After Action Report

AQAP Air Freight/Printer Bomb Plot

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1. Name of Operation: AQAP Air Freight/Printer Bomb Plot

2. Event Date: 29 October 2010

3. Location(s):

Device #1: Originated Sana’a Yemen en route to Chicago, IL via

Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE) to Cologne, Germany to East

Midlands, United Kingdom (UK) where parcel was located.

Device #2: Originated in Sana’a, Yemen en route to Chicago, IL

via Doha, Qatar to Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE) where

parcel was located.

One package’s destination was to Congregation Or Chadesh’s

former location on West Barry, the other was addressed to

Congregation B’nai Zion an inactive synagogue also in Chicago.

4. Disposition

All aircraft, distribution centers and cargo intact

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All personnel unharmed

Aircraft in East Midlands removed to a remote airport

location, cargo unloaded. Package detected, secured,

isolated and made inert.

Package in Dubai FedEx distribution center, detected,

secured, isolated and made inert.

Ibrahim Hassan Tali al-Asiri – still at large in Yemen.

Anwar Nasser Abdullah al-Awlaki – still at large in Yemen.

Hanan al-Samawi – She was released within 24 hours as

officials determined that she was not the individual who

signed the shipping manifesto and that her identity had been

stolen.

No further suspects have been identified or arrested in

Yemen.

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5. Keywords

AQAP – al-Qa’eda in the Arabian Peninsula

GCHQ - Governmental Communications Headquarters, United

Kingdom

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MI6 – British government’s Secret Intelligence Service

(SIS) responsible for supplying foreign intelligence.

PETN – Pentaerythritol tetranitrate is a powdered, stable,

colorless, odorless plastic explosive that is difficult to

detect.

Lead azide – a powerful chemical initiator.

Diego Deza – Reference to Don Diego Deza, 15th century

Archbishop of Seville and Inquisitor General who

sadistically interrogated, expelled and exterminated

Muslims during the Spanish Inquisition from the Iberian

Peninsula

Reynold Krak – Reference to Reynald de Chatillon, a French

knight of the Second Crusade who wantonly slaughtered

Muslim pilgrims passing through Jerusalem on their way to

Mecca and was later beheaded when Christian Western

invaders were defeated by Sultan Salah al-Din Yusuf ibn

Ayyub when he recaptured the city.

6. Executive Summary

On October 28th, 2010 Saudi counter-terrorism officials relayed to

U.S. and German authorities specific intelligence regarding two packages

originating in Sana’a Yemen. Each parcel carried an incendiary explosive

device bound for the Chicago, IL. In both cases the IED was concealed

inside the toner cartridges of a Hewlett Packard laser jet desktop

printer. A 22 year old Yemeni computer engineering student, Hanan al-

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Samawi was believed to have mailed both packages the previous day but

was subsequently released due and believed that her identity had been

stolen and used. Al-Qa’eda of the Arabian Peninsula had begun “Operation

Hemorrhage”.

____________________________________________________________________________________

Device #1 was in a package was posted at a UPS agent in Sana’a,

Yemen and checked in on ultimately bound for Chicago. The first plane

(passenger) left Sana’a, Yemen to Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE).

From Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE) to Cologne, Germany on a UPS

cargo plane, and then placed on UPS Flight 232, a Boeing 767, bound for

the United States. However, due to it’s heavy cargo there was a

scheduling change to refuel in East Midlands, UK in order to complete

its transatlantic leg when Scotland Yard’s Bomb Disposal Unit made a 6

hour initial sweep of UPS’s parcel distribution center and failed to

locate the device and the aircraft was cleared to continue on to

Pittsburgh, PA. The first device was found in Dubai, the plane was

recalled and upon a second sweep located the package. Seven examinations

of the package were made and it was believed to be a “dummy package” and

disassembled in 3 hours. It was not until confirmation of the viability

of the bomb discovered in Dubai that the team realized that they had

taken apart and detonated a live device.

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Device #2 was a package posted at a Federal Express agent in

Sana’a, Yemen bound for Chicago, checked on 2 separate passenger planes.

