Army Aviation Digest - May 1963

8/12/2019 Army Aviation Digest - May 1963

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UNITED

OF ARMY AVIATION ODCSOPSOF THE ARMYCol Robert H. Schulz

U. S. ARMY AVIATION SCHOOLBrig Gen Robert R. Williams

COMDT U. S. ARMY AVIATION SCHOOLCol Warren R. Williams

Capt Richard C. AnglinFred M. MontgomeryRichard K. TierneyWilliam H. SmithMj Sgt Thomas M. LangDiana G. Will iams

EDUCATION AND LITERATURE DIVPierce L. WigginWilliam E. CarterJames E. Coleman

Cover: South Vietnamese troopsboard a U. S. Army CH-21 helicopter to embark on a missionagainst Viet Cong forces inSouth Vietnam. t took 18 seconds to load and 12 to unloadeach aircraft.

RMY VI TION1GESJMAY 963 VOLUME 9 NUMBER 5

CONTENTS

LETTERS 1NO MAGIC FORMULAS, Gerard Bruggink 3GUARD TALKS PREVENTION 10WE SUPPORT, Capt Arthur E. Dewey . . . 12A PAGE IN HISTORY, }'laj Milton P. Cherne 16AVIATION SAFETY , Capt Joseph C. Boggs . . . . . . . 19A SMALL UNIT INSTRUMENT TRAINING PROGRAM,

Maj Edwin O. Carr . . 23TWX 26UH -lBs REACH THE SOUTH POLE , Scot MacDonald, JO C , USN 28START YOUR FLIGHT RIGHT . . . . .MAN TO MANWHO'S GOT A SECRET? . . . . . . . . .

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FLYING AND T-BUMPERS, William H. Smith . . . . . . . . 34SPARK PLUG FOULING, Lt William J Hodnet t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40SS-ll WEAPON SYSTEM . . . . . . '" '" '" ' . . 4CRASH SENSE . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45START YOUR FLIGHT RIGHT . . . . . . Inside Bac

The mission of the U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST is to provide information of aoperat ional or functional nature concerning safety and aircraft accident prevention, trainingmaintenance, operations, research and development , aviation medicine, and other related dataThe DIGEST is an official Department of the Army periodical published monthly undethe supervision of the Commandant, U. S. Army Aviation School. Views expressed hereiare not necessarily those of Department of the Army or the U. S. Army Aviation SchoolPhotos are U. S. Army unless otherwise specified. Material may be reprinted giving credito the DIGEST and to the auth or , unless otherwise indicated.Articles, photos, and items of interest on Army Aviat ion are invited. Direct communicat ion is authorized to: Editor- in-Chi e , U. S. Army Aviation Digest Fort Rucker, Alabama .Use of funds for printing of th is publication has been approved by HeadquartersDepartment of the Army, 27 November 1961.To be distributed in accordance with requirements stated in DA Form 12.


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Sir:We here at Fort Riley read the twoarticles concerning helicopter formation flying in the February issue withpersonal interest. The accompanyingarticle to the one by CWO Wilcoxen,written by Dr. Prophet, was of especialinterest. Of course, we had no idea

that this idea was of so much scientificinterest, but feel that some explanation of how we did this may be helpful. I, for one, would definitely like tosee more research on the problem ofcrew duties in Army Aviation.

First, let me say, this idea was nothandled quite as haphazardly as Mr.Wilcoxen may have indicated. We leftout some of the background on thearticle (in fact, I'll take the blame forthe blue pencilling) in order to shortenthe article. I see now that this was amistake.

Second, when the idea was first proposed by Mr. Wilcoxen, many aviatorsdid just as the Doctor said, and poohpoohed it.

Third, the entire idea was analyzedwith flight safety in mind. This ideawas discussed in the early stages withthe flight surgeon, and the aviationsafety officers of the airfield and theunit (both of whom are graduates ofthe USC safety course) . Their ideaswere incorporated into our final expression.

I chaired the discussions that fol-

MAY 1963

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lowed, as I was the section commander, and the seventeen aviatorsinvolved were extremely free withideas during the discussions. We usedthe following method to arrive at ourfinal solution before we ever tried it:a. When did most critical time occur?b. Who was doing what at thistime?c What was actually happening at

this time that was causing difficulties:d. What had to be done to correctc, above?e How could it be done?f Who could do it?g Who would do it?I m not at all sure of the science involved in this, for while we 'd all beento college, probably Psych one or twois all we had. But this went on forsome thirty days, off-duty in people'shomes, and of course, in the CockpitClub that all aviators know at Marshall

Field. I m sure we did not considerfeedback, and I m certain we'd liketo know more about what that is.I think, though, that the final result

of those finely trained aviators, cooperating with each other, benefittedthe entire effort here at Ft. Riley. Westandardized every aviator involved tothe point where any two could get intothe cockpit, and fly the mission with noproblems, often without even communicating with each other. Pressures onthe controls told the story. One aviator

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followed through on control pressures,even though one watched the groundand one watched the aircraft in theformation. Any really serious pressuretook control as long as the pressurewas maintained. After flew the systemmany times myself, realized that theactual control passed rapidly back andforth from one side of the cockpit tothe other on each landing.

hope that Doctor Prophet can workon this system and refine it for universal use. It is really needed today nthe field, if we are to get in and outquickly and still retain our basic formations.

Sir:

CHARLES H. DRUMMOND , Jf.Major, ArtilleryHq Prov Avn BnFort Riley, KansasI was very interested in the articleon autorotations, Yes or No, in yourDecember issue.The argument against autorotationsappears to contain at least one verylarge hole. No mention is made of howmuch more expensive the accidentswould have been, both in life andhardware, if autorotations had not beenpractised previously.The opening quotation lifted fromCol Neel seems singularly inappropriate. Surely the point is that havingreceived some measure of instructionin touchdown autorotations the unfortunate non-swimmer has at leastbeen introduced to the water.


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Probably the greatest fear of all isthe fear of the unknown.It is noticeable, during autorotations,the psychological change that comesover a pilot when his mental approachchanges from I think I can" to IKNOW I can." This psychologicalchange is manifest in a marked improvement in airmanship from entryto touchdown. The apprehension whichfogged his mind in the initial stages ofthe exercise has been replaced by anability to concentrate on each stage ofthe manoeuvre resulting in all roundimprovement in morale.Of course it may be argued that thecircumstances and terrain will determine the outcome of the landing. This,however, is no excuse for doingnothing.It is unrealistic to imply that thepresence of the I.P. was unnecessaryin many instances. The exposure rateof the I.P. is very high and it is probably true to say that the initial instructional periods are the most hazardous.The ground is removed from themanoeuvre during part of the autorotation instructional sequence by employing the power recovery techniqueduring a number of lessons. Unfortunately the fear of the unknown touchdown remains.

The solo autorotation to touchdown, properly supervised, is a vitalpart of the training of any Armyhelicopter pilot.After all, has anyone ever suggestedthat we should stop making glidelandings in light fixed wing aircraft?

Sir:

J AMES CULLENSMajor, Army Air CorpsBritish Exchange OfficerCanadian Joint Air Training Centre

Lt Col Cantlebary's article [January1963], A COMMAND PERFORMANCE, really hits the spot Thewhole problem of safety can only beresolved when commanders assumetheir share of the task in promotingaviation safety.This article supports my argumentswhen I have vehemently disagreed withthose who claimed "They're ratedaviators" or He's checked-out in theaircraft" and that the commander'sresponsibility rested there. Just as longas his aviators are flying, he must besure that the pilot can cope with theconditions he may encounter on thatflight on that day.Furthermore, as Col CantIebary says,an SOP alone will not make a programwork. The SOP must be realistic andmust be utilized, particularly by theC.O. who sets the theme. The com-

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mander can only make his peopleaware of safety by being safety conscious himself.

Sir:

A. R. ZENZCapt, CE

While reading the letter from CaptainLe Blanc, published in the February1963 issue, I became quite concerned;not with the intent or philosophy thathe is attempting to impart, but withthe misconceptions his statements mightlead toCaptain Le Blanc stated the -20Pand the -34P for the U-6A do list bothFSN 6610-557-3407 and FSN 6610-557-3408 as Indicator, Attitude, in theindices (both part number and FSN).However, it would have been betterhad he gone on and stated that, in thebreakdown, Section II, Sub-section0300.15, these two items are listed withcorrect nomenclature and acceptableinterchangeables for each.I take exception to the statement inCaptain Le Blanc's second paragraph:

