French Algeria

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REVOLUTIONARYWARFAItI

IW I . ~"I r- 'l1 Gr:1rI< UNITED

STATES.MILITARY.ACADEMY-

IWIST POINl' NIW 'I


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X./WARFILEDAl]:ICjf,gDEPARTMENT OF MILITARY ART AND ENGINEERING

UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMYWEST POINT, NEW YORK

HM 381REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE

VOLUME VFRENCH COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY

STRUGGLES: INDOCHINA AND ALGERIA

edited byMajo r J. W. Woodmansee, J r .

IZG-VSU8J.

This is an interim text used solely fo r in st ruc tion of Cadets . I t will notbe r ep roduced nor c it ed in any manner without permiss ion of the Professorof the Department of Mili ta ry Ar t and Engineering.


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CONTENTS

Chapter OneINDOCHINA (1946-54)

by Bernard B. Fal l . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Chapter TwoOPERATIONS IN NORTH VIETNAM, 1950-1952

by Bernard B. Fal l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Chapter ThreeVO NGUYEN GIAP: VICTORY FOR THE PEOPLE'S ARMY

edited by MAJ J .W. Woodmansee, J r 65

Chapter FourALGERIA (1956-62)

by MAJ J. W. Woodmansee, Jr 97


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LIST OF MAPS

The Battle of Vinh-Yen 41The Def en se of Mao-Khe . . , , 45The Battle of th e Day River. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48The "Hell of Hoa-Binh" 53Death at Tu-Vu , '" , " 54Failure a t Xom-Pheo 58FLN Organization (Algeria) " , lG4General Map of South East Asia (Map #1) .... , In side back coverIndochina - Tonkin, 1951 (Map #2) " . . . . . . . . . " " "Winter ' 5 3 - Spr ing ' 54 Campaign (Map #3). . . . . . . . . . . . . . " " "Dien Bien Phu (Map #4). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " " "General Map of Nor thern Alger ia (Map #5). .... . . . . . . . . . " " "


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Chapter One

INDOCHINA (1946-1954)

by Bernard B. Fal l

This chapter is a condensation of the late Dr. Fal l ' s study writ tenas a part of th e three volume ser ies , Challenge and Response in InternalConflict. The ser ies was compiled for the Department of the Army byThe C en te r f or Research in Social Systems (CRESS) of the AmericanUniversity.


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INDOCHINA (1946-1954)by Bernard B. FallThe French in Indochina- - their control weakened bywartime concessions that strengthened Vietnamesenationalism - -were unable either to meet the postwar poli ti cal threat of a capable, determinedCommunist leadership that perfectly exploited theindigenous desire fo r independence, or to defeat therevolutionary forces in th e field.

BACKGROUND

(See Map #1) The French colonial terr i tory of Indochina, consisting of th e present countr iesof Cambodia, Laos, and th e two Vie t-Nams, compri sed 284,800 squa re m i le s and wasslightly larger t ha n t he State of Texas. Its location in th e mon soon zone o f southeast Asiadetermined to a great extent th e technicpe of th e insurgency that broke out there and theeventual military outcome.The climate of the area accounts for i ts t rop ica l veg it at io ll, which ext ends f rom the

southernmost tip t o s li gh tl y nor th of Hanoi, with normal variations for altitude an d latitude.In th e north, rubber t rees do not flourish; in th e south, European-type vege tab le s may begrown, bu t on ly where high altitudes permit . Almost 50 percent of the vege ta l cover of th earea is high-stand jun gle, and another 35 percent is bush or 6-foot-high elephant grass .

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The remainder of th e a re a is lowland r ice paddy, swampy fo r six or more months of th eyear .

Geographically, the Indochinese area consists of th e coas ta l deltas of th e Red River, theMekong, an d central Vietnamese r ivers; t he val le ys of th e Red River and th e Mekong, andtheir tributaries; the Annamite mountain range and its various plateau outcroppings, whichform much of t he bounda ry between Laos, V ie t-Nam , and Cambodia; and the Thai highlands,which cover mos t of northern Indochina. There are no natural east-west communicationr ou te s: V ie t- Na m is oriented toward th e coast; Laos and Cambodia toward th e Mekongvalley.

Of the 36 million people living in Indoch ina in 1954, probably fewer than 4 million livedin th e vast highlands which make up more than 75 percent of th e country's ter r i tory. Theseuplanders, mainly rnontagnards, were f ir st of all hunters and only secondarily growers ofcrops. Many were seminomadic . About 90 percent o f all Cambodians, Laotians, andVietnamese l ived a t a lt it ud es u nd er 1, 000 feet, where th e principal occupat ion was t he g rowingof irr igat ed ric e.

The economic structure of French Indochina was t yp ica ll y colon ia l. geared to provide rawmaterials fo r the home country and a market fo r France's manufactured goods. Indochina wasamply qualified for th e former role , bu t it f ai le d in th e lat ter . Throughout most of th ecolonial period, Indochina exported far more to France than it bought, and France was neverit s exclusive source of finished products. France's attempt to maintain Indochina almostexclusively as a s ourc e o f raw materials le d to a distortion of the economic process and hadan obvious influence on the country's socioeconomic s tructure. I

The fai lure to crea te local industries until very late in the colonial period. including thefailure to realize that greater colonial purchasing power would in itself increase imports.

left Indochina at the mercy of commercial monopol ies which suppl ied the Indochinese economywith imported goods at prices far above th e world market. The colony was deprived ofmany essential goods when normal trade currents were interrupted during World War II .

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The key factor leading to the 1946 insurgency i n Indoch ina was poli t ical in nature andderived from the imposition of an alien colonial regime upon a highly nationalistic andres is tant population. The colon ia l federation of French Indochina comprised the protectoratesof Cambodia and Laos, which France had governed since 1863 and 1893 respectively, and the

three Vietnamese territories of Cochin-China. annexed by France in 1862. and Aouam andTonkin, which the French had ruled as protectorates s ince th e 1880's . Coch in -China .comprising the Mekong Delta and Saigon region of the present South Vie t-Nam, was the areaof g r ea t es t F r ench penetration and influence. M ost of t he 4 0, 00 0 French set t lers in Indochinaa t t he beg inning of World War II were concentrated in Cochin-China.

French political contro l was absolute, and th er e was lit tle , if any. a tt empt to inc ludelocal elites in shaping t he des ti ny of Indochina. The t i tular sovereigns of Cambodia, Luang-Prabang (Laos). and Aouam retained some importance in the cultural ceremonial of theircountries , bu t th ey wer e summari ly removed when they so ught t o g ain actual control of anypar t of the adminis t ra t ive machinery. There existed, for all to se e, the glaring differencebetween the political roles of the French minority and th e vas t Asian major ity.

Inside Indochina. indigenous parties. both Communist and non-Communist. operated--sometimes openly, but clandestinely when necessary. The non-Communist nationalist

*arties were made up chie fly of Confucian mandarins or other upperclass groups, and sowere hard pu t t o devel op a mass base. In many cases , they did no t even look for one, butrather preferred to use the conspiratorial approach familiar to them from Chinese -typesecret societies.

The only indigenous poli t ical group in Indochina which made a deliberate and concentratedeffort at gaining a mass base was the Indochinese Communist Par ty (ICP), created in 1930.I t had both t he out side organizational suppor t ( from th e U. S. S. R., France, a nd Chin a) an dthe ability in terms of trained cadres to create a nationwide movement. The ICP was a lwayspredominantly Vietnamese in composition and leadership. although Cambodians and Laotians

2were inc luded in the membership.*Vietnamese mandarins were civil servants schoo led in the Chinese classics and

Vietnamese traditionalism. who served in the imperial bureaucracy or lo cal administration.5


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T he IC P at first made grievous mistakes . Its leaders were repeat ed ly dep le te d by t heFrench Surete in Indochina- -probably one of the most efficient poli t ical police forces of i tst ime. But the party also learned from i ts errors , and pat ient ly rebuil t i ts organizational

s t r u c t u r e ~ trained it s personnel, and went on with its work. The core of th e present-day3

leadership of Vietnamese communism still d ate s from th at difficult period in the 1930 's .

Worl d Wa r II And The Evolu tion of the Viet-MinhWorld War II (1939-45) shattered th e image of French authori ty in Indochina an d destroyed

the substance of European colonial rule over the country. T he German defeat of France inJune 1940 and th e ensuing armistice between Germany and th e pro-Axis Vichy French reg imeopened Indochina to Japanese penetrat ion and explo ita tion. On September 22, 1940, Japanesef or ce s, a fte r c ru shi ng l ocal French forces at th e Chinese-Tonkin border, la nd ed a t Haiphongand proceeded t o occupy strategic po in ts t hr oughou t t he country.

