Army Aviation Digest - Jul 1990

7/28/2019 Army Aviation Digest - Jul 1990

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Safety integration:An investment in our future readinessBG c. A. HenniesDirector ofArmy Safety andCommanding General, U.S. ArmySafety Center

W e safety folks arealways reportingto you on Armyaircraft accidentsand telling youabout the things that have gonewrong. Perhaps we haven't beenquite as faithful in telling youabout th e positive side-thethings that have gone right. Andthere have been many.Where we've beenTo understand where we are inaviation safety now, we need totake a look at where we've been.For a historical view of Armyaviation safety, we go back to1958, because that's the year wefirst began recording Armywideaircraft accident data.

For every 100,000 hours flownin 1958, we had 54.3 accidents.By fiscal 1985, we had gotten theClass A rate down to 2.94, andever since, it has been hoveringaround the 2.0 mark.To put this in perspective, le t'slook at that rate of2.0 from a battalion point of view. I t takes thetypical aviation battalion 10 to 12years to fly 100,000 hours. AClass A rate of2.0 means that thetypical battalion has only 2 suchaccidents during all this time.The rate certainly looks bette r, but rate alone doesn't reflectthe magnitude of the drop. Look-

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u.s. ARMY Af TV CENTERing only at accident rates andtrying to see where we are inArmy aviation safety is a littlelike looking at a human skeletonand trying to picture what theperson looked like. We need someflesh on the bones.

We have to look at the operational environment during thistime. As the rates were comingdown, the mission demands weregoing up. Nobody has to tell youthat there are a lot more risks involved in flying today than therewere in 1958 or even in 1982.

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One of the hardest year foranyone in Army aviation to lookat is fiscal year 82. That year wasArmy aviation's 40th anniversary, and it would prove to be acatastrophic year from an aviation safety standpoint. In - oneCH-47 accident alone, 8 soldiersand 38 civilian members of an international parachute team werekilled. By the time th e yearended, 46 soldiers and 40civilians had been killed, another95 crewmembers and passengersinjured, and 48 aircraft

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destroyed. It was th e worst Armyaviation safety record in 10 years ,and it triggered a full-court pressin accident prevention that hasgotten us to where we are today.

Where we areSo we've come along, long wayand not just inaviation safety.The Army is saferacross the boardthan ever before.Total Army accidents have declined steadily ,an d , proportionally, the greatestperiod of declinehas been from1985 to present.In these last 5years, we've gonefrom 15 ,000 accidents per year toless than 10 ,000.And in fiscal 89,we had 2 ,000fewer accidentsthan in the previous year. It'strue that aviationaccounts for only1 percent of thistotal , bu t it's alsotrue that aviationaccounts for

about 50 percent of the cost.We also have to rememberthat embedded in our fi cal 1989aviation Class A rate of 1.90 accidents per 100,000 flying hourswere 35 fatalities , 30 destroyedaircraft , and a cost of $110 million. This is another reason wecan no longer just talk rate andwhy single accidents become soimportant. This is why we haveto start managing th e numbers-because accidents don ' t killstatistics , the y kill humanbeings.

u.s. Army Aviation Digest

Where we 're goingWe know that human error is involved in 8 out of 10 Class Athrough C accidents, so humanerror is the nut we have to crack.And your Safety Center is tryingto do that.

In addition to improving ouraccident analysis to try to determine the "why" behind th e error,we're in the midst of severalstudies that will yield information that will help combat thehuman-error problem. Perhapsour most important venture isthe study on crew coordination.This study, in conjunction withthe efforts of the Army ResearchInstitute and the Army AviationCenter, will produce a basicdefinition of crew coordinationand carry through to actual applications. It will result in improvements to our AircrewCoordination Training Programby providing policy, procedures,and training for specific aircrewresponsibilities and tasks , whichwill ultimately reduce human errors in the cockpit.Today's realitiesNow, while we're doing all this,we 're living with some hardrealities. Some are coming; manyare already here. We're dealingwith the realities of uncertainty- a very lean force structureand a very tight budget that puta lot of demands on people.All this equals high pace. And,if we're not careful, pace can ge tout of control. Then th e shortcutswill start- th e shortcuts thatlead to disregard ofcritical thingsat critical times, the shortcutsthat lead to catastrophic accidents.

It's like a treadmill. Pace hasto be controlled. If it's not, you'reliable to do more damage thangood. The first few minutes, you

walk. Then you gradually speedup th e pace. But you don't go fullbore right away; you work up toit. We have to do the same in ourunits; we have to take the time todevelop good habits to be able toeffectively execute our tough anddemanding missions withoutmishaps to con erve our preciousand limited resources.We are , in a sense , facingsome of the challenges th e airlines faced when they werederegulated. Their main objective, of course, was to make aprofit. And in order to show thatprofit, the industry took someshortcuts.In his book Blind Trust (William Morrow an d Company, Inc. ,1986 ), John J. Nance suggeststhat in many cases, the airline industry sacrificed safety for profit.He says that however excellentand progressive deregulationmay be in terms of economic efficiency and cheap ticket prices,it has exposed an d exacerbatedthe weaknesses in airlinesafety-weaknesses that wemust never allow to develop inArmy aviation.Shortcuts to profitNance points out that, in somecases, the quest for efficiency ledto shortcuts such as disregardingprocedures and regulations , discouraging pilots from listingmaintenance deficiencies thatmight ground an aircraft, overloading passengers or cargo,reducing spare parts inventories,and reducing the quality of trainin g programs. Any of theseshortcuts could happen in theArmy if commanders are not wiseenough to prevent them.Let's draw some parallels .Let's equate profit to missionaccomplishment---{)r better yet,to proficiency. Let's measure our"profit" in proficiency.

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Doing these things willproduce a dual benefit: highreadiness and safe operations.Command climateI want to make a final point toaviation commanders from BlindTrust. I t has to do with climatein our case, command climate. Alo t of small commuter linesoperating with a slim profit margin tried to cut corners by pushing their people to the limit.Nance says that in some cases,management tended to providejob security based on whether ornot a pilot would fly an overweight aircraft or take off in lessthan legal weather.As a result, some dangerousattitudes developed in these commuter lines. When pilots foundthat they could meet most of theirschedules despite bad weather bysneaking around the minimumsand the rules, a sort of perversepride in their own abilitiesdeveloped. In addition, a pilotwho would fly an overweightairplane, take off in less thanlegal weather, or ignore mechanical problems was, more oftenthan not, pretty secure in his job.

Nance points out that, oncethey established this climate,managers didn't have to order ordirect their pilots to perpetuatethis attitude of cowboyish noncompliance with the rules; peerpressure did it for them. And Iwant to point out that commanders don't have to order ordirect their aviators to takeshortcuts; all they have to do iscreate a command climate thatallows it. And when they do, riskswill outweigh their benefits, andaccidents will become inevitable.Risks can be managedAlthough many of our day-to-dayaviation operations involve risk ,those risks can be managed. Thefirst question to ask ourselves is,"Has anyone ever done thisbefore?" If the answer is no,there's probably a reason. That"no" should be our signal to slow


down, to crawl before we walk,walk before we run, and to makesure that what we're taking is amanaged risk, no t a gamble.

There's a big difference between a risk and a gamble. Riskimplies a certain calculated, controlled element of danger as opposed to a gamble, which is justthrowing the dice. We can't affordto just throw the dice wheresoldiers'lives are at stake.

The bottom line is: If you conduct tough, realistic trainingthrough proper risk management, you're not gambling withsoldiers' lives; you're increasingyour net worth by protecting yourresources.It can be done ...The better you train, the moreyou use risk management, theless luck will factor into your success. Units have proven this. Wehave units that have incrediblesafety records, units that haveflown thousands of hours an dmany, many years without an accident. Let me give you some examples: Aviation Detachment, 172dInfantry Brigade (Alaska), FortGreely, Alaska, has flown for 26years in some of th e toughestweather conditions in the worldwithout a Class A, B, or C accident. 4th Brigade, 1st ArmoredDivision, USAREUR, has flownmore than 150,000 accident-freehours. New Cumberland ArmyDepot, U.S. Army MaterielDevelopment and ReadinessCommand, New Cumberland,PA, has had only one accidentsince 1970-a Class C in 1972. 1s t Battalion, 212th Aviation Regiment, Aviation TrainingBrigade, Fort Rucker, AL, flew290,000 hours without a Class A,B, or C accident.

These units-and there aremany others out there-havebeen able to sustain these outstanding safety records because

an attitude has been perpetuatedfrom commander to commanderthat accidents are not the cost ofdoing business. These units haveevolutionary programs passed toand reinforced by succeedingcommanders who integratesafety into the way they do business. And, it's no accident thatth e units with th e good safetyrecords are also the units withthe tremendous readinessrecords.

I t is these units that ar e carrying the safety banner into th e90s.Safety challenge in the 90sand beyondThe bottom line is that safetymust be embedded into th e mindse t ofleaders at all levels throughawareness and leader development. We must integrate safetyinto all aspects of military life inorder to create safe, professionalaviators.These aviators are happiestwhen flying, an d they like to flytough missions. Bu t they like tofly with a meaning and a purpose. They like to have meaningful training programs that ge tthem to a level of proficiency andwhat I call "prudent confidence"to accomplish their missions.

