Army Aviation Digest - Dec 1974

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UNITED S

HE INSPECTOR GENERAL ANDAUDITOR GENERALLTG H. N. Maples

COMMANDER, U. S. ARMYENCY FOR AVIATION SAFETY

COL Norman W. Paulson

COMMANDING GENERALS. ARMY AVIATION CENTERMG William J. MadGiox Jr.

UTY COMMANDING GENERALS. ARMY AVIATION CENTERBG Robert A. Holloman III

EDITORS. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

Richard K. Tierney

ABOUT THE COVER

his month the DIGEST's theme is Rearch and Development. It featuresticles beginning on pages 2 and 4at point the way to the future Armyiation operating effectively in a lowvel. adverse weather tactical enronment as depicted on the fronter Another article beginning onge 30 and the back cover warns ofe threat wires pose during low level

flight. Covers by Jack Deloney.

TES RMY YI A T OliliN

1GESJDECEMBER1974 VOLUME20 NUMBER1

Army Aviation R D LooksTo Technology, LTG John R. Deane Jr. . . . . .

Army Aviation Priorities, MG William J Maddox Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ViewsFrom Readers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Standardization Corner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Army DivisionForce Concept, William K. Brehm, DAC

Covert Night MultiaircraftOperational Capability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1Michael J. Wilken, DAC

OPMSQuestions Answers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Terrain Flight, CW2 William H. Blamey and CW2 Wallace H. Stoneberg 2

Wires-New Threat To Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

ArmyAviation Professionals Do It Right. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 3

Operation Eagle Finch. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Army Operational Hazard Reporting System 3

Something New In Hazard Reporting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 3

Write To Right . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 4

Mistaken Assumptions . . 4Helicopter Seats, LTCWilliam F. Gabella 4

Pearl s . . . . . . . 4- I U L . J S - A m A ~ S O S o~ z 4

The missIon of the U S. AIMY AVIATION DIGEST is to provide information of Cln operational or functional nature concerning safety and aircraf t accident prevention, trCllningmaintenance, operations, relearch and development, aviation medicine and other rela ted data.

The DIGEST i l an official Department of the Army periodical publlihed monthly underthe supervision of the Commanding General, U S. Army Avlcrtion Center. Views expressedherein are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army or the U S. ArmyAviation Center. Photos are U S Army unless otherwlle IpeciRed. Material may bereprinted provided credit Is given to the DIGEST and to the author, unless otherwiseindicated.

Articles, photos, and Items of interest on Army aviation are invited. Direct communication Is authorized to: Editor, U S Army Aviation Digest, Fort Rucker, AL 36360.

Use of funds for printing of this' publication has been approved by The Adlutant General, Headquarters Department of the Army, 8 April 1914; in accordan.ce with AR 310-1.

Active Army units receive distribution under the pinpoint distribution system as outlined In AR 310.1. Complete DA Forin 12-5 and send directly to CO AG Publications Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, MD 21220. For any change In distribution requirements, Initiate a revised DA Form 12-5.

National Guard and Army Reserve units under clnpolnt distribution also should submitDA Form 12-5. Other National Guard units shou d submit requests through their stateadlutant general.

Those not eligible for official distribution or who desire perlOnal caples of the DIGESTcan order the magazln. from the Superintendent of Documents, U S. Government PrintingOfIIc. Washington, D C. 20402. Annual subscription ra t . s are 13.40 dom.stlc and 16.15

5 cop ' . s are 1.20.


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Norman R. Augustine

DECEMBER 1974

T HE COMBAT effectiveness of the Army of the decades aheadwill depend to a great extent on the creativity of today's re-search and development community. This creativity must encompass technological advancements that will enable the Armyto procure and to maintain new systems in reasonable numbersat an affordable cost. The cost aspect of tomorrow's weaponsand equipment has taken on significant new implications withrising inflation and increasing people costs. The most remark

able battlefield devices ever devised would be of little use if theArmy were unable to afford to buy them, to maintain them, orto operate them. For that reason General Deane and I have beenstressing, whenever possible, that today's technology efforts betotal efforts advance our capabil ity but advance it at an affordable price [see Army Aviation R D Looks To Technology, page2]

In this era of ever-tightening defense budgets we are beingforced to increase selectivity. I anticipate very few new majorhigh cost development programs will be initiated in the nextdecade. But this is not to be taken as an alarming fact, for afamily of major new i tems-the Big Five -are due to come intothe inventory in the next 5 to 8 years. Furthermore, a large partof our inventory is capable of being product improved to meetthe requirement of the immediate future, and we intend to makegreater use of this option to help assure the numerical adequacywhich is so essential on the battlefield. As the Secretary of De-fense has noted, when Daniel Boone, who shot fifty bears a year,was replaced by fifty hunters who averaged two bears each, thebears saw no occasion to celebrate the decline in human marksmanship.

