HOSTAGE TO FATE: A STORY OF RAILA AMOLO ODINGA

Published by the Nairobi ChronicleWritten by the Chief EditorEmail: nairobichronicle@live.com

Contents Introduction The 1980s – Detention and Exile Taking up from the late Jaramogi Co-operation with Moi Moi's treachery Joining hands with Kibaki Falling out with Kibaki The 2007 General Elections Kenya's plunge into violence Raila Odinga as Prime Minister of Kenya

IntroductionI first heard about Raila after the 1982 coup attempt. I was in school back then and the coup really shook every Kenyan. For the first time, it looked like Kenya was going the way of other African countries. Luckily, the coup attempt by junior Kenya Airforce officers was thwarted within hours. And then there were the ramifications.

The Kenya Airforce was disbanded and the entire rank and file sent into detention. Most were released slowly over ensuing months, their lives in ruins. The coup plotters had fled to Tanzania, but they were repatriated back to Kenya, tried and hanged. Thousands of students, lecturers, trade unionists, politicians, security officers as well as ordinary folk lost their jobs, their pensions and sometimes their lives.

It is in this fearful atmosphere that Raila Odinga truly broke into the limelight as his own man. Prior to 1982, Raila used to be known as, “the son of Jaramogi Oginga Odinga,” and everything he did was viewed as an extension of his father's will.

Jaramogi was Kenya's first Vice President after independence in 1963 but fell out with Jomo Kenyatta over ideological differences and power sharing. He left Kenyatta's government and formed an opposition party in 1966 that was promptly banned. Throughout the late 1960s and 1970s, Jaramogi was in and out of detention facilities because of his socialist leanings at a time when Kenya was pro-West during the Cold War. By 1982, the Odinga family had been labelled as renegades in Kenya's politics.

The 1980s – Detention and ExileKenyatta died in August 1978. On assuming power, his vice president Daniel arap Moi released all political detainees while promising greater openness in politics. The coup attempt of 1982 changed Moi's reformist leanings though and he cracked down on dissent with a vengeance. The Odinga family, with their history of political rebellion were an obvious target but Moi, respected Jaramogi, who was by then in his 70s. His politically active son, Raila became the obvious substitute. But there was another reason why Raila was detained and tortured by Moi's agents.

Nigerian biographer, Dr. Babafemi Adesina Badejo, talks about Raila's involvement in the 1982 coup in the book, Raila Odinga: An Enigma in Kenyan politics (2006). As it turned out, the junior Airforce officers involved in the coup attempt were from the same Luo tribe as Raila. Badejo writes that Raila did meet the masterminds of the coup attempt and even participated in logistics. For his involvement, Raila was jailed without trial for six years until February 1988.

In 2006, following the launch of Dr Badejo's book, Raila himself admitted his involvement in planning for the coup attempt. Raila defends his actions saying that he was fighting dictatorship at a time when Kenya was a one-party state. Critics point to the admission as evidence of Raila's violent, revolutionary streak.

After releasing Raila from detention in 1988, Moi still harboured deep suspicion over him. Moi held public rallies across the countryside warning Kenyans about Raila's, “violent nature.” Moi was worried about Raila's capacity to raise large numbers of youth to help him pursue his goals.

Moi was not averse to the use of violence for political ends. As the Cold War was ending, Kenya was under pressure to undertake democratic reforms, including allowing multi party politics. Opponents of Moi were continually harassed, subjected to show trials, detained without trial, tortured and killed. Moi didn't overcome his suspicions of Raila and ordered for his detention in September 1988, just 6 months after releasing him.

Raila was released again in June 1989 and promptly got involved in opposition politics. His father, Jaramogi, was actively agitating for a return to multi-party democracy alongside such personalities as Kenneth Matiba and Charles Rubia. Matiba and Rubia had been close allies of Moi before falling out with him in the

late 1980s. However, Moi again did not arrest the aging Jaramogi and, in his place, put Raila into custody in July 1990 for another one year. Following his release in June 1991, Raila fled into exile to Norway.

This is how Wikipedia describes subsequent events:

At the time of Raila's departure to Norway, the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD), a movement formed to agitate for the return of multi-party democracy to Kenya, was newly formed. In February 1992, Raila returned to join FORD, then led by his father Jaramogi Oginga Odinga. He was elected Vice Chairman of the General Purposes Committee of the party. In the months running up to the 1992 General Election, FORD split into Ford Kenya, led by Raila's father Jaramogi, and FORD-Asili led by Kenneth Matiba. Raila became Ford-Kenya's Deputy Director of Elections. Raila won the Langata Constituency parliamentary seat, previously held by Philip Leakey of Moi's party, KANU.

In the 1992 General Elections, Moi won 36% of the vote in the first multi party elections in close to 30 years. Ethnic tensions in the country intensified, setting the stage for the chaos of 2008. The genesis of contemporary ethnic clashes in Kenya lay in the Rift Valley province, home to Moi's Kalenjin ethnic group.

Kenya has eight provinces. According to electoral law, a winning presidential candidate must get at least 25% of votes in not less than five provinces in addition to a simple majority of national votes. From the outset, it was obvious that Kenneth Matiba would get a majority of votes in Central, Nairobi and possibly, Eastern Provinces. Jaramogi had a chance of getting at least 25% in his native Nyanza, in Western and Nairobi.

Matiba, a Kikuyu, also had a strong possibilities of getting 25% in the Rift Valley province thanks to the significant Kikuyu settler population. The Kalenjin, fearing that Moi could lose the presidency, began a campaign of ethnic cleansing from the Rift Valley in order to ensure that Moi took the province. Huge chunks of the Rift Valley were declared, “KANU zones,” in reference to Moi's political party. Moi and his cronies went back to parliament unopposed.

Ethnic wars began in 1992 pitting the Kalenjin with almost all settler communities in the Rift Valley. It was not only the Kikuyu who were affected but large numbers of Luo, Luhya and Kisii. Non-Kalenjin tribes in the Rift Valley were refered to as, “madoa doa,” meaning, “specks of dirt.” The Rift Valley is also home to the Pokot and Maasai tribes and their politicians were drawn into the pro-Moi alliance. Consequently, Kikuyu, Luo and Luhya settlers were evicted from Pokot and Maasai areas especially around Narok, Enoosupukia and Kapenguria.

The pro-Moi ethnic alliance began calling for Majimbo, a form of federalism. According to such personalities as the late Kipkalya Kones, late Shariff Nassir,

William Ntimama and late Paul Chepkok, a federal system of government would ensure that each ethnic group governed itself and had monopoly over jobs, land and commerce within its enclave. The comments were targetted at the Kikuyu, who have managed to emigrate and settle in other parts of the country mostly for economic reasons. Because the Kikuyu settlers had a relatively higher standard of living due to commercial activities, the calls for ethnic based federalism proved quite popular in the Rift Valley and parts of the Coast province.

