Transformation after two decades of agrarian reform program

Pamela CrosbyMSc in Geography CandidateDepartment of Geography

University of the Philippines Diliman

Introduction

In the Philippines, a large proportion of the population is

involved in the agricultural sector. According to the Bureau of

Agricultural Statistics (BAS), an office under the Department of

Agriculture (DA), about 12.03 million were employed in the

agriculture sector. It represents about 35 percent of the

country's employment in 2008. In terms of wage, an agricultural

worker earns on average Php325 (7.3 US dollars)* daily, if

employed in agricultural lands within the National Capital

Region, the political and economic center of the Philippines or

between Php185-257 (4.2-5.8 US dollars), if employed outside NCR

(National Wages and Productivity Commission, 2008). Comparing

these figures to earnings from non-agricultural employment,

Php325-362 (7.3-8.1 US dollars) in NCR and Php183-287 (4.1-6.5 US

dollars) outside NCR, the difference is quite significant.

Oftentimes the terms “agricultural” is often equated to “rural”

although they are not necessarily so. These words in turn are

associated with poverty, backwardness, and underdevelopment. The

*Based on the average exchange rate in 2008.

bleak characterization of the rural-agricultural areas is

attributed to landlessness, or more aptly, to unequal access to

land, which in turn, maintains the dependency of the landless on

landed entities, be they traditional landlords or huge commercial

companies. In both cases, tenant farmers and farm workers are

treated as mere tillers of land and have no decision-making power

over the utilization of the land and the resources in it.

For rural developers, the way then to correct stagnation and

poverty in the rural areas is to redistribute land, which is

tantamount to redistributing wealth and power (Thiesenhusen,

2001; Borras, 2008b). By having access to land, tillers are no

longer forced into an iniquitous sharing system with landlords or

pressed into oftentimes-onerous wage labor system. Access to land

also means freedom to diversify their livelihoods, directly join

in the agricultural market, or even move away from agriculture.

On the other hand, landlords attempt to preserve their

landholdings by sidestepping the agrarian reform programs using

overt and covert means, from converting agricultural lands into

other uses to employing outright armed resistance. Two decades

after the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform

Program (CARP) in the Philippines, what has happened then to the

“former” landlords, the beneficiaries of the CARP, and their

respective lands?

2

This paper outlines some of the findings of my masteral thesis

which examines the impacts of agrarian reform on the social

relations in the study area and on the production and

reproduction spaces in the said community. The study is being

conducted on three agrarian reform (AR) sites in the municipality

of Buenavista, namely, Poblacion, Catulin, and Lilukin.

Agrarian Reform Impact Studies in the Philippines

In the Philippines, most “CARP impact assessment” studies focus

on the socioeconomic effects of the CARP, particularly on poverty

alleviation and policy implications (see studies done by

Balisacan, Borras and the PIDS). Many of these have been

concerned with evaluating the “success” rate of the CARP and only

a few have been concerned with the spatial effects of the program

on the physical land itself. Among these few is a study done by

Ballesteros & de la Cruz (2006) who examined the impacts of the

CARP on land ownership concentration in the rice-growing areas in

Nueva Ecija, Central Luzon. One of the evitable effects of the

CARP is the decline of large consolidate rice lands and the

increase of small rice farm landholdings, at least for a certain

period of time. In one of the conclusions of the author, these

agrarian reform sites in Nueva Ecija did not experience much

change since farmers who benefited from the CARP eventually re-

sold or pawned their lands not necessarily to their old landlords

but to new land buyers, which is also a common practice among the

3

CARP beneficiaries of Buenavista, Quezon.. What happens is that a

new breed of landowners is emerging in these villages.

In relation to this, a study done by Llanto & Dingcong (1991)

examine the frequently forgotten actors/stakeholders in the CARP,

which are the landowners. Among the important focus of the study

are “the factors that encourage or discourage the shift of

landowners from agriculture to industry” and the “impact of

agrarian reform on their income and investment behavior”.

However, the authors discussed only the economizing behaviors and

response of landowners to the CARP and portrayed them as rational

“entrepreneurs” which is not always the case, especially in the

Philippines where land is laden with political and social

functions. It is a common fact that land reform programs are

often met with resistance from large land owning entities.

Area of Study

Buenavista was established as the 37th municipality of the

Province of Quezon in the northeastern Philippines on August 26,

1950. However, it already existed as a small village (or a sitio)

in the 1800s, founded by Spaniards who settled in the area. It

has 37 barangays (the smallest administrative unit in the

Philippines), with a total area of 16,135.07 hectares and a total

population of 23,834 (as of 2003), such that 1.48 people live in

an hectare of land.