Therefore, priority of our research and development resourcesis being given to completing development of selected programs,principally our Big Five, to conducting needed product improvements and to supporting our research and exploratory development programs-the so-called technological base effort that isthe lifeblood of the weapon systems of 20 years hence. Two of

the Big Five are aviation programs-the UTTAS [utility tacticaltransport aircraft system] and the AAH [advanced assault helicopter]. We intend to carry these Big Five programs to completion, if necessary at the expense of certain other developmentefforts. Looking well beyond the day when these aircraft enterthe inventory, Army aviation will continue to receive a majorshare of the technological base effort. These efforts will beutilized not only in designing entire new aircraft systems butalso to provide the product improvement advances mentionedearlier. It should not be overlooked, however, that high priorityattention within the technological bases of both the United Statesand USSR is devoted to exploiting new technology for adaptationto air defense weapons.

As the world's largest owner of aviation assets, the Army looksforward to seven first flights in the 3 year period we have justentered. Truly the future of the Army is intimately coupled withthe future of aviation, with as yet unforeseen concepts such asair-to-air combat between helicopters likely to become a reality,and with land combat truly moving into the third dimension.

fnw_ tJ / ' t ~NORMAN R. AUGUSTI NEAssistant Secretary of the Army(Research and Development)


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Boeing Vertol s UTTAS entry

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ARMY AVIATION R D

Lieutenant GeneralJohn R Deane Jr

Chief o Research and DevelopmentDepartment o the Army

ASK TODA Y'S young boy- then soldier of the 1980s and

1 9 9 0 s - t o quickly name somethings he associates with the soldier.He will no doubt cite rifles, cannonsand tanks, but chances are he willsay helicopters rather than trucks,reflecting the change in image andcapability of today's Army. Thelads who are now 10 to 15 yearsold have become familiar withphotographs and television scene sof GIs climbing aboard or scrambling out of a Huey (UH-l ) - tha t sabout the only helicopter they'vesee n And for good reason - it'sbeen around about 15 years and it'sthe workhorse of the airmobileconcept.

But we do not intend that theyoung volunteers of tomorrow willstill find the Huey , or the HueyCobra (AH 1) , or the Chinook(CH-47) in the 1990s s ti1l playingthe role of the modern Armyaviation fleet of that day. A s thereaders of thi s magazine know only

tooweB

, these aircraft represent,basical1y , technology of the late1950s and early 1960s. Since thenthere hav e been remarkable stridesin technology , in a variety of areas,that impact directly on avia tion . Wehave learned much , operationallyand technologically, about reliability and maintainability, safety andsurvivability , new materials to improve engine, transmission and


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OOKS TO TE HNOLOGY

rotor blade performance and avionics and armament systems , to citea few.

Two of today's new aviation development programs-the UTT S(utility tactical transport aircraftsystem) and the AAH (advancedattack he l icop te r - incorporatethese technological advances. Butadvances of the state-of-the-art donot come in weeks or months. Makeno mistake, they take years beforesystems application and one seesthe proven product appearing onthe production line.

Part of the problem in Army research and development (R D)over the past few years has beenthat the rate of potential technologcal opportunities presented us for

exploration has been increasing. tseems at times that as we openedone door to explore that area wewere immediately confronted withthree more doors directly ahead.We never have had sufficient fundsor time to explore all of these indepth, so we have had to be very,and we hope correctly , selective.

Today the problem has becomemore acute as defense dollars arebuying so much less than they dida few years ago. What then is the

outlook for the future?Very honestly put, I see a decadeof reduced R D, in order to support the additional requirements ofhe 16-division force structure and

concurrent modernization of theArmy's equipment inventory. Thiswill be particularly true after weget over the hump of major fundingof the Army's Big Five projects -

Continued o n page 2

Sikorsky s UTTAS entry

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lviilfiiln rii Irii tii(I$General Maddox emphasizes the need for immediate reorientation of ouraviation doctrine in view of the sophisticated Soviet antiaircraft equipment displayed in the Mid-East war of 1973. Tactical employment concepts refinement, increased aviator training, terrain flying, and improvedaircraft and equipment are among the priorities the author highlights

T AST MONTH in the U. S.L ARMY AVIATION DIGES TI pointed out that Army aviation isin a state of flux , which is all rightif we're improving our lot.

Well , we know where we are andwhere we are going which not accidentally) was the title of last

month's article. Army aviation'sgoal is to provide the combat armswith the firepower and mobility toattack, hold ground and defeat theenemy in a high threat environment.We 're moving toward that goal, butto achieve it we must establishpriorities of effort.

Priorities depend largely on deficiencies. Last month I listed aviation deficiencie s under three majorheadings: doctrine staying powerand training.

Significant effort is required ineach major area at once and concurrently if we are to attain themaximum capabilities from our current equipment and prepare for thesubstantial modernization whichbe gins late in this decade.

The modernization bow wave andaffordability seem to always triggerlively debate. Therefore, it is appropriate to take a closer look at the

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Major General William J. Maddox Jr.Commander , U. S. Army Aviation Center

situation. Over the fiscal year FY)1964-1973 period the aviation program has averaged 20.5 percent ofthe procurement program. In FY1974 we did not buy any airframes.While past procurement may be attributed in part to wartime expenditures, there would have been a large

bulge even without the war in theRepublic of Vietnam because thehelicopter and airmobility came ofage during this decade. Incidentally ,the assets procured during thatperiod constitute the bulk of ourinventory through the next 10 yearperiod. Related to the Army's totalobligation authority during the FY1964-1973 period , the aviationbudget never exceeded 14 percentwhile providing a great tactical advance for ground combat.

