Army Aviation Digest - Mar 1968

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ESC PE AND EVASION

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UNITED

DIRECTOR OF ARMY AVIATION ACSFORDEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

COL Edwin L Powell Jr .

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COMMANDANT U. S . ARMY AVIATION SCHOO L

MG Delk M. Oden

ASST COMDT U. S. ARMY AVIATION SCHOOL

COL M. H . Parson

DIGEST EDITORIAL STAFF

MAJ L J. Herman Jr. ChiefRichard K. Tierney EditorWill iam H. SmithDiana G . WilliamsJohn P. Jones

GRAPHIC ART SUPPORT

Harold G. l inn

Harry A. Picke lDorothy L CrowleyAngela A. Akin

DIRECTOR, U . S . ARMY BOARD FOR AVIATION

ACCIDENT RESEARCH

COL Warren R. Williams

USA8AAR EDUCATION AND LITERATURE DIV

Pierce L Wiggin Chief

Will iam E. CarterJack DeloneyTed KontosCharles MabiusPatsy Thompson

Mary W. Windham

RM VI TION

1GESMARCH 968 VOLUME 4 NUMBER 3

ESCAPE AND EVASION, John P Jones

CHECK THAT FUEL CONSUMPTION, CPT Robert D Taylor

DEAD RIGHT, CW2 Robert R Vaughan, Jr.

I HAVE THE AIRCRAFT, CPT S C Allison andCPT W P Campbell

A DUTY DAY IN VIETNAM, CPT John L Brown

WITH THE INFANTRY, MAJ Howard J. Stiles

VIEWS FROM READERS

KITTEN IN THE TANK, Francis P McCourt

YOU NEED A UNIT SURVIVAL OFFICER, CPT John R Ulbinski

THE GREATEST AVIATOR, by Ivan Slipshod

THE MISADVENTURE OF BUDDY BUG, CPT Robert S Fairweathe r

YOU HOllER, WE FOllER, MAJ Norman W Kemp

CRASH SENSE

PEARL S

TALES FROM THE TROJAN

AIRMOBILE ARTillERY PLATFORMS

The mission of the U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST is to provide information of an operatioor functional nature concerning safety and aircraft accident prevention , training maintenanceoperations research and development aviation medicine . and other related data.

The DIGEST is an official Departmont of the Army periodical published monthly under the suvhion of the Commandant U. S. Army Aviation School. Views expressed herein are not necesst h o ~ of Department of the Army or the U. S. Army Aviation School . Photos re U. S. Army unotherwise specified. Material may be reprinted provided credit is given to the DIGEST and to author unless otherwise indicated.

Articles, photos and items of interest on Army Aviation are invited . Direct communicationauthorized to: Editor-in-Chief , U. S. Army Aviation Digest, Fort Rucker, Alabama.

Use of funds for print ing of this publication has been approved by Headquarters , Departmof the Army, 3 November 1967.

Active Army units receive distribution under the pinpoint distribution system as outlinedAR 310-1, 20 March 62, and DA Circular 310-57, 14 March 63 . Complete DA Form 12·4 and send rectly to CO , AG Publications Center. 2800 Eastern Boulevard , Baltimore, Md. 21220 . For any chain distribution requirements merely initiate a revised DA Form 12-4.

National Guard and Army Reserve units submit requirements through their state adjutants gen

eral and U. S. Army Corps commanders respectively .For those not eligible for official distribution or who desire personal copies of the DIGEST,subscriptions , 4.50 domestic and 5 .50 overseas are available from the Superintendent of DocumU. S. Government Printing Office, Washington D. C. 20402.



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scape nd vasion

T HE NAME OF THE coursewas Escape and Evasion-and

that's just what most of us wantedto do. Escape our certain plightand evade having to weave ourway through the tangled woodsin the middle of the night.

But like all escape and evasionsituations this was forced, leavingno room for debate as to whetheror not it should be accomplished.

Speaking strictly from hearsay,t can best be compared to

motherhood. It 's just plain agonywhile it's happening, but whenit's over, the relief of having itbehind you is more than enoughto compensate for the suffering.

The only evidence that lifecould survive in this pit of miserywas the occasional idiot hoot,

MARCH 1968

ohn P ones

hoot of an owl and rather frequent utterances of oh [curseword, curse word] as someonefell into a hole or pulled a thornfrom his nose. I can guaranteeyou I feared I might freeze todeath in the middle of the nastiestbunch of briars, ravines, and mudI have ever seen.

The group to which I was as-signed expressed the expectedamount of elation at being ableto take a civilian through thecourse. Oddly enough though,they somehow got my name confused and insis ted on calling meMillstonel

After the instructor told usthat we were to establish a tactical encampment, cook our meal(we had had nothing to eat all

day long) and then begin theE and E, we voted on whetherwe wanted rabbit or chicken.

One thinking lieutenant suggested we get a rabbit since i twould be easier to clean. Havingshown this obvious flair for theculinary art, he was immediatelyappointed chef and told to gopick up our rabbit. We knew itwas a rabbit he brought back because that's what we decided wewanted, but this rabbit had justtwo legs, two wings and a beak.

We set out, all 18 of us, carrying our airborne rabbit, twoonions and two carrots, with ourchef ceremoniously leading theway. When we reached the sitewhere we were to make camp,the captain in charge finally

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found a task for which he felt Iwas qualified. I was proud andfelt I had really become one ofthe troops as I gathered the firewood.

T o cook our meal, whichturned out to be half a canteencup of some pretty tasty soup,we dug a rectangular trench,

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built the fire and, s icking theirhandles into the earth, hung thecups over the flames.

N at to dampen your spirits,but in case you haven't alreadydiscovered, one winged rabbit,two onions and two carrots willnot make stew for 8 people. Abroth with an occasional lumpof something is about as far asyou can stretch it - even if youadd a dash of dirt, a sprinkling ofleaves, and a few unfortunate insects.

When the feast was over, weproperly smeared our faces withcharcoal. Again we went nontac-

tical for our trek to a Vienamese village where the actualescape and evasion would begi

A Daniel Boone I 'm not, antripping the light fantasticthe glare of flfShlights I endeup kneedeep in water even beforthe good part began. The threother men assigned to my E anE team were obviously delightedto see my agility and were confident that we could cross thaggressors' lines without beindetected.

At the village, instructor pesonnel explained that most vilages like the one we werehave a system of escape tunneland warned us of the danger

pungi pits.When the lecture was over we

began a tour of the village. A

our guide warned us nottamper with village shrines, thesky lit up and a series of eplosions rocked the earth. Someone yelled that the tunnel win a hut at the rear of the vilage, so we blindly ran in thadirection.

As I scooted down the passageway behind the three me n whmeant my only hope of makingthrough the course, my ponchogot caught on something at thtop of the tunnel. I droppedmy stomach, snaked my way

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U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGES



through the narrow portion, andscurried out at the other end.

Then i t hit me: here I was inhe middle of a clearing, didn' t

have the f ~ n t e s tidea of whichdirection I was supposed to go,and the back of one running GIooks just like another. When

my panic had nearly reached apoint of calling the whole thingoft, someone grabbed my shoulder and said, "Come on; thisway. Whether out of pity orwhat, it didn't matter; my buddieshad saved me.

With all the stealth and cun

ning of a Caterpillar tractor, Ifollowed them through the brush.A volley of shots was fired anda voice yelled "Halt " Ah, butthat was too far away to be meantfor us. We crept on a little fartheruntil we came to a road.

Our point man, who gave megreat confidence because he wasan infantry officer, told us wewould meet by the tallest tree onthe other side if we were detected

M RCH 968

crossing the road and had to flee.One by one we made our way

across without being discovered.When we had penetrated far

enough into the woods on the opposite side, we stopped to get acompass reading. Confident thatwe were on the right track in spiteof having a broken compass, weagain set ou t through the boonies.The farther we wen t the moredense the forest became.

Our point man assured us thatthis was as i t should be becausewe had to go through a valley andacross a river. We had one flash

light with a red lens and a set ofweak batteries. We used i t onlyfor a moment at a time when thegoing got particularly rough.

After a while I got hopelesslyhung in a "wait-a-minute" briarand asked the lieutenant to turnon the light for a minute. Heturned i t on and whistled in relief. Had he taken one more stephe would have gone off the edgeof a 10-15 foot ravine.

After what seemed like an eternity we finally heard sounds ofother life. "Purple," the othergroup challenged. "Passion," wereplied.

"Hey, how did you guys getacross this stream? . one of themyelled to us.. Feeling the chill ofour wet socks and pants legs, wetold them there was a bridge alittle ways back. Not buying ourstory they asked us to wait a minute until they crossed so we couldcompare compass readings.

. "Our compass doesn't work,"they told us, and oddly enoughtheir problem

was ·the

same asours. The dial wouldn't turn. Sinceboth of the instruments providedthe same "inaccurate" infomation,they went their way and we ours.

Somewhere ahead of us weheard a truck. The chef, whoreally was a . transportation officer,said it was a six-by. We reachedthe road and took another reading from the map.

"We must be here," one of my

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buddies said, pointing to the map.No, we can't be. We have to

be here, another answered, pointing to a second location.

Finally we all agreed that wedidn' t have the slightest idea ofwhere we were. The two lieutenan s headed down the edge ofthe road in opposite directions tosee if they could find some land

mark that would be on the map.The woe and I remained in thebrush.

Because of a unique intersection and a road sign we were ableto find our location, and decidedto remain near the road for direction . Our spirits heightenedsince we knew we were headed inthe right direction. We movedright along toward our partisanpoint.

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After about an hour I heard amotor running in the distance andremembered the warning they hadgiven us earlier in the day.

We used to have a 24-voltgenerator at the POW compoundand some of the guys would pullthe wires out to help their bud-

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dies. O ur new generator is 1volts and to avoid possible electrocution we have to forbid thisthe major had said.

He also told us that i we folowed a straight line we wouldright past the compound. Well,there it was just s big as lif

U S RMY VI TION DIGEST



ight in the middle of our path.It was obvious that the only

way we could get around it wi thut ending up as residents in the

middle of all that barbed wire waso cross the road. Fortunately, the Jr<> _ _

woods on that side were relativelylear and we made pretty goodime, with my falling into a waist

deep hole the only incident.A short distance beyond the

ompound was the trail leading tour partisan poin . s we crossedack to the other side we heardomeone walking in the woods.

We stopped and he stopped. Weeard the bolt of an M-14 (at leasthat's the nomenclature our transortation officer offered and we

decided to wait a few moments.When i t appeared safe to re

ume our trek, we again movedut. We reached the warmth ofhe fire at our partisan point withut further incident.

I was informed tha t I was toemain there and my friends, whoad somehow gotten me throughhe whole mess, were given theiroordinates to the pickup point.

A short time la ter I was pickedp and taken back to the POWompound so I could observe thectivities there. It didn't take longor me to appreicate that we hadot been caught.

A captain who was commanant of the compound, like the

mother in My Fair Lady, had avoice that would shatter glass. Heurely must have spent manyleepless nights devising new

methods of breaking a man. One

uch device looked like a fat hitchng post similar to those in teleision westerns.

When I arrived at the comound the captain had a lieutennt kneeling on the cross memer, balancing himself with oneinger on a length of two-by-four.

The captain made him extend hisree arm in front of him to furtherid the misery.

The commandant fired ques-

M RCH 968

tion after question at the lieutenant while he kicked lightly atthe two-by-four as if to knock i tout from under his prisoner.

Bit by bit the lieutenantdrooped lower and lower as fa-

tigue overcame him. When it became apparent he would drop atany moment, the commandantharshly ordered him to get upand run around the compound.After two or three laps the captain ordered him to get back onthe log, and began the wholegrueling ordeal again.

Meanwhile, other aggressor per-

sonnel were subjecting the otherprisoners to similar treatment inan effort to break their resistance.

As the sun finally rose in the

east, 180 tired but hopefully wiseraviators began boarding Hueysfor the end of their E and E.

Incidentally, the broken compasses weren't broken at all. I tseems that lifting the sighting device unlocks the dial so it may beturned. It's such a simple thing,but I can assure you at least eightof us are living testimony that thesjmple things can make T H E difference.

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Che k That Fuel onsumptionA N OPP O RTUNITY for a

TDY flight to Fort Worth,Texas. This is always appealingto a bachelor. u ~ job would beto fly out, drop off some parts tothe Bell people, and r e t u r r ~Noth-ing real exciting or real critical,but an opportunity to go cross

country. I competed for the opportunity, since I knew a younglady going to an airlines stewardess school, same location.

Our section leader got out hishighly unofficial TDY roster,titled Good Deals Duty Roster,and decided, with everything considered, that I (a recent Vietnamreturnee) and another lieutenant(a recent graduate of the school)

would go. We were both new inthe unit and my flight time wasconfined recently to renewing myinstrument ticket and one radiorelay mission in our old reliableU-6A. I was warned that the aircraft had been scheduled for salvage before the unit was formed,and that they were not in goodcondition.

We made a prefligh checkedweather, and were ready to go.After filing a flight plan with

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Captain Robert D Tay lor

Lawson ops at Fort Benning, Ga.,with a fuel stop at Jackson, Miss.,we took off. Our flight was uneventful until we were about 25miles short of Jackson. Weatherwas moving in and we made anormal VOR approach in heavyrain, and filed a flight plan en

route with the FSS at Jackson.We parked the aircraft as di

rected and charged through therain t the terminal. After a shortsnack, again we checked weatherand found that low ceilings werepredicted at Greater Southwest In-ternational; however, our weatherforecas ted was sufficien t. I t w s

still raining hard when I crawledinto the left seat and started mypre-takeoff check (no thoroughpreflight was made i t w s r in-

ing . I was interested in doing theflying because the pilot was veryunsure of himself upon landing atJackson. I had to take over thecon troIs after the second, driftingbounce.

I called out switches on andchecked the fuel. The tanks wereindicating full. As copilot on thefirst leg I had no idea of howmuch fuel was used. I asked my

copilot how much fuel was added.He didn't know. As I was strapping in, he had sought out thcontract fuel people and hadsigned for the fuel. He told methe tip tanks were full.

We received an IFR clearanceand took off, headed for Jackson

VOR. About 15 minutes out oJackson we were advised by radathat we were 10 miles right ocourse. Our omni, however, indicated on course. I advised centerof this fact. They rogered outransmission.

Our winds were very poor andquite different from forecast. Awe droned on in our reliableBeaver I became mor e and moreworried over the fuel supply. T hweather was clear and darkneswas setting in. You could see dark area ahead and I felt a greasurge of excitement. I enjoy actualinstrument flying and love to f

CPT Taylor was assigned to th e U.Army Aviation School's Departmentof Tactics at the time his story wawritten. He based his account oactual experience with the hope imay save others the mental anguishhe and his copilot encountered.

U S ARM Y V I T ION DIGEST



n weather. Of course, I avoiddangerous weather that producesthunderstorms, ice, or a moderateto heavy turbulence. I had justeturned from Vietnam where I

had several times flown AI in my0 1 Bird Dog and loved it.

My VOR had settled down andFort Worth center picked us upon radar. Apparently our VORtrouble had only been temporary. We were able to see the VORstations on the ground en route,and with the use of available ADFstations, we checked and foundthat the VOR appeared reliable.

We hit the weather at 6,000 feetabout 50 miles short of Dallas.My map light was burned out,

(written up, but not taken careof-EDP). I pulled my flashlightout of my ] epp case. Deadl t hadbeen a long time since I had triedi t out. I started studying GreaterSouthwest s approaches, and to doit I used the available light frommy copilot s map light. He tookover the con troIs and flew forabout 20 minutes before I noticedthat ice was building up on thewings. I advised center; they

rogered and told us to expect alower altitude after passing Dallas.I had drained the tip tanks

very quickly. Remembering whatone of myoId instructors had toldme during instrument phase, Iplaced the tip-tank selector to

right in hopes of drawing everypossible drop. Fuel was gettingcritical and I leaned i t out somemore. I t was difficult to understand why our fuel was so lowsince we had only been flying 3hours and 50 minu tes, and weonly had 16 gallons of fuel left.Also I was confused as to why Icould only get 10 gallons out ofthe tips.

We were vectored for a finalapproach course and turned overto Greater Southwest tower, whoadvised us our weather was dropping very quickly. I advised themthat our fuel was getting low and

MARCH 968

requested Dallas weather. We hadbeen monitoring our weather andit had closed in around us. Therewas not one airport within ourfuel range with an acceptableforecast. The tower advised usthat Dallas was closed and thatOUr alternate was reportingweather below our minimums.

I knew then that our only hopein getting on the ground safelywas this approach. I had longsince given up on my copilot, ashe now sat frozen in the rightseat. I turned the fuel selectorswitch to rear and flew until thefuel pressure dropped, and I didthe same on the middle tank. Ihad fuel in the front tank only.

I might mention that fuel management was something that Iplaced stress upon. In Vietnam weleaned our engines out in an attempt to get as much time aspossible. On many occasions weflew right up to the last momentwhen we had enough fuel to getus home. (On one occasion I ranout of gas at about 3,000 feet, 2miles from our airstrip at QuangN gai, and landed wi th a dead

engine.)Then the copilot's map lightburned outl I had already memorized the minimum altitudethough, and continued descending. However, my copilot was getting very exci ted.

Greater Southwest tower musthave sensed my apprehensivenessand seriousness, because after wereported the outer marker inbound the controller said theweather was a heavy rainshowerover the sou th half of the field,moving very quickly, the ceilingwas below minimums, and con-t inu approach He continued totalk to me and kept me advisedfor the remainder of the approach.

I descended quickly to minimums and was relieved to see theground momentarily. The approach lights were in sight. I wasstill in the clouds though. In

desperation I descended another100 feet. The bright strobe lightswere giving me vertigo, and Icalled the tower controller to turnthem off. He didn t turn them off.I frantically called him again asthe lights seemed to fill the cabin.They continued. I didn' t know Iwas descending. I looked up atmy selector panel and checked myswi tches. I was on intercom. Iswitched to number two andyelled to approach to turn thestrobe lights off. They went outimmediately.

I then remembered that I hadto give instructions to my copilotto tune in the locator middlemarker and had forgotten to

switch back. I looked at my altimeter and was 50 feet above fieldelevation. I looked out, and couldsee nothing but heavy rain. I waspouring the coal to my R-985 andjust beginning to climb when Isaw a portion of the runway andthe numbers. As I touched downthe rain seemed to increase inintensity. I gave a sigh of reliefand looked over at my copilot.He was staring out as though he

had been struck by lightning.His white appearance startled meback into reality.

I taxied to the ramp and shutdown. We had flown 4 hours and

U minutes. I was interested infinding out just how much fuelwe had left. (I didn't even darelook at the fuel gauge the last fewminutes of flight.) After refuelingwe found we had 3 gallons of fuelleft in our front tank. A little tooclose for me.

I closed the flight plan andcalled approach control to saythanks. I still enjoy weather fly-ing, but I am not nearly as trusting. I plan closer, make sure mycopilot is qualified, and I checkthe consumption ratio of fuel foreach aircraft instead of putt ingdown the amount of fuel time Iam supposed to get. I also keep acheck on my own qualifications.

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D E D R I G H TThe General does not know it yet but he is deadl

There remains only the mechanics of dying

HE MORNING is still dark,and would be silen t if i t were

not for the many things that makeup the beginning of a new day onan Army post. There is the highpi ched whine of a 3/4 ton truckas it drops off new guards andpicks up the ones who, while waiting to be relieved, have been staring at their watches in impatience.There are the spasmatic coughsof the outside men on KP in thevarious mess halls as they banggarbage cans around, hoping towake up some of the lucky ones

who are still lying, cocoon like, inthe warm protection of theirbunks. It is a day like any day andcould be on any post within theentire United States Army.

0700, 15 November: Major General P. T. Hennison has just fin-ished breakfast. He ate well-twoeggs (over easy), bacon (welldone), toast (dry), and coffee(black). He is looking over thepapers that he must present to themeeting at Fort Bains today. Mrs.Hennison asks his opinion of thesmall dinner she is planning forColonel and Mrs. McKay tonight.The general answers noncommittally, preoccupied with the papersthat he is studying. He does notrealize that he won t be at thedinner party. As a matter of factthere will be no dinner party atall. The general does not knowit yet, but he is d e ~ d There re-

CW2 Robert R Vaughan Jr.

mains only the mechanics of dy-ing.

0715, 15 November: CW3 RayVane, maintenance officer for ACompany of the aviation battalion, checks his distribution andnotices a TWX safety of flightmessage concerning UH-l aircraft.

t is an inspection that must bemade before the next flight. Heinitials the TWX, puts it in a redfolder for his tech inspectors tosee, and makes a note that all aircraft scheduled to fly in supportof the FTX today must have this

accomplished before they fly.Number 555 is down for an intermediate, so there is no immediateproblem with it.

0745, 15 November: lLT JerryTeas, the general s aide, dials G3to arrange for an aircraft. He hadno time to do it the day before,and now he is really pressed fortime because the Old Man, assuming that everything is already prepared, is busy preparing for thetrip.

0800, 15 November: The weatherman is compiling the weatherforecast and readying it for posting. Although he doesn t realizeit, he is this very minute concerned wi th the weather en rou teto the general s destination. It is0/0 in the hills, clear in thevalleys.

0815, 15 November: WOI LarryNewpilot is just finishing his first

tour of duty as staff duty officer.He was so intent on doing well othis first strictly officer type duty

that he stayed awake the wholenight. He turned in a voluminousduty report, covering everythingfrom the results of his tours oinspection to a running accounof the temperature during thnight. He is very tired now, buat least he has the satisfaction ofknowing that he has performedhis first tour of duty in an outstanding manner. t is also hilast tour of duty.