The U-1A -20P and -34P contain thesame mistake in both the numericalindex and the systems breakdown." Iam convinced that the Captain wasreferring to publications which havesince been republished, as the current-20P and -34P for the U-1A, September 1962, are correct in all areasregarding the two indicators.Further, it is very possible that thesubmission of the URs to this headquarters by Captain Le Blanc's unit,regarding the discrepancies, could havebeen instrumental in correcting thelatest publications. However, I wouldlike to point out that the proper formto use when advising this headquartersof noted discrepancies in supply-typepublications is the DA Form 2028.Now, let's get into the area of"interchangeable versus substitute" and"SACs 19, 3 and 32" items. There isa distinct difference between an interchangeable item and a substitute item,in that the interchangeable itemspossess such technical and physicalcharacteristics as to be freely exchangedone for another, irrespective of application and performance. These arereplaceable-type items whose internalcomponents, repair parts, etc. , are notcompletely 100% interchangeable. Theyare usually AERNO, AN, MS, etc.,type items. Substitute items, on theother hand, are items which have beensuperseded by an improved version ofan item currently in use in a givenapplication. Use of the substitute itemis usually continued until existing stockis consumed or exhausted.In view of the above definitions, the

first sentence of paragraph 4 of Captain Le Blanc's article: For each typeinstrument we find in Army Aviation,there are a multitude of substitutes;however, only one of these interchangeabies is coded with a SAC of 32," isvery misleading and adds to the existing confusion in the use of the twoterms. SAC 32 is used to identify the"master item number." This is areference and or procurement numberonly for items functionally interchangeable (code 07) such as AERNOs, ANs,MSs, procurement reference numbers,etc. This code (32) [SM 55-135-1-32,dated 2 July 1962] is applied to themaster accessory item for groupinginterchangeables, requirements computations and levels of items manufac-tured by two or more manufacturers.Substitute items, code 04 (as definedabove) are related to SACs 9 or 31.As further clarification, the followingis submitted for the edification of all:a. SAC 19. tock Item. This itemis carried in depot stock and or is onprocurement for depot stockage. Itemswith substitute item code (04) indicate one way substitutability.b. SAC 31. Preferred Item. Thisitem is a superseding item for one ormore other items with SAC 04. It isissued only after the stock of 04 itemsis exhausted. This item has complete(two-way) substitutability with its code04 item(s).Captain e Blanc further states thatif the instrument face is appreciably

different, and you have a group ofArmy Aviators who confuse as easily asPoor 01 Joe, carry a writeup (reddiagonal) on the DA Form 2408-13or DA Form 2408-14 until the instrument is replaced with one that Joeunderstands." This is incorrect in accordance with paragraph 57c( 4) ofTM 38-750 as long as the instrument isperforming its prescribed function. Theonly thing to do in a case of thisnature is for the pilot to becomefamiliar with the new type face priorto takeoff.This letter is not written to criticizethe writings of Captain Raoul J. LeBlanc, Jr.; in fact, he is to be commended for taking the time and effortto prepare his letter. What he wrotehas generated thought and action andis, therefore, beneficial to the Department of the Army as a whole. Morepeople, like Captain Le Blanc, shouldair their findings and opinions ratherthan keep them to themselves where noone can discover or take correctiveaction, when necessary, regarding them.GLENN H. DZOMBARTechnical Assistance OfficerHeadquarters, USATMC

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V ~ R SINCE it became possIble to make a living inthe accident investigation andprevention field, the complexityof the investigating and reporting procedures has grown withthe pay scales of the safety experts. So much is required nowfrom the man in the field thatthe essentials of the investigation often are lost in a flurry ofpaper. As part of our overall effort to increase Army Aviation'smission capability through improved accident research, I willtry to put the What, Why, andHow of accident investigation intheir proper perspectives, without resorting to magic formulas.

WH T S N ACCIDENTWe could spend several hours

discussing the validity of all thedefinitions that have been developed, starting with the onethat calls an accident an un-

MAY 1963

Where do you look for cluesNo agicFormulas

Gerard Bruggink

planned event, but it serves nouseful purpose. From the practical point of view, an accidentis adequately defined as a mani-festation of failure Of course,there are exceptions in the formof so-called a( ts of God, butthese are adequately covered inTwilight Zone." Our concern

is with the typical, everydayArmy aviation accident, whichinvariably can be traced back tofailure on the part of designer,builder, operator, or supportingpersonnel.Accidents are a waste, but notcompletely so, unless we ignorethe basic reasons for the underlying failure. Aircraft accidentsare as old as aviation and, paradoxically enough, have played acritical role in the rapid progress of aviation, because theirinvestigation and analysis stimulate the search for perfection.There is no need to prove that

thorough accident investigationplays just as critical a role in themission capability and missionaccomplishment of Army Aviation.

HOW TO ORGANIZE NACCIDENT INVESTIGATIONYou receive an excited tele

phone call informing you thatone of your pilots cIo bbered anOH-23. What do you do now?

f you have followed the instructions n DA Pamphlet 95-5,there s not a thing you have todo right now, because the twomost immediate problems-thecrash rescue of survivors andthe preservation of wreckagewere solved ages ago in yourunit's preaccident plan. Whilethis plan takes effect, don't

Mr Bruggink is an air safetyinvestigator with the Investiga-tion Division o SABAAR

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waste time and energy with remarks as: There goes our safety record, or It was just amatter of time with him. Anaccident especially a bad onecan be a very unsettling event,but as a man in a responsibleposition you should know theimportance of keeping youremotions and opinions underyour hat.

After the dust has settled andyou have had the opportunityto establish the basic accidentfacts you send a crash factsmessage as spelled out in AR385-40. Don't feel obliged tospecuLate on the cause of the accident in this message. All thatis required of you is a brief description of how the accidentoccurred. t is easier to send asupplementary message than tohave to retract an untimelystatement.In many cases valuable evidence at the scene of the accident is lost or destroyed alreadybefore the crash facts messagehi s the wires. Typical examples:

Rescue, firefighting and sightseeing v e h i c I e s obliteratedground marks.o v e r z e a l ou s firefightersdrained fuel tanks before samples were taken.

Scattered parts collected byorder-loving persons or guardpersonnel.

Photographers arrived late atthe scene or economized on film.

Failure to obtain statements(or addresses) from witnessesbefore they left the scene of theaccident.

Accident board members began to tinker with the wreckage on their own initiative, andbefore the investigation was organized.

Before becoming involved indetails let's ask ourselves:What exactly is meant by the

organization of an investigationand when does it start?

Only one part of this questionhas a straight answer: the in-vestigation starts as soon as youbecome aware o the accident.My answer to the question oforganization of the investigation sounds like a misplacedjoke. Nevertheless, here it is:you cannot organize an investigation in the business sense ofthe word; you can only orientthe investigative efforts. f amdisappointing you with thisstatement it is only becausetextbooks have given you thewrong impression. When youread examples used for illustrative purposes, you are awareonly of the purposeful actionsall leading to the gift-wrappedsolution at the end. This givesyou the idea that the wholething was prearranged or preorganized while actually, the

Play it by ear

organizational aspects of the investigation become apparentwith hindsight only.

There is a strong parallel herewith the hindsight of historianswho overnight, make a brilliantstrategist out of a general whowas only adjusting himself tothe conditions as they changed.f you want to see organization

in an investigation, you mustlook at the orientation of allinvestigative efforts. In manycases you don't even knowwhat you are looking for untilyou find it. t is like having anoctopus by the tail but youdon't know which tail it is. Youhave to keep chopping at themuntil all mystery is gone.

t is only during the initialphase of the investigation thata more or less standard set ofroutines can be applied such as:

t he collection of all dataand documents having a bearing on the aircraft, the pilot theflight plan, the weather, and allrlelated factors;

-obtaining statements fromcrew members, passengers, witnesses and other personnelwhich may be involved;

a preliminary survey of thescene of the accidents (wreckage diagram and debris pattern) .

Information gained fromthese initial procedures provides


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the board with a picture of thepertinent circumstances surrounding the accident and will,in most cases, govern the nextstep in the conduct of the investigation. From this point on,you are involved in the actualinvestigation and there are norules to lean on. You have toplay it by ear. f you are luckyenough to find one or more specific clues in the initial data, youfollow them up. f there are noclues, you may have to use thenegative approach; that is, thesystematic elimination of all factors that could not have contributed to the accident.

When properly tackled, thistask is not as hopeless as itsounds. Your main concernshould be to have a definite butflexible plan of attack and thento see to it that the right job isdone by the right man. Basically, the investigation of an accident is nothing but the application of common sense andavailable knowledge to a problem which is bewildering onlywhen we try to solve it withoutdefining it. In other words, organized, methodical thinking ismore important than organizational talent per se. NOTE:Every board member should befamiliar with the general principles of accident investigation,as explained in DA Pamphlet95-5, before an accident occurs.Further guidance can be foundin the excellent ICAO publication: MANUAL OF AIR-MAY 1963

Who s in charge here?CRAFT ACCIDENT INVEST I G A T ION Doc 6920-AN/ 855/ 3.)

When confronted with a serious accident, your first impulsemay be to call everybody butyour mother-in-law for assistance. This is natural, but re member that too many helperscan be just as harmful as nothaving enough. First, use theavailable resources in your owncommand; find out what theircapabilities are and exploit themwithout exceeding them. Toooften, evidence is lost becauseunqualified personnel tamperwith complex equipment whichcan be tested only by higherechelons or by the manufacturer. Not long ago I saw awell-meaning flight surgeon disassemble a defective inertia reelwith a pocket knife, while hewas sitting in the grass near theaccident site )

AR 385-40 gives you the privilege to request special assistance when your own m npowerresources are inadequate. Remember, however, that regardless of the number of specialistsinvolved, you are conductingthe overall investigative effortand you are responsible for thefinal report.WHAT TO INVESTIGATEProbably more important

than knowing how to investigate is knowing wh t to investigate. This is another areawhere textbooks are of little

help, because they provide onlyg e n e ra l i z e d guidel ines. Aschool-trained in v e s t i ga t rwithout field experience maytry to make the accident conform to his checklist and weareverybody out in the process.He may end up with a boardmore interested in hanging thansupporting him. A more popular, but just as harmful, type isthe investigator who tries tomake the evidence fit his pettheory. Beware of him, especially when he is a slick talker.You may end up with a quickand good looking accident re port, but i you have a no-nonsense CO, he will shoot it fullof holes at first sight.