Indochina was thus firmly in th e Japanese sphere long before th e Pacific war began, although France remained the nominal sovereign of the territory and French colonial administrators remained at their posts. The Japanese were chie fly interes ted in th e economicresources of Indochina and did not want to undertake direct administration at this t ime.

Admira l Jean Decoux, t he V ichy Governor-General of Indochina, cooperated with the Jap-anes e s ince th e international s ituation seemed to offer him no other a l t e r n a t i v e ~ in the hopethat French authority cou ld even tual ly be fully restored.

This ambiguous period of Franco-Japanese I1cooperation" lasted until March 9. 1945,when the Japanese arre st ed a ll F rench o ff ic ia ls and civil ians in the country and destroyed allthe French mil ita ry fo rces except those able to fight their way north to Allied l ines in Chinaor to hold ou t in t he w ild s of Laos. 4

The Japanese now moved to replace the French. In a gesture toward Vietnamesenat ionali sm, they insta ll ed th e Emperor Bao Dai. traditional ruler at Hue in Annam (centralViet-Nam). as head of an "independent" Vietnamese state comprising Annam and Tonkin in

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the north. The J a p a n e s e ~ however, continued French policy with regard to Cochin-China,the third integral and most prosperous part of Viet-Nam, administering it directly as acolony. In th e last days of th e war , th e Japanese acceded to Vietnamese demands and a llowedCochin-China to j oi n Bao Dai 's kingdom. Thus i n Augus t 1945, Viet -Nam rega ined i ts

5precolonial, 1858 boundaries.Most of the leaders of the ICP had fled to China when th e 1940 uprisings were crushed, and

in May 1941 t he y h ad organ iz ed , unde r Ch ines e auspices, a Communis t f ron t called the Viet-Nam Doc-Lap Dong-Minh Hoi (Vietnamese Revolutionary Independence League) , or VietMinh. With more than a decade o f experience in underground organization and quasi-legalpoli tical act ivi ty, the ICP stood ready to t ak e ful l a dvan ta ge of the World War II situation.By late 1943, Viet Minh guerri l las and unde rg round agen t s were operating i n Tonk in , and onDecemher 22 , 1944, the Vie tnamese Communis t and nationalist leader Vo Nguyen Giapcreated the f i rs t unit of th e Viet-Nam People 's Army (VPA). When the Japanese dissolutionof French colonial forces early in 1945 deprived th e Allies of an intelligence apparatusinside Indochina, American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) te am s wer e parachuted in towork with the Viet Minh, and Brit ish Force 136 began operations in support of resistancegroups in the south . Viet Minh guerri llas cons istently avoided any massive contact with

Japanese forces, h o w e v e r ~ preferring not to grapple with an enemy who was bound to besoon leaving as th e fortunes of war t u rned aga in st it , and devoted this t ime to perfecting

6t he Communi st political control network throughout th e countryside.

Viet-Minh Fi l l Post-War Poli t ical Vacuum in t he Nor th,On August 14, 1945, Japan surrendered to th e Allied Forces . According to Allied agree-

men ts, the surrender of Japanese troops in Indochina was to be effected by British andChinese occupat ion forces, with th e 16th parallel serving as the dividing l in e between the twooccupation zo nes. B efore the Allies could a r r i v e ~ however, the Viet Minh proclaimed Viet-namese independence from France and set up a Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam (DRVN) in

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Hanoi. In Tonkin an d northern Annam th e DRVN actually functioned as a de facto government for more than a year after th e war ended.

In the SQuth. where th e Viet Minh was weaker and where British occupation forces hadpromptly released imprisoned French forces, th e DRVN was u na ble to g ain a solid foothold.

Quickly driven out o f Saigon an d other administrative centers sou th o f the 16th paral le l by th eFrench, the Viet Minh cou ld opera te only a II shadow government" in th e SQuth.

French Return to IndochinaThe French, firmly established in th e south, found i t expedient to negotiate with th e

DRVN regime in the north. since they considered it less dangerous to l ong-t erm Frenchinterests th an th e Chinese Nat ional is ts, whom they suspected of attempting to instal l a puppetreg ime of pro-Chinese Vietnamese nati ona li st s. The agreement o f March 6, 1946, wherebyth e French returned to the north, recognized the DRVN as a "Free State" with in t he I ndochinese Federation and the French Union, with its own national a ss embl y. i ts own armedforces, and its own finances. Cochin-China was to dec ide by plebiscite whether or not tojoin th e Hanoi-based DRVN. Th is agr eemen t further added to th e prestige of t he Hanoiregime, an d as th e Chinese withdrew from Indochina on March 6, th e V iet Minh was sol id lyentrenched and a form of dual government then prevailed in Vietnamese territory. Thus.the Communists had won their f irst major victory in Indochina almost without firing a shot.

Differences between French and Viet Minh forces soon developed, however. The Frenchproceeded to set up a separate administration for the central Vietnamese highlands. Theirauthorities in saigon encouraged the es tabli shment of an "Autonomous Republic" in CochinChina, despi te their earlier commitment to a plebiscite. Lack of coord inat ion and controlby French authorities in Paris ove r the ir forces in Indochina was a major factor in thedeter iorat ion of Franco-Vietnamese relat ions .

Negotiations dragged on throughout th e summer of 1946. Ho Chi Minh, Pres ident of theDRVN and the leading exponen t of Vietnamese independence, as well as th e founding father

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of th e Indochinese Communis t movement, headed th e Vietnamese de legat ion sent to Franceto negotiate for recognit ion of a unified and independent Viet-Nam under DRVN control. BySeptember, the Fontainebleau Conference had ended inconclusively and th e Vietnameseleaders returned to Hanoi to pr epare fo r a ction o f a different sort. Relations betweenFrench an d DRVN officials went from bad to worse. In Novembe r, s hoot ing broke ou t inHaiphong, and the French re sponded by bombar di ng t he c it y, k ill in g several thousand Vietnamese. The DRVN reacted to the Haiphong incident by attacking French garrisons onDecember 19, 1946, and the mili tary phase of t he r evol ut io n had begun. 7

INSURGENCYAlthough the military phase of th e insrugency did not beg in unt il th e end of 1946, its

political phase had begun well before the end of World War II. Through propaganda andindoctrination efforts begun in 1943, the Viet Minh had gained pol it ica l con tro l of manyvillages in Tonkin, particularly along the Chinese border . In August 1945, the V iet M inhhad another political success . Emperor Bao Dai, whom the Japanese had instal led a fewmonths earlier as head of an "independent" Vietnamese s ta te . d ec id ed to abdicate in favorof t he V ie t Minh, which this weak but pronationalis t monarch believed to be a genuinenationalist movement. On Augu st 25. Baa Dai had handed over the imperial seal and othersymbols of authori ty to Ho Chi Minh, thus conferring a semblance of legitimacy, part icularly in t e rms of Vietnamese t radi t ion, on the DRVN r eg ime , f orma lly proclaimed by theViet Minh on September 2, 1945. On that day, Ho Chi M inh began his address to the crowdsin words well -known t o ano ther people : "We hold these truths to be self-evident. that all menare creat ed equal. . . . " It was fr om the Japanese, Ho stated, that independence had beenwon, because I ls ince the autumn of 1940. our country ceased to be a French colony . . . . ,. 8Viet-Minh Military Organization

On th e mili tary sid e, th e V ie t-N am People 's Army (VPA) at f irst copied the French

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quaternary organization: 2, 500-man regiments o f f our battalions, including a heavy weaponso r a rt il le ry unit. By 1949, 5, OOO-man brigades appeared, and by late 1950, 1O,OOO-manternary divisions. Later a Russian-model "heavy division!! appeared, w ith two field artillery regiments, one combat engineer regiment , an antiaircraft battalion, and the usual

service units.In terms of mission. three echelons made their appearance in th e VPA by 1947; th e first

line regulars , or main fo rc e (chu- luc) ; the regional units (dia-phuong quan); a nd the localmilitia (du-kich). Of these, only t he chu-luc "NaS fully mobile, being likely to show up incombat anywhere f rom the Ch in es e border to northern Cambodia. With almost no exceptions. the men covered these vast distances on foot. carrying full battle kit. The Vie t Minhforces consistently outpaced French estimates o f the ir mobility; jungle dashes of 25 milesa day fo r several consecutive days were not unknown. Viet Minh regulars were sparinglyused and were reserved for batt le s of strategic importance; but when the t arge t was wor th while--as, for example. th e l iquidation of French forces on the Chinese border in 1950, orthe attempted capture of Hanoi in 1951, or th e batt le of Dien Bien Phu in 1954- -they werefully committed regardless of casualties. Although two regiments of regulars were infiltrated inside the Red River Del ta and its 1!Marshal de Lattre" fort if ied l ine of 2. 200 bunkers,

most small attacks were carr ied out by the regionals. The local mili t ia was used chie fly inreconnaissance fo r larger units unfamiliar with th e terrain, or in covering the wi thdrawalof such units; it also played an important role in gathering local intelligence and in preparingambushes and in sabotage.