Qatar Airways jet (144 seat Airbus A320), left from Sana’a, Yemen to

Doha, Qatar where it remained for a day. The second Qatar Airways plane

(Airbus A321 or Boeing 777) left from Doha to a scheduled stopover in

Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE). The package was detected and seized

prior to departure for the 3rd leg of it’s journey on a FedEx Express

plane in the Fed Ex distribution center at the Dubai International

Airport.

Difficulty in detection was due to the sophistication of the

device’s elements made to look naturally a part of a standard printer

cartridge and the use of PETN made it virtually undetectable. The

cartridges each contained 340 grams of PETN, 50 grams of which would be

sufficient to puncture an aircraft’s skin. A syringe containing lead

azide acted as the detonating charge for both devices as well as the

timing mechanism created from disassembled mobile phones. Forensic

experts identified Ibrahim Hassan al-Asiri , AQAP’s primary bomb maker,

as the architect of the devices.

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7. Target / Victims

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Primary victims were global corporations such as UPS, Federal

Express and Qatar Airlines, their passengers and crewmembers. Secondary

victims: Congregation Or Chadesh and Congregation B’nai Zion to whom

packages were addressed.

8. Actors / Agents

Al-Qa’eda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is designated as

a foreign terrorist organization whose base of operations

is currently in southern Yemen. It is a dissident militant

Islamic organization and a main branch of Al-Qa’eda proper

in Afghanistan/Pakistan regions.

Ibrahim Hassan Tali al-Asiri – 22 year old, male, Saudi

national and AQAP’s principle bomb maker believed to be

responsible for both IED

Anwar al-Awlaki - 39 year old, male, American/Yemeni dual

national, spiritual leader and senior AQAP member believed

to have directed the operation.

Qa’sim Yahya Mahdi al-Rimi – 32 year old, male, Yemeni

national, AQAP military commander and believed to be the

mastermind behind this operation.

Hanan al-Samawi - 22 year old, female, Yemeni national and

computer engineering student was arrested on suspicion of

mailing the packages at both the UPS and FedEx offices in

Sana’a, Yemen. Has no known association with AQAP.

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Jaber Jabran al-Faifi – Saudi National (35) and former

Guantanamo Bay detainee remanded into Saudi custody for

rehabilitation in 2006. Al-Faifi escaped, rejoined AQAP in

2008 but on October 16th, 2010 turned himself in to Saudi

custody and has been providing information. It is believed

that the tip may have come from this source, however al-

Faifi or that Saudi’s have managed to place an operative

inside AQAP that provided the tip.

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9. Background

Al-Qa’eda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is borne out of the

merger of al-Qa’eda in Yemen (AQY) and their branch in the Kingdom of

Saudi Arabia. A successful joint operation counterterrorism campaign by

the American, Saudi Arabian, Afghan and Pakistani forces had by 2009

seemed to be exerting enough pressure on al-Qa’eda in the AfPak region

and their cells in Saudi Arabia to have dismantled or greatly curtailed

their level of activities in those states/regions. Operatives in KSA

were obliged to flee south into Yemen where they regrouped with other

recent arrivals hailing from Pakistan, Somalia and Iraq. Among them

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former are al-Qa’eda figures that have escaped Yemeni custody and

former Guantanamo Bay detainees remanded into Saudi custody.

Taking over leadership of al-Qa’eda in Yemen (AQY) was Nasir al-

Wuhayshi, former secretary to Osama bin Laden who had charged him this

authority while still under Yemeni custody in 2006. In a spectacular

prison break, al-Wuhayshi and 22 others escaped from Yemeni Security

Prison in Sana’a. His ambition and skills reformulated AQY and in 2009

formerly announced the merger of AQY and its Saudi affiliate into AQAP.

The strategic coup for AQAP’s revitalization is due to Yemen’s

permissive operating environment

AQAP’s regional aim, formerly focusing on Saudi Arabia, has

morphed into sophisticated projects taking on transnational objectives

by way of alliances with al-Shabbab in

Somalia and the far reach of its two online magazines reaching out to

English speaking and Arabic speaking audiences to act on their own

within their respective nations.

