Failed State or Forever Free

Newbill: Pol-312 Term PaperYemen's Arab Spring

Failed State or Forever Free:

Yemen's Revolution, State Issues, and

Prospects for Democracy.

Que Newbill: Pol-312 Term Paper

Yemen's Arab Spring

1


Failed State or Forever Free: Yemen's Revolution, State

Issues, and Prospects for Democracy

Introduction

The international community has become both baffled and

intrigued with the revolts in the Arab World. Many of the revolutions

seemed to have defied the established, but stagnant theories set

forth by middle eastern scholars. While these areas specialists

return to reform their disputations as policy analysts create new

rule books, the world watches. It is true, most of the revolutions

can be drawn from similar political and social-economic conditions,

but this general approach overlooks the distinctive dynamics in each

country which may have different theoretical causes. This is

especially true with Yemen.

Statement of Purpose

Yemen presents a special case in the study of the Arab

2


revolutions. This paper explains the exceptionalism of Yemen with

regards to its revolution, state issues, and prospects for

democratization. Yemen's revolution is unique for a number of

reasons. Not only is Yemen considered the “poorest” Arab country, it

is currently the only Arab state (in revolt) struggling with both

secessionist movements and even deeper tribalism issues. These

cultural features have galvanized its revolution, but also created

more uncertainty for its future. As Yemen's movement progresses,

these cleavages have become more enhanced. The direction of the

movement will be critical to deciding if Yemen as a state will

continue to exist.

Fragile Roots: National Identity and State Issues

The roots of Yemen's current issues began early in its history.

Originally, Yemen existed as two different states: the Yemen Arab

Republic (YAR) in the north and the People’s Democratic Republic of

Yemen (PDR) in the south. The Ottoman Empire controlled northern

Yemen until 1918. After independence, the Hamidaddin monarchy ruled

3


for several decades. In 1962, revolutionary forces overthrew the

monarchy and established the Yemen Arab Republic.

South Yemen’s modern period began a bit later than north Yemen.

The British controlled this region known as the Aden Protectorate

until 1967. Afterward, the southern government adopted a communist

system, the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen. South Yemen

existed as the only Marxist state in the Arab world with established

ties to the USSR, China, and Cuba. The two Yemeni states remained

amicable to each other. In 1972, the two heads of states decided to

unify. Tensions and disagreements over sharing power led to delays of

the eventual union. Finally, on May 22, 1990, North and South Yemen

formally united under then President Salih1.

State Formation and Regionalism

Despite a carefully formulated timetable with international

consultation, Yemen's unification cannot be called a true success.

While the first years after unification seemed promising, historical

tensions between the two former states were never solved. Roots of

resentment over distribution of resources have become the fertile

1 Salih is also spelled Saleh

4


grounds for the southern separatist movement and general social

discontent.

One of the primary problems is how southern Yemen perceives

northern Yemen as more developed. This has resulted in tensions

between the two states. After the border between the two countries

opened, the Yemenis noticed a stark difference between the northern

and southern cities. (Dunbar 1992) pointed this out,

“It was easy for travelers to see that the cities of Sanaa,

Taiz, and al-Hudaydah had surpassed Aden-once the second or

third busiest port in the world-as centers of commercial

activity. By the same token, North Yemeni visitors to the PDRY-

especially those who recalled the days prior to the revolution-

returned home with the impression that, whatever its faults, the

YAR system had produced obvious progress whereas Aden's brand of

Marxism had transformed the PDRY into an economic backwater with

limited prospects for advancement.”

In addition to these visible economic differences, northern Yemenis

were skeptical of a Marxist economic system. These fears were

alleviated with the proposed government that involved a structure of

5


a 50-50 split of positions between the northern and southern

officials. Problems resurfaced when the new government began, because

southern officials complained of low salaries compared to their

northern counterparts. Another issue was land reform; the government

was very slow in its effort to return properties taken by northern

Yemenis during the civil war. These tensions, because of ideology

and perceived wealth inequality made Yemenis in the south bitter.

These issues are still present in southern Yemen’s grievances today.

Protest rallies in the southern region are orchestrated on symbolic

days such as July 7th the anniversary of the entry of northern troops

in Aden (Mermier 2008). Saleh's regime has strategically used these

interests to retain power.