The DRVN saw to it that it s units were ethnically homogeneous, at least at regimentallevel . Thus t he 308th Division was known as th e "capital division" because of it s Hanoirecruitment, whi le t he 316th was largely of Tho t r ibal origin and the 335th of Thai t r ibalorigin. Regiment 120 was Hre, an d 803 Jara i . In this way, a un it c ou ld b e fairly sure ofbeing well received and perfectly at home in at least one area.

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The in su rgen ts ' mi l it a ry effor t was ably assisted by a psychological warfare andintelligence operation of major proportions. Special Viet Minh teams and units known asdieh-van (translated as "moral intervention, 1/ or more realistically "armed propaganda")were used to penetrate villages and French pos ts in order to gather intelligence andprepare the way for insurgent a ttack. There were also dieh-van teams in charge o fassassinating officials who refused to collaborate w ith th e V iet M inh . The mos t notable suchcoup was th e simultaneous murder in August 1951 of French Genera l Chanson and SouthVietnamese Regional Governor Thai Lap Thanh by a "suicide volunteer l1 boobytrapped withhand grenade s.

Communist forces started with a strength of about 60, 000 men in 1946 and ended th einsurgency with close to 380 , 000 men, of whom f ewe r than 120, 000 were r eg ula rs . T heirtotal casualties will no doubt be forever unknown, since it is impossible to tel l a deadpeasant from a dead guerrilla and since th e Viet Minh made a habit of carrying off casualties.precisely to prevent their being correct ly estimated. But su ch battles as that of Vinh-Yenin 1951 cost th e Viet Minh 6, 000 casualties and that o f Dien Bien Phu 22, 000 ; total casualtieswere beyond a doubt no t far from 500, 000, or about t hr ee t ime s those of the French UnionForces . 9

Although guided by leaders who had learned their job in French, Chinese Nationalist, andChinese Communist schools, the VPA sometimes made grievous mistakes, such as thethree abor tive offensives in 1951 against th e French-held Red River Del ta, b ut they alwayscorrected these with alacrity. Th e Communis t method of "self-criticism" and "comradelycriticism" of others may have con tri bu te d t o t he VPA's e ffi ci en cy . The VPA proved to bea great d ea l more f lexibl e tactically and strategically than has been generally believed. Thedecision to revert to low-level attacks when b ig-uni t operations fai led may have been th e

critical dec is ion of th e Viet Minh campaign.The commander in ch ie f of the VPA was Vo Nguyen Giap. Son of a poo r scho la r, Giap

was educated at the Lycee National in Hue, the traditional capital. Involved in various

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na tiona l is t movements in th e 1920' s and early 1930 's , he joined th e rcp about 1937. Until1940, he was a history professor in Hanoi . He is said to have never forgiven the Frenchfo r the death of his w ife in a French prison in 1943. Ho Chi Minh put him in charge oftraining a guerril la force during World War II , and by the end of th e war, G ia p was s ec on donl y t o Ho Chi Minh in th e Communis t movement in Indochina. A great admirer of Mao Tse-tung, he took over M ao 's c once pt s o f revolutionary warfare tactics , adapting them wherever

10necessary.

Five Phases of Viet-Minh OperationsThe Viet Minh' s combat operations against the French fell i nt o f ive major phases. The

first of these was "beachhead elimination, 1/ the ill-fated attempt at throwing the French intoth e sea before they could ge t a solid foothold in Vie t-Nam (December 1946-March 1947).Next came a period of trcontainment and consolidation, " after the collapse of talks with theFrench in March 1947, when t he V ie t Minh finally realized it must expect a protractedconflict and must , according ly , creat e some rel at ivel y secure bases and. i f poss ib l e,establish permanent contact with a sanctuary. In several l imited offensives , the Viet Minhcleared a redoubt in northwestern Tonkin, crushed th e French border positions. and thuses tab li shed permanent contact w ith Red China. I t could train and equ ip i ts r eg ul ar s thereby th e t ime this phase ended in October 1950.

The third phase, l a ter termed th e "erroneous general counter-offensive. " followed next,with multidivision attacks against French lowland positions in th e spring of 1951. I t failedwhen French air- transported reinforcement sand U. S. equipment were u se d to b rea k upmassed Viet Minh attacks in the Red River Del ta z one. [this phase will be covered in moredetail in the next chapter. ] An insufficiently-prepared a t tack aga ins t th e Thai highlands,aft er in it ia l success, also failed, when attempts at storming th e French airborne strongholdat Na San met defeat. with heavy Viet Minh c a s u a l t i e s ~ On the other hand, two deep stabsby the French at Hoa-Binh and Phu-Doan enabl ed t he V ie t Minh to study in detail the weak-

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nesses of French motorized forces in the face of guerril la-type, hit-and-run attacks.T he V ie t Minh next began a fourth or II strategic defensive" phase with small but

effective stabs deep int o French-held areas. This included offensives into northern Laosin the winter of 1953 and into southern Laos an d the southern plateau in the spring of 1954.

These operations were m ean t to deplete French reserves and s tra in thei r log is t ica l system,while building up th e insurgents ' regular f or ce s f or their fifth and f inal phase of "generalcounteroffensive, " a series of brief but brutal large-scale attacks made for th e purpose ofdestroying a maximum o f French t roops . Dien Bien Phu and th e battle fo r th e Red RiverDelta were h ighl ight s o f th is per iod, whi ch ended when French and Vietnamese forces signeda cease-f ire agreement at Geneva, on July 20, 1954. [These last tw o phases will be coveredin detail in Chapter Three of this text. J

External Support Vital To Communist VictoryThere ca n be no doubt that external aid was crucial to th e insurgents' eventual success .

The aid given in 1945-46 to DRVN forces by Chinese Na tiona li st s, Japanese deserters , andeven American ass teams and t he Comba t Section, South China Command, under Brig . Gen.Philip E. Gal lagher , was crucial in th e early days. In add it ion, unt il late 1947, there wasa steady flow of U. S. equipment smuggled in by private aircraft and vessels from th ePhilippines, in exchange for gold an d opium. These craft were finally attacked withoutwarn ing by th e French an d destroyed, thus ending this SOurce of Vie t Minh supply. 11 Thereis no way of estimating th e size or kind of equipment which reached t he V iet Minh from summiscellaneous sources.

Foreign aid to th e Viet Minh began 'to playa really effective role only after 1950, whenRed Chinese deliveries permitted the equipment of a first wave of 26 battalions. The bulkof these forces was trained in Red China at Chiang-Hsi (Kwangsi Province). Red Chineseaid, coming by known routes, could be fairly closely estimated. French intelligencesourCes stated that about 75 percent of Chinese aid consisted of fuel and a m m u n i t i o n ~ 25

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percent of weapons and other equipment. Deliveries went from 10-20 tons a month in 1951to 250 tons a month by the end of 1952, t o 400 -600 tons a month in 1953, and to a peak of1,500-4,000 tons a month between January an d June 1954. 12

Soviet b lo c and French Commun is t a id t o th e Viet Minh was important i n b ot h th eeconomic and political fields. In 1950, almost 40 percent of the vehicles sent to Frenchforces in Indochina from France were sabotaged, and even equipment delivered from American wes t coast ports was not exempt f rom Communist tampering. Funds for th e V ie t Minhwere col lected in most Soviet satellites and by French Communists . For propaganda purposes, th e U. S. S. R. repatriated captured German members of th e French Foreign Legionto East Berlin; Czechosolvakia mailed le t ters and propaganda newspapers from Frenchprisoners of war to their families in France. The insurgents wer e a lso aided by neutralIndia 's policy of forb idding the overflight of her terr i tory by French t ran spo rt aircraf t . Allof these activities helped the insurgents, particularly the last , which affected indirectly thecause of th e battle of D ie n Bien Phu.

COUNTERINSURGENCYEven before the genera l ou tbreak of armed i nsurgency in late 1946 there was already a

deep spl it between France's military and civil ian leadership in Indochina concerning theVietnamese situation. For the most part, the French underestimated the seriousness ofth e V iet Minh challenge and failed to understand the depth and intensity of Vietnamesenationalist sentiment. Gen. Philippe Leclerc. the commander of French forces in Indochina from October 1945 to July 1946, realized that the returning French were up against apopular movement which would be dif ficult to defeat militarily, and he was also keenlyaware of the numerical weaknes s o f French forces in the country. On the other hand,Admiral d'Argenlieu, France's civilian High Commissioner to Indochina stationed in Saigonand a firm believer in tough colonial policies, discounted the seriousness of the s ituation.