And that 's what we, theleadership, should gear ourtraining toward: that we developtough aviators who don't havebad habits, aviators who willdeliver on time and on target.The way to do that is to, first,know what we're about-be clearabout our purpose and our mission-and then to se t high standards and train to thosestandards.Always.Every day.Every night.No shortcuts.No compromises.Because, bottom line, safetyintegration is an investment inour future readiness.

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Preparation, the Key to SafetyCW2 Craig M. DyerB Company, 23d Task ForceAPO New York

FLYING IS AN inherentlydangerous business that requiresbattling for safety on all fronts. Ascompetent aviators, our job is tofight these battles daily to reduceassociated risks related to aviationand provide a combat capable force.Military commanders and safetyofficers in all arenas preach safetycontinuously. While all of us, asprofessionals, have incorporatedsafety into our consciousness, accidents unfortunately still occur.Striving for an accident-free rate is ademanding and complex goal ofevery military unit. Achieving andmaintaining this goal can be elusiveat best, in the safest organizations.Because of the crucial nature offlying, something, somewhere, sometime, may go wrong.One of the unwritten rules in aviation is asfollows: I f something can go wrong it will and it isonly a matter of time before it does. While thisrule reflects a realistic attitude bordering on pessimism, most of us tend to believe, "it will neverhappen to us." However, if you stay in aviationlong enough, a time will come when you will haveto deal with an accident or tragic incident. It maybe major or minor. When "that something" does6

go wrong, will you be prepared to deal with thesituation? This article provides useful informationfor that moment when disaster strikes and you arethrust into critical circumstances.For the second time in my brief aviation career, Ihave been involved in a situation during a normaltraining flight when a tragedy has occurred. Whilenot directly involved in each specific incident, bothClass A mishaps, I was a crew member aboard thefirst aircraft to arrive at the crash sites. Thus, Iturned my ordinary training missions into searchand rescue operations.Each accident involved a single aircraft andcritically injured personnel with medical evacuation(MEDEV AC) unavailable to assist. My focus ofattention concerning these mishaps is centered onthe most recent and more acute of the two. I amnot a MEDEV AC pilot. However, the informationdiscussed in this article is to aid anyone who dealswith similar situations in the future.An OH-58 Kiowa crew, performing a nightvision devices (NVDs) training mission, in anapproved local training area, struck a 180-foot hightension wire and crashed. The pilot was killed, hisaerial observer was severely injured and the aircraftwas destroyed. The weather that night was morethan adequate, with no ceiling and unrestrictive

visibility although moon illumination was min'imal.At the time of the crash, the single ship aircraftwas en route from a local helicopter training areato its home station. Flight following was with anearby airfield control tower. The pilot was ex-pected to report entering the control zone at adesignated point on the airfield. However, thetower never received his report.Acting as air mission commander for a flight oftwo UH-60 Black Hawks, our mission was to

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conduct NVD mission and currency training in anadjacent training area. Upon completion of oursecond training period, we were also en route toour home airfield. We contacted the same controltower with which the OH-58 was flight following,to request transition through their control zone.Once clearance was received, the tower asked if wecould contact the OH-58. Tower informed us thatthey had lost communication with the aircraft andthe pilot never reported entering the control zone.Our transition route-of-flight took us from east-towest north of the airfield. The route for the OH-58was from the northwest-to-south. We were scheduled to pass over the same designated reportingpoint that the OH-58 was scheduled to reportreaching.During our transition at minimum safe altitude,we attempted to contact the OH-58 numerous timeson the specific training area and tower frequencies.We also unsuccessfully conducted a visual searchfor the OH-58 in the vicinity of the designatedcheckpoint. At this point, the farthest thing fromour minds was that an aircraft had actuallycrashed. The worst case, we thought, was that thecrew had to make a precautionary landing, wasunable to notify the tower, and was in the processof trying to reach a telephone.After reaching the western edge of the controlzone, we decided to turn around and not give upthe search so quickly. We requested another transition, this time from west-to-east. We also askedpermission to use the guard frequency. Aftersearching the northern area of the control zone,and we were still unable to contact the OH-58 onguard, our concerns began to grow. When ourwest-to-east search was complete, we requestedtower to verify the route-of-flight of the OH-58once more. By now, another aircraft, an AH-lCobra, had joined us in the search. The AH-l crewwas informed of the situation. The AH-I was enroute to the area the OH-58 reported leaving. Weconcentrated our search from the control zonereporting point to that area.

Within minutes of our search from the checkpoint to the area the OH-58 reported leaving, wespotted a small single light. No other lights werewithin a kilometer. The temperature at the timewas below zero degrees Celsius. It seemed odd thatanyone would be shining a light at a helicopter forno apparent reason. We decided to investigate, andlanded about 75 meters in front of the light. Our


companion aircraft stayed airborne for communication purposes. Upon landing, we looked throughthe NVDs but we could not make out who or whatwas shining the light. Looking under, not using theNVDs, we could not see the light at all. Ourcrewchief went to find out what exactly was goingon. Arriving at the light, he began to signal us withhis flashlight. Still unaware of what was happening, my copilot left the aircraft to give assistanceand relay information. When my copilot returned,he informed me that an aircraft did in fact crashand there were injured personnel.Receiving this information, I advised our companion aircraft crew of the situation, then askedthem to notify the tower. I also requested MEDEVAC assistance along with obtaining an accurategrid location. At this point, however, the searchwas not over. The crew member shining the light atus was the enlisted aerial observer. Being injured,in severe shock and disoriented, he had managed towalk about 200 meters away from the crash site.

When tragedy occurs, such as the accident Involving thiscrashed OH-58 Kiowa, being prepared to deal with thesituation is key to safety.

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This created a problem in locating the pilot andaircraft. The ground search turned out to be moredifficult than the air search.The AH-l crew was informed of our locationand arrived shortly after being notified. Once onthe ground, they assisted in the search for the pilotand aircraft. When my copilot returned, he men-tioned that he needed his NVDs. He was unable tosee anything with his small flashlight. At this time,the aircraft landing light was on and pointed at theaerial observer. This added light helped the AH-lcrew find the location. It also provided enoughlight for our companion aircraft to spot the aircraftwreckage under a large set of power lines. Frustrat-ingly, our companion aircraft did not realize thatwe did not know where the wreckage was, and didnot inform us of the location.

While my copilot was donning his NVDs, Iturned on my survival radio and gave it to him.This allowed us to communicate out of sight. Hewas also able to quickly inform us of what wasgoing on while searching for the pilot. I was theonly crewmember aboard my aircraft who had aradio. Because of a shortage of radios within ourunit, the priority for radios was given to the pilotin command (PC). The copilot took the first aid kitand a cold weather kit that was in the aircraft.The copilot stabilized the aerial observer, thenassisted the AH-l crew in search of the pilot. Withthe aid of the NVDs, he was able to find theaircraft wreckage. While searching the wreckage asecond time, he spotted the pilot buried beneath.He informed us via survival radio that they hadfound the pilot was unconscious, severely injuredand with a possible pulse. Shortly before thisinformation, our companion aircraft relayed to methat MEDEVAC assistance was unavailable. Atthat time, we decided to transport the injured crewto the hospital in our own aircraft. The PC of ourcompanion aircraft notified the tower of our deci-sion and requested an ambulance be standing by atthe helipad. Within 10 minutes of departure, theinjured crewmembers were at the hospital.

The decision to transport injured personnelshould rest with the air mission commander or PCof the aircraft performing the evacuation. Thisdecision is the most demanding one to make. Onlyin extreme life or death circumstances, with noother viable means of medical assistance available,should it be considered. In our situation, the wordwas that we would not receive medical assistance

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and we were within 10 kilometers of a hospital.About 20 minutes after our companion aircraftdeparted to the hospital helipad a ground ambulance arrived. Each particular situation will dictatewhat method of transportation should be em-ployed. Each option should be carefully calculated.The search and rescue aspect of this incident wasnot accomplished without complications and prob-lems. The fact that it was dark created anotherwhole dimension to the complexity of events. Allof the crewmembers involved in this incident feelthat we did our best. The findings of the autopsyreport revealed that there wasn't anything thatcould have been accomplished to save the pilot'slife. It appeared that he died upon impact orshortly afterward. The medical personnel whotreated the observer indicated that if we had nottransported him to the hospital when we did, heprobably would not have made it another hourexposed to the cold with his injuries, blood lossand shock condition.

As a result of the difficulties experienced duringthis situation, three important items stand out.Communication, teamwork and equipment areyour most valuable resources. Manage these ele-ments wisely and the success of any mission will beenhanced.Communication. During this mishap, use of thesurvival radio was instrumental in relaying infor-

mation rapidly. This allowed decisions to be madeand actions accomplished based on those decisionswith minimal time wasted. Most associated withaviation tend to think of using the survival radioonly for their own rescue. The radio allowed mycopilot to inform us immediately when the pilotand wreckage were found, and the apparent condi-tion of the pilot. Reaction to the events wasimmediate and all the necessary authorities werenotified through additional communication withthe tower by our airborne companion aircraft. Thefaster organizations, such as the hospital, arenotified the better they will be prepared to dealwith the crisis arid provide assistance.Another aspect of communication, not oftenthought of, is signaling. The injured aerial observershined his double "A" battery flashlight at us andwe reacted. The light saved his life. Any form ofeffective communication undeniably saves lives.Teamwork. Teamwork provides a diversification

of tasks. One person could not have accomplishedall that was done in double the amount of time.