Yemen's Tribalism, National Identity, and Democratization

Concerning democratization, Yemen's fractionalism presents many

complications.. Democratization requires a certain degree of a

cohesive national identity, which Yemen currently does not have,

because of the regional and tribal identities of the north and south.

(Schnapper 2011) argues that in a democratic society, individuals and

groups buy into the idea of a “community of citizens”. This

6


“citizenship” creates a social and political link between

individuals. The role of tribes in Yemen makes “citizenship”

problematic. The now defunct central government has not found a way

to incorporate tribal identities into the political system. (Manea

1996) characterizes contemporary Yemen tribe- states relations by two

elements: “a tribal perception that separates national identity from

the concept of a sovereign state; and an alienation of tribesmen from

their tribal leaders who exercise political power in the center.” The

tribal and national spheres are very “disconnected” and “disengaged”

(Ibid). Yemenis find it difficult to accept the concept of a

sovereign state. There is no connection between their national

identity and the state that claims to represent that identity (Ibid).

(Manea 1996) concludes that “As far as [tribal leaders] are

concerned, the state is a mere synonym of the political elite who

holds the power in Yemen to the detriment of the country.” (Fattah

2011:5) concurs , “Yemen perhaps the last bastion of tribal power in

the Middle East … in some tribal areas, the presence of national-

security forces or military units is perceived as a foreign

intrusion”.

7


In the context of development, democratization issues become

even bigger when the state is fragile and unstable like Yemen.

(Grugal 2002:77) writes “the survival of sub-state nationalism in

nation states a considerable challenge to democracy”. Secessionist

movements such as the ones in the north (Al-Houthis) and the south

essentially “corrode” the chances for democracy. Nationality issues

can lead to “social breakdown,” “social exclusion,” and “civil

strife,”. These issues may culminate into a state of “diminished

sovereignty” (Grugel 2002:80). In Yemen, the sense of national

identity from unification eroded into regional affiliations due to

stronger tribal associations and the government patronage system

which still operates through tribal links. The state institutions

have only served to facilitate and to reinforce these patron-client

relations, rather than operate in the democratic nature of each

institution. This is discussed in-depth in a later section.

The Power Game and Its Players

Currently, these issues are demonstrated in Yemen's revolution.

Saleh's complex system of governance, a mix between coalitions and

patron-client relationships, which has reinforced tribal affiliations

8


and played up rivalries, has now turned to a labyrinth of power

networks that he is struggling to control. In contrast to the JMP,

(largely dominated by the Islamic party Islah) vying for an Islamist

state and the a grassroots, non-partisan, youthful pro-democracy,

groups such as secessionists from Yemen’s oil-exporting south, and

Houthi Shia rebels from the northern province of Saada both desire

“guarantees of autonomy”. Southern dissents have taken complete

control of Yemen's second-largest city, Taez, and Houthis rebels in

the north have taken complete control of Saada (Fattah 2011). The

Yemen central government does not have control over most parts of

Yemen.

It is also important to note, these groups vying for autonomy

have existed even before the “Arab Spring”. Saleh's armed conflict

with Al Houthis has existed for decades with only relatively short

periods of ceasefires. (Schall 2011) wrote, “The Houthis view his

[Saleh] government as a puppet for the United States and the Saudis,

and believe they are fighting to preserve their Zaidi sect of Shiite

Islam. Even though Saleh is a Zaidi, the Houthis allege he has

allowed Wahhabi (i.e., radical Sunni) forces to threaten their

9


existence. Indeed, the Saudis have bombed the Houthis on numerous

occasions and the Saudis continue to arm loyal sheiks along the

border of Yemen. As one scholar quotes, “Yemen is to Saudi Arabia

what Mexico is to the United States: a source of concern.”

The Marxist sect from the PDR in southern Yemen is still active

and earlier this year, separatist militants assassinated a top Yemeni

security officer. Of course, experts credit the growing secessionist

movement in southern Yemen with the increasing number of attacks.

These groups desire a South Yemen to be reconstituted.

A recent poll by the Yemeni Center for Civil Rights reported 70%

of Yemenis in the south favored succession.2 Outside of the need for

economic survival, many north Yemenis do not see the need for

unification. The southern Yemenis do not see the benefit either.