Concerning affordability, I amless awed by the size of projectedprocurements than I am by the expectation of major gains in combatcapabilities and the enormity of theresponsibilities that aviators mustassume in preparing for combat ofthe future.

N ow for the priorities.Because the battle is the payoff

I place particular emphasis on those

requirements which will contributeto an early increase in our combatcapabilities. With a scheduled arrival of the AH-1Q Cobra/TOWwithin the next year-and the extended range TOW shortly thereafter-the largest increases in tactical capabilities will come most

quickly through improved doctrineand training for TOW employmentTOW refers to a Tube launched,

Optically tracked, Wire guided missile; see Germany Tests AirborneTOW, March 1972 DIGEST and

1st Combat Aerial TOW Team:Helicopter vs Armor, February1974 DIGEST).

Soviet antiaircraft equipment inthe Mid-East war of October 1973dramatized the need to immediatelyreorient our avia t ion doctrine.

Otherwi se we will be guilty of fighting the next war much as we foughtthe last one.

The U. S Army Training andDoctrine Command TRADOC)already has directed the development community to produce a basic

This rticle was d pted fromGeneral Maddox presentation at theArmy Aviation t rogram Review in

August of this year

U. S ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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doctrinal threat manual, Employment Of Army Aviation In TheHigh Threat Environment. Thiswill be a foundation manual uponwhich a large number of proponentmanuals will be based. It should beavailable early in 1975.

The tactical employment concepts for the Air Cavalry CombatBrigade (ACCB) must be furtherrefined and must stress the employment of armed helicopters in mass,by platoons , companies and battalions. The ACCB must capitalize onthe initiative of offensive action andthe surprise to be achieved by itsmobility.

Improved training can be accomplished by a relatively modest increas e in operating dollars , but itwill require a major commitment incommand supervision. Here is atraining priority list which shouldbe accomplished by all aviators toprepare themselves for mid-intensitywar:

survivability flying, night flying, instrument training, electronic warfare , gunnery, and synthetic flight trainer.

First, survivabilit y flying involvesnew tactics. Helicopter aviatorsmust be threat conscientious and

. . . aviators must be threat conscient ious trained in terrain flying andNOE navigation using tactical maps

trained in terrain flying and nap-ofthe-earth (NOE) navigation usingtactical maps. While the main burden falls on the tactical units thereis a valid , unfilled requirement fora terrain flying standardizationcourse for instructor pilots and commanders at the aviation trainingbase at Fort Rucker, AL .

Emphasis on night flight will provide the next greatest increase incombat capabilities. Our peoplemust fly more at night to becomeaccustomed to night operationswithout night vision aids. The experience of the Ow] Team at theCombat Developments Experimentation Command (CDEC) indicatesthat aviators can learn to use am

bient light conditions and be proficient n low level flight at 100 to200 feet altitude at reduced air-

speeds-again unaided. Subsequently we could then graduate tothe use of night vision devices sthey become available. Comprehensive coverage of the Army's nightflight program appeared in theMarch 1974 DIGEST. Copies ofthese articles, plus a night bibliography of all of the DIGEST'S nightcoverage, is available by writing:Editor, u. S . ARMY AVIATION DIGEST,P. O. Drawer P , Fort Rucker, AL36360 .

nstrument flight proficiency ismandatory for all aviators. Firs t , wemust learn and practice in units thecontinental United States (CONUS)type instrument flying such as hasbeen taught at Fort Rucker for sev

eral years. Then we must graduateto a frontline environment wherethere will be minimum aids andregulation for accomplishing normalbattlefield tasks into and out of in

Army aviators must learn tacticalinstruments to prepare for the frontline environment with minimum

strument conditions. Incidentally,we have just begun teaching thistype of tactical instrument flying for

N V lDs

DECEMBER 1974

the first time at Fort Rucker.Communications discipline and

- an awareness of electronic warfare? - capabilities are other subjects which f must be integrated into our tactical

training at once.Specialized gunner y tables for at

tack helicopter crews must stressminimum exposure through use ofterrain , quick engagement and alternate positions. Annual qualifications should be mandatory-thesame s tank gunnery and marksmanship training.

Use of synthetic flight trainersContinued o n page 7

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JEWS

R O ME D E R S

Sir:May I, at this extremely late date ,

make a comment on the article Pinnacle Operations by Flight LieutenantBrian A. Wright of the Royal Air Force

as published in the September 1973issue of your magazine.

t appears that the CFS (RAF) is atsome variance (on one major point)with such mountain flying authoritiesas the Okanagan Helicopter Company,its Mountain Flying School, and numerous other helicopter compaQies operating in Canada and worldwide.

Whereas Flight Lieutenant Wrightadvocates a steep approach (the strongerthe wind the steeper . the approach) , theOkanagan technique is ba sed on a n e rlyflat approach, with no noticeable attitude changes on the way in, a highcollective all the way, and maintgininga drop-off (or escape rbute) at alltimes. Approaches are never mlldedirectly towards a pinnacle or ridge,instead the Okanagan technique is tostay in close to the ridge and in upliftingair. (One must think of mountain windsas blowing up and down-not horizontally.)