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Our companion aircraft maintained a high capproviding essential communications and eventuallytransporting the injured crew. As the air missioncommander, I provided the ground-to-air link thatmaintained command and control. Our crewchiefstayed to aid the observer and monitor his condition. The AH-l crew along with my copilot locatedthe pilot and wreckage and informed us of thestatus of events. The teamwork involved increasedthe efficiency of each task and decreased the timerequired to manage the situation. Teamwork positively saves lives.

Equipment. I have already expressed the importance of the survival radio as an important tool inany critical situation. Every piece of equipmentavailable should be considered for use in anycircumstance. I f we had not been flying withNVDs, we would have never seen the observer'sflashlight. Finding the aircraft wreckage and pilotburied beneath it would have taken much longerthan it did. The NVDs aided immensely.

I f the observer had not had his flashlight in hisflight suit panel marker pocket, he would not havebeen able to signal us. His injuries were such that,if he wanted to extract any item from his survivalvest, he most probably could not. In any crashsequence, what you have with you at the time willmost presumably be the only things available foruse to save your life.During night operations it is essential to havemore than one flashlight. Our experience dictatethe use of as many flashlights as possible. However, we turned up short without quality highpower lights.I t is imperative to know the function and location of all the survival items in your vest andaircraft. Aircraft cold and warm weather kitsshould be easily accessible and obtainable with onehand. Standardized locations of these items inaircraft will prevent searching for equipment in

critical situations when time is crucial.There is no substitute for creative thinking whenit comes to equipment applications. The AH-l crewand my copilot used one of the passenger seatsfrom our companion aircraft as a support stretcherto transport the pilot to the aircraft.U nits are encouraged to procure emergency locating transmitters (EL Ts). I f the OH-58 had beenequipped with an EL T, notification of the crashwould have been immediate. The proximity of thecrash to the airfield with which the pilot was flight


following was sufficient for an ELT to alert thetower. The tower then could have initiated a searchwithout delay. Although most Army aircraft do nothave ELT direction finding capability, it is important to realize that the guard receivers incorporatedin all aircraft radios are capable of receiving theELT signal. Aircraft in the vicinity of downedaircraft also will be notified immediately. Thesetwo factors combined could have expedited rescueefforts.Flight data recorders (FDRs) are another area ofinterest. While FDRs will not directly prevent anaccident from occurring, they do provide usefulinformation that can be applied to prevent futureaccidents. Productive use of all equipment resources available definitely saves lives.The subjects discussed here will not provide allthe answers pertaining to every critical situation.Hopefully, they will provide insight that will assistanyone who encounters similar instances. Associated with any comparable circumstance will be aunique set of problems with which to contend.While it is impossible to predict future occurrencesand the problems accompanying them, preparingfor the unexpected starts with eliminating complacency and gathering useful information related tothe topic. Additional information can be obtainedfrom the following publications:

Army Regulation (AR) 385-40, Accident Re-porting and Records AR 385-95, Army A viation Accident Preven-tion. Department of the Army Pamphlet 385-95,Aircraft Accident Investigation and Reporting. Field Manual 1-302, A viation Life SupportEquipment for Army Aircrews.The number of Class A accidents for fiscal year(FY) 1988 was 32 with 39 fatalities. In FY 1989 the

number of accidents was 32, while decreasing theprevious year's fatalities to 35. The major cause ofthese accidents remains human error. I t is everyone's goal to eliminate the human error factor toprevent as many accidents as possible. However, itis just as important to be prepared for the timewhen something unfortunately does go awry. Thenyour primary consideration becomes the safety andsurvival of yourself and your crew or other brethren in peril. Inevitably, preparation begins withyou, the aircrewmember. ~

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EVERY YEAR numerous accidents result from pilots attempting to continue under visualmeteorological conditions (VMC)while in instrument meteorological conditions (lMC). Aviatorsare evaluated each year on theirknowledge of emergency IMCprocedures during their AnnualProficiency and Readiness Test.Usually, the instructor pilot (IP)takes the controls and has thepilot put the hood on and perform an approach and maybe oneor two unusual attitude recoveries. But, does this really prepare apilot for an encounter with inadvertent IMC?

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While returning from a fieldtraining exercise in June 1989, Iwas able to practice my skills andknowledge of inadvertent IMCprocedures while flying as chalktwo in a flight of three UH-IHueys. We were making our second trip when we encounteredheavy rainshowers, which quicklyreduced visibility to less than 300meters. We executed a 180-degreeturn to exit the rainshowers. Aswe gained altitude to clear a hightension powerline, the pilot incommand and I lost visual reference with the ground.

All aviators have memorizedthe procedures for inadvertent

IMC. We all know to level theaircraft, maintain heading, establish climb power and air speed,squawk 7700 and contact the controlling agency on guard frequency. We all can tell the IPthese procedures on our checkride; however, there is more toinadvertent IMC than memorizingthese procedures. I f you prepareyourself and your aircraft forIMC, your chances of a smoothtransition to instrument flight anda safe recovery will be increased.

I f you are out flying in marginal VMC, or are experiencingdeteriorating weather conditions,here are some simple but sensible

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things you can do to help yourself be prepared. First, don't beafraid to find a place to land towait for better weather. This isprobably the hardest thing to dowith "get-homeitis" or pressingmission requirements. I recommend establishing your ownweather minimums that arehigher than those in AR 95-1,Army A viation: Flight Regula-tions, and then sticking to them.In other words, be constantlyaware of places to land or deviate, and take into account localterrain and obstacles while factoring in your own experience andability.


Second, if you're flying in marginal conditions, prepare yourselfand the aircraft for IMC. Get outthe approach procedures and review the IMC procedures as wellas the approaches for the recovery field. Leave some headroomto avoid interfering with IFRtraffic during inadverent IMCclimbing maneuvers.

Next, pre-tune the navigationand communication radios. Thisway, you will not have to fumble with those tasks upon inadvertent IMC, and you can devoteyour attention to the critical aspects of maintaining aircraftcontrol.

Finally, if you lose ground reference, don't try to re-establishVMC. I f you have prepared yourself, you should not hesitate inestablishing yourself on the instruments.

VVe used these procedures and,although they didn't make ourencounter with inadvertent IMCpleasant, they helped to make ourtransition easy and there was noconfusion in our recovery. Thekey to our safe execution of thisemergency, as in all emergencies,was planning ahead. Plan aheadso that, if you go inadvertentIMC, you will be able to make asafe recovery. ~

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Safety, Jnst Say YesCaptain Frank ButlerChief, Cargo Utilities BranchAviation DivisionDepartment of Tactics and SimulationU.S. Army Aviation CenterFort Rucker, AL

A s technology advances, thecomplexity of the modern battlefield continues to multiply. TheU.S. Army, in turn, developsmore sophisticated equipment toaid us in managing the battle. Inthe end, however, our success inbattle relies on people and howwell they communicate. As aviators, we call this dynamics ofaircrew communications and co-ordination (DA CC).Clear, concise communicationbetween aircrews and other aviation team members is essential.Therefore, training our people tocommunicate effectively is imperative.Experience demonstrates thatmost Class A accidents occur because of human error. In fact,

from fiscal year (FY) 1983through FY 1989, environmentalfactors caused 9 percent of ouraccidents; materiel failure, 17;and human error, 74. In the human error category, about 5 percent of the accidents were causedby maintenance personnel's failure to perform work by the book;

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10 percent by supervisory error infailing to manage risk at unitlevel; and 80 percent by flightcrew failure in following procedures.Note that most accidents resultfrom human errors and flightcrews' failing to follow established guidelines and procedures.Complacency, coupled with pooraircrew communication and coordination, ultimately results in accidents. Keep in mind that theusual result of an aviation accident is either loss of life or permanent injury and the destructionof extremely valuable combat resources. Data indicate that human error is a factor in mostaccidents. They further indicatethat people are the problem.Therefore, with the proper training, correct guidance and continued emphasis on safety, peopleare the solution.

Accident investigations haveidentified four trends that directlyrelate to human-error accidents. Too few questions asked.

Too little informationshared. Too many assumptionsmade. Unresolved conflicting views.Failure to exert appropriatefirst line supervisory influenceleads to tragedy. Currently, everyaviator receives instruction inDACC. This block of instructionis designed to pique the awarenessof students and aviators in theessential nature of effective communicative skills. Safety officerscan broaden this instruction byusing trainers to administer theU.S. Army Aviation Center Programed Test 25, exportable training package, on DACC. Trainerscan present the entire packagewith no additional outside support.Today our aircraft and missions are more complex than before. Each of us, from crewchiefto commander, plays a vital rolein reducing human error accidents. All it takes is participation.Become active in this endeavor.Remember-Safety, Just Say Yes!

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AVIATION LOGISTICSu.s. Army Aviation Logistics School

Becoming A USAALS InstructorSergeant Robert K. PeckAttack Helicopter DivisionDepartment of Attack Helicopter TrainingFort Eustis, VA

Sergeant Peck ... we've just receivedyour levy notice from the militarypersonnel office; you're headed toFt. Eustis, VA."I had waited 8 months to hear the words: I was

going to leave Korea and report to Ft. Eustis to bean instructor (I hoped). I remember thinking howgreat it would be to return to the post where Iattended advanced individual training (AIT) andsee things from a different perspective. I hadalways felt that one had no easier job in the Army:pin on an "instructor" brassard; go to the head ofthe class; and work a normal "9-to-5" job for achange.