0830, 15 November: SFCNaimec, A Company s operationsergeant, indicates completion othe inspections on an aircraft thaare to fly today and stands at thwindow watching as they take off.He notices that no pilots are leftbehind, but it doesn t really matter; there are no aircraft availablenow anyway. The telephone ringsand the caller requests an aircraft, but SFC Naimec informshim of the current status of naircraft, no aviators.

CW2 Vaughan, a member of theMaintenance Training Departmentat Ft Eustis offers the knowledgehe has gained of aircraft maintenance limitations. Through his fictitious account he vividly driveshome the need for inspection andmaintenance when it is due, nowhen it is convenient.



0845. 15 November: CaptainMinz. post G3. has just receivedword that there is neither aircraftnor aviator available. and he isflabbergasted. He looks on thechart for A Company. and noticesthat sixteen UH-ls are assignedand eighteen aviators. He wondersif the people just don t realizethe importance of this mission.He decides to apply a little pressure, to let them know how important the mission really is.

0900, 15 November: SFCThomas of Aviation Battalion S-3is manning the phone in the absence of the S-3 Officer. It rings,and when he answers i t he receives a more strongly wordedrequest for an aircraft. Sergeant

Thomas promises to see what hecan do, so he calls A Companyone more time. This time SFCN aimec gives him the exact status.Two pilots on leave, six TDY,nine on the FTX support mission,and Mister Newpilot, who justcompleted a 24 hour duty. As foraircraft, one DH-I is just beginning intermediate, three are onTDY, eight flying on the FTX,and five EDP. Sergeant Thomasthanks him and hangs up. Hecalls the post G3 with the information.

0915, 15 November: CaptainMinz remarks to someone howexasperating i t is to have all thoseaircraft and pilots assigned, andthen not be able to use them whenhe really needs one. He reads offthe status of all the aircraft andaviators. One of the other menmentions that he knows what anintermediate is, and it seems to

him that the solution is rightthere. Stop the intermediate sinceit isn t very important anyway,and get Mister Newpilot to fly.Captain Minz decides to take itupon himself to consider this anemergency condition. He beginsanew his fight for the aircraft,this time with all the pressure ofthe post behind him.

0930, November:N aimec receives still another callconcerning the flight, and thistime the pressure of the wholesystem is on him. He pleads for afew minutes to see what he cando. During the few minutes, tokeep the pressure on, CaptainM inz has several other membersof various staffs call both A Company and the battalion S-3, demanding quick action. The aviation battalion succumbs to thepressure and orders A Companyto roll 555 ou t of the hangar. SFCNaimec is told to call WOl Newpilot's BOQ room and direct himto get dressed and be down to thefield for a 1030 takeoff.

1015, 15 November: WOl New

pilot is drinking a cup of coffeeand filing for his Hight. He seesthat it is in the hills andcalls the operations sergeant andtells him that he can t go. Thisinformation is relayed backthrough channels until someonehigher up calls the weathermanand gets the information that itis clear in the valley and a VFRcan go. N ewpilo t is told this, andhe begrudgingly agrees to go.

1020, 15 November: The general's staff car arrives to take himto the airfield. He knows nothingof the fight to get him an aircraft,and assumes that everything hadalready been laid on and he isleaving with the minimum of flap.

1025, -15 November:- The techinspector pulls a very hasty, incomplete inspection to complywith the TWX, so he can sign themessage off the book on 555. Mister Newpilot is sitting in the seatnapping, and the crewchief isstill tigh tening screws in inspection panels.

1028, 15 November: The general's car pulls up to the helicopter. Mister Newpilot and thecrewchief are standing at attention beside the aircraft, and thedriver of the car gets out andruns around to open the door forthe general. General Hennisonreturns the salutes and strides toward the aircraft. The crewchiefputs the star plates on the outside

of the aircraft and gets aboard,with the blades already spinninga.bove his head.

1030, 15 November: The powerful throb of the aircraft as i tpasses over post causes many members of the various staffs who wereinvolved in this morning s pressure proceedings to look up. Theysmile inwardly as they realize thatthe general probably little knowsor appreciates the effort they haveput into securing an aircraft forhim. They take another swallowof coffee, smugly content that theyhave done their part this morning. Probably none of them realize that they have just committedmurder.

POSTSCRIPTON 25 NOVEMBER, IN AND FOR THE DEPARTMENTOF THE ARMY, A TRIAL WAS HELD IN THE FORM

OFAN

ACCIDENT BOARD.NONE

OF THE TRUECRIMINALS WERE ARRAIGNED BEFORE THIS COURT,AND THE RESULTS THOUGH ENLIGHTENING WERE

INCONCLUSIVE. THE AFOREMENTIONED GUILTYPARTIES ARE STILL AT LARGE, CALLOUSLY ARRANGING THE MURDERS OF OTHER VIP S UNDERTHE AUSPICES OF CUTTING THE RED TAPE (ANDSOMETIMES RED X) TO GET AIRCRAFT FOR THEIRCOMMANDERS



Have he ircrafThe instructor must know not only howbut more important when to take control

Ca p tain S. C. Allison and Ca p tain W . P. Campbell

A CCIDENT FILES are filled with cases whereinstructor pilots have allowed students to go

too far before attempting to take the controls, orwher e there was a misunderstanding , as to who actually had control of the aircraft.

In an at t empt to reduce the probability of futureaccidents caused by any misunderstanding betweenan instructor pilot and a student as to who hascontrol of the aircraft , the Standardization Branch,Department of Rotary Wing Training at FortRucker, Ala. , published Standardization Memonumber 67 -3, dated 9 January 1967. This memodictates proper procedure for relinquishing controlof an aircraft from instructor to student or studentto instructor.

Briefly the memo states: When transferring control of the aircraft from instructor to student, theinstructor will state, You have the aircraft. Thestudent will then reply, I have it. Before relinquishing the controls, the instructor will look to seethat the student is physically on the aircraft controls.

When the instructor takes control of the aircraftfrom the student, the sequence begins with theinstructor saying, I have the aircraft. The studentwill look to make sure the instructor has control ofthe aircraft then state, You have it. Then and

only then will he release control of the a.ircraft.Strict adherence to these procedures should great

ly reduce or completely eliminate accidents causedby a misunderstanding of which pilot has control ofthe aircraft.

N ow that our problem of misunderstanding hasbeen solved, let us proceed to the case where theinstructor has allowed the student to go too farbefore taking over the con troIs.

Occasionally the instructor pilot fails to recognize

10

an accident-producing situation in progress. Eitherthrough his neglect to analyze the situation andapply corrective action in time, or through his inabilit y to recognize the situation as exceeding limitations on either the aircraft or his student, heallows the accident to occur. t then becomes aaccid ent on file in USABAAR with the contributingfactor , Instructor pilot failed to take control of thaircraft in time to prevent the accident.

To prevent accidents of this nature the instructormust know not only ow but, even more important,w h n to take control. As a general rule it is safe tsay that whenever there is doubt in the instructor'smind as to the safety of any part of a particularmaneuver, he should assume control of the aircraft

s simple as this rule is, it is violated almost dailyin our training because not enough instructors believe it, or if they believe it they become hypnotizedwhen confronted with the tight situation.

n example of this hypnotic effect occurs whenyou are doing 80 mph in a 60 mph zone and yosee the two timing ropes which clock your speestretched across the highway. You know you shouldhit your brakes or reduce speed before you run ovethem but you are slow reacting because of a hypnotic type condition. The speeding situation macost you a few dollars or your driver ' s license, bu

the situation you would be confronted with as helicopter instructor pilot might well cost you muchmore. The re a l trick is to be able to anticipate

CPTs Al lison and Campbell were assigned to the U.S

Army Aviation School's Rotary Wing QualificationCourse at the time they authored their article. It wa

through their experience and observation that theformulated the opinions expressed in I Have Th

Aircraft . CPT Allison currently is serving in Vietnamand CPT C ampbell has reentered civilian life.

U S ARMY AVIATION DIGE S



rough situations just moments away and take over.Another and more desirable way to prevent a

dangerous situation from going to termination is tonever let the ituation begin. Several techniques canbe employed to attain this desirable condition. Onemethod is to tap the particular control the studentis having problems with in the de ired direction.This method will be similar to verbally telling the

tudent he i making the wrong re ponse to a givensituation.

Another and probably the best method is to letthe tudent perform a maneuver in the manner hethink it hould be done while the instructor simul-taneously performs the same maneuver. The pointof error will be where the student feel resistance tohis efforts. From this the student can analyze thereason for his error and correct it.

This latter technique is considered better becausethe tudent performs the maneuver himself withgood firm guidance from a knowing hand. With theinstructor so close to the controls though the com-plaint that the instructor infringes on the student sprivilege of flying the aircraft-better known as rid-ing the control i s sometimes heard.

I think mo t instructors will agree that while thestudent has the contr ols the less riding of the con-trols by the instructor the better. Riding the con-trols tends to suppress the student s ability to per-ceive his faults. t increases the time required forhim to learn the control touch and pressures re-quired to obtain a desired result. t also gives the

student the feeling that he is not really responsiblefor the actions of the aircraft. He is unable to ex-periment and finally becomes much too qependenton the instructor.

While the above statements in favor of the stu-dent are very good in basic concept they havenumerous flaws which are as we hope to showaccident causing factors.

Fir t let us examine a situation that might besomewhat different from what we normally thinkof as an accident. An accident it is though and canbe measured in dollars or manhours for repair.

The particular situation is an engine or rotor sys-tem overspeed.

There are two ways to overspeed the rotor systemand one way to overspeed the engine.

In one instance both the engine and rotor systemwill get the overspeed simultaneously. The casewhere the rotor system only is damaged from anoverspeed we will just mention, since the studentseldom feels enough at ease in the aircraft to ac-complish it. This would be in a sharp deceleration

ontinued on page 5



uty ay In Vietnam

IT WAS THE tenth of February 1965when I awoke from a night's sleep

to a new challenge. The U. S. ArmyAirfield at Vinh Long in the Republicof South Vietnam burst into life asthe men stationed there made readyto wage war against the Viet Congo

0500 hours was a time for speedas the men ran to the latrine, sincehot water was hottest for those luckyindividuals who were first in line atthe wash basins.

0530 hours and another line, as Iawaited my order of breakfast (orwhatever they call it in the MekongManor Officers' Club ). If only thefood were as fancy as the namel

0600 hours and time was precious,as I had no desire to be rushed during my preflight inspection of myarmed UH 1 B helicopter. It was animportant day for me, for I was nolonger a worm, but a full-fledgedmember of the Cobras, as thearmed helicopter p latoon was known.My initial training period was over,and I was assigned for the first timeas aircraft commander of an armed

12

Captain John L. Brown

helicopter on a combat mission.0630 hours found my ship airborne

at last in a flight of six armed helicopters flying a tight V formationen route to the airfield a t Soc Trang.I was assigned to the second fireteam as wingman for the fire teamleader. It was a strain to stay in thenumber four position in the formation but our platoon leader helpedme by giving command guidanceover the radio: Move up, four, moveback, four too high, four too low,four. The blacktop runway at SocTrang was a most welcome sight aswe turned final in preparation forlanding and a premission briefing.

0800 hours and combat at last asour armed helicopter platoon arrivedon station over the village of Cau Ke.The Viet Cong were there as theiraccurate fire knocked out the hy·draulics of Cobra One, forcing himand his wingman to return to SocTrang for repairs. My moment oftruth had arrived also. I was orderedto exchange places with my fire teamleader; he had experienced FM radio

failure and could no longer communicate with the ground troops. I

took command of the fire team whilehe covered me. As we conducted alow level reconnaissance, a call camefrom our platoon leader: CobraLead receiving fire; automaticweapon at eight o'clock, red smokeis outl My fire team conducted afiring pass on the enemy positionusing machineguns, but as my shipbroke off to the right, 200 metersshort of the target, a loud explosionwas heard from the engine compart.ment followed by the low audiowarning and the flashing of assortedlights on the caution panel. TheUH· B fell out of the sky as I at

CPT Brown based his article on personal exper ience encountered whilhe was a member of an armedhelicopter platoon dur ing 1965 iVietnam. After serving as an instructor at the Army AviationSchool's Department of Tactics aFt Rucker he recently was reassigned to Vietnam.

U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST



tempted an autorotative landingfrom 250 feet absolute altitude: acritical maneuver for a ship loadedto maximum gross weight with fourteen 2.75 rockets, 10,000 rounds of2.76 mm machinegun ammunitionand a crew of four.

The main rotor was dangerouslylow as the copilot calmly called outthe airspeed. A full flare was executed just before touchdown, thusstopping the ship about 10 feet shortof a dike that could easily have overturned it. The ship was moderatelydamaged by the main rotor bladeswhich flexed down and hit the tailboom, but the entire crew was uninjured and immediately took up defensive positions around the downedship. The aviator who was flyingcover for our ship when it went downspotted a squad of Viet Cong closingin ) us rom a nearby treeline andtoo them under fire with rockets andmacfimeguns, killing eight. The crewa d w r rescued uninjured by twohelicopters that landed under coverof rocket and machinegun fire laiddown by the remaining armed helicopters.

1100 hours found my crew andmyself back on station with a newUH-1 B flying a protective orbit overour downed aircraft. The damagedship was successfully recovered andsling-loaded back to Soc Trang by atwin-engine CH-37 helicopter. Ourarmed platoon then returned to theoperational area.

1300 hours and the Vietnamesetroops had made contact with alarge force of Viet Cong who weredug in throughout the length of abanana-shaped treeline which ranparallel to a branch of the MekongRiver. The Viet Cong were beingharassed from behind by boats ofthe Vietnamese River Assault Group

on the river, while a troop of Vietnamese M 113 armored personnelcarriers supported by Vietnameseinfantrymen attempted a frontal assault.

The armed helicopters deliveredsuppressive rocket and machinegunfire to the Viet Cong flanks, but thefrontal assault was quickly stoppedby the Viet Cong gunners who scoreddirect hits with recoilless rifles on twoAPCs which burst into flames. The

M RCH 968

carriers immediately shifted into reverse and backed out of range of theenemy recoilless rifles. They continued to engage the enemy positionswith .50 caliber machinegun firewhile the River Assault Group hit theenemy from the rear with .50 caliber

machinegun and 20 mm cannon fire.Our armed helicopter platoon received enemy fire from 360 0 outsidethe friendly positions and hits w r

scored on our aircraft on each circuit. As a result, our armed helicopters resorted to overflying theenemy positions at 1,500 feet and firing straight down into the holes andtrenches. In this manner, some of thepressure was relieved from the friendly troops who w r pinned down bythe enemy fire. Constant suppressivefire was kept on the enemy by boththe Cobra armed platoon and theViking armed platoon from SocTrang.

t 2000 hours the last fljght wasmade from the battle area to SocTrong to refuel and rearm beforebeing released to return to homestation. The remaining Viet Cong hadbroken off contact with the friendlytroops and departed the area undercover of darkness. My crewchief discovered upon close examinationback at Soc Trang that our UH - l Bwas unsafe for further flight as theresult of a hit to the synchronjzedelevator and another hit which destroyed components located in the

battery compartment. As a result, Iwas ordered to fly back to homestation as copilot on another ship.

At 2030 hours, with great joy, theremnants of the Cobra armed helicopter platoon departed Soc Trangfor home station. But the joy was

short-lived as a radio message diverted the flight to the coast southeast of Tra Vinh, where an A 1-E Skyraider had been shot down by enemyground fire. Preliminary informationindicated that the Vietnamese observer had parachuted from the disabled craft while the American pilothad ridden the ship into the water.

The mission of the armed helicopters was to provide cover for amedical evacuation helicopter already searching the area a t lowlevel with its searchlight in a courageous effort to save the crew. TheViet Cong harassed the operation byfiring tracers at any and all aircraft,but the American pilot, who had hidden himself on the beach, signaledthe medical evacuation helicopterand was rescued uninjured. Thearmed ships returned the fire of theenemy and continued the futilesearch for the Vietnamese observeruntil officially relieved from the mission .

0115 hours at home station andthe end of a long but worthwhileday, as the Cobra armed helicopterplatoon was able to soy with pride,Mission accomplished./I.

The M1l3 armored personnel carriers move Into the assault

13



r

Maior oward J. Stiles

n rmy viator

With

henfantr

14 U S ARMY AVIATION DIGEST



I T ALL HAPPENED on a dayin November. I was flying com

mand and control for a fabulousbattalion <;pmmander. The battalion was having a combat as-

sault to place three companies

around a suspected VC townnorthwest of Tuy Hoa. s soonas the lift ships discharged theirtroops, the area became a shooting gallery. All we lacked wereflashing lights and bells. Charliestarted to evacuate the area posthaste.

Gunships were zooming in,shooting up the trails and streambeds. The battalion commanderwas in ~ h eback yelling his headoff. s we dived in to drop smoke,he was actually standing on theskid blazing away with his M-16.The artillery LN 0 was hangingonto him f9r dear life. Well, thiscontinued for about 20 minutes.I've never seen anything like it Ireally got psyched up. My airborne-Infantry-ranger blood gotto boiling. I wanted to find outwhat t was all about down thereo ~ the ground. After all, I was arecent graduate of the career

course from the hallowed halls ofthe Infantry School.

Later in the day, we returnedto the tac CPo Over a nice cup ofcoffee, I approached the battalioncommander on the subject of joining a company for a week in thejungle. The Old Man thoughtthat was an outstanding idea andgave his quick approval.

During the next week, I madearrangements to go with a particu

lar company and to draw my fieldgear.The day before my departure

for the boonies, I wen t over to therear area supply room to acquiremy battle paraphernalia. Frankly,upon entering the tent, I felt likethe proverbial shady-lady inchurch. The old supply sergeantput my anxiety to rest as hemoved around pulling stuff out of

M RCH 968

cubby holes and making a mountain of equipment in the middleof the floor. I got straps, packs,belts, suspenders, heat tablets, bugjuice, and a sweater. About thetime I was drawing my air mat

tress, the executive officer camebouncing in and convinced methey were no good. He gave mehis hamlIlock. I was also told tocarry a minimum of four dayssupply of C-rations. I looked atthe pile of equipment and wishedI had brought a truck instead ofa jeep.

That night I made like a magician as I figured out where to puteverything and how to wear it.

Soon I was set, and even soonermorning arrived. My poor backsagged under the weight of allthat equipment, and the M-16 inmy hands felt singularly unfamiliar. s I climbed aboard the utilityhelicopter, my helmet came flyingoff my head, hit my knee, andnearly burst my kneecap. Myfriends taunted me with a common unfriendly gesture and shooktheir heads in utter amazement aswe li fted off.

What am I doing here? I wondered. My anxiety rose to a fevered pitch during the flight, butsoon we landed and it was time toget with the program.

I met the CO and first sergeant.They were very nice and I rel a ~ e dThe company was in a restposition. One platoon was out onpa trol. I walked around the perimeter and met the platoon leaders and their platoon sergeants.

The weather turned worse; i trained on and off all afternoon.Late in the day, a chopper arrivedto pick up the CO for a meeting.When he returned, we learned ofour mission. We were to make atwo days' clandestine march totry to find a large weapons cache.The platoon out on patrol waslost. Through the radio andbinoculars, we located them about

a mile and a half away on anotherridge.

s the sun set, rain came downharder. This did not help cookingand eating C's, but I survived. Iwas invited to sleep in a lean-to

with the CO and first sergeant,but I told them I didn't have anair mattress. I t then dawned onme that the bald ridge we were ondid not have any trees for myhammock. How stupid can youget? I finally settled on one sideof the shelter and wrapped up inmy poncho and poncho liner.

In a matter of hours, I wassoaked and lying in a pool ofwater. I got up and found a pieceof higher ground. I actually wrungout my poncho liner and tried i tagain. This was an hourly procedure for the rest of the night. Iwoke up in the morning with myhands and feet looking likeprunes. I was really shriveled up.

We hit the trail about 0700 andplanned to link up with the otherplatoon around n o o n ~ w h i hwedid. The terrain was terrible. Allwe did was go up and down. Iswear, in spots the slope was at

least 70°. People fell all over theplace. The wet ground was slick,and of course it was still raining.Vines were a .real enemy, and theelephant grass cut you like a razor.

Every time we stopped, myoIdjoints got stiff and sore. The comfort of the cockpit sure seemednice, even though i t was far away.We waded through some rice paddies, and the worms and leecheswere 6 inches long.

That night I did not have anytrouble finding a tree. The trou-

MAJ Stiles, a 1959 graduate ofWest Point, offers his thoughtprovoking article as a personalobservation of what The ArmyTeam is as a result of the helicopter. As his article points out,though he is a dual-rated aviator.he spent a week with an infantryunit in Vietnam to see how theother half lives.

15



With he nfantryble was in finding a place clearenough to hang my hammock.Everything I owned was soaked.I was really beat, tired, and hun

gry-but learning. When I triedto get in the hammock, I foundout i t was made for ARVN, andI stuck out all over the place.

