Off1nc KReject the affirmatives solution as grounded in a parsimonious model of IR predictions that drives Newtonian rationality and serial policy failure key to complexify the disciplineKavalski, PhD, 12(Emilian, professor of IR University of Western Sydney, PhD international politics Loughborough University, Waking IR Up from its Deep Newtonian Slumber Millennium: Journal of International Studies 41(1) 137 150 )Is the discipline of International Relations (IR) a science? Its scientific credentials have long concerned proponents and detractors. As Ronald Rogowskis claim in the epigraph suggests, the hankering after an elegant science of international politics has virtually become a dream to which his and subsequent generations of IR scholars have succumbed. Belying this dreaming is a question whether IRs social-scientific inquiry can ever approximate that of the natural sciences. Perceiving the natural sciences to be an exact science, cohorts of IR students have been developing powerful and parsimonious models for the explanation and understanding of international politics. Take the balance of power, for instance. Its aim is to ascertain the existence of a particular regularity in world affairs parity between adversaries. Borrowing the notion of equilibrium from the natural sciences, the balance of power explains international order as a regulating mechanism motivated by the natural desire of states for survival. In this way, IR has tended to propound explanations premised on assumptions of predictability rooted in the conviction that international life is a closed system, changing in a gradual manner and following linear trajectories, which can be elicited through discrete assessments of dependent and independent variables. What IR intends to produce in this way is a nearly mechanistic model of international politics that is perceived to be as rigorous and robust as the one of the natural sciences. In recent years, the simplification and reductionism underpinning this dream of a scientific IR have come under severe criticism from different quarters. In fact, some such as John G. Ruggie have made the point that the discipline needs to wake up from this deep Newtonian slumber, if it is to have any bearing on the real world of international politics. The three books under review actively contribute to this decentring project by advancing the complexification of IR. The notion of complexification entails different things for different authors, but what all of them share is some form of engagement with the complexity paradigm of the philosophy of science.3 Originating in the natural sciences, the complexity paradigm challenges the Newtonian view of an orderly world and suggests that global interactions occur in a non-linear fashion. Consequently, the outcomes of such interactions are difficult to infer, let alone to predict. In this respect, the proponents of the complexification of IR have noted that while the hard sciences have become increasingly soft as a result of their acceptance of the uncertainty and randomness of reality, IR has hardened as a result of its suppression of ambiguity, disregard for surprises and over-investment in its capacity to forecast international developments. Richard Ned Lebow explains this search for (and commitment to) a predictable worldview of regularities as a need for psychological closure, reflecting a desire for definitive conclusions in support of preferred theoretical assumptions.4 It is in this context that Damian Popolo asks the pertinent question whether scientific IR is not premised on fundamentally misleading notions about science.5 In other words, the question that emerges is whether things appear perplexing because the ken of the mainstream is askew. In its response to this query, the complexity paradigm reveals that Newtonian IR tends to operate on very little information (usually a few variables); yet, this does not prevent it from jumping to conclusions as if it had knowledge about the whole picture. Such lack of sensitivity to what IR does not know then underpins a model of the world that is rarely stumped. As a result, when the accepted framework for explanation and understanding fails that is, it faces a question that it cannot answer (for instance, Why IR failed to anticipate the end of the Cold War?) IR comes up with a question that it can answer (for instance, Why the Cold War ended?, answer: Because the Soviet Union could no longer maintain the balance of power and, therefore, without such capability it could no longer survive in the international system and had to implode). The complexified IR suggests that by answering the wrong questions, Newtonian IR enacts a theatre of validity to generate explanations far more coherent than reality. Therefore, the incredible rate of failure of the very frameworks asserting the law-like regularities of international politics to anticipate any of the major events of the past 25 years should not be surprising.6 The irony of this situation is not lost on Lebow, who notes that it is the commitment to science and scientific methods by international relations scholars that provides a major impediment to their practice of science.7 Thus, this review article assesses the three books under review in the context of the current state of the art in the emerging complexity paradigm of IR. Since this paradigm intends a complete rethinking of the discipline, the article will focus on the complexification of the ontology, epistemology, methodology and ethics of IR. It has to be stressed at the outset that while IR students will find all three books under review of immense interest, their authors reach out to much wider and interdisciplinary audiences thus, the collection edited by Jonathan Joseph and Colin Wight will be of immense relevance to any of the subfields of political science, especially international political economy; Lebows work has historians, literary theorists and psychologists in mind; while Popolos book addresses political theorists and philosophers. (137-9)

1NC Wolf DAProstitution reform is a lightning rodHeiges 9 (Moira, J.D. Candidate 2010, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2004, Yale University, From the Inside Out: Reforming State and Local Prostitution Enforcement to Combat Sex Trafficking in the United States and Abroad 94 Minn. L. Rev. 428) The topic of prostitution is fraught with moral, ideological, and therefore political controversy. n233 Domestically, as well as internationally, a small but outspoken minority perceives prostitution as a freely chosen profession that should be protected as a legitimate form of work. n234 Meanwhile, an opposing though equally powerful lobby sees it as an inherently violent form of sexual exploitation that is particularly harmful to women. n235 Yet in spite of the inherent political pitfalls, leaders at all levels of government have a vested interest in addressing both voluntary and coercive forms of prostitution in their jurisdictions.Wolfs PC passes Pennsylvania tax reform and oversight key to Marcellus shale development, education, and drilling regsStephanie Ritenbaugh 3-24-2015; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette Pennsylvania lawmakers dig in on natural gas severance tax http://powersource.post-gazette.com/powersource/policy-powersource/2015/03/24/Pennsylvania-lawmakers-dig-in-on-Marcellus-Shale-severance-tax/stories/201503240019Pennsylvania Republican lawmakers are maintaining a hardline stance against Gov. Tom Wolfs Marcellus Shale severance tax proposal, saying they wont discuss a tax until bills dealing with pensions and liquor privatization are settled. And with Mr. Wolfs proposal to use a severance tax to reinvest in education being a campaign cornerstone, the stage is set for legislative horse trading this spring. Voters elected him, and Pennsylvania understands this issue, said John Hanger, Mr. Wolfs director of planning and policy. We are interested in good faith negotiation and conversation about the details. But we need a drilling tax. Drew Crompton, chief of staff for state Sen. Joe Scarnati, R-Jefferson, the Senate president pro tempore said pensions must be dealt with first. Were going to pick up the pension bill in April, Mr. Crompton said. Then we would be willing to talk about the need for new revenue. The problem with the budget proposal isnt just the severance tax, but all the tax increases the governor is proposing, Mr. Crompton said. Republicans make up the majority in both the state Senate and House of Representatives. The severance tax proposal calls for a 5 percent tax on the value of the natural gas extracted from wells, 4.7 cents per thousand cubic feet (Mcf) on the volume of the natural gas, and a 5 percent tax on the value of natural gas liquids produced. Mr. Wolf has said the proposal will raise $1 billion in its first full year, the lions share of which would be dedicated to education. Drawing the ire of the natural gas industry is another feature of the governors plan a $2.97/Mcf minimum value for shale gas produced in Pennsylvania, regardless of the actual sale price. Drillers wouldnt be able to pass any extra cost on to landowners, according to the proposal. In the Marcellus Shale region, natural gas prices have been depressed as pipeline capacity has not kept pace with surging production. On March 20, natural gas traded at $2/Mcf at Dominion South Point, while natural gas at the Henry Hub the national benchmark in Louisiana sold for $2.80, according to Bloomberg data. Meanwhile, operators selling gas at the Leidy Hub in north-central Pennsylvania traded at $1.49. The severance tax is not much different than a sales tax it should be based on what youre actually paying, Mr. Crompton said. You cant negotiate when one side is asking for too much, he said. Steve Miskin, a spokesman for the House Republican majority, said the proposal is out of step with todays market. When natural gas prices are low, his tax hits its height, Mr. Miskin said. They arrived at $1 billion and they want to spend higher and higher to meet that goal. Were not advocating for new taxes, Mr. Miskin said. If revenue is necessary, we believe its through liquor privatization and dealing with cost drivers. Kevin Sunday, spokesman for the Harrisburg-based Pennsylvania Chamber of Business and Industry, compared the inclusion of the $2.97 floor price as making someone making $40,000 a year pay income tax on $100,000. This proposal is much higher than the advertised 5 percent tax, Mr. Sunday said. Mr. Hanger said the proposed severance tax would take effect in 2016, so the first day is still more than nine months away, and natural gas prices are at rock bottom levels. Theres only one place for it to go and thats up. Current levels arent sustainable. For the first year of the tax, the proposal assumes gas prices will average $3.25, which wouldnt trigger the floor price, Mr. Hanger said. Theres precedence for pricing a floor for commodity that provide public improvement, he said, noting that Act 89, which funds bridge and road repairs, includes a floor price for gasoline at $2.49. The left-leaning Pennsylvania Budget and Policy Center believes the severance tax proposal is important