As a graduate of the Okanagan mountain flying course and one who hasoperated both piston and turbine helicopters in the CanaQian Rocky Mountains , up to about 1] ,000 feet, I amsurprised that anyone would advocateanything other than the nearly flatapproach. t is possible that the RAFhave taught themselves some false lessons operating in the Welsh mountains which peak out at about 4,000feet?

There is one other aspect to thismountain flying business that is largelyignored , and that is the purely miiitaryconsideration of cOhcealment of one'sactivities. t is rather obvious that onedoes not want military helicoptersflitting around above the peaks wherethey a re exposed to enemy observations ,as one assumes that military heiicopterslanding in mountainous areas do so formilit a ry reasons. t h e flat approach thusblend s in nicely with military requirements.

Major John HugillCombat Arms SchoolCombat Training CentreCanadian Forces Base GagetownNew Brunswick. Callada

The September issue of the DIGEST

For those who want an authentic piece of aviation . history the SmithsonianInstitution has published the first of its Historic Aviation Series of posters.

In preparing the CHICAGO, f1agplane of the first round-the-world flightfor display in the new National Air and Space Museum, the Smithsonian hadto replace the deteriorated wing and tail fabric. The replaced original fabricwas cut in 2 i n ~ hsquares and mounted on a handsome IS x 20 poster undera print of the CHICAGO .The second in this matching series of posters will bethe Fokker D -7 of World War I and Red Baron fame, and the third, the FokkerT-2 that was the first to make a nonstop flight from coast to coast.

Because the posters contain an authentic piece of history and were producedby the Smithsonian in only very limited numbers , they are really valuable coilectors' items. They are most suitable for framing. The posters can be orderedfor $10.00 each from: Historic Aviation Series; National Air and SpaceMuseum, Room 1168; Attention: Joan Burroughs; Smithsonian Institution ;Washington, DC 20560.

o n t ~ i n e dan error on page 19, whichcontinues the l 'hreat story. Photograph numtier 12 is wrongly identifiedas the ZSU-23 in the caption. The photois correctly identified in the body copyhalfway down the same column as theZSU-57-2.-Edilor

Sir:Having survived the apathy toward

Army aviation of the 1950s and themayheri1 of the 1960s, I am concernedthat being nibbled to death by ducksmay be the cause of Army aviation'sdeath in the 1970s.

As a result of cutbacks in the sizeof the Army and the corresponding reductioris in defense spending, the demand for aviators and aircraft is notnearly what we have grown accllstomedto .

Reorganizations of major commands along with the ongoing reorganization of Department of the Army staffhave had, and will continue to have,significant impact on Army aviation.

Industry is feeling the pinch of ourreduced spending arid much of Armyaviation's support from that segment iswaning.

Internally, the running gun battlebetween warrant officer and officer aviators over flight pay, assignments , prestige, ad infinitum is seriotlsly cripplingArmy aviation.

Decline in the total number ofaviators and flying positions Army-widehas drastically dimmed our visibilityand influence throughout the Army.

The loss of the Director of ArmyAviation in the Office of the AssistantChief of Staff for Force Developmentas the focai point for aviation mattersat Department of the Army (DA) levelputs us in the position of having to rely,in many instances, on nonaviators toplead our case for people, money andpolicy.

Doctrinal concept conflicts which



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exist between and among various serviceschools charged with an important sliceof the aviation pie because they will notagree on which way we are going orshould go.

The temptation a nd evidence of atrend to turn inward and isolate ou rselves until the "second coming of

Army aviation takes place. O ther ducks which you can supplyfrom your own flock.

Stop and consider these ducks. Theyaffect you, me, and everyone else involved in Army aviation. They affect theArmy. I hope that we can do somethingto lessen their impact or better yet turnthem to our advantage. I do not haveall the answers or advice necessary tocombat the ducks, but I have some opinions that might give us a start (or heartattack) :

Settle our internal disputes amongwarrant officer and officer aviators. Myfeelings are that flight pay should beequal for equal experience and responsibility in aviation. A ratio of warrantto commissioned aviators of 10 to 1may be a suitable ratio in aviationunits. Let warrant officers concentrateon being professional aviators and commissioned officers concentrate on beingprofessional officers because the officerpersonnel management system (OPMS)requires officers to have a primary andan alternate specialty - aviation is ot aspecialty. There is no room at the topfor a fulltime throttle jockey, but wecannot exist without them. Thus warrantofficers are indispensable.

Out of all of the Army aviatorsthat we have, how m any are activemembers of the Army Aviation Association of America (AAAA)? This isnot a shill job for AAAA, but untilsome other organization comes alongwe should have maximum membership ,maximum participation and maximumsupport of the only organization thatArmy aviators have to lobby for support of programs necessary for us toprogress. f this is unacceptable , thenmaybe we should all join the Association of the United States Army andforce them to represent us. Associations

of this nature serve another vital function which is to enhance and increasethe close relationship between industryand Army aviation in a helpful manner.Industry can and does lobby for us andwe can use all the help we can get whenit is for our mutual advantage.