I've never been so wrong in my life!After arriving at Ft. Eustis, I was amazed at howlittle things had changed. At first glance, I thought

the post had not changed much during my 5-yearhiatus in the field. First stop-in-processing whereI began the typical Army routine: finance, transportation, 201 file-you know, "the essentials."That, however, was when the routine changed.

For the first time in my Army career, I wasgoing to see face-to-face the person who woulddecide my next assignment: the sergeant major of


the U. S. Army Aviation Logistics School(USAALS). I was greatly impressed to think thesergeant major was taking time to personally interview me for a position as a school instructor.

It was then when I began to realize thatUSAALS instructors must be important to theArmy, considering the time the sergeant majorspent "hand picking" them. In the time it normallytakes to find out where you'll be sleeping on thefirst night, I had finished in-processing. As thesergeant major handed me a slip of paper with myposition and paragraph line numbers on it, hewelcomed me on board and wished me good luck.

Only a matter of minutes passed before I was atmy new unit receiving my welcome briefings . Thefirst thing I learned during the briefings wasUSAALS doesn't let "just anyone" get on aplatform and teach AIT students. I was informedall new instructors were required to attend and passan instructor training course (lTC) before instructing students.ITCThe next rung in the ladder was to attend ITC. Ihad heard horror stories about the dreaded ITC. Iwas told by those who attended before me that ITC

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A viation Logistics continued

was almost impossible to pass and had about a50-percent attrition rate. This was not very encouraging. All I could do was wait for my class dateand see for myself.

That day came soon enough, and I was getting afirst-hand account of everything I was told. Thecourse was difficult, to put it mildly. The one thingthat makes ITC a "bear" is the class workload.Because of the curriculum setup, the instructors arerequired to disseminate tremendous amounts ofinformation in a relatively short period of 1 week.

During the remaining 2 weeks, the studentsprepare two class presentations and the following:lesson plans, lesson unit outlines, presentation outlines and review of questions. An instructor mustinspect and approve these steps before the studentcan practice the presentation.

During the first week, the class load remindedme of the book, Future Shock, by Alvin Toffler.The author discusses how a lot of informationreceived at increasingly faster rates can overload aperson who cannot adapt to change. I thought Mr.Toffler could probably learn a thing or two byattending ITC at Ft. Eustis.

I, however, was the one going through classnumber 7-89. I needed to use all the time availableto try and sort through the constant deluge ofinformation. Even though ITC had recently beenrevamped and decreased its failure rate, the coursewas still demanding.

The instructors who evaluate each student's presentation are bound by strict guidelines. I remember feeling pretty good about my first class as Iwalked to the afteraction review. I was told I was a"no-go" due to my excessive use of the transitionword "OK." I was devastated: I gave everything I

14

had to prepare for my presentation, only to bethwarted by a "crutch word."

My instructors told me not to worry as I wouldhave two more tries. I began to see why the coursewas feared as much as it was respected. When Iasked the instructor who came up with all of the"attention-to-detail" type requirements, I was told," ... a board of U.S. Army sergeants major." Well,that made sense.

As it turned out, I would need those skills whenI made my second trek to the podium to get a"go" for my presentation. My second presentationwas a tremendous improvement over the first, andmy instructor gave me a "go." I t was over! I hadfinally passed ITC and lived to tell about it.USAALS InstructorAfter 3 long weeks of rigid trammg in lTC, Ithought to myself, "Now I'm going to showeveryone .. . I'm going to be the best instructorthey've ever seen."

I wanted everything to be perfect for my firstclass as a primary instructor. First impressions arethe ones that stand out in people's minds. I tried toget everything prepared for a flawless presentationto my first class.

I came in early on that first morning to allow forany unforeseen difficulties. Everything went perfectly; everything, that is, except me. In the time ithad taken me to wake up, rehearse the first lessonunit in my mind and arrive at the hangar, I haddeteriorated into a fumbling bundle of nerves! Iglanced at the clock: 0620. My students should bemoving toward the classroom, I thought.

With what remaining nerves I possessed, I gathered up my lesson unit materials and made my way

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to the classroom. As I walked down the 15-foothallway toward my classroom, I could have swornthe trip took 3 minutes! The 12 students waitingfor me to begin teaching must have had another 50to 60 students packed in their desks; I swear it.There I was face-to-face with ~ o m e of thegreenest AIT students in aviation. I was petrified;afraid I was not going to get through my first classalive. It was then a comment from a fellow ITCgraduate came to mind: "There ain't nothin' toit. .. but to do it!" So, I just "did it."

The seconds turned into minutes, the minutesinto hours, and finally, the class was over. .. wait aminute, it's only break time. That was only 50minutes! I had another five class periods to gountil I could call it a day. The other class periodsbecame progressively easier to give as a lot of theITC course material and guidelines came back tome.

Six hours and a few gray hairs later, it was over.I had finished "day one" of the powertrain androtor block of instruction, only 7 more days to gobefore the cycle started c;tll over again.

I found teaching a lot like maintenance; younever really reach a stopping point, and no twosituations are ever the same. I realized the job isnever done ... always more students and differentquestions to ask.

It has been some time since I made that firstlonely walk up to the podium, and I have sentmany students out into the aviation maintenancefield to begin their Army careers. Every time I seeanother student graduate move to his first dutystation, I cannot help but wonder, "Did I doeverything I could .. . was there anything else I couldhave done to help that soldier become a bettermechanic?"Those are the kind of questions every instructorshould have in the back of the mind. In addition,every soldier who leaves USAALS reflects thenoncommissioned officer (NCO) teacher. Excellence is not the goal at USAALS; it is the standard.Nearby AttractionsInstructing is not the only reason I was interestedin coming back to Ft. Eustis. I really enjoy driving


to the beach to relax on weekends. The trip fromthe gate of Ft. Eustis to Virginia Beach is only 50miles-less than an hour on the interstate.

Also nearby are the historic cities of Yorktownand Williamsburg. Yorktown especially appeals tome- I was interested in stories relating to promotion board questions I've answered on militaryhistory. I always wanted to go to the YorktownMuseum to see the actual tent where GeneralGeorge Washington commanded his colonialtroops. I stood where our first commander in chiefstood and saw unchanged battlefields of 200 yearsago. It may seem strange, but this experience mademy job as a soldier seem just a little moreimportant and a lot more rewarding.

I was also pleased to discover that Busch Gardens is only 10 miles from my front door. I havealways enjoyed going to amusement parks, andBusch Gardens is definitely one of the best. Whilethere, I had the opportunity to visit "The OldCountry." I never realized a theme park "inside"of the main park. The Old Country is based on thecultures of European countries. I've never been toGermany; however, after visiting The Old Country,I'm positive that's where I want to go for my nextoverseas tour.

I also couldn't believe Ft. Eustis offered all ofthe surrounding historical areas, "plus" the hunting and fishing areas, too. I like to get out intonature once in a while. With the thousands ofwooded acres Ft. Eustis affords, I just couldn'tfind a better place to hunt and fish.

Being an instructor at USAALS has been morerewarding and exciting than I ever anticipated. I'msure this experience will be even more so in themonths to come.

I f you feel you have some valuable knowledge inthe aviation field and you can handle the exactingstandards of a training unit-then talk to yourpersonnel administration center NCO about requesting an assignment to Ft. Eustis after your nextoverseas tour or even as a stateside swap.

I f you're lucky, you may find yourself on yourway to the most challenging job Army Aviation hasto offer as an NCO: an instructor of students atUSAALS. ~

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DIRECTORATE FOR MAINTENANCEu.s. Army Aviation Systems Command

The Army Oil Analysis ProgramAn analysis oj engine oil is like testing blood: blood tests

detect physical changes in people-oil analyses detect physi-cal changes in engines.Mr. Jack GlaeserDepot Engineering and Reliability Centered MaintenanceSupport OfficeCorpus Christi Army DepotCorpus Christi , TX

THE ARMY OIL Analysis Program (AOAP) ispart of the Department of Defense initiative begunat Ft. Rucker, AL, in 1964 by Mr. Joseph P.Cribbins, now special assistant to the Deputy Chiefof Logistics, Headquarters, Department of theArmy. The main objectives of this program are toenhance safety; improve operational readiness ofArmy equipment; detect impending equipmentcomponent failures; avoid extensive repairs; andconserve lubricating and hydraulic oils with on-lineand laboratory analyses of oil and grease samples.