to the regional development of the Marcellus Shale formation, which spans several states, said Michael Wood, research director. Pennsylvania is the only major oil and gas producing state without a formal severance tax. Mr. Wolfs proposal is modeled after West Virginias tax, but adds the $2.97/Mcf minimum. Mr. Wood also said natural gas prices wont stay low forever as demand increases and as companies prepare to enter new markets. The first exports of liquefied natural gas are expected to begin this year. The worry about low prices now is just an excuse to not pass this tax, Mr. Wood said. For the last seven or eight years, people have found excuses to not have the tax that other states levy. Its past time to have this in place. The longer we wait, the more it harms Pennsylvania. Environmental advocacy group PennFuture also supports the proposal as it stands, which includes greater funding for regulatory and enforcement agencies. Robert Altenburg, director of the energy center for PennFuture, notes that staffing levels have fallen at the state Department of Environmental Protection. I dont know if this will completely reverse that trend, but its headed in the right direction, Mr. Altenburg said. While the $2.97 minimum built into the proposal will make it difficult for drillers to plan their tax burden and will eat into profit margins, its not likely to drive drillers away from one of the most economical shale plays in North America, said Bill Holland senior reporter for SNL Energy, a trade publication. Its shallow, its rich and its undeniably huge, Mr. Holland said. Pennsylvanias unconventional gas producers pulled more than 2 trillion cubic feet of gas out of the ground during the second half of 2014 alone, according to data released by the state Department of Environmental Protection. When the governor comes in, its part politics, part horse trading. Hes starting with a high hand, Mr. Holland said. But the governor will likely get the tax. Its just too large to ignore. A severance tax is going to narrow the margins and make Pennsylvania less attractive, but where else are you going to go in this low price environment? Overall, the shale tax is popular with voters. According to a Franklin & Marshall poll in June 2012, 55 percent of Pennsylvania voters supported it, with another 18 percent somewhat favoring such a measure. About 20 percent were opposed. Among independent polls, you might get different percentages depending on how the question is phrased, but youre not seeing anything showing its unpopular, said G. Terry Madonna, a political scientist and pollster at Franklin & Marshall in Lancaster. For most people, its not a tax that they have to pay directly not like an income tax. But the budget debates this spring are shaping up to be challenging. With a Republican majority in both state houses, it will be difficult to deal with a severance tax unless they reach some accommodation on pensions and liquor privatization, Mr. Madonna said. Key to manufacturing baseJohn Yudichak, MSC, et al 11-13-2013; Marcellus Shale Coalition Founded in 2008, the Marcellus Shale Coalition (MSC) works with exploration and production, midstream and supply chain partners in the Appalachian Basin and across the country to address issues regarding the production of clean, job-creating, American natural gas from the Marcellus and Utica Shale plays. Yudichak, Pa. state Senator John Yudichak (Dem.-Plymouth); Marcellus Shale: A Transformational Economic Opportunity For All http://marcelluscoalition.org/2013/11/marcellus-shale-a-transformational-economic-opportunity-for-all/The overwhelmingly positive impact of the Marcellus Shale continued to make its way throughout Pennsylvania this week. At an economic seminar, Pa. state Senator John Yudichak (Dem.-Plymouth) touted safe and tightly-regulated shale development as a transformational economic opportunity. These homegrown jobs are renewing small towns, driving down once-skyrocketing unemployment rates and reigniting our manufacturing sector. At the same time, as Bloomberg News reports this week, The shale boom has moved the U.S. closer to energy independence, added jobs, helped revive manufacturing, and lowered gas bills. Heres what theyre saying about the clear benefits of shale which are Powering An American Renaissance: Economic Benefits of Marcellus Shale Are Many: Public and private officials said Thursday that the economic benefits of the Marcellus Shale are many. When [KDKAs Jon] Delano asked what they considered to be the single most important contribution to the region, panelists had a difficult time limiting their answer to one item. To [MSCs Dave] Spigelmyer, the explosion of natural shale gas production has put the country on a path to energy security and created more than 200,000 jobs across the commonwealth, while setting a market price for power in just a few short years. Speaking for the airport authority, which in February received a $50 million signing bonus from Consol Energy to extract natural gas from beneath Pittsburgh International Airport that officials say could bring as much as $450 million in royalties, Penrod listed the financial gain, as well as strong regional economic growth. Some of that growth is directly impacting the airports bottom line, he said. Weve had a 4.5 percent increase in seats sold at the airport from a year ago, Penrod said. Noble said her township is benefitting from the impact fees generated from Act 13, noting that it has received $1.1 million in fees over the last two years. (Washington Observer-Reporter, 11/14/13) Sen. John Yudichak: Marcellus Shale Presents Transformational Economic Opportunity: State Sen. John Yudichak Thursday said the Marcellus shale industry will lift Northeastern Pennsylvania out of the cloud of economic hardship and will continue to do so for generations to come. We are all here for one reason and singular goal to learn how NEPA can leverage the transformational economic opportunity presented by Marcellus shale into the creation of new jobs, new businesses and sustainable economic growth. John Augustine, community outreach manager for the Marcellus Shale Coalition, gave a detailed presentation on the state of the industry, its economic impact and the anticipated growth over the next 40 to 50 years. Augustine said the Marcellus shale region produces 12 billion cubic feet of natural gas per day and will soon surpass 13 billion cubic feet per day. Augustine said the industry employs about 232,000 people with an average salary of $83,000 per year. Between 2010 and 2012, Augustine said there were 4,500 wells drilled, representing a $31.5 billion investment. He said the industry has generated $1.8 billion in tax revenue since 2006. Webber said the gas industry has dramatically grown jobs for members of his union. Since 2006, the union man hours have grown from 200,000 to 3.6 million in 2012. Yudichak said the natural gas industry will power modern manufacturing plants, fuel more efficient vehicles and light the way for new technologies that push the boundaries of health, science and commerce. (Times-Leader, 11/15/13)Global warBarry D Watts 2008; Senior Fellow, The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, The US Defense Industrial Base, Past, Present and Future, CBA, http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20081015._The_US_Defense_In/R.20081015._The_US_Defense_In.pdfSince the 1950s, the US defense industrial base has been a source of long-term strategic advantage for the United States, just as it was during World War II. American defense companies provided the bombers and missiles on which nuclear deterrence rested and armed the US military with world-class weapons, including low-observable aircraft, wide-area surveillance and targeting sensors, and reliable guided munitions cheap enough to be employed in large numbers. They also contributed to the development of modern digital computers, successfully orbited the first reconnaissance satellites, put a man on the moon in less than a decade, and played a pivotal role in developing the worldwide web. Critics have long emphasized President Eisenhowers warning in his farewell television address that the nation needed to guard against the acquisition of undue influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. Usually forgotten or ignored has been an earlier, equally important, passage in Eisenhowers January 1961 speech: A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction. Eisenhowers warning about undue influence, rather than the need to maintain American military strength, tends to dominate contemporary discussions of the US defense industrial base. While the percentage of US gross domestic product going to national defense remains low compared to the 1950s and 1960s, there is a growing list of defense programs that have experienced problems with cost, schedule, and, in a few cases, weapon performance. In fairness, the federal government, including the Department of Defense and Congress, is at least as much to blame for many of these programmatic difficulties as US defense firms. Nevertheless, those critical of the defense industry tend to concentrate on these acquisition shortcomings. The main focus of this report is on a larger question. How prepared is the US defense industrial base to meet the needs of the US military Services in coming decades? The Cold War challenge of Soviet power has largely ebbed, but new challenges have emerged. There is the immediate threat of the violence stemming from SalafiTakfiri and Khomeinist terrorist groups and their state sponsors, that have consumed so much American blood and treasure in Iraq; the longer-term challenge of authoritarian capitalist regimes epitomized by the rise of China and a resurgent Russia; and, not least, the worsening problem of proliferation, particularly of nuclear weapons. In the face of these more complex and varied challenges, it would surely be premature to begin dismantling the US defense industry. From a competitive perspective, therefore, the vital question about the defense industrial base is whether it will be as much a source of long-term advantage in the decades ahead as it has been since the 1950s.CP 1Plan: The United States courts should rule that prostitution is legal and should require states to:-classify sex workers as employees and create regulations for sex work that ensure a safe and healthy workplace, not including mandatory health screenings or licenses for individual workers;-require licensing for third-party operators, exempting single-operator owned entities with four sex workers or less;-prohibit employers from forcing a worker to engage in a sex act;-provide recourse to workers whose employer violates these employment regulations

CP 2 The Congress of the United States should require that prostitution is legal based on international human rights law, citing the Supreme Court of Canadas citing the Supreme Court of Canadas decision in Bedford v. Canada, and should require states to:-classify sex workers as employees and create regulations for sex work that ensure a safe and healthy workplace, not including mandatory health screenings or licenses for individual workers;-require licensing for third-party operators, exempting single-operator owned entities with four sex workers or less;-prohibit employers from forcing a worker to engage in a sex act;-provide recourse to workers whose employer violates these employment regulationsCP 3