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Backed by th e old-line "Indochina hands" of t he col on ia l civil service in Saigon, d'Argenlieu'sview s prevai led over those of Leclerc.

*he mission of Leclerc ' s French Expedit ionary Corps (FEC) was thus regarded simplyas one of I'pacification, II to be conducted along the classic l ines of France1s earliercolonial wars. What actually occurred was a ser ies of flag marches through Viet Minhterritory, with columns o f tank s and personnel carriers moving rapidly from town to townbut neve r meet ing the enemy head-on and w it h no plans - -or mil i ta ry capab il i ty - -fo r occupa-tion in d epth. W ith in a few months, much of what th e French still regarded as Cochin-Chinawas once more under French control--to the extent o f about 100 yards on either side of allmajor roads . Tte lack of Vietnamese resistance in the face of French armored columns wasinterpreted as a sign of submission, and th e Viet Minh's continued killing of local officials

13was believed to be merely a sign of temporary lawlessness in the countryside.However, when negotiations at Fontainebleau broke down and tens ion between French

and DRVN forces in the north began mounting in the fall of 1946, incidents increased and thetrue dimensions of the Viet Minh problem in th e countryside became apparent.

Initial French Actions

The FEC then had at i ts disposal one infantry division at full strength and an armoredcombat command, two parachute battalions, and about three Spitfire fighter squadrons.Miscel laneous French units reconstituted from prisoners of war l iberated from Japanes econcentration camps accounted fo r about three regiments, some of which containedindigenous t roops. The total number of troops available in Indoch ina a t t he beg inning of1947 was about 40 , 000; by th e en d of that y ea r t he re were some 70, 000. Only th e para-troops, two companies o f whi ch had liberated all o f Lao s in a ser ies of lightning raids,could be cons idered suitable for counterinsurgency operations in the jungle. The remainder

*Corps Expedit ionnaire Francais Extreme -Orient (CEFEO).

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were useful only fo r conventional warfare.What gave th e appearance of at l ea s t l im i ted French success in th e first sequence of

events was the fact that th e Viet Minh had t ried to defend fixed obj ec ti ve s, most of whichthe French took without great difficulty. The French appeared to be stymied ch ie fly by theirlack of troops and supplies. 14 In 1947, th e FEC began l ar ge p incer operat ions, s ome ofwhich, such as Operation LEA, involved 20,000 troops of all services . These weredesigned to capture or destroy th e bul k of the V ie t Minh's regular troops and th e DRVNgovernmental apparatus then in h id ing around Tuyen -Quang. Whil e the statistics on VietMinh casualties lent each French operation th e appearance of v i c t o r y ~ none ever achievedthe basic objective of destroying th e enemy's means o f maintaining political and militaryresistance.

For th e F r e n c h ~ the Indochina War became an unending search fo r th e "se t - piecebattle." Slowly, French tactical organization went through a ser ies of modifications to adaptitself to th e terrain and th e enemy it wou ld have to fight. From div is ions o f th e Europeantype, th e FEC in 1949 went to th e equal ly unwie ldy o the r ex tr eme , with battalions that werenot strong enough to withs tand at tack by the enemy's basic large unit, th e brigade.

de LaUre Reorgan iz ed the ForcesIn 1950, Gen. Jean de Lattre de Tassigny took over as commander in chief of th e French

Union Forces (FUF) [and as High Commissioner] . Imperious and commanding- -known as"Ie roi Jean ll --de Lattre set the "tone" of th e theater until he left in late 1951 to die of

c ~ n c e r . He was posthumously awarded the rank of Field Marshal. Given to demanding allth e honors of ceremony and known to h av e fired th e area commander of Hanoi fo r deficiencies in his honor guard, de Lat tr e was also highly practical. He drafted French

civilians in Indochina fo r guard duties and commandeered civi l ian aircraft in Saigon fortroop t ransport . During batt le, he once flew into a smal l endangered outpost and answereda subordinate commander's radioed reminder of his danger w i t h ~ "Well, break through

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15and get me out. " In 1951, General de Lattre developed th e standard unit for the Indochinawar, the Groupe Mobile, a ternary regimental combat t eam o rg an iz ed to operate independently.

,

I t existed both as a mobile infantry unit (GM) and as an armored unit (GB); and late in 1952it even appeared in an airborne (GAP) v ersio n, of which there were finally one Vietnameseand two French units, with a t ot al o f nine bat ta li on s. However . th e appearance of two orthree jointly-operating Viet Minh divisions compelled the French to operate in l a rger GMformations in 1953-54, and l igh t d ivi s ions were in the process of being reintroduced when thewar ended. There a ls o existed four provisional Divis ions de Marche in Tonkin. formedfrom the ava il ab le GM' s .

When, after 1949, in poli t ical developments to be discussed later , France gave the threeIndochinese countries technical independence, it also created national armies for Cambodia,Laos, and Viet-Nam. Some, but not all, of the ind igenous t roops se rv ing with the FEC weretransferred into these national armies and military schools were set up in each country toprovide native officer cadres-- though in insufficient numbers fo r these national forces. Thehigh command of the French Union Forces controlled both th e French and African regularsof the FEe and th e three national Indochinese armies . This organizational structure remain-ed in effect until after the 1954 cease-f ire , e xc ep t in th e case of Cambodia, where theCambodian Army High Command took full admin is tr a ti ve cont ro l over the Royal KhmerForces as e ar ly a s October 1953. By 1954, FEC for ce s totaled 278 , 000 and national compon-ents about 200, 000.

The F rench a ls o used montagnard forces in the northern highlands of Laos and Viet-Nam and on th e Southern Plateau of Viet-Nam. There was a regimental combat team (GroupeMobile No . 42) made up of Bahnar and Rhade t r ibesmen; a 4th Vietnamese Mountain Divi-sion, created in 1951; an d t he f amous 5th Div is io n, made up of northern Nungs. Themontagnards also provided exce l len t officer material , an d they fought loyally on the Frenchside to the end.

Irregular forces used by th e counterinsurgents included the private armies of th e

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various politico-religious sects. In the s o u t h ~ th e Roa-Rac and Cao-Dai s e c t s ~ whoserel igious pract ices a re modified forms of Buddh ism, h ad a to ta l s t reng th of about 4 millionbel ievers and controlled large segments of the population in the Mekong Delta an d Tay-Ninh Province. Some 15, 000 to 20 , 000 Cao-Dai t roops and about 8, 000 to la, 000 Hoa-Hao

16t roops fought on the Government side. Catholic armed units , called Unites Mobiles deDefense des Chretientes (Christ ian Communit ies Mobile Defense Units), controlled largeparts of the eastern Mekong Delta area; in th e north, similar Catholic self-defense unitsexisted in the bishoprics of Phat-Diem an d Bui-Chu in t he southe rn part of the Red RiverDelta. Small French liaison teams were assigned to these Buddhist and Christian f o r c e s ~referred to by the French as suppletifs , but they had their own cadres and officers, many ofwhom were g iven t ra in ing by the French in a special paramil itary school at Thu-Duc nearSaigon. These paramili tary units were l oosel y coordinated by the Inspectorate forSupplementary Forces under th e French Union Forces General Staff.

Examination of French combat operations in Indochina wi ll c l ear ly demonstrate severalphases. 17 Until September 1 9 5 0 ~ a "constant offensive" was e m p l o y e d ~ using pincer opera-tions designed to destroy bot h th e guerr i l la forces in the field an d the insurgent administra-tive apparatus. After the destruction and loss of French positions along the Chinese borderin 1950, the French decided to wit hd raw to t he l owland Red River Delta and to consolidatetheir posit ions there until they were ready for fur th er o ff ensi ve opera ti ons. Thi s phase of"retrenchment and consolidation" led to the construction of a bunker line in the Red RiverDelta [th e "d e Lattre Line"J The fall of 1951 saw the beginning of a period of offensive stabs,such as the on e around Hoa-Binh, Operation LORRAINE, and constant mopping-up opera-tio ns in the Mekong and Red Rive r De lt as . Momentum was lost when t he g rowingaggressiveness of Viet Minh forces in th e spr ing o f 1953 le d to a policy of "hedgehogs. II Inorder to break the momentum of guerrilla attacks until sufficient Indochinese nationalforces became available for s tat ic defensive missions and freed th e FEe fo r constant offen-s iv es, a i r- supp li ed hedgehog positions were created in 1953-54 at Na San, the Plain of Jars ,

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Muong-Sai, Seno, and Dien Bien Phu. The se we re des igned to defl ec t Vie t Minh attacksagainst vital centers .