Ibrahim al-Asiri is the principle bomb maker for al-Qa’eda in the

Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), among the top explosives experts throughout

the al-Qa’eda organization and head of AQAP’s bomb making classes. He is

among the senior members of AQAP leadership. He crossed into Yemen

illegally sometime between 2006 and 2009, however a precise date cannot

be

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____________________________________________________________________________________

determined as his passport has no record of him exiting Saudi Arabian.

Al-Asiri, was involved in AQ activities while in KSA and his background

and subsequent activities supports the assertion that he falls in line

with the principle idealogy of al-Qaeda. The unification of the Yemeni

and KSA branches into AQAP in January 2009 only served to elevate his

status among the membership.

A testament to al-Asiri’s innovation and commitment to AQAP

idealogy and measures was evidenced in the 27 August 2009 suicide

bombing attempt to assassinate Saudi Deputy Interior Minister Prince

Muhammad bin Nayif in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The operative carrying out

the bombing was his younger brother, Abdullah al-Asiri. Al-Asiri had the

bomb was surgically implanted inside his brother’s body and detonated by

a mobile telephone trigger. A second novel device was used in the 25

December 2009 attempt to detonate an IED aboard Northwest flight 253 en

route from Amsterdam to Detroit. Al-Asiri is believed to have designed

the bomb hidden in the underpants of Nigerian national and AQAP

operative, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab. However, he is a crusader and a

true believer proven by attempts to cross into Iraq to join the

insurgency against the US and his participation in AQ cells in the

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

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During mid September 2010, 3 packages originating in Yemen

destined for Chicago were seized in transit prior to reaching their

destination. They contained no explosive devices, household goods,

papers, CD’s and religious books. A source tipped off U.S. officials of

these packages that were later linked to AQAP. A “dry run” laying the

groundwork for the actual event that would take place in October, it

would supply AQAP through the use of UPS and FedEx websites package

tracking critical information as to time, route, distribution centers,

etc.

10. Goal / Mission

AQAP’s goal was to attack the heart of U.S. global business interests

by striking its foundation - the multi-billion dollar airfreight industry and

creating economic leverage with a

____________________________________________________________________________________

nominal outlay of $4200 to fund the operation. Outlined in the special

November edition of its online e-magazine, Inspire, Yahya Ibrahim (AQAP

operative) clarifies that the success of the operation would have two

prerequisites:

1) That the parcels pass undetected through the latest security

equipment

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2) The ability for the devices to infiltrate security apparatus

would cause such a fear that billions more in resources will be

funneled to find new measures of protection of American and

European shipping and air freight industries which is the

foundation for the global interests in the world economy.

The second objective is the disseminations of the technical aspects of

these devices to jihadi’s everywhere so that they can plan to fulfill

their own operations from within their home countries, particularly the

U.S. and their European Allies.

11. Threats / Communication

The month following the event AQAP released a special November 2010 issue

of it’s online e-magazines Inspire and Malahim, in English and Arabic

respectively. The issue was solely dedicated to discussing general and

technical details, operational objectives, its economic leverage v. cost

effectiveness and their specific theological interpretation that underpins

these operations that would seek to further justify their actions to the

Muslim world and strengthen their religious credentials.

On 5 November 2010, via its media arm, Sada el Malahim,

claimed responsibility for the event by releasing a message

to a myriad of jihadi websites.

AQAP military commander and senior leader, Qa’sim Yahya

Mahdi al-Rimi forecasted the operation in a little known audiotape

obtained by U.S. intelligence officials 3 weeks prior to the

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event. Al-Rimi hinted at an upcoming attack using explosives as

an “experiment”.

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12. Intelligence

July 2010 – Saudi intelligence officials sent a general

warning of impending attack against U.S. or Europe.

9 October 2010 – Three weeks prior to attack Saudi

intelligence officials send more detailed report stating that four

days earlier AQAP completed planning for an attack that involved

one or two airplanes within a week or two of that transmission.