4

Buenavista is a fifth-class municipality, meaning, it has an

annual income of 10 million pesos to 20 million pesos (217,037.4

US dollars to 434,074.9 US dollars), which is practically at the

bottom of the income classification of municipalities in the

country. It is part of the Bondoc Peninsula, a sub-region located

in the southern portion of the province. Buenavista is

approximately 226 km southeast of Manila and about 114 km

southeast of Lucena, Quezon Province’s capital and lone city.

Buenavista is an agricultural municipality, with 62% of its total

land area (or 10,009 hectares), devoted for agricultural use. Of

these 10,009 hectares, 8,153.8 or 81% of the agricultural area is

planted with coconut. However, just like the rest of the Bondoc

Peninsula subregion, has been handicapped by its physical

geography. This area is characterized by a hilly and mountainous

topography, high soil erodibility, and by leached upland soils.

Moreover, this municipality is often in the path of typhoons that

originate in the Pacific area.

Land, Agriculture and the Rise of Agrarian Elites

In the Rise and Fall of Elites, the English translation of Pareto’s Un

applicazione di teorie sociologiche, elite was defined as “the strongest,

the most energetic, and the most capable – for good as well as

evil”, and that, “peoples are always governed by an elite.”

Mosca, on the other hand, defined the elite by distinguishing two

5

classes of people in a society: one that rules and one that is

ruled. He continued,

“The first class, always the less numerous,

performs all political functions, monopolizes

power and enjoys the advantages that power

brings, whereas the second, the more numerous

class, is directed and controlled by the

first, in a manner that is now more or less

legal, now more or less arbitrary and

violent.”

While Pareto’s and Mosca’s definitions did not particularly

discuss the rise of agrarian elites, their definitions provide a

good starting point in discussing the assent of agrarian elites

and their roles in rural politics in the Philippines. Questions

like how do the elites come to power, and maintain their

‘legitimacy’ in the countrysides need to be addresses.

Wolters (1984), in his Politics, Patronage and Class Conflict in Central Luzon,

stated that the local elites rose to power when they started to

amass lands in rural areas where most of supplies of land were.

This process was a result of two developments that happened in

the country during the colonial times: first, the “incorporation

of prominent native members of the population into the colonial

government” and, second, “the opening of the Philippine

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archipelago to the world market” through commodity production.

The Spanish colonial government forcibly opened to the

international market by mandating exportation of agricultural

products. To produce more cash crops, many of the land owners had

their hacienda tilled by peasants under the kasamá sharecropping

system (or the landlord-tenant system). This started the

feudalistic feature of the rural-agricultural Philippines.

The feudalistic relationship between the landlord and the

tenants, however, did not remain economic. As the landlords

flourished economically, they did also politically. Due to their

financial power, they became the financiers of political parties

and even became the candidates themselves that they eventually

became part of the Philippine political system (von Albertini,

1971; McCoy, 1998). What the country then had at this time were

economic and political landlords (McCoy, 1998; Hutchcroft, 2000).

“Landlordism” and Agrarian Reform in the Philippines

The notion and reality of power that is equated to ownership of

land is deeply entrenched in the Philippine society, even before

Christianity and Islam arrived in the country. However, the wide-

scale acquisition and (mis)appropriation of land proliferated

during the Spanish period in the country, particularly in the

lowlands (Wolters, 1984; McCoy, 1993; Veneracion, 2001). Villages

or pueblo, and later on, municipalities were set up while land

grants were handed out to obedient implementers of the

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colonization project of the Spanish crown through the encomienda,

alcadia and estancia systems. These systems, wherein large tracts of

lands were cultivated for cash crops or used for ranching

(Veneracion, 2001:85-103), are feudalistic in nature. Because of

the prestige associated with “owning” large areas of land, many

individuals started acquiring them on their own. It was during

this period that land grabbing became rampant despite the regalian

doctrine. The Spanish Period, and the American Period,

subsequently, in the Philippines gave birth to the present

landlords in the country.

‘Landlordism’ or the landlord-tenant system was abolished since

the passing of the institution of the Republic Act 6657 or the

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL of 1988), which

is the legal basis for the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program

(CARP). The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) is a

ten-year program that is implemented by the Department of

Agrarian Reform (DAR). The deadline for CARP was 1998 but it was

extended until 2008, a decade late of the original deadline.