With the Luo tribe also facing persecution due to its oppositionist leanings, both Jaramogi and Raila Odinga condemned Moi's tactics. 30 years earlier, it was Jaramogi and Kenyatta who had turned Kenya into a unitary republic after rejecting federalism.

In response to calls for federalism by pro Moi politicians, Raila is quoted as saying that a call for federalism was akin to the ethnic balkanization of Kenya.

Taking up from the late JaramogiJaramogi died in 1994, having made peace with Moi through a co-operation agreement between KANU and his FORD-K party. Raila assumed the mantle of leading the Luo ethnic group from his father, and he immediately began his quest for the presidency, sparking off a bitter power struggle within the FORD-K party.

Following the death of Jaramogi, FORD-K picked Michael Kijana Wamalwa as the party leader. Wamalwa was a Luhya from a prominent family. Raila knew that FORD-K was a formidable political movement with national support, having been in the forefront in activism for multiparty democracy. The next general elections were due in 1997 and it was important that Raila prepare his campaignhttp://www.msn.com/ machinery early enough. As it turned out, Wamalwa had presidential ambitions of his own and was banking on a bloc vote from the Luhya.

So bitter was the power struggle that it degenerated into violent clashes at Thika Stadium during negotiations called by an Anglican church bishop. Raila decided to leave FORD-K to join the National Development Party (NDP) of one Stephen Omondi Oludhe. Critics say Raila bought the party from Oludhe, a claim he denied. However, subsequent statements from Oludhe indicate that inducements were made to secure the party for Raila.

Kenyan electoral law says that if a Member of Parliament moves from a political party while in office, there must be a fresh election in that constituency. This is what happened in Raila's Langata constituency and Raila was re-elected as the first parliamentary representative of the NDP Party. Of course, Raila now called the shots in NDP.

The General Elections of 1997 came but the opposition was so fragmented that even the international community could not accuse Moi of rigging the elections. After Moi, the second candidate was former Vice President, Mwai Kibaki from

the Kikuyu tribe. Raila came third in the 1997 elections, with less than a million votes nationally.

Matiba, who was the main Kikuyu candidate back in 1992, had vowed never to run for office because of what he thought was a stolen victory back then. Kibaki had served in Kenya's independence governments since 1963 until he, like Matiba, had fallen out with Moi in the late 1980s. However, Kibaki did not subscribe to Matiba's radical politics. Being a keen follower of Kenya's first president, Jomo Kenyatta, Kibaki was not attracted to Jaramogi's radical politics either and so he formed the conservative-leaning Democratic Party in 1990.

Just like in 1992, there were politically motivated ethnic clashes prior to and after the 1997 General Elections. This time, the flash point was not the Rift Valley, but the Coast. In Mombasa, Sharif Nassir, a Moi ally had led KANU campaigns in the area. Mombasa was founded by Arab traders almost a thousand years ago. The population of Mombasa and the Coastal strip consists of the Swahili, who are of mixed Arab and African ancestry. There is also the Mijikenda tribe as well as Hindus, Persians and Europeans.

The building of the railway and the expansion of the Mombasa port in the 20th century attracted large numbers of workers from the interior of Kenya. The workers came mostly from the Luo, Kikuyu, Luhya, Kamba and Taita tribes. In the 1980s, a booming tourism industry attracted greater numbers of migrant workers in search of jobs and business opportunities.

During the 1997 electoral campaigns, Nassir and KANU were worried that the migrant workers would not vote for Moi. Just like in 1992 in the Rift Valley, a campaign for Majimbo federalism was began. Nassir and his allies claimed that migrant workers were taking up jobs at the coast at the expense of local people. Claims were made that migrant workers were responsible for rising crime, prostitution and drugs trafficking at the coast. As it turns out, the local Mijikenda tribe found these messages very appealing and gave their support to KANU. Then came the terror.

In August 1997, a group consisting of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of raiders attacked the Likoni Police Station, just across the bay from Mombasa Port. Police officers were killed, prisoners released and firearms looted. Within the Likoni area, large numbers of Luo and Kikuyu were attacked and forced into trains heading for the interior. It was rumored at the time that the vanguard of the raiding unit consisted of Interahamwe militia, straight out of the Rwanda genocide. Other rumors indicated that the raiders were led by foreign-trained elite forces loyal to Moi.

Evidence was produced in a Commission of Inquiry implicating senior politicians in the Moi government and KANU party. One farmer alleged that his property was used to oath local youths and that his reports to the authorities had gone unheeded.

With Moi declared as winner of the 1997 elections, Mwai Kibaki, who was the runner-up went to court to petition the results. Kibaki claimed that there had been electoral malpractices that gave Moi an unfair advantage over his opponents. Moi's allies in the Rift Valley were outraged by what they saw as Kibaki's “challenge” and a fresh round of ethnic clashes began. Kikuyu settlers in Laikipia District were especially affected by incidences of raiders burning homes and looting livestock.

You must be wondering what all these has to do with Raila. It is important that the reader understand this narrative because it will explain the violence witnessed in Kenya from December 2007.

In 1997, Moi got 41% of the total vote, slightly better than the 36% he got in 1992. The opposition was fragmented and visionless. From a single party state just a decade earlier, the Kenya of 1997 had close to a hundred political parties. Many were owned by “political entrepreneurs” hoping to make a lucrative deal similar to the one between Omondi Oludhe of the National Development Party (NDP) and Raila Odinga. Incidentally, Oludhe fell out with Raila and formed another party, the Economic Independence Party (EIP).

Raila, as expected, retook his Langata seat on the NDP party. He also convinced legislators from his Luo tribe to run on the party's ticket. The result was that NDP essentially became a Luo party. But this was not unique to the NDP. Mwai Kibaki's Democratic Party became the Kikuyu party while FORD-K of Michael Wamalwa turned into a Bungoma political movement. The SDP of Charity Ngilu was known as the Kamba party (by coincidence, the SDP was founded by a Kamba politician who fell out with Moi and later died).

Co-operation with MoiThere was another important political milestone after the 1997 elections: Moi was in his last term of office. Kenya's constitution states that an individual can become president for only two elected terms. Well, this amendment was done in 1992, just before the first multi party elections but Moi's supporters argued that the law could not be backdated to include Moi's tenure since 1978. Therefore, with the amendment of 1992, Moi began his “first” term in office and won a “second” and final term after the 1997 elections.