Navar re Assumes Command i n 1953When Gen . Henri-Eugene Navarre took over as commander in chief of th e FUF in

July 1953, his inst ruc tions were to defend Laos i f possible bu t to safeguard th e FrenchExpeditionary Corps at a ll c os ts . His plan for action cal led for continuation and intensification of de Lattre 's tactics; the bui ldup of local national forces; and t he infus ion ofnew spirit , mobility, and aggressiveness in French forces. The Navarre Plan, whichwas to have been fu lly implemented by 1955 but was never pu t in to e ff ec t in view of th eFrench defea t, p rovided for freeing th e FEC entirely from static defense missions.Stationed at 21"1and-air bases fl set up within Viet Minh territory, troops were to carryou t offensive operations that would compel th e enemy to use h is tro ops fo r t he defenseof his ow n rear areas.

French Attempt Specia lWarfareOne of th e most in teres t ing aspects of French counterinsurgency operations was th e

increasingly in tensive use of long-range penetration and commando operations behindenemy lines, or rather inside enemy terri tory. Created by General de Lattre in 1951,th e Groupements de Commandos Mixtes Aeroportes (GCMA), or Composite AirborneCommando Group s, under t he command of Lt. Col. Roger Trinquier, began to fight th eViet Minh with i ts own tactics. The purpose of th e GCMA was empha ti ca lly no t to hitand run in ra ider fashion but to establish loca l contac ts with the populat ion and arousethem to resistance against the V ie t Minh. When a willingness to do so had beendemonstrated, th e French would then parachute in additional cadres of loca l orig in totransform a French-created activity into a purely indigenous movement. 18 Such workrequired a great deal of patience and r isk-taking on th e part of th e initial contact teams

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o f perhaps four or five men, which necessarily included on e or two natives from th econtact area.

Trinquier asser ts to this day that, had h is oper at ion been given wider l at itude andmore log ist ica l support, th e GCMA could have t ransformed th e whole character of th e

19struggle. By July 1954, there even existed in t he moun ta in areas of Tonkin the begin-n ing s o f a "Mountain People 's Commit tee" ca ll ing for self-government of the northernmountain areas "liberated" by th e GCMA. Over 20,000 French-sponsored guerr i l laswere actually operating inside Viet Minh terr i tory by mid -1954, a nd plans called for50, 000 by 1955. There is no doubt that such a force would have created seriousdifficulties for the Viet Minh forces. As i t was, the GCMA could point to the fact thattheir operations in the highlands kept 14 Vie t Minh battalions on the lookout during thebattle o f D ien Bien Phu, whi le the 15,000 FEC troops at Dien Bien Phu tied down only 29Vie t Minh battalions. The GCMA a lso l ibera ted singlehandedly all of Phong Saly Provincein Laos--a feat regular forces had been unable to accomplish 9

On the other hand, the GCMA failed in what should have been its primary mission:the destruction of Viet Minh supply routes to Dien Bie n Phu . GCMA proponents c la im,however, th at th e cautious approach the commandos had to use to be successfullyaccep ted by the local population made i t impossible to create an effective force in th eDien Bien Phu area in time to intervene successfully. Trinquier asserts that, after thecease-fire, he attempted to ge t American military authorities in Saigon to continuesupport of th e anti -Communist guerrillas inside what was to become Communist NorthViet-Nam bu t met with no encou ragemen t. The ant i-Communi st guerr i l las weredestroyed by the Viet Minh after 1954. 20

The Role of Air and Sea PowerAirpower, which was also used for reconnaissance and tactical bombing and strafing

missions, provided the French with essentia l logist ical support, often in places where

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a i rbo rne r ei nfo rc emen ts we re t he o nl y kind which cou ld get through. The French A irForce (FAF) at f i rs t used Sp it fi re s and P-63 ' s in ground support operations and C-47 'sfor bombing and t ransport missions. In th e 1950-54 period, when American B-26 's andF4F ' s became the tact ical mainstay, there was a total of 475 aircraf t operating in I nd o-china. The pr imary mission of the FAF was to provide close tact ical support to FUFground forces and to transport army personne l and supplies. Airborne operations wereconducted extens ive ly during the last years of the war , although hel ic op te rs we re n ev erin active use . Some FAF officers compla ined of h av in g to fu nct io n i n a supporting roleunder the command of FUF ground uni ts , i ns te ad of being allowed to concentrate on a irs tr ikes agains t Viet Minh supply l ines. I t is no t l ik el y, however , that a ir attacks wouldhave met with any great success , as th e Vietnamese insurgents were particularly adeptat camouflage and decentral ization of logist ical targets . Also, in the l a te r state of th ewar, the insurgents had an t ia i rcra f t capab i li ti e s .

I f ai rpower proved general ly disappoin t ing except in the very impor tant area oflogistics, the French Navy's amphibious operations in Indochina made a signif icantcontribution to th e art of warfare. Since Vietnamese rivers are navigable for LCM-andLCT-type craft* fairly fa r inland, the French Navy developed tact ical units known asDinassauts (naval assaul t d iv is ions) equ ipped with some 12 to 18 craf t ranging fromLCVP's to L SSL's. E ac h D in assau t was made up of an Opening Group (Groupementd 'ouverture) of small reconnaissance craft; a Shock Group of sh ips carrying marinecommandos and sometimes armored vehic les ; a Base-af-Fire Group, composed of ship-borne heavy mor ta rs o r tank-turreted ~ C M ' S ; and a Command and Support Group, whichusually i nc luded the command LSSL, supply LCM's , and often th e smal l amphibian air -craf t which were part of the Dinassaut.

In addition to these purely naval units, which possessed considerable f ire and shock*Locally modified U. S. landing craft: LCM (Landing Craf t, Ma te ri el ), LCT

(Landing Craft , Tan k), LCVP (Landing Craft , Vehicle, Personnel) , LSSL (Landing ShipSupport, Large), LST (Landing Ship, Tank).

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power and participated in several major operations . t he re were other specializedamphibious uni ts bui lt a round Crab-and Alligator-type U. S. naval craft . Each suc h groupwas composed of 33 vehicles, including art i l lery and mortars . Finally, th e FrenchQuartermaster Serv ice opera ted several supply companies equipped with 32 LCM's each.Since each LCM h ad the carrying capacity of fifty 2.5 -ton t rucks, any operation withinreach of a navigable r iver was normally assured of rapid and fairly safe logisticalsupport, although there were many ambushes of such convoys by the Viet Minh. Frenchunits faced r iver mines and attacks by well-camouflaged snipers with r e co i ll e ss r if le salong th e riverbanks; t he re wer e even cases of dams being built at night across a r iverto cut off the withdrawal of French r iver craft . 21

French Lose The Political BattleIn the all-important area of political reform, th e c olonia l p ower was handicapped by

th e total lack of consensus in France and Indochina alike as to the future of th e terr i toryand by the absence of effective indigenous leadership once a policy of decolonializationwas f inal ly embarked upon. When Bao Da i returned to lead th e reunified and theoretically independent non-Communist state of Viet-Nam, there was l it tl e to ex cite th eimagination of the Vie tnamese people, and endless haggling over details among Frenchand Indochinese officials fri t tered away th e psychological impact of t he event . The "BaoDai solut ion .. " with it s series of ineffect ive premiers under the inept leadership of anunpopular monarch and the continued dominance of th e French High Commissioner inSaigon, failed a lmost f rom th e star t . The Bao Dai regime set up in 1949 was never ableto offer any real cha ll enge to th e Ho Chi Minh regime. 22

In t he f ac e of basic military and political failures, th e various techniques ofpopulation management tried by th e French had little pract ical effect. The country wasfar to o vast and rebel-held areas too i nt erwoven with loya l areas even to app ly e ff ec ti vefood-denial measures . Too much of the population was directly under Viet Minh control

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to implement a thoroughgoing program of resettlement, although a limited program inCambodia met with much success . 23 Police action against Viet Minh terror ists in theSaigon area was successful after 1951, however , when a brutally efficient securitysystem was established.

Viet-Minh Operations Disperse French Military Strength(see Map #3) Dur ing the last six months of the Indochina conflict , French Union Forcessuffered serious reverses, beginning with the Viet-Minh offensive into Laos in December1953. In a r ap id dash across northern Laos, the VPA's 308th Division reached Muong-Sai, north of Luang- Prabang, while ano ther s tab across central Laos by s t rong e lementsof th e 304 th and 325th VPA Divisions reached the Mekong a t Thakh ek by late December,cutting Laos in hal f and rolling back French positions all along the Mekong Valley to th eThai border.

In the meantime, t he Vie t Minh had also gone on t he o ff en si ve i n th e SouthernPlateau. There, VPA Regiments 108 and 803 swarmed across Roads 14 and 19,encircled Ankh" , t ook Kon tum, and proceeded to destroy GM's 100 and 42 in a gruelingcampaign that was to last until the July cease-f ire . Thi s d ri ve eventually brought VPAregulars to the southern edge of th e Southern Plateau.