Twenty-four AOAP laboratories and two mobilelabs support Army operations worldwide. (Theirlocations and addresses are near the end of thisarticle.) These labs interact with labs from othermilitary services as part of the Joint Oil AnalysisProgram. Mr. Cribbins is responsible for general

16

staff superVISIon and approves all AOAP policy.The Depot Engineering and Reliability CenteredMaintenance Support Office (DERSO) is the Aviation Systems Command Program Manager for allaeronautical equipment in the Regular Army, including units in the Army National Guard andReserve Components. Army AOAP encompasses8,700 helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft and46,664 subsystems.EvolutionOriginally, AOAP was called the Army Spectrometric Oil Analysis Program, because the onlydiagnostic tool recognized at the time was thespectrometer. Engineering technology expanded toinclude more diagnostic techniques, such as microscopy, ferrography, discriminating chip detectors,

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filter inspections and even fine-filter debris analysis. This expansion caused the name to change toAOAP to encompass all these disciplines of hydraulic oils and grease samplings. Some aviationpersonnel refer to the program as the Army lubricated component analysis program.A Diagnostic ToolBasically, AOAP is the analysis of oil and greasefrom lubricated components. The analysis is usedas a diagnostic tool to determine the internalcondition of engines, gearboxes, transmissions andother lubricated systems. This analysis is a test or aseries of tests that show the condition of equipmentcomponents. Also, this analysis precisely detectsand quantitatively measures wear metals and contaminants in oil or grease, chip detectors andfilters.AOAP GrowthDuring the beginning of AOAP, the spectrometerwas the basic oil analysis instrument. The AOAPhas grown to include new laboratory instrumentation and technological growth in aircraft systems.The ferrograph is being used more as a diagnostictool. Modern aircraft advances include discriminating chip detectors, in-line particle counters and finefiltration. Fine-mesh filters remove all wear metalsand contaminants from lubricating systems thatwould otherwise have been detected by the spectrometer or ferrograph. Therefore, routine laboratory sampling is not conducted on systems withfine filtration, such as on the OH-58D KiowaWarrior helicopter. However, AOAP on this system includes discriminating chip detectors, finefiltration and the diagnostic methods from TM55-1520-248-23.AOAP InstrumentationThe most familiar analytical instruments used inthe AOAP are the spectrometer and ferrograph.However, high-powered microscopes, chip detectorsand the naked eye are used in this program todetect contaminants and failing parts. Spectrometric analysis is used to determine the concentrationsof various wear metals, such as iron, copper andsilver in oil samples. Wear-metal particles are


produced by friction of moving parts in mechanicalsystems. These particles enter the oil system andthen are dispersed throughout the system itself.

Spectroscopy detects both the kinds and quantities of metallic particles in the oil sample. Analysisidentifies the wear-metal elements and aids indetermining the part from where they came. Theseparts can be repaired or replaced before theydamage the assembly or mechanical system. Periodic samplings can reveal abnormal wear trends.

Ferrographic analysis is used as a primary greaseanalysis test on selected components. The ferrograph extends the range of detectable particle sizesbeyond that of the spectrometer. In addition, theferrograph is used to determine the size, shape andtype of wear-metal particles generated by a worncomponent. Not only are wear metals detected bythe analysis, but contaminants are discovered. Twocontaminants are magnesium (indication of internalcorrosion) and silicon (indication of sand and dirt).Particle Sizes

Wear-metal particles are measured in microns(micrometers), or one millionth of a meter. Thespectrometer identifies particles in the 1 to 8micron range and the ferrograph measures particlesin the 7 to 250 micron range. To better understandthe size of wear metals in oil samples, a micrometeris 0.000039 inch; a period on this page is about 254microns or 0.01 inch; and the resolving power ofthe eye is nearly 40 microns or 0.0016 inch.Engineering AnalysisA component is removed when the AOAP discloses abnormal wear metals or contamination. Thecomponent's removal serves three purposes-

Precludes catastrophic failures. Removes component before any actual failureand avoids extensive repairs. Prevents secondary damage to the componentand allows completion of an engineering analysis of the failing component. The component iscompletely disassembled to reveal the failingparts and to determine the failure mode.

The Analytical Investigation Branch (AlB) personnel disassemble AOAP-removed components atthe Corpus Christi Army Depot (CCAD), TX.

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The ArmyOil AnalysisProgram

DERSO engineers monitor the teardown process todetermine the failure mode of selected components.One of the reasons that DERSO is collocated withCCAD is to accomplish the AOAP engineeringanalysis of aviation components. The analysis datais documented, scored and entered in the reliabilitycentered maintenance data bank.

This data is used to support engineering changeproposals and component improvement programsto improve safety and readiness of Army Aviationequipment. This AOAP can uncover parts notproperly designed or manufactured and reveal production processes not up to specifications. As anexample, oil and grease systems are routinely sampled and analyzed at CCAD after items are overhauled and before shipment to the field units.

AOAP InitiativesRoutine grease samplings and ferrographic analysis of AH-l series Cobra helicopter swashplates,scissors and sleeves have already proven successfulby detecting potential problems. A 12-month testfor ferrographic analysis of intermediate and tailrotor gearboxes for nearly 35 AH-64 series Apachehelicopters is being planned. The grease samplesare analyzed at the Army's oil lab at CCAD. Theanalytical teardown of AOAP-removed componentswill be conducted at AlB for the analysis. The testobjectives include the following questions-

Should the internal conditions of the gearboxesusing the ferrograph be monitored?

Could ferrographic analysis be used as a permanent method for monitoring internal conditions of gearboxes?

Can ferrography be used to establish timebetween-overhaul criteria?

18

AOAP Policies and ProceduresUsers can find a comprehensive description ofthe AOAP in the following publications-

AR 750-1, Army Materiel Maintenance Policyand Retail Maintenance Operations.

TB 43-0106, Aeronautical Equipment ArmyOil Analysis Program. A major revision to thispublication is underway. When completed, thisrevision will contain detailed information onthe AOAP about Army Aviation.

TB 43-0211, Army Oil Analysis ProgramGuide For Leaders and Users.

Army Aviation AOAP ManagerThe AOAP is a cornerstone in the reliabilty

centered maintenance program. AOAP provides apowerful tool for the Army's repertoire of diagnostic and predictive maintenance procedures.

Dr. Lewis NeriDERSOATTN: AMSAV-MRCorpus Christi Army DepotCorpus Christi, TX 78419-6195;AUTOVON 861-2023, Commercial 512-937-2023

Army Aviation AOAP Operating LabsCommanderU.S. Army Infantry Center and Ft. BenningATTN: ATZB-DL-MA-Q, AOAPFt. Benning, GA 31905-5174CommanderU.S . Army Air Defense Center and Ft. BlissATTN: ATZC-DIM-QA, AOAPFt. Bliss, TX 79916-6024Commander18th Airborne Corps and Ft. BraggATTN: AFZA-DL-MC, AOAPFt. Bragg, NC 28307-5000

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Commander101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)ATTN: AFZB-DL-M-SO, AOAPFt. Campbell, KY 42223-5000Commander4th Infantry DivisionATTN: AFZC-DL-MQ, AOAPFt. Carson, CO 80913-5029CommanderCorpus Christi Army DepotATTN: SDSCC-QLS, AOAPCorpus Christi, TX 78419-6040Commander10th Mountain Division Light InfantryAOAPFort Drum, NY 13602-5000CommanderV.S. Army Training Center and Ft. EustisATTN: AOAP LaboratoryP. O. Box 4581Ft. Eustis, VA 23604-0581CommanderIII Corps and Ft. HoodATTN: AFZF-DL-MNT-AL, AOAPFt. Hood, TX 76544-5056CommanderNational Training CenterATTN: AFZJ-DLM, AOAPFt. Irwin, CA 92310-5000CommanderV.S. Armor Center and Ft. KnoxATTN: ATZK-DL-M-Q, AOAPFt. Knox, KY 71459-5000CommanderI Corps and Ft. LewisATTN: AFZH-AOAPFt. Lewis, WA 98433-5000Commander7th Infantry Division and Ft. OrdATTN: AFZW-DL-MT, AOAPBuilding 2390Ft. Ord, CA 93941-5555


Commander5th Infantry Division and Ft. PolkATTN: AFZX-DL-M, AOAPFt. Polk, LA 71459-5000Commander6th Infantry Division (L) DOLATTN: AFVR-DL-LQ, AOAPFt. Richardson, AK 99505-57001st Infantry Division and Ft. RileyATTN: AFZN-DL-ML, AOAPBuilding 8100Ft. Riley, KS 66442-5956CommanderV.S. Army Aviation Center and Ft. RuckerATTN: ATZQ-DOL-SS, AOAPFt. Rucker, AL 36362-5114CommanderV.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Ft. SillATTN: AOAPFt. Sill, OK 73505-5100Commander24th Infantry Division and Ft. StewartMaintenance Division, Building 1128ATTN: AFZP-DLM-QA, AOAPHunter Army AirfieldSavannah, GA 31409-5022

AOAP In EuropeV.S. Army Europe Materiel and Equipment Oil

Analysis LaboratoryATTN: AERAS-MVAPO NY 09028V.S. Army Europe Oil LaboratoryGiessen Army Depot, Building 106APO NY 09161V.S. Army Europe Oil Analyses LaboratoryMuna-Installation-BambergATTN: AERAS-MV-BBuilding 8527APO NY 09139

Mobile AOAP LabsV.S. Army Materiel Readiness Support Activitry

(two labs)Lexington Bluegrass Army DepotLexington, KY 40511-5101

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AVIATION MEDICINE REPORTOffice of the Aviation Medicine Consultant

Use of Nonsedating Antihistaminesfor Army Aviation ApplicationsMajor Darcelle M. Delrie, M.D.u.s. Army Aeromedical CenterFort Rucker, AL

ANTIHISTAMINES are associated with impaired central nervous system (CNS) functions,such as drowsiness and altered psychomotor performance. Therefore, the usefulness of antihistaminesby aircrews has been limited by their sedative sideeffects and unacceptable decrements in performance. The introduction of nonsedating antihistamines arouses considerable interest because of theirreported freedom from side effects.

Terfenadine (Seldane) was introduced by MerrellDow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. in 1985 and astemizole(Hismanal), by Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc. in1988. These new, selective antihistamines are devoid of sedative properties commonly associatedwith antihistamine therapy. Studies have shownthem to be free of central nervous system sideeffects in pharmacological, toxicological and clinical studies. Clinically, these nonsedating antihistamines are effective for the relief of symptomsassociated with seasonal allergic rhinitis (hay fever)and other histamine-mediated disorders.