However, a recent resolution of the Presidential Agrarian Reform

Committee (PARC), signed this February 2007, states a plan to

extend the program beyond 2008.

‘Agrarian reform’ is defined as:

“the redistribution of lands, regardless of

crops or fruits produced, to farmers and

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regular farm workers who are landless,

irrespective of tenurial arrangement, to

include the totality of factors and support

services designed to lift the economic status

of the beneficiaries and all other

arrangements alternative to the physical

redistribution of lands, such as production

or profit-sharing, labor administration, and

the distribution of shares of stock, which

will allow beneficiaries to receive a just

share of the fruits of the lands they work.”

(RA 6657, Section 3a)

This was reiterated by DAR, the main body tasked to implement the

CARP:

“Agrarian reform is the redistribution of

agricultural lands to farmers and regular

farmworkers who are landless, irrespective of

tenurial arrangement. It includes the

provision of support services such as: credit

extension, irrigation, roads and bridges,

marketing facilities, human resource and

institutional development.”

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Agrarian reform, therefore, does not only mean redistribution of

lands but providing the beneficiaries with extension services and

incentives to the beneficiaries.

However, despite the delay in meeting the deadline for the CARP,

the government is positive that it is producing concrete results

as evidenced in DAR’s 2006 Annual Accomplishment Report. DAR

reported that it was able to distribute 96% of its targeted

130,000 hectares for that particular year. The government’s

optimism was bolstered by positive praises from international

observers, as reflected in a news article published in DAR’s

website citing the country as a model for agrarian reform

implementation (“Int’l. rural dev’t planners: laud RP agrarian

program”, May 31, 2007, http://www.dar.gov.ph). Ironically, at

the same page, another headline reads, “Police, soldiers key to

CARP’s success” (May 31, 2007, http://www.dar.gov.ph). This

mentions the violence associated with the implementation of the

CARP in areas that are controlled by prominent figures, usually

politicians and businessmen. This same conflict echoes the same

resistance from many of the lawmakers, staged at the time when

CARL was still a bill. Many congressmen objected to the

provisions of the bill because it threatens their own large

landholdings back in their provinces. These legislators were not

only political elites, but were, firstly, agrarian elites.

Fragmentation of Land, Redistribution of Power?

10

In the Philippine countryside, land remains in the core of

resource conflicts, and parallel to these, of the rural

development agenda. The dichotomy between the landed and the

landless continues to define the political, economic, and socio-

cultural landscapes of the rural areas. In a country where most

people still depend on agriculture, land remains one of the most

important “factor of production” or capital. However, it is also

true that land is more than an economic factor. It has political

and social functions such that in many rural areas in the

Philippines, control of the land means control of the people

within this land. Land-owning entities occupy the upper tier of

society – they are the wealthy, the force that can dictate the

development trajectory (or lack thereof) of barangays, towns,

even provinces, they are the ones whereupon the landless are

depending on for socioeconomic and political security. Land means

power.

The series of agrarian reform programs in the Philippines aimed

to rectify the problem of inequality based on land ownership

through the redistribution scheme. The Comprehensive Agrarian Law

of 1988 mandated the abolishment of the tenancy system in the

country to make way for a society where first, no one is excluded

from access to land and other capitals, and two, access to these

resources is equal for everyone.

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More than the fragmentation of lands, land redistribution

projects have more profound effects. Going back to the premise of

the CARP, it aims to upset the existing power relations between

the tenants, farm workers and other beneficiaries and the

landlords by providing a “level” playing field. For the past

decades, a number of studies conducted particularly by the

Popular Institute for Democratic Studies (PIDS) (see Llanto &

Dingcong, 1991; Sanchez, 1991; Geron, 1994; Reyes, 2002; Llantos

& Ballesteros, 2003; Ballesteros & de la Cruz, 2006; Adriano,

2008; Ballesteros & Cortes, 2008; Leonen, 2008) assessed the

socioeconomic impacts and policy implications of the CARP. Most

of these studies reflect the failure of the program in achieving

its goals, thereby, presenting only pictures of a “stagnant”

rural, i.e., low-density in terms of settlements; agricultural,

i.e., land use is still predominated by crops production,

countryside, which are not particularly accurate; and one that is

still defined by traditional patron-client bonds.