The United States Congresses should require that prostitution is legal based on international human rights law, citing the Supreme Court of Canadas citing the Supreme Court of Canadas decision in Bedford v. Canada, and should require states to:-classify sex workers as employees and create regulations for sex work that ensure a safe and healthy workplace, not including mandatory health screenings or licenses for individual workers;-require licensing for third-party operators, exempting single-operator owned entities with four sex workers or less;-prohibit employers from forcing a worker to engage in a sex act;-provide recourse to workers whose employer violates these employment regulations

1nc treaty power

Federal treaty power is strong now the plan shatters it Corn & Brenner-Beck 15 (Geoffrey S. Corn, Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law; Lieutenant Colonel (Retired), U.S. Army Judge Advocate Generals Corps, formerly the Armys senior law of war advisor, supervisory defense counsel for the Western United States, Chief of International Law for U.S. Army Europe, and served as a tactical intelligence officer in Panama; and Dru Brenner-Beck, Lieutenant Colonel (Retired), U.S. Army Judge Advocate Generals Corps, formerly served as Deputy Legal Counsel, U.S. Armys Office of the Inspector General and Chief, Military and Civil Law, U.S. Army Europe, former law clerk to the Honorable Carlos F. Lucero, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, and legal consultant on international law matters, President of the National Institute of Military Justice; Exploring U.S. Treaty Practice Through a Military Lens, Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, 38(2), forthcoming 2015, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2399917)VII. THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUILIBRIUM, TILTED TOWARD OUR AMERICAN VALUES Perhaps the only normative conclusions that can be drawn from examining LOAC treaty practice is that this area of treaty practice involves a continual search for equilibrium between the nations sovereign prerogative to act in defense of its vital national interests and the advancement of those interests through commitment to international legal constraints. The search for this equilibrium in large measure parallels an analogous search embedded in the law itselfthe equilibrium between the necessities of war and humanitarian constraint. U.S. LOAC treaty practice reveals the vital and at times competing roles of the three branches of the federal government, and the inherent limitations of federalism, in achieving this equilibrium. This search for equilibrium is similar to that conducted by James Madison himself. Considered a political pragmatist, Madisons constitutional interpretations did not follow an evolutionary development. Instead, they pragmatically changed with circumstances in order to maintain political equilibrium . . . equilibrium between national departments, the federal center, and the state periphery.268 This Article posits that similar shifts can be seen among the various branches, and between state and federal power in the maintenance of equilibrium in the treaty power, with a small tilt toward an equilibrium that preserves American values. The Senate, in the early 1950s, consented to an unprecedented expansion of binding international obligations through the treaty power.269 Accepting both the NATO Treaty itself, and the NATO SOFA, as well as the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the Senate understood both the necessity of mutual defense arrangements and the concomitant restriction on U.S. unilateral action.270 Because of the shared worldview between the President and the Senate that arose in the aftermath of World War II and the advent of the Cold War, the Senate understood and accepted the necessity of binding international ties in the U.S. policy of active diplomacy, even when those agreements affected both the rights of U.S. soldiers overseas and the jurisdiction of domestic U.S. state courts. These important treaties were concluded at the same time as Senator Brickers failed attempts to amend the U.S. Constitution to overrule Missouri v. Holland and limit the treaty powers domestic effects to those areas already strictly within Congresss Article I powers. The rejection of the Bricker Amendment and the acceptance of these binding international treaty obligations reflects an acceptance by the Senate of the necessity of a robust treaty power at the federal level. Significant to the Senates acceptance of these limits on autonomy is the perception that they reflected both American values and practice.271 By the 1990s, however, the Soviet Union had disintegrated, and the omnipresent threat that had motivated the imperative of maximizing congressional and presidential consensus on foreign policy dissipated. No longer was foreign policy conceived of as an area immune from partisanship and this change in national security perspective produced increased friction between the Senate and the President in relation to treaty obligations. As a result, even seemingly uncontroversial treaties, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, were subject to divisive battles in the Senate during its consideration of their ratification. Similar opposition can be seen in the Senates decades-long and still extant delay in considering Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, and in its passage of the 2006 Military Commissions Act provision that prohibited the invoking of the Geneva Conventions as a source of rights in habeas or civil proceedings in any U.S. court. During this same period the courtsand most notably the Supreme Courtseemed to indicate a greater inclination to impose limitations on national power through the treaty interpretation process. In Yamashita and Eisentrager, the Supreme Court in the late 1940s and early 1950s narrowly construed treaty provisions to permit the military commission trials of General Yamashita and 28 German prisoners, even though this interpretation was arguably a contravention of the humanitarian object and purpose of the 1929 Geneva Conventions. Yet, even at this time, vociferous dissents by Justices Murphy and Rutledge advocated interpretations that reflected an inconsistency between a narrow and permissively oriented interpretation of the Geneva Conventions and fundamental American values. 272 In 2006, however, the Supreme Court interpreted Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions to provide a floor of humanitarian protection to Salim Hamdan, invalidating his military commission trial conducted solely under executive authority. Although subject to debate, the Courts decision to interpret Common Article 3 to apply to the non-international armed conflict against al-Qaeda was an effort to fulfil the humanitarian purposes of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.273 Finally, the defeat of the Bricker Amendments during the 1950s sustained the holdings of Missouri v. Holland and ensured that federalism would pose no real constraints on the treaty power. Nevertheless, the resurgence of federalism in the Courts commerce clause jurisprudence in the 1990s may have predicted a similar return of federalism challenges to the treaty power. In its Bond decisions, the Court recognized both that federalism protects the liberty of individual citizens, and that treaties will not be interpreted to intrude on traditional areas of state responsibilities absent a clear Congressional statement of their intent to do so. In its 2014 decision, the Court also cast doubt on Hollands shorthand holding that a valid treaty equals valid implementing legislation, creating possibilities of attack against future treaty implementing legislation. The three concurrences in that case would have gone even further in restricting the scope of the federal treaty power, even in this core LOAC treaty, with Justice Scalias eliminating it as an independent power altogether.274 This resurgence of federalism concerns, particularly where the underlying treaty lies at the core of the treaty power, may reflect an underlying new susceptibility to a treaty impacting a states traditional role, something also seen in the 2008 Medelln decision. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, although sanctioning federalism challenges to treaty-based legislation, did not address the key treaty power questions raised, preserving the broad ruling of Missouri v. Holland, at least for the near future. VIII. CONCLUSION As in any political system, voluntary international obligations assumed by a nation reflect the values and history of the nation acting on the international stage, both of which can change over time. In the U.S., the policy objectives, views of the proper U.S. role in the world, and perception of U.S. values influence all three branches of government as they fulfill their constitutional roles in the formation, implementation, and interpretation of treaties. Although limited in number, because they implicate the core functions of the national governmentforeign policy and national defenseLOAC treaties and the cases implicating them provide important insights into U.S. treaty practice. The role of treaties and international law influence all three branches search for the equilibrium between national and international imperatives. Done against the background of their reverence for, and commitment to, the law of nations,275 the Framers designed the Constitution to involve all three branches of the U.S. Government in formulating and enforcing its international obligations. Although cases interpreting LOAC treaties are sparse, they do exist, and they do provide evidence of the significant influence the judiciary has and will continue to have on the rules that regulate the use of U.S. military power. Perhaps the nation has entered an era of a greater willingness by the judiciary to prioritize the object and purpose of relevant LOAC treaties over Executive interpretation. Such an interpretive perspective would certainly help explain decisions like Hamdan and Noriega. Whether this perception is justified or exaggerated, it is interesting that in the wake of the Hamdan decision, Congress sought to foreclose reliance on the Geneva Conventions as a basis for judicial relief. This provision of the Military Commission Act of 2006 was, ironically, challenged by none other than General Noriega when he sought to block his post-incarceration extradition to France based on Frances inability or unwillingness to ensure respect for his rights as a POW. The district court rejected his challenge based on this statutory ban on asserting the Geneva Conventions as a source of right in U.S. courts, a holding upheld by the Eleventh Circuit. None other than Justice Thomas questioned the validity of such a statute when he dissented in the subsequent denial of Noriegas petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.276 