Before the Arab Spring, southern Yemenis began pushing for a Sudan-

style referendum to decide if the south should be sovereign once

again. To make matters worse, Al-Qaeda reportedly also supports the

southern succession.3 Yemen is considered the homeland of Al-Qaeda

2 Examiner “Southern Yemen: 70% favor secession poll shows”3 Jamestown Foundation “Al-Qaeda in Yemen Supports Southern Secession”

10


in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), it is also considered to have the

most dangerous branch of Al-Qaeda in the Middle- East (Fattah 2011).

As military leaders and tribal leaders ,the two factions of

Saleh's support base, continue to defect or resign, experts consider

a civil war a real possibility for Yemen (Freedberg Jr. 2011). Even

Saleh himself , in an attempt to gain international support, warned

of a bloody civil war that would precipitate an Al-Qaeda takeover if

he stepped down. The current situation has supports this idea.

Currently, Yemen has two armies, one that supports Saleh and the

other led by General Ali Muhsin, the commander of one of Yemen’s four

main military zones, who supports and protects the protestors. Adding

to this volatile mix, are the heavily armed sheiks. Earlier this year

when Saleh's guards attempted to storm the housing compound of Sheikh

Sadeq al-Ahmar, his tribal rival, the tribal militia of Sheikh Sadeq

unleashed “hell” on Saleh's troops and then laid siege to at least

nine government ministries.

Modern Yemen: The Teetering Tower

State Resources, Disparities, and Sand

In 2010, Transparency International (TI) ranked Yemen as one of

11


the corrupt states in the world, and second most corrupt in the

Middle-East region. In almost every facet of industry, patronage and

cronyism plague Yemen. For example, Saleh sells the Yemeni

government’s share of extracted crude oil to select groups and it is

rumored that most privileged clients can buy the subsidized oil

products, diesel for example, and then sell it for a profit on the

international market. (Alley 2011). Saleh has also used his political

party the General People’s Congress (GPC) to build and expand his

patronage-client relationships. A GPC membership represents a sign of

“loyalty” to the regime and the local committees it is comprised of

serve central government interest as a means to obtain government

benefits.

In addition to the corruption, Yemen faces a laundry list of

development issues and it has not found the balance between

increasing its capacity and delivering basic goods to the public.

Overall, the Yemen state cannot provide basic services to its 23.5

million population, that is growing at a rate of 2.7 percent annually

(Alley 2010). To make matters worse, its oil revenue which accounts

for majority of the state’s income may expire in the next decade

12


(Ibid). Water is another rapidly depleting natural resource and it is

still considered the greatest threat facing Yemen (Ismail 2000). The

water issue has become a “key political battleground” and exposed the

“cultural disconnect” between central government officials advocating

for water management and rural tribal groups that adhere to

traditional local customs. The government is also tied by Islamic law

that “All surface and groundwater on waqf lands was considered res

communis – i.e. for the benefit of the Muslim community; water on

mawt or mirr" public land was considered res nullius or ‘right of no

one’” ( Ismail 2000). Thus, the state has trouble controlling and

regulating allocation of groundwater. Some technical reports suggest

that Sanaa could be the first capital in the world to run out of

water (Fatah 2011).

The nature of the labor force presents a paradox of sorts in

Yemen. Yemen suffers from a crippling illiteracy rate. An estimated

43% of Yemenis live below the poverty line and employment is at a

staggering 40% (Fatah 2011). A large number of Yemeni males travel

abroad in search of employment. Domestic development projects are

untended and village communities remain heavily dependent on

13


remittances from emigrant workers. These workers may return home with

savings that they invest in a small business such as shops, but

rising inflation makes these business ventures economically

nonviable. From the 1980s to the present, it has been cheaper to

import food than it is to grow it. Taxes present a worse situation,

because Islamic law makes it hard to tax both wealth and produce.

