COMELEC Preparedness for Elections 2013 - PPCRV Pre-Election National Conference

Scope of Presentation

Challenges

Enhancements of the AES

Status of Preparations

TEC Certification

Timelines

CHALLENGES

Option to Purchase/Deed of Sale

Resolution No.

9376 • March 21, 2012

Exercise of Option to

Purchase/Deed of Sale with

Smartmatic-TIM • In accordance with AES

contract in connection with

May 10, 2010 elections


4 Petitions filed

with Supreme

Court • Assailing validity

and

constitutionality of

Deed of Sale

• Praying for TRO

1. GR No. 201112 (Archbishop

Capalla, Ali, et al)

2. GR No. 201121 (Solidarity for

Sovereignity [S4S], Pedrosa, et al)

3. GR No. 201127 (Guingona, Bishop

Pabillo, et al)

4. GR No. 201429 (Tanggulang

Demokrasya [Tan Dem], Kilayko, et al)


Supreme Court

issued TRO • April 24, 2012

After Oral Arguments, SC

• Dismissed the petitions

• Lifted the TRO


SC Decision • June 13, 2012

• OTP did not expire

• Nothing wrong with the Extension

Agreement • Extension Agreement did not give

Smartmatic additional right that was not

previously available to other bidders

• No substantial or material

modification/amendment of AES contract

• Exercise of OTP is more

advantageous to the Comelec



• PCOS machines are capable of

producing digitally-signed

transmissions

• Justice Carpio: “No, that’s a third

party ... That’s a third-party certifier,

but that’s an option. The law does

not require a third-party certifier. It

merely says that transmission must

be digitally signed.”



• Alleged defects, glitches and

infirmities have been determined

and may be corrected

• Enhancements have been

undertaken

• Petitioners could not even give

any plausible alternative to ensure

the conduct of a successful 2013

elections, in the event the SC

nullified the Deed of Sale


Motion for

Reconsideration

• Denied for lack of merit • October 23, 2012

ENHANCEMENTS OF AES

PCOS Enhancement Purpose

Automatic creation of

the precinct results

(election returns and

transmission files) • Once CLOSE VOTING

option is executed

To eliminate accidental

transmission of the

results file created

during FTS


REZERO function When used, PCOS

deletes all the

generated files

including the ballot

images except the

audit logs and

configuration data


Functionality

that sets

allowable

number of

REZERO

Once permitted number of

REZERO operations has been

consumed, PCOS will refuse to

allow any further REZERO

operation • If further REZERO operations are

required, memory card will have to

be re-programmed for that PCOS


Accurately reflects

user in the PCOS

log

User is identified either

as BEI Chairman, Poll

Clerk or Third Member • In 2010, the logs only

reflected user as

Administrator


Physical seal of

PCOS port • Even if physical seal

is destroyed, port

remains inactive • Activated only at the

software level

Eliminate unauthorized

access to the system


During generation of

ballot PDFs, and prior

to printing of ballots, a

tool is provided to

verify if ovals in ballot

templates are in their

proper coordinates

Eliminate risk of

PCOS machine

misreading the ballots


PCOS prompts BEI to

verify DATE and TIME

upon start up

If time is erroneous,

BEI required to make

corrections, and enter

such fact in Minutes of

Voting • In case of correct date

and time, BEI to enter

such fact in Minutes

CCS Enhancement Purpose

Additional CCS

hierarchy (Regional

CCS)

To receive provincial

results for ARMM

Regional Governor

and Vice-Governor


“PARAMETERS

BY CONTEST”

• Lowering of

threshold

functionality

Sets number of registered

voters of remaining

precincts not yet

transmitted • In 2010, threshold was based

on the percentage of precincts

transmitted


Transmit results

to next level of

canvassing either

• Per position

• All the higher

level

positions

In 2010, transmission done

simultaneously for all

positions • Transmission cannot be done

unless canvassing issues for all

positions are first resolved • Pre-proclamation controversy

• Illegal composition

• Illegal proceedings


Provides

monitoring tallies

of results

received either

through

• Transmission

• Manual loading

In 2010, system does not

specify if election results are

received through

transmission or contingency

measures e.g. manual

loading

STATUS OF PREPARATIONS

Procurement of

Goods and Services Goods/Services Status

Warehouse and

Configuration Facilities

Writ of Possession issued by RTC in favor of

COMELEC; Pre-LAT on-going

Transmission Services Negotiations with public telcos; Done

Transmission Modems Deliveries on-going

Consumables Deliveries on-going

Ballot Boxes Manufacturing on-going

Ballot Packaging Packaging on-going

National Support Center Awarded, contract preparation

Deployment Awarded; contract preparation

Official Ballots 26.11 million ballots already printed as of

7:30 am March 5, 2013

Resolutions General Instructions for Board of Canvassers

• Resolution No. 9648, February 22, 2013

General Instructions for Board of Election Inspectors


Continuity Plan


Random Manual Audit

• Resolution No. 9595, December 21, 2013

TEC CERTIFICATION

Republic Act No. 9369 Created a Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC),

whose function is to

• “certify, through an established international certification

entity to be chosen by the Commission from the

recommendations of the Advisory Council, not later than

three months before the date of the electoral exercises,

categorically stating that the AES, including its hardware

and software components, is operating properly, securely,

and accurately, in accordance with the provisions of this

Act based, among others, on the following documented

results: […]”

COMELEC Advisory Council ‣ Only two established international certification entities

recommended by COMELEC Advisory Council to

conduct source code review of COMELEC AES 2013

Voting System

• SLI Global Solutions Inc.