The possibility of having available antihistaminesthat do not adversely affect performance or evenslightly impair performance is important for aviation and military populations. This article identifies

20

and addresses the issues about allergic rhinitis andusing nonsedating antihistamines for Army Aviation applications.HI-Receptor Antagonists (Antihistamines)The HI-receptor antagonists, or HI-blockers,often referred to as the antihistamines, were introduced into clinical practice more than 40 years ago.Since then, personnel have used them extensively toprovide symptomatic relief for allergic conditions.All of the so-called classical antihistamines havebeen effective in relieving the symptoms of allergicdisorders. In fact, one can make only a slightdistinction between them, because they all work thesame way. However, these classical antihistamineshave side effects that greatly reduce their therapeutic usefulness.

Antihistamines can both stimulate and depressthe CNS. How the various drugs produce theirdepressant and stimulant effects is uncertain. Thedrugs bind with high affinity to H I-receptors in thebrain and the effects may reflect antagonism, orblocking, of the H I-receptors in the brain.

Central depression usually accompanies therapeutic doses with diminished alertness, slowed reaction

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times and somnolence (sleepiness) as common manifestations. Occasionally, patients given conventional doses become stimulated and becomerestless, nervous and unable to sleep.

Some antihistamines are more likely to depressthe eNS than others, and patients vary in theirsusceptibility and responses to individual drugs.Diphenhydramine (Benadryl), for example, causessomnolence or drowsiness in about half of thosetaking the drug. Other, and perhaps unrelated,central actions include the ability of certain antihistamines to counter motion sickness and vertigo.

Drowsiness associated with antihistamines hasbeen attributed to various mechanisms; however,sedative effects seem dependent on the ability of aparticular drug to cross the blood-brain barrier andgain access to the eNS. A common property ofmany antihistamines is the ease in which they crossthe blood-brain barrier.

However, some compounds cross the blood-brainbarrier only with great difficulty. These compounds, such as terfenadine and astemizole, appearto have little association, if any, with impairedcentral nervous function. The lack of eNS sideeffects with terfenadine and astemizole probably isdue to their poor penetration into the eNS.Allergic Rhinitis and U.S. Army AviatorsAllergic rhinitis, or hay fever, is a continuousproblem that has plagued the military aviationpopulation for many years. Associated hay feversymptoms include sneezing, rhinorrhea (runnynose), pruritus (itching) and lacrimation (tearing).Nasal allergies are extremely common between 5and 20 percent of the population.

Allergic rhinitis has the potential for medicallyincapacitating aviators. Aviators tolerate the bothersome and distracting symptoms of allergic rhinitis. Aviators, in particular, are at an increasedrisk of developing barotitis (ear block); barosinusitis (sinus block); and alternobaric (pressure) vertigo during flight due to edema, or swelling, andcongestion secondary to allergic rhinitis.

Ear and sinus blocks, which can develop suddenly, can produce excruciating pain. Pressurevertigo with its spinning sensation can create disorientation. The aeromedical significance of develop-


ing any of these problems is obvious: each problemcan cause sudden inability in the aviator to fly theaircraft.

Many of the medications and treatments ofallergic rhinitis are contraindicated in the flyingstatus patient. Therefore, the aviation communityrepresents a difficult group of patients to treatadequately.

Flight personnel may hide the problem or seekmedical treatment from sources that do not understand the dangers that certain medications presentin the flight environment. Some flight personnelself-medicate with antihistamines and other drugsthey purchase over the counter-even though thisclearly violates Army Regulation 40-8, TemporaryFlying Restrictions Due to Exogenous Factors.

Allergic rhinitis is best considered an immunologic disorder that separates into seasonal allergicrhinitis (hay fever) and perennial allergic rhinitis.Seasonal allergic rhinitis patients are sensitive tospecific molds and pollens only present duringspecific seasons. Perennial allergic rhinitis patientsare sensitive to those substances, such as housedust, animal dander and, infrequently, foods. Thepatient with seasonal allergic rhinitis has specificepisodes that resolve after seasonal or residentialchanges. The patient with perennial allergic rhinitishas symptoms throughout the year.

Most patients blame their symptoms on chronic"colds" or "sinus problems" when, in reality,their underlying problem is allergic rhinitis. Othersymptoms include the description of postnasaldrainage and the frequent "sore throat." Manypatients also develop symptoms of allergic conjunctivitis with complaints of tearing, itching, burningeyes and feelings of pressure around the periorbital(eye) areas.

Personal histories and facial appearances oftenhelp medical personnel readily diagnose patientswith significant allergies. Many patients may demonstrate the "allergic salute," a maneuver using thepalm of the hand to rub the nose upwardly andoutwardly. This relieves the itching and oftenresults in a transverse crease across the lower thirdof the nose. Venous stasis and congestion maycause "allergic shiners," the dark circles under theeyes. Extremely common problems include infraor-

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bital edema (swelling under the eyes); dark discoloration of the lower lids; pale, boggy mucosa onboth the septum and the turbinates of the nose;and a mucoid rhinorrhea (clear runny nose). Severely atopic (allergic) individuals are excludedfrom the aviator community; however, many aviators do suffer from mild perennial or intermittentseasonal allergic rhinitis and perform very satisfactorily on flight status.

The best treatment for allergic rhinitis is avoidingthe allergen. However this may be next to impossible. Avoiding overexposures to heavy pollen loads,cleaning as much house dust as possible andavoiding animal dander are helpful. Still, thesetreatments do not offer significant relief to thepatient suffering from an acute episode of allergicrhinitis. The most common treatment for allergicrhinitis is using decongestant and antihistaminecombinations. However, these medications are onlypartially effective and have been contraindicated inaviators in the past due to the sedative side effects.

According to AR 40-501, Standards oj MedicalFitness, allergic rhinitis disqualifies a person foraviation duties-unless the hay fever is mild andconsidered unlikely to limit flying activities. Thedecision to allow aircrewmembers with allergicrhinitis to continue to fly is based on the severityand frequency of symptoms and the need to useantihistamines.WaiversThe Army currently allows flight personnel, whoare on flight status and treated by a flight surgeon,the occasional use of the decongestant pseudoephe-

22

drine (Sudafed) without waiver. This is allowed forpersonnel whose minimal rhinitis symptoms do notinterfere with flying duties.

When significant disease exists, aviators may getwaivers for the allergic rhinitis and its treatment.However, the individual needs to control the symptoms with no significant adverse effects accordingto Aeromedical Policy Letter 14-87, Allergic Rhinitis and Desensitization Therapy.

Waivers may be considered for flight personnelwho choose to undergo desensitization therapy(allergy shots) and whose symptoms are controlledby the immunotherapy. Desensitization with allergen extracts (allergy shots) has been effective inrelieving many of the symptoms in a large percentage of the aviation population.

Waivers may be given for the use of the topicalnasal steroid sprays, beclomethasone diproprionate(Vancenase or Beconase) and flunisolide (Nasalide).Nasal steroid sprays are reasonably effective due totheir high degree of topical activity and essentiallyhave no adverse systemic effects.

In addition, aviators may get waivers for the useof the topical nasal spray, cromolyn sodium (Nasalcrom). Cromolyn sodium, a topical mast cellstabilizing medication, prevents the release of histamine. Pretreatment with cromolyn sodium, a reasonably effective treatment, is not contraindicatedin the aviator community due to its lack ofsystemic effects.

The usual treatment of allergic rhinitis with theclassical sedative antihistamines makes continuedflight unacceptable. Furthermore, AR 40-8 specifically restricts the performance of aircrew dutieswhile aviators take the typical antihistamines.

Until recently, the flight surgeon had little tooffer the aircrewmember in need of antihistaminesbecause of the antihistamine's sedative side effects.With the introduction of terfenadine and astemizole as nonsedating antihistamines, the flight surgeon now may have the tools needed to care foraviators. These aviators would benefit from the useof antihistamines without suffering the sedativeside effects.

In 1986, under the recommendation of the U.S.Army Aeromedical Center (USAAMC), the Department of the Army (DA) and National Guard

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Bureau (NOB) began to waive the new nonsedatingantihistamine, terfenadine, for use in aircrewmembers. USAAMC only recommends waivers; DA orNOB is the waiver authority. Therefore, Armyaircrewmembers with waiver can now use terfenadine.Nonsedating PrescriptionsCurrent plans of the U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command (USAMRDC),Ft. Detrick, Frederick, MD, include an appliedresearch program. The program will use the UH-60Black Hawk flight simulator at the U.S. ArmyAeromedical Research Laboratory (USAARL), Ft.Rucker, AL. The program will evaluate the effectsof terfenadine as a nonsedating antihistamine onflight performance.

In conjunction with this program, Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Blacksburg, VA, is under contractwith USAMRDC. The institute will evaluate theeffects of astemizole as a nonsedating antihistamineon complex cognitive performance. These studieswill attempt to validate terfenadine and astemizoleas nonsedating antihistamines for use within theaviation and military environment.

With studies completed and results established,and barring any unforseen occurrence, USAAMCmay allow aviators to use these nonsedating antihistamines without a waiver. Then they could getthese nonsedating antihistamines with only a prescription from the flight surgeon, as they alreadydo to obtain Sudafed.