Adding to this, The recent Yemen-Al Houthis conflicts displaced

an estimated 130,000 persons from their homes in the northern

governorates.4 Majority of the government's revenues come from

Yemen's oil reserves and this is expected to be completed depleted in

the near future. Again, compounding these issues is the nature of the

patronage system. (Alley 2011:8) describes Saleh's rile as “solidly

neopatrimonial” versus “sultanistic”, because the social and

political limitations on Salih’s rule, and the relatively wide circle

of clients that support his regime. Two of the most powerful tribes

tribes, Saleh's Sanhan and al-Ahmar have allowed their local areas to

remain underdeveloped. Very little wealth has trickled down from the

tribal elites. As one scholar concluded “As a result of the

4 The Graduate Institute Geneva: Yemen

14


historical absence of strong central authority and the failure of

socialization of Yemenis as citizens, the state often behaves like a

tribe, and the tribe behaves like a state.” With such a volatile

situation and worsening socio-economic conditions, it is not a

surprise that Yemen followed suit like other Arab states with massive

anti-government protests.

Yemen's Relationship with US

The U.S. Foreign policy towards Yemen as only served to worsen

the situation. After September 11th, Former President George Walker

Bush introduced a national security policy coupled with democracy

promotion (Alzandani 2010). Bush’s approach combined elements of

realism and liberalism to tackle terrorist activities in the Middle

East. Due to its strategic location, Yemen became a focal point.

Yemen borders Saudi Arabia (a highly important American ally in the

Gulf region), the Red Sea, and provides access to the Indian Ocean.

Following a seven-year hiatus, USAID reopened its offices in

Yemen and restarted its foreign aid program to Yemen. Up until 2003,

this aid focused almost exclusively on US-Yemen military projects.

Year Total Military Development

15


2001 $5.4

million

$5.4

million

--

2002 $29.7

million

$20

million

$9.7

million

2003 $17.1

million

$1.9

million

$15.2

million

2004 $33.4

million

$14.9

million

$18.6

million

TABLE 1.1 Source: usatoday.com/news/world/2010-01-05-yemen-

aid_N.htm

By analyzing the numbers in Table 1.1 one can recognize that

U.S. foreign aid allocated to Yemen was very tiny in comparison with

the social needs that Salah‘s government is faces. The largest amount

that the Bush Administration provided to Yemen was earmarked to

military sector, with exception of the FY2003 335, For instance in

the FY2001 the entire aid went to military area 336 and in 2002 from

the total aid $29.7 million, more than 66% was allocated to military

assistance. Also, in FY2004 when aid totaled $33.4 million, $14.9

16


million of which was earmarked for military sector and the rest went

to other development sectors including democracy promotion.

According to the Minister of Human Rights Huda Alban, the Bush

Administration did not spend even one percent of its aid to Yemen for

democracy promotion” (Ibid). Alzandani concluded, “Overall, the total

aid Yemen received from the U.S. during the first term of Bush‘s

Administration was only $85.6 million; around 50% of that aid was

spent for security and military purposes”(Alzandani 2010 p. 204). Of

course, this relationship has proved tenuous in the current

revolution. Aside from calling for a end to the violence, the US

administration has remained silent on the Yemen situation. A few days

after a massacre in Saana, Defense Secretary Robert Gates, on a visit

to Moscow, was asked if the United States still backed Saleh. “I

don’t think it’s my place to talk about internal affairs in Yemen,”.

Earlier this year, (Schall 2011) wrote “if President Saleh falls, the

US will have lost a pliant partner in its 'global war on terror'.

Even though US backing of Saleh has done more to de-legitimatize the

regime.

The Obama administration has not only continued Bush's foreign

17


policy, but only also strengthened it. In a meeting with Obama

foreign policy delegates, Saleh pledged ““unfettered access to

Yemen’s national territory for U.S. counterterrorism operations,”

according to a classified US diplomatic cable released by WikiLeaks.

“Saleh insisted that Yemen’s national territory is available for

unilateral counterterrorism operations by the U.S. (Schall 2011)”. In

fact since 2009, the U.S. has executed numerous “clandestine

operations”, “launched surveillance aircraft to survey the intended

targets”, and conducted extensive missile strike and raids in

southern Yemen. (Schall 2011). In 2010, under General Petraeaus, the

US doubled its “security assistance” to Yemen. According to Wikileak

cables, Saleh authorized the United States to strike Al-Aqaeda in

Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) when “actionable intelligence” was

available. The same cable revealed Saleh's concern that the cruise

missiles used were not very accurate, but also that the Yemen

government would continue take “100% credit” for the strikes. Most

Yemenis do not believe the strikes to be from Saleh though. The

weaponry recovered from sites were clearly more advanced than

current Yemen arms. All this has only served to strength the fight

18


against the Saleh regime.