With an ethnically fragmented opposition, Raila realized that the only hope of becoming president was by joining KANU and fighting it out for the succession. In 1998, Raila's NDP and Moi's KANU entered a period of co-operation. During that time, Raila influenced the appointment of Luos into high government positions. By the beginning of the new millenium, the co-operation became a merger. KANU and NDP merged to become a single KANU party with Moi as party President.

In June 2001, Raila and several other members from the former NDP became

ministers in the Moi government. In early 2002, KANU held internal elections where Raila became the party's Secretary General. Elections were due in December 2002, just a few months away. Raila's position and the demeanour of President Daniel arap Moi indicated that the elections were already a done deal. The presidency was going to be Raila Odinga's for the taking.

In the period of 1998 – 2002, during the co-operation and, later, merger of NDP and KANU, the opposition was warned Raila on the dangers of working with Moi. Hardly surprising, considering that Kenya's opposition consisted of people who had fallen out of favor with Moi!

Michael Wamalwa of FORD-K told Raila that he would not get whatever deal he was making with Moi. Kibaki, who had served as Moi's Vice president for eight years, told Raila that Moi was not in the habit of making deals and certainly not with an individual with Raila's record of opposition politics. Within his own Luo community, personalities like James Orengo told Raila not to trust Moi. However, for reasons that are difficult to understand, Raila had absolute faith in Moi.

Moi represented everything that the late Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, Raila's father, had spent his life fighting. While Jaramogi and Kenyatta fought for Kenya's independence in the KANU party, Moi was in the Kenya African Democratic Union, KADU. Moi's KADU party was said to be amicable to white settler interests. The independence elections of 1963 saw KANU defeat KADU and Kenyatta became Prime Minister. In December 1964, Kenya became a republic with Kenyatta as President and Jaramogi as his vice president.

After independence, KADU dissolved itself to merge with KANU and Moi became a cabinet minister in the Kenyatta government. When Vice President Jaramogi fell out with Kenyatta, Moi eventually replaced him as Kenyatta's number 2. Moi grew into an extremely wealthy personality with interests in manufacturing, ranching and property development.

Moi became president upon Kenyatta's death in 1978, ushering in a period of reforms and political freedom. Come the 1982 coup attempt and Moi turned into a monster, worse than anyone could ever imagine. Not wanting to detain the elderly Jaramogi, Moi pounced on Raila. Between 1982 and 1992, Raila spent eight years in detention suffering from physical and psychological torture. Moi did not trust the Odingas but made a deal with them after the 1992 elections. By the time Jaramogi died in 1994, he was singing Moi's praises. Jaramogi described Moi as, “the long-necked giraffe that can see far beyond what ordinary eyes can see.”

Political pundits could tell that Moi's co-operation with Raila was a scheme to contain Raila. Besides, Moi needed Raila's NDP in Parliament to counter any challenges posed by Kibaki's Democratic Party and Wamalwa's FORD-K. In other words, Raila's willingness to co-operate and merge with KANU was to Moi's advantage. There was no visible benefit either for the NDP or for Raila's Luo tribe. But in spite of these misgivings, Raila was certain that he could use KANU

to ascend to Kenya's presidency.

Moi was the Machiavellian power broker who never gave anything for free and with Raila, there was no exception. While discussing the NDP and KANU merger, Raila asked Moi to help in the economic empowerment of the Luo by transferring the ownership of the Kisumu Molasses Plant to a holding company owned by the tribe.

The Kisumu Molasses plant was a government project conceived in the late 1970s to produce spirits and ethanol using molasses from neighboring sugar companies. Construction began in the early 1980s along the Kisumu – Busia highway but the project was never completed. There were allegations that massive corruption by Moi ministers had led to the collapse of the project. Indeed, the issue of Kisumu Molasses was among the grievances that the Luo had against Moi. That and the murder of Foreign Affairs minister Robert Ouko in 1990.

Robert Ouko, who was also the legislator for Kisumu, apparently possessed a dossier on Kisumu Molasses. In February 1990, Ouko was abducted from his house, tortured and killed by unknown people. But that's another story.

The point is this: Kisumu Molasses Plant sat on land that the government had acquired from a Luo clan in Kisumu – the Kanyakwar clan. Raila promised his Luo people that his co-operation with KANU would revive the Kisumu Molasses Plant, which experts had dismissed as a, “white elephant.” Raila called on the Luo to contribute funds that would establish an entity to run the plant hence boosting the faltering economy of Kisumu. The fund raising managed to collect close to Kshs200 million (US$3.12 million) which was nevertheless far below the government's price for the plant.

Following discussions between Raila and Moi, the Kenyan government agreed to transfer ownership of the plant to Raila and the Luo holding company he had established. However, true to Moi's nature, it later turned out that the transfer applied only to the plant and equipment, not including land. As far as the law was concerned, the land where Kisumu Molasses stood was government land. Therefore, Raila found himself operating a factory on public land. It is a saga that has not been resolved to date and, indeed, the land remains a subject of dispute between Raila and the Kenyan government.

Raila become Secretary General of KANU in February 2002 in a political scheme engineered by none other than Moi. KANU, by then, was close to 40 years old and had ruled Kenya uninterrupted since independence from Britain in 1963. Since his presidency began in 1978, Moi had turned KANU into a powerful political machine with roots in every sector of Kenya's society.

With Moi's tenure of office ending in 2002, a strong succession power struggle had simmered within the party for years. Two clear blocs had emerged in KANU. There were the hardliners, fronted by Vice President George Saitoti, former

Secretary General Joseph Kamotho and Nicholas Biwott, a confidante of Moi. Through Moi's machinations, Kamotho was edged out of the Secretary General's seat to make room for Raila Odinga.

The second bloc in KANU consisted of young moderates such as Musalia Mudavadi and Kalonzo Musyoka.

So, in KANU, the prospective presidential candidates were VP George Saitoti, Musalia Mudavadi and Kalonzo Musyoka. There had been another potential candidate, Simeon Nyachae, a former Chief Secretary in the Moi presidency. However, Nyachae fell out with Moi and joined FORD-People (FORD-P) which was a splinter group from the original FORD movement of the early 1990s.

Raila's entry into KANU through Moi's schemes complicated the KANU succession. Personalities such as Joseph Kamotho and Kalonzo Musyoka had spent the better part of their political careers fighting against people like Raila. Now, the man on whose behalf they were fighting for now expected all of them to work together. But Moi was not done yet, he still had another card up his sleeves.

Moi's treacheryAs the clock ticked towards the 2002 polls, Moi introduced a dark horse into the game. He picked Uhuru Kenyatta, son of the late Jomo Kenyatta as his successor. Moi went around the country introducing Uhuru to the public. Moi said, “I have analyzed the qualities of all the people around me and I have seen the potential in this young man. I am not running again for office but when you vote for Uhuru, you will be voting for me.”