Being so tired helped, becauseI ~ l l asleep immediately. I awokeseveral hours later to find rainrunning down the ropes whichsupported the hammock. I waslying in a pool of water. But Iwrapped up in my drenched poncho liner and fell back into the

arms of Morpheus.It was still raining on the thirdday. I woke up rather stiff; however, I was proud because my legsand back were doing remarkablywell. Shortly after noon, we pickedup a trail and signs of life. Iclutched the M-16 and really keptmy eyes peeled. Finally we cameto an abandoned company sizedbase camp. I expected to get shotat any minute, but it was soonapparent that it had not been

used in months. I was really impressed with the complexities ofthe camp. -

Later in the day, we discoveredan arms cache on a little standright next to the trail. The weapons were rusted almost beyondrecognition after long exposure tothe elemen s After calling inabout our treasure to battalion,we plodded on. I was still wet.The skin on my hands just peeledoff when I grabbed a vine or treeto steady myself. Do believe I hadimmersion hand

We plodded on like this for

two more days. Our tactical planshad been changed, so we continued to sweep through thedense, mountainous jungle looking for Charlie.

Where was all the glory, theshoot em up? I t was not there.This was the grim ungloriousdirty work of the infantryman.This was humping hills only tohave to hump another hill. Thiswas sleeping in mud. This was

. the groundpounders way of life.

A GI would look at the helicopter as if It were his best girl

16

For two days we had to carryour sick and lame because of alack of LZs. Finally we found aclearing. Thirteen people had tobe evacuated because of twistedankles, knees, or bleeding feet.The helicopter was our lifeline.It took out the sick; it brought inreplacements. Everyone receivedtwo pairs of dry socks and a drysweater. The sundry packs arrived.

You could see the spirits lift.You could catch GIs looking atthe helicopter as if that big whirlybird were his ' best girl. Youcould hear the whispers at night.The troops knew that if all hellbroke out those gunships wouldbe there in minutes spewing out

hot lead. Firefly Ship would beoverhead turning night into day.I learned a lot about the ground

pounders' war. I also learned thatthe people on the ground love theaviator. They need you; they relyon you. I knew I d p p r e c i t ~myflying job more after this experience. I realized the helicopter andthe pilots who fly them are a veryimportant part of the Army team.I was glad to be a small part ofthat team.

U S ARMY AVIATION DIGEST



M RCH 968

I ve called you together to

talk about aircraft. In thepast, when we have beenve r y busy m i g r a t i n g ,building nests and chasinginsects, we have had towatch out for them.

Now I understand tha t allpilots have been warnedto watch out for us Theyhave apparently learnedthat birds and aircraftmeeting can be dangerousfor both.

Let me warn you not to de-pend on a pilot to get outof your way. There is thefoolish one who will flythrough our flocks or chaseyou down when you areflying alone.

17



Sir:Take heed and listen and you shall hear,The crunching, ripping of a Seahorse gear,Thru concertina, then off a gas truck,Flew into an embankment; what rotten luck

Luck, some may say. Skill and awareness are really the key words. Many do notwish to discuss their misfortunes of flight,but I honestly believe that more discussionof errors committed, in a persohal vein,might prevent another aviator from dup

licating the event.Immediately following graduation from

Fort Rucker I joined the 183d Reconnaissance Airplane Co (0-1) in Vietnam. ByI June I was considered operational. For25 days, totaling 93 hours, I flew combatmissions. Then on 26 June it happenedMy mission was scheduled for 1630 hours.After preflighting the aircraft, my observerand I got into the bird and everythingchecked out fine. The tower advised thatwi nds were va ria ble from 150 0 to 180 0

,

1 knots gusting to 22 knots, active runway 25. I looked at the windsock somewhatapprehensive, but not really worried, as

I had made several takeoffs previouslyunder similar conditions.

Tower cleared me for takeoff. I checked

flaps, gauges in the green and startedrelling. The runway was rough and causedsome bouncing, while the wind was blowing us to the right. I became airborne andhad flying speed. Then I noticed thatmy gear was entangled in the concertinafence that ran parallel to the runway,some 15 feet to the side. My only thoughtat the time was to keep the bird in theair until I could put the Bird Dog downin the clear area to my front. I thencaught a glimpse of an object to myright front which caused me to automatically lift the right wing, but because ofbeing only about 6 feet in the air I didn'tdip the left wing too low for fear of striking the ground. At this point, my rightwing struck the object, a 5,000 gallon fueltanker. I ended up crashing into an embankment a t 60 mph. All was quiet exceptfor the sound of trickling fuel from theruptured fuel cell.

We were extricated from the aircraftand checked for injuries, of which therewere none except my injured pride. I

8

know that the locked shoulder harness,gloves and rolled down sleeves played avital part in preventing injuries.

I personally feel that four factors enterinto this case: inexperience, or a lack ofawareness of conditions til-at surroundedme; excessively strong winds for myexperience level and runway conditions; avery rough runway which makes a smoothcrosswind takeoff difficult; and armorplates on the sides of the seats which re

stricted me from achieving full oileroncontrol.

At the time of this writing, two of thefour conditions have been corrected. Theconcertina fence has been moved fartherfrom the runway, and the armor plateshave been taken off the aircraft. The runway is an occupational hazard that must betolerated until engineer support clln beobtained. My proficiency has increasedespecially in the area of "awareness." Myonly hope is that anyone reading thisletter will grasp just one small point thatwill prevent an accident: not to let complacency invade his actions and always be

"aware."

Sir:

LT FRED C. HANKINSON183d Reconnaissance Airplane Co223d Combat Support Avn BnDong Ba Thin, Vietnam

Let's go back in time to the date youfirst received orders assigning you to flightschool. Now let's ossume that flight training was not avoilable in this country andthat you had been ordered to the LaotianMilitary Aviation School, Vientiane, Laos,TDY en route for 15 weeks to the LaotianLanguage School. Can you imagine howmuch differently flight troining might havebeen, or the many exosperating momentsyou might have had because you couldnot fully understand and your instructorwas not able to " get through" to you?

Although the foregoing situation isabsurd, the reverse does and is happeningat this time. Southeast Asians, particulorlyVietnamese, Laotians and Thais, are beingsent to our Aviotion School to learn theart of helicopter flying. The majority ofthese students do not know the first wordof English when they first set foot onAmerican soil. Couple this with the fact

that their entire life's environment hasbeen a country where the latest scientificbreakthrough wos the discovery of thewheel and you can well imogine what yourjob would be like as their flight instructor.

Although the English Looguage Instituteat Lackla nd AFB, Sa n Anton io, Texas, doeswonders with our Allied students, it is stilla IS-week program and only so much canbe gained in that span of time. Then too,there are many aviation oriented terms

and phroses that the student must grospthat are not trooslatable into his nativetongue. Often some of the phrases usedduring instruction are tronslated by thestudent to his native language to get themeaning of the words before he understands what his instructor is telling him. Arated helicopter pilot can readily understand some of the situations resulting fromthis "time lag" in language translotion andapplication o controls to complete a givenmaneuver-for example, an autorotation.

A unique problem when working withAsian students is understonding their "focesaving values," and although they differ

slightly from country to country, one aspectof these values seems common to all. AnAsioo, we have found, will never let onthat he does not understood. Consequently,you will never know whether or not yourinstruction was understood until you allowthe student to demonstrate. Hair raisingexperiences are often encountered duringthis sequence of training. Just when youthink this student has "seen the light" andyou begin to relox a little, the curtain fallsand he will do something so completelyunexpected thot it makes you wonder if hewill ever earn his wings.

Another unique problem encounteredwith these students concerns the aircraftthey are learning to fly. Let's face it, theC H - H just wosn't designed for AsiansHumorous situations are forever arising inthe cockpit. Because Asians are quite abit smaller in physique, pillows ore oftenused to adjust their position so they cansee outside and still reach the controls.Oftentimes seatbelts and shoulder harnesses are drawn to their smallest extreme before a proper fit is reoched. Some of ourshorter friends have a choice to moke:either sit high enough to see outside orlow enough to reach the pedals.




The s e ~ t s in the CH-34 ~ r e springl o ~ d e dto the up position. On one occ ~ s i o n ,the student found t h ~ t in ~ t

tempting to lower the s e ~ t he did notweigh enough to overcome this springtension ~ n d his instructor h ~ dto help himpush the s e ~ tdown.

Whereby ~ n A m e r i c ~ nh ~ n dfits the

throttlec o m f o r t ~ b l y ,

the Asian finds her e ~ l I yhas a h ~ n dfull. Also , the CH-34p e d ~ l srequire much g r e ~ t e rpressures tomove them t h ~ n most other helicopters.B e c ~ u s eof the ~ w k w ~ r dseat position hemust ~ s s u m e, the A s i ~ nusually finds hec ~ n n o tget the correct l e v e r ~ g e~ n dmustl e ~ r nto use brute force for the requiredmovements of these controls.

This has been just ~ s ~ m p l eof someof the problems t h ~ tinstructors must overcome when working with A s i ~ n s~ s comp ~ r e dto t r ~ i n i n gA m e r i c ~ nstudents. I ~ m

proud to s ~ yt h ~ tcome g r ~ d u ~ t i o nday ourA s i ~ nfriends c o m p ~ r ef ~ v o r ~ b l yin theirfly ing ~ b i l it i e s with their A m e r i c ~ ncounterp ~ r t s .The job , however, is c h ~ l I e n g i n g ,

to s ~ ythe least.Should you sometime become bored

with your present duties, you might consider ~ t r ~ n s f e r~ n d try your h ~ n d ~ t

training Allied students. I personally recommend it. As e x a s p e r ~ t i v eand futile asit may seem at times, the end result is avery gratifying sense of ~ c c o m p l i s h m e n t .

CW3 LYLE I. MILLERFlight Standardization DivDept of Ro t ary Wing TngFt Rucker , A la . 36360

• With all the problems, frustrations, andcrowning sense of pride and accomplishment inherent in flight instruction, weseldom think of these added adversecircumstances our Allied students and theirinstructors face in daily flight training .Both students and instructors warrantspecial commendation.-The Editors

Sir:We just received your December issue

of the DIGEST and read the C ~ n Doarticle by Ken Mertel. We certainly ~ g r e e

that our younger generation of aviators ~ r e

doing ~ magnificent job over here. However, some of the oldtimers will be ~ bithurt to find they were so u n p r o f e s s i o n ~ 11

years agoFor example, it w ~ s a s m ~ 1 Igroup ofthose nonpros who stood off the Air Corpsand got the p r o g r ~ mstarted to beginwith. And the then young r e g u l ~ r swhogave up promising ~ r t l l e r y careers toenter w h ~ twas ~ d e ~ d end street -from ~ career s t ~ n d p o i n t- were certainly not p r o f e s s i o n ~ l s ,~ n d the hundredsof officers who volunteered for the airwith its then projected 12 minutes lifee x p e c t ~ n c y .The same ones who flew theirM ~ y t ~ gMesserschmidts in every t h e ~ t e r

of w ~ rand established quite a " c ~ ndo

MARCH 968

h e r i t ~ g e .And don't forget the pioneerswho b ~ c k e dthem up with the first maint e n ~ n c eond supply outfits.

Between w ~ r s ,the ones t h ~ t kept thep r o g r ~ m~ I i v e, ~ d d i n gnewer ~ i r c r ~ f t~ n d

pioneer ing the helicopter. The s ~ m e"oldnonpros," ~ I o n gwith some Johnny-ComeL ~ t e l i e st r ~ i n e d~ f t e rWorld War II, whos ~ w

the firsts l ~ s h

ofc o m b ~ t

in Korea andm ~ n n e dthe first m e d e v ~ cchoppers thatsaved so m ~ n ylives in t h ~ t f r ~ c ~ s .Theterm c o m m ~ n dond control" wasn't bornthen, but someone flew the Army corps~ n d division commonders into forwarda r e ~ sfor on-the-spot command influence intight s i t u ~ t i o n s .They weren 't professionals ,just ~ v i a t o r sdoing onother job in a "cando monner. Then there were the oneswho sparked whole new t r ~ i n i n gconceptsat Sill ~ n d t r ~ i n e dthe warronts ~ n d

m e c h ~ n i c sto m ~ n the initial helicoptercompanies; the ones t h ~ tfought for equalc ~ r e e ropportunities for a v i ~ t o r sonde s t ~ b s h e dprogressive c ~ r e e rp ~ t t e r n sforus.

It's a r e ~ 1 shame t h ~ t there weren't~ n y pros ~ v ~ i I ~ b l eto get CAA instrument ~ n dATR r ~ t i n g swith their own timeand money - ~ n d fight to e s t ~ b l i s haninstrument program in the Army. The samelack of profess ionalism was displayed inestablishing a separate Center, School ~ n d

Test Boa rd . It was surely the c ~utious, overs ~ f e t y - c o n s c i o u sold ~ v i ~ t o r swho finallysickened from a needless waste of menand machine ry and established USABAAR.

A complete I ~ c kof vision w ~ sd i s p l ~ y e d

~ i Benning and L e ~ v e n w o r t hwhere theywere teach ing ~ i r o l e operations; ~ t

Knox , the Sky C ~ Vconcept; ~ n d at Sill,aerial artillery . At Rucker they were h ~ n g

ing all sorts of firearms and rockets on fly-ing machinery. Yes, this w ~ s~ I I going onwhen the new g r ~ d u a t ewas so disillusioned1 years ~ g o with the nonprofessionalsthen in ~ v i ~ t i o n .This s ~ m etype of overage aviator w ~ d e dthrough m o u n t ~ i n sofpaper ~ I I week, then flew nights ~ n d Sundays to m ~ i n t a i nminimums , or took l e ~ v e

to get sufficient time free to qualify foran instrument rating. Some of the old nonpros who organized , equipped ~ n dtrained

m ~ n yof the ~ v i ~ t i o nunits now in VietMm ~ r e over here for their third war -in Army ~ v i ~ t i o nTheir "con do attitudereally shouldn't be q u e ~ t i o n e d

No one is more proud of the p l ~ c e

our young guys h ~ v ec ~ r v e dfor ~ v i ~

tion in Vietnom t h ~ nthe old h ~ n d sstill~ r o u n d .The terms " p r o f e s s i o n ~ l i s m "and" c ~ n

doh ~ v e

certainly been coined within the I ~ s t I 0 y e ~ r s ,~ I o n gwith n ~ p ofthe e ~ r t h "~ n d "air ~ s s ~ u l t . "But r e ~ l I y ,

the whole thing w ~ s n t ~ c c o m p l i s h e dinjust the I ~ s tI0 y e ~ r s

LTC WILLIAM G. BLACKAAD-ACTIVAPO Sen Francisco 96384

• It was not the intent of Colonel Mertel'sarticle to minimize the great abilities andforesight of those dedicated men whoseloyal contributions built the foundationson which today's airmobile concepts rest.No one wants to minimize the efforts anddetermination of Army aviation's pioneers.

t was this group of true professionals wholed the way for today's can do aviatorsto follow.-The EditorsSir:

Even though I ~ m not in the Aviationb r ~ n c hof the Army, I read your finemagazine whenever possible. This is usuallydetermined if they h ~ v e enough e x t r ~ s

to put in our mail bag.However, there is one thing, one

quality , which I think your m ~ g ~ z i n elacks.This is some good VietMm humor. In-clo sed you will find the new grenadelauncher which I h ~ v edesigned. M ~ n y

hours of designing ~ n d practical experience went into this wonderful I ~ u n c h e r .

As you c ~ n see, [below] it is truly onaviation m ~ s t e r p i e c e .There are probablysome minor stability problems with thislauncher, but ~ s I said before , these ~ r e

minor ~ n deasily corrected.I hope you enjoy this ~ n d if you do

publish it , which I believe very unlikely,I would appreciate your sending ~ copyto me.

• Geronimo

SP 4 TIMOTHY SULLIVANLZ GeronimoC e n t r ~ 1Highlands, V i e t n ~ m

9



Kitten In The TankU S

rmy Aviation Laboratories reports a significantbreakthrough developing crashproof tanks and safer fuel

A PHILOSOPHER once saidthat in spite of the destruc

tion and wastefulness of wars,from each comes something tha tis helpful to the human race.

His statement may not be exactly true of all wars, particularlythose early in mankind s history,but the scientific developmentspromoted by most of those foughtin the last 100 years cannot bequestioned. They have stimulatedso many new developments anddiscoveries that to list them all isimpracticable.

Back in the Napoleonic waroleomargarine was developed and

2

Francis P. McCourt

is today one of the most popular··spreads. The Spanish American War left man the ability tofight mosquito-borne diseases.From World War I we got a 10or 20 year heads tart on the airplane. From World War II camejet aircraft, missiles, and pencillin. In the Korean War, the helicopter proved its potential forboth military and civilian use.

It s too early to tell what advancements the Vietnam conflictwill bring the world, but it'salready evident that there will bemany. One that seems to be shaping up is a new aircraft fuel and

crash resistant fuel tank that willreduce the chances of postcrashfires and save the lives of manyfuture air travelers.

A study of rotary wing andfixed wing crashes involving fires

Mr. McCourt is chief of the Safetyand Survivability Division of U.SArmy Aviation Materiel Laboratories AVLABS) and has receivedseveral world-renowned awards forhis contributions to aviation safety.He is a dual-rated pilot and aretired lieutenant colonel in theArmy Reserves. During his militarycareer he served in WW and theKorean War.

U SARMY AVIATION DIGEST



A gallon of JP-4 spreads liberally when spilled left) unless it is emulsified above)

shows that about 8 percent ofthose persons involved survivedthe initial crash only to be burnedto death in the postcrash fire. TheCivil Aeronautics Board reportsthat 343 of a total of 2 161 civil-ian aircraft crash fatalities whichhave occurred since 1955 can beattributed to fire.

The problem is not the air-craft itself but the highly flam-mable fuel used to propel it. Re-peated improvements have madethe aircraft relatively failsafe

mechanically. The fuel, on theother hand, gets more dangerousand harder to handle as it is im-proved.

Tests by a variety of aviationresearch agencies show tha t thebehavior of fuel in a crash en-vironment is always the same:an inadequate container permitsvaporization of large quantities ofhighly flammable fuel. All that isneeded to set this fuel off is a

spark; and in spite of the manyimprovements, during a crashplenty of these are usuallyaround.

The solution seems obvious:develop a container that won trelease vast quantities of fuel atone time and chemically alter thephysical state of the fuel so thatit is not likely to ignite even ifit should be released.

MARCH 1968

It s a pretty large order to makea fuel that won t vaporize whenexposed to the air and thatchanges itself as it enters theengine to become a powerfulvolatile fuel. But the U.S. ArmyAviation Materiel Laboratories(AVLABS) is trying to do just

that. About two years ago theirSafety and Survivability Divisionstarted working on the projectand is now able to report asignificant breakthrough, not onlyin development of a crashproof

tank but also in a safe fuel.In developing a fuel that is

safe in a crash environment, thefundamental properties of a fuel

line must be kept in mind. Liquidfuel won t burn, but as it de-composes into a vapor it will burnwhen mixed with oxygen and ex-posed to an ignition source. Themost practical way to keep thisfuel from burning would seem tobe to eliminate one of these threeelements. Or, i one of the ele-ments is reduced, especially vaporor oxygen, the possibi li ty of ac-cidentally setting off a disastrousfire is also reduced.

Earlier a proposal had been

made to emulsify fuel, a processwhich reduces vaporization. Fuelwould then be shipped in thisrelatively safe form to the airfield

These two photographs show the effect of a sharp anvil making an angular punctureof a self-sealing tank. t left, the raw JP-4 fuel pours from the rupture in the bottomof the tank, the same treatment i t could expect in a violent plane crash. Seconds later,however, coagulation start s right>. The puncture is almost sealed and completecoagulation is accomplished, thus preventing the escaping fuel from forming a mistand fumes which cause violent explosion and burning.

{





and emulsions tend to suspendany contaminates in the fuel sys-tem and these must be strainedout.

Scientists at AVLABS say thatby use of an emulsified fuel theymay produce a safety bonus forthe Army aviator. In addition toreducing postcrash fires, the newtype fuel may also help reducehelicopter vulnerability in combat. Helicopters are the primemovers in vertical envelopmenttactics and while in this environment are vulnerable to groundfire. Preliminary ballistic testingindicates that emulsified fuelsmay prove less vulnerable to ball,AP, and incendiary fire than

liquid fuel.Until AVLABS started theirstudy of a fuel tank, most of theeffort in preventing postcrashfires had gone into developingcrash resistant bladder tanks.These are good in certain circumstances, but not in others.

No matter what the size or configuration, rubberized materialtanks tear when penetrated by asharp object.

AVLABS began by testing some8 different materials made up fortank application. Then they sub-

jected the best 1 to drop-towertesting for penetration and teartesting under carefully controlledlaboratory conditions.

One of the most promising ofthese 10 is a polyurethane-bondedmultiply nylon tank. In additionto undergoing tests mentionedabove, it was control-tested in aC-45 crash, impacting at 95 mph.The right wing of the aircraftwas made to hi t a telephone poleat the center of the tank. In theimpact, the outboard tank wascompressed to almost 50 percentof the tank depth; yet it resistedpenetration by crash-jagged wingskin and structural members anddid not leak.

The same type tank was crashtested in a CH-34 helicopter. Thehelicopter was equipped withboth the new and conventionaltanks. T o simulate an extremelyrough terrain, boulders were tiedto the bottom of the fuselage. Inthe induced vertical crash, thetanks were subjected to a forcein excess of 100 g s. The new tankabsorbed the force and localizedimpact produced by the boulderswithout leaking. The conventional tank ruptured and burst intoflames.

A somewhat similar materialwi th a felt core and a surface ofpleated thermoplastic film alsoworked extremely well. In a C-45crash test, a full fuel tank madeout of this material was actuallythrown clear of the wing structure. It came to rest 6 feet in frontof the wing, without any leakageor fire.