Even more important, in the 2009 MCA, Congress significantly limited this bar. Ultimately, this merely reflects the ongoing ebbs and flows of influence asserted by each branch of our government on the treaty creation, implementation, and interpretation process as each seeks the appropriate equilibrium. It is also possible that the nation is experiencing an era in which Congress is taking a more narrow view of international law as a mechanism to restrict U.S. national power; a narrowing that can be seen through its role in LOAC formation, advice and consent, and statutory treaty implementation. In its approval of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the Senate embraced the imposition of binding international standards governing armed conflict in large measure because it saw those standards as embodying the values and practices of the United States in the face of the emerging Cold War threat from the eastern bloc. In other cases, the Senate, and Congress more generally, resisted treaties they believed limited U.S. freedom of action in foreign affairs and war powers. Most notably, the Senate has leveraged the advice and consent process to compel Executive commitment to implement treaty obligations consistent with Senate will, and at times to even assert pressure on the President in relation to matters in no way connected to the treaty. The ratification struggle over the CWC illustrates both of these Senate practices, resulting in presidential concessions that were arguably inconsistent with the object and purpose of the treaty. Limitations imposed by the U.S. federalist system of government are also now impacting the nations implementation of LOAC treaty obligations. The Bond case demonstrates that individual citizens will have standing to contest the validity of implementing legislation or perhaps self-executing treaties in circumscribing their behavior in areas traditionally reserved to the states. Regardless, although not resolving Justice Holmes invisible radiations from the Tenth Amendment, Bond establishes that implementing legislation will not be interpreted to interfere with the traditional division of law enforcement authority between federal and state governments absent a clear statement from Congress of that intent. Given the central concern of the Framers during the drafting of the Constitution over the states interference with the fulfillment of national treaty obligations, it is ironic that federalism may still have an impact on such an important function of the federal government in the twenty-first century. Ultimately, while it is true that war is a challenge to law,277 it remains an open question whether it is the law, or war itself, that must adjust. Leveraging the nations military power to advance vital national security interests while advancing the regulation of hostilities through the treaty power will, as it has in the past, impose pressures on the three branches of the U.S. government and on our federal system itself. Their actions in response will provide a lens into how treaties and international law itself will operate in U.S. practice in the future.

The plan shifts to a constitutional model that favors federalism concerns over the treaty powerPowell 1 (Catherine Powell, Associate Clinical Professor of Law, Columbia Law School, Executive Director, Human Rights Institute, J.D., Yale Law School, M.P.A., Woodrow Wilson School in Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, B.A., Yale University, Dialogic Federalism: Constitutional Possibilities for Incorporation of Human Rights Law in the United States, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, November 2001, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 245-295 (2001), http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3254&context=penn_law_review)While the U.S. Constitution assigns the power to make and adopt treaties to the federal government, several state and local governments have "adopted" human rights treaties and other international norms, often in response to constituent pressures that are more effectively mobilized at the subnational level . For example, in the absence of federal ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), San Francisco has incorporated "principles of CEDAW" into binding local law. In the death penalty context, where the federal government has not yet opted to ratify the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR) , aimed at the abolition of the death penalty, a handful of cities have urged their states, and in some cases the federal government, to support a moratorium, relying on the United Nations Commission on Human Rights' call for such a moratorium. What are the constitutional implications of this and other moves to bypass the federal government in incorporating and enforcing international human rights? Discussions about the allocation of authority between federal and subfederal systems in the implementation of international human rights law typically proceed by staking out one of two initial positions At one end of the spectrum, a traditional constitutional theory takes a restrictive view of state and local authority, envisioning hierarchical imposition of federally implemented international law norms through the federal treaty power" and determination of customary international law ' 9 by federal courts.'0 At the other end of the spectrum, a revisionist theory assumes greater fragmentation and authority reserved to the states based on federalism and separation of powers limits on federal authority." "These divergent images capture different moments of political promise and despair, at times focused on the immense power of the national project, and other times appreciating the vitality and durability of forms of governance that, without . . . great resources, continue to have social and political force."12 Under both models, one system-either federal or sub-federal has a predominant voice in deciding when and how international human rights law is implemented. Such either/or approaches seek to avoid the conflict and indeterminacy created when the distribution of constitutional authority is uncertain.13 At the traditional/hierarchical end of the spectrum, the conflict is interference with the ability of the nation to speak with "one voice" in foreign affairs, 4 posed by "divergent and perhaps parochial state interpretations" of international law.' 5 At the revisionist/fragmentation end, the conflict, at its core, is interference with states' rights by federal courts (without authorization to do so by the federal political branches) and by the political branches (particularly Congress, when it exercises the treaty power to legislate in areas beyond those specifically conferred in the U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8).' While the two paradigms described here are idealized and oversimplify the subtlety and hybridity within these paradigms, in fact much of the scholarship on federalism and human rights law in the United States loosely tracks one or the other of these two models, if not always in its purest form.

Specifically, expanding state court jurisdiction to interpret and apply treaties results in Status-of-Forces Agreement breaches and collapses NATO cohesion and LOAC complianceBrenner-Beck 14 (Dru Brenner-Beck, Lieutenant Colonel (Retired), U.S. Army Judge Advocate Generals Corps, formerly served as Deputy Legal Counsel, U.S. Armys Office of the Inspector General and Chief, Military and Civil Law, U.S. Army Europe, former law clerk to the Honorable Carlos F. Lucero, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, and legal consultant on international law matters, President of the National Institute of Military Justice, Federalism and the Treaty Power: Breaking the Bond(S) Between Nations: The Treaty Power and Status of Forces Agreements, American University National Security Law Brief, 5(1), 9-4-2014, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2491979 *bracket edited for gendered language)B. Visiting Forces, Status Agreements, and the Usurpation of State Criminal Jurisdiction? The Bond case raises potentially significant federalism concerns in relation to treaties regulating the means of warfare. However, a much more direct and potentially disruptive effect on the balance between federal and state authorities in our Constitutional structure is produced by a different category of treaty related to military affairs: status of forces agreements (SOFAs). Because the numbers of foreign soldiers present in the United States are relatively few in comparison to the numbers of U.S. soldiers overseas, the effect of these agreements on the federal-state division of power has been infrequent Nonetheless, SOFAs offer an important illustration of the intersection of treaty power and federalism concerns, and how Bonds clear statement rule could genuinely frustrate the nations ability to advance its national security interests by reciprocally protecting allied forces from assertions of a states criminal power. The United States hosts over 7000 military students from over 136 nations at 150 schools or installations nationwide under its International Military Education and Training (IMET) program.144 Additionally, at least two German units are permanently stationed in the United States at Fort Bliss in Texas and at Holloman Air Force Base in New Mexico.145 Thus, there are significant numbers of foreign NATO forces and family members as well as significant numbers of non-NATO military personnel engaged in international exchanges present in the United States present at any given time. Although relatively small in number compared with the number of U.S. forces and associated personnel residing overseas, these foreign forces and their families are involved in the same proportion of crimes and accidents as any other inhabitant of the United States.146 With a far-flung military presence in dozens of foreign nations, the United States currently has over 100 international SOFA type agreements that address the status of military forces.147 These agreements can be bi-lateral, multi-lateral, reciprocal or non-reciprocal. With the exception of the multi-lateral North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) SOFA- the only SOFA that is a treaty148- most SOFAs take the form of executive agreements, some of which are concluded on the basis of authority contained in a treaty, while others are based on other congressional authority, and still others, more loosely associated with other defense agreements or based on exclusive executive authority.149 Because the domestic legal effect of the alternatives to formal Article II, section 2 treaties is far from settled, the form of the SOFA can be critical is assessing its federalism impact. Although treaties clearly operate as the supreme law of the land under the Constitutions Supremacy Clause, the effect of a SOFA concluded by executive agreement would not necessarily have the same domestic force and effect. Accordingly, any interference with a state criminal prosecution arising from operation of a SOFA, particularly the typical executive agreement type SOFA, could very easily trigger federalism