It is a mystery as to why Moi settled on Uhuru Kenyatta only months to the polls. It was obvious that Uhuru was going to lose the elections, hence Moi's appeal that, “a vote for Uhuru is a vote for me.” For all his faults, Moi is not a fool and his enduring quality is his ability to decipher political trends. Yet, by choosing on Uhuru, Moi was going against his instincts in a move that puzzled his closest aides. Moi lost many friends as a result of his refusal to change his mind. If he wanted Uhuru to succeed him all along, why wait until the last minute?

Meanwhile, the opposition was readying itself for the general elections. After the 1997 debacle, the opposition realized that there was little chance of removing KANU from the presidency. Thus, the opposition parties such as Mwai Kibaki's Democratic Party, Michael Wamalwa's FORD-K and Charity Ngilu's NPK created an alliance with civil society aimed at securing a parliamentary majority.

There was a push to review the constitution to allow for the creation of the post of Prime Minister. The draft constitution proposed that the Prime Minister be the head of a party with a parliamentary majority. The Prime Minister would have executive powers of government while the President would remain as a ceremonial Head of State. Opposition strategists thought that an opposition

alliance could win enough seats to enable them select the Prime Minister and therefore run the government.

Not surprisingly, Moi had no intention of changing the constitution in such a manner. In this, he was supported by the KANU echelons including George Saitoti, Kalonzo Musyoka, Musalia Mudavadi and Raila Odinga.

Kibaki, Wamalwa and Ngilu agreed to present a united opposition during the elections and formed the National Alliance for Change (NAC). Meanwhile, Simeon Nyachae was mobilizing his FORD-P party through national campaign rallies.

The situation in KANU was getting tense. Dissent over the choice of Uhuru Kenyatta had created an alliance between Raila, Saitoti, Kamotho, Kalonzo, Mudavadi and Najib Balala, a coastal politician. The group called itself the, “Rainbow Alliance,” and projected itself as an opposition within the ruling party. Seeing that he had lost control of his erstwhile allies, Moi brought into the limelight young KANU politicians to fight for him. These included William Ruto and Isaac Ruto, both of them Kalenjin politicians from the Rift Valley. William Ruto told the Rainbow alliance to leave KANU and form its own party.

In October 2002, Rainbow did exactly that. KANU held a delegates conference at the Moi Sports Centre and declared Uhuru Kenyatta as the official presidential candidate for the 2002 elections. In a move reminiscent of Raila's takeover of the NDP in 1996, the Rainbow alliance immediately joined a little known party, known as the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). It is widely believed that the party's leader (or owner in Kenyan circles) was handsomely compensated for agreeing to hand over the party to the Rainbow alliance.

Now, the LDP had within its ranks a galaxy of nationally famed politicians eager to run for President. There was Raila, then Saitoti, Kalonzo, Mudavadi and Balala. The General Elections were expected in December, just two months away. Moi was said to be so furious with the Rainbow move that there were fears he would call for early elections in order to destabilize the LDP. But there was another reason why the LDP could not present a presidential candidate. The Kenyan voters were disgusted with KANU and anybody associated with Moi. The composition of LDP made it a mere splinter of KANU.

By 2002, Kenya was in a hopeless state. The economy had shrank for three consecutive years. The youth had no hope of getting employment as companies fired staff or closed shop altogether. Crime was at its highest in Kenya's history, police patrols had all but collapsed. Power supply was erratic at best and over 60% of the urban population was wasting away in slums. The roads were in tatters, often transport links between Nairobi and the Mombasa port would be washed away by rains. At the same time, you had a president willing to use bribery, murder and extortion in order to remain in power.

The country's forests were hived off and dished out to KANU politicians. Public

parks, school playgrounds, hospital yards and public toilets were all sold. In some cases, influential persons were allocated land in the middle of roads. Kenya became a haven for warlords from Rwanda, Burundi, Congo and Somalia.

Ethnic clashes were growing in intensity. Cattle rustling, an ancient warrior tradition among the tribes of Northern Kenya, assumed commercial angles. Powerful personalities would send raiding parties to loot cattle, sheep and goats which would eventually find their way for sale in the cities.

With this scenario in mind, there is absolutely no way that LDP would have won the elections. There exists a myth that if it weren't for the LDP, then Mwai Kibaki would not have won the presidency. True enough. But the LDP really did not have a choice. Kenyans would not have voted for KANU politicians no matter how much they distanced themselves from Moi. In this, Raila was in the same boat.

After he began cooperating with KANU in 1998, opposition figures warned Raila that Moi was not a trustworthy man. They gave Raila their own examples as evidence of Moi's deceptive tricks. Now, Moi's true nature had revealed itself. After 5 years of cooperating with KANU, and after dissolving his NDP party, Raila found himself as far away from Kenya's presidency as he had been in 1998. If he had stood by himself for the presidency on an LDP ticket, he would not have gained sufficient votes outside his Luo homeland.

On the other hand, the National Alliance for Change (NAC) and Nyachae's FORD-P were getting energized by the woes afflicting KANU. For the first time in Kenya's history, there lay a strong possibility that KANU could lose its grip on power.

Joining hands with KibakiThe LDP engaged in talks with both the NAC and FORD-P. It was agreed that a united opposition fight against KANU in the elections. It was also agreed that a presidential candidate would be selected from among the leading contenders, that is, Kibaki, Wamalwa, Ngilu, Nyachae, Kalonzo and Raila. Mudavadi by then had gone back to KANU. The National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) was born.

NARC began a series of public meetings in the capital Nairobi. Huge crowds turned up to witness the emerging political phenomenon that was now big enough to change the country. Just before one of the rallies held at Nairobi's Uhuru Park, the NARC leadership had a meeting at the nearby Serena Hotel. Nothing concrete was decided before the leaders left to address the Uhuru Park rally.

At the rally, there was excitement and jubilation. Bands sent the crowds into ecstasy with songs such as, “Unbwogable,” meaning, “Unbeatable.” Amidst the excitement, Raila announced that Kibaki was enough of a candidate for the NARC presidential ticket. “Kibaki tosha,” ran the famous words. Nyachae was outraged and left NARC in a huff. The other contenders were relieved that a

nominations battle had been avoided and quickly endorsed Kibaki. Many of them were from KANU anyway and stood little chance of getting elected as president.

Asked on whether his anger was motivated by greed for power, Nyachae said this: “Political party affairs cannot be decided on a whim. Negotiations for power sharing must be structured otherwise you will have problems in future. How can a presidential candidate be declared without a consensus between us?” Unfortunately, the “traitor” tag clung on Nyachae and he came a dismal third in the General elections. He could not even manage 500,000 votes.