Buenavista presents a classic example of what seems to be

“feudalistic” society, or one that is characterized by landlord-

tenant/patron-client relationship. Ownership of most of the lands

is concentrated to only a few families, among them the Reyes and

the Uy families (Franco, 2005). During the Marcos regime, the

Reyeses in particular, rose to political power and held the

leadership of the local government unit of Buenavista from 1972

until 1986. It was during this time that they supposedly amassed

12

most of the lands in the municipality. After the collapse of the

Marcos government, they were able to re-establish their power as

economic and political elites in the area by employing the

classic “guns, goons, and gold” operandi. To counter these

forces, the New People’s Army (NPA) has also entered the area.

Since then, this municipality, just like the Bondoc Peninsula in

general, has become a hotspot for violent encounters between the

armed landlords, the NPA, and the military. Because of the “reign

of terror” in this municipality, Buenavista is practically cut

off from other outside influences.

By exercising various forms of power play, those in power aim

that certain persons, perspectives, issues or conflicts never

enter the overt political arena, thereby, maintaining the status

quo. The implementation of the CARP has led many landlords to

practice all their means of power to resist the program. Either

they overtly refuse to participate in the program or they

circumvent the law. Yet, despite this resistance, Buenavista has

a strong farmers cooperative and a functioning Municipal Agrarian

Reform Office (MARO). These two were instrumental in winning the

case between a group of farmers in one of the agrarian reform

sites and the Domingo Reyes estate, owned by the one of the most

influential and powerful families in Bondoc Peninsula. In

December 1998, the farmers were granted almost 164 hectares of

the hacienda (Franco, 2005). As of 2006, other pockets of agrarian

13

reform areas have dotted the once consolidated landholdings of

the said family.

It is important to note the complexities of Buenavista. The

“success” of the land redistribution program in this municipality

is said to be attributed to several factors: 1) the presence of

organized farmers group, in the form of a cooperative, that

openly fought for its members’ claims to the land; 2) a

functioning Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO), which is the

main implementer of the CARP in the local communities, 3) the

entry of local and foreign nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),

civil society and other agrarian/rural reform advocate groups

that assist the farmers/tenants in their fight for their lands,

and 4) the overt and covert initiatives practiced by the farmers

at the individual level to oppose the existing large land owners

in the area. On the other hand, there are also factors that stall

the success of the agrarian reform program in Buenavista: 1) the

continuing influx of migrants, mostly landless farmers, from the

Bicol region, who eventually become dependent on land owning

entities; 2) the new “propaganda” and tactics used by these

landlords to halt the CARP program like conversion of their

remaining landholdings into non-agricultural lands and re-buying

back lands from the CARP beneficiaries; and 3) CARP grantees who

re-sell or pawn their lands to their former landlords.

Agrarian Reform and the Peasants

14

The remaining hacienda of the Reyeses in Buenavista has about 155

tenants, subject to the 70-30 crop sharing system (locally known

as tersyohan), in favor of the landlord. Among these tenants are

caretakers or overseers cum ‘estate managers’, locally known as

enkargados, of the coconut plantations. They are the most trusted

men of the landowner. The landowners do not directly negotiate

with their tenants but through these enkargados. This implies a

hierarchy within the tenants: the

caretakers/overseers/managers/enkargados above the ordinary

tenants who work directly on the land.

Prior to the agrarian reform, harvests of the tenants are turned

over to the enkargados who, in turn, would oversee the processing

of the nuts into copra. Ordinarily, the same tenants who

harvested the nuts would transport the nuts to the drying area,

de-husk and cook (through smoking) the nuts to become copra. The

enkargado would then sell the copra to coconut buyers, usually,

in the capital town of Quezon, Province. The profit from this

would be divided between the landlord who gets 70% of the share

and the enkargado who gets the remaining share. The enkargado, in

turn, ‘pays’ the tenants at a rate of P10 per kilo of copra that

were produced, with additional payments for their extra labor.

However, during the land redistribution program, this Reyeses

started to engage the services of non-tenants who are willing to

work as farm workers in the hacienda. This has been a source of

conflict between the ‘legitimate’ tenants and the outsiders.

15

According to some of the tenants of the hacienda, during and after

the process of the redistribution of the Reyes’ lands to the

beneficiaries, the landowners, through the enkargados, started

hiring farmworkers from other barangays and municipalities into

the plantation. It was a ploy to show the local agrarian reform

office that the Reyeses have no remaining tenants. However, this

scheme displaced more than ten families who are legitimate

tenants of the plantation. The displaced households are now

‘squatters’ on the land they once tilled.

Moreover, the landlords have been blaming the agrarian reform for

the shutting down of the two oil mills, reasoning that because

their coconut plantations were reduced to more than half of their

original sizes, the supply coconut coming from the remaining area

of the plantation can not support the operation of the oil mills.