General officer aviator representation at DA and Department of Defense( D OD) in key positions is out of myrealm , so I'll duck this one and letsomeone else handle it.

Stop the introvert trend. Get outand sell aviation . Find new ways that

DECEMBER 1974

aviation can contribute to the Army'smission. Don't live in the past when ourfuture is still ahead of us.

Watch out for the ducksLTC William W. FrakerODCSROTC (ATRO-ED)HQ TRADOC

Regardless of what branch personsmay be, their stories of how communications-electronics played a significantrole in the success or failure of anoperation at division level or lower inVietnam could be most useful.

Fort Monroe, VA 23651

Sir:

Anyone who is willing to contributeto this segment of military history by

relating significant personal experiences,or sharing photographs or other historical documents, please contact:

Monograph Task ForceU. S. Army Signal SchoolAT I N : ATSO-MTFRoom 218 , Nelson HallFort Gordon , GA 30905AUTOVON: 780 665217254

COL Joe W . Finley

An official Department of the Armyhistory of division-level communications in the Republic of Vietnam is beingwritten. The assistance of people (bothactive and retired) with significant co mmunications-electronics related command, staff or operational experience inVietnam is needed. Leader , Monograph Task Force

A SIGN SIMILAR to the one atright was observed in an airfieldoperations recently.

CONSUMPTIONUH-1 90 GPHU-8 XX GPHT-41 XX GPH

This br ings to mind a number of questions . Just what is averagefuel consumption ? Is it the fue l used ove r a per iod of timedivided by the hou rs flown , or is it an average fuel consumptio nof a fleet of ai rcraft? Unde r what cond itions was the above average fuel consu mption determined? Is the average va lid for allser ies UH-1 A, B, C, D, H, M)? Conside r the UH-1 D/H alone.There is a dist inct difference in the fue l cons umpti on of theT53 -L-11 and T53-L-13 engines . Furthermo re, var iatio ns in g rossweight , airspeed , temperature , altitude and use of bleed a ir causesignif icant changes in fuel flow. Compare the following for theUH-1 H:Example

ABCD

GRWT Airspeed OAT Pres s Alt Fuel Consu mp ti on lb /h r )( Ib) ( KIAS) ( OC) f t) Bleed Air On Blee d Air ff

9,500 90 0 Sea Level 575 5459,500 113 0 Sea Level 700 6427,500 90 +10 6,000 510 4627,500 102 +10 6 ,000 568 505

In example A, the helicopter (with crashworthy fuel systemand bleed air ON) would have 2 hours and 2 1 min utes fuel onboard for that condition and could travel a distance of 163nautical miles (with 30 minute fuel reserve). In contrast, exampleD would have 2 hours and 24 m inutes fuel onboard and couldtravel 214 nautical miles (with 30 minute reserve).

As a matter of fact, fuel consumption for this one airc raftmay vary from 360 pounds per hou r (55 gallons per hour) to 710pounds per hour 1 09 gallons per hour) at gross weig ht s of 7 ,000to 9,500 pounds .

These examples point up the fact that there is no average f ue lconsumption that can be applied to all flight conditions for anind ividual a ircraft - and certainly not to different series.

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William K BrehmAssistant Secretary o Defense

or

Manpower and Reserve Affairs

I N PREPARING FOR this address, I had a number of choicesas to topic: I could speak about theall-volunteer force and the Army'ssuccesses in meeting its manpowergoals; I could talk about the futureof Department of Defense (DOD)manpower programs; I could discuss DOD's 7 billion commitmentto the training mission, which is notmuch smaller than the entire DODResearch & Development, Test &Evaluation (RDT&E) budget; orI could speak about the headquarters review exercise directed bythe Secretary of Defense in Octo

ber 1973.

8

With the possible exception of

Mr Brehm became the AssistantSecretary of Defense for Man-power and Reserve Affairs inSeptember 1973 Before this hewas the Deputy Assistant Sec-retary of the Army for LandForces Programs

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oncept o ~ : rO o

the headquarters review, however,none of these deals directly withforce structure. And having been asometime participant in the development of the force structure planning concept now in use by theArmy, I was intrigued by the opportunity to discuss that concept.So I ask your indulgence as I commit one of the cardinal sins of management-that is , dealing with anostalgic subject now being wellhandled by experts, but with whichit is most difficult to sever one'sdirect interest.

Before proceeding, however, Iwould like to note the progress thathas been made in the area of headquarters reductions. To date,through consolidation and streamlining we have been able to identify22,400 support spaces which nowcan be converted to increase combatstrength and readiness. And, we areby no means finished. The Army'sshare of these savings has much todo with its ability to build toward

16 active divisions without changing total active-duty strength. Oursuccess in this effort has been directly attributable to the Services'hard work and sincere support;and on behalf of the Secretary ofDefense, I express our deepest appreciation. You have made our taskmuch less difficult than originallyanticipated.