In December 2002 on his way back to Nairobi after campaigning in Eastern Province, NARC presidential candidate, Mwai Kibaki was involved in a near-fatal car crash. He was taken to the Nairobi Hospital and later flown to the United Kingdom for specialist treatment. It is said that Kibaki never fully recovered from injuries sustained in the accident. His poor health contributed to a political crisis in later years as the LDP demanded the spoils of power for having campaigned for while he was in hospital.

The December 2002 polls were the most peaceful in contemporary times. Kibaki emerged as winner with over 2 million votes. Uhuru Kenyatta came second with about 1.5 million votes and he promptly acknowledged defeat to Kibaki, his baptismal god-father.

Kibaki was sworn into office on December 30th, 2002 in a ceremony attended by just a couple of African presidents. South African President Thabo Mbeki, sent his wife. During Kibaki's chaotic swearing in ceremony, Moi was pelted with mud cakes. Moi conducted himself with respectable decorum then boarded an Airforce helicopter that flew him to his rural home in the Rift Valley.

Falling out with KibakiProblems in NARC began with the appointment of the first cabinet. A Memorandum of Understanding between NAC and LDP just before the elections had indicated a 50-50 power sharing arrangement. Kibaki stuck to the deal in composing the members of the cabinet. However, the LDP was dissatisfied because most of its members, having served in Moi's cabinet, expected to become ministers in the NARC administration.

Kibaki's hands were tied because he made a campaign promise about having a lean government. Former president Moi had been criticized for stuffing his cabinet with KANU cronies, so much that at one point, more than a third of Parliament consisted of ministers and assistant ministers. Kibaki wanted to avoid repeating the same mistake. Besides, Kibaki had his own backers from NAC who had been in the opposition for decades and who resented the late entry of ex-KANU LDP into the opposition alliance.

Another problem that arose with the Memorandum of Understanding was on how far it was going to be applied. Kibaki was of the view that the 50-50 power

sharing arrangement was confined to the cabinet. In contrast, the LDP wanted the 50-50 formula applied to all state appointments including the Judiciary, the civil service, security forces, diplomatic corps and state owned corporations. Kibaki refused to accede to this demand for fear of politicizing the civil service.

Political realignments were also taking place within Raila Odinga's LDP party. Senior LDP personalities such as Vice President Moody Awori, ex VP George Saitoti (now Education Minister) and Raphael Tuju began gravitating towards Kibaki. Ideologically, Saitoti and Awori had more in common with Kibaki than with Raila. Like Kibaki, they represented the interests of Kenya's wealthy corporate elite unlike Raila who is more of a grassroots mobilizer.

It should not be forgotten that the LDP was a branch from the old KANU and many of its personalities had a different political outlook from Raila. Kalonzo Musyoka, who had served as Moi's Foreign Minister, presented an alternative power bloc within LDP to which many of the former KANU members allied themselves. Mombasa politician, Najib Balala became another rising star within LDP. Thus, Raila could only count on his fellow Luo for support within the LDP. Even that was not guaranteed, as evidenced by Tuju's shift towards Kibaki.

LDP consoled itself with the enactment of a new constitution. In 2002, a draft constitution was ready but Moi scuttled the exercise when he called for elections in December. NARC had capitalized on this by promising that it would enact a new constitution within 100 days of taking power. The new constitution would create the post of executive prime minister, leaving the presidency with ceremonial powers. It was assumed that, with Kibaki running for President, the new Prime Minister's post would go to Raila.

The problem with the proposed constitutional changes was that they were based on a completely different political scenario. The draft constitution had been made with the assumption that KANU would always have the presidency but the opposition would have a parliamentary majority. Therefore, the executive prime minister would come from the party or coalition with the most seats in the House. After 2003, NARC which had been the opposition, took both the presidency and the House. It was a scenario that nobody in Kenya had ever dreamt possible.

A Kibaki ally, John Michuki, told a crowd that the purpose of constitutional changes all along had been to remove Moi and KANU from power. Since those objectives had been achieved, it was no longer necessary to review the country's constitution.

LDP was outraged. They viewed this as yet another broken promise by Kibaki in addition to the Memorandum of Understanding. By August 2003, NARC was in shambles and LDP began openly campaigning against Kibaki. To shore up his numbers in Parliament, Kibaki invited members of KANU and Simeon Nyachae's FORD-P into the government. War had been declared.

Kibaki represented (and still does) Kenya's wealthy elite. Just like anybody else from his social class, Kibaki tends to be conservative in his approach to political and economic affairs. One of the reasons why a new constitution was not implemented as promised by NARC was that Kenya's elite are wary of Raila's brand of revolutionary politics. The post of executive Prime Minister would have given Raila a free hand to change government policy in ways that could not be predicted. While the presidency has a two-term limit, the proposed Prime Minister's office had no term limits. If Raila got the post, he could rule indefinitely. And yet, as far as Kenya's ruling elite are concerned, Raila is an outsider due to his populist political stance.

Kibaki comes from the Kikuyu tribe, Kenya's single largest tribe consisting of about 22% of the population. The Kikuyu are ethnically related to the Meru, the Embu and the Mbeere. The three groups present a combined ethnic bloc comprising 30% of Kenya's population.

The Kikuyu were the most affected by British colonialism. Starting from World War 1, the British colonial government took large tracts of land from the Kikuyu and leased it to white settlers. The Kikuyu were not the only people to lose land, other tribes such as the Kamba, the Maasai, Kalenjin and Meru were also affected. The Maasai, for instance, lost the fertile lands of the Central Rift Valley including Nakuru, Njoro, Molo, Naivasha, Eldoret and Laikipia. But the effects of colonialism were most felt in the Central Province because, compared to other parts of Kenya, it was already highly populated.

Unlike the other tribes, Kikuyu land was taken forcefully and the natives herded into fortified villages called, “reserves”. Military expeditions were sent to punish the Kikuyu for resisting white settlement and the payment of taxes. That explains why colonialism in Kikuyu land caused a greater upset compared to other parts of Kenya. As a consequence, large numbers of Kikuyu migrated to the rest of Kenya in search of jobs, land and business opportunities.

With time, the Kikuyu have emerged as an extremely prosperous merchantilist class with interests in retailing, transport, schools, religious institutions, banks and community organizations all over Kenya. This, inevitably, has generated resentment in other Kenyan tribes who feel that the Kikuyu are dominating them.In 1990s, Moi tapped into this anti-Kikuyu resentment to spark off tribal clashes in the Rift Valley and Coast Provinces.

The LDP also capitalized on the same resentment to campaign against Kibaki. The LDP accused Kibaki of appointing Kikuyu into the government at the expense of other Kenyan tribes. Kibaki was further accused of sacking Kalenjin officials appointed by ex-president Moi and replacing them with Kikuyu.