The two types of investigators just described present twoextremes: one investigates toomuch lack of judgment), theother not enough misjudgment). One is overeager, theother is prejudiced. Somewherein between stands the cool catwe are looking for-the manwho organizes and directs theinvestigative efforts of the boardwithout regard for the consequences, guided solely by professional integrity and the evidence as it develops. This manrealizes that evidence, even inthe form of a hint or a suspicionprovided by the initial data, is ina constant state of flux. However, he never has a problemdeciding wh t to investigate because to him it is simply a matter of applying the prove-or-dis-

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prove-it method to every possible cause factor suggested bythe evidence s it becomes avail-able

Instead of drooling over anideal investigator, let us reviewsome practical don ts.Don't ever jump to conclusions; don't even venture a suggestion as to a probable causeunless you have investigated allpossibili ies.Don't take anything forgranted; every statement youmake must be verifiable.

Don't expect that every accident investigation will result inearth-shaking revelations.

Don't rely on persons who believe that accident investigationis purely a white-collar job.

Don't let the deadline for thereport rush you into prematureconclusions.Don't move the wreckage to amore secure area unless you aresure that no relevant evidencewill be lost in the process.

Don't release the wreckagefor salvage until the investigation is closed.

Don't underestimate theavailable services of your flightsurgeon or medical officer. Inmost cases they are the onlypersonnel qualified to look intothe human factors aspects of theaccident.

THE CCIDENT R PORTThe accident report is the cul

mination of all investigative efforts. It explains what happened, how it happened, why ithappened, and what can be doneto eliminate all related and unrelated cause factors. Unfortunately, it is in this critical areaof the accident board's responsibility that most of the errorsnot to say blunders-are made.

Complying with the clear-cutrequirements in AR 385-40 andcompleting the routine parts ofthe Army aircraft accident form(DA Form 2397) is no problem.It is only when the wide openspaces of section N (Descriptionof the Accident) and section 0(Findings and Recommendations) have to be filled with rational language that we becomehelpless at times. Don't feel tooguilty about this. The instructions you have to work withleave something to be desired,and i f you have no experiencein this field, they can easily leadyou astray.

The instructions for section Nread: Use this section to makea brief narrative of the accident.A detailed description will alsobe made and placed in the accident report as an attachment.What is meant here? DA Pamphlet 95-5 (chapter 4) providesthe answer.

Section N of the accident formshould contain a rief narrativeof the accident, including whathappened, ut omitting detailsThe detailed narrative referredto in the instructions is a selfcontained history of the accidentand the investigation, written in

a manner that will tell the reader the sequence of events leading to, during, and followingthe accident. It should bechronologically clear, well supported with evidence, and shouldleave no doubt in the reader'smind about the completenessand thoroughness of the investigation.

The detailed narrative, attached to the report as a continuation of section N, is theheart of the report. The suggested outline to write this narrative, given on pages 30 and 31of DA Pamphlet 95-5, is the bestinsurance against inadequate reporting, because it forces you toevaluate the effectiveness andlogic of your efforts to determine the cause factors. As wassaid before, it is only at thistime that any form of organization or logic in your investigation becomes evident, in retrospect, in your description of theaccident and investigative procedures.

Finally, our greatest bottleneck: Findings and Recommendations (section 0 . The instructions read: List all factorswhich contributed toward theaccident. List all recommendations which will serve to prevent recurrence of this type accident.

In many cases, a thorough investigation will reveal deficiencies which have no bearing onthe cause of the accident. twould be unfair to the personnel involved to list them as factors contributing to the accident. On the other hand, by notmentioning them, you may deprive your CO and probablyother units from the chance toimprove the quality of their operations. To avoid this oversightin the instructions, I suggestthat you list your findings ascontributing factors and un

related factors.

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This distinction is not neededfor the recommendations. In addition to what the instructionssay, it is my opinion that recommendations should go beyondthe limited objective of preventing recurrence of this typeaccident. Accident investigation should primarily be seen asone of the quality control toolsin the improvement of ArmyAviation's mISSIOn capability.By revealing failures and thesource of failures, we not onlyprovide the means for the prevention of one particular typeaccident but, more significantly,we provide the means for overall system improvement. twould be a sad day indeed whenour concern about failures wasmotivated only by their accident potential. As the old sayinggoes: Safety is the by-productof doing something the rightway.

Your findings and recommendations can be brief and to thepoint, because all the explaining is done in the detailed narrative. Some more don'ts:

Don't mention names in connection with cause factors; it issufficient to mention an individual's function.

MAY 1963

Don't list cause factors whichare not analyzed in the narrative.

Don't refrain from mentioninga cause factor because somebodymay not like to see it printed.

Don't look at cause factors asa blame distribution system.Don't use the description of

an event in the accident sequence as a cause factor.

Don't hesitate to admit defeatwhen no cause factors can be established. When you can offertheories only, make this clear,and be sure to substantiate themin your narrative.

When you have properly defined the cause factors, youshould have no difficulty comingup with pertinent recommendations. Don't try to fix all ofArmy Aviation's problems onceand for all. Stick to the problems revealed by your investigation and you will have a moreattentive audience. Leave outall generalities such as, Commanders should assure that allpilots attend the safety meetings. " Unless the pilot n thesubject accident missed a vitalpiece of information by not at tending one particular safetymeeting, you are confusing theissue.

C SE HISTORIESThere is probably no better

way to impress you with thefact that the quality of your investigation reflects your tt -tu e toward aviation and aviation safety than the analysis of afew accident reports as we received them. Without exaggeration, it can be said that accidentreports are like personal lettersoften they reveal more about

the sender's character andstanding than is anticipated ordesirable

C SE NO 1An OH-23 pilot with 1,850

hours of flying time, with 400in helicopters, took off for a local weather check. According tothe pilot, he encountered lowering ceilings at a distance of 6miles from his home pad and decided that he could not continueon his course under VFR conditions. As he started to make a180 0 turn, he began to lose rotorrpm and altitude. Full throttlewas applied but the aircraftcontinued its descent and waslanded on a raill10ad track. Themain rotor struck a tree, resulting in a total damage of $12,500.

According to the accident re port, the ceiling at the time ofthe accident was 7 feet with avisibility of mile. When thepilot noticed that the railroadtracks he was following wereentering a tunnel, approximately % mile ahead of him, he initiated a 180 0 turn to the right.During this turn, engine rpmwas reduoed to 2600 and theaircraft airspeed fell to zero, followed by an uncontrollable descent of the aircraft.

The passenger in the aircraft(a mechanic) had this to say:As we rounded a curve in the

railroad tracks, we came upon arailroad tunnel and the pilotstarted to turn around. We began to lose altitude and the pilot

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was unable to recover.After reading these three versions of the same event, healthy

curiosity immediately raises thefollowing questions:What approach did the acci

dent board use to investigate thisaccident?What is the purpose of check

ing weather which forces a pilotdown on the deck?

Was the drop in rotor rpmpilot-induced, or had it a mechanical origin?

What did the flight surgeonhave to say about the pilot'sperseverance under the existingweather conditions?

Unfortunately, we will neverknow the answers to these questions because the accident re port lacks the following items: A narrative of the board'sproceedings and analysis. The flight surgeon's analysis. A copy of the pertinent official weather report.

All we have to work with arethe board's conclusions and recommendations. Only by readingbetween the lines do we get avague notion of the true story.

The accident report lists theprimary unsafe act as Loss ofrpm and airspeed during 180 0turn, resulting in uncontrollabledescent. This so-called primaryunsafe act is nothing but the description of ,one event in a chainof events, leading to the accident. With respect to the truecause - and - effect relationship,this conclusion has the same insignificance as the statementthat the cause of a groundloopwas loss of directional control.Loss of rpm and airspeed havespecific causes. Although an investigation may fail to provide adefinite answer, it is the board'sresponsibility to analyze andevaluate each possible cause. Inthis particular accident, there isonly indirect reference to the

ent aft wing sp r attachment

cause of the loss of rpm and airspeed, nicely hidden in recommendation No.1: All pilotsshould be briefed on the necessity to maintain rpm and airspeed during turns. The implication of this recommendation,obviously, is that the board considered the loss of rpm and airspeed pilot-induced.

Since railroad tracks occasionally have the habit of disappearing into the ground, thereby depriving the pilot of a navigational aid, the board also recommended that Pilots be re briefed on the danger of following railroad tracks in terrainwhere tunnels are prevalent.

Finally, since flying intomarginal weather in hilly terrain was mentioned in the report as a contributing factor, itwas recommended that Pilotsbe reminded of the danger offlying VFR in IFR conditions.Instead of resorting to this noncommittal generality, the boardshould have discussed the VFRweather minima in the pilot'sunit and the reasons why theapplicable rules were inadequate to prevent the pilot's at tempt to fly beyond his capability.

Don't let the critical reviewof this accident report give you

the impression that it is thepoorest case in our files. Thedisturbing fact is that as far asquality of investigation and re porting is concerned, this caseis only slightly below average. Iselected it only because it illustrates so well the problems confronting an accident boardcharged with the investigationof the intangibles of a typicalweather accident.

C SE NO 2Let us consider the case of theU-6 pilot who struck a gatepostwhile taxiing his 48-foot wideaircraft through a 65-foot widegate at a USAF base, causing$5,300 damage to the left wing.