concerns and state initiated challenge to the effect of the agreement. Because the NATO SOFA jurisdictional framework is considered a benchmark and model for all other SOFA type agreements, examination of its criminal jurisdiction provisions is critical to understanding the potential impact of SOFAs on federalism.150 Article VII of the NATO SOFA151 grants exclusive criminal jurisdiction where only the laws of one state are broken;152 in all other cases the NATO SOFA grants concurrent jurisdiction to both the sending and receiving state. In other words, if a service-member covered by the SOFA commits an act that violates the law of only one state, that state has exclusive jurisdiction. But in the much more common situation where the conduct violates the laws of both the sending and receiving state, jurisdiction is concurrent. Within this category of concurrent jurisdiction, the SOFA allocates the primary right to exercise jurisdiction to the sending state for acts or omissions arising from the performance of official duties or for inter se cases where both the accused and the victim are members of the sending state.153 The receiving state is granted primary jurisdiction in all other cases. In cases of concurrent jurisdiction, either state may cede their right of primary jurisdiction to the other. This jurisdictional allocation creates the potential for interference with U.S. state criminal proceedings in the two situations of concurrent jurisdiction: - cases arising from official duty and inter se cases.154 In both these situations, the foreign sending State would have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction, a right granted by an international agreement with the United States. This means the United States would be obligated to allow the sending state to assert jurisdiction and would preclude the assertion of U.S. jurisdiction absent a waiver by the sending state. But what exactly is U.S. jurisdiction in such a context? Does such a SOFA foreclose the assertion of jurisdiction by only the federal government? Or does the agreement prohibit the state from asserting jurisdiction for a crime that occurs in its territory whenever the sending state chooses to assert its primacy under the SOFA? Considering that most criminal law in the United States is administered primarily by the states, this is a profoundly significant question, and for the NATO SOFA treaty was one explicitly considered by the Senate. Examples of cases where the sending state has the primary right of jurisdiction highlight the tensions that can emerge between state and federal authorities when compliance with an international treaty or international agreement is at stake. Two hypothetical examples involving the German forces stationed in Texas and New Mexico illustrate the potential for federalism concerns produced by the NATO SOFA.155 First, recall that the SOFA grants the sending state primary jurisdiction for official duty offenses. If an on-duty German military member kills an American citizen as the result of an automobile accident while driving an official German military vehicle offpost,156 the State of New Mexico or Texas would ordinarily have jurisdiction to charge the German driver with vehicular homicide or other applicable criminal offense. However, because the alleged criminal act occurred while the soldier was in an official-duty status, the German government (as the sending State) would have a treaty-based right to assert primary jurisdiction for this offense.157 In the second type of case, a foreign military member might commit spouse or child abuse in the familys off-post residence. Assuming both the victim and the accused in this hypothetical are German citizens present in the United States under the provisions of the SOFA, this is an inter se case, and again, under Article VII Germany would have primary jurisdiction.158 It is easy to comprehend the sensitivities of local prosecutors and courts in cases involving these and other types of criminal misconduct committed in their jurisdictions.159 Nevertheless, a local court would be expected to analyze the provisions of the SOFA to determine the treatyimposed limitations on the exercise of its own jurisdiction, and in these cases, forego prosecution or dismiss160 charges absent a German waiver of the right to exercise primary jurisdiction. If, however, the local court refused to defer to the German assertion of primary jurisdiction - the outcome mandated by Article VII of the NATO SOFA - the state through the decision of the local prosecutor or state judge, would effectively force the United States to breach its international obligations. Interestingly, the Senate appears to have contemplated these type of conflicts when it considered the NATO SOFA during ratification hearings. In order to illustrate the potential interference with states rights, the Senate explicitly discussed the impact of the NATO SOFA jurisdictional sharing provisions on a hypothetical foreign soldier in the United States involved in an automobile accident while on official duty resulting in injury or fatality to a U.S. citizen. The Senate fully understood that if ratified, Article VII161 would alter state criminal law under the Supremacy Clause, and further, it would regularly fall to the state courts to implement NATO SOFA obligations. Thus, the Senate envisioned a local court determining its own jurisdiction under the SOFA and the Supremacy Clause and dismissing any case in which the SOFA granted the primary right of prosecution to the foreign sending state. It is therefore clear the Senate understood the seriousness of this potential interference with U.S. state criminal jurisdiction. However, it also understood that permitting this interference was necessary to protect U.S. forces abroad from the plenary territorial sovereignty of allied receiving states, a trade-off certainly influenced by the expectation that U.S. forces would be affected by the SOFA far more frequently than allied forces in the United States.162 In its hearings on the NATO SOFA the Senate expressed the understanding that state courts would comply with the Constitutions Supremacy Clause and properly limit their own jurisdiction to try the foreign military member in accordance with the SOFAs provisions. Furthermore, because the Senate considered the provisions of the NATO SOFA to be self-executing, Congress never passed explicit implementing laws that would allow the federal government to compel dismissal of the state criminal proceeding if it believed the state court did not properly interpret the SOFA provisions.163 Indeed, in its hearings the Senate recognized that there was no real federal remedy if the local state criminal court improperly determined that it had jurisdiction over a visiting force member when the foreign sending state disagreed. Instead, such disparate interpretations of the SOFAs concurrent jurisdiction provision would be left to the realm of international negotiation.164 Such an unresolved breach could easily lead to retaliatory action by our NATO allies, affecting U.S. military members and their families overseas, but also the integrity of the defense alliance itself. This is especially true in our modern era, when unlike the height of the Cold War, foreign hosts of U.S. forces often perceive the U.S. military presence to be of less interest to their own security than to that of the U.S. Accordingly, enforcement of the NATO SOFA, and other analogous status agreements, is functionally dependent on a state court recognition and application of the SOFAs allocation of concurrent jurisdiction- recognition ostensibly mandated by the Supremacy Clause for treaties, and from the federal government perspective, hopefully for executive agreements as well. This enforcement is well within a state courts capabilities. However, should a court prove obdurate or a local prosecutor unconvinced of the importance of these SOFA provisions when weighed against local sovereignty and the interests of the local community, it would prove difficult to enforce compliance with these treaty provisions. Ironically, this was a problem the Founders certainly appreciated, as compliance with Treaty obligations was a driving reason for the failure of the Confederation.165 Nonetheless, because they remove state criminal jurisdiction where the sending state has primary jurisdiction, SOFAs affect a traditional and core area of state sovereignty in the most fundamental way. Still, given that the Senate consented to the NATO SOFA Treaty as it was rejecting Senator Brickers proposed constitutional amendment to overturn Missouri v. Holland, which explicitly permitted interference with traditional state prerogatives under the treaty power, any state failure to comply with the NATO SOFAs jurisdictional provisions would be particularly ironic. Bond, as resolved by the Supreme Court, only defers resolution of the extent of the invisible radiations arising from the Tenth Amendment on treaty-implementing legislation, and does not address what limitations, if any, exist when, as directly contemplated by the Founders, the treaty is self-executing.166 other soFas: executive & congressional-executive agreements While the NATO SOFA is the sole SOFA concluded as a treaty, the United States is currently party to over 100 agreements that may be considered SOFAs.167 These agreements can be bi-lateral, multi-lateral, reciprocal or non-reciprocal, and most SOFAs take the form of executive agreements.168 The form of the SOFA agreement can arguably impact its domestic legal consequences. If the President is authorized by Congress to negotiate and conclude international agreements on particular subjects, or if the agreement is approved by a joint resolution of Congress, these Congressional-Executive agreements have been considered the equivalent of a treaty.169 Although treaties clearly operate as the supreme law of the land under the Constitutions Supremacy Clause, the domestic effect of a SOFA concluded by congressional-executive agreement could arguably be subject to Bonds clear indication rule before it could affect the traditional division of law enforcement authority between federal and state governments. Although most SOFA agreements have been entered into as part of an overall mutual or bi-lateral defense or security agreements, only the NATO SOFA and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) SOFA are reciprocal, posing federalism concerns in their enforcement. As part of post-Cold War diplomacy, the PfP Agreement authorized the establishment of bilateral agreements between NATO and individual Euro-Atlantic partner countries, usually former Warsaw pact countries, to encourage their democratization and integration with Europe and NATO.170 The PfP applies most of the provisions of the NATO SOFA bilaterally between signatory states of the PfP and NATO member nations.171 In 1994, Congress authorized the President to apply the provisions of the reciprocal NATO SOFA to PfP nations by entering into executive agreements to that effect.172 As of 2012, an additional 24 counties are subject to the NATO SOFA through implementation of the PfP Agreement through executive agreement, with the NATO