This tank, like the nylon tank,successfully retained its fuel whenpositioned between a cargo floorload and large boulders attachedto the bottom of a helicopter.

These and other tests have convinced AVLABS that materialsare available today which canprovide resistance to crash impact

penetration and tearing.Although these tests were promising, the use of . some type ofemulsified fuel and crash resistanttanks is still some distance off.There is both theoretical andpractical work to be done beforethe fuel system becomes a reality.However, the work done byA VLABS and other agencies is am a j o r t echno log ica l breakthrough and it is now only arna tter of time before Army aircraft will have this increased safetyfactor.

A puncture-resistant nylon crash fuel tank was torn from this wing but none of the JP-4 escaped

M RCH 1968 23



~ o u eed Unit Survival Officer

A IRCRAFT ARE MOREeasily replaced than avia

tors. Besides the humanitarianaspect of saving lives, this is thebasic idea behind the drive to doeverything possible to see that allsurvivors of a crash have a fighting chance to get back safely.

As part of the program, manyaviation units are appointing unitsurvival officers. A unit survivalofficer is not required by regulations, but the appointing of oneis encouraged by the u.s. ArmyBoard for Aviation Accident Research at Fort Rucker, Ala. Principal duties of the survival officeris to keep the unit's survivalequipment and training at asatisfactory level.

Recent graduates of the U.S.Army Aviation School have hada certain amount of formal sur

vival training. However, this

Captain John R Ulbinski

tralnIng is necessarily limited inscope due to the time availablefor the training. Also it is impossible to tailor the instructionto the type of uni t or the geographical area to which each individual will be assigned.

In some cases , the older graduates have not had formal survival training unless they had theopportunity to attend an Air

Force or Navy survival school.The survival school at o r tRucker was not established untillate 1962. With no formal training the survival readiness of theseaviators and crewmembers canbe expected to be very low.

Emphasis on survival hasreached the point that the Armyaviator now has the survivalequipment he needs to help him.Besides the SEEK-I Individual

Survival Kit and the three big

USAAVNS survivaltraining below) is necessarily limited

4

25 -pound survival kits (hot climate, cold climate, and overwaterfor fixed and rotary wing) thereare four survival kits speciallydesigned for the OV-I Mohawk,which are equipped with an ejection seat, survival kit lightweightand survival vest SV-2.

The survival kit lightweight, anew survival kit similar to theSEEK-I, is especially designed foruse in such places as Vietnam andis being issued in that area first.

Of course, the unit survivalofficer should have his appoint-ment as an additional duty. Careshould be taken to select an individual who is genuinely interested in the job. Ex-survival instructors or aviators who havehad a walk back one time areusually militant on the subject.

The survival officer should not

let his du ties of survival, evasion,and escape training conflict withthe duties of the unit trainingofficer, who is responsible fortraining on a much larger scale.Who will be responsible for survival training in the final analysisis up to the commanding officer,but usually i t is best to let thesurvival officer be responsible ashe will be a specialist on the subject.

The surv iva l officer should

establish a lesson plan file forpresentation to the unit's avia-

CPT Ulbinski was assigned to theArmy Aviation School's Departmentof Tactics, Special Subjects Divisionat the time he wrote his articleon the unit survival officer. Duringhis tenure with DOT he was engagedin survival training and based hisstory on experience gained there.He currently is serving in Vietnam.




tors and crewmembers. There area number of places where he canget help. For instance, the Depart

ment of Publication and Nonresidence Instruction at FortRucker has two plans: lessonplans 6/22-570-26, and 28-547-6,Survival, Evasion, and Escape.These are available on requestand may be ordered on DA Form17 Requisition Publication andBlank Forms).

Good information on survivalmay be had from FM 21-76, Survival, various aviation magazinesand publications, like the U.S.

r m y Aviation Digest andDepartment of the Army pamphlets, the U.S. Army Board forAviation Accident Research atFort Rucker, the Aviation SchoolSurvival Committee at Fort Rucker, and the U.S. Army Aviation School Library, also at FortRucker. The school library willassist in answering questions tothe point of contacting suchplaces as the Air University Li

brary and the Public Service Library of Alabama if the information is not available at FortRucker.

Training should be directedtoward the operational and climatic conditions in which theunit is operating. Besides conducting regularly scheduled classes a portion of the monthlysafety meeting should be devotedto a discussion of survival topicsconducted by the survival officer.Recent accounts of aviators whohave had to face a survival situation make ou tstanding discussiontopics. f the si tuation is such thatorganized classes and briefings arenot practical, the survival officercan dis t r ibu te mimeographedbriefing sheets.

Survival equipment should beone of the specialities of the sur·vival officer. Detailed instruction

MARCH 968

THIS LD E YOUR

LIFE, .LE RN TO STAY

LIVE

SURVIVE

on the proper use of the contentsof the kits should be made. Heshould also aid the unit commander in establishing policies tostandardize the survival equipment to be carried on each mission. A standardizing programwill correct the practice of flyingwith too little or too much survival gear.

Inspection of the individualsurvival kits should also be theresponsibility of the unit survivalofficer. Monthly inspections wouldhelp keep the aviator from flyingwith bad or damaged equipment.

Some medicines in the kits have atwo-year shelf life after which

they can be no good or dangerous to use. Of course, in the caseof medicines, the flight surgeon

should have the final say as towhen they should be inspected,by whom, and whether theyshould be discarded or not.

Immediately upon receipt ofnew kits they should be checkedto make sure all items are included.

Many items, such as the Signal,Smoke Illumination, MarineMk-13 flare, Matches and Tri-oxane Fuel are shipped separatelyand must be placed in the kitbefore they are issued. The CO 2

cylinder on the life raft in theoverwa ter ki ts should also bechecked for proper installation.

With the rapid expansion ofArmy aviation and the hostilitiesin Vietnam, many Army aviatorsare being exposed to survivalsituations. By appointing a unitsurvival officer, the commanderwill have gone a long way towardspreparing his aviators to face

these situations and to live, flyand fight again.

Units such as this one from Ft uachuca stress local survival points

25



Tile Gregtest lv fltorI WONDER HOW it all got

started? I guess that i t wasback when I was just a kid andI saw my very first movie aboutthe old biplanes used in WW Iand the Lafayette Escadrille. Theleather helmets, flying whitescarfs, and devil-may-care attitudethe pilots had in that era reallyaffected me. I imagine this is whatset me on the road to becomingthe greatest aviator of all time.

Yes looking back over my greatand illustrious career as an Armyaviator I can see that I, IvanSlipshod, was the best, the greatest

6

y van Slipshod

of all time. I t all comes back tome in a flood of memory

Almost immediately after seeingthat movie I must have been atthe ripe old age of 10) I decidedthat I wanted to be known andremembered as the greatest pilot.I daydreamed constantly aboutsoaring through the clouds likean eagle - foot loose and fancyfree. I read everything concerning flying that I could lay myhands on, even Peter Pan

Need is the mother of invention. f this is true then desiremust be the brother, sister, or

something. I even built my ownairplane.

I was reading a magazine whenI came across the plans for building a model airplane. I decidedthat all I would have to do wasincrease the size of the plan and,Since there is no mail service between Ivan Slipshod s duty stationin the clouds and Ft Rucker hesolicited the assistance of WO IBasil D. Tisdale in conveying hismessage. WO I Tisdale was assignedto the Army Aviation School sDepartment of Tactics when hehelped Ivan. Presently he is servingin Vietnam.




accordingly, I would have an airplane that I could fly myself. Iworked on my plane night andday as I was able) for a wholeweek. I did not rationalize thataeronautical engineers t a k emonths or even years just in theplanning the building of an aircraft I knew that t wouldwork.) I trudged on. .

My airplane was to be a glideras I had no motor to put into it.I made it with a body of stickscut from trees and covered i t withcardboard and newspapers. I usedthe wheels from my wagon so itwould roll. Then came the daywhen my plane was finally finished. I had put glue, wire, tacks,

nails, sweat, heart and soul intoits building.There was a hill near our house

- n o t very steep but steep enough.The road that ran down the hillmade a left turn, but I plannedto go straight ahead and off thesteep embankment at the bottomand then sail off into the wildblue yonder.

The big even t had to take placeearly in the morning so nobodywould know of my great adventure. I t was time. I pushedmy airplane out of the yard intothe street, started i t rolling downthe hill and climbed in. I knewit would work.

Well, I need not tell you how i tturned out. My beautiful airplanerolled down the hill like I knew itwould. It continued straight whenthe road turned like I knew itwould. It went off the steep embankmen t like I knew it would.

However, it did not fly like Ithought it would. In fact, it didnot even get off the ground. Itwen t down the near vertical slopebouncing, skidding, sliding, andweaving like a drunken albatrossat a frightful speed and came toan abrupt halt against a tree.THEN I WENT SAILING offinto the wild blue by myself,which is not the way I had

M RCH 968

planned this thing at all.I picked myself up and brushed

the dirt from my face. Then Itook inventory to see that allparts of me were still intact. Battered and bruised, sadder butwiser, I climbed the hill towardthe house to dream more of mydream.

f nothing else (at that time,for I am the greatest now) I atleast had the desire to become apilot and nothing was going todeter me or change my mind. Forthe next several years I restrictedmyself to the daydreaming of thedanger, romance, excitement andrewards of flying. I dreamed allthe time of myself at the con

trols of an airplane, wind whipping past my face (naturally wearing a white scarf), combat anddogfights, screaming bullets, engine on fire and oil smoke trailing away from the airplane andme laughing and loving everyminute of the battle.

Finally, I was of age. My par-

I went sailing off into the wild blue by myself

en s consen ted for me to get alicense to fly more to get me outof their hair than anything elseI think). To me it was my chanceto show the world what a greatpilot I would be, and I wanted toget started. I went out to theairport and enrolled in a flightcourse. I was on my way. I won tbother you with the details of myfirst ride. I guess that everybodygets airsick their first time offthe ground. I do remember thatI was rather white when I camedown.

Then my first solo ride. I rolledthe plane out onto the runwayand with three or four bounces I\- as airborne. During that ride I

fully realized that I was a bornpilot. Everything went smoothlyand all too soon it was over.

I was happy just flying basicmaneuvers for a while, but quickly the new wore off and this typeof flying was boring for a naturalborn pilot like me. After all,wasn t I born to be great? Born

27



y beautiful airplane had cartwheeled a couple o times but I came out without a scratch

with one foot in the clouds -that s mel I needed and cravedaction. I started low level flyingat high speeds, tight spins, highspeed stalls, etc., in short anything that I could do for thrills.The one thing I liked to do morethan a n y t h i n g else was buzzhouses upside down. After that,I liked to fly under things (that sa lot of fun).

One day I noticed a dilapidatedold airplane si tting behind oneof the hangars at the airfield, andupon inquiring around I foundthat it was for sale. Naturallynothing would do me but to buyit. We had a large field out behind our house that I thoughtwould be great to use s my veryown private airport.

I flew my new airplane overto the house and after making

several passes to im press theneighbors I started my approachto the field, not taking into consideration the old sawed-off treestumps and the (very) largeboulders that I knew were there.Needless to say, my landing wasless than outstanding. Spectacular,it was. The left landing gear collapsed almost immediately afterI hit the first tree stump and the

28

left wing came off. My beautifulairplane cartwheeled a couple oftimes and came to rest on its nose,but I came out of it without ascratch. I was a very good pilotand I am sure that my handlingof that situation is, of course,what saved me.

I salvaged what I could andmoved the plane up close to thebarn. I haven't been home insome years but I guess that airpJane is still where I left it.

I went right back to flyingfrom the airport and, in time, Igot a job flying a light planecarrying cargo from one place toanother. After a time even thisbored me and I started lookingfor things to do that would add alittle excitement to my trips. Istarted flying low and waving tofarmers and pretty girls. I'll bet

that I really impressed some ofthem. The more experience I gotthe more daring I became. (I eventried crop dusting for thrills fora litt le while.)

Eventually, s was bound tohappen, Uncle Sam called me toService and, s was bound to happen, I found out about the Army saviation program. I applied andnaturally after they found out

about my outstanding qualifications, I was accepted and startedflight school. (I should have beengiven a direct appointment s anaviator, for in my own mind Iknew that school would neverteach me anything that I did notalready know.)

My very first IP was a grea t disappointment to me. Here I was,the greatest pilot he would everhave the good fortune to meetand he was treating me like a beginner. (He should have takenadvantage of the situation andtried to learn a few things.) Howcould I be expected to get allexcited over something s simples flying? A lot of times I didn't

bother to even listen to what hewas saying.

I knew that he jumped me forso-called errors just to show the

others that he had no favoritismtoward me because I was so farahead of them in flying ability. Iknew that I was a well above average student (I called myself astudent just to show the othersthat I didn't look down on thembecause I was so much better thanthey) and that I could handle anysituation that might come up.\Vhy bother me with all that er-




roneous information? I knewmore about flying than did anyIP I have ever met.

t was very obvious to me thatall my IPs were jealous of myflight ability because I wouldnever have one any too long before I would be transferred toanother. I had to straighten outmore than one of them. Theywould argue for awhile . . . thenI would have another IP.

I t seemed to me that I hadquite a few checkrides. I guessthat when they wanted a checkpilot straightened out on a particular procedure they were senton a ride with me. A natural bornpilot doesn't need to worry about

little things like someone checking to see if he knows how to flyI always fly to perfection althoughi t always irked me to fly by thebook. These old "scardy-cats"were just afraid that someonewith more ability than they hadwould graduate and show themup for the sissy they really were.Safety my aching back They

were just plain scared.Flying in this manner bored me

to tears. A natural born pilot wasmeant for bigger, better, andgreater things than this. Aftermany long and boring hours Ifinally graduated and pinned onthe wings of a fledgling pilot.Fledgling pilot my happy foot Iknew better. I was going to showthe whole world what a greatpilot I was . . . now was the time .

Now I didn't have to listen likea fool to things like safety, fuelreserve, emergency procedure, takeoff into the wind, etc., etc., etc.,for as everybody knows that i f youtake off into the wind you are asissy Anybody knows that these

red lines on all of these instruments have a built-in safety factora nd nothing happens i f you exceed them at will. Yes sir . . . I wasgoing to show them.

I was always the first aircraftoff the flight line and into theair. Preflight? No need; thesemechanics know their business.Oust hop in the aircraft and go.)

I started flying low and waving to farmers and pretty girls--.i 54

-

: ~ . ~

MARCH 968

Deficiencies noted during a flight?No need to write them down onthe -13 as the next person to flythe aircraft was sure to noticethem. Use a checklist? Why? I almost had a photographic memorywith almost total recall. No needfor a checklist. Study proceduresand regulations? Why? With myability and experience I couldhandle any situation. Rotor overspeed? Overboost? No need toworry about it. These little babieswere mean t to fly and fly them Idid. They were built to take itand I was just the person to putthem through their paces.

During one of my more relaxedtimes when nothing much was go

ing on, I was sitting in the flightbriefing room reading a magazinewhen I noticed this saying . . . allan accident is running out ofability, experience and luck all atthe same time." Reading thisreally convinced me that I couldnever run out of ability, my experience was one of my greatestassets and I was born with a

29



From my cloud I could easily see that I was still the best

rabbit's foot in my back pocket.I was the bes t pilot in my unit

and as far as that goes, I was thebest pilot in the Army. I was wellon my way to proving it.

Take that time I lost hydraulicpressure. Didn't I continue andsuccessfully complete my mission?They didn't have to send a replacement aircraft. Somebody elsewould have set down and startedyelling.

What about that time we hit astrong headwind on the homeward leg of our trip? Didn't Icontinue flying until we ran outof gas so that the VIP on boardwouldn't have to walk so far toget back to base? Wasn't that abeautiful forced landing? Yes, Iwas the greatest.

N one of the crewchiefs wouldride in my aircraft because theywere scared to fly. I don't understand how a person could have ajob that required them to fly andbe scared to go up. Anyway, Inever

forced anyone to gothat

didn't want to. f a person didn'twant to go up, then stay on theground-that 's my motto.

Of course I got called on thecarpet a few times for the way Idid things. Every great personthroughout history had a roughtime of things. I just consideredit not worth my time to thinkabout it and continued on my

3

·way. (They were just envious,that's all.)

Looking back I can see it allnow. I certainly proved that Iwas the best. How could I knowthat someone would drop the balland not do their job. (It was themechanic's fault-not mine.)

This is the way that it happened:

I t was a rush job, hurry andgo. That was my speciality andaway I went. This was goin g to beeasy. I had some rugged terrainto cross up ahead-a mountainrange but i t was no sweat. Therewas what appeared to be lightrain or snow obscuring the topsof the mountains but no problem. I was the best and I knewit. I would just climb on top andcontinue on my way.

The weather was getting worseby the mile. I didn't have an instrument ticket. No problem.Ground fog was building rapidlyand the ceili ng was coming down.

Pretty soon I had no ground reference and the wea ther was moving in pretty close, so I startedclimbing. Still no problem as Iknew that 1 could handle it.

I applied full power and whenwe reached 9,000 the sick beastrefused to go any higher. This isw hen I decided to turn on mynav radios. You guessed it; theydidn't work. On top of that it was

about this time that I had complete electrical failure. I reachedfor the logb ook (cussing because Ishould have checked before leaving the ground) to see what waswritten up. NOTHINGI This wasmy aircraft-the one that I flew~ the time. I had passed thepoint of no return and couldn'tgo back now. 1 had to go on. 1made a mental note to really crawlmy crewchief as soon as I got backfor not keeping my aircraft in topcondition.)

Before long 1 lost all referenceto the horizon. Didn't I have theability to back me up? Wasn't 1experienced? How about all ofthat luck that had ridden on myshoulder for so long? Me worry?Not on your life. I knew all aboutthose mountains just ahead

I still have wings and I am stilla great pilot even though I

haven't flown an aircraft in someyears. I still look down on theworld and frown on all thosescardy-cats that fly these days.

You say that you have neverheard of me? I will admit that myname isn't as famous as Richenbacker or Lindbergh, or even as

famous as any of your astronauts.This is due simply to the publicity the others got that I didn't.But my name will live on longafter time has forgotten the othersin the slogan: SLIPSHOD PRACTICES. And if you listen carefully you can hear me talk to youevery time you get in a hurry:

don't check that, it's always beenright before you know that'sOK . . . no need to get a mechanic, it's within tolerances anyway

From my perch on this cloudI can easily see that I was thebest. Yes, looking back on mygreat and illustrious career as anArmy aviator I can see that I,Ivan Slipshod, was the best, thegreatest of all time. t all comesback to me in a flood of memory. . . .




B UDDY BUG felt great. Thiswas his first day as an instru

ment instructor and soon hewould be taking his first studentout for training. After that yearlong tour in Beenam against thesoldier ants, this would be aninteresting and safe job.

"Okay, Student Bug, let's get

with it so I can get all the demonstrations in during this period. Iwill show you a tactical approachat the Dandelion NDB, and thenwe will come back to the Milkweed Beacon where I'll show youa standard ADF approach," advised Buddy.

The two walked swiftly out tothe parking ramp, dodging thescurrying ants which maintainedthe aircraft, and quickly locatedthe dragonfly assigned to them forthat period. Student Bug climbedaboard and put on his hood.Buddy, meanwhile, made the preflight. He always took care whendoing this chore and prided himself on his safety consciqpsness.

The dragonfly was in goodshape. So Buddy climbed aboard,put his helmet (t.nd tick skingloves on, and put the qragonflyinto action. The wings quicklygained speed, and Buddy completed the runup while StudentBug checked the instruments.

"Horsefly Ground, this is Dragonfly 6 requesting hover taxi instructions; IFR Dandelion. Over,"reported Student Bug.

Buddy Bug, acting as controller,answered and continued the se-quence of reports. He was justifiably proud of his knowledge ofcontroller procedures, for he had

M RCH 968

Captain Robert S Fairweather

spent many hours developing thisability.

Soon the two were winging theirway to Dandelion NDB. StudentBug leveled off at 2,000 inchesand complet ed his level-off checks.Buddy explained how to trackand make wind corrections andthen let his student practice while

en rou te to the beacon."OK, I've got it," said Buddy asthey arrived at the beacon. Hestarted into the explanation anddemonstration of the tactical approach which he learned so wellin IMOI (Insect Method of Instruction). With great detail heexplained every point of the approach as he skillfully maneuvered the dragonfly so that allgauge readings were perfect.

After the dazzling pisplay,

Buddy handed the contrgIs overto Student Bug and § ~ e dforquestions. Of course, the studenthad no questions because he wasbusy studying his feet during thedemonstration, as students are inclined to do, and was "afraid toshow his lack of attention.

The two original aces thenguided their craft on to MilkweedNDB for the next demonstration.Buddy made full use of the timeby discussing and p o i n ~ i n gout onthe panel all the little techniqueswhich make for successful tracking and track interception.

Upon arrival at MilkweedBeacon, Buddy again took controland started demonstrating thestandard ADF approach with allthe flair of an orchestra conductor.

"Now that we have completedour procedure turn, we track in-

bound to the beacon. See how Ihave us locked on a track of 185 0

•

Next Before Buddy couldcomplete the sentence, movementcaught the periphery of his vision,and he looked up just in time towatch his dragonfly collide with alarge moth. He desperately sweptat the controls, but it was too late.

The force of the collisiond r o v ~

him and Student Bug into their;eats, and the dragonfly dropped

into a spiralling descent, sheddingits wings on the way.