Also, indicated probability that planes might be used

simultaneously to carry out the attack.

28 October 2010 – 11th hour tip from Saudi intelligence

provided more specific information directing attention to air

cargo flights originating from Yemen.

The GCHQ Afghanistan team picked up a leak with the phrase

“A wedding gift is being delivered” being exchanged between al-

Qa’eda HQ and AQAP perhaps distinguishing the level of cooperation

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and information exchange between the two. Triggering an

intelligence alert, GCHQ informed MI6, which forwarded the warning

to London and Washington.

13. Outcome

The intended detonation of either device did not come to fruition

and was the product of swift, coordinated international action on the

heels of good intelligence. The outcome of this event was met with the

following actions:

Although AQAP took responsibility for the devices, no persons

affiliated wit

United Parcel Service and Federal Express have frozen all

business in Yemen.

Department of Homeland Security has raised national threat

level to “High”.

____________________________________________________________________________________

Within 48 hours of this incident the U.S. Transportation

Security Administration dispatched to Yemen a team of security

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experts to provide expertise, equipment and training in

examining cargo bound to U.S. destinations.

U.S. TSA enacts the following measures:

Creation of a voluntary program to facilitate screening

throughout the air cargo supply chain

Steps to test technologies for screening air cargo

Expanding its explosives detection canine program

A temporary ban on air freight originating from Yemen from the

following countries: United States, United Arab Emirates,

Germany, United Kingdom, France, Canada and the Netherlands.

Several bans were later lifted, including the US, and must meet

specialized standards with increased security screening prior

to departure from Yemen.

U.S. Congress mandated set a deadline for TSA to screen 100% of

all air cargo for bombs or hazardous materials by December

2011.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection sets requirement for

manifests to be submitted for air cargo by shippers more that

four hours prior to arrival.

Toner and ink cartridges weighing more than 1 lb (0.45 Kg) are

banned from checked or carry-on baggage from all commercial and

some international air cargo flights

14. Analysis

This event had the intended global reach impacting the entire

international shipping, airfreight and passenger transportation

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industries. It highlighted the effectiveness and quick action on the

part of the international intelligence communities as well as failures,

gaps and the predictability of current security measures. An awareness

that that checks on freight are not as stringent as those focusing on

passengers allowed for the creative methods AQAP used to bypass them.

____________________________________________________________________________________

UPS and Federal Express were cherry picked by AQAP because they

were accessible, because they were American companies and most of all

because the global economy completely hinges on the multi-billion dollar

foundational shipping and air cargo industries that moves it – not the

airline passenger industry. Strategically, the usefulness of these

carriers lies in the ability to track a shipments location hour by hour

relaying critical information about time, route and method of a parcel

or freight’s delivery.

It would be a mistake to oversimplify this event based on the package

addresses of Chicago synagogues that coincidentally no longer housed either

congregation. Lack of attention to this detail of not one but two

synagogues would be sloppy and would be indicative of an emerging terrorist

not an organization on the order of AQAP. AQAP is extremely thorough and

thoughtful in their procedural details - to painstakingly put together this

operation with such elegant devices only to be sent to the wrong

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institutions due to a sophomoric research error would fail to be line

with their organizational character. To highlight this point each package

was addressed to persons referencing historical individuals. Diego Deza, a

reference to Don Diego Deza, and Reynald Krak, a reference to Reynald de

Chaillon, infamous historical figures in Islamic lore known for their

sadistic brutality towards Muslims in their respective eras. To add to the

wry dark humor a Charles Dickens classic, Great Expectations, was also included

in one of the packages. Accordingly, demolition experts did not feel that

the packages were meant to arrive at their destinations but either to be

detonated mid flight upon entering U.S. air space or perhaps simply to be

found in order to further test for system weaknesses, response time,

detection, etc.