FUF activ it ie s during this critical peri od wer e a imed at preventing a rapid buildupof Viet -Minh forces around the vital Red River Delta in the nor th and at diverting VPAtroops in central Viet -Nam from attacks agains t the Mekong Valley and th e northernPOSitions. 24 Operation ATLANTE, a : french seaborne landing made at Tuy -Hoa in southcentral V i e t - N a m ~ ~ a s therefore under taken in the insurgents' Interzone V. 25 It s goal--to divert VPA troops--was, however, unsuccessful both in concept and execution. Tuy-Hoa was too far away t o t empt Vie t-Minh forces in t he nor th , and in f ac t t he Vie t-Minhwere not drawn away from t hei r cent er s of strength. Thus th e French frittered awayvaluable resources. In a s econd e ffor t t o attract northern Viet-Minh forces away from

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the Red River Delta and to block their entry into northern Laos, French f or ce s we reairdropped into Dien Bien Phu , l ocated only 230 miles northwest of th e Red River Delta,on November 3D, 1953; th is was th e star t of Operation CASTOR.

Dien Bien Phu-Operation CASTORGarrisoned in a valley somewhat less than 10 miles long and 6 miles wide, with

outlying defense positions on some bu t no t all of the surround ing hills, eight battalionsof FUF troops waited for a lmost fou r mon th s before the Vie t-Minh attacked in force.The two -mon th s iege of Dien Bien Phu b eg an in March 1954, when the VPA took uppositions in th e hills overlooking the French outposts and began a barrage of artilleryfire which could no t be countered. The 15,000 defenders soon found t ha t t hey haddrast ical ly underest imated the VPA 's artillery and attack capabil it ies. Meanwhile, th eonset of t he monsoon season curtailed French a ir opera tions vi ta l in the lift of th e 200tons of supply a day r equ ir ed for the troops at Dien Bien Phu . Under incessant shellingand wave after wave of attacking VPA infantry. French defense perimeters weres teadi ly reduced until finally even the a ir strips inside Dien Bien Phu were lost . Leftwithout adequate a ir support a nd cut of f from relief by g round forces unable to break

26t hrough the iron ring of the VPA siege force, the garr ison surrendered on May 8, 1954.The consequences o f D ie n Bien Phu's fall were far-reaching. Although five Viet-

Minh divisions had r ema ined concent ra ted in that area f or a lmos t four months, partiallyachieving the initial goal of def lec ting VPA pressure elsewhere, the fall of th e garrisonwas devastat ing in terms of loss of French combat morale and world opinion. Therespite thus bought for th e Red River Delta by th e sacrifice o f D ien Bie n Phu was toos ho rt t o do any good. Three VPA divis ions appeared on th e e dg e of th e delta within amonth after Dien Bien Phu , and by July th e French per ime te r around th e Hanoi-Haiphongroad and rail axis had shrunk to a narrow corridor. Except in southern Viet-Nam. th esituation changed for the worse.

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To cop e with the vastly deteriorated mili tary situation, the French needed re -inforcements of supplies and personnel in .large numbers. French l a w s ~ however. sti l lforbade the use of French draftees outside of Europe. In the United States there waslittle opposition to supplying economic and material aid to th e French, but th e possibility

of involving American troops in combat operations in Indochina created an immediateoutcry in the U. S. Congress. France ' s failure to give real substance to the independencegranted th e Indochinese states in 1949 gav e th e conflict th e character of a colonial warin American e y e s ~ and besides, the memory of Korea was all too fresh. Anxious toavoid involvement in another Asian war, the United States refused even to sendAmer ican p lanes to rescue th e beleaguered French at Dien Bien Phu. 27

In France, th e war in Indochina became increas ingly unpopular because of i tsfinancial cost, i ts drain on the French Regular Army, and its exploitation by th e Ieftwing part ies as a domes tic po li ti cal issue. Faced with mounting domestic opposition toa continuance of the war, and without any hope of active Anglo-American participation intheir counterinsurgent efforts, the French Government of Prime Minister PierreMendes -France resolved to end th e conflict by negotiations at an international conferenceof world powers.

OUTCOME AND CONCLUSIONSHostilities were officially ended on July 20, 1954, when a ceasefi re agreement was

signed at Geneva, Switzerland, by th e mili tary representat ives of th e FUF High Commandon behalf of th e FEC and the Vietnamese and Laotian A rmies and by representatives ofth e Vietnamese Peop le' s Army High Command. The Cambodian Army High Command.operating alone s ince October 1953, signed on its own. Communist China, th e U. S. S. R.Great Britain, and the United States wer e a ls o represented. I t was agreed at thisconference that all Viet-Minh forces would be "regrouped" north of th e 17th paral lel(the present terr i tory of North Viet-Nam) and all Laotian Communist forces in Laos were

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to be withdrawn to southern Indochina. Pending eventual elections to reunify Viet-Nam,that country was to be administered by Communist forces in the north and by nonCommunist forces in the south. Neither the Government of Viet-Nam (GVN) in thesouth--later to become the Republic of Viet-Nam--nor th e United States signed theGeneva agreements, but in a separate declaration th e United States promised to "refrainfrom th e threat or use of force to disturb" these agreements and th e U. S. Governmentstated that "it would view any renewal of th e aggression. . . . with grave concern. ,,28

The Geneva agreements of 1954, by providing the Viet-Minh with a homogeneous andopenly-held terr i tory an d a Communist buffer zone in Laos, gave the DRVN an international standing which it had no t previously enjoyed. Also, the t ransfer to Communisthands of North Vietnamese industrial centers an d th e prestige-laden city of Hanoi, withits modern installations and Indochina's only full-fledged university, gave the DRVN th ebasic infrastructure for national viability. The fact that 860,000 North Vietnamese fledto th e south during th e 300-day grace period for withdrawals provided in the agreementsalso temporarily lightened the DRVN's supply burden. North Viet-Nam, it should beremembered, is a food-deficit area. On th e other hand, th e Viet-Minh received lessterr i tory under the Geneva settlement--which divided Viet-Nam at the 17th paral lel -than their military forces actually held at the time of the diplomatic conference. Thishas been explained by th e conciliatory role played at Geneva by th e U. S. S. R ., which in1954 was trying to induce France not to join the European Defense Community.

The effect of th e cease-fi re on South Viet-Nam was in some ways beneficial. I tbrought a temporary halt to open Communist activity, cleared the way for the totalwithdrawal of the colonial presence of France, made possible large-scale ai d by theUnited States, an d provided the breathing space necessary for th e creation of a morestable system of civilian government in the form of the Republic of Viet-Nam, proclaimed on October 26, 1955. Until late in 1959, Communist insurgency was limited toth e fringe areas of Laos and to small-scale activities in South Viet - Nam, where it s

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apparently non-mili tary nature (e . g., th e assassination of vil lage off ic ia ls ) wasmistakenly in te rpre ted as the "dying gasps" of the earl ier Indochina war rather t han theresumption of new hostilities. 28

F o r F r a n c e , th e Gen ev a ac c or d provided an e x i t - - a l b e i t a humiliating o n e - - f r o ma military and political cul-de-sac whose expense i n both t reasure and manpower wasbeyond endurance. Despite increasing American aid , which by 1954 was expected toreach 70 percent of th e current w ar cos ts , th e Indochina war was damaging th e Frencheconomy, its total cost estimated to have been over $11 billion. The conflict alsodistorted th e structure of th e French military establishment, whose best troops wereinvolved 8,000 miles f rom home. 29

Total casualties in th e French Expeditionary Corps during t he e ight years of fightingamounted to 140,000, and there were some 31,000 casualties in th e Indochinese nationalarmies . Although there was no deliberate pol icy to kill wounded prisoners of war, nospecial facil it ies were provided for their care by th e Communists before 1954. No

30p r i s o n e r s with abdominal, chest" o r s kull wounds a r e known to have surv i v ed.From a military viewpoint, th e French A rmy gained from its Indochinese experience

a valuable store of first-hand knowledge about counterinsurgency warfare operationswhich was later to prove usefu l in Algeria.