•Bobby Blatz and his big brother,

George, sat on the open patioeating the lunch which theirmother had just brought out forthem. As Bobby reached for hispeanut butter and jelly sandwich,he noticed something drop into

his glass of milk."Hey, George, a bug fell into

my glass. And look-it 'looks likeit's dressed in a flying suit "shouted Bobby.

"Aw, you little kids have wildimaginations," remarked Georgeas he scooped the bug onto theground and mashed it wi th hisfoot.MORAL When the other bug s

under the hood look out or youwill get squashed. This is alsogood advice for Army aviators.CPT Fairweather was assigned tothe U.S. Army Aviation School'sDepartment of Rotary Wing Training, Advanced Instrument FlightDivision, when he wrote his article.It was a result of his experience asan "under the hood" I P thatprompted "The Misadventure ofBuddy Bug. Currently he is servingin Vietnam.

3



W HAT STARTED OUT asa routine hunt for Charlie

turned out to be quite an experience for Mister Forward Air Controller (FAC), the spotter. Hefound Charlie all right, but he

had to make a forced landingafter taking several hits. Whenthe pilot crawled from his aircraft, he was pleasantly surprisedto see an Army Huey sitting therewaiting for him.

Where did the Huey come from?How did the Huey pilot know theF AC was there? It really is simple.Both aircraft were being flightfollowed by the 125th Air TrafficCompany. The controller divertedthe Huey when he heard theFAC's distress call. Another crewwas saved through the Army'sflight following system in theRepu blic of Vietnam.

Before August 1965, flight following for United States Armyaircraft in R VN was conductedby the 18th Airfield OperationDetachment (AOD). This unitdid an outstanding job with

32

ou ollerlimited personnel and equipment,sometimes even using rapios fromsalvaged aircraft.

As Army aviation in Vietnamincreased, so did the need for abetter flight following system.More and better communicationswere needed along with morequalified controller personnt l.

Located at Fort Benning, Ga.,was a unit that could fill the bill.The 72nd Air Traffic Companyhad just proved itself during testing of the 11 th Air Assault Division. Here was an ideal unit withmodern equipment and trainedpersonnel, but mission requirements for this unit prevented itfrom going to VietIlam. So another unit had to be formed.

Out of the 72nd Air TrafficCompany came the 125th AirTraffic Company. The tremendoustask of organizing, equipping anddeploying this unit to Vietnamfell upon the able shoulders ofMAJ Jack Anderson, Jr., selectedby Department of the Army to bethe commanding officer. Major

Anderson was an old-timer in theair traffic control business, andhe knew the type people andequipment needed in Vietnam.

His personnel were hand-pickedand the equipment was manufactured at Blue Grass Army Depot,Lexington, Ky. This all startedin late June 1965, and one monthlater the first packet of personneland equipment left Fort Benningfor Vietnam. By September of thesame year the entire unit was inVietnam, in place and performing its assigned mission.

Just what is the assigned mission of the 125th Air Traffic Company in Vietnam? How does themission affect Army aviation elements in country? United StatesArmy Vietnam Regulation number 95-7, dated 2 March "1966,gives the answer to these twoquestions. .

This regulation was written toestablish standard Army air trafficcontrol AT C procedures, to assign responsibilities, and to describe functions of the 125th Air




We ollerTraffic Company. The regulationapplies to all Army aviation unitsand aviation support units as-

signed or attached to Headquar-ters, United States Army Vietnam,and to all units having Army aircraft operating in the Republic ofVietnam.

The mission of the 125th AirTraffic Company as outlined inUSARV 95 7 falls into three categories:

• Command and control The125th Air Traffic Company prof ides a service designed to establish a command and control radiocommunications system that provides Army aircraft and aviationunit

commandersan

air-groundradio capability. This communications system is responsive to theaviation unit commander in thecontrol of his aircraft, thus theterm command and controlsystem.

• light following The 125thAir Traffic Company provides aflight following system using thesame communications system and

M RCH 968

facilities established for commandand control net, thereby relievingthe aviation commander of theresponsibility for providing thisservice.

This system provides maximumcommunications coverage of R VNto ensure safe and continuousflight following for all Army aircraf . Wea ther and search andrescue is tied into the system.Even though this flight followingsystem was designed primarily forArmy aviation in RVN, it is available to any aviator who requestsit, as in the case of our F ACfriend.

• Fixed airfield terminal facili-t ies The

125thAir

Traffic Company provides terminal facilitiesto include navigational aids

NDB, GCA, tower) in accordance with priorities established byHeadquarters, USARV.

Mobile control teams consistingof tower and GCA units may beprovided to aviation units involved in large operations. Requests for these teams are coor-

Major Norman W Kemp

dinated through Headquarters,U SAR V. Smaller operations aresupported by controllers withground radio sets, and this serviceis normally obtained through direct coordination with the appro-priate platoon commander of the125th ATC. A platoon commander is located in each corpsarea.

t should be noted here thatthe Directorate of Civil Aviation

DCA), which functions as doesFAA in the States, maintainsclearing authority for all IFRflights in country. The 125th ATChas communications to DCA andcan assist aviators in obtaining anIFR

clearance.This

is accomplished by four flight operationcenters FOC) located in country.

MAJ Kemp was executive officer,125th Air Traffic Company, duringthe time he wrote about it. He wasan original rTlember of the unit whenit was formed at Ft Benning, movingwith it to Vietnam. Currently he is in

the Command and Staff DivisionDept of Tactics, USAAVNS.

33



Each FOC has one flight coordination ~ n t e r(FCC) to provideextention of the communicationssystem.

The communications system includes UHF, VHF, FM, SSB,R T T and land line telephones.The single sideband is used primarily to pass flight plan information from one FOC to another orto another air traffic controlagency. It could be said that the125th Air Traffic Company is asmall FAA operation providingjust about everything an Armyaviator needs information-wise, toinclude air warnings.

Back at the 125th ATC headquarters is a flight information

section which providespublished

changes of frequencies for air traffic facilities and navigational fa-cilities in R VN. This section isthe collection agency for R VNaviation flight information whichis published in the Southeast AsiaAirfield Directory.

This directory is published bythe U. S Army Flight Information Detachment (USARP AC)and con tains R VN airfield andheliport diredory with essential

information concerning airfieldsand heliports and a listing ofnavigational aids within RVN.Any Army aviator or unit commander may recommend changes,corrections, additions , or deletionsto this directory by forwardingpertinent information to Commanding Officer, 125th ATC.

Another function of the 125thATC is publication and distribution of the air traffic frequencycharts for air traffic facilities andnavigational facilities in RVN.The 125th ATC is also the Army'srepresentative on the Air Space~ o o r d i n t i n gCommittee whichmeets regularly in Saigon. Thiscommittee is made up of all alliedaviation and irons out airspaceproblems as they occur.

As stated before, the DirectorateQf Civil Aviation maintains IFR

4

clearing authority and in essenceowns the airspace. The establishment of an Army air traffic regulating system could only comeabout by good relations and aletter of agreement between theDCA, United States and Vietnamese mili tary forces.

How does the aviator use thesystem? When he makes initialcontact with the FOC or FCC, hegives his call sign, mission number (if appropriate), place of departure, time of departure (ifother than time of initial call),estimated time en route, preferredflight route (if used), and placeof first intended landing . Place ofdeparture and place of landing

may be given by checkpoint codeor grid reference system unlessthey are major secured airfields.

The FOC will log in the aircraft and place his flight strip inthe cardinal 1/4-hour block following the one in which his estimate falls. f at the end of thisquarter-hour block, the aircraftfails to report, the FOC will attempt to contact him by all available radios, A TC stations, andother aircraft in the vicinity. At

the same time, the place of intended landing will be contactedby land line or other means anda ramp check requested. f theseefforts fail to locate the overdueaircraft within 30 minutes, a comp l ~ t esearch and rescue will beinitiated.

Time position reports are required at 30-minute intervals aftertakeoff if the ETE exceeds 30minutes. These reports may bemade to any element of the Armyflight following system handled bythe 125th Air Traffic Company,and they will be relayed automatically to the parent FOC ofthe element contacted unless another FOC is specified. In addition to the time and position reports only changes to the originalflight plan need to be included.

Passing from one corps area into

another also requires changingthe responsibility for flight following from one FOC to another. Toensure continuity, reports aremade to each FOC concerned.Normally the aircraft will begiven a time or place to contactthe other FOC, much like FAAprocedures in the States. f nocontact is made with the next:FOC or allied ATe stations inthe corps which the aircraft isentering, the pilot returns to thef r e q u e n ~ yof the FOC with whomhe has been flight following.These FOCs are in constant contact with each other, ensuringcomplete radio coverage and flightfollowing service.

Landings are reported to FOCor ATC stations simply by callingdestination. f the flight is to

be continued, the pilot shouldgive estimated ground time so hisflight strip remains on the boardat the FOC. f the landing is to bethe last of the mission or last landing of the day, the call to theFOC or ATC station should addthe word termination to thelanding call. The flight strip isthen removed from the board and

placed on file.. When a mission requires morethan one landing, the proceduresand calls outlined are to be repeated, except that aviators mayomit the mission number aftertlle initial call; and for the placeof takeoff, the phrase off last 10

ca tion may be used.The Army flight following sys-

tem in the Republic of Vietnam isbeing improved every day. It maynot measure up to FAA standa,rds,but through the system, severaldowned crews and aircraft havebeen recovered unharmed.

This flight following system inthe combat zone is another first inArmy aviation. The 125th AirTraffic Company offers a serviceto all aviators in the Republic ofVietnam. Their controllers say,You holler-we foller.




ont inued from p ge

and the student would shy away from this becauseof the unusual attitude involved.

The case of the simultaneous engine and rotorsystem overspeed is very real and comes as secondnature to the student, since in reciprocating engines

the hardest control for him to masters

the throttle.I t s also very hard for the instructor to guardagainst since high rpm s not one of the commonerrors he s associated with, unless in his experienceshe has been confronted with the situation.

Three particular examples I have in mind alloccur when the engine is under very little load lessthan 20 of manifold pressure). This allows theoverspeed to happen so fast the instructor must beon the controls to prevent it. Just being close to thecontrols s seldom good enough.

Example occurs on final for a normal approach.The student is in his descent and low rotor rpm.The rpm s not so low though that the instructorwill not tolerate it with a 6 hour level student. Having been chastised many times because of low rpm,the student finally checks his tachometer and notingthe low rpm increases the throttle rapidly.

Example 2 has the student at operating rpmabout to reduce the throttle for a low speed magcheck. He remembers it takes right pedal for absence of engine torque, so he overcontrols his rightpedal while simultaneously increasing the throttles.This accident can be worth more than engine androtor changes, if the aircraft rotates violently.

The last example happens at the start of an autorotation with pitch full down, the aircraft trimmedwith right pedal, but instead of decreasing throttlethe s tuden t increases rpm.

Speaking of autorotations, it is here that we seemto comprise our greatest number of accidents. Fromthe moment the student reduces collective pitch toinitiate the maneuver until the aircraft comes to acomplete stop on the lane, the instructor must remain constantly vigilant and prepared to take anynecessary action to prevent a simulated emergencymaneuver from becoming the real thing. Most ofthe actions the student will perform are so commonwe can list them along with the necessary corre ctiveaction required by the IP.

The P should be able to tell as soon as a descents established whether or not the aircraft will land

on the lane. f it s going to be close and is apparentthat the student has not recognized this fact, the P

should bring it to the student's attention. Havingbeen briefed on the situation, the student should beallowed to learn for himself as long as there s

plenty of altitude; however, low altitude in an auto-

M RCH 968

rotation is no place for experiment. f the students unable to correct the situation, the instructor

pilot should ei ther tell him to go around or takeover himself. There s no excuse to allow an autorotation to continue when the point of touchdowns doubtful.

Oursecond

major problem in autorotationis

theinability of students to determine rate of descent

especially in observation type aircraft without instantaneous vertical speed indicator) and applynecessary corrective action to reduce an excessiverate of descent. The instructor has little time herefor trial and error, but if he takes control of theaircraft the student should be allowed to followthrough on the recovery in hopes that some trainingcan be salvaged from the maneuver.

One cannot talk about autorotations withoutmentioning the application of collective pitch. Forsome reason this seems to be the hardest part of theautorotation to teach, and the part most susceptibleto error. Many instructor pilots will sit back duringan autorotation until time for initial pitch andthen get on all the controls, checking and doublechecking to make sure the student does everythingas he should. To a certain degree, I have to go alongwith this procedure. Unless the maneuver be<:omesunsafe, to take the controls away from the studentat this point or to ride the controls so heavily thathe is unable to feel what his movements are accomplishing can be the most detrimental thing the instructor can do. Yet the instructor must be capable

of taking the controls to abort the maneuver in aspli t second.T o be able to take control at this point and pre

vent an accident requires a preplanned course ofaction with no time allotted for trial and error.

N ext let us consider a hovering autorotation. Thehelicopter s at a 3-foot hover, headed into the windat operating rpm. The power is reduced and-bu twait, now any self-respecting instructor anticipatesthe student's reducing collective. Yes, you're right.So you pick the aircraft back up to a hover, explainthe maneuver once again and again you reduce thethrottle, with the same results. Once again you takea raincheck to the smiled cross tube ceremony.

This time instead of instructing verbally, you alsodemonstrate the hovering autorotation. Once again3 feet, into wind operating rpm when you reducethe throttle. But after the student reducing collective pitch twice before, you are ready for him-onlyto feel yourself being pressed into your seat as hemakes a violent pitch pull.

Who has the aircraft? Instructors, you have theaircraft.

5



CR SH SENSE

the following 8 pagesprepared by the U S

rmy Board for via-tion ccident Research

6

oo




U H-1C CREWCHIEF: At about 1400, we wereinformed about a mission and proceeded to

the ship. The aircraft commander and pilot preflighted. The aircraft commander then started theaircraft and tried to hover backwards out of therevetment to go to the POL. We had approximately

900 pounds of fuel aboard and he was unable tohover without losing rpm, so he told the gunnerand me to get out and walk to the POL.

When the ship got to the POL, we added alittle over 100 pounds, bringing the total aboardto more than 1,000 pounds. We then moved to theroad beside the runway and waited for the slick totake off. The flight commander called on the radio

M RCH 968

and said there would be a delay. He told us toreturn to the parking area. Again, the aircraft commander was unable to hover without losing rpm,and the gunner and I walked back to the parkingarea.

After hovering back to the parking pad and

shutting down, the aircraft commander askedi

we had any extra weight on board and we removeda case of M-79 ammunition.

In about 1 minutes, we cranked again for takeoff. This time we hovered out of the parking stallwith the full crew of four aboard. The aircraftcommander called the flight commander and toldhim we were going to have a little trouble gettingoff because we were loaded pretty heavy. We startedour takeoff at the far end of the parking area onthe road normally used for takeoff.

The aircraft commander began the takeoff bysliding along the ground and then rose about 2 feet,

but fell through, bounced the skids, then rose again.At the time we bounced, we were abou t 20 yardsfrom the first obstacle. As we came off the ground,the aircraft commander pulled pitch to clear thewires. As we passed over the wires, the pilot calledout the rpm as 5600. After clearing the wires, theaircraft commander reduced pitch to try and regainrpm. Our flight path took us over the open fieldnorth of the main tenance area. When we reachedthe end of the compound, we were below the fence,and the pilot called out the rpm as 6000. The aircraft commander again pulled pitch to clear thefence and continued over a small field, beyondwhich was a wall of rubber trees.

At this point, he looked ahead and to the right,then banked the aircraft to the right when we wereabout halfway across the field. After banking, hecontinued to try to climb and follow a low drawthrough the trees. The main rotor hit one tree andchanged our course slightly. The aircraft commander seemed to have little control and was unable to avoid a large tree which we hit head-on.

After hitting the tree, I think I was thrown fromthe aircraft, but can't be certain. The next thing Iwas fully conscious of was being on the ground

about 25 yards from the aircraft. I jumped up andran , to i t and found the aircraft commander tryingto climb out of the wreckage. I reached for him andhelped pull him free and away from the aircraft

Investigation narrative They were shutdown for approximately 1 minutes before againcranking for takeoff. During this time, the aircraftcommander had the crewchief remove a case ofM-79 ammunition, which was the only item ofweight not normally carried His actual takeoff

7



O O

weight was 8,360 pounds and his takeoff attemptwas made on a road along and beside the parkingarea. He had 847 feet of clear area before reachingthe first obstacle (wires) about 20 feet high.

He began his takeoff sliding along the ground,then rose about 2 feet and continued to gaingroundspeed. The aircraft then dipped down,striking the skids hard, and bounced into the air.Witnesses said it had a high groundspeed and unusually nose-low attitude prior to bouncing. Afterbouncing, it was about 60 feet from the wires andthe aircraft commander began pulling in pitch. Asthey cleared the wires, the pilot called out the rpmas 5600. At this point, the aircraft commander reduced pitch to try and regain rpm. The aircraftdropped behind some tents and buildings and wasout of view of the ground witnesses.

The flight path took the aircraft over a shortopen area where the takeoff could have beenaborted, but the aircraft commander elected tocontinue. As they approached the fence at the edgeof the compound, the pilot called out the ,rpm as6000. The aircraft commander again increased pitchto clear the fence and the flight path took themover another open field. Beyond the field was aplantation of tall rubber trees.

The aircraft commander again elected not toput the aircraft down and headed for a low pointin the trees. He continued to try to climb. As theycleared the first trees, the rpm was bleeding andthe aircraft commander began flying through lowareas in the treetops. The skids began draggingthrough the trees, the main rotors hit the trees,and then the aircraft struck a large tree head-on.It came to rest 35 meters from the tree. Beforehitting the ground, it turned 115° to the left androlled inverted.

The crewchief believes he was thrown from theaircraft. When he came to, the aircraft had startedto burn. He went to the wreckage and helped pullthe aircraft commander away. A fire truck arrivedat the crash and the pilot and gunner were pulled

from the wreckage. The gunner was the most seriously injured, with fractures of both upper legs,pelvis, neck, ribs, and jaw. The crewchief had onlyminor lacerations on his hands. The aircraft commander had a fractured leg and the pilot sustainedlacerations and second degree burns on his head,face, and hands. His most serious injuries can beaccounted for by the fact that he was not wearinggloves. He said that he had lost his gloves a fewdays before the accident.

The engine was removed from the aircraft. AI

8

though crash and fire damage was too extensive forit to be run on a test stand, it was examined by anengine specialist who stated that he could find noindication of a malfunction. There was no turbinedamage other than from impact. Examination ofthe fuel control unit indicated the aircraft commander had full throttle, full beep, and full pitchat the time of impact. In the specialist'S opinion,the engine was functioning properly. Fuel sampleswere taken from all bladders and no indication offuel contamination was found. There was no evidence of mechanical malfunction.

The takeoff weight was 8,360 pounds; pressurealtitude was 1,706 feet; temperature was gO°F; andthe wind was calm The cause of this accidentis considered to be the aircraft commander's failureto abort the takeoff on two occasions when he couldhave landed without damage. f he had electedto put the aircraft on the ground, either before or

after the compound fence, this accident would nothave happened. The fact that the aircraft was overgross weight limitations for the pressure altitudeand temperature accounted for his difficulty takingoff and the resultant low rpm. Failure to use therunway is considered a factor. Although he had along takeoff distance and a low barrier, his safetyfactor would have been increased if he had takenthe time to hover back to the runway.

eviewing official: The aircraft commanderinvolved in this accident was well versed in theoperation of the UH-Ie. In this case, it becameobvious, after the crash, that the aircraft would not

fly this time. Loss of rpm during takeoff is a common occurrence. This aircraft commander had atleast two opportunities to abort his takeoff andmake a safe landing. He elected to continue eachtime. He failed to use the runway for his takeoff.Use of the runway has become SOP in this unit forall gunship takeoffs

Headquarters indorsement: Assuming theweight data presented in the report is approximately correct, a reduction of load by at least 121pounds was in order. This fact was readily apparentto the aircraft commander when he had to remove

the crewchief and gunner to hover to the POLpoint. The aircraft commander exercised poorjudgment when he failed to reduce the load.

It is implied that mission accomplishment wouldnot have been possible if the load had been reducedto the point where a normal takeoff could havebeen made. There is no evidence presented in thereport substantiated by performance data that thismission could not have been accomplished by reducing the fuel or ammunition load by 100-300pounds




\ \~ \1

O H-13S PILOT: . . . . . We had taken off from anLZ and were making a visual reconnaissance

of the mountains. It was partially cloudy and windat 10 knots from the northeast. At the time I wastraveling approximately 50 feet above the trees,and alongside a ridge line I was in a left bankand was maintaining 40 knots when the engine

quit. The aircraft had been running normal all during the half-hour flight and none of the gaugesindicated any malfunction.

When I heard the engine quit, there was noshuddering or shaking. The engine tach and manifold pressure gauges dropped off and I autorotated.I told my wingman over the radio that my enginehad failed. I maneuvered to the top of the ridgeand zeroed my airspeed. Using rotor rpm, I cushioned the aircraft into the trees, tail low. The tailboom caught in a tree and the aircraft pitched bub-

M RCH 968

ble down and we fell head first through the 100-foot trees.

Due to the thick growth, we were hardly joltedupon contact with the ground, and got out uninjured. The M-60 hanging in the right door andmy survival gear in the front right side were torn

fromthe

aircraft, and my crewchief and I began asearch for them. We popped white and red smoketo let my wingman know we were at least alive. Wenever located the M-60, but the survival gear wasdown th(: side of the ridge and I immediately calledmy wingman. I told him we were OK and he statedhelp was on the way. I rogered him and said Iwould call him back in a few minutes as I wantedto look over the aircraft and see what could be salvaged and i we could determine the cause of engine failure.