• Wyle Laboratories

‣ SLI Global Solutions, Inc. (SLI) is the established

international certification entity chosen by COMELEC

SLI Test Results End to End Test Results

Execution of this suite leads to a determination that the

system does have all basic required functionality in place

(to conduct an election cycle).

Volume and Stress Test

The system is able to handle even far higher levels of

transmission, to even extreme stress levels.

SLI Test Results Transmission Test Results

Testing of the AES validated that the system is able to

handle multiple types of transmission.

The transmission method employed in any given

jurisdiction is able to be handled by the AES system.

Accuracy Test Results

Vote totals matched the expected results of the scanning,

for a 100% accuracy return.

SLI Test Results Audit Test Results

Review shows that an acceptable level of auditing is in place to assist any reviews that occur for elections in question.

Event recording for both normal and abnormal conditions within the election cycle.

PCOS Hardware Integrity and Data Retention Test Results

All aspects of the PCOS, as evaluated in the test suite, were satisfactorily verified.

SLI Test Results Security –

Access Control Test Results

Physical Security Test Results

Software-Firmware Test Results

Telecom Test Results

Security measures are implemented in a satisfactory manner.

Functional Findings

No issues were left unresolved that would have an impact

on an election, or its results.

SLI Source Code Review

SUMMARY

“Final results of the review of modified code determined

that the code satisfactorily met the prescribed

standards. Additionally, all remaining open “Major”

discrepancies from the May 2011 code base were

determined to be satisfactorily resolved. No “Critical” or

“Major” discrepancies remain open within the source

code base.”


SUMMARY

“There were no instances discovered of any

intentionally malicious code having been written by the

vendor and included in the voting system source code.”


CONCLUSION

“The system conforms to requirements and is

operationally suitable for use. SLI Global Solutions

determination is that the Automated Election System is

functionally capable of operating properly, securely and

accurately. SLI recommends the system for

certification, as it is conformant with operational

requirements and is suitable for use in applicable future

elections.”

TEC Resolution No. 2013-001

Adopted on February 12, 2013

Entitled “Resolution on the Certification of Automated

Election System (AES) for the May 13, 2013 National

and Local Elections”

TEC Certification NOW THEREFORE, the Technical Evaluation Committee, having

considered the totality of the certification test artifacts, findings logs, corresponding continuity plan, the on-site evaluation of field test and mock elections, systems acceptance and certification test reports as herein identified, RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES, to certify that the AES, as submitted, with full adoption of the recommended compensating controls, can operate properly, securely, and accurately be used by the voters, boards of election inspectors, local and national boards of canvassers, and COMELEC in the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections.

FURTHER RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, that to comply with the requirements under RA 9369, the AES source code as submitted and reviewed be kept in escrow with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.

Compensating controls Administrative and Procedural in Nature

Proper account management and usage

Properly trained BEI and BOC

BEI and BOC Assessment

Configuration management

Hardening of EMS system

Authenticated actions

Account and password management

Continuity plan

Voting and Consolidation maintenance


Tamper evident seals

UPS for EMS system

Chain of Custody for accountable forms/supplies

Physical Key Chain of Custody

COMELEC Security Policy

Job Rotation

PCOS Environment (RF transmitting devices)

Voting System Integrity (Virus)


Procedures for

• BEI and BOC Abnormal Situations

• AES Test

• PCOS and CCS Receipt

• Restoration of Chain of Custody

• Test Plan

• Election Information Control and Archiving

• Change Management

• Voting and Consolidation Systems Administration

• Software Validation

• Voting and Canvassing Systems Usage

• Acceptance Testing Warehouse

• Polling Place Testing and Sealing

• Audit

Source Code Source Codes for PCOS, CCS and EMS existing

• Reviewed by SLI Global Solutions

• Binary Codes compiled by SLI Global Solutions

Hash Codes given to interested parties during January 10,

2013 Trusted Build activities

Also posted in www.comelec.gov.ph

Source Code Code Review

• Delivery of PCOS Source Code for local review currently

under discussion between COMELEC, Smartmatic-TIM

and Dominion Voting System

• CCS and EMS Codes already available for review

• Resolution No. 9651 dated March 1, 2013

Who are considered interested groups that may conduct

source code review

Qualifications of code reviewers

COMELEC Advisory Council recommendations

TIMELINES

TIMELINES

Random Manual Audit (RMA) Done

Period to finalize List of Candidates Done

Period to finalize Project of Precincts (POPs) Done

Laboratory Test Done

Field Test Done

Configuration of PCOS/CCS On-going up to April 25

Mock Elections Done

Printing of Official Ballots On-going up to April 25

Pre-Election Logic and Accuracy Test On-going up to April 30

Training On-going up to April 7

TIMELINES

Deployment March 15 to May 8

COMELEC & TEC acceptance of

transmission system March 15 to April 30

Preparation of voting, counting and

canvassing sites April 1 to April 30

Final Testing and Sealing May 6 to May 10

Election Day May 13

THANK YOU! www.comelec.gov.ph

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COMELEC Preparedness for Elections 2013 - PPCRV Pre-Election National Conference

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