Now to force structure. One ofthe unique characteristics of landforces is that their complexity dictates a need for some kind of theory(if not theology) to enable us tocomprehend, measure and managethem from a force structure pointof view. Those of us who haveworked on these issues appreciatethe need for a simple system thatwill enable us to describe Armyforce structure in a way that accounts for ll units-not just combat divisions. Such a system thencan be used not only for forcestructure managemen t but also as abasis for making force level de-

U.S

ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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ooo t ~

o~ \- This is an adaption of a speech that Mr.~ ; . . OBrehm, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, presented to the Army World-Wide Force Stftlcture Con-o ference held recently in Warrenton, VA. I t

affords a penetrating and interesting lookinto Army force stftlcture concepts. Ther g DIGEST appreciates this opportunity to pub lish Mr. Brehm s article and to convey his

. f l ; } , ~thoughts to i t s readers

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cisions and determining gross manpower requirements. The Army hassuch a system today and it is workng very well

Since about 1966 the Army forcestructure has been constrained by avery simple device-the total number of structure spaces militarypersonnel billets at 100 percentmanning) authorized for all tablesof organization and equipment

TOE) and tables of distributionand allowances TDA) units in theactive reserve and unmanned components. In peacetime certain units

are equipped but not manned onhe theory that there will be time toorganize and fill them with trainedpersonnel after M-Day.) Thesestructure spaces are in turn dividednto three categories: division

forces special mission forces andgeneral support forces. Special mission forces comprise groups of unitshighly tailored to specific missionssuch as the brigades in Alaska,Panama and Berlin. General sup-

DECEMBER 1974

port forces are designed to supportdivision and special mission forces.I t is the first category divisionforces that I will cover here.

The number of structure spacesavailable for division forces is determined by mUltiplying the totalnumber of division forces authorized by the division force planningfac to r the average number ofstructure spaces required for thedivision and the support units itneeds to sustain it in combat:

Total Structure SpacesDivision Foree (DF) tatagory

Number of F Total StructureFs Planning Factor Spaces - Fs

23 x 48,000 1,104,000I t often is called the division forceequivalent DFE). These structurespaces are then divided among thethree components-active, reserveand unmanned-accord ing toreadiness objectives.

The initial formulation of theDFE in the middle 1960s, whileeasy to comprehend, was indeed aprofound step forward in basic

force planning and management.There was a time in the early 1960swhen the Secretary of Defense andthe Secretary of the Army discussedand even debated what the appropriate size of a combat divisionshould be. This seemed to some ofus at the time to be a questionabletopic for discussion at that highlevel. First, the divisions represented but a fraction of the totalforce structure. Second, the membrane that separates the divisionfrom the rest of the Army-in-thefield is really arbitrary; it is based

on such considerations as span ofcontrol and allocation of missionsamong field commanders at the division, corps and field Army headquarters levels. Yet, because Armyforce structure then was basicallyopen-ended, there was a tendencyto place great importance on thesize of individual units and, ofcourse, the divisions were the mostobvious.

After the DFE concept was im-

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USE OF RESERVE COMPONENTSEPARATE BRIGADE TO

ROUND OUT ACTIVE DIVISION

frame. Those studies produceddifferent force planning guides fordifferent areas of the world. Forexample, it was determined that weneeded about 52 000 structurespaces per division for multidivisiondeployments to Southeast Asia;about 50,000 per division for deployments to the Republic of Korea;and about 45,000 per division forEurope. Initially, different valuesof the planning factor were used fordifferent divisions to reflect theneeds of the particular theater inquestion, but ultimately a singlevalue of 48,000 was adopted in theinterest of simplicity.

DivisionForce:

DivisionEquivalent

SupportIncrement

ActiveComponent

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Bde Bde

III

ReserveComponents

Bde Bde Bde

SepBde

Figure 1 But the DFE of 48,000 is now 8

years old and a number of thingshave changed in the interim. Wehave fought another war and understand better the relationships between support units and combatunits. We have developed newequipment which is more effectivebut which, in some cases, is also agreater consumer of support. Wehave a national policy that suggestsa stronger force orientation towardNATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization) where we can expect

certain kinds of support from ourallies. In addition, manpower costshave risen substantially and it hasbecome increasingly necessary to

plemented as a management tool anumber of things happened. First,the Secretary of Defense lost interest and properly so in the sizing ofArmy divisions, and the responsibility for making that determinationwas delegated to those in the bestposition to do so Moreover, detailed Secretary of Defense controlson other major force structure unitsbrigades, battalions, aviation com

panies) disappeared because there

was no need for them. The DFE,by definition, placed a limit on theaggregate amount of structure thatcould be used to support a combatdivision, and then it was up to theArmy to allocate the spaces in themost effective way. This establisheda healthy competition among thevarious functional claimants forstructure: maneuver, artillery, engineer, medical transportationmaintenance, etc. This competitionhelps to ensure that only those proponents with the most persuasivearguments will succeed in getting anincrease in the structure allocatedto their function. I t means that whena new mission comes along it must,in effect, fight its way into the DFEand force out something else oflower priority.

Under this concept one does notchange the size of the Army bychanging the DFE but rather by

10

changing the number of divisionforces. And this, of course, is exactly the kind of issue upon whichthe Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Army should focusnot on how large a combat divisionshould be.