Lessons LearnedWhat were the lessons of th e Indochina conflict? French forces in Indochina were

highly organized and well-equipped for conventional combat operations, at l ea st a ft er1946. The very sophistication and complex ity of the French military establishment, how-e v e r , deprived it of on e e s s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of s u c c e s s f u l co unt eri nsurg ency - - speedin r ea ct in g t o ne w s ituations . What i s meant h e r e i s no t s pe ed o f m ov em en t a c r o s sterrain, s o much a s lIad m i n is t ra t iv e s p ee d , " o r th e t i m e r eq u ir ed t o r e l a y valuableinformation and to get back th e proper orders in response. In t ha t s en se , th e French

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never gained th e initiative. Although i t h as b een widely accepted t ha t F rench counterinsurgency opera tions in Indochina were entirely of th e Maginot Line variety, t he f ac ts failto bear ou t that view. Until 1949, the very size of t he FEC p recl ud ed its resort to any suchattempt at holding a battleline; i ns te ad t he FEC practiced another well-known Frenchconcept of war which proved to be a lmos t a s costly as Maginot Line tactics migh t havebeen - - the cons tan t of fens e tactic.

A majo r l es son of the Indochinese confl ict is t ha t t he indigenous peoples of SoutheastAsia fight well when properly motivated and led. Among th e animistic mountain tribesof Viet- Nam, military p rowess has as high a value as among American plains Indians.The lowland Indochinese have made good highland jungle f ighters, disproving th e myththat lowlanders fight well only in a r ice- paddy environment.

Above all, what accounted for the eventual French defeat was simply the f ac t t ha t theFrench were fighting a t a lmo st a 1-to-1 ratio, a type of w ar in which a 10-to-1 superiori tyon the p ar t o f t he c ou nt er in su rg en t f o r c e is g e ne ra l ly c on s id e re d m i ni m al fo r s u c c e s s . 31The r eal su rpr i se o f th e French counter insurgency effor t in Indochina is no t t ha t t heFrench were defea ted, but that it to ok e ight years for this t o happen.

The chi ef poli tical mis take of the French colonial regime in Indochina was i ts failuret o e nc ou ra ge m o d er a te e l em e n ts to for m l o ca l m a s s- b a se d p o l it i c a l p a r t i e s. Thus" non-Communist nationalists were forced to choose either abject submis si on as French pnppetsor active part ic ipa t ion in the Communist -dominated Viet-Minh.

One remarkable t hing about the Communist organization in Indochina was that th eICP dominated the national movement - - the only Communist party i n sou theas t Asi a to doso . E ve n i n I nd on es ia , w h e r e Dutch c olonial p o l i c i e s c e r tainly di d no t favor th e m o d e r a t e s ,t he C o m mu n is t s ha d be e n u na bl e t o c ontr ol th e n a t i on a l is t m o v e me n t . Co m m u n i st s u c c e s sin Indochina was a s m uch d ue to the s o ph i st i ca t io n o f Vi et na m ese Co m m u n i st le ade r s hip a sto the nature of French colonial policies, although these two factors complemented eachother. What sets of f th e ICP from other Communist organizat ions almost th e world overi s that" long be for e T ito an d othe r s in e as te r n E u ro p e d i s c o v e r e d " national c om m unis m , 11

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th e Indochinese Communists had achieved a complete symbiosis of their doctrinal andnational objectives. In fact, it can be shown that their nat ionalis t ant i -French res is t ancewas not at first greeted with enthusiasm on the part of either th e French or SovietC . . 32 B tommunlst Parties. ut 1 completely fooled those non-Communist observers who sawonly the lepr s primarily "nationalist" behavior and not its ultimate lICornmunist" objec-tivea.

When hostili t ies b eg an in Viet-Nam in late 1946, th e French had only two realchoices. They could turn Viet-Nam over without a fight to the DRVN regime, i n whi chthe Communists were already the dominant political group and the controlling force, orthey could fight . Twic e duri ng th e Indochina war a negotiated peace might have beenobtained. The first t ime was in March 1947, when P rof es sor Pau l Mus, the Frenchnegotiator, had almost come to f ul l agreement with Ho Chi Minh; but th e French highcommand insisted upon the return to French authority of all "war criminals and deser-ters, " such as foreign instructors, mainly Japanese and_ German, who were serving withthe Viet-Minh. The second chance came a ft er Giapls "erroneous offensives ll of the 1951-52 period had brough the V ie t-Minh to grief . A French delegat ion was about to meetwith DRVN representatives in Rangoon when it received orders to return to France,allegedly as a result of American pressure , 33 since an end of the war in Indochina a t thatt ime would have th rown the entire weight of Communi st aggression in A sia upon th eKorean front. On th e whole, however, th e French maintained an unreal ist ic pol icy ofunconditional surrender almost unt il the end of the insurgency. I t was only when militaryvictory appeared completely impossibl,e that the French accepted an alternative solutiongiving th e Communists something less t han ful l control of Viet-Nam, key to th e entireIndochinese territory.

Admit ting tha t the Indochina struggle was first and foremost a colonial war and thatFrance's motives fo r fighting it were not strictly altruistic, it should nevertheless benoted th at th e outc ome of the conflict bought at least five years o f f re edom f rom

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C o m m u n i s t t a k e o v e r fo r so m e 23 ou t o f about 38 m il li on p eo ple . C on si de ri ng t healternative p o ssi b i l i t y , th e r e s u l t s o f th e F r e n c h c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y in Indochina do no tappear to h av e b e e n w h o lly n eg at i v e.

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NOTES

IBernard B. Fall, The Two Viet-Nams (rev. ed.; New York: Praeger , 1964), pp.29-31.2For a good appraisal of IC P operations in th e 1930's, see 1. Milton Sacks, "Marxism

in Viet-Nam, " Marxism in Southeast Asia, ed. Frank Trager (Stanford: Stanford University Press , 1960).3 .Cf. Truong Chmh, Pr imer for Revolt (New York: Praeger , 1963).4Fal l, Two Viet-Nams, pp . 40-59.5Ibid . , p. 60; Hammer, S tr uggl e, pp. 45-53.6Fal l , Two Viet-Nams, pp. 61-63.7Ibid., pp. 71-78.8Quoted in Hammer, Struggle, p. 105.9Ibid., pp. 116, 129.

lOVo Nguyen Giap, People's War, People's Army (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp.xxix -xxxix.

I IGen. Boyer de la Tour, Le Martyre de l 'Armee Francaise (Paris: Les Presses duMail, 1963), p. 47 .

12George K. Tanham, Communist Revolut ionary Warfare: th e Viet-Minh in Indochina(New York: Praeger , 1961), pp. 68-69.

13Fal l , Two Viet-Nams, pp. 106 -107 .14Fal l in Street Without J oy h as pointed ou t that at least one major FUF offensive in

North Viet-Nam, designed to crush th e whole headquarters of th e r ebel li on , f el l shortof its objective due to the last-minute diversion of French troops to crush an uprisingin Madagascar. Today it is an interesting speculation as to whether th e Malagasy affairdid no t in fact sav e the Viet Minh.15Fall, Two Viet-Nams, p. ll5.16Hamme r, S trugg le , p . 285.17Cf. Gen. Jean Marchand, L'Indochine en Guerr e (Par is : Pouzet , 1954).18 Ibid.19Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counter-Insurgency Warfare

(New York: Praeger, 1964).

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21Good sources on the subject can b e found in Jacques Morda l. Mari ne Indochine(Paris: Amiot-Dumont. 1953); Jean Mauclere. Marins dans les Arroyos (Paris:Peyronnet. 1949); Cdr. Brossard . Dinassaut (Paris: France-Empire . 1952).

22Fal l Two Viet-Nams. pp. 212-216.23Jean Laprollx, "30 , 000 Cambodgiens echappent a l 'emprise des rebelles, IIIndochine-Sudest Asiatique (Saigon).( January 1953), 23-28.24Navarre. quoted in Fall. Two Viet-Nams. p. 127.25Fal l Street. pp. 186ff.26Ibid . pp. 312-329; The Washington Post (November 5. 1964), p. A 26 .27See Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway and H.H. Martin. Soldier: Memoirs of Matthew B.

Ridgway (New York: Harper & Brothers . 1956) and Dwight D. Eisenhower. Mandate fo rChange. 1953-1956 (New York: Doubleday & Company. 1963).

28Fall . Two Viet-Nams. pp. 3 37 -3 84 .29For a French a pp ra is al . s ee Gen. Paul Ely. L'Indochine dans la Tourmente. (Paris:

PIon. 1964).30Fall. Street . p. 296.31W.W. Rostow, "Guerrilla Warfare in Underdeveloped Areas," Marine Corps

Gazette (January 1962), p. 49: " . . . As you know. i t t akes somewhere between 10 and20 soldiers to control 1 guerrilla in an organized operation . . . . "

32Berna rd Fa l l. "Tria ls and Tribulations of a Party Line: The French CommunistParty and the Indochina War." Foreign Affairs (April 1955).33See Bidault-Daladier exchange of March 9. 1954. in Journal officiel DebatesParliamentaires (March 10. 1954), p. 768.