All we found was oil in the turbocharger, butit was damaged during the fall which could have

caused this condition. We gathered everything wecould together and piled i t in front of the aircraftand I ~ l l e dmy wingman. He asked me to popsmoke so the rescue ship could locate me, which wedid. I began talking to the pilot of the rescue shipand he directed us to an opening about 500 metersnorthwest of us. As we could not carry t:q.e equipment, seat cushions, radios, skidmounted M-60,and chest plates through the thick undergrowth,we left them with the aircraft, only carrying anM-16, smoke grenades, and radio. We were hoistedout by a Chinook and returned to the LZ.

A crew of three men were sent in to see if theaircraft could be salvaged. They determined it wasnot, ~ o i s t e dwhat equipment they could back out,and were ordered to burn the aircraft.

Wingman We were flying generally northup a slight draw. The pilot in the other aircraftturned south and a few seconds later I heard adistress call. I saw him flare and settle into the treesslightly tail low. The wind was from the southapproximately 5 knots and he was at an altitude of30-50 feet. Weather was clear with light turbulence.The trees were extremely thick and approximately100 feet tall in the area of the forced landing. Theonly contact I had with the pilot after the accidentwas through the use of the URC-10 emergencyradio.

Aircraft accident investigation board Thepilot and gunner were extracted from the areawithin the hour. The short period between crashand rescue can be directly contributed to use ofURC-lO survival radio which e n ~ l e daircraft circling above the area to direct the pilot and gunnerto a suitable pickup point.

39



4U S RMY VI TION DIGEST



NVESTIGATION BOARD NARRATIVE: Atapproximately llOO a UH-ID, with a crew of

ur and four passengers left for an LZ. When herived the aircraft commander circled the LZ sev-al times and, observing smoke made a circlingscent landing to the east. The wind on the valley

oor was estimated at 2 3 knots light and variableom the sou theast. The aircraft commander had nofficulty during the landing and, after discharginge passenger prepared to take off.

From the takeoff point, after making a hovereck the aircraft commander departed to theutheast circling to the north. The takeoff wasade nose low in an attempt to gain airspeed. As

M RCH 968

the aircraft neared the steep wooded hillsides tothe east it continued to turn to the north, gainingaltitude slightly and steepening the bank. The air-craft commander continued the turn through aheading of north in order to avoid the trees. Whiledoing so he crossed the valley opening to the north.Just after crossing the opening to the north, whilein a 60° bank, the aircraft started to lose rpm andsettled.

In order to avoid the steep heavily woodedslopes to the northwest, the aircraft commandercontinued to turn and increased collective pitch toavoid striking the trees. In doing so the angle ofbank was further increased and the engine and

4



WRON W Y OUT

rotor rpm continued to drop. The turn was completed at extremely low rotor rpm and a final flarewas made just prior to impact. The aircraft struckwith the skids nearly level, an.d with considerableforward motion. It slid forward a short distance,struck a dike, shearing the left skid from the fuselage, and started to bounce and roll. After twobounces, it rolled to the left, the main rotor androtor head separated, and the aircraft came to reston its left side.

The gunner jumped from the aircraft before i tcame to rest. One passenger remembers sliding fromthe aircraft and landing on his chest in the paddy.After the helicopter came to rest, the aircraft com

mander, pilot, crewchief; and one passenger exitedand a count of personnel was made. One passengerwas missing. He was found pinned beneath thewreckage. He was removed and life-saving measureswere started immediately. The engine was still run-ning and, at this time, another pilot arrived in anOH-13. He and the UH-1 pilot attempted to shutdown the engine. During this attempt, the spilledfuel caught fire. No firefighting attempt was madedue to the lack of equipment and size of the fire.The aircraft burned.

Analysis The board concluded that there was

no evidence of materiel failure, improper maintenance, or inspections, although the aircraft wasflown 1 minutes past an intermediate inspection.Pending the results of the engine analysis, the boardhas proceeded with the assumption that there wasno engine or fuel system malfunction. Possible malfunction in the other systems could not be investigated due to the almost complete destruction of theaircraft.

Examination of the aircraft records and available 2408-13's and 2408-14's offered no evidence ofdiscrepancies which could have contributed to theaccident. The 2408-13 dated 20 days before the accident indicated a momentary power loss, but an inspection by maintenance proved negative.

There was no subsequent power loss in the period leading up to the accident, except on the dayof the accident, when a 100 engine rpm loss was noticed by the pilots, at 91 % to 93% increase N 1 Theboard concluded that this was due to a takeoff froma pinnacle and the consequent and immediate lossof ground effect.

The board considered the possibility that the

4

aircraft was out of weight and balance limitations,but investigation proved that the aircraft, with itsfuel and cargo loads for weather conditions existing at the time and place of the accident, was wellwithin weight and balance limitations. The nextand final consideration after expending all otherpossibilities was pilot judgment and technique.

The aircraft commander stated that he circledthe landing zone several times to determine the bestapproach route with existing wind conditions indicated by the smoke provided by the ground unit.These orbits gave him an opportunity to select notonly the best approach route, but also the best departure route.

The aircraft commander, who remained at thecontrols prior to the accident, executed a circlingapproach with a final leg to the southeast. After discharging one passenger, the aircraft load was threepassengers, 100 pounds of cargo, and four crewmembers. The aircraft commander pulled a hover checkwhich indicated 93% N l affording a 2% powermargin for takeoff, as the topping had been previously determined during the morning as 95%.

The aircraft commander, from his takeoff point,could not see the open valley to the north, whichafforded the safest departure route. It was blocked

from his vision by the rapidly rising terrain. Hisonly knowledge of this exit route could have comefrom a terrain analysis while performing his highreconnaissance. The aircraft commander, with apredetermined decision for a circling departure, departed to the southeast into the light and variablewind, reached translational lift at an estimated distance of 50 feet, and performed a left turn to thenorth, at the same time incr easing his takeoff powerto 95%. This maneuver brought the aircraft indirect confrontation with the rapidly rising valleywalls and the 100-foot trees.

The aircraft continued on its flight path overthis terrain, gaining up to 60 knots of airspeedand 150 feet altitude, the maximum altitude priorto the crash. He sacrificed altitude for airspeed,necessitating a continued power application of 95%N 1. After continuing his flight path to the northfor approximately 300 meters, the aircraft commander banked sharply to the left, in accord withhis plan for a circling departure. Here again, theaircraft commander, sitting in the left seat, failedto see the open valley to the north, due to the left




side low attitude of the aircraft in a left bank.He continued in a left turn, sharply increasing

the bank to 60° plus. He saw that his engine rpmwas 6200 and decreasing, then rolled out of his turnmomentarily, at the same time pulling more powerto remain above the trees. Realizing his hazardousflight conditions, the aircraft commander continueda sharp left bank, possibly increasing the angle to80°-900, intending to land in one of the open ricepaddies on the valley floor. Continuous applicationof collective pitch was employed to prevent theaircraft from settling in the trees.

After the aircraft cleared the trees, the aircraftcommander, in an attempt to regain lost rpm,

bottomed collective pitch, flared, then pulled pitchto cushion his landing. The force of impact, although the soft ground of the rice paddy provideda partial cushion, indicated the lack of enoughrotor rpm to properly cushion the rapidly settlingaircraft. The partially intact main rotor blade gavean indication of the slow rotor rpm. The tail lowattitude at the point of impact indicated that theaircraft commander failed to level the skids priorto the touchdown, or that there was insufficientrotor rpm to allow control response.

Cause factors Failure to operate within operating limitations. The combined factors of weight,airspeed, angle of blade attack, degree of bank,and radius of turn resulted in a loss of lift androtor rpm, causing the aircraft to settle. The combined factors added up to a flight condition fromwhich the aircraft commander was unable to recover because of his selected flight path.

Failure to properly evaluate the landing zonefor approach and departure routes.

Failure to execute a normal or maximum performance takeoff to clear the obstacles.

Lack of communication between aircraft commander and pilot. The pilot had no knowledge of

the takeoff route.Recommendations Review of the effects of un

usual flight attitudes carried out in close proximityto the ground.

Review of techniques necessary to evaluate terrain during high recons.

Review of the proper use of the GO-NO-GOchart.

Bring to the attention of all aviators the factsand circumstances surrounding this accident.

M RCH 968

WRONG

W Y

IN

a -ID PILOT: e After 30-45 minutes ofvisual reconnaissance, we flew around a basinthen began working our way eastward. The

terrain rises fairly fast in that area, so I addedclimb power. I noticed that the aircraft was notclimbing. The terrain was rising rapidly, so Iwent to takeoff power. Still the aircraft failed toclimb. We were heading for a very large, high tree,so I started to lower a little flap and began tomake a turn to the right to avoid the tree andhead for lower terrain. I don't remember anything else until about 45 minutes later when I regained consciousness and the observer told me wehad crashed

The aircraft accident investigation board listedthe following cause factors:

Failure to recognize the rate of terrain riseand start a climb in sufficient time.

Flying at an altitude (300-500 feet) below thatapproved for routine visual reconnaissance missions.

Exceeding aircraft capabilities by lowering flapsand banking at low airspeed.

Operating over allowable gross weight and outof c.g.

High density altitude.

4



Pivot} installed in accordance with Murph y s Law(upside down } came out} causing servo to fullyextend and forcing cyclic to left rear position. Tailrotor hit ground and UH-J rolled to left and crashed.

MURPHY SLAW?

CORRECT

CYLI NDER SSEMBLY

PIVOT INCORRECTLYINST LLED

SPOOL V LVE




U H-IB AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: Ipreflighted and everything checked out well.

. . . The pilot got in and started the engine. Afterwe completed our checks, we started hovering out

to take off. He was a little rusty on the controls.Since he hadn't flown for a while, I took over. Istarted hovering out, got halfway, and the cycliccame back to the left corner of the cockpit. I usedboth hands and tried to shove it back. That didn'twork. I should've gone down on pitch, rather thantrying to shove it back. I thought the hydraulicshad gone out. It wouldn't go back so I pushed as

hard as I could with both hands and it justwouldn't go. The aircraft was shaking and vibrat-ing and it rolled on its left side.

The helicopter burst into flames and burned.The gunner was killed. The aircraft commander,crewchief, and only passenger sustained criticalburn injuries to their faces and extremities. Thepilot escaped with minor contusions and abrasionson his hip and legs.

Investigation board narrative There were sev-

eral witnesses to the accident, some only a fewyards away. After evaluating witness statements andinterviewing the pilot, the board directed its atten-tion to loss of control, either by materiel failure orpilot technique. Considerable time was spent goingthrough what was left of the wreckage. Nothing of

importance was found.A request was made for technical assistance. Thefollowing morning, technical representatives arrivedto assist the investigation. Three members of theboard interviewed the aircraft commander beforehe was evacuated for further treatment. After possi-ble cause factors were discussed with the representa-tives, a complete re-examination of the wreckagewas started. All push-pull rods and tubes had beenmelted by fire, but bell cranks and hard points weredistinguishable. The aircraft commander stated thatthe cyclic had moved to the left rear and he was

unable to return it to the center position using bothhands. The board concentrated on determiningwhat would cause a cyclic input of this nature.

Detailed examination of the cyclic servos re-vealed that the pivot (horseshoe washer) was miss-ing from the right lateral servo The board con-cluded that the pivot came out of the servo cylinderwhile the aircraft was at a hover, causing the servoto fully extend and forcing the cyclic to left rearposition. s a result, the tail rotor struck the

M RCH 968

ground, and the aircraft rolled to the left andcrashed.

The aircraft had flown I hour since the comple-tion of the 17th periodic inspection. The unit

received the aircraft 2 weeks prior to the accident.I t had been grounded since the acceptance andperiodic inspections. The PE was pulled 3 hoursearly in conjunction with the acceptance check.

The aircraft commander had worked closelywith the crewchief, conducting the PE and gettingnecessary parts. One of the parts which requiredreplacement was the lever assembly cylinder . Thepart was obtained through the general supportmaintenance unit and installed by the crewchief.The technical manuals indicated that replacementof the lever assembly cylinder would be done bygeneral support maintenance . T o replace the leverassembly cylinder, the pivot (horseshoe washer)must be removed along with several other smallparts. According to the statement of the technicalinspector, the crewchief did this work and he in-spected t and found i t to be correct.

The aircraft crashed as a result of loss of controlcaused by the pivot coming out of the servo cylin-der. The replacement of parts on the servo cylinderwas done by organizational maintenance and in-spected by direct support maintenance personnel.The work should have been done by a general sup-port maintenance unit.

There are two critical points when assemblingthe lever assembly servo, which, if not done properly, will result in the pivot £aIling out ' the assem-bly. f the pivot is installed upside down, and i tw ll fit that way, the pivot will break and fall out.When the fine adjustment is made, with limits of0.001 to 0.004, any dirt, sand, or foreign matter inthe system will result in improper tolerance, thuspermitting the pivot to work free. f the pivot isinstalled properly and the correct adjustments aremade, the pivot cannot be pulled out of positionby any reasonable force.

Flight surgeon The civilian was not wearing ahelmet and consequently had severe burns aboutthe head and face. He was not wearing gloves andwas wearing nylon stockings, resulting in severeburns of his hands and feet. None of the membersof this flight were wearing fire retardant clothing.

Stronger emphasis should be placed on the useof helmets, gloves, and the proper clothing by allmembers and passengers of aircraft. Fire retardantclothing could have prevented much suffering inthis accident and may have saved a life.

45



TOOMU H

TOO L TEU -IA AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: l When

we first landed, the tower did not inform usabout the ditch that had been cut across the runwayat approximately the halfway point. The dirt hadbeen piled next to the ditch on the north side. Welanded to the south on the north end of the runwayand nei ther of us saw the pile of dirt until we werealready on the ground in our landing roll. We wereable to stop before hitting the dirt or the ditch. Icalled the tower operator on FM and asked him whyhe had not informed us of the hazard on the runway. He 'hemmed and hawed' around and finallysaid that he 'thought all fixed wing traffic had beennotified.' I told him to inform all fixed wing trafficby radio as each approached for landing. We thentook off.

When we returned, the tower operator said 'beadvised, we have only 1,500 feet of usable runway.'We landed and picked up our passenger. This gaveus three passengers and approximately 250 poundsof cargo

As we taxied out for takeoff, I saw an 0 1 onthe active waiting for takeoff. We held on the firsttaxiway and performed an abbreviated runup andcomplete pre-takeoff check. I called out the checklist to the pilot. When the Bird Dog departed, Irequested takeoff clearance. We were cleared intoposition and told to call when ready for departure.We taxied into position and I checked to see i thepassengers were secure, as we had left our crewchiefat another airfield.

The pilot lined up, rolled forward a short way,switched the tail wheel into the lock position, androlled forward a little farther, 10-20 feet. He thenlocked his brakes and advanced the throttle to 30inches as I received takeoff clearance. As he reached30 inches, he released his brakes and advanced thepower to approximately 35-36 inches and approximately 2225-2250 rpm. We started rolling straightdown the runway. After a short distance, we startedto swerve toward the left. The pilot brought theaircraft back toward the center of the runway. I tdid not want to leave the ground and made a fairlyvioiellt swerve to the left again, toward a long

46

double row of landing mat pallets that were linedup near the side of the runway. We were ' dangerously close to the pallets, so I assisted on the controls. We attempted to clear the pile of dirt next tothe di tch across the runway.

We were too close to the pallets and the ditch tocut the power and abort the takeoff safely, and I

felt that with a little more back pressure we couldclear the dirt. We both pulled back on the yoke,but the aircraft did not leave the ground fastenough and we struck the dirt wi th our gear Weboth thought that we had only hit the right gear,so when I called the tower I told them that Ithought we had damaged our right main gear andrequested permission to do a 180 0 turn and fly bythe tower to check for damage.

As we were climbing and turning for our pass,I tried to check the gear myself. The tower informedus that our gear appeared to be intact but the rear(drag) strut seemed to be bent. We climbed outtoward the southeast and I turned around in myseat, put my feet through the cabin door, told oneof our passengers to hold on to my feet, leaned outthe cockpit door, and examined the right gear asbest I could. I could see no damage to the compression strut or the axle strut, except for a scrape markon the compression strut from the upper fairing.The drag strut had been bent and was cracked . I thad the same appearance as a piece of copper tubing that had been bent almost double and straightened out again. I knew that without a proper dragstrut, the gear would no doubt collapse on landing.

I took control and told the pilot to try to see if wehad any damage to the left gear. He could not seeany damage

We came to an airfield and decided to land. Irequested a landing on taxiway 27. With the windgenerally out of the south at 6 8 knots, we would beable to keep the right gear off the ground muchlonger and possibly delay its collapse. The towersuggested that we try to land south on the numberone taxiway that runs between the runway and theparallel taxiway. It was 1,200 feet long and wideenough. I took a pass at the taxiway and decided itwould be sufficient. I told the pilot that I wouldmake the landing from the right seat, but for himto be ready to help.

We made a wider than normal approach andtouched down left gear and tail wheel first with theright gear still in the air. t didn't stay up very longbecause the left gear started to collapse immediately, causing a left turn and bringing the right geardown abruptly . They both collapsed and we headedoff the taxiway to the left. I pulled the emergencyfuel and ·oil shutoff valve and started to shut off




switches. When we came to rest, we had turnedabout 120° from our landing direction.

I yelled for the passengers to get out, finishedthrowing switches and pulling circuit breakers,checked to see if the passengers were ou t OK, andgot out.

Crash rescue personnel were already standing by

the aircraft when I got out. There was no fire so Ireturned and checked that all of the switches wereoff and disconnected the battery.

I have been in and out of the airfield manytimes in the past 9 months and I have experiencedvery similar actions on takeoff from that strip. Ithas, at times, very unusual wind currents that dounusual things with an aircraft. Many of the pilotsI have flown with have expressed the feeling thatthe aircraft either would not come off the groundwhen it should, or it seemed to be pushed backdown to the runway.

UH-Is were parked fairly close to the side of therunway on the left side. Due to the high trees andthe proximity to the runway, i f a Huey is turningup, or even at flight idle, it produces an exaggeratedeffect on any fixed wing aircraft landing or takingoff on the strip, especially an Otter

One UH-I had just landed prior to our takeoff.It landed near the beginning of the row of helipadsand, even though I did not actually see it, I thinki t caused our first swerve. I think our second swervewas caused by a UH-IC picking up to a hover fortakeoff. I have felt swerves like that before in thesame area and two other facts make me believe that

the swerve was caused by rotorwash. First, the sec-ond swerve occurred even with the helipads. Second,an aircraft was cleared for takeoff very shortly afterwe cleared the runway. f we had not used up s6much runway counteracting the two swerves andavoiding the pallets on the side of the runway, wewould have been able to gain sufficient airspeedand altitude to clear the pile of dirt at the ditch.I felt that we could not have cut power and safelygotten away from the pallets on the side of therunway.

Accident investigation board narrative In

vestigation and analysis of the statements receivedfrom the aircraft commander and pilot revealedthat the control techniques used by the pilot tocounteract the crosswind could very likely havecaused the abnormally long groundroll. The boardbelieved that the application of excessive left aileron and right rudder at or near flying speed wouldhave caused the aircraft to slip to the left and notbecome airborne . There was evidence that the pilotused right brake on the second swerve. The possi-

M RCH 968

bility exists that this was also done during the firstswerve and contributed to the increased takeoffdistance.

The board felt that the crown of the runwaywas a contributing factor. After the first swerve,the aircraft was proceeding down the left side of therunway in a left wing low attitude. At the time of

the second swerve, the aircraft commander appliedfull right aileron, picking the left wing and wheelup to clear the boxes. The right . wheel stayed onthe slope of the runway, creating friction andhindering the attainment of enough speed to clearthe mound of dirt. However, the runway crownwas not enough to cause the accident.

Weather was considered a contributing factorbecause crosswind correction had to be applied tocompensate for variable wind conditions 40°-70°from the direction of takeoff. Both tower operatorssaid there was light rain when the aircraft attempted to take off and rainshowers were forecast.This would contribute to directional control problems

The aircraft commander w ~ fatigued. This created the possibility of impaired judgment, coordination, and prolonged reflex time at the time of theaccident. He was on duty as staff duty officer the22 hours immediately preceding the flight and hadgotten only 3 hours and 2 minutes of sleep in thepreceding 24-hour period. This is the only evidenceof crew fatigue determined by the medical officer'sreport.

Both the aircraft commander and pilot stated

that they felt the swerves could have been causedby helicopter rotorwash. The board believed thiscondition could have existed due to the intensevolume of helicopter operations normally conducted immediately adjacent to the runway. However, investigation failed to substantiate helicopteroperations in the immediate vicinity of the runwayat the time of the accident.

In conclusion, it appears that the pilot failed totake corrective action soon enough to regain directional control, necessitating excessive use of controlsand brakes. This did not allow flying speed in timeto clear the barrier.

He evidenced poor judgment in not using theentire length of the runway for takeoff, knowingthat the runway was relatively short and a barrierexisted.

The aircraft commander failed to take immediate corrective action to avoid a dangerous situation.

Supervision was also a factor because the aircraftcommander was scheduled for a flight immediatelyafter performing as staff duty officer with very littlerest.

7



8

U -6A INSTRUCTOR PILOT: Prior totakeoff a complete runup was made and no

discrepancies were not ed. Approximately 1Y hoursafter takeoff, ~ saw a small amount of oil comingfrom the top of the engine cowling. The engineinstruments showed normal readings. They remained the same for the rest of the flight.