There is something peculiarabou damaging an aircraft onthe ground. According to ourregulations (AR 385-40), a mishap on the ground resulting indamage becomes an aircraft accident only when there was intent for flight. In this particularcase, the pilot happened to becoming in from a landing, andthe accident board was in business.

Another interesting fact abouttaxi accidents is that by definition they are almost the resultof operator error. There are exceptions, such as sudden brake

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failure or collapsing pavement,but not in this case.This accident was simply a

matter of a pilot taxiing the leftwing (on his side) into a 10-foothigh gatepost (the top four feetpainted orange) in broad daylight. There are no indicationsthat the pilot was concernedabout the clearance between thegateposts. He did not wait forassistance, nor did he ask .one ofhis four passengers to guidehim. After feeling the firstbump, he thought that the tailwheel had struck something andapplied power to proceed. Theresulting second contact withthe post was the most severe.

Before continuing with theboard's findings, it should benoted that:

Periodic inspection No. 8 hadjust been completed on this aircraft and a test flight was re quired. The test flight was combined with the administrativeflight during which the incidentoccurred.

After a local inspection of theaircraft damage, the cross-country flight was completed without further incident. Before fieldmaintenance grounded the aircraft, five days after the acci-dent due to a bent ft wingspar tt chment requiring majoroverh ul of the wing the aircraft was used for the followingmissions: NIGHT FLYING,SHORT FIELD TAKEOFFSAND LANDINGS, AND PARADROPS.

What did the accident boardhave to say about the accidentcause factors? The report listseight cause factors: the first fivere summarized as supervisory

error; the last three, pilot error.The first one on the list of theaccused must have been as surprised as we were: the Aviaion School at Fort Rucker, forqualifying the pilot in the U-6

after only 4.5 hours of dual VFRMAY 1963

instruction and an incompletecheckou in all phases of U -6 operations. (NOTE: The pilothad 65 hours of U-6 time, including 46 hours hood time.)The second one on the list s theunit's aviation and maintenanceofficer, for allowing the aircraftto be scheduled on a mission before oompletion of a test flight.The other participants were anordnance officer who failed tocut the gateposts down to sizeand the aviation section personnel at the AF base who failed toguide the pilot and pain ed tooshort a yellow center line in thegate opening.

In the second section of thecause factors, it is admitted thatthe pilot was not fully alert andcautious while approaching theparking area. Strangely enough,however, none of the recommendations have a bearing onthe pilot's inv.olvement in thisaccident. They refer only to thealleged shortcomings of supervisory personnel. Needless to saythat this analysis caused someclearly-worded nonconcursfrom reviewing officials.

Actually, the only boardmember who hit the nail on thehead was the flight surgeon. Hetook the trouble of looking intothe human factors aspects ofthis accident and discovered thatthe pilot's judgment at the timeof the accident had been adversely affected by his unfamiliarity with the Air Force base

and the time spent trying to locate the Army area. In the flightsurgeon's w.ords, The pilot wasmad because he had been taxiing around lost for 15-20 minutes. Because of the delay infinding the Army parking ramp,he was apprehensive that hewould be late taking off. He wasnot paying as much attention tothe gateposts as he should, butwas aware of their presence.

What does all this commotionabout a straight-f.orward taxi accident prove besides the nuisance value of our nit-pickingability? Simply this: The realissue in an accident should notbe confused with the circumstances surrounding it; the accident board did an excellentjob of unearthing contributingfactors, but put the wrong emphasis on them; and thoroughaccident investigation gives thecommander the opportunity todiscover and remedy organizational deficiencies which maynot even be remotely connectedwith the direct cause of the accident.

ON LUSIONSIf, after saying my piece, Ihave left you with the impression that you have heard nothing that you did not know orsuspect already, I would be extremely pleased. It would meanthat I have managed to discussthe essence of accident investigation and reporting in practical, useful terms. t would meanalso that you must be convinced,as we are, that the most important part of the investigation isthe investigator himself.

Accidents and accident investigations are not the most pleasant aspects of aviation. However, without the dedicationand perseverance of the menwho have to delve into them, wewould repeat our failures anddefeat the purpose of our mission.

9


12/52

Ai afety eet n Windy City

uard Talks Prevention

MEETING IN Chicago, theArmy National Guard heldthe first aviation safety conference of its type 12-13 March.Brig Gen Francis S. Greenlief,Assistant Chief, National GuardBureau, issued invitations to attend through the adjutants general of all 5 states and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Representatives from 49 states responded, despite snow, sleet,rain, and low ceilings whichgrounded many commercial airliners and forced some of theGuard aviators to complete theirtravel by train and auto.

Other conferees included personnel from U SC 0 N ARCODCSOPS USABAARUSAAVNS, and the FAA. Thehost officer was Lt Col Frank O.Grey, Jr., Illinois. Serving asmoderator was Lt Col George P.Kelly, Chief, Aviation Branch,Operations and Training Division, National Guard Bureau.

USABAAR director, Col Robert M. Hamilton, and four members of his staff delivered themajor portion of the oonferencespeaking schedule. ColonelHamilton stressed the need forimproved unit training in boththe ARNG and Active Army.We fully realize that our prob

lems in the Active Army arePrepared by the United Statesrmy Board for viation cci-

dent Research10

basically no different f ro myours

. . . Army advisors have theresponsibility of flight checkingyour aviators and recommending them for permanent flyingstatus. Therefore, well-qualifiedaviators must be selected as advisors. They must have sufficientexperience to tell when an aviator is properly transitioned andthey must have time to do theirjob properly.

National Guard accidents na turally increase during the summer training period due to increased flying and exposuretime. I recommend that youstress field operations in everyphase of training prior to summer camp.

We are very happy to see theoperations and training positionbecome a reality in the Guard.You O&T people have the ability, authority, opportunity, andresponsibility to improve thecaliber of aviators through abetter education and trainingprogram.Speaking on the subject ofstandardization, Maj George C.Kuhl said, Basically, ActiveArmy Aviation is encounteringmany of the same problems thatthe National Guard is experiencing. In numerous areas wecan draw parallels. Standardization of flight training is one ofthese problem areas. Major

Kuhl recommended that a National Guard standardizationboard be designated and assigned the responsibility for providing, publishing, and distributing procedures for standardization of all Guard aviation.This would include standardiza-. tion of aircraft checklists andflight maneuvers. The boardwould be the final authority inall changes involving standardization and would have the re sponsibility to designate themost qualified instructor pilotsto conduct the Guard flighttraining program.

Major Kuhl concluded by saying, There is no place in aviation, whether it be Active Armyor Guard, for haphazard, inadequate flight programs governedby obsolete regulations andpoorly supervised flying practices.

Present and proposed aircraftinventory figures were presented by Col Robert H. Schulz,ODCSOPS. He pointed out theincreased emphasis being placedon aviators to achieve true mobility and stressed the need ofpreserving trained personneland aircraft for potential combatefforts.

Mr. Gerard M. Bruggink,USABAAR air safety investigator, whose article No MagicFormulas appears on page 3 ofthis issue, discussed techniquesof accident investigation, with



13/52

emphasis on an open mind attitude.

The Army training programand directives concerning combat effectiveness tests and evaluations related to ARNG trainingwere discussed by Lt Col William C. Edler, USCONARC.Charles W. Carmody, Chief,Operations and Evaluation Division of Air Traffic Control,FAA, briefed the gathering onthe operation of his organization. Following this, during a15-minute question-and-answersession he offered practical solu-

tions to communications prob- sion, he included command relems facing Guard units. sponsibility and the importance

Other speakers representing of educating nonflying comUSABAAR and the Army Avi- manders to the peculiar needs ofation School were Mr. James E. aviation.Coleman and Captain Ronald C. Colonel Hamilton called theVines. conference, One of the finest I

An indication of the success ever attended. The atmosphereof the conference was reflected was open and frank, and enthuin the closing remarks of Gen- siasm was high. People sat downeral Greenlief, who cited three and took a hard look at theirimportant areas where ARNG pr.oblems and discussed themcould derive benefits from the candidly. This is essential to aconference: standardization su successful safety meeting. ampervision and field training op- sure the conference will be oferations. In discussing supervi- lasting benefit.

= = = = = } { m r ~ r } > t t r ? m : : r r : = : m = = : ? t : W M n r : T l t r r X I T i % w : r : : n n : r r I K r m n m : = : = l : = : w r m m m m m m m m r m r U ; : l : : : r t m m r m m m i l l

Three viation CoursesOffered by US FITHE UNITED States ArmedForces Institute (USAFI) is offering three correspondencecourses in aviation that are ofvalue to personnel intending tofollow an aviation career.The courses-General Aeronautics, Aircraft Engines, andJet Aircraft Engines-are available to all military personnel onactive duty who have at least 120days of obligated service. (Alsoeligible are cadets at the fourservice academies .) General Aeronautics isavailable as a 12-lesson introductory correspondence course inbasic principles and mechanics ofaircraft operation and construction.Topics covered include the history of flight and aircraft; forcesof motion; forces acting on theaircraft; control of aircraft inflight; stability, design, and construction of aircraft components;powerplants; instruments; propellers, fundamentals of flight;meteorology and navigation; and

MAY 1963

aviation terminology.The prerequisite for this classis a course in high school physics. Aircraft Engines is available

as a 22-lesson correspondencecourse covering procedures foroperation, inspection, maintenance, repair and overhaul ofthe reciprocating aircraft engine.Topics covered include, internal-combustion engine principles; float-type carburetors;pressure-inj,ection carburetors;superchargers; fuel and fuel systems; valve and ignition timing;starting systems; engine controlsystems; propeller fundamentals;maintenance and repair; principles of jet propulsion and jet engines.

