Non- Proliferation and Safeguards Safeguards ... Malik...IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency...

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IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

Non- Proliferation and Safeguards

Safeguards Implementation

Concepts and Practices

Malik Derrough

Senior Inspector, Division of Operations B

World Nuclear University - Summer Institute 2012

Oxford, United Kingdom

30 July 2012

Outline

1. A few basic principles

2. State reporting obligations

3. Agency in-field verification activities

4. Other sources of information

5. Evaluation of information and safeguards

conclusions

6. Key points

1. A few basic principles

Safeguards Agreements

• Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs) (INFCIRC/153 (Corr.)) Concluded by NNWS in connection with the NPT and NWFZ

Treaties

• Item Specific (INFCIRC/66/Rev.2)

Concluded prior to the NPT or by non-NPT States

• Voluntary Offer Agreements (VOAs) Concluded by NPT NWS i.e. China, France, Russia, UK, US

The Model Additional Protocol

• New legal instrument approved by Board of Governors in May 1997 (INFCIRC/540)

• Concluded by States on a voluntary basis; becomes part of a State’s safeguards agreement

Nuclear Material

Nuclear material is anything that contains

in any physical or chemical form and in any quantities

(except ore)

Uranium (U) Plutonium (Pu) Thorium (Th)

Nuclear Material

Radioactive sources are not nuclear material

(e.g. cobalt, cesium, polonium)

IAEA 8

Basic Concept

Plan safeguards activities

Conduct safeguards activities

Analyse all information

Other information

State declarations

2. State Reporting Obligations

Three Types of Information Supplied

Nuclear material

accountancy; facility

design information

Voluntary

reporting

Additional protocol

declarations

State-supplied

information

States’ Obligations under a CSA

• Establish a State system of accounting for and

control of nuclear material (SSAC)

• Provide required reports and declarations to the

IAEA that are timely, accurate and complete

• Facilitate inspector access during in-field

activities

• Respond to questions in a timely manner

• Cooperate with the IAEA in the implementation

of safeguards

Coverage under a CSA

Waste Storage

Provision of information under CSA

• Nuclear material accounting reports detailing

quantities, types and location of nuclear material

inventories

• Inventory changes

• Advance notifications of transfers of nuclear

material

• Facility design information

Expanded coverage with an AP

CSA AP

Waste Storage

3. Agency In-Field Verification Activities

Three Types of Verification Activities

Nuclear material

design information

Voluntary

reporting

Additional protocol

declarations

State-supplied

information

Inspection

Design information

verification (DIV)

Complementary

access

Verification

Activities

Basic Concept

Trust but verify!

Agency Inspectors

• Appointed by Director General

• Approved by Board of Governors

• Designated for the country

• Granted privileges and immunities

Verification Type - Inspections

• To verify that the nuclear material declared and

placed under safeguards remains in peaceful

nuclear activities or is otherwise adequately

accounted for

• Frequency and intensity varies depending on type

of facility, type of nuclear material and other State

factors

Inspection: example of activities

Records Examination

Identification

Measurements

Inspection: Non-Destructive Assay

Inspectors counting and identifying

fresh fuel at a power reactor

Inspection: NDA & DA Verification

Non-destructive assay measurements

Nuclear material samples

Cameras/Video

Inspection: Containment & Surveillance

Surveillance cameras

being serviced Sealing of a transport cask

Computerfor local

Data Acquisition

Camera(s)

Seal(s)

Sensor(s)

Telephone

Satellite dish

Telephone

Satellite

Headquarters

or Field Office

Review Station

Inspection: Remote Monitoring Systems

Remote Monitoring – Current Status

• Total 271 systems with remote

monitoring capabilities in 22

countries

• 156 surveillance systems (590

cameras)

• 115 radiation detection systems

• Approximately 3.5 GB/day.

Environmental Sampling

Based on the premise that every nuclear process, no matter how leak tight, emits small amounts of process material to the environment

Environmental Sampling

Network of Analytical Laboratories

QinetiQ UK

ORNL USA

PNNL USA

LANL USA

LLNL USA

AFTAC USA

ANSTO Australia

LMA Russia

ITU EC

SAL IAEA

KRI Russia

CEA France

JAEA Japan

CNEN Brazil

NRI Řež Czech Rep.

STUK Finland

KAERI South Korea

AWE UK

• Implemented as a

safeguards

verification method

17 years ago

• Swipe sample

collections in more

than 75 countries

• Network of Analytical

Laboratories

(NWAL): 19

laboratories in 8

Member States, the

European

Commission and the

Verification Type: Design Information

Verification (DIV)

To ensure that appropriate safeguards

measures are applied

to detect potential misuse of a facility

DIV During Construction

DIV During Operation

Verification of piping

and cascade layout

Complementary Access / Objectives

• To assure the absence of undeclared nuclear

material or activities

• To resolve questions or inconsistencies with

respect to States’ declarations

• To confirm the decommissioned status of

facilities and locations outside facilities

Verification Type: Complementary

Access

Additional Protocol provides broader access to:

• All places in nuclear installations or on sites

• All other places where nuclear material is located

• Decommissioned facilities

• Certain locations where nuclear-related activities are

conducted

• Other locations, under certain circumstances

4. Other Sources of Information

Nuclear material

design information

Voluntary

reporting

Additional protocol

declarations

State-supplied

information

Inspection

Design information

verification (DIV)

Complementary

access

Verification

activities

Other Information

Open and

other sources

information

Open and Other Sources of Information

• IAEA information

• Satellite imagery

• Scientific and technical literature

• Academic and research institutions

• Trade publications

• Newspapers/radio/television/magazine reports

• Third-party information

Commercial Satellite Imagery

• In-house satellite imagery

laboratory established

• High-resolution

commercial imagery

acquired from over 15

imagery providers in

11 States

• In past year over 700

images purchased and

analysed

Trade Information

5. Evaluation of Information

and Safeguards Conclusions

Evaluation of Information for each

“State as a whole”

Nuclear material

design information

Voluntary

reporting

Additional protocol

declarations

State-supplied

information

Inspection

Design information

verification (DIV)

Complementary

access

Results

of verification

activities

Open and

other sources

information

State Evaluation

• Provides picture of a State’s

nuclear and nuclear-related

activities

• Involves comparison and

assessment of all

information available

• Identifies issues requiring

follow up

• Information continuously

evaluated

• Forms basis for SG

conclusions

Consistency Analysis

• Internal consistency of the information provided by a State

• e.g. bidding procedure vs future plans

• Consistency of the information provided by a State with information resulting from Agency verification activities

• e.g. declared enrichment level vs ES results

• Consistency of the information provided by a State with other information

• e.g. declared activities vs published report

IAEA 44

Consistency Analysis – Scientific Literature

The Analytical Process

1. DEFINE BORDERS/BOUNDARIES/PERIMETERS (SEPARATES WHEAT FROM CHAFF – KNOWN FROM UNKNOWN)

BASIC METHODOLOGY

2. SELECT OR CLASSIFY FUNCTIONAL AREAS (CHARACTERISTICS OF LAYOUT OR FEATURES OR GENERAL FUNCTION)

3. IDENTIFY RECOGNISED FACILITIES (SHAPE - SIZE - SHADOW - TONE - ASSOCIATED FEATURES)

(DATE OF INFORMATION MAY BE CRITICAL RELATIVE TO IMAGERY ACQUISITION DATE)

4. USE COLLATERAL TO CONFIRM OR REFUTE ANALYSIS

AREA 1

STEAM CONDUIT

UNL STOCK TANKS OFF-GAS SCRUBBING

FOUNDRY

DISSOLUTION

FILTRATION

SOLVENT EXTRACTION

CONCENTRATION

DENITRATION UO3

HYDRATION UO3

REDUCTION UO2

U-MET PRODUCTION

FLUORINE PRODUCTION

UF6 PRODUCTION

HYDROFLUORINATION UF4

FORCED-DRAFT COOLING

EVAPORATION BASIN

FUEL FAB

HYDROGEN STORAGE

NITRIC ACID STORAGE

HEAT/STEAM PLANT

Consistency Analysis – Satellite Imagery

Consistency Analysis – Thermal Imagery

Landsat Thermal Imagery

Light tone = warmer temp

Consistency Analysis - Network Link

• Trading company in State

1 seeking specific

nuclear-related

technology outside its

main business area

• Suspected end-user

entity in State 2

• Links to watch-listed

entity in State 2

Any additional data could

reveal bigger picture

Acquisition Path Analysis

Operational Possible R&D

Under Safeguards

Not confirmed

Safeguards Conclusions

• Annual statement made by the Agency for every State with a safeguards agreement regarding the State’s compliance with its safeguards obligations

• Based on evaluation of all information available to the Agency on States’ nuclear activities

• Reported annually in the Agency’s Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR)

Safeguards Conclusions

• … the nuclear material and other items placed under safeguards remained in peaceful activities …

For States with comprehensive safeguards

agreements and additional protocols:

• … all nuclear material remained

in peaceful activities …

For States with safeguards agreements:

6. Key Points

• Agreements: three types of safeguards agreements

(CSA, INFCIRC/66, VOA) with or without an additional protocol

• Reporting and verification activities: depend on

the agreement and if AP in force. Activities include

inspections, DIV, CA (if AP in force) with tools such as

NDA, DA, ES taking, containment and surveillance

measures, remote monitoring

• SSAC: Cooperation from States is important to ensure

effective and efficient implementation

Key Points – Agreements and Activities

• Multiple sources of information: State declared,

from Agency verification activities, open and other sources

• Evaluation: comparison & assessment of all information,

consistency analysis. Regularly reported and form basis for

conclusions.

• Tools for evaluation: include satellite imagery analysis,

acquisition pathway analysis, trade analysis and others.

• Conclusions: nuclear material and items placed under

safeguards / all nuclear material remain in peaceful activities

Key Points – Evaluation of information

The way we implement the safeguards system

continues to evolve to anticipate and respond

to new challenges

Concluding Remark

Non- Proliferation and Safeguards Safeguards ... Malik...IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency...

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