SOFA implemented by a treaty, and the PfP SOFA by a congressional-executive agreement. Between the NATO SOFA and the PfP SOFA, the U.S. has common reciprocal SOFA arrangements with approximately 58 countries, amounting to over half the SOFA arrangements currently in place.173 Just as the Supreme Court did not discuss the effects of its requirement for a clear indication that Congress sought to change the traditional balance of criminal authority, it also did not discuss whether and how such a clear indication would be shown when the source of the change was a congressional-executive agreement, such as the PfP SOFA agreements. The Senate in considering the NATO SOFA did understand, and accept, the effect of the SOFAs criminal jurisdiction provisions on traditional state criminal jurisdiction. While Congress clearly authorized the President to enter into these reciprocal PfP SOFA arrangements, and because the underlying PfP agreement requires direct application of the NATO SOFA provisions to these new countries,174 they should have equal domestic effect. Nevertheless, just as the effect of the Bond decision on self-executing treaties is unknown, so too will be its effect on a reciprocal SOFA entered into as a congressional-executive agreement. Here, it is clear that reciprocity was authorized by Congress in the context of extending the NATO SOFA protections to PfP nations. Presumably, Congress in extending these provisions did so with the knowledge that the NATO SOFA itself was a self-executing treaty, and applied directly to affect state criminal jurisdiction. Such common sense evaluation of the statutory effect, however, may not be the sort of clear indication mandated by the Supreme Court in Bond. Conclusion Limitations imposed on federal power pursuant to the U.S. federalist system of government are central to our democracy. However the exercise of the national treaty power, and the implementation of these agreements, have historically been immune from these limitations. This may no longer be the case as federalism concerns are now impacting the nations implementation of core LOAC treaty obligations. The Bond case demonstrates that individual citizens will have standing to contest the validity of implementing legislation or perhaps self-executing treaties in circumscribing their behavior in areas traditionally reserved to the states. Although not resolving Justice Holmes invisible radiations from the Tenth Amendment, Bond establishes that implementing legislation will not be interpreted to interfere with the traditional division of law enforcement authority between Federal and State governments absent a clear indication from Congress of that intent. Lurking in the background are SOFA treaties, treaties that reflect fundamental foreign policy, war powers, and national security decisions of the nation, but that similarly implicate the core of traditional states areas of responsibility in our federal system. Given the central concern of the Founders during the drafting of the Constitution over the States interference with the fulfillment of national treaty obligations, it is particularly ironic that federalism may still have an impact on such an important function of the federal government in the 21st Century. Awareness of the periodic ebbs and flows of the relationship between the nations treaty powers and federalism, against the backdrop of our nations history, indicate that Congress and the President should directly address the federalism concerns extant in relation to adoption of treaties and other international agreements. The current position of the Supreme Court reflects these historic divides. Just as our Founders wrestled with the creation of unified nation capable of acting on the world stage as a legitimate member of the family of nations, the Court should carefully consider rulings, which in the name of federalism, emasculate [weaken] the nation as a responsible international actor and compromise its vital national security interests. In spite of Justice Holmes resolution of questions related to the scope of the treaty power framed by the outcome of the Civil War, and President Eisenhower by the rejection of Senator Brickers proposed constitutional amendments, Bond seems to have only exacerbated federalism uncertainty. The political branches must take up the mantle and provide much clearer statements of their expectation that treaties and international agreements, especially those related to status of visiting forces, trump states rights.

ExtinctionFarmer 15 (Ben Farmer, Defense Correspondent at The Daily Telegraph, citing General Sir Adrian Bradshaw, Deputy Commander of NATO Forces in Europe, and former Director of British Special Forces, and Michael Fallon, Secretary of State for Defence, member of the National Security Council, and Member of Parliament, United Kingdom and Great Britain and Northern Ireland, NATO general: Russia tensions could escalate into all-out war, Business Insider, 2-20-2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/nato-general-russia-tensions-could-escalate-to-war-2015-2)Tensions with Russia could blow up into all-out conflict, posing an existential threat to our whole being, Britains top general in Nato has warned. Gen Sir Adrian Bradshaw, deputy commander of Nato forces in Europe, said there was a danger Vladimir Putin could try to use his armies to invade and seize Nato territory, after calculating the alliance would be too afraid of escalating violence to respond. His comments follow a clash between London and Moscow after the Defence Secretary, Michael Fallon, said there was a "real and present danger" Mr Putin could try to destabilize the Baltic states with a campaign of subversion and irregular warfare. The Kremlin called those comments absolutely unacceptable". Sir Adrian told the Royal United Services Institute there was a danger such a campaign of undercover attacks could paralyze Nato decision making, as members disagreed over how much Russia was responsible, and how to respond. Nato commanders fear a campaign of skilfully disguised, irregular military action by Russia, which is carefully designed not to trigger the alliance's mutual defence pact. He said the "resulting ambiguity" would make "collective decisions relating to the appropriate responses more difficult". But Sir Adrian, one of the most senior generals in the British Army and a former director of special forces, went further and said there was also danger that Russia could use conventional forces and Soviet-era brinkmanship to seize Nato territory. He said Russia had shown last year it could generate large conventional forces at short notice for snap exercises along its borders. There was a danger these could be used not only for intimidation and coercion but potentially to seize Nato territory, after which the threat of escalation might be used to prevent re-establishment of territorial integrity. This use of so called escalation dominance was of course a classic Soviet technique. He went on to say that the threat from Russia, together with the risk it brings of a miscalculation resulting in a strategic conflict, however unlikely we see it as being right now, represents an existential threat to our whole being. Nato has agreed to set up a rapid reaction force of around 5,000 troops ready to move at 48 hours notice, in case of Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. Supplies, equipment and ammunition will be stockpiled in bases in the region. Alliance leaders hope the force will deter any incursion. David Cameron warned Vladimir Putin there will be more sanctions and "more consequences" for Russia if the ceasefire in Ukraine does not hold. The Prime Minister vowed that the West would be "staunch" in its response to Russia and was prepared to maintain pressure on Moscow "for the long term". He rejected the findings of a scathing parliamentary committee report that the UK found itself "sleep-walking" into the crisis over Ukraine. The EU Committee of the House of Lords found there had been a "catastrophic misreading" of mood by European diplomats in the run-up to the crisis. Earlier this week, Mr Fallon said the Russian president might try to test Natos resolve with the same Kremlin-backed subversion used in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. A murky campaign of infiltration, propaganda, undercover forces and cyber attack such as that used in the early stages of the Ukraine conflict could be used to inflame ethnic tensions in Estonia, Lithuania or Latvia, he said. The military alliance must be prepared to repel Russian aggression whatever form it takes, Mr Fallon said, as he warned that tensions between the two were warming up. His comments were dismissed in Moscow. Russia's Foreign Ministry spokesman said the country does not pose a threat to Baltic countries and accused Mr Fallon of going beyond diplomatic ethics . Alexander Lukashevich said: "His absolutely unacceptable characteristics of the Russian Federation remind me of last year's speech of US president Barack Obama before the UN general assembly, in which he mentioned Russia among the three most serious challenges his country was facing. "I believe we will find a way to react to Mr Secretary's statements."1nc judicial budgets

Courts are effectively lobbying state governments now for budgetary relief inter-branch relations are keyHartley & English 14 (Roger E. Hartley, professor and director of the masters of public affairs program in the Department of Political Science and Public Affairs at Western Carolina University, and Melissa L. English, assistant professor of business law at Western Carolina University, former civil litigator, J.D. University of Arizona, The State of State Courts: Efforts to Improve Interbranch Relations in the Wake of Perceptions of Crisis, The Council of State Governments, The Book of the States 2014, 10-15-2014, http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/content/state-state-courts-efforts-improve-interbranch-relations-wake-perceptions-crisis)Efforts to Improve Intergovernmental Relations In the past five years, a renewed focus has been placed on improving the judiciarys intergovernmental relationships and crafting strategies that will help courts negotiate the rough-and-tumble of the political process. Court officials at the highest levels, public legal organizations such as the National Center for State Courts and the American Bar Association, political scientists and legal scholars have shared this focus. The result has been the identification of important opportunities for the judiciary to improve intergovernmental relationships, and the development of innovative programs to develop the opportunities and capacity for courts to advocate within the political process. One opportunity that has been identified is for court leaders to build collegial relationships with the other branches so the members of those branches understand the role of courts, their importance to the legal system and their needs. In 2009, the American Bar Associations Presidential Commission on Fair and Impartial State Courts and the National Center for State Courts sponsored a national summit in Charlotte, N.C., entitled Justice