The display of tactical agility, keen attention to detail and

growing sophistication in the creation and innovation of its devices to

fit the operation demonstrates that this branch of al-Qa’eda has not yet

reached their peak and capacity. Every new operation appears to be a

challenge Ibrahim al-Asiri relishes to see if he can trump the ingenuity

of his last device and he is developing a real taste for the global

attention and respect (even of his enemies) that his skills garner. A

reasonable expectation would be for AQAP to lend out, for cash or trade,

al-Asiri’s

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____________________________________________________________________________________

services to other organizations looking to hire a professional of his

skill level, particularly now that he has overseen the development of a

demolitions department and introducing a new generation of students into

the art.

With “Operation Hemorrhage,” as the entire focus of it’s special

issue of Inspire, AQAP is signaling that one need not make the pilgrimage

to AQ bases in Yemen or the AfPak region to be initiated into the fold,

trained and tasked - “Open Source Jihad” is the name of the game and the

objective is accountability. Those on the cusp, particularly young men

between the ages of 17 – 35, are enticed by the sleek modernity of the

magazine but most importantly it speaks to their generation with a

familiar voice not unlike their own. With an acute awareness and

understanding of what is needed to cross that mental threshold, they are

guided and encouraged essentially to become an army of one.

Prevention of this type of radicalization within our own borders must begin

first and foremost with an honest desire to reach out and work

collaboratively with Muslim communities in a far more meaningful way than

is presently being done. Unfortunately, by our own hand, we are creating

enmity with the citizens we need to partner with. The landscape is ripe

with incidents and anecdotal evidence of abuse, humiliation, detention at

border crossings, airport facilities, courthouses and government buildings

where the average American Muslim citizen is subjected to rude and

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inflammatory interrogation and treatment. These same citizens would be

our supportive allies understanding of the measures needed to be taken to

secure the nation. Now, due to these degrading experiences, added to the

palpable culture of fear that developed post 9/11 among Muslims, the door

has been opened wider in the minds of these citizens, their families and

acquaintances that create a greater understanding for the motivations of

AQAP and other organizations who claim to take up the banner of Muslim

dignity.

A real contextual cultural and religious training of local, state and federal

law enforcement, military and other departments that deal directly with this

population group prepared by known, recognized and

____________________________________________________________________________________

accepted scholars, academics from within the Muslim community is in dire

need. A small measure of understanding, respect for another’s dignity

and civility in these front line security matters would do immeasurable

good. Clearly any prior training in this arena has failed.

A sustained joint campaign with Muslim communities around the

nation welcoming, encouraging and urging their civic participation as

the duty of all Americans will most likely be met enthusiastically by

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many young and middle age Muslims. The results would be effective in

many ways

It would give 1st, 2nd generation Americans Muslims a sense of

their place and a stake in this country and counter the

isolating effect 9/11 has had on the community.

It would make American Muslims more visible to the broader

American society as visibility and interaction has been a

determining factor in the rise of negative feelings and actions

toward Muslims.

Would allow for a normalization of relations between the

community and security agencies that would minimize the deeply

rooted suspicion and fear of government due to past experiences

in their countries of origin and exacerbated here by post 9/11

policies.

The evolving and mutating nature of these threats causes a rush to

approve more funding for newer technologies, however the approach of

organizations like AQAP will also evolve in step with the technology.

The air freight and shipping industries are particularly vulnerable due

to the sheer volume exchanged globally every day. Better strategic

utilization of resources to close security gap and increasing the

expertise of the screeners with increased training will help reduce

tensions due to profiling techniques where screeners gauge the threat

level of a passenger based on outward religious garb, skin color or

accents rather than skillful reasoning through documentation, expert

questioning and behavioral analysis for passenger travel.

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____________________________________________________________________________________

15. Stakeholders

United Parcel Service (UPS)

Federal Express International

Qatar Airlines

Qatar Airlines passengers

Sana’a International Airport, Sana’a, Yemen

Doha International Airport, Doha, Qatar

Dubai International Airport, Dubai, United Arab Emirates

(UAE)

Cologne Bonn Airport, Cologne, Germany

East Midlands Airport, East Midlands, United Kingdom

16. Notes

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