Conclusion: Failed State or Forever Free

Yemen provides an excellent example of revolutions in weak

state. The complexities of national identity, factionalism, and poor

state development contribute to a plethora of questions for the

Yemeni people to answer amidst their movement to produce a more

equitable state. The same features that sparked the revolution have

accelerated the movement and increased its potency. These same

features may also lead to a “failed state”, a divided state, or an

Al-Qaeda controlled state enterprise. In the same turn, the

diversity of supporters in the movement have shown great harmony and

coordinated in the efforts to oust Saleh. If this same energy is

directed in creating a coherent state, Yemen has the potential to

become a liberal state.

Yemen's current protestors can be divided into three main

groups. First, the youth who represent Nearly three-quarters of

Yemen’s population.5 Most of the youth represented come from the

central and southern governorates, where there tends to be a higher

5 Yemen and Its Youth Population: A Closer Look

19


level of education. The second major group is tribal. Headed by al

Ahmar family, it is the militarily and financially the strongest. The

last camp is the weakest and made up mostly of opposition parties.

Saleh's policy towards protestors has only deepened distrust in the

government and depleted the public funds even more, exacerbating

Yemen’s already bleak economic situation. While the anti-government

protests are hopeful and sincere, they still lack clear leadership.

Many factions are also represented in them. As one activist noted,

“There is a popular movement and a political movement in Yemen. But

there is no support from the political parties for the popular

movement, which is not organized. It is still weak and in the

beginning stages."6

For democratization to begin, Yemen needs more than just Saleh

removed, dealing with it’s nationality issues may be more important.

In states with strong regional affiliations and ethnic cleavages,

some experts recommend regional autonomy (Day 2006). This “democratic

federalism” has proved somewhat successful in Iraq, where the new

government allowed Kurds to maintain autonomous regional authority in

6 The Washington Post "In Yemen, Calls for Revolution But Many Hurdles"

20


the Northern provinces. Of course it is important not to draw strong

parallels between Iraq and Yemen, especially since Yemen

independently coordinated its unification while Iraq's occurred

during a military occupation. Still, the idea merits exploration and

study. Some scholars consider “Balkanization” a viable option as

well. It would be very similar process to regional federalism.

Yemen is the first arguable substantive experiment for democracy

in the Middle East. Yet, as it stands with its infrastructure

continuing to deteriorate, Salih refusing to resign, and disparate

factions in the movement, Yemen may fail as a state (Grosshans

2011). Democratization may be Yemen’s only option. The very

challenges of democratization may be the very problems that save it.

Some of the issues that states encounter in moving toward democracy

include “problems of diminished or contested sovereignty, poor state

capacity, and authoritarian legacies” (Ibid). These all prove to be

the case with Yemen, but this process can transform the state. It is

truly a “make it or break it” situation.

Cited Sources:Alley, April. "Yemen's Multiple Crises." Journal of Democracy 21.4 (2010):

n. pag. Web. Nov 25

21


2011.<http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/summary/v021/2

1.4.alley.html>.

Alley, April. “The Rules of the Game: Unpacking Patronage Politics in

Yemen”. Middle East Journal. Middle East Institute. Nov 25 2011.

Alzandani, BA. "The Bush Doctrine, the War on Terror, and American

promotion of democracy in the Middle East: The cases of Egypt and

Yemen ." (2011): n. pag.

Web. Nov 25 2011.

Daragahi , Borzou , and Noah Browning. "Tens of thousands turn out for

rival rallies in Yemen." Los Angeles Times February 03, 2011: n. pag.

Nov 25 2011. 2011.<http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/03/world/la-

fg-yemen-rallies-20110204>.

Dunbar , Charles. "The Unification of Yemen: Process, Politics, and

Prospects." Middle East Journal. Middle East Institute, Summer 1992.

Web. Nov 25 2011. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/4328466.pdf?

acceptTC=true>.

Fattah, Khaled. “Yemen: A Social Intifada In A Republic of Sheikhs.” Middle

East Policy. Vol XVIII, No.3. Nov 25 2011.