The period beginning 2003 when NARC got into office witnessed renewed economic activity. Dormant industries were re-activated and major highways renovated. Clinics were restaffed and re-equipped with drugs. School enrollment increased and there was a sharp drop in the numbers of street children. The

prices of agricultural produce such as coffee, tea and milk went up benefiting farmers. The banking sector was revitalized and, for the first time in a decade, interest rates went below 15%. The ordinary man or woman could afford a house, a car, a college education and even a holiday at the coast.

Because the Kikuyu were already ingrained into Kenya's commercial sector, the fruits of economic growth were more evident among them. Kikuyu business people opened retail outlets across the country. Bus companies owned by Kikuyu operators expanded their fleet to remote rural outposts. Mega supermarkets opening in the country's cities were mostly staffed by Kikuyu. Poor Kikuyu youths migrated in large numbers to the cities of Mombasa, Kisumu, Nakuru and Eldoret where they worked as hawkers, transport workers and petty traders.

Other Kenyan tribes did not benefit very much from the economic growth and resentment of the Kikuyu manifested itself as hatred for President Mwai Kibaki.

In 2005, in reaction to continued pressure for a new constitution, Kibaki's allies made some modifications to the draft of 2002. In place of an executive prime minister, the draft written by Kibaki proposed that the presidency retain most of its powers with the Prime Minister exercising delegated authority. The LDP, as expected, rejected the move with Raila viewing it as robbing him of executive authority. Against all advice, Kibaki decided to put his version of the draft constitution to a referendum scheduled for November 2005.

In truth, the November 2005 referendum was not about the constitution. Instead, it was a power contest between the LDP and President Kibaki. Majority of Kenyans voted without ever having read the draft. The Kikuyu voted for the draft out of loyalty to Kibaki and fear of Raila. Those who voted against the draft were spiting Kibaki and the Kikuyu in general.

In his usual style, Electoral Commission of Kenya chairman, Samuel Kivuitu allocated fruit symbols to the two sides. The YES side would be represented by a banana while the NO side was represented by an orange. This marked the beginning of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM).

Raila Odinga and his remaining allies in LDP joined forces with KANU to campaign against Kibaki's draft constitution. With Raila in LDP were Kalonzo Musyoka and Najib Balala. The KANU side was represented by Uhuru Kenyatta, William Ruto, Musalia Mudavadi and ex-president Moi's son, Gideon. Moi himself vowed to defeat Kibaki's draft.

The Orange alliance capitalized on anti-Kikuyu resentment to mobilize votes against the Kibaki draft. A new phrase was coined: “41-1” meaning that out of the 42 tribes in Kenya, 41 were against the Kikuyu.

The result of the November referendum was a strong NO against the Kibaki draft. The Orange alliance was ecstatic and demanded for immediate elections. Kibaki refused to call elections and instead dissolved the cabinet. When he later

announced a new cabinet, Raila and his allies were not included. Instead, Kibaki appointed ministers from his NAC alliance, from FORD-K, FORD-P and renegade KANU members. Kibaki allies argued that since Kenyans had rejected the draft constitution, then there was no review the existing constitution, thus any hopes for creating the office of Prime Minister were dashed.

Actually, Raila and his faction of the LDP were shaken by the move as they never expected Kibaki to dispense with them. Kalonzo, who had served as a cabinet minister without break since the 1980s sulked. Raila was in the opposition – again.

Soon after the referendum, ex-President Moi shifted his loyalties from the Orange movement to Kibaki. In Moi's estimation, the Orange movement was Raila's vehicle to the Presidency and it had to be stopped at all costs. Moi pressured his proteges, Uhuru Kenyatta, William Ruto and Henry Kosgey to abandon Raila but they refused. After the 2002 elections, KANU had almost disappeared into oblivion but the Orange alliance had revitalized the party's fortunes. With only two years to go before the 2007 elections, what remained of KANU was latching onto the Orange movement for political relevance.

Said Uhuru Kenyatta: “The trend in Kenyan politics is towards the formation of coalitions. No single party can make it on its own without joining others.”

Of course, Moi knew this. But he wasn't willing to let KANU give Raila a shot at the presidency. Moi then used his confidante, Nicholas Biwott, to engineer a coup in KANU. Uhuru, Ruto and Kosgey refused to vacate office, resulting in the splitting of KANU into two. The Nicholas Biwott faction of KANU was duly recognized by the Registrar of Parties and allied itself with President Mwai Kibaki.

Meanwhile, the government was using its legal machinery to make life difficult for the Orange movement. For reasons that are difficult to explain, Raila and his Orange allies did not transform the movement into a political party as quickly as they had promised. From the November 2005 referendum until the next year, little action was taken. When they were ready to present their papers to the registrar of societies, they were in for a shock: somebody else had registered a party with the names, “Orange Democratic Movement Party” (ODM)

Raila and his colleagues were livid at this apparent government plot to deny them a political vehicle. They threatened to stage street protests in a bid to force the government to register their party. Finally, the government agreed to the name, “Orange Democratic Movement Party of Kenya” (ODM-K). In effect, there now existed two factions of ODM. Apparently, Kibaki had now adopted the political survival tactics of Moi by splitting parties.

The 2007 General Elections2007 was the year of elections. Campaigns were well underway with the former

LDP, now ODM-K, having spent four years pitching for these elections. As 2007 began, Kalonzo Musyoka was the hot favorite for the ODM-K presidential ticket. Raila was hovering between second and third favorite. Its not difficult to understand why Kalonzo was popular within ODM-K. The party was basically ex-KANU. With Kalonzo being a Moi protege, the ex-KANU types felt right at home with him. In addition, many were still fearful of Raila's politics in view of what their mentor – Moi – taught them about Raila.

In early 2007, there emerged a row over who the ODM-K candidate was going to be. The leading contenders were Kalonzo, Raila, Musalia Mudavadi, William Ruto and Najib Balala. At one point, the leading candidates held a meeting where Raila was prevailed upon to support Kalonzo for the presidency. Raila was promised the Prime Minister's post once the constitution was changed. Newspaper reports indicate that harsh words were uttered that left some of the personalities shedding tears. Nevertheless, Raila refused to bow down.

Raila has the talent of mobilizing public support. With time, public opinion started shifting from Kalonzo in favor of Raila. Kalonzo and his allies were made to look like power hungry traitors scheming against Raila. In the meantime, Raila was actively campaigning for himself and even changed the ODM-K slogan from “Orange” to “Hammer.” With the new “Hammer” slogan, Raila bought himself a H2 Humvee, the first of its kind in Kenya. The vehicle pulled crowds and further enhanced Raila's popularity. Kalonzo found himself increasingly isolated as the other ODM-K contenders began reconsidering their stand.

