover, the importance of American financial aid to Mex-ico serves as leverage for gaining the latter’s cooperation, even though its industriesand cities have lagged behind their American counterparts in implementing somewater quality mitigation measures.

The flash-points in the Danube have been too limited to serve as catalysts forregion-wide actions. Moreover, the financial capacities of the riparians greatly vary,from such wealthy countries as Germany and Austria, and the emerging market ofHungary, to the depressed economies of the other basin countries. Conflicts withinand between states mitigate against a sense of regional interest, and internationalinvestment has been concentrated in the already developed economies. Despite theweakness of these three forces, it is the political developments that are pointing tothe windows of environmental opportunity.

Neither of the flash-points—the 1977 WHO warning that Danube water pollutioncontrols were inadequate, or the dispute between Hungary and Slovakia over GN—spurred major new steps to mitigate pollution. Upstream Germany and Austria, whichare major sources of pollution, were unresponsive and took little initiative to seekbasin-wide controls. However, in the 1990s the lessons from the Rhine, influencedthe Danube cobasin states, jointly with NGO participation, to begin planning for anintegrated program for the basin-wide control of water quality.

Nevertheless, the financial capacities of Germany and Austria, as well as the Euro-pean and international agencies that could put teeth into the Danube EnvironmentalProgramme, have not yet mobilized. Part of the problem is the lack of enforcementpower of the Programme, so that bilateralism remains the dominant negotiation modeeven as basin-wide planning is conceptually accepted.

Another problem is the multiplicity of riparians that are divided by ancient rivalriesand differing economic development goals—e.g. industrialization in Slovakia andHungary versus tourism in the Lower Danube. Conflict and political chaos in formerYugoslavia add to the difficulty of forging a region-wide agreement (an insightful


summary of the difficulties and accomplishments which have emerged after a “dec-ade of cooperation” can be found in Danubius, 1998).

There may be cause for optimism in that German and US investment in Hungarianindustries may become subject to pressures from their environmental movements toaddress river pollution, particularly at its heaviest stretch between Vienna and Budap-est. Moreover, the strong environmental movements in Germany and Austria, andthe nascent one in Hungary offer a political window of environmental opportunityto re-configure the Danube environmental program to enable effective basin-wideaction to be taken.

For the Elbe, the reunification of Germany brought with it both public outrage atthe degree to which it was being used virtually as a sewer, and the potential ofGerman and EU investment to remedy the situation. The Czech Republic’s reorien-tation to the West created a viable regional framework for adopting basin-wideimproved water quality measures. In addition to reunification, political windows ofenvironmental opportunity have been created by establishment of IPCE, and theinfluence of environmental movements.

When most of the Elbe Basin came under unified Germany’s stewardship in 1990,it came as a shock to the West Germans that the Elbe’s water quality degradationmatched that of the Rhine before its cleanup. The commitment of the Federal govern-ment to modernize East Germany at the initial cost estimate of $500 billion hadprovisions for substantial capital to clean up the river. This was supplemented byEU financing. To bring the Elbe up to acceptable EU standards, however, it is alsonecessary to provide the Czech Republic with German and EU funds. In addition,modernization of Czech industry is underway, with investments from German andother European industries that are far more environmentally sensitive than were Com-munist Czechoslovakia’s nationalized industries.

The ICPE was established by Germany, former Czechoslovakia and the EUimmediately after the reunification of Germany and the creation of a non-communistCzech government, thus making the Elbe a fully “western” basin. The various polit-ical windows of environmental opportunity noted have been enhanced by the CzechRepublic’s strong desire to join the EU. Other important political factors are theemergence of a Czech environmental movement, and the increased clout of Ger-many’s Green Party within the new Socialist government coalition.

All four forces have combined to make the Rhine a unique success story of waterquality improvement. The flash-points were dramatic; the financial resources arereadily available; regional and global forces permeate the basin; and the EU hasbeen a decisive political catalyst.

The Rhine, like the Elbe, is among the most urbanized and industrialized basinsin the world. In addition, it is one of the busiest water transportation arteries, andby the 1970s had reached pollution crisis proportions. The compelling flash-pointsincluded the law suit of the Dutch farmers against France for its refusal to sign thechloride pollution agreement, threats of lawsuits by Europort over polluted sedi-ments, and the 1986 chemical fire near Basel.

The high level of prosperity amongst all of the Rhine’s riparians has provided thefinancial capacity to restore the river to high standards of water quality within two


decades. EU cost sharing makes a significant contribution. Regionalization, andindeed globalization, within the Rhine basin has advanced the effort. In particular, thetransnational petrochemical and pharmaceutical industries have found it expedient toconform to EU standards as quickly as possible.

The decisive political window of environmental opportunity was the 1976 amend-ment of the ICPR agreement to include the EC (now the EU) to join. EU has emergedas the strong defender of both urban consumers and farmers, making it impossiblefor the upstream riparians to continue to ignore the problems they had historicallycreated for the delta riparians.

As water quality gains importance as a major issue in international river basinnegotiations, a structured approach to the analysis of the issues and possibilitiesshould be helpful. Basin-wide agreements, though difficult to reach, can be attainedwhen they are clearly focused, fulfill the needs of the concerned parties, and areafforded the required resources. The forces identified in this study are meant toprovide some guidance to the factors conducive to failure or success.

Acknowledgements

Special thanks to Stanley Waterman and Uri Shamir, who read the draft manu-scripts and provided invaluable insights, comments and encouragement. Thethoroughness of the referees’ remarks contributed significantly to the quality of thepaper. I gratefully acknowledge, also, the support and guidance of John O’Loughlinin structuring the final version.

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Water quality in international river basins

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