~ p p r o x i m , a f e l y3 hours after takeoff, oil suddenly covered the windshield and we saw oil coming from the area of the air intake on the top rightside of the cowling. We made a call to control andtoltl them about our problem, and reported we

were returning to base. Our altitude was 2,200 feet.Just prior to reaching an en route airfield, I

queried control about status of the airfield. I hadmonitored a radio transmission a few days before~ v i s i n gthat it was closed to fixed wing traffic.Control advised me to stand by and I continuedflying south. There were no indications of anyproblem other than the o il l eak a t this time. By thetime con trol confirmed the airfield was open tofixed wing traffic, we were well past the field andelected to continue towards our home field. Weknew that another airfield lay between us and ourhome field, if circumstances necessitated a landingbefore we re t ched home base.

Approximately 15 minutes after we saw thesecond oil leak, the engine coughed and sputtered

When t ppet nut came loose djustment screw hit rocket box coverand oil covered windshield completely blankingforward visibility

U. S. RMY VI TION DIGEST



a few times. We changed to the center tank andincreased the mixture to full rich. The engine ransmooth for 3 or 4 minutes and then began to runrough again.

We called 'MAYDAY' to control. The engine

ran rougher and rougher un til i t failed. The windshield was completely covered by this time.

We located a section of highway without trafficand made an approach. . . . Since the pilot wasrelatively inexperienced, I made the approachSince it was impossible to see ahead, I turnedslightly to the left by kicking left rudder. I did thisin an unsuccessful attempt to see what was ahead.Since I couldn't see, I turned back to align approximately with the road. At approximately 10 feet,the aircraft struck and sheared the top off a 20-foot

tree. The airspeed was approximately 60 knots andwe had full flaps. We touched down on the road,but I was unable to see if we were lined up with it.

Apparently we were at a slight angle, becausewe went off the left side into an open grassy field.The road was elevated approximately 5 feet abovethe

field, sothe aircraft

was momentarily airborneas it left the road. By this time I had lost directionalcontrol. We came to a stop in an upright position

There was major damage to the wings, both mainlanding gear, and engine section.

ccident investigation board findings The coverof the exhaust rocker box to no. 9 cylinder wasbroken through. Failure was due to the tappet locknut coming loose, resulting in the adjustment screwstriking the cover of the rocker box. This allowedthe oil to escape through the rocker box cover. Thelock nut was approximately nine turns from theproper adjustment. Although this in itself will notcause a complete engine failure, oil on the windscreen and the rough running engine are attributedto the broken rocker box. . . . t is felt by thisinvestigating officer that, through a period of time,the lock nut had started to back off. On this particular flight, it lost all torque, backed off enough toaffect the setting of the adjustment screw, and ultimately caused it to break through the rocker boxcover . . . . . . . .

FROZ N THROTTL

O H-23D PILOT: On preflight I had a frozenthrottle and maintenance freed it twice. On

the third try, it w ~OK, so I completed my cockpitcheck and left the heliport at 0750. I discovered afrozen throttle at 1,800 feet. I turned north into thewind and made a forced landing. This happened 1minutes after takeqff.

The forced landing was begun at 1,800 feet at60-65 knots. I cut off fuel selector valve and thenthe mag switch. On 'completion of the flare, the aircraft ballooned. I leveled and made a second flare.The tail rotor hit the ground and I lost directionalcontrol. After the accident, I shut off the auxiliaryfuel pump, then the master switch. I exited the aircraft and took along the fire extinguisher. . . .

The accident caused major damage to the mainrotor blades, tail rotor blades, yokes, I-inch drive,tail boom, and tail.skid.

M RCH 968

The aircraft accident investigation board checkedwith maintenance to see why they had let the pilotfly the aircraft after twice having a frozen throttle.Maintenance replied that the frozen throttle hadbeen thawed out by two personnel and that if theyhad known it was the second frozen throttle in sucha short time, they would have grounded the air

craft. The frozen throttle had not been written upon DA Form 2408-13.

Cause factors 1. Pilot elected to autorotate toa sod area instead of going to heliport or stagefield.

2. Pilot flared too high and made impropercorrection.

3. Throttle was inoperative because of frozenmoisture located in throttle cable housing.

Temperature at the time of the accident was 21°F.

49



WHIT OUT

UH-1D PILOT: The flight was an attempt

to pick up a crew of two from a peak approximately 10 miles northwest of the base camp. I haddropped them on the peak at approximately 0930that morning. Weather conditions deterioratedshortly afterwards, preventing a pickup as scheduled. We attempted to return and make the pickup,but the weather prevented it. Base camp monitoreda radio transmission from the crew at 1300, statingthey were OK at that time. No other positive contact was made. A garbled transmission was monitored at 1730.

Winds had been high, with blowing snowthroughout the day. At about 2030, there was abreak in the weather. Based on available information concerning the crew, and the improvingweather, I decided to attempt a pickup.

I took off at 2045 with a copilot, crewchief,medic, and passenger aboard. Weather at takeoffwas high overcast, 3 5 miles visibility, and winds15-18 knots frorp. the northwest. The pickup pointweather was broken, visibility 1/2-1 mile in thenortheast quadrant and 3 miles plus in all otherquadrants. The crew was spotted 'on the peak, butwe encountered severe turbulence. Winds were inexcess of 60 knots at the pickup site.

Since both men indicated they were OK, I didnot consider it necessary or safe to attempt a landing. The copilot and I decided to return to campand wait for better weather. He contacted basecamp and was advised that weather was also deteriorating at the camp site . As we passed abeam ofcamp at approximately 800 feet above the terrain,I started a letdown and a 180 turn to approachcamp into the wind and from the quadrant of bestvisibility and surface definition. We had the campin sight as I started the turn to final. Shortly afterthe turn was started, we again experienced severeturbulence and a partial whiteout condition. Within seconds, the aircraft struck the snow and cameto a stop in an upright position, after sliding approximately 300 feet. My first thought was thatstructural failure had occurred because of the severeturbulence.

The passengers got out through the right cargodoor. My door was jammed, so I also left throughthe cargo ~ o o r The copilot was able to leavethrough his door. There was no panic. Within 5minutes from the time of impact, we had secured

50

survival clothing and removed the survival sled

from the aircraft. At this time we were experiencinga complete whiteout, with the wind estimated at35 knots.

The copilot transmitted in the blind on all available radios, advising that we were on the groundand all personnel were OK. We then put the smalltent up for protection and settled down to wait outthe weather. There were improvements from timeto time in the visibility, but only for short periods.At about 0030, two polaris sleds arrived, picked usup, and returned us to camp.

Cause factors Weather-Aircraft encounteredunexpected and unforecasted severe turbulence andwhiteout conditions. There was no possible alternate.

Inattention to altimeter.Lack of coordination between pilots.

R ecommendations 1. Improved capability forforecasting local weather. A fixed approach facilityand IFR approach procedures be established at basecamps where no alternates are availaf.>le.

2. Installation of a radar type altimeter in theaircraft with a low altitude warning device.

3. Positive steps to assure that one or bothpilots are continually monitoring flight instruments

NO SWEAT

CH-47A PILOT: We released our sling loadand hovered forward to a clear area, then set

the aircraft down. I set the brakes and the rampwas lowered to load a 1/4-ton jeep trailer. Afterarrangements were made over the radio for groundmovement of the trailer, I removed my helmet towipe the perspiration from my head. I turned to

place my helmet on the map case at the rear of thecenter console. I did not see what took place at thistime.

I felt the bump and dropped my helmet on thefloor behind the console. Looking down the cargocompartment, I saw fuel escaping from the line onthe left side in the ramp area. At this time, the aircraft commander moved both condition levers tostop and the aircraft was shut down.




With no possible alternate U H l entered unforecast turbulence nd whiteout nd crashed in snow

during flight in adverse weather conditions.Stat emen t of Teviewing official This headquar-

ter concurs in the findings and recommendations ofthe board, with the exception of finding number 2and recommendation number 3 This finding hasnot been substantiated either in the pilots' state-ments or the narrative by the board. As stated by

Accident investigation boaTd naTmtive Thepilot executed a normal landing and set the park-ing brakes. However, a final check of the flight con-trols was not made by either pilot. The cyclic stickcontrol indicator was not checked to see if it wascentered and the thrust lever was not checked to seeif it was in the 3° detent position. At this time, the

flight engineer had lowered the ramp by the rampcontrol lever to accept the internal load. The leverwas not checked to ensure it was in the stop posi-tion.

The pilot then removed his helmet to wipe theperspiration from his face. In placing his helmet tothe rear of the console, he accidentally pushed for-ward the cyclic stick. The combination of the cyclicstick not being in the neutral position and the

MARCH 1968

the board, weather forecasting capabilities are ex-tremely limited. Accordingly, altimeter settings arenot available. Additionally, this detachment oper-ates in uncharted areas and the altitude above theterrain has to be estimated. These factors, coupledwith no approach facility, left the pilots no choicebut to attempt a VFR approach

thrust lever not fully seated in the 3° detent posi-tion, coupled with the accidental forward move-ment of the cyclic by the pilot, resulted in the aftwheels coming off the ground. As the wheels cameoff the ground, the ramp continued to lower be-cause the ramp control lever was not in the stopposition.

The aircraft commander immediately saw thenose low condition of the aircraft and rapidly ap-plied aft cyclic to return it to the ground. At thistime the ramp was extended below the aft wheels.With the sudden application of aft cyclic, the ramp,rather than the landing gear, absorbed the impact.Impact caused the bulkhead at station 502.4, attach-ing point of the ramp actuators, to buckle. Thissevered the left fuel line and the right utility hy-draulic line to the ramp valve

51



A C C I D E N T INVESTIGATION BOARDNARRATIVE: The OH-23G took off for a

25-mile flight on a southerly heading. Beforedeparture, it was estimated the aircraft had beenflown 2 hours and 5 minutes since refueling. Thiswas a postcrash computation based on an examination of the flight routes and locations where theaircraft had been. Not included in this estimationis any ground time.

At the time of departure, the pilot informed hissection commander by radio that his fuel state was8 gallons or approximately 30 minutes flying time.The investigator computed the flight time requiredto accomplish the intended flight as 25 minutes.

After takeoff, the pilot climbed to approximately 100 feet, then descended to treetop level for therest of the flight. Weather at the time was clearand visibility was at least 15 miles along the flightroute.

After 10-15 minutes, the engine stopped. Theaircraft entered 15-20 foot scrub trees on the downslope of a hill. The tail rotor, attached to a 2-foot section of the tail boom, was located approximately 30 meters back along the flight path fromthe main wreckage. I t was at about this point thatthe aircraft entered the trees. This was evidenced

52

by tree strikes and is indicative of an abrupt flarein an attempt to slow the aircraft for impact. Themain rotor blades most probably severed the tailboom at this time.

Final impact occurred at the bottom of aravine in a small stream. The aircraft came to reston its nose after turning 90° from the directionof flight. It was supported by the main rotor andmast, with the front of the aircraft resting on thestream bed and the tail boom upright. The rightside was against one bank of the stream, blockingthat side. The pilot and one passenger were pinnedin place by the pedestal and firewall and could notescape. The other passenger had no trouble gettingfree of the wreck age through the left side

N fuel was found in the carburetor or fuellines and there was no evidence the engine wasdeveloping power at the time of impact.

The cause of the engine failure was established

as fuel exhaustion,probably

the result of faultyflight planning and fuel management. Possiblythe fuel tank had not been 'topped-off' at the timeof last refueling. This was brought out as a possibility by the pilot's section commander. OH-23sof the unit are routinely refueled while the engineis running and the pilot, as the only crewmember,is not able to personally check the fuel level. Thepilot may not have accurately accounted for thetime flown and his time on the ground at idle, considering his repeated stops.

Other errors contributing to this accident were:1) Flying at treetop level when there was no

necessity to do so, particularly during a low fuelstate, allowing no possibility for successful autorotation. 2) Attempting a flight of approximately 25minutes duration over wilderness in a low fuelstate when a road could have been followed, providing areas for autorotation and a better chance forrescue.

Other factors to be considered in this accidentpertain to the element of survival. The location of the crash was in an area over wh ich aircraftwere flying at the same general time. O n boardwere several items of survival gear, including aURC-10 radio, signal mirrors, and smoke grenades,all of which would have attracted the attention ofaircraft in the vicinity. Although the pilot was incapable of reaching these items or using them, hefailed to call them to the attention of the one survivor who was free of the aircraft. This survivordid not know that these items were available tohim

The wreckage was located more than 40 hoursafter the crash and the trapped pilot and passengerdid not survive. fi>. <




MARCH 1968

Dear Pearl:

Pearl couldn't be with usthi s month, so I 've come out

of ret i rement to tell you

young whi ppersnappers athi ng or two about surv i valand rescue gear for her.There may be some of youwho prefer my looks. I f youdo, stay on the ground and

see your fl i ght surgeon r ightaway Meanwh i le , \ 1 1 see i fI can round up a young fi I Iyfor next month. But

r emember - I d idn' t reach thi sage w i thout learn ingeverything I could about mypersonal equipment andsurv iva l gear. If you intend

to e nj oy a lo n g an d healthy

I i fe, I reco mm end you doIi kew i se .

I would like to have some information on theCombat Boot Tropical D MS in use in SoutheastAsia. Some of the questions which have arisen inmy mind are:

1 Will the boot provide sufficient foot andankle protection in a crash?

2 Will the boot with its cotton canvas andnylon uppers provide adequate protection in theevent of fire?

3 Will the boot provide sufficient ankle supportin the event a parachute exit is required during thelanding for individuals not jump qualified?

4. Which boot leather or tropical does the

53



Board recommend for personnel flying in Southeast Asia?

CPT Calvin B. ChandlerAviation Safety Officer1st Radio Research Company

Dear Captain Chandler:To answer all your questions in one statement,

USABAAR recommends only the leather combatboot for flying in Southeast Asia. It provides moreprotection to the foot and ankle in a crash and/orin the event of postcrash fire the nylon in thetropical boot will melt). I t also provides moreprotection during landing following parachuteegress or ejection. As you probably know, the jungleboot was developed primarily for the soldier, withno thought given the aviator. Attempts are beingmade to provide you fellows with your own bootswhich will have safety toes and quick donning ordoffing characteristics.

PEARLDear Pearl:

The OV-l survival vest, FSN 4220-300-0006, isequipped with th e distress marker light, FSN 6230-015-7216. What i the FSN on the battery and theordering authority?

CPT John J. SpisakFlight Line Maint Officer244th Aviation Company (AS)

Dear Captain Spisak:The federal stock number for the distress marker

light battery is 6135-073-8939. You use the sameordering authority for the battery as you did forthe light. This information came from MIL-L-38217 and was supplied by USAAVCOM.

PEARLDear Pearl:

Recently a U-21 airplane was assigned to FortHood with the oxygen system installed in the aircraft. However, no oxygen mask came with theaircraft for the pilot and copilot. There were sixdisposable m asks with the aircraft for the passengers.

The mask for the pilot s the demand type andfor the passengers the constant flow type.

What is the correct FSN and authority for thedemand type mask as it is not listed in TM 55-1510-209-24P-l dated April 1967?

What is the FSN for the nondisposal constantflow oxygen mask and are they au thorized in lieuof the disposable mask listed in the TM?

Dear Sergeant Freeman:

SFC Samuel T. FreemanSupply SergeantFort Hood, Texas

To equip your pilots and copilots with oxygen

54

masks for the U-21, each pilot/copilot will need amask, a tube a sembly to adapt the ma sk to theox ygen ou tlet in the aircraft, and a modificationkit to install the mask on the APH-5 helmet.Nomenclature and FSN of required equipmentfollow:

NOMENCLATURE

Mask, Oxygen, SmallMask, Oxygen, MediumMask, Oxygen, Large

Tube, Assembly, Oxygen

FSN1660-516-66071660-51 ()-66201660-516-6621

1660-692-3939

Modification Kit, Small 1660 -872 -7794Modification Kit, Medium 1660-872-7795Modification Kit, Large 1660-872-7796

The basis of issue for this equipment is one percrewm ember in aircraft with a demand oxygensystem. Until such time as a new supply bulletinfor expendable supplies is published in early 1968,AVCOM will honor requisitions without a quotedau thorization.

The FSN for the disposable constant flow mask(P N 28301 -12) s 1660-902 -5308. All masks arecon idered expendable since they cannot be decontaminated for reuse by another individual. Therefore, i t s considered desirable to provide passengerswith a disposable mask.

PEARL

Dear Pearl:

Reference your comments about NOMEX flightsuits in the December issue, although NOMEXsuits are available through commercial outlets,their use would be prohibited by cost and by thefact that they would not be regulation. However,there is a solution for those who desire fire protection.

NOMEX underwear, which looks like a light,insulated, two-piece underwear, is available forapproximately 15.00 from at least two mailorder




f ou have a question aboutpersonal equipment or rescue and

survival gear write to Pearl

U. S. Army Board for Aviation Accident Research

Fort Rucker Alabama 3636

house s. Since underwear is not subject to militaryregulation, this can be worn under the uniform ofthe day and give a high degree of protection.

The fireproofing method that you detailed doesgi ve some protection, bu t the rna terial becomes soco a rse as to require something worn under it. With

the fireproofed flight suit and NOMEX underwear,a person would be doubly protected and stand agood chance of being around when the Army cansupply everyone fl y ing with NOMEX clothing.

As far as I know, no dye has been developedth a t will adhere to NOMEX and since the naturalcolor is an off-white, do pilots look anything likedoctors?

Cadet James F. Dugan IIINorth Carolina State University

Dear Cadet Dugan:

Your suggestion certainly has merit and is beingco n sidered by the military. However, the primeconsideration at this time is to provide protectionfor air crews in Southeast Asia, since the additionalhazards of enemy fire and adverse terrain increasethe possibility of crash fires. The absorbent qualities and comfort of NOMEX underwear limitsits use in the hot and humid climate found in thatarea.

NOMEX will take some dyes. Olive green OG)probably has been the most successful dye to beused up until now.

The NOMEX flight clothing that will shortly be

available in Southeast Asia is two-piece and similarin appearance to the fatigue uniform. I t also hascovered zipper pockets placed approximately asthey are on the legs of one-piece flight suits, as wellas pockets on both sleeves. Hopefully, this flightuniform will be available to all aviation personnelin the near fu ture.

PEARLDear Pearl:

Reference your December column)FSN 8465-082-2512 is a component of the Sur-

M RCH 968

vival Kit, Individual Cold Climate). This component is Case Outer, Individu a l Survival Kit. TheFSN of the end item Survival Kit, Individual, ColdClimate is 8465-973-1862.

No technical manual has been published for Survival Kit, Individual Cold Climate), FSN 8465-

973 -1862. However, a technical manual is in theprocess of development at U.S. Army AviationM aterial Command, St. Louis, Mo.

TM 55-8465-206-13, dated 19 December 1966,applied to:

1 The Army OV-l aircraft individual kit alsoknown as Pararaft Kit or RVN Composite Kit),FSN 8465-j22-0033.

2 Leg Holster Kit Army lightweight individual survival kit), FSN 8465-935-4728.

3. Vest Kit Army aircraft escape and evadekit), FSN 4220-BOO-0006.

Dear Pearl:

Robert C. MauckU.S. Army Support CenterPhiladelphia, Pa.

I wish to advise that your answer in the December issue of the AVIATION DIGEST to SP6Robert M. Smith , 42d Transportat ion Company.for a publication to cover survival kits, cold climate,FSN 8465-082-2512, is not accurate. T M 55-8465-206-13 was published by this command to coversurvival kits in SEA which consist of a Survival KitComposite Pararaft, SV2 Survival Vest, and Survival Kit Leg Holster Individual for U.S. Army

aircrews.Publications to include Survival Kit, FSN 8465-

082-2512, and all other survival kits used in Armyaircraft will be published by this command in thelast half of fiscal year 1968 .

Gentlemen:

.John MolinarEquipment SpecialistUSAAVCOM

Thank you for your correction.PEARL

55



talesfromthetrojanThe following stories were writtenby mem bers of a recent Communicationsskill class of COL Daniel M. LewisUSAF) Ret.) of the Institute of

Aerospace Safety and Managementat the University of SouthernCalifornia Each contains animportant safety message

LE RN FROM

MYMIST KESARRIVED at the main airfield about 0700 andmet the instructor who was to give me an in

country IFR checkout in operations. We talkedbriefly and he told me to file an IFR flight plan. Icompleted the flight plan and received the following weather: minimum en route ceiling zero;freezing level on the surface; and light rime icingin the clouds. I discussed the weather with the instructor and he told me it was all right, that heflew in light icing conditions all the time. He alsotold me that a local regulation authorized flightin light icing even with no deicing equipment.

Since I had no experience in flying in icing conditions I relied on his judgment.The crewchief was wiping the windshield of the

U-6 when we arrived and told us the aircraft wasin top shape. I checked the log book and foundonly a few minor discrepancies. We completed thepreflight and climbed aboard.

I taxied to the approach end of the runway andcompleted the runup and pre akeoff check. I received takeoff clearance from the tower and startedto roll. I was instructed to climb to 1 500 feet via

6

flight plan route and contact control for my clearance.