Prerequisites are courses inhigh school mathematics andphysics. Jet A ircraft Engines isavailable as a 16-week correspondence course covering theory, construction, operation andmaintenance of jet aircraft engines.

Topics covered include historyand theory of jet propulsion; theaviation gas turbine; rockets,ramjets and pulsejets; fuels andfuel systems; lubricants and lu bricating systems; inlets; exhaustsystems; and thrust augmentation.

Prerequisi es are courses inhigh school mathematics andphysics.

Personnel interested in takingone of these courses must fill outDD Form 305. f this is an original enrollment with USAFI, a5.00 postal money order or acertified check payable to theTreasurer of the United States(USAFI) must be included.(Additional courses are free i fthe original enrollment is successfully completed.)

Enrollment forms must be submitted to local education centers.f such a center is not available,

the applicant should submit hisforms to his commanding officer,who will forward them to theappropriate USAFI office.


14/52

IIWe Support/I motto of the 1st Aviation Com-pany in Southeast Asial has more than ordinaryconnotations It is no vague idle boastl but anecessary way of life to many units in Vietnam

HE ARMY S 1st AviationCompany is now a perma-

nent part of the scene in theRepublic of Vietnam. The company is now operating out of itsbase at Cap St Jacques, 40 milessoutheast of Saigon. Twelve ofits sixteen Caribou aircraft flyfrom Vung Tau Airfield at theCap in support of III and IVVietnamese Corps while the restare supporting I and II Corpsin the north.

aptain rthur E ewey

The 1st Aviation Company ar-rived in Southeast Asia in June1962, after a historic 11,000 mileflight from Fort Benning, Ga.This marked the first time anArmy Aviation unit had flownits organic aircraft to an over-seas destination [outside theNorth American continent].

The company became a partof the SEATO commitment toThailand and flew in support ofJoint Task Force 116. t was as-

Loading jeep and trailer into CV-2B at Korat Thailand

12

signed to the 9th LogisticalCommand, which had arrivedfrom Okinawa during this timeof instability, and established itsbase at Korat, approximately100 miles northeast of Bangkok.

The company supported the first major tactical unit assignedto JTF 116, the 1st BattleGroup, 27th Infantry (Wolfhounds), in weekly rotation ofits rifle companies to positionsnear the Laotian border. TheCaribou also provided rationand equipment airlift to thesecompanies. This undevelopedportion of Thailand s northeastis accessible only by air duringmuch of the monsoon season.

The Wolfhound s replacement,1st Battle Group, 35th Infantry(Cacti), ranged even farther in-to Thailand s hinterland andp r e s en te correspondinglygreater requirements for airliftand aerial resupply. The battlegroup s biggest training exercisewas in the remote northwestnear Chiang MaL

Capt Dewey is a Corps ofEngineer officer with the 1stAviation Company in the Re-public of Vietnam

u.s ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


15/52

Most tourists to Thailand readabout Chiang Mai with its teakforests, elephants, and woodcraftsmen, but few make the 3-hour flight from Bangkok to seeit. Fewer still penetrate the jun-gle curtain surrounding the city.Hence these modern militaryexplorers had only scant infor-mation and unreliable mapswith which to start their jungleforays in this region.

The Caribou provided valu-able terrain intelligence on re-connaissance flights wi h thebattle grour staff and companycommande,,s. They flew the tac-tical troops and their equipmentto Chiang Mai, kept them resup-plied and evacuated medical pa-tients and defective equipmentback to Korat. This was accomplished on a daily basis, in spiteof heavy monsoon rains and lowceilings which added to the haz-ards of flying in the rugged ter-rain. The Caribou pilots alsorendezvoused with the Cacticompanies at a small airstripnear the Burmese border andreturned them with their nativeguides back to Chiang Mai whentheir jungle m.arch was over.Meanwhile, monsoon rains inthe northeast created problemsfor units of the 4th Cavalry,who were on a 40-day, 800-mileroad reconnaissance, testing ar -mor trafficability. These troopswere isolated for some time andthe CV 2s became their prin-cipal contact with the outsideworld.

The company could expect avariety of mission requests dur-ing a typical day's operation inThailand. These might includeflights for counterinsurgencytraining cadres, rushing serumto a snakebite victim, carryingR R troops to Bangkok or selected personnel on orientationtrips to the Republic of Viet-nam. VIP flights were also fre-quent.

MAY 963

Aircraft at Korat ThailandDuring typhoon Harriet when

wind and water created somuch damage in southern Thai-land, the Caribou crews flew re -lief to the victims in the form offood and medical supplies, together with engineer teams andtheir equipment.A glimpse of the company'scamp at Korat would revealtheir close identification withthe ground soldier. The tents inwhich they lived, together withtheir operations and mainte-nance areas, were located besidethe runway. With the assistance

of the company's three Engineerofficers, and some Peace Corpstype engineering, the men builttheir ,own mess hall, troop billets, day room, and operationsbuilding. They literally carvedtheir camp out of the jungle, ridit of snakes and underbrush, andmade t home for 39 officers and124 enlisted men.

The Thailand chapter of thecompany's operations closedwith the phasing out of the U.S.tactical troops and the dissolution of JTF 116. In December1962, the company received or-ders for deployment to the Re-public of Vietnam.

Eight Caribou crews had already been assigned n the Re-public of Vietnam on a monthlytemporary duty basis; hence, thepilots and crewchiefs were quitefamiliar with operations in theirnew location. The crews contin-ued their normal operationswithout a break while the restof the company made the movefrom Thailand. The companywas assigned to the UnitedStates Army Support Group,Vietnam (ASGV) and becameoperational on 1 January 1963.Its mission is to provide imme-diate and highly flexible aircraft

CV 2Bs in formation; looking out ramp door of lead aircraft

3


16/52

support in furtherance of theMAAG mission in the Republicof Vietnam.

The record so far in Vietnamhas already furnished impressive evidence of the Cariboucompany's unique ability to provide flexible support for theground soldier whenever andwherever he needs it. The keyto this kind of support is in thecompany's close identificationwith the ground soldier. This includes the ability to adjust tohis often unforeseeable schedules of troop movement, resupply and evacuation. Vietnam hasprovided significant challengesto the 1st Aviation Company inthis flexible response role. Loading rice for air drop to Vietnamese troopsLogistics support in the Re- gin for error. Particularly in thepublic of Vietnam's Mekong del- mountains of the Da Nang area,ta and Ca Mau peninsula hinges low clouds, turbulence, and unlargely on the use of expedient predictable downdrafts add toairstrips in various stages of de- the difficulties inherent in thevelopment. Most of the strips are use of small drop zones andshort and narrow; many are lit- short unimproved airstrips.tle islands in the rice paddies Coupled with these demandswith no overruns. Most are on the aircraft and its crew isplagued with difficult cross- the not uncommon possibility ofwinds during much of the year. receiving Viet Cong ground fire.Yet, the Caribou pilots use these Both in the southern rice fieldsstrips every day, both on sched- and in the northern jungles, theuled milk runs and on special line of security becomes exmissions. tremely vague off the limits of

The terrain typical of the cen- the airstrip or drop zone and thetral and northern Vietnamese outpost it serves. Consequently,highlands allows even less mar- Caribou have occasionally beenVietnamese piloted AD 6 flying escort with CV 2B on a mission

over VC infested territory in the Vietnamese highlands

14

hit-on climbout from the ricedrops, on final approach to airland cargo, on medical evacuations during combat operations,and on leaflet drops over unsecure areas.

In spite of these difficulties,the Caribou crews have beenable to conduct their flights on aregular and dependable basis.Special Forces personnel atMang Buk 30 minutes south ofDa Nang) have come to rely onUnloading rice and livestock atA Loui outpost Vietnam.



17/52

the Caribou crews to drop therice thatch, and equipment theyneed for their new compound.The Vietnamese soldier at ALoui outpost (west of DaNang), cut off from the outsideworld except for an adjoining1 200-foot runway, knows thatwhenever humanly possible theCaribou crews will fly in thepigs ducks and rice he musthave for survival.

Last Christmas Eve was agood example. For nine dayslow clouds and monsoon rainshad blanketed the A Loui valley. Rations in the outpost wereexhausted, and the troops wereeating a chop suey made ofgrass. Then at approximately1600 hours on 24 December, theweather broke for about threehours. The Caribou crew at DaNang had waited for days forthis opportunity, and they wereready when it came. Withinminutes they were airborne.Thirty minutes later they hadcrossed the trackless jungle tothe A Loui valley and descended through the suddenbreak in the cloud cover to thetiny strip. Scores of hungrytroops were standing by and unloaded the squealing, cacklingcargo n time for the aircraft totake off bef.ore the clouds spilledinto the valley again. Throughthe dust below the pilots couldsee the campfires lit and thetroops preparing an unexpectedpork, duck and rice feast forChristmas Eve.