is the Business of Government: The Critical Role of Fair and Impartial State Courts.23 The summit included 300 attendees and delegations for each branch of government from 37 states. It focused on the need to improve relations among the branches and concluded that court leadership needed to become more assertive about the needs of courts. Among the conclusions of the summit was for each delegation to create local plans for regularized communication with the other branches of government with specific attention to legislation with an impact on courts.24 The 2013 annual meeting of the Conference of Chief Justices and Conference of State Court Administrators in Burlington, Vermont, had a similar focus: Collaborative Justice: Interbranch Relations in the New Century. This meeting was notable for including representatives from the National Governors Association and the National Conference of State Legislatures. The Justices and court administrators spent significant time discussing how to improve lobbying efforts with other branches. Among the findings were that judicial leaders needed to create and maintain personal relationships with legislative and executive leaders.25 The attendees established a framework for an institutionalized meeting structure where regular interbranch communication can occur and committed to build national partnerships with the National Governors Association and National Conference of State Legislatures to work on policy agendas and research of interest to all three branches.26 Courts also recognize the necessity of internal and external reforms to increase the courts capacity to lobby while also closing avenues for reprisal. In the context of budget politics, external reforms include constitutional amendments to allow direct submission of the budget to state legislators, legislative efforts to free courts of restrictive budget line items and institutional changes inside courts that would build better strategic lobbying efforts.27 Internally, courts can improve capacity for political engagement by devoting more resources to intergovernmental relations staff and building internal lobbying processes that persist across budget cycles.28 Unfortunately, no research examining the amount of money and staff courts devote to their intergovernmental relations work has been conducted. Other scholars have noted the importance of improving tactics and effective messaging. For example, Jeremy Buchman, Associate Professor of Political Science at Long Island University, has documented how the U.S. Supreme Court successfully lobbied for the Judiciary Act of 1925. The Act sought to reduce the U.S. Supreme Courts caseload by expanding the Courts discretionary jurisdiction and forcing more parties to seek review by writ of certiorari. The U.S. Supreme Court used improvement of court efficiency as a means to persuade lawmakers.29 Research also documents strategy and successful efforts where federal court officials worked with the other branches to build judicial institutions over time and the lobbying work of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.30 For example, court officials at the federal level successfully lobbied for the Judiciary Act of 1891 that created the United States Circuit Court of Appeals and in 1939 Congress created the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. In states, a host of reforms have been created in partnership with state legislatures and governors like court unification of administration efforts, changes to judicial selection methods, and support of specialized courts.31 Judicial leadership and tenure also have been identified as being important to improving interbranch relationships. Effective leadership is important to build better relations with the other branches and to form partnerships. Rather arbitrary selection methods, limits on the tenure of court leadersin Alabama, for example, presiding circuit judges are limited to three-year termsor mandatory rotation of judicial positions and benches may fracture important networks once they are formed. For example, chief judges of the circuit and district courts are the most senior judge in the federal court system. They may serve a seven year term or until the age of 70.32 An alternative to short rotations of judicial leaders is longer terms with attention to judges with court leadership skills, providing mentoring and grooming them for succession into leadership, and giving them the opportunity to serve longer or multiple terms. Courts also might create partnerships with outside organizations to help advance causes of importance to courts. Courts in Tennessee, for example, have created partnerships with executive branch agencies that are participants in the court system, including the prosecution and public defense bars.33 Partnerships like these allow courts to have allies that might raise the salience of court issues and needs that would otherwise be ignored when the branch goes into the political process alone. In Washington state, the courts helped organize the Justice in Jeopardy Commission, which included representatives from business, the bar, the legislature and others to lobby on behalf of court funding increases.34 Conclusion Indiana Chief Justice Randall T. Shepard wrote the following about the need for effective court leadership on societal problems and interbranch relations: A member of the judicial family is called upon to play roles that are not strictly a part of the classic adjudicative function, but reflect instead the exercise of leadership in other ways, like lending a part of the credibility the judicial branch acquires over time to a very important undertaking that society needs.35 The crisis in court funding and efforts to alter the powers of courts call attention to importance of the courts intergovernmental relationships and how, without effective and competitive advocacy, court needs get lost in the rough and tumble of the political process. While courts and allied organizations have a renewed focus on the importance of intergovernmental relations, the effectiveness of emerging strategies and best practices still need evaluation. In addition, more scholarly research is needed to continue to identify effective strategies for courts to improve their capacity and ability to lobby other branches, their tactics and how these strategies compare to those of the executive agencies with whom courts compete.

The plan sours state inter-branch relations generates massive controversy

Controversial rulings sour inter-branch relations and trade off with efforts to secure fundingAmestoy 14 (Jeff Amestoy, former Chief Justice of the Vermont Supreme Court, former Attorney General of Vermont, Fellow at the Center for Public Leadership, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, The Politics of Restraint: State Judicial Leadership in the 21st Century, Perspectiives on State Court Leadership Series, 4-30-2014, http://www.ncsc.org/Services-and-Experts/Court-leadership/Harvard-Executive-Session/~/media/Files/PDF/Services%20and%20Experts/Harvard%20Executive%20Session/Politics-of-Restraint.ashx)In an age of political excess, restraint is little valued as a source of political authority. By training, temperament, and judicial function, state court leaders rightly conceive restraint as a virtue essential to the branchs legitimacy. But restraint can provide state judicial leaders the standing to exercise the necessary political dimension of their leadership. The restrained and prudent use of judicial branch authority maximizes the capacity of state judicial leaders to exercise their broader responsibility as leaders of a democratic society. The affirmative rights that typify many state constitutions (e.g., the right to privacy, the right to adequate education) often compel judicial decisions that prompt public, legislative, and executive branch responses.4 The structure of state constitutional law provides legitimate roles for the public, legislature, and executive in responding to judicial opinions.5 State constitutional amendments prompted by citizen initiative petitions or a states legislative process are often a part of the constitutional discourse. Effective state judicial leadership recognizes that judicial authority is not ultimate authority. The politics of restraint cautions judicial leaders to be equally alert to nuances of political engagement in judicial advocacy of programs and appropriations. Every state judicial leader engaged in the challenges confronted by American society understands the inherent tension between the judicial responsibility to decide cases and the desire to alter the social conditions that give rise to those cases. Problem solving courts, of which drug courts, mental health courts, and fathering courts are but three examples, represent responses of state judicial leaders to the understandable desire to confront the fierce urgency of now.6 Yet such initiativeswhich require interaction with legislators and other stakeholdersmust be accompanied by a nuanced calculation of both the cost of that political engagement and the risk of compromising the distinct status of the judiciary as impartial adjudicators.7 Restraint provides a value for state judicial leaders who are compelled to navigate the currents of interbranch relations. If judicial independence is to be found in the freedom to design the architecture of ones own restraint, state judicial leaders must be particularly attuned to how they expend political capital in building the architecture. For example, a state judicial leadership initiative that seeks to marshal legislative support for judicial appropriations by enlisting the lobbying power of the business community could raise questions of its potential effect on the judiciarys reputation for decisional independence. A judicial independence, historically rooted in the capacity to produce case decisions free from influence, cautions restraint in utilizing a state judicial leaders political capital for protecting funding when it may be needed to preserve decisional independence.8