Emerging Actors in the Agricultural Industry

While the Reyeses remain to dominate and control the municipality

and its political and economic structures, a number of actors and

groups are starting to emerge as players in the coconut industry

of this locality. They may be in the form of independent coconut

traders, individuals who took the land redistribution program as

an opportunity to provide alternatives to the new small holders

of lands by setting up relatively higher buying price for copra

(12-14 pesos versus the fixed ten pesos rate at the hacienda).

16

Corporations have also started to tap the human labor of the

municipality by contracting them to be farmworkers in their own

plantations. One of these attempts was the plan of San Miguel

Corporation to initiate a cassava planting program in Buenavista.

Produce from these farms would be used to supply the beer

manufacturing of this corporation. However, this plan did not

push through, much to the disappointment of the local people.

One of the significant events in Buenavista is the emergence of

peasant organizations and farmers cooperatives which, after

winning their battles against the Reyeses for their rights to

their own lands, became an empowering tool for its members. These

cooperatives and groups provide its members capital through

credit system to start up their own farms.

Despite the changes brought about by the agrarian reform program

and the emerging opportunities for the population of Buenavista,

this place and its people remain tied to the Reyeses. Why this is

so?

This may be explained by the persisting patron-client culture in

Buenavista. While some tenants were able to acquire their own

lands, they were not fully emancipated from their bondage to

their former landlords. For one, they cannot freely exercise

their new-found ‘freedom’ because the municipality is

17

militarized. This can be observed by the presence of military

checkpoints and military personnel regularly patrolling the

municipality. These are supposedly means to intercept members of

the NPA. Some farmers, however, claim that these are surveillance

ploys of the Reyeses to identify individuals or groups, like the

farmers associations, who are plotting against the clan. This

paranoia is so obvious that new comers in the municipality like

migrants have to endure frequent ‘visitations’ from the military

or the police. Even researchers are treated circumspectly, and

kept close, by the mayor’s minions, under the guise of protecting

the people from possible NPA harassment while in the area. The

Reyeses also try to proliferate this anti-NPA attitude by casting

the latter into bad light and accusing them of extortion (in the

form of revolutionary tax collection, which, according to the

government, the proceeds do not go to the people but to the NPA

members’ pockets), theft and harassment. The military is

necessary to protect the people from these aggravations. The

whole municipality then becomes under the ‘protection’ of the

government, which, in this case, is the Reyeses.

Migrants and the Persistence of Patron-Client Relationship

Because of its proximity to the Bicol and Visayas regions,

Buenavista has been experiencing a steady inflow of migrants.

Ironically, these migrants are landless families escaping poverty

in their own hometowns. All of those who ended up in Buenavista

18

became squatters in the Reyeses’ lands. These people have been

permitted by Mayor Reyes to put up their houses in his lands but

forbidden them to till the land. This leads to total dependency

on the part of the migrants to the Reyeses. Some of them seek and

are able to work as farmworkers in the hacienda, either as

harvesters, nut collectors, or de-huskers. However, these ‘jobs’

do not pay much and too temporary. There are no other employments

available in the municipality. Clerical positions in the

municipal hall were already occupied by people who have

connections with the mayor. Engaging in the transportation sector

is not an option either since the migrants do not have the

capital to buy or rent vehicles, in the first place. The only

option left is farming or fishing, the latter still

underdeveloped, and so, unprofitable. Since the migrants do not

have access to lands, some of them resort to stealing coconuts

(or paglulusot) or other crops from the plantation. Others have no

choice but to use a portion of their ‘backyard’ to plant

vegetables or corn, even if this is prohibited. Many of them are

caught by the military who are regularly monitoring the

migrants/squatters in the Reyeses’ lands.

Persisting Patronage

The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 aims first,

“promote social justice justice”, second, “move the nation

toward sound rural development and industrialization”,and third,

establish “owner cultivatorship of economic-sized farms as the

19

basis of Philippine agriculture” by prioritizing the “welfare of

the landless” and a “more equitable distribution and ownership of

land.” With the CARP, large landholdings of family elites like

the Reyeses were already fragmented, if not completely

presumably, and distributed to once landless tenants. However,

bondage to these elites persists. Does it only show that the

agrarian reform has freed these tenants in title only but not

politically, economically and socially? This is so the case, at

least in Buenavista, where the agrarian reform program did not

necessarily emancipated the peasants from the onerous patronage

system. For many years to come, this will be the case if the

government itself is dominated by agrarian elites who control the

economic and political powers that legitimize their authority

over the masses.

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