One should not change the DFEfrequently, for to do so would destroy one of its main virtues-thatof lending stability and credibilityto the force planning process. Thecurrent value of the DFE-48 000structure spaces-originally was derived from wargame analyses conducted in the 1964-1965 time

Numberof DFE

Figure 2ARMY DIVISION FORCES

PLOT OF POSSIBLE DFE COMBINATIONS

With . 295 Maneuver Battalions. 1 104 000 Structure Strength

~ ~

30

25

20

15

1 ~ ~ ~ ~_ _ w _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Sizeof DFE

80 000

70 000

60 000

50 000

40 000

30 00012 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Average Number Of Maneuver Battalions Per DFE



13/52

mprove the productivity of our personnel. We believe too that theSoviet Union, whom we consider tobe our principal potential adversary, devotes a larger fraction of itsdivision f o r c ~structure to combatcapability than we do. The latterpoint poses a pit of a dilemma forus: We either have to d o w n g r a d ~Soviet combat capability on thetheory that its combat units areundersupported; or assume thatSoviet strategists are preparing fora different type of war than we; orconclude that they have a bettergrip on the teeth-to-tail problemthan we.

All of these things suggest thatafter 8 years the time is right for re

examining the DFE and its relationship to the combat division and theArmy s missions. The Army staffcurrently is engaged ip such a review and I understand that theresults will be v a i l a b l esometimethis fiscal y e ~ r I don t propose totalk today about the internal unitmix of the division force, but IwOtlld like to discuss some changesthat have already taken place whichmay, in tum, require a change inthe size of the DFE. These changeshave to do primarily with the treatment of the separate brigade.

There is an inconsistency in thedivision force planning conceptdating back to the Reserve Component reorganization of 1967-1968when 21 separate brigades were formally brought into the force structure. Many of these representedresidual elements of reserve combatdivisions that were being disestab-lished simply because the total number of divisions in the ReserveComponents at that time was out ofline with respect to our ability toequip and support them. The reorganization eliminated low priorityReserve Component units, thus itbecame necessary to find missionsfor the new separate brigades andto rationalize them into the Armytotal force structure. .

Missions for four of the 21 brigades were found in the special mis-

DECEMBER 1974

ARMY DIVISION FORCESPLOT OF POSSIBLE DFE COMBINATIONS

Numberof DFE

With 295 Maneuver Battalions Size1 104 0


14/52

RMY DIVISION FORCESPLOT OF POSSIBLE DFE COMBIN TIONS

With . 295 Maneuver Battalions SizeNumber 0 S S th of DFE. 1,104,00 tructure trengof D i F ; ; ; ; E - ao ooo

30

25

20

- 70 000

60,000

50 000

15 ~ ~ L - . : . = - = - = - ~ ~ - ~ - - - - - - = - = - . . : . . . : . . . - _ 1 40 00010 L J ~ _ ~ _ ~ _ . l . . . _ _ _ _ L _ . . . . . J . . ._ _ _ _ . . L _ _ _ _ I . . . . . . . _ ....... 30 000

201 12 13 14 15Average Number Of Maneuver Battalions Per DFE

Figure 4

tionalized and the Army improvedits system for determining supportrequirements, the brigades came tobe treated as though they were combat units that would fight in the line,perhaps as part of a corps forcealongside the combat divisions. Thismeant in effect that the mix of unitswithin the 48,000 planning factorgradually was adjusted to accommodate a full measure of support

for divisions and separate brigadesalike. While this did not happen ina single stroke, the net result wasthe same, and it is the situation wefind existing today. In terms ofbasic concept there is very little todistinguish the separate brigadesfrom the divisions with respect tosustained fighting capability.

What has happened is that theArmy has improved its teeth-to-tailratio by upgrading these supportbrigades from the status of nonfighters to combat units, all withinthe planning factor of 48,000. Yet,the Army has not taken credit fordoing so.

The war in Vietnam was an interesting test case for determiningwhat the real role of the separatebrigade would be in a future conflict. Several separate brigades weredeployed to the Republic of Vietnam, and all were fully supported

as combat units. Moreover, mostwere ultimately formed into divisional structure.

t also is worth noting that thecorps headquarters gradually hasassumed the role of the field Armyheadquarters, performing both thetactical headquarters and supportheadquarters functions. Thus, it becomes relatively simple to considerseparate brigades with a comple

ment of three to five maneuver battalions as small divisions which canin effect be fought as corps combatunits alongside the larger conventional combat divisions.