Thus, these nonsedating antihistamines wouldbenefit Army Aviation personnel who are reluctantto come forward and have their allergic rhinitisdiagnosed as medically disqualifying. This reluctance may well be justified. This implies manyaircrewmembers probably have only minimal allergic rhinitis symptoms that do not interfere withflying duties. Also, these aviators may benefitsignificantly from the occasional use of these nonsedating antihistamines. These individuals currentlycontrol their symptoms with Kleenex, handkerchiefs, sleeves and the occasional use of Sudafed.

At present, flight surgeons are prescribing terfenadine for aircrewmembers on flight status whohave waivers for their allergic rhinitis and for theuse of terfenadine. One may consider allergicrhinitis that requires using antihistamines, topicalnasal medications or immunotherapy: this is still acondition that needs a waiver and a situation thataviators should not consider minimal. Significantallergic rhinitis and its therapy are disqualifying.But fortunately, the therapy controls the diseaseand is effective and safe for use in aviation. Thuswaivers are readily granted for these disqualifications.

No longer should aircrewmembers feel reluctantto seek the aid of their flight surgeon for theirrhinitis symptoms, such as sneezing, runny nose,itching and tearing. No longer do aircrewmembersneed to control their allergic rhinitis symptoms withonly Kleenex, handkerchiefs, sleeves and the occasional use of Sudafed.

The efficacy of terfenadine and astemizole inallergic rhinitis and histamine-mediated skin disorders has been demonstrated clearly. Both drugsoffer an important advantage over traditional antihistamines: they lack CNS side effects, particularlysedation.

Although one may consider other clinical factors,the question now arises as to whether aviatorsinvolved in skilled activity can safely use nonsedating antihistamines. However, in the critical situation of aviators, any possibility of anyone havingunusual reactions or side effects during the initialuse of terfenadine and astemizole must be excluded.

As with any other medication, aviators shouldfirst use terfenadine and astemizole with caution.Aviators should begin treatment when they are in anonflying status. Barring unexpected findings, nonsedating antihistamines, such as terfenadine andastemizole, could well become the "drugs ofchoice" for those soldiers involved in any skilled orhazardous activity in which alertness is crucial toperformance. These soldiers include aviators whoindicate a need for antihistamines. -.; ;- , ,-

The Aviation Medicine Report is a bimonthly report from the Aviation Medicine Consultant of TSG. Please forward subject matter of currentaeromedical importance for editorial consideration to U.S. Anny Aeromedical Center, ATTN: HSXY-ADJ, Fort Rucker, AL 36362-5333.

u.s. Army Aviation Digest 23


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PEARL!SPersonal Equipment And Rescue/survival LowdoNn

Walk-Around Restraint HarnessesHelp Prevent Accidents

Warning. The walk-around restraint harnessis not designed for, nor intended to be used inplace of, a seatbelt. The purpose of thewalk-around restraint harness is to allow aircrewmembers in flight to work around opendoors without anyone falling out of the aircraft. Therefore, the aircrewmember must adjust the pigtail to a length that allows freemovement within the aircraft. This samelength must not go beyond the door opening.

In the event of an accident, the walk-aroundrestraint harness will not prevent injury. Whennot required to walk, aircrewmembers shouldsit down and use seat belts .

Point of contact is Mr. James Dittmer,AUTOVON 693-3573 or Commercial 314-263-3573.Back To Basics

Recent phone calls from the field indicateaviation life support equipment (ALSE) technicians need to go back to basics to inspect andperform maintenance by the book.

Survival Vests. The SRU-21/P survival vestincludes an optional survival knife. The loca-

24

tion of the knife on the vest (as shown in TM55-1680-317-23&P, Aviation Unit and AviationIntermediate Maintenance Manual with RepairParts and Special Tools List for Army AircraftSurvival Kits, paragraph C-18) is mandatorywith handle up, blade down and next to thePRC-90 radio pocket. This position is thesafest. I f one has the knife positioned up onthe shoulder with the handle down and theblade up, that individual will look at seriousfacial injuries during a crash sequence.

Survival Kits. When the ALSE techniciansecures the slide fastener thong, that individualuses the same method shown in TM 55-1680-317-23&P, figure 2-9a on page 2-50. The noteon page 2-49 tells one how to sew the tacstitches. The aircrewmember should not useplastic cable ties or safety wire to secure theslide fastener thong, but instead should use theprescribed method. The aircrewmember shouldnot remove any mandatory item from anysurvival kit and replace it with anything, evenif the replacement is almost like the original.One can add but not replace mandatory itemsto a survival kit.

Aircraft First Aid Kits. Referencing leadseals and prescribed methods in TM 55-1500-

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204-25/1, General Aircraft Maintenance Manual, change 37, tells how to use the lead sealsto secure the aircraft first aid kit. Aircrewmembers should not use nylon seals or fasteners, because no one can break the ties with lessthan a 8- to 12-pound pull. Most often, onewill need a pocket knife to cut the plastic /nylon seal.

SPH-4 Helmet. ALSE technicians are notperforming the SPH-4 helmet maintenance andinspections by the book. Inspections haveshown that helmets have improper ear cushions. The correct ear cushion, however, hasthe ' bump" on it. This bump is positioned atthe bottom of the ear in the valley of the outer

lobe. The bump does not build up sweat onhot days.

The donut that belongs in the eve helmetsuspension assembly does not belong in theSPH-4 suspension assembly. If parts are not inthe SPH-4 helmet manual, they do not belongin or on the SPH-4 helmet.

Aircrewmembers should help themselves bygoing by the book while they inspect or repair.In the long run, each person helps the other byhaving a good and safe ALSE program thatlater means successful Aviation Resource Management Survey inspections. Point of contactis Mr. Jim Angelos, AUTOVON 693-3574.

If you have a question about personal equipment or rescue/survival gear, write PEARL 'S AMC Product Management Office, ATTN:AMCPM-ALSE, 4300 Goodfel low Blvd., St. Louis, MO 63120-1798 or call AUTOVON 693-3573 or Commercial 314-263-3573.

u.s. Army Class A Aviation Flight MishapsArmy Total CostNumber Flying Hours Rate Fatalities (in millions)

FY 89 (through 30 June) 26 1,353,187 1.92 28 $100.9FY 90 (through 30 June) 25 1,382,934* 1.81 31 $111.0

' estimated

u.s. Army Aviation Digest 25


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The new Alrcrew Integrated Helmet System has a star war's appearance.The U.S. Army Aviation Development Test Activity, Ft. Rucker, AL, finishedtesting the system in February.

26

Seeing Better inthe DarkCaptain Mark R. Pedron

CPT Mark R. Pedron was attending the AviationOfficer Advanced Course 89-3, U.S. Army AviationCenter, Ft. Rucker, AL , when he wrote this article.

HAVE YOU GOT thewires? Come on, can you see thewires at 300 meters?" asked CW3Hudson."OK, I think I've got 'em. Just

let me adjust this left tube,"replied 2LT Johnson.The above dialogue could beheard during any night vision de-vice (NVD) training flight at theU.S. Army Aviation Center, Ft.Rucker, AL. However, this con-versation, or one just like it, willnow take place in a classroom.The A viation Center has estab-lished the first NVD training andoperations facility. The facility isdesigned to enhance the currentNVD training at the AviationCenter. This training also pro-vides the field commander with amore qualified and better trainedpilot.HistoryBetween 1974 and 1988, therewere numerous accidents duringNVD flights. More than 120 air-craft and 64 lives were lost. Therewas a total dollar cost of $139million. Pilot error was named asthe major contributing factor inmost of these accidents.A review of aviation accidentsrevealed that there are some mis-understandings among pilots onthe use and limitations of NVDs.The command at the AviationCenter felt that to correct thisdeficiency the initial aviation stu-dent needed more ground andclassroom instructions on theproper use of NVDs.Currently, NVD instruction istaught in three environments: thestudent is familiarized with theNVDs in a classroom, performscockpit operations in the flightsimulator and then is taught tofly with devices in the aircraft.

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With this three-step method,there was no hands-on practicalexercise during academics for thestudent to see the limitations andhazards of NVD flight before actual flight training.In 1987 the commander of theAviation Center, concerned withthe NVD training deficiency, visited the Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-One(MAWTS-One) in Yuma, AZ. AtMAWTS-One, the Marines hadcontracted for a night trainingclassroom. The Marine CorpsNight Imaging and Threat Evaluation (NITE) Laboratory provided the Marine Corps aviatorswith basic operation, limitationsand introduction to NVDs andtheir vulnerabilities to laser warfare. The lab was divided intofour rooms: the eye lane (focuslcalibration) room for basic operation and adjustment; the terrainboard room for viewing of nightflight hazards with NVDs; thelaser threat room for viewing thevulnerabilities of the devices during laser operations; and thenear-infrared (lR) video projection room for viewing flight footage wearing the devices.

The commander was so impressed with the NITE Laboratory that he directed the AviationCenter to build a similar facility.The Directorate of Plans, Training, Mobilization and Securityacted as lead agency, along withthe Directorate of CombinedArms Tactics, now the Directorate of Tactics and Simulation(DOTS), in the constructionof the facility. The DOTS teachesNVD academics.Facility Description

The Night Vision Device Training and Operations Facility ex-


poses aviators to th e fullspectrum of possible flight conditions in a low-risk environment.The facility is made up of threeclassrooms, and each has a different training focus. The threerooms are the eye lane room, theterrain board room and the projection room.