A row over the selection of the delegates to nominate the ODM-K presidential contender split the party. Disputes arose over how many delegates each constituency would send. Then another dispute centred on whether delegates would vote using secret ballot or acclamation. Both Kalonzo and Raila favored a system that each felt would favor him. Then disputes arose over who actually controlled ODM-K.

ODM-K was a coalition between Raila Odinga's LDP, the Labor Party of Kenya and several other parties. Since LDP had dozens of elected legislators, it was viewed as the major partner. However, the Labor Party of Kenya (LPK) was, in theory, entitled to an equal say within ODM-K. The LPK was “owned” by Dr Julia Ojiambo who had served in Moi's cabinet with Kalonzo. Realizing that the tide in the LDP was in favor of Raila, Kalonzo defected from the LDP to Dr Ojiambo's LPK. The move gave him a greater say in the determination of the presidential nomination process in ODM-K.

Sounds confusing? Take a break and read on ...

Raila, seeing that he was loosing control of ODM-K, decided to defect from the LDP. He looked for the young lawyer who had run away with the original Orange Democratic Movement. It is believed that lawyer Mugambi Imanyara received millions of shillings in order to give up ODM to Raila. Thus, Raila gained control of the original ODM. More significantly, he shifted with the pro-ODM KANU

faction of William Ruto, Uhuru Kenyatta and Musalia Mudavadi.

In effect, Kalonzo turned ODM-K into a Kamba political party. Raila turned his ODM into an alliance between the Luo, Kalenjin, Luhya and coastal tribes. Kibaki allies were fronting for a new party, NARK-Kenya but it became nothing more than a Kikuyu party. Therefore, Raila Odinga's ODM as an alliance of several major tribes was poised to take over the country's leadership.

Moi, was of course, working to ensure that his Kalenjin tribe left the ODM and joined the Biwott KANU faction that was supporting Kibaki. Moi described the ODM as a tribal party. However, William Ruto and other Kalenjin politicians such as Kipkalya Kones, Franklin Bett and Isaac Ruto refused to budge. Majority of Kalenjins decided to support Ruto in the struggle with Moi. In turn, Moi vowed to ensure that his erstwhile proteges failed politically.

In the meantime, Moi convinced Uhuru that he could not be elected on a pro-Raila platform within the central province. Uhuru is a Kikuyu just like Kibaki. Political campaigns had increased ethnic tension in Kenya so much that the Kikuyu were never going to vote for Raila. Similarly, the Luo, Luhya and Kalenjin were never going to vote for Kibaki on account of ethnicity. Uhuru represents a Kikuyu dominated constituency in Gatundu and if he stuck with ODM, he would have been accused of undermining Kibaki. Uhuru was thus forced by circumstances to abandon Raila and join the Kibaki – Moi axis.

When ODM-K was a united party, it capitalized on anti-Kikuyu resentment in its campaigns against Kibaki. Kalonzo gained control of ODM-K and immediately charted a moderate approach. Kalonzo has never been a politician to utilize ethnic differences to win votes.

In Raila Odinga's ODM, the situation was different. Its not because Raila is a tribalist, far from it. Raila is eager to cut the image of a national politician with support from across the country. What happened with ODM was that it became the home of all the Moi – era politicians associated with tribal clashes. In the 1990s, Moi friendly politicians incited ethnic strife in the Rift Valley and the coast to drive out tribes that were sympathetic to the opposition of the time. The Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya and Kisii were most affected for their opposition to Moi. This time, in 2007 the same individuals used ethnic divisions to campaign for Raila.

The growth of the Kikuyu business class, as stated earlier, was generating resentment among the Luo, Luhya, Kalenjin and coastal groups, These communities felt threatened as Kikuyu merchants opened shops, bought land and operated transport fleets in their areas. The Kikuyu were working through private enterprise but ODM politicians made it seem as though they were getting assistance from President Kibaki.

Then there was a renewed campaign for federalism. In the 1990s, the Kalenjin and coastal tribes wanted federalism in order to keep away migrant ethnicities such as the Kikuyu. It was felt that federalism would assure jobs and commercial

opportunities for indigenous communities. In the 1990s, Raila opposed these calls for federalism as an attempt to balkanize Kenya into ethnic fiefdoms. In 2007, Raila supported federalism as a means of empowering indigenous people. Thus the ODM campaign for ethnic federalism helped raise ethnic nationalism as the General Elections drew closer.

In its campaigns, ODM stated that wealth differences between the Kikuyu and other ethnic groups were caused by the location of the Kenyan capital, Nairobi, close to the Kikuyu homelands. ODM argued that with devolution of government departments to other cities, there would be greater opportunities for other ethnicities to get jobs. ODM promised that, once in power, it would compel industries to move away from Nairobi to other parts of the country. Industries located in specific towns would be expected to give preference of employment to resident communities and not to migrant workers.

In the cities, ODM supporters from the Luo tribe told their Kikuyu landlords that they'll stop paying rent once Raila became president. ODM itself said that it would control rents and the prices of basic commodities.

The Kikuyu panicked.

Viewing the pro-federalism campaigns as an attack against them, the Kikuyu rallied behind President Mwai Kibaki. The Kikuyu saw the ODM as working for their extermination. Pro-Kibaki politicians in Kikuyu dominated areas fed on this fear, saying that if ODM won the elections, the Kikuyu would lose all their property and businesses. ODM politicians were not allowed to campaign in the Kikuyu, Meru and Embu areas. When Raila Odinga went on a campaign rally to the Kikuyu heartlands, he was booed and shouted down. In Karatina, he was hounded out of a hotel where he had stopped for drinks.

Raila's Luo tribe does not circumcise their men but the Kikuyu initiation rites include male circumcision. According to Kikuyu traditions, a man who is not circumcised is equal to a child. This aspect of Kikuyu culture was used to denigrate Raila's political campaigns. The Kikuyu were told not to vote for Raila as they could end up being led by, “a child.” This message attracted widespread disgust from the Luo and pushed them further into Raila's orbit.

In Meru, Raila's campaign was marred by rowdy youths who even blocked playing fields to prevent his helicopter from landing. Out of frustration, Raila said something that struck fear among the Kikuyu. “You can oppose me now but when I become president, you will shed tears.” If there was any proof needed that Raila was anti-Kikuyu, this was it.

The elections were scheduled for December 27th, 2007 just after Christmas. By early December, ODM claimed that the government was going to rig the election. Ethnic tension was rising in the country, ODM supporters felt they were being liberated from the Kikuyu. On the other hand, the Kikuyu felt under threat. In the Rift Valley, the Kikuyu were told to vote along with the Kalenjin or risk eviction.

Calls of 41-1 rent the air (41 tribes against 1). Rigging plots appeared everywhere.