Still another flaw in placing theseparate brigade within the supportsegment of the planning factor developed as a result of the affiliationconcept, whereby reserve units areassociated with active units. In theArmy's current force plan, certainseparate brigades from the ReserveComponents will constitute the thirdbrigades of a select number of active divisions. Thus, the active divisions wiIJ be operating on a peacetime basis with only two activebrigades and will depend on the reserve brigades to round them out tofull strength. While a sound ideafrom the standpoint of readiness,this introduces an internal contradiction because we are counting

such brigades as part of divisionson the one hand and as supportbrigades to provide rear area security on the other

What would be the impact of upgrading these separate brigades andcounting them (in three's) as division equivalents? The arithmeticis simple. Given a total number ofdivision force structure spaces, wewould divide that number by alarger number of division equivalents and, hence, would obtain asmaller DFE. We could do this withthe assurance that all of the divisionequivalents, including those formedby the separate brigades, would, infact, be fully supported because thatis precisely how the Army has been

planning for them in recent years.The Army's projected 16 divisionactive force, coupled with the eightNational Guard divisions, normallywould give us a total of 24 divisionequivalents. However, because threeof the 16 active divisions have onlytwo brigades each, these three divisions in terms of division equivalents are worth only two. So, t htotal number of division equivalentsis really 23. While each of the threedivisions would pick up a separate

brigade from the reserves uponmobilization, they would do so atthe expense of opening up holes inthe support increments. The bri- ades can t be counted both ways.Figure 1 illustrates the situation.

Figure 2 is a nomograph whichhelps us determine the total numberof division forces we can get out ofa total structure strength of 1,100,-000 as a function of the size of theOPE. It also permits us to determine the average number ofmaneuver battalions per DFE, assuming that the total number ofmaneuver battalions available is theprogramed active and reserve division forces total of 295. The current situation is portrayed: We seethat for a planning factor of 48,000we can form 23 DFEs, with anaverage complement of 12.8 maneuver battalions each.

The first step that should be con-

12 U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


15/52

sidered is to account properly forthe three separate brigades in theReserve Components that would beused to round out the three activeArmy divisions. The three can collectively be counted as a divisionequivalent and since they are fullysupported we can add one divisionforce to the 23 that we already arecounting. However, to do s o - a n dstill live within our present totalstructure strength-requires that wereduce the DFE in size. Going backto our nomograph (figure 3) we seethat the effect of this change is toreduce the DFE to 46,000 structure spaces. This approach slightlyreduces the average number of maneuver battalions per DFE , from12.8 to 12.3.

That clears up one major inconsistency but it does not yet get uscompletely square with reality. Weare still counting as support unitscombat brigades which are fullysupported themselves and whichcould, therefore, at least theoretically, take their places in the linealongside the larger divisions. I f wetake the additional step of countingthese remaining 13 brigades as 41;3division equivalents , then the total

number of division forces is increased to 28 13 as shown in figure4. We see that for this third way ofportraying the force structure wewould have a DFE of 39 ,000 structure spaces with an average of 10.4maneuver battalions each.

I t should be noted that in addition to furnishing roundout brigadesfor three active divisions the Reserve Components also furnish individual maneuver battalions forcertain active divisions to bringthem up to a full complement uponmobilization. Under today's planthese battalions would come fromthe group of separate maneuver battalions provided within the reservestructure. This concept of complementing the active forces withquickly mobilized reserve units canand should be continued since itmaximizes force readiness. Withinthe 16 division active Army a total

DECEMBER 1974

SUMMARYOF DIVISION FORCESACCOUNTING OPTIONS

(Structure Spaces In OOOs)

Counts These Organizations: Results In:

DFE Divisions en en I)l) (1)(1) bD

- ~ e n ~

Accounting (1) ~ (1) OL&J L J ' - 0 O 1) ; jQ ~ m c , "'- , -c1:) c;; ,) 1:... . ,2: ~ ~ c cCns S; 5 ; jOption: .c =Q c. >


16/52

S t a t i o n k e e p i n g l i g h t s f o rthe OH 8 are electroluminescent2 by 10 jnclri paneldights. They are positioned to appearas a d i a f I l g l d ; t ~~ ~ u ~g r nand one on the n a c ~ l I eis

< . . red colored.


17/52


18/52

- ~

.roll and yaw are immediately detectable by a trailing aircraft whichresults in reduced aircraft separation (when desired) and elimination of any requirement that thescout radio intentions before a turnor change in airspeed. Yet the lightsare positioned or shielded so as toprevent their detection from belowthe aircraft. This was confirmedduring the CDEC experiment using air defense crews equipped withlight intensification sights.

This stationkeeping light kit consists of a control panel and fourvariable intensity electroluminescent (EL) panel type lights appropriately colored and positioned onthe fuselage. EL lights are broad

area phosphorescent type lights andhave seen commercial applicationin the home in recent years as greennight lights. Actually the color canbe one of several depending uponthe phosphor used. On the OH-58

[~

I

rIrBLO

50

three EL lights are green and oneis red. All lights are 2 inches by10 inches in illuminated area. Theyare positioned on the aircraft soas to be on the corners of an imaginary diamond with the red lighton the front corner of the diamond(figure 1 . The red light which istilted back is covered with lightcontrol film to prevent ground observation. Light control film is athin sheet of plastic which workslike a Venetian blind channelingthe light in a desired direction . Thegreen lights are positioned face upto prevent their detection from theground. The installation is simpleand thus far dependable.

After evaluation of the OH-58

Kiowa CDEC requested that a stationkeeping light kit for an AH-l GHueyCobra be designed and built.Since it was to have similar light kitoperational requirements it was decided to keep the OH-58 and AH -

O S

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