The takeoff and climb to 1 500 feet were un-eventful. I called control, received my clearanceand was directed to climb and maintain FL 60.I applied climb power and started the climb. Aswe passed 3 000 feet I saw that my rate of climbwas only 100 feet per minute and decided to applyMETO power. I still had trouble climbing. I beganto wonder if I had forgotten to raise the flaps. Ichecked the flap handle and found the flaps wereup. As I passed 4 000 feet the airspeed was about 90mph and rate of climb 100 feet per minute. Ithought maybe something was wrong with the airspeed indicator and remembered I should turn onthe pitot heater. I knew I was in the clouds be

cause the ceiling had been about 2 000 feet. I stillhad the hood on and made no attempt to lookoutside. I was desperately trying to determine whyI couldn't climb more than 100 feet per minute.I decided to maintain 9 mph and accept the rateof climb.

I finally reached FL 60 and leveled off. I left thepower at METO and waited for the airspeed toincrease to cruise. t did not increase but remainedat about 9 mph. I decided something must definitely be wrong with the airspeed indicator andstarted to reduce the power to cruise.

The instructor had not spoken since takeoffbut when I started to reduce the power he told meto leave it in that we would need it. He also toldme to take off my hood. I removed my hood andlooked around. The clouds were thick and wet.I saw ice forming around the windshield andchecked to see that the heater was full open. Ilooked out at the left wing and saw about 2 or 3inches of ice had formed along the leading edgeand was continuing to build. When I looked backat my instruments, I saw that I had lost 200 feet.

The instructor said ' 'I've got the radio. Hecalled control, advised them we were picking up

ice and requested a lower altitude. Controlreplied

they were unable to approve a lower altitude andinstructed us to maintain FL 60. He then calledand requested the weather at the closest airfield toour position. t was 100 feet obscured in heavysnow.

I was having trouble maintaining airspeed andaltitude. The windshield was almost completelyiced over. The wings struts wheels and everythingin sight had about 3 or 4 inches of ice formed onthe forward side. When I lost altitude, I was un-




able to regain it. The airspeed varied from 75 to80 mph.

For the first time I realized we might have tojump. I t was then that I became aware that wedid not have our chutes on. The instructor musthave been thinking the same thing because he tookthe controls and told me to put my chute on. Istruggled with the straps which had not beenadjusted. I was cold yet I could feel the perspiration running down my ears and forehead. Mypalms were wet and my hands shook. My breathingwas rapid and I felt sick at my stomach. Afterwhat seemed forever I had the chute on. I took the

controls and the instructor struggled into his. Iwondered who would jump first.The MEA was 4 000 feet and control called and

cleared us to descend and maintain 4 000 feet. Irelaxed the back pressure and the Beaver seemedto fall to 4 000 feet. We were still in the cloudsand the temperature was _1 0 C. We were stillpicking up ice and I knew we couldn't fly muchlonger. The instructor increased and decreased thepropeller pitch. I could hear the ice hitting the aircraft as it was tom from the propeller.

M RCH 968

The instructor increased the power to maximumallowable when we saw the hole. I saw trees andheavy snow directly below us. The instructor yelled"I've got it " and went into a steep descending leftturn. He leveled off about 100 feet above the treesheading in the general direction of the airfield. Itwas snowing very hard and our visibility was practically zero. I flew just above the treetops by looking out the left window and crosschecking the instruments. The airspeed was approximately 75mph with maximum power. Luckily we spotted alarge powerline which he recognized. I t wouldtake us to the airfield. The instructor canceled ourIFR clearance and we flew along the powerlineback to the field.

After several calls we contacted the control

tower and were advised the airfield was closed dueto weather. We told the tower about our situationand stated that we would be landing.

The instructor was very familiar with the areaand told me when to turn in order to get us onfinal. After turning final I picked up the lightsof the snow-covered runway. Everything was looking good until we suddenly pitched forward. Chartsand pencils slid from my lap to the floor underthe rudder pedals. We were both startled andstruggled to regain control. The aircraft respondedand we landed without incident.

I taxied up on the ramp in front of operations

and we were met by 8 or 1 pilots. They walkedaround and looked at the ice. After saying a littleprayer, I climbed out and planted my ·feet solidlyon the ground.

I had learned many things the hard way. I willnot a t tempt to explain why the instructor allowedhimself to get into this situation, but I do want topoint out how ignorance can kill you and how wecan learn from our mistakes and the mistakes ofothers.

Here are some of the things I learned from thisexperience:

N ever fly into forecast icing conditions withoutdeicing equipment unless you can stay below thefreezing level or clear of clouds

A lways check and adjust your parachute beforeflight and wear it at all times when instrumentconditions are anticipated

When ice is first encountered} take immediateaction to prevent accumulation

I f you have ice on your aircraft during landingapproach} be prepared for pitching moments s aresult of changing c g due to ice breaking off

57



talesfromthetrojan

As we approached the radio relay site the snow fell

even heavier . . . the ceiling was down to about 2

feet and visibility was less than h lf a mile . . .

TheLastiveeet

S NOW AND LOW CEILINGS seemed to followus like a plague. Several times the visibility

dropped to nil. This presented no large problemas there were many open fields to land in when thesnow got too heavy. We did just that several times.We knew our VIP passenger was an avid bridgefan and we had tactfully seen to i t that playingcards were aboard. I wondered what the farmersthought when they saw a card game going on inthe helicopters that landed in their fields.

The second night out provided a break in theroutine. We dropped our passengers with instructions to pick them up again in the morning. Asfor us, we were to spend the night in town. Andwhat a time for itt The holiday season was in fullswing and parties were as common as snowflakes.Those people really knew how to spend the lastfew days before Lent. I won t list our evening sactivities here. Suffice it to say that flying the nextmorning was not foremost in our minds.

Dawn came all too soon and we were back inthe air again. Somehow, we managed to arrive at

58

the pickup point at the appointed time. f weshowed the aftereffects of the night before, ourpassengers didn t seem to notice. We hadn t ridourselves of the snow and low visibility during thenight. t looked like it was going to be a carboncopy of the previous days.

It was at the third stop that it happened. s

we approached the radio relay site on a hilltop, thesnow fell even heavier. The ceiling was down toabout 200 feet at the hilltop and visibility was lessthan half a mile. The landing area wasn t thela rgest I had seen, but it would accommodate bothUH-Is. We were still flying trail so we had to orbit

while the lead pilot made his approach. Fred wasat the controls and I was handling the radios. Nosense in making too much chatter, I thought. Oneof our passengers might be listening in and I didn twant to d a rken his picture of our professionalm a nner. s we orbited, the snowfall became moreintense. I t was no time to be circling. We needed toget on the ground before the weather forced usthere.

After what seemed like an eternity, the lead shipwas on the ground. Fred swung into the wind andwe were on our approach. I saw that the crewchiefof the lead ship had dismounted and was readyto help guide us down. At about 50 feet, a lightningrod loomed up from nowhere, forcing Fred to veerleft and steepen his approach. t would put uspretty close to the other aircraft, but we still hadroom.

s we approached a hover i t hi t us-we wereengulfed by snow that was thrown up and stirredby our rotorwash. To try and pull up and goaround could have been fatal. True, we had afull panel of instruments in front of us, but to

U S MY AVIATION DIGEST



attempt a quick transItIOn to using them wouldhave been folly. Fred did the only thing he coulddo and planted it. When we lost the horizon wehad been at an altitude of only about 5 feet. Withany luck, the skids should have been level whenwe touched down. Our touchdown was far fromVIP quality, but at least we were on the ground .

For a moment, I almost relaxed. Then, throughthe chin bubble on my side of the aircraft, I couldsee snow moving past us-packed snow. We weresliding forward Worse, before the snow swallowedus, we were pointed directly at the other ship andits crewchief. My reflexes took over. There wasn ttime to key the interphone and tell Fr d. I grabbedthe cyclic stick and pulled back sharply. I mighthave damaged the aircraft, but better ' one than two.Although we jolted slightly, there were no crunching sounds.

When the now settled, we could see how closeto disaster we had come. There was a scant 3 feetbetween the turning main rotors of the two Hueys.We had to do some explaining about the rough

M RCH 968

landing to our passengers, but that was easy com-pared to explaining a collision.

We shut down, got out, and iooked for damages.The snow that had been our enemy for three dayshad made amends. When the ta i l boom rockedback, the thick blanket of snow acted as a cushion.A close inspection revealed that the only damagewas a bent tai l rotor guard.

We had been extremely lucky. T o this day Idon t know what made me glance down throughthe chin bubble when I did. t was the one thingthat saved us from the errors that we had com-pounded. We had flown in marginal weather whengood judgment told us to stay on the ground Wehad socialized when we should have been restingA nd 7 to impress our passengers 7 I stayed off theradio when I should have been finding out aboutthat lightning rod

I learned a lesson that day I have never for-gotten. The book may tell you what to do if youinadvertently encounter whiteout, but only goodjudgment will keep you out of it in the first place

59



talesfromthetrojan

RESTFUL SLEEP a wholesome breakfastVFR weather, and a good helicopter under

him-what else could a man ask? I was flying ascopilot in a UH-ID, taking a team of officers to adesert site. I was an IP in the UH-I with more than3 000 helicopter hours. The pilot was an officer Ihad previously checked out in the aircraft. He didnot have a great deal of helicopter time but hehandled the aircraft well. The crewchief had flownin Hueys in Vietnam and was very conscientious.With the four passengers aboard, we had a totalof seven people .

After making contact with the helicopter thathad sighted our destination, we landed. The earlymorning sun felt good on my back as we waited forthe experts to be experts. They decided it wasn'tthe right location, and the other helicopter madeus eat dust as it departed for another search. One ofthe passengers was the hospi tal commander. He requested that we make a stop at a road junction sothat he could give instructions to one of his ambu

lances parked there.The junction was a crossroad with the inevitable

restaurant and service station. Because it was theonly habitation for miles it was a logical place forthe ambulance crew to wait. During the few minutes flying time I was busy on the radio talking tothe local control and relaying a message from oneof the passengers. I called the pilot of the other helicopter to advise him of our intention, then attempted to contact a ground vehicle. I saw that wehad approached and were circling the junction at300 feet while the pilot performed a high recon.

He turned from base to final in a generally easthe ading as I continued my radio conversation. Onthe approach, I saw we were paralleling a powerline to my left and a road to my right. The ambulance wa parked in front of the cafe alongside theroad ahead and to our right.

We were just coming to a hover, with a littlefor ward speed and slight descent when it began. Isaw the cables ahead and above near the end ofthe tip path plane. In most stories the hero freezesw ith horror at this point. Not me. I moved for

60

OneStrikndOu

those controls like lightning, shouting, "Wires" atthe top of my lungs. Jim must have seen themabout the sa me instant I did. s I felt for the cyclicI felt it come aft. The nose pitched up and th e aircraft shuddered . t immediately started a turn tothe right with the left side low. I know because Iwa looking down at the dirt, expecting to turnover at any second. The metal made a sickeningsound as it was wrenched and torn and I thought insurprise "We're cra shing " The aircraft struck onthe kids in a tilt to the left and the blades hit theground. I recall thinking of fire and, during theturn, got the switches off. Jim had his hands fullwith the controls as the helicopter continued a 270 0

turn to the right and hit twice more before comingto rest upright. The glass between us shattered whenthe main transmission tore out and flew forward.

Suddenly everything was still and the crewchiefwas shouting to the passengers to get out. W e evacuated and I heard someone cry a warning to be careful of the hot wires. Through the settling dust I

saw that although the cabin area was intact, theblades were smashed the transmi sion gone skidsbent, tail boom twisted and the tail rotor missing.One word summed it up - total. t was almost impossible to believe that less than a minute hadpassed since we saw the wires. I don't know whenI've felt sicker. N o o n e was hurt, except Jim, whocompl a ined about a sprained wrist.

Wh a t had happened wasn't hard to reconstruct.The blades striking the wires about the time thecyclic was moved aft resulted in a nose high attitude and caused the tail rotor to dig into the

ground. The resultant torque spun the helicopter tothe right, and the left side low attitude allowed theblades to strike the ground. I t just beat itself todeath. The most amazing thing was the speed withwhich it happened. One moment everything wasfine and a few seconds later-disaster.

Why didn't we see the wires? A high recon wasperformed and low recon was made on final. Therewere at least five pairs of eyes looking forward during the approach, although my attention was di-




vided by radio transmISSIOns. Yet no one saw thewires until they were silhouetted against the sky. Its true that there was a powerline along the left

side, about 50 yards from the road, and any goodMonday morning quarterback will tell you that wetherefore shouldn t have landed in that spot. Butthere were no wires visible in the flight path andno pole could be seen on the right. We were tryingto put the ho pital commander as near the ambu-lance as possible so he wouldn t have to walk toofar. Again, we could be faulted for that. But thereal question was, Why hadn t any of us seen thewires?

From the time we turned on final, we were on acollision course for them. This question so intriguedthe president of the accident board that two dayslater, after the wires had been repaired, he flew asa passenger in another helicopter and duplicatedour approach. Although both he and the pilot werelooking for the wires and knew they were there,they did not see them until they were almost ontop of them. A more perfect job of camouflage of

MARCH 968

wires could hardly have been made. Pictures toprove the point were taken from the helicopter onapproach and submitted with the accident report.

What can be done about this type of accident?Well, wire strikes could probably be eliminated:

If we never landed near anything resembling apole and a wire

If we landed only at designated spots that hadbeen examined from the ground by someone quali-fied to judge the area

Since these two alternatives are not always possi-ble, the exposure rate could be reduced by:

Marking all wires in a standard way just s wemark danger areas on our roads

ragging every strange landing spot at low alti-tude and speed to make sure it is free of obstruc-tions

The latter two are only ways to reduce exposure,and I m afraid we ll still be reading about wire

strikes in the Weekly Summary until someone comesup with a solution. Be sure you re not the onethey re writing about.

6



talesfromthetrojan

i ream

W HAT A WILD DREAM-I wish I 'd wakeup The irritation of cockpit and passenger

noises did not let up. Suddenly, I realized I wasawake. The sound of pain from my passengers wasreal: the wreckage of my helicopter was not dreamsville. It was here and now.

Realization forced me out of limbo into actionand I cut the switches. The odor of fuel was heavyand fire was an immediate hazard. I moved to tripmy seat belt and a sudden pain told me I had

smashed my chest on the cyclic. Luckily, my shoulder harness was fastened or the injury would havebeen worse. I left what remained of the cockpit,wondering how I had gotten here.

I moved around the front of the helicopter andsnapped the safety belt off the right-hand passenger.One leg and both his arms were broken. Lifting athim to assist his exit, I slumped unconscious again.After several attempts to remove him, spurred onby the fear of fire, I had him on the ground. I madea quick check of both passengers and found no cutsor bleeding. The center passenger, still in the air

craft,had

abroken

legand

possiblestomach

injuries and was unable to move. I returned to thefirst passenger, splinted his broken limbs, and madehim as comfortable as possible. I again failed toremove the second passenger. I resolved, with thecoming of darkness, not to waste daylight andsplinted his leg, making him as comfortable aspossible in the aircraft.

I removed blankets and tarpaulins and coveredthe injured to prevent further shock. My survivalkit was scattered in the jungle growth and I found

6

only one can of water. The passengers' equipmentprovided water, blankets, and protection for thenight. s I finished securing the injured, I heardan 0-1 overhead. Knowing a search had beenlaunched, I grabbed for my survival radio andpunched the buttons, with no results. t was inoperative. Noting the concern of my passengers, Itold them I had made contact, and that a rescueparty was being organized and should arrive by themiddle of the next day. I buried my disappointment

in my efforts to make them more comfortable.s darkness fell, the jungle became quite. I gave

water and words of encouragement to the injured.N o o n e wanted food. Conversation was needed tobolster our spirits and we talked about what hadhappened to the helicopter.

The mission was supporting topographic surveypartie, with transportation of personnel and equipment from survey station to survey station. Theweather was typical of the rain forest, low cloudsand rain, mixed with intermittent breaks of clearing and good visibility. The speed of moving surveyparties, when possible, could result in weeks savedin weather waiting time. All moves were made byhelicopter, and most survey work (actual angleshots and elevations) was done at night. When aweather break came, an all-out "go-move-surveyparties was launched.

I had been into this particular station severaltimes before. This morning, I moved one-half theparty of four in two loads, carrying personnel andequipment to a new location 45 minutes away. Aftertwo trips, I took on a full fuel load so I could make




the jungle was only few feet below the skids . . . theengine surged coughed and surged again

two more trips for the remaining personnel andequipment. As I approached the pickup area, I saw

the weather was closing in again, and that I couldprobably take only one more load. I landed on asandbar and dumped mo t of my fuel, keeping onlyenough to pick up the gear, plus a reserve, andenough to return to base camp.

Arriving on station , I hurried the loading of twopeople and their equipment. I knew I 'd be overgross and would need all the skill I could musterfor a safe takeoff. The wind was approximately10-15 knots toward the nose of the helicopter, andthe clouds were covering the hill, with intermittentclearing. I had carried as much weight out of worsespots during the preceding 30 days. I revved up tooperating rpm, pulled pitch, and took off. Not morethan 1 feet from the pad, the engine lost power,the needles split, and I wished we were back onsolid mountain. The jungle was only a few feetbelow the skids. The engine surged, coughed, andsurged again. I realized we were going into thejungle canopy. I yelled to tell my passengers anddecelerated to get zero airspeed and a tail low attitude for entry. Milking rpm and trying to clear thehill mass, I ran out of speed and lift at the sametime. The next thing was What a wild dream-Iwish I 'd wake upl

The passengers were in pain and we establisheda I-hour cycle of water and conversation to helpthem through the night.

At dawn, I prepared a signal for the search aircraft I knew would soon be overhead. There wereno openings in the jungle canopy near us, but Ithought I could use the fuel from the rupturedtanks to make enough smoke to clear the trees. At0600 I heard the 0-1 overhead. I tried to light thefuel and tried the radio again, but both failed. Ourspiri ts dropped.

I realized by the sound of the search aircraft thatour penetration had left little or no mark on thejungle canopy. I decided to make my passengers acomfortable as possible and return to the helipadon the mountaintop. After 2Y2 hours of climb, slips,cuts, and falls, I arrived at the mountaintop clearing. Later, I could hardly believe that the wreckagewas only 295 feet below the takeoff point. Lookingdown the flight path, I could see no indicationwhere we had entered the treetops. No marks orscars were evident and I realized how lucky we werethat one of us was able to climb to the helipad.

M RCH 968

I built a fire at the campsite and prepared greenleaves to make a smoke signal when the aircraft

came near.As

the morning progressed, I swore atthe pilot for searching on down the survey line, asit was quite evident to me that I was not wherehe was looking. The sight of that beautiful aircraftcoming back changed my curses to blessings. Its lowpass of recognition was the most beau tiful sight I'veever seen I made hand signals to indicate wherethe helicopter was and the extent of injuries to thepassengers. The pilot dropped a message pack, saying the re cue team was en rou te by helicopter andshould arrive around noon. I shouted this information down the mountainside to m y passengers. Theyreplied that they were not in need of water or relief,and asked me to wait for the rescue party and helpthem locate the wreckage.

At noon the UH-I9 landed with a flight surgeonand party. We hurried to the wreckage. The recovery of the injured required two trips by litter, taking 4 hours each.

The accident and eventual recovery made severalitems apparent to those flying over the jungle. Thelack of radio communication hampered the search,as no exact flight path had been filed. Failure ofthe survival radio resulted in a second failure topinpoint the wreckage. Serious effort must. be made

to record every leg of flight paths. A reliable radiobackup became a necessity on every flight after thatand the failed radio was the subject of -an equipment improvement report.

The failure of the survival kit pointed out shortcomings in that area. To have carried supplies foran emergency only to have them disappear in theaccident was ridiculous. Packaging and securing thecontainer to the aircraft is equally important. Themost important factor became readily apparent tome as the survival situation developed. The removalof the injured, particularly when all are incapacitated, is extremely difficult. The immediate treatment of the injured can prevent further shock andsave energy and effort for survival. Even a short24-hour period can end in tragedy if all participating are not properly motivated. One person mustassume the leadership role at the accident site. Alogical sequence must be established and followedto prevent wasted effort and time.

Prior planning by every crew member can produce a plan of action that can be adapted to anysurvival situation.

63



CH-47 Chinook helicopter inVietnam withdraws one of ArmyWeapons Command s airmobileplatforms from water during ademonstration of transportability

irmobile rtillery PlatformsHE U. S ARMY WeaponsCommand recently brought

to its Rock Island Arsenal in Illinois a touch of Vietnam, in theform of a simulated rice paddy

without r ice-for testing the newU. S Army portable firing platform.

Need for such a platform ; for

firing artille ry arose from the factthat much of the terrain in thedelta region of southeast Vietnamis covered by 6 inches to 2 feet ofwa ter over from 6 to 18 inches of

mud. To simulate this condition,a large hole was excavated nearthe combat vehicle testing rangeon Arsenal Island.

Howitzer crew in Vietnam tests airmobile platform

Mud of the consistency foundin Vietnam was hauled from alocal swampy region and dumpedinto the hole. Enough was used tocover the bottom to a depth of 2

feet on top of which water waspumped from a nearby pond. Constant water level of 2 feet is maintained in the test swamp.

The platform, designed for fir-

ing the M-l02 105 mm howitzeris air transportable by helicopteras an external load. It consists ofa 22-foot square aluminum structure with a plywood deck and adjustable legs at the corners. At thetips of these legs in contact withthe mud, are 4-fodt square, perforated metal bases that sink intothe mud and reach the hardpan.These bases give the platform stability.

The original request for theplatform was made by GeneralWestmoreland s headquarters inVietnam, to the Office of Chief ofResearch and Development in thePentagon.






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Army Aviation Digest - Mar 1968

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