Grosshans, Todd. "Is Yemen the Next Failed State?. "VOA Feb 16 2010: n.

pag. Web. Nov 25 2011.

Hamidi, Ayamn. “Inscriptions of Violence in Northern Yemen: Haunting

Histories, Unstable Moral Spaces”. Middle Eastern Studies. Vol 45, No.

2 165-187, March 2009. Nov 25 2011.

Horton, Michael. "Why Southern Yemen is pushing for succession." CS

Monitor. CS Monitor, December 2009.Web. 19 May 2011.

<http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2009/1215/Why-southern-

Yemen-is-pushing-for-secession>

22

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/summary/v021/21.4.alley.html

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/summary/v021/21.4.alley.html

http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/4328466.pdf?acceptTC=true

http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/4328466.pdf?acceptTC=true


Ismail, Sharif. "UNIFICATION IN YEMEN Dynamics of Political Integration,

1978-2000." N.p., n.d. Web. 19 May 2011.

<http://users.ox.ac.uk/~metheses/Ismail%20Thesis.pdf>

Mermier Franck , "Yemen: the South towards secession?" EchoGéo , A Brush

2008, 2008, [online], posted 19 June 2008.

URL:http://echogeo.revues.org/index5603.html. Nov 25 2011.

Manea, Manea. "Yemen, the tribe and the state." (1996): n. pag. Web. Nov 25

2011.

<http://www.al-bab.com/yemen/soc/manea1.htm>.

Oweis, Khaled. "South Yemen politician wants referendum on secession."

Reuters. Reuters, March 2011. Web. 19 May 2011.

<http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/01/us-yemen-separatist-

USTRE7202OD20110301>.

" Profile: Yemen's Houthi Fighters." Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera, August 2009.

Web. Nov 25 2011.

<http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2009/08

/200981294214604934.html>.

Rosen, Nir. “Thugs on Payroll”. New Statesman: Mar 21 2011. Nov 25 2011.

Rustow, dankwart. "Transitions to Democracy." Comparative Politics Journal

2.3 (1970): 337-363. Web. Nov 25 2011.

<http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/mcooper/ps744readings

/rustow.pdf>

Schwedler, Jillian. "Yemen's Aborted Opening." Journal of Democracy 13.4

(2002): 48-55. Web. Nov 25 2011.

Scahill, Jeremy. “The Dangerous US Game in Yemen”. The Nation. Apr 18 2011.

Nov 25 2011.

Sharp, Jemery. " Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations." Congressional

23


Research Service. Congressional Research Service, March 22 2011. Web.

Nov 25 2011. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34170.pdf>

Sharp, Jemery. " Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations." Congressional

Research Service. Congressional Research Service, September 12 2011.

Web. Nov 25 2011. <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi- bin/GetTRDoc?

AD=ADA471821&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>.

Sinjab , Lina. "Yemen protests: 20,000 call for President Saleh to go." BBC

February 03, 2011: n. pag. Web. Nov 25

2011.<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12353479>.

Schnapper "Summer University for Democracy." Council of Europe. Council of

Europe, July 200. Web. Nov 25 2011.

<http://www.coe.int/t/dgap/sps/report_2007_en.pdf>.

Sweetland, Haley. “Divided They Stand”. The New Republic Apr 28, 2011. Nov

25 2011.

Wagner-Pacific, Robin. “Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power, and

Performance in Yemen” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 115, No. 5

(March 2010), pp. 1657-1659. Nov 25 2011.

"The State of Democracy in Yemen." N.p., n.d. Web. Nov 25 2011.

<https://www.aswat.com/en/node/1193>.

"2010-2012 Yemen Country Strategy." USAID. N.p., n.d. Web. Nov 25 2011.

<http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACP572.pdf>.

"Yemen Country Profile." BBC. BBC, April 2011. Web. Nov 25 2011.

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/784383.stm>.

"Yemen's 1993 elections." http://www.al-bab.com/.International Republican

Institute, n.d. Web. Nov 25

2011.<http://www.al-bab.com/yemen/pol/iri0.htm>.

24

http://www.coe.int/t/dgap/sps/report_2007_en.pdf

Date post:	24-Feb-2023
Category:	Documents
Upload:	independent
View:	0 times
Download:	0 times

Failed State or Forever Free

Documents