The eye lane room is dedicatedto introducing and familiarizingstudents to NVDs. The studentslearn to fit, adjust and operatethe ANIAVS-6 and AN/PVS-5NVDs. Using high and low contrast tribar resolution charts, students are taught the properprocedures for focusing theNVDs. In addition, basic limitations and emergency proceduresare briefed at the facility.In the terrain board room, students view controlled variationson moon illumination and angles.Round terrain boards are furnished with known flight hazards,which allow students to view suchhazards as wires and antennas inlow illumination conditions.In the projection room, students, while wearing NVDs, view

near-IR films depicting a widevariety of flight conditions. Anycondition associated with NVDflight can be filmed during daylight hours, then projectedthrough a near-IR projection system. These conditions include basic flight maneuvers; nap-ofthe-earth, low-level and contourflight; formation flight; leadchanges; confined area operationsand flight hazards.Training Scope

Each year, the Night VisionDevice Training and OperationsFacility trains 3,600 students in23 U.S. Army Aviation Centercourses of instruction. Instructionat the facility enhances the current curriculum of NVD instruction.With the introduction of thissafety foundation before an actual NVD flight, we should havebetter qualified pilots to fly in thehigh-risk night environment. Theend result of this training translates into students who are betterprepared to fly a variety of NVDmissions, safely! f

Captain George V. DimitroY wears the Integrated Helmet and DisplaySighting System, the helmet used In the AH-64.

27


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NothingMysteriousAbout WhatMakes aGood PilotMAJ Lauran Paine Jr.Major Lauran Paine flies for Horizon Airlines, and isan OV-1 Mohawk pilot with the Oregon NationalGuard. Reprinted with permission of WesternFlyer/General Aviation.

28

BEING fairly se-nior at my airline, Iwas one of the first toget checked out in anew type airplane thecompany hadpurchased. The airlinethen asked me to be-come a check airmanin the new aircraft. Ihad always, in thepast, turned downsuch requests. Train-ing was just not my"thing." At any rate,being "companyman" and being sensi-tive to their need, thistime I said yes. Fromthis inauspicious be-ginning the way waspaved for some newlearning, for which Iam now grateful. Inmy new position I hadthe opportunity to flywith and check outsome very experiencedcaptains. After awhileI began to notice thegood ones had certaincharacteristics verymuch in common. Itook notes and I thinkthose characteristicsare important to passon. We can learnmuch that is impor-tant from good pilots .One of the things Ilearned is that the bestones are not the mostdemonstrative ones. Inother words, they arenot the loudest ones atthe bar. They are out-going people but fairlyintrospective about

their work; they arewhat psychologistswould call controlledextroverts. Thus mostof what I learnedfrom them was in thewatching. What fol-lows is what I saw incommon among thegood ones.

The good ones pre-pare. They come tothe task ready to fly.They know what isexpected of them andthey prepare to meetthose expectations.They know their limi-tations; they knowtheir aircraft's limita-tions. And they donot cut corners.

The good ones planahead. I could easilyhave said, "The goodones plan wayahead," because theydo. They are seldomcaught by surprise;while involved in oneevent they alreadyhave another plan inmind if the presentone does not workout. Their "war sto-ries" are usually onlyones of some mechani-cal failure becausethey plan ahead suchthat they seldom, ifever, put themselves ina position to fail.

The good onesknow and respect theweather. The goodones study the weatherbefore they go; they

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are aware of worst are fitting in the big can be so timid as to some lengths to staycase scenarios and picture. The good say no to everything; healthy both physicallyplan accordingly. Sim- ones even anticipate that is safe but accom- and mentally. Theyply put, they just do the controller's needs plishes little. The good have the courage andnot leave weather to and are courteous and pilots get the job intelligence to not flychance. And they helpful to them as well done. They will go to when they know theyavoid the really bad as to other pilots. The the limit but that is are not up to flying.stuff like root-canal good ones never think because they knowwork. they are the only air- what the limit is. They The good ones read.

The good ones look plane in the sky. use-but do not Yeah, they are alwaysoutside a lot. Almost The good ones are abuse-limits. Mini- reading about avia-constantly! They scan brief on the radio. mums are sacred to tion. Newspaper arti-inside but, VFR, their The good pilots know them. des, magazines,attention is outside. what the controller The good ones are books; if it has to doCockpit duties are needs to know and safe. It follows that with airplanes they aredone so that no one will say in one call pride never gets in the interested. That inter-thing keeps their heads what many take three way of being safe. est pays them divi-down for extended calls to say. And the They will get the job dends. They are awareperiods of time. In good ones, when given done-if it can be of all aspects of theirother words, when a frequency change, done-but with safety industry. It is anflying, they are heads- never rudely reply, first. awareness that pays;up people. "Bye." The good ones do they are always up todate.The good ones The good ones have not mind checkrides. The one word Inever seem to get ex- a feel for their air- Really! For the good would pick to sum upcited. The good ones plane. The good ones pilots it is an opportu- the good ones woulddo not rattle easily; just seem to know nity to show their be professional. Flyingthey just sort of work where their airplane is, stuff. In fact, if after is what they do andthrough things, bit by insofar as how it is a checkride, you men- they do it well. (Thebit, until they get the flying, at all times. tion an area of con- type airplane is imma-situation under con- Their maneuvers are cern to them they terial; they are profes-trol. They exude a never in doubt. They already know what sional in anyrather quiet confidence are the master of their they did (and probably airplane.)in most all situations . craft; the craft never know some things they Many will readI guess it follows, flies them. It follows did that you did not themselves into thethen, that that's why that the good ones are even catch). The good characteristics of thethe good ones are gen- out flying; you do not ones set their stan- good ones when inerally very smooth; no get a feel for an air- dards much higher reality there are butjerky, rapid control plane sitting in an of- than the minimums, few. But is that notmovements from these fice talking yet they remain open one of the beauties ofpilots, just constant about it. minded to new tech- aviation? It is alwaysattention and gentle The good ones are niques. challenging. We havepressures. proud. I wanted to say The good ones take yet to fly the perfectThe good ones are the good ones are not care of themselves. flight but we shouldaware of their sur- wimps but that gives They just understand always be out thereroundings. They know poor connotation in that when they are trying. That is whatwhere other IFR traf- print. By wimp, I healthy they perform the good ones arefi,c is and where they mean too timid. One better. They go to doing. -----=,.U.S. Army Aviation Digest 29


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Above and Beyond theCall of DutyCorporal Ruben SantosDepartment of Enlisted Training

U.S. Army Aviation CenterFort Rucker, AL

CONGRESS ESTABLISHEDthe Medal of Honor in 1862. Thismedal is to be given for "a deed ofpersonal bravery or self-sacrificeabove and beyond the call of dutywhile a member of the ArmedForces in actual combat with anenemy of the Nation." The roll ofhonor includes 3,394of the tens of millions of men andwomen who haveserved their countryin the time of needsince the Civil War.Among them are thenames of generalsand privates alikeAmericans of everycolor and creed from Medal of Honorevery corner of this vast land. As asymbol of heroism, it has no equalin American life. General George S.Patton once declared, "I'd give myimmortal soul for that decoration."But t\l.e Medal of Honor is earnedin action at the risk of a soldier'slife. The medal is not given for30

ordinary bravery. Fighting men areexpected to be brave. That is part oftheir duty and the Medal of Honoris given only to the bravest of thebrave. Special Forces Sergeant(SGT) Roy P. Benavidez was one ofthe men willing to put his duty, hiscountry and the welfare of his com

rades above himself.A 12-man SpecialForces reconnaissance team had beeninserted 48 kilometers inside Cambodiaon a Top Secret intelligence gatheringmission. Standing inside the radio shackat Loc Ninh, Cam-

photo by Oscar Porter bod a,on 2 May1968, SGT Benavidez was amazed atthe sound of gunfire coming overthe radio. SGT Benavidez rushed tothe helicopter pad and jumped intoa UH-l Huey helicopter as it readiedfor takeoff. Over the border, enemyfire, which was too heavy to allowthe H uey to land near them, sur-

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rounded the men on the ground.The pilot reached another clearing75 yards away and SOT Benavidezjumped out, running toward theAmerican position.Enemy fire poured at him fromtrees and bushes all around. SOTBenavidez felt the bullets go into hislegs and face. The fire knocked himdown several times, but he kept ongoing. Reaching the team, SOT Be-navidez found four men dead andeight others wounded. When the he-licopter touched down, a few Ameri-cans climbed aboard while SOTBenavidez ran to retrieve classifieddocuments and a camera. While re-turning, SOT Benavidez was shot inthe back and knocked down. Look-ing up, he saw the helicopter crashand burn after being hit by sniperfire. He ran to the aircraft andpulled out two crewmen, then ledthem to the others and established asmall defensive perimeter.By now, he was bleeding heavilyfrom bullet wounds all over hisbody. One man begged SOT Benavi-dez to kill him, but the sergeant toldhim to "shut up. We don't havepermission to die!" SOT Benavidezand the others were on the groundalmost 8 hours. During that time,several helicopters were shot downtrying to evacuate the men. Finally,one helicopter landed nearby. SOTu.s. Army Aviation Digest

Benavidez was taking the men to theaircraft when he was struck on theback of the head by a rifle butt.Wheeling around he saw a NorthVietnamese soldier thrusting a bayo-net toward his midsection. SOT Be-navidez grabbed the blade, cuttingopen his

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Army Aviation Digest - Jul 1990

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