Failure to mitigate court budget crisis slows economic growth and collapses rule of law reverse causal prefer quantitative studiesMagnuson, et al 14 (Eric J. Magnuson, Partner at Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi L.L.P., Vice Chair of DRIs Judicial Task Force, former Chief Justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court, has more than 35 years of experience practicing law; Steven M. Puiszis, Partner and Deputy General Counsel of Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Secretary Treasurer of DRI, a member of its Board of Directors and former Chair of DRIs Judicial Task Force, former President of the Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel; Lisa M. Agrimonti, Shareholder at Briggs and Morgan, Professional Association, currently pursuing Doctorate of Business Administration; and Nicole S. Frank, Associate at Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi L.L.P.; The Economics of Justice, DRI, 2014, http://www.dri.org/DRI/webdocs/news/2014%20Economics%20of%20Justice.pdf *bracket edited for ablest language)Executive Summary In 1776, Thomas Jefferson decried that the king has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries. For depriving us in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury. (Declaration of Independence, 1776).1 While Jefferson and the other Framers provided for an independent federal judiciary in the Constitution, no effective way has been found to address the occasional choke hold that the executive and legislative branches exert on the federal and state judiciaries through control of the purse strings. The reality is that the third and co-equal branch has been reduced to a supplicant in search of funding from the two other branches of government. It does not bode well for democracy when access to the justice system can be held hostage to political debate and often loses out to the competing policies of the moment. While much has been made of the political/philosophical ramifications of this regrettable reality and its effect on the timely administration of justice, little debate has turned on a more practical reality. That is, the economic effects of a woefully underfunded judiciary on local economies or inversely the economic benefits of a fully funded judiciary on those local economies. That exploration is the purpose of this paper. Citizens turn to our state courts when their lives are in crisis. But after years of underfunding, many state courts are unable to timely deliver the justice our citizens seek, and to which they are entitled. The business community also relies on a functioning court system to efficiently resolve their disputes. Budget cuts in many states, however, have required court systems to lay off staff, reduce court hours, close or consolidate courts in some instances, and give priority to criminal cases that require speedy trial rules. This has resulted in significant delays in resolving civil cases in jurisdictions where court funding has been cut. Delayed resolution through lack of judicial funding inflicts widespread economic harm. Because of uncertainty in the outcome of a pending trial or even a trial date, for that matter, businesses are reluctant to add employees, expand product lines, or invest in capital equipment all of which affects the vitality of the local economy. From an economic analysis, underfunded courts have a profound negative impact on the state economies they serve. Multiple economic studies independently demonstrate that the savings achieved through funding reductions to a state-court system are exceeded by lost tax revenues and other harmful economic impacts to a states economy. State court systems take up a minute percentage of a states overall budget, typically from less than one percent to three percent. Thus, the overall savings resulting from cuts to a states judicial branch are relatively small. Because of the courts structural composition, however, the vast majority of a state courts budget, sometimes as high as 96 percent,2 is consumed by the salaries of judges, clerks, court staff, and probation officers. Cuts to the judicial branch often result in disproportionate job losses, diminished tax revenues, and increased unemployment benefits. The relatively small savings achieved by cuts to a states judicial branch are outweighed by direct loss of revenues. Moreover, these budget cuts indirectly create additional social and economic problems for the state and local governments. At a time when scarce resources need to be carefully managed, the relatively small investment needed to ensure adequate funding of our state courtsa fraction of a penny for each tax dollarcan be made with no significant impact on the other needs of state and federal government. In short, adequate court funding is a smart use of the publics resources. Today however, this issue flies under the radar of the public, and in many instances is ignored by the leaders of other branches of state government. A 2013 national poll conducted by the DRI Center for Law and Public Policy on our civil justice system revealed that only 40 percent of those polled felt that our state courts were underfunded. (DRI National Poll on the Civil Justice System, 2013). A similar percentage expressed the view that state courts were adequately funded, while another 20 percent of those polled had no opinion on the issue. (Id.) The sad reality facing America is that many of our state court systems are so poorly funded that they are at a tipping point of dysfunction. We hope that this whitepaper will help to educate both the public and leaders of state and local governments that many of our state-court systems are woefully underfunded to the extent that justice may end up being rationed. Our state courts impact the lives of virtually every citizen in America. They are not simply another governmental agency with projects that can be pushed into the next fiscal year. As Chief Justice Roberts explained in his 2013 Year-End Report: The impact of the sequester was more significant on the courts than elsewhere in the government, because virtually all of their core functions are constitutionally and statutorily required. Unlike Executive Branch agencies, the courts do not have discretionary programs they can eliminate or postpone in response to budget cuts. The courts must resolve all criminal, civil, and bankruptcy cases that fall within their jurisdiction, often under tight time constraints. (Roberts, 2013). It is not an understatement to say that American democracy is built on our court systems. To protect our democracy and contribute to the well-being of local economies, it is critical that our courts remain independent and adequately funded. Thus, this whitepaper will document the evidence that our court systems are woefully underfunded; explore the impact of underfunded courts on American society; and explain the urgent need for both the public and governmental leaders to recognize the value of a fully funded justice system, and restore adequate funding to the judicial branch. The First Purpose of Government: Upholding the Rule of Law No matter how fair a law may be, if it cannot be enforced, it becomes meaningless. Our state courts are constitutionally charged with upholding the rule of law and providing citizens with equal access to justice. The fairness of our laws is rendered meaningless if our courts lack the necessary resources to enforce them. The essence of American democracy is premised on a clear separation of powers between the judicial, executive and legislative branches of government. Indeed, Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist Papers No. 78 observed, there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive branches. As the Supreme Court has observed: The Framers of our Government knew that the most precious of liberties could remain secure only if they created a structure of Government based on a permanent separation of powers. Indeed, the Framers devoted almost the whole of their attention at the Constitutional Convention to the creation of a secure and enduring structure for the new Government. It remains one of the most vital functions of this Court to police with care the separation of the governing powers. Pub. Citizen v. United States Dept of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 468 (1989) (internal citations omitted). A courts mission, as part of an independent branch of government, is to administer justice equally to all and protect the rights and liberties guaranteed by the state or federal Constitution and laws. Enforcing the rule of law requires resources, generally in the form of human capital, which requires adequate funding. However, by constitutional design, the judiciary is the least dangerous branch of government because it has been granted no influence over either the sword or the purse. (The Federalist No. 78). Neither the U.S. Constitution, nor state constitutions address the level of funding the judicial branch should receive, nor how the adequacy of that funding should be determined. Rather, funding is left in each instance to the executive and legislative branches of state government. Thus, state courts are at the mercy of other branches of government when it comes to funding. (Interview Lippman, 2013). While our courts are an independent branch of government by constitutional design, [they] are also, in so many ways, interdependent, including with respect to [their] budget[s].(Id.). Fully Funded vs. Underfunded: A Penny or Less Our state court systemseven when fully fundeddo not consume much of a states overall budget. In fact many states fund their courts at less than 1 percent and not a single state in America spends more than 4 percent of its annual budget on its judiciary. (Gildea & Tews, 2012, p. 10 (quoting Edwin Meese III & Robinson III, William T., 2012)). As a result: The proportion of state and local budgets represented by even a fully funded court system is quite smallin the range of 1 to 2 percent. (ABA Task Force on Preservation of the Justice System Rep. (ABA Task Force), 2011; see also DRI, WFOF in 2011 (Despite the broad services provided by our state court systems, they typically receive only one to three percent of a states budget.)). At the federal level, for each citizens tax dollar, only two-tenths of one penny go toward funding the entire third branch of government. (Roberts, 2012; see also Hogan, 2010 (same)). Nonetheless, state court systems around the country are experiencing an underfunding crisis as budget cuts continue. Because the judicial branch comprises such a small portion of a state governments overall budget, cuts to the judicial branch result in little savings for state governments, but trigger significant governmental, social, and economic costs. Notably, underfunding state justice systems also raises serious constitutional issues as underfunded courts struggle to perform their constitutional duties. Citizens are denied access to the courts and access to justice. In some cases, criminal defendants are denied their right to a speedy trial, resulting in the dismissal of charges. (Gildea & Tews, 2012 (citing State v. Colbert, No. A10-55, 2011 WL 67785, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2011) (reversing conviction for speedy trial violation)). More fundamentally, however, the failure of the executive and legislative branches to adequately fund a state court system poses a significant constitutional threat to the very structure of American government. To adequately fund our state court systems requires only a little additional funding, but that modest investment will deliver manifold benefits. National Trend to Underfund State Courts State courts are the cornerstone to justice in America. Funding cuts to state courts have a particularly negative impact on our nations legal system because they handle the vast majority of legal businessmore than 95 percent of all civil and criminal litigation. (DRI, WFOF in 2011 p. 611 ; see also Interview Lippman, 2013). Despite the important role that state courts play, the trend in judicial funding since 2008, or in some cases, over the last decade, has been flat or declining nationally. (See Greenberg & McGovern, 2012). For instance, a 2013 Report by the Illinois State Bar Associations Special Committee on Fair and Impa