The Caribou s reputation forreliability and flexibility hasspread throughout the Republicof Vietnam. This is the airplanethat Vietnamese commandersand American advisers dependon when they need a tough jobdone quickly. A Viletnamese officer who suddenly faced the requirement of moving his battalion to a beseiged outpost beforenightfall can testify to this. SoMAY 1963

V 2Bs used to relocate Montagnard tribesmen in Vietnam

can an American adviser whocould find no other way to re move wounded men from aremote, unlighted airstrip atnight. So can American missionaries whose families criticallyneeded medical attention, andwho could find no other way toget them to a hospital.

The Caribou performed thesemissions because it was built tohandle the difficult and unpredictable. Yet, operations here

remind one constantly that itsmechanical ability is inextricably linked to human appreciation of its capabilities and theirwillingness to exploi them.This willingness on the part ofthe officers and men of the 1stAviation Company has createdthe flexible man-machine teamwhich has come to assume suchan important role in the Republic of Vietnam s counterinsurgency war.

Caribou pilots with the Vietnamese commander at A Loui outpost

5


18/52

Your outfit is part of a STRAC unit a prac-tice alert is called you leave for n unknowndestination I This happened to the first Armycargo helicopter unit to fly in South VietnamWould your outfit be ready for such n emer-gency

Page istoryMajor Milton P Cherne

PRIL OF 1961 found the world in a turmoiland Southeast Al?ia floundering in internaldispute. All eyes followed the news reportsclosely and speculation of American assistancewas a common topic. This month proved to bea triple barreled month for the 57th Transportation Company (Lt Hel) Fort Lewis Wash. On 1April 1961 the 57th was selected as a superiorSTRAC unit. Several days later a typical practice alert was called and the unit started to prepare for movement.

Plans were pulled from the files boxes weretaken out of storage packing and crating beganon a 24-hour basis. Shot records wills powers ofattorney were reviewed; clothing was inspected;doublechecks were made on aircraft and vehiclemaintenance, replacement of short time compo-nent parts, and the multitude of other itemsthat must be checked and doublechecked whenyou are about ready to move. All loading wasaccomplished in the prescribed time frame. Thenwaiting for the word began. One day two daysa week-then came the word to unload and prepare for immediate movement to Yakima, Wash.to support the STRAC 4th Infantry throughtheir yearly maneuver. Carefully, each item wasunpacked and stored. Massive notes were takento emphasize the lessons learned and assist theunit should the day arrive for another move.Early November found the officers and men ofthe unit starting to think about Thanksgiving andChristmas leaves. Little did they realize thatThanksgiving would be spent on the PacificOcean and Christmas would be a sacred momentor tw p in South Vietnam, crammed betweenmaintenance or missions. Again came the16

word, but the procedures were old hat. Inspections checks allotments etc. were more orless routine. In four days 100 percent of all TOEaircraft were flyable and ready to depart.

At 1000 hours, 6 November 1961 twenty CH -21s departed Gray Army Airfield Fort LewisWash. for Stockton, Calif. At 1900 hours, 8 No-vember, 20 helicopters arrived on schedule without incident. This included a night flight over theSierra mountains which reached an altitude of10 500 feet.

On 21 November the USS Core departed fordestination unknown with its small flight deckloaded to capacity with white, ghostly shaped CH-

Maj Cherne is dual rated with over 2300 flighthours. He is Chief Armament Branch Avn Com-bat Developments Agency Fort Rucker .



19/52

21s sealed and protected from the salt spray.Three weeks later crowds gathered to observethe banana helicopter on this flight deck alongthe dock in Saigon, Vietnam. Hundreds of people gazed with admiration at the big helicopterswith U. S. Army boldly written across theside. As rapidly as possible the cocoons were re moved, blades secured, engines preoiled and theships readied for flight. The crowds waited ex pectantly as the first helicopter was pushed intoposition for runup. Smoke blew out of the stacksas the engine roared into action. Slowly theblades began to turn. Final rotor engagementwas made, and the pilot completed his flightchecks. Then with a powerful lurch, the firstUnited States Army cargo helicopter to fly inSouth Vietnam lifted off the deck of the carrierand sped down the Mekong River to the SaigonInternational Airport. One by one the CH-21smoved noisily off the carrier to their new homein a strange, unfamiliar land.

The 22d of December 1961 will long be remembered by the men who served with this uniton that day. Operating jointly with members ofthe 8th Transportation Company (Lt Hel) atraining exercise was conducted north of thecity of Saigon. Everyone knew that this was arehearsal for the real thing that was to follow.Thirty CH-21 helicopters, loaded to maximumcapacity with crack Vietnamese paratroopers,raced across the docile countryside. Takeoff,checkpoints, release points and the landing areawere hit with exact timing, indicating the degreeof professionalism and training that these twounits possessed. The training exercise was completed successfully in every detail and we knewthat we were ready for the big one.

MAY 1963

At dawn on the morning of 23 December 1961,the pilots examined their aircraft with unusualthoroughness. Each item on the preflight checklist was carefully scrutinized. Simultaneously, theVietnamese paratroopers quietly and orderlybroke themselves into chalk loads and assembledaround the helicopter that was to carry them intohistory.

Slowly the time passed: one hour two. . . then three. The pilots laughed nervously asintelligence patiently tried to get a fix on the radio transmitter that we were after. Then theword came: GO Thirty helicopters gained speedas they left the Saigon Airport behind, forminginto right and left echelons to place the troops onboth sides of a canal. On time and on target, thehelicopters flared for a landing into an almost impossible landing zone: perpendicular rows ofpineapple fields, with 3-foot troughs between rowsfilled with water and mud. f ever pilot trainingand technique paid dividends, this was the day.Small arms fire broke out immediately, and several of the aircraft were under fire as they departed the area to return for additional troopsand reenforcements. As the aviators looked backthey could see the cloud of black smoke andorange flarnes reaching for the sky. There was little doubt as to what had happened.

On the 24th of December, a Specialist-4 wasreported kidnaped by the insurgent Viet CongoThe 57th and 8th Transportation Companieswere jointly alerted to prepare to mass a largenumber of troops as soon as the location ofthis American soldier was determined. Franticpreparations were made to continue work on thehelicopters for this most important mission.

On the 2d of January, his position was pin- rmyCH 21s take off from the USS Core

7


20/52

pointed and for the first time a large number oftroops were delivered into an otherwise inacces.sible area. One thousand and thirty-six soldierswere flown into a hole. in the jungle. The landingzone was approximately 300 by 150 yards. Theground was soft, and the zone was further re stricted by isolated trees and brush growing atrandom. Towering jungle trees ridged the areathat was our destination. The Viet Cong roamedat will throughout this dense foliaged sector. Thismission was performed without incident to theamazement of the Vietnamese staff and commanders who were now grasping the importanceof helicopters in their future operations. Nowthey had complete freedom of movement andgreater flexibility in their fight against an elusive foe.A one time priority of training became ourgoal. Helicopters departed regularly to train theirinfantrymen on the minimum procedures theymust grasp before being sent on an assault mission. In three months the 57th Trans adequatelytrained 26,000 men in the techniques of loadingand off-loading. It took 18 seconds to on-load, and12 seconds to off-load each aircraft. We now hadthe capability to move anywhere in the Mekongdelta area and displace trained troops.At first, the soldier was awed by the helicopterand fearful of the noise and vibrations. Howeverhe soon came to look forward to an assault byhelicopter. Slowly, the local commanders began toemploy the helicopters in less stereotyped missions.They began to flex their muscles and employ the helicopters with more and more confidence. Although mistakes were made they werenever made twice by the same commander. New

ideas were sought and the aviators of the units. with their abundance of enthusiasm and immensebackground in helicopter techniques assisted inevery possible way. An entirely new concept ntheir thinking and maneuvering against the insurgent forces made the helicopter the most desired tool in their inventory. The ratio of troopsemployed to Viet Cong destroyed clearly demonstrated the soundness of helicopter vertical en velopment.

With the arrival of the United States MarineSquadron came an even greater lift capability.Instead of 15 or 16 choppers we could now employ 30 or more. The Army men eagerly greetedthe Marines passing on to them the experiencethat had been gained during the many assaultmissions that had been flown.

In mid-April a massive mission of transporting1,100 troops was jointly shared by the Army andMarines. These men were placed in a little-knownarea in an effort to suppress those who wishedto overthrow the existing government. With minimum planning and liaison the mission was performed in training film style as each unit moveddirectly to the appointed place at the appointedtime with split-second timing. The men werelanded in flooded rice paddies, with mud andwater up to their waists and chests-a featdeemed impossible just a few short months ago

The vehicle, tactics, concepts, and techniqueswill no doubt change as we develop more ex perience in ' this relatively new dimension ofground warfare. But to change, modify, reworkor revamp you must depart from the established.The established is the doctrine that the pioneersin Vietnam proved in their page of history.

housands o Vietnamese soldiers have been trained for heliborne operations. On-loading time foreach aircraft is 18 seconds; off-loading 12 seconds


21/52

ll membersof the team have responsibilitiesfor ccident prevention in rmy Aviation. Thecommanders rmy Aviators and m inten ncepersonnel-all c n and should promote

VI TION S FETY

HE WEATHER AT Checkout AAF on 1 October

was an indefinite obscuration, 1mile of visibility, fog and intermittent light rain. At 0900 hoursbase operations received a message from the local sheriff soffice stating that a helicopterhad crashed 3 miles southeast ofSawbuck. Immediate action wastaken by base operations toplace in effect their crash plan.Crash and rescue personnel ar -

MAY 1963

Captain Joseph C. Boggs

rived at the accident scene tofind only the remains of aburned helicopter which hadcarried two Army Aviators anda crewchief to their deaths.