In Kericho, ODM supporters raided a church claiming that ballots were being stuffed. By Christmas day, hordes of youths were barricading roads in Eldoret demanding identity cards from passengers. The implication was that if you were not from the area, then you had to be an, “agent of rigging.” Buses owned by Kikuyu transport companies were burnt on allegations of, “transporting rigging agents.” In Homa Bay, policemen were lynched after Raila claimed that they were Kibaki's “rigging” agents. Youths ransacked hotels, attacking strangers.

A milk company owned by the Kenyatta family was attacked by ODM supporters in Eldoret. They peeped through the fence and mistook milk crates for ballot boxes. Still in Eldoret, offices of the Electoral Commission of Kenya were broken into and an elections vehicle burnt. Buses owned by Kikuyu companies took shelter at the local police station for fear of attack. This however, enraged the local Kalenjin who accused the police of being part of a plot to rig the elections.

The violence that was witnessed in Kenya after the elections began long before the elections were held.

The expectations placed on the polls were too high. ODM politicians were already talking of the decisions they would make in government within 24 hours of the polls. There would be a new constitution within 6 months including the enactment of a federal government. The government would employ 66,000 teachers. There would be irrigation works in the arid parts of Kenya. Rural areas would have international airports to facilitate the export of farm produce. The economy would grow by 15% annually.

The 2007 polls witnessed the largest number of participating political parties, at over 300. Some constituencies had upto 30 political candidates seeking the seat. There were more polling stations than before. At 14 million, the number of registered voters was the highest in Kenya's history. It was just impossible for elections results to be released within 24 hours. However, the stakes were very high and so was tension in the country. Neither side was prepared to lose, more so, the ODM.

ODM was convinced that it would get the same number of votes it got during the November 2005 referendum. This was a major miscalculation because it failed to take into account shifting voter attitudes. The referendum was a simple YES or NO vote while the elections were much more complex. The referendum did not have immediate consequences on ordinary life, that is, even if the new constitution were passed, there was no compulsion to implement it immediately. Thirdly, if the draft were defeated, as it was, there would be no consequences. The 2007 General Elections were going to have consequences regardless of which side won and the choice, therefore, was difficult for voters. All opinion polls indicated that the result was going to be very close.

The Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK), without a doubt, bungled the elections. But it wasn't a deliberate attempt at rigging. Kenyan electoral procedures make it very difficult to stuff ballots or to falsify results. Instead, the bungled election was a manifestation of mediocrity, corruption and waste that has infiltrated every Kenyan institution. Even if the ECK had been headed by a different team, the outcome would not be different. In some areas, polling clerks were recruited the day before the elections. They had no clue on what to do.

Both sides engaged in electoral fraud. Certain constituencies in Raila and Kibaki strongholds recorded voter turn out in excess of 90% yet the average turn out nationally was between 50% and 70%. The only possible scenario where you can get 90% voter turn out is if voters were registered the day before the elections. The reason why 90% is impossible is because voters may have moved from the area, others may be sick or unwilling to vote and still others may have died.

In pro-Kibaki areas, ODM agents were denied entry into polling centres. The same was replicated in ODM strongholds. In the Luo areas of Nyanza province youths ejected police officers from the polling stations. In Meru, a pro-Kibaki stronghold, a mysterious power blackout hampered vote counting.

Kenya's plunge into violencePresident Mwai Kibaki was declared the winner on December 30th, 2007 and promptly sworn into a second term of office. According to the ECK, Kibaki had 4.5 million votes compared to Raila's 4.3 million. As suggested by the opinion polls, the results were very close. ODM immediately rejected the results and the country plunged into chaos and mayhem.

The bulk of the violence lasted from December 2007 to February 2008. About 1,500 people died and half a million left homeless. At least 10,000 fled to Uganda. There were riots, looting, rape and killing everywhere.

In summary, there were three aspects to the violence, now called post-elections violence:

1). There was a spontaneous reaction by supporters of the ODM to the announcement of Mwai Kibaki as the winner. ODM supporters took to the streets in Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, Eldoret, Kakamega and Migori.

2). There was the police reaction to the riots, which was brutal in many cases. In Kisumu, at least 80 people were shot during the riots. ODM demonstrators were shot in Kibera, Kariobangi and Dandora in Nairobi.

3). There were instances of ethnic cleansing especially in Eldoret, Kakamega, Kisumu, Kericho, Nakuru, Naivasha and Limuru. Parts of Nairobi such as Kibera, Kariobangi, Mathare and Huruma were affected. A few areas at the coast experienced ethnic cleansing. Ethnic cleansing during the post elections violence means an ethnically dominant group evicting minorities from its area.

The post elections violence grew to such intensity that the politicians lost control of it. Hundreds of thousands of poor, unemployed and poorly educated youths blocked highways, robbed, raped and killed travellers, Shops were looted as were factories, schools and warehouses. Bridges were blown up in some hotspots. In parts of the Rift Valley, a “Republic” was declared. Police officers and administrators were lynched. Commercial activities collapsed. There were shortages of food and fuel. Nobody was in charge. The State had ceased to exist.

The international community was concerned that a Rwanda type of genocide was emerging in Kenya. African mediators such as Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Graca Machel and former presidents Joachim Chissano, Kenneth Kaunda and Benjamin Mkapa intervened to no avail. The positions of Raila and Kibaki were just too hard. Neither wanted to appear as having surrendered to the other. Former United Nations Secretary General, Koffi Annan flew into Kenya in late January 2008 to begin mediation. US President George Bush called on Kenya's leaders to form a coalition government.

Raila Odinga as Prime Minister of KenyaIn April 2008, a coalition government was formed between Raila Odinga's ODM, Kalonzo Musyoka's ODM-K and Mwai Kibaki's PNU party. Kibaki remains the president, with Raila as the Prime Minister. Kalonzo is Kenya's Vice President today.

Ethnic tensions within Kenya's population have not cooled down. Tribes that were evicted during the violence are only just beginning to return but its going to be a long, difficult process. Kenya is still a divided country.

Supporters of Raila Odinga regard him as the true president of Kenya and hardly make any reference to Kibaki. On the other hand, Kibaki and Kalonzo's supporters (the Kikuyu, Embu, Meru and the Kamba) have not yet acknowledged the presence of a Prime Minister in Kenya. The top leaders are preaching peace, and shaking hands while smiling for the cameras. Its hard to tell how long the charade will last.

Meanwhile, the next elections are due in 2012. Kibaki will not be a candidate because he is barred by the constitution from running for a third term. For now, the top contenders for Kibaki's succession will be Raila Odinga and Kalonzo Musyoka. It is feared that the next elections will see greater violence between Kenya's ethnic groups.

END