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SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHYButtinger, Joseph. The Smal ler Dragon. New York: Praeger , 1958.Devillers, Philippe. Histoire du Viet-Nam de 1940 a1952. Paris : Editions du e Seuil, 1952.Fall , B ernard B. "M aster of the Red Jab," Saturday Evening Post , CCXXV (November 24 ,

1962), 18-21.Street Without Joy. 4th ed. Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole, 1964.The Two Viet-Nams. Rev. ed. New York: Praeger , 1964.The Viet Minh Regime. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1956.

Giap, Vo Nguyen. People 's War, People 's Army. New York: Praeger , 1962.Hammer , E ll en J . The Struggle for I ndochina . S ta nford: Stanford Universi ty Press , 1954.Jones, F.C . Japan 's New Order in East Asia, 1937-1945. New York: Oxford Universi ty

Press , 1954.Lancaster, Donald. The Emancipat ion of French Indo-China. London: Oxford Universi ty

Press , 1945.Tanharn, Geo rg e K .. C o m m un i st R e v ol u ti o na r y W arfare: T h e Viet Minh i n I nd o ch in a . Ne w

York: Praeger , 1961.

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-Chapter Two

OPERATIONS IN NORTH VIET-NAM, 1950-1952

by Bernard B. Fal l -

This chapter is extracted from Street Without Joy, by Bernard B. Fall ,and i s reproduced with the permiss ion of The Stackpole Company solely for- the instruction of cadets.


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' : 'OPERATIONS IN ;\10RTR VIET-NAM, 1950-1952by Bernard B. Fall

After receiving assistance from th e ChineseCommunists, th e Viet- Minh forces began acounteroffensive in October 1950 which ledto successive defeats of the Communists bythe French under th e inspired leadership ofGeneral de Lattre de Tassigny. Despite thefutile attempt at Roa Binh, th e search for asimilar TI set-piece" battle with th e VietMinh was to become the hal lmark of Frenchst ra tegy throughout the remainder of thewar.

From the Red River Delta to the Roa-Binh SalientThe ar r iva l of the Chinese Communists on the borders of North Viet- Nam in

November 1949 closed th e f i rs t chapter of the Indochina war and doomed all Frenchchances of full victory. From then on, th e Viet-Minh possessed, like th e Reds in Korea,a !I sanctuary" \vhere they could refit and retrain their troops with full impunity in Chinese

'- ' Communist training camps at Nanning and the ar t i l lery f ir ing ranges of Ching- Rsi. Soon,Viet-Minh battalions began to appear in full field formations, equipped with heavy mor tar sand pack howitzers, followed shortly thereaf ter by complete ar t i l lery battalions usingAmerican-made recoil less ri i les and l05mm howitzers. After nearly a year of relentless

t ra ining, Vo Nguyen Giap, the Communist commander, felt that his newly forged tool wasready for the first direct showdown with th e French.

Viet- Minh Clear Route Coloniale #4Beginning on October 1, 1950, Giap.attacked one by one the str ing of French forts

along the Chinese border with fourteen battalions of regular infantry and three artil lerybattalions. Separated from the French main line of resistance by 300 miles of

~ : ~ D r . Fall's title of this chapter in his book, Street V!ithout J o y ~ is II Set-PieceBattle--I. 11 The title of II Operations in North V i e t - N a m ~ 1950-1952" and th e briefsummary under th e by-line are additions made by Major J. V!. V r o o d m a n s e e ~ Jr. tomake th e format of this volume of th e cadet text- consistent with th e other volumes ofRevolutionary Warfare.

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Communist-held jungle, th e dispersed French posts, though numbering close to 10,000troops, never had a chance. By October 17 , all th e garr isons along the border , includingthree paratroop battalions dropped in during the batt le in the forlorn hope of reopening themain road to the ke y fort of Lang-Son, had been completely destroyed. Lang-Son i tself ,which could perhaps have been defended fo r a certain time, was abandoned in an almostpanic with 1,300 tons of ammunition, food; equipment and artillery stil l intact.

When the smoke cleared, the French had suffered the i r greates t colonial defeat sinceMontcalm ha d died at Quebec. They had lost 6,000 troops, 13 ar t i l lery pieces an d 125mortars , 450 t rucks and three armored platoons, 940 machine guns, 1200 sub-machineguns an d more than 8,000 rifles. Their abandoned stocks alone sufficed for the equipmentof a whole additional Viet- Minh division.!

By January 1, 1951, the French had lost control of all of North Viet-Nam to thenorth of the Red River and were no w desperately digging in to hold on to the key pawn ofthe whole Indochina war-- the Red River delta. On the Communist side, General Giappressed on . The guerri l la groups of 1946-1949 had t ransformed themselves into battalions,then into regiments, an d now began to take their final shape as 10,000-man divisions. Thef irst series of five divisions--the Divisions 304, 308, 312, 316, and 320--was created in1950, soon to be followed by a so-cal led" 35ls t Heavy Division" of the Soviet ar t i l lerydivision t:Ype an d composed of two artillery regiments an d one combat engineer regiment.The Viet-Minh felt ready to throw the French into the sea .

I t was late in 1950 that Giap elaborated his final plan to defeat the French armies inIndochina. In a remarkable staff study presented by him before ih e political commissarsof th e 316th Infantry Division, Giap outlined the Indochina war as consisting of threestages. Firs t was that of th e initial re t rea t of the Viet- Minh forces until they had t ime tore-train and consolidate. The second phase would begin when the French, failing todestroy th e Viet-Minh guerrilla forces, would allow them to re- equip themselves an dwith th e help of th e Chinese Communists, to eliminate slowly but sure ly most of the smal lFrench posts in th e Viet-Minh base area. The third stage was to be th e total destruction

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- of the French troops. In Giap's ow n words:The enemy will pass slowly from the offensive to th e defensive. Thebli tzkrieg will t ransform i tself into a war of long duration. Thus, theenemy will be caught in a dilemma: he has to drag out the war in orderto win i t an d does not possess, on the other hand, the psychologicaland political means to fight a long drawn-out war.

Giap was no fool. A French-trained history professor an d a member of the IndochineseCommunist Party since 1930, he probably was in a bet ter position to evaluate his enemy'spotential than anyone else. Being perfectly informed as to the situation of French moraleat home and fully aware of American hesitation to commit United States troops in a11 colonial l1 war, Giap felt i t impor tant to l iquidate the French as a mili tary threat beforethe arr ival of massive American material aid. Giap stated further:

Our strategy early in th e course of th e third stage is that of a generalcounter-offensive. We shall attack without cease until final victory,until we have swept th e enemy forces from Indochina. During the f i rs tan d second stage, we have gnawed away at th e enemy forces; now wemust destroy them. All mili tary activities of the third stage must tendto the same simple aim--the total destruction of French forces.We shal l go on to th e general counter-offensive when the followingconditions have been fulfilled: (1) superiori ty of our forces over- those of the enemy; (2) the international situation is in our favor;(3) the mili tary situation is in our favor. We will have to receive aidfrom abroad in order to be able to car ry ou t th e counter-offensive, butto count solely upon i t without taking into account our ow n capabilitiesis to show proof of subjectivism an d of lack of political conscience.But on the other hard we cannot deny the importance of such aid.When we shall have reached th e third stage, th e following tact icalprinciples will be applied: mobile warfare will become the principalactivity, positional warfare and guerri l la warfare will becomesecondary.

By the 10th of January, 1951, the bulk of Giap's t roops--81 battalions including 12heavy 1,veapons battalions and 8 engineer .battalions- -were ready for the genera l counteroffensive, the big push on to Hanoi itself. In fact, 1,vithin Hanoi and the whole delta area .Communist propagandists had begun to post leaflets with the inscription l iRa Chi Minh in

Hanoi for the Tet.11

(Tet is the Chinese lunar ne w year which usually falls in the middleof February . ) French intelligence had identified the approximate whereabouts of theenemy's concentration an d the enemy had given i ts target date and main target.- 39


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For th e f i rs t t ime since the beginning of th e Indochina war, the French were going tohave th e opportnnity of fighting a set-p iece battle.

Assaul t Against the de Lattre Line (Map #2)On th e French side, th e arr ival of Marshal de Lattre de Tassigny as the new

Commander- in-Chief had given the sagging French morale a badly needed shot in the arm.De Lattre ha d assumed command of the Indochina theater on December 17 , 1950 and hadundertaken several measures which none of his predecessors had dared to undertake; hemobilized the French civilians living in Indochina fo r additional guard duties l thus liberating garrison troops for active combat; and sent back to France th e ships which hadarrived to evacuate th e French women and children living in Indochina. As de Lattresaid, "As long as th e women and children are here, th e men wanlt dare to let go. 11

From what was known of the enemy's intentions, the major thrust would come fromthe Tam-Dao Massif in direction of Vinh-Yen. On the French side, tw o mobile