Two questions immediatelycame to the mind of the aviationsafety officer: What caused thisaccident? Could it have beenp r e v e n t e d These samethoughts have surely passedthrough the minds of everyone

in Army Aviation after hearingabout an aircraft accident. Aviation safety is not the concern ofthe aviation safety officer alone,but must be the concern of allwho are a part of Army Aviation. Everyone from the mostsenior commander down to thelowest ranking private has ashare of t he responsibility forAVIATION SAFETY.

A review of statistics on r-my Aviation safety reveals thatduring fiscal year 1962 therewere 360 major Army aircraftaccidents. Sixty-nine crewmenand passengers were killed as aresult. During the first half offiscal year 1963, a total of 161major Army aircraft accidentsoccurred, and 14 passengers andcrewmen lost their lives.

These statistics readily revealthat a continued effort in acci-dent prevention is needed. Tobe successful this effort needsthe support and participation ofeveryone in Army Aviation. thas been proved that many acci-dents which happen could havebeen prevented. It s our job to

Capt Boggs is assigned to the1st vn Co. 1st Inf Div. He isdual rated with over 2 000 flighthours.19


22/52

learn the techniques of accidentprevention and to practice them.

How are aircraft accidentsprevented? There are many facets of an aircraft accident prevention program. They basicallybreak down into two categories:preventing an accident before ithappens, and preventing futuresimilar accidents.

A properly conducted aircraftinvestigation is one of the mostvaluable tools the commandercan use to prevent accidents. Apoorly conducted aircraft investigation is next to valueless. Theboard that winds up with weakand inconclusive findings hasdone nothing to prevent futureaccidents. A good commanderwill not accept this type of finding because he knows that itcan cause him to be faced withanother accident from the sameundetermined cause.

The aircraft accident prevention program needs the supportand participation of all to makeit a success. The commandercan do a great deal of planningand directing but the details areup to all of us. n individualcan do many things to promoteaircraft accident prevention.Subsequent paragraphs list someof the responsibilities of thecommander, the aviator and themaintenance support personnelto the aircraft accident prevention program.

COMMANDER SRESPONSIBILITIES

The commander must knowthe accident business personally.He must understand that human errors cause 60 percent ofour losses and that these are theeasiest to eliminate. The commander has the responsibility toassure that an active aircraft accident prevention program is ineffect within his command ssafety program. In addition toapproving the safety program,

20

the commander must activelyparticipate in and supervise itsconduct. Leadership is vital inproducing the desired resultsfrom the subordinates who mustcarry out the details of the prevention program.

Other responsibilities of thecommander are to: Direct preparation and publication of SOPs and other directives which establish standard procedures and policies foroperation of Army aircraft within his command. Ensure strict standardization of all aviators in types ofaircraft which they operate.

Ensure that all s u b o ~ d i n a t eaviation units establish activeaircraft accident prevention programs.AVIATOR S RESPONSIBILITY

The aviator has a large responsibility in the implementation of an effective aircraft accident prevention program. HeThe BX ppro ch to physic lfitness is designed to develop anadequate level of reserve energyneeded for vigorous well being

t 1T ~ ~ t

TWO THIEE FOUl.1 ltJ r.ach

3STAITING POSITION

-NE TWO. .THIEE FOUllo w / d

5STAITING ,OSITION

ONE

TWO

THIEEfOUl

2'* t-.TARTING ONE TWOPOSITION

* ~HREE FOUlSq a' t.ru.'t t 4

STAITING POSITION

K 6STAITING OSITION~ KNE TWO THIEE fOUlr . ,.,1.,.,.

should have a vital interest because it can mean the differencebetween failure or completion ofthe mission-or the differencebetween life and death. Let s investigate some of the ways inwhich an aviator can help prevent aircraft accidents.

The physical and mental condition of an aviator affects hisability to perform his flight duties. It is his responsibility tokeep himself in good physicalcondition and within weight requirements. His ability to withstand fatigue is directly relatedto his physical condition. Aviators who deviate from their normal health posture should report immediately to the flightsurgeon for diagnosis and treatment. Ailments should not beself-treated or withheld for fearof loss of flight pay. Withholding a health problem can causemental anxiety which can resultin inattention or a decrease inalertness.

The writeup of aircraft deficiencies is another very important responsibility of the aviator. A clear and concise writeuplets the maintenance peopleknow what is wrong with theaircraft. Many times aviators exceed the maximum allowablerpm in helicopters or have hardlandings in fixed wing aircraftand fail to write up these conditions. They seem to fear beingquestioned or that it reflects ontheir flying ability.

The aviator is responsible forwriting up these conditions.Failing to do so means thatmaintenance personnel are notrequired to conduct an inspection on the aircraft for structural damage or other deficiencies. There may be no apparentdamage; however, the overstressed condition can causecreep or fatigue failures to startin the aircraft. Proper inspections can reveal these deficien-

u.s. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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cies and corrective maintenancecan prevent an accident due tomateriel failure. Conscientiouswriteups o f deficiencies notedon the aircraft can save livesand loss of aircraft. It s oneof the best preventive techniques that the aviator hasat his disposal.

Most accidents begin withsome type of an emergency condition. The aircraft accident in vestigator has to ask himselfthese questions. Should the aviator have been able to co.pe withthis emergency? Did this emergency end up in an accident because the aviator did not knowthe pro.per emergency procedures?You are cruising along in aU-6A at 4 000 feet ; suddenly

you detect a large increase inmanifold pressure and a largedecrease in rpm. What is youremergency? What are youremergency procedures? Theemergency is a propeller failurein flight. Your emergency procedures are as follows:

1 Put propeller contro.l inhigh pitch.

2 Throttle back to an air-

MAY 1963

speed just sufficient to maintainflight.3. Check oil pressure gauge.Even i o il pressure is lo.w it isPo.ssible to nurse the engine bykeeping the rpm to a minimumand by keeping the engine asCOo l as Po.ssible.

4 Make an emergency landingwith limited power. Most emergencies are not this simple. Youare responsible for knowing thematerial in the -10 of the aircraft in which you are qualified.How well do you know theemergency procedures operating limitations weight limitations and flight characteristicsof the aircraft in which you arequalified? Could you pass aclosed boo.k examination onthese subj ects ?

Most Army Aviators are qualified in two. or more types of aircraft which they fly as a part oftheir normal duties. Instead ofknowing one aircraft the aviator must know several aircraft.The aviator should take the -10o f each aircraft in which he isqualified and make a comprehensive study of it. It is surprising ho W many little things one

can forget and probably a couple of big points too. The morethe aviator knows about the aircraft he flies the better hischances are to handle th temergency which will arise.Many accidents in the fiLes couldhave been prevented i the aviator had known his aircraft better.

These examples of aviato.r re sponsibilities in aircraft accident prevention have merelyscratched the surface. There aremany other ways in which theArmy Aviator is responsible forimplementing the aircraft accident prevention program. It isan individual responsibility todo everything Po.ssible to improve aviation safety.M INTEN NCE P RSONN L

R SPONSI I LITI ESMaintenance personnel also

have a part of the responsibilityin the aircraft accident prevention program. There are numerous ways in which they can helpprevent accidents.

The majo.rity of the prevention techniques in the maintenance field relate directly to themanner of performance o f assigned maintenance duties.Maintenance errors can becaused by poor workmanshipresulting from a lack of training inattention or failure tofollow published maintenanceinstructions. Inadequate inspections can also. cause maintenance errors through absence ofa qualified tech inspector atcompletion of maintenance inattention by inspecto.rs or failure to perform functional checksor final test.

The prevention of maintenance errors depends primarilyon the state of mind of the maintenance and supervisory personnel. Each man must take pridein his work and be personallyresponsible for its quality andcompleteness. The prevention of

21


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maintenance errors will preventaircraft accidents.

Aircraft accidents can be prevented. Enough facts are avail-able to substantiate this. Manyaccidents that happened shouldnot have happened. An effectiveaircraft accident prevention program requires the support andparticipation of every memberof the Army Aviation team.

No matter what your particular job, y u can do somethingto promote safer operations.This is the responsibility whichrests upon each of us. f each ofus carries our load, we will re duce the number of aircraft accidents. As members of theArmy Aviation team we havethe responsibility to learn andpractice the techniques of accident prevention to promotebetter AVIATION SAFETY.

USATRECOM Tests 3 Bladed Rigid Rotor UH IBO PERATING AT normalgross weight and power,speeds in excess of 147.0 knotshave been achieved by a highperformance UH-1B researchhelicopter fitted with a threebladed rigid rotor system.

USATRECOM reports thatthree different rotor systems arebeing test flown on the helicopter. Besides the three-bladedrigid rotor system, a threebladed gimbal mounted rotorsystem and the UH-1 Iroquoisseries standard two-bladedsemirigid rotor system havebeen tested. [See back pageJanuary 63 DIGEST.]

Advantages of a rigid rotorsystem are simpler design, fabrication and maintenance;quicker response to pilot con-trol, and indiscriminate loadingwit less regard for center ofgravity.

22 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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oes accomplishment of your unit s missionsuffer from a lack of trained helicopter in-strument rated aviators? Need a helping handto overcome this bottleneck Maybe you canuse this unit s POI s a guide to solving yourproblems.

Small Unitnstrument Training Program

H ELICOPTER instrumentflying, although by nomeans new or unusual, is stillsomewhat rare at division aviation company level.

The average line division inEurope is spread out over a vastsector. Even more dispersedthan the average is the 4th Armored Division, with headquarters at Goeppingen, Germany.The problem of command control is such that a special aviation unit known as DetachmentH has been formed from portions of the organic aviationcompany. The primary missionof the detachment is to transportthe division commander andstaff.The nemesis of any aviationMAY 1963

Major Edwin O Carr

transport system is, of course,the weather. Attempting allweather operation with only aVFR capability has its drawbacks. Most helicopter pilots willreadily agree that it is possible(I didn't say safe) to fly in fsmile visibility and 30 to 40 feetof ceiling. But in Europe, withboth departure point and destination reported open, zero/ zeroweather is often encountered enroute. Consistent mission accomplishment requires a helicopter instrument flight capability.

All the aviators assigned toDetachment H were selected fortheir background and experience. All have current fixedwing instrument cards and ll

are superb helicopter pilots. Theaverage experience level is inthe vicinity of 1500 flying hours,usually about two-thirds fixedwing with approximately 20hours of weather time and 10 )hours of hood. The other onethird is helicopter time, usuallysplit about fifty-fifty between reconnaissance OH-13, OH-23)and utility UH-19, UH-IB)helicopters.

The Bell UH-IB helicopter(six are assigned to DetachmentH) is unusually well instrumented. It has m r e t h n

Maj arr is dual rated andhas over 4 600 flying hours . Heis now assigned to the 40th A r-tillery Brigade Presidio of SanFrancisco

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In Europe zero/ zero weather is often encountered en route whiledeparture and destination points are openenough radios and navigationalaids to be a good weather aircraft, plus enough electricalbackup for any eventuality (a300 amp main generator with a200 amp standby generator). tis exceptionally well poweredand will climb over 1,000 fpmunder most conditions. Also ashelicopters go, the UH-1B isvery stable. t has only a yawinstability, usually induced by aheavy foot on the pedals. Therange, 2 hours and 40 minutes,is sufficient for most normalmissions in Europe, especially inview of the low minimum andalternate requirements prescribed in AR 95-2. The machine presents no problem foruse in weather.

Increasing the capability ofDetachment H to include IFRoperation meant bringing themen and the helicopters together to exploit the maximum capabilities of both.A POI especially tailored tothe situation was devised. Insubstance it consisted of 16 hours24

of flight instruction, 15 hours ofground school, and 2 hoursof link. The course was organized to the extent that theflying periods were worked outaccording to lesson plan. Thiswas necessary in view of thelimited flying time available. tmust be remembered that thisunit had to continue its operational missions also.

Instruction was to be given inseven working days. By assigning two aviators and a UH-1Bto this program, the operationalmission of the detachment, although reduced, could be continued.

No unusual problems were encountered. By adhering to thePOI, all eight rotary wing aviators assigned were rotary winginstrument qualified over a period of 44 days. This allowed atwo-day break between classesplus weekends. The cost of this100 percent rotary wing instrument capability was approximately 125 hours of UH-1B flying time.

The success of such a programcan be attributed to three factors:

Continuity of instruction.This means i n s t r u c t i n g inplanned sequence, every day. Insome cases the operational commitments of the unit made itnecessary to fly during off dutyhours. However, th resultswere well worth the extra effort.

Complete cooperation fromthe students plus a desire tolearn as much as possible. Motivation of the student is always90 percent of the instructor'sbattle.

Complete log l andh g h l y organized instruction.Changing the flight instructorsets back the program and ispoor procedure at best. Sincethe course was relatively short,t h i s problem wasn't encountered.

Illustrated is a copy of thecourse used by this organization. t may not work for y.ours.In that case change it; add orsubtract as necessary to meetthe needs of your unit. f theaverage aviator in your unit islong on helicopter experiencebut gets lost in the vicinity ofthe VOR, increase the amountof rad10 work. Conversely, i fyou have airline pilots familiarize them with the bush. Dowhatever is necessary to adaptthe program to your organization. Implementing s u c h acourse of instruction not onlysaves many taxpayer dollars butraises the training status andmorale of your unit to a trulyprofessional status. Try it andsee.

[This POI is feasible only foraviators with a high degree ofproficiency in rotary wing flyingand fixed wing instruments . Itis not considered sufficient forall Army Aviators. Editor.]



27/52

POI OR R W INSTRUMENT TR NSITION

Day Subject Length

1st AM) Aircraft instruments. Detailed 3 Hoursdiscussion of attitude instruments Classroomavailable in the UH-1B.

1st PM) Demonstration of subject matter 1 30covered in AM period. Also, dem- Hoursonstration of pitch, yaw, and UH-IBbank control.

2d AM) Sensations of instrument flight.(Vertigo, flicker-how to combatand control them.)

2d AM) Instrument takeoff. Full panelclimbs, descents, turns. Fundamentals of power control techniques.Control touch and control procedures.

2d AM) Detailed discussion of radio andnavigation aids available on theUH-IB ARC 73, ARC 44, omni,ADF) and FM homing.

2d PM) Demonstration of instrumenttakeoff. Practice of straight climbsand descents, descending andclimbing turns. Two ADF approaches.

3d AM) Discussion of emergency paneloperations; when used. Techniquesof cross-check. Partial panel approaches. Gyro out GCAs.

3d AM) Emergency procedures: fire, icing,engine failure. Use of parachutes;autorotation on instruments (fulland partial panel); servo failure;use of copilot during emergencies.

3d AM) Rough air and turbulence procedures in rotary wing on instruments; use of trim. Effects of load,blade stall, accelerations.

MAY 1963

1 HourClassroom

1 HourClassroom

1 HourClassroom

2 HoursUH-IB

1 HourClassroom

1 HourClassroom

1 HourClassroom

Day

3d PM)

16 hours flying5 hours classroom2 hours syntheticinstrument traineI

SUbjectReview of all full-panel procedures. Demonstration of partialpanel: straight climbs, descents,compass turns, climbing and dedescending turns, steep turns, unusual positions. Partial and fullpanel autorotation.

Length

2 30HoursUH-IB

4th AM) Weight and balance. Filling out 1 Hour

4th AM)

4th PM)

5th AM)

5th AM)

5th PM)

6th AM)

6th PM)

6th PM)

7th AMPM)

weight and balance forms. Classroom

Flight planning: clearance, altitudes, routes, differences fromfixed wing. Techniques of airspeedcomputation in flight.

Emergency panel, maneuvers, approaches. Gyro out GCA approaches.Plan cross-country flight to Nurnberg via Dinkelsbuehl, with Illesheim as alternate.Fly planned cross-country in synthetic instrument trainer.

Review all previous work. Complete at least 3 approaches.

Fly IFR to Schwabisch Hall;shoot 2 approaches and return.

Review all ground school workpreviously covered.

Written examination of all workcovered.

Check ride in accordance withAR 95-63 and AR 95-67. IFRflight to Fuerth AAF and return(via Stuttgart).

2 HoursClassroom

2 HoursUH-IB

1 HourClassroom

2 HoursSyntheticInstrumentTrainer

2 HoursUH-IB

2 HoursUH-IB

1 HourClassroom

2 HoursClassroom

All Day

25


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prepared byTHE U S ARMY

BOARD FORAVIATIONACCIDENT RESEARCH

UH-l

U1A

CH 21

0 1

6

WX EX ERPTSFrom March nd pril

CH 41A

OH 13

U 8

CH 37

CH 37B EMITTED LOUD NOISE from transmission area during flight, followed by loss of rotorrpm. Rotor rpm could not be maintained andaircraft settled into rice paddy dike. Major damage to clamshell doors and right gear drag braceassembly. Caused by failure of main gear box.

CH 21C SKIN WRINKLE damage found afterflight in which demonstration hovering autorotation was made. Suspect bulkhead damage.

UH l B TAIL ROTOR FAILED during hoveringflight. Aircraft assumed nose-low attitude, spun270 0 to right, and crashed on ramp. Aircraft wastotal loss. Nut PIN 204-010-711-1) had notbeen safetied to yoke assembly PIN 204-010-781-1 ). Pilot sustained minor injuries.

0 1 A SMOKE ODOR detected in cockpit, andsmoke observed coming from under instrumentpanel in flight. Caused by loose wire to rotatingbeacon.

UH IA ENGINE LOST OIL PRESSURE in flight .Successful forced landing accomplished.

UH l A CABIN AIR SCOOP assembly was partially torn loose in flight. Caused by failure ofscoop (FSN 1560-739-2586).


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OH-13E STABILIZER B R failed and separatedfrom aircraft in flight. Severe vibration was experienced. Successful forced landing was accomplished. Caused by material failure ofstabilizer bar tie rod assembly (FSN 1560-520-6080) at the inboard mounting point. Examination of inboard section of stabilizer bar tie rodassembly revealed that 50 percent of the bar hadfailed due to fatigue prior to loss of stabilizerbar assembly. Failure occurred approximatelyone-half inch outboard of stabilizer bar rod endnut (FSN 5310-478-5923) and perpendicular tothe longitudinal axis of the assembly.U 1A ENGINE RAN ROUGH and backfired during climb. Successful forced landing accomplished. Caused by crack in No.3 cylinder.U 1A EMITTED smoke through firewall intocockpit during flight. Caused by adjusting nut(FSN 5310-146-0781) on N o 9 cylinder intake rocker arm working loose and

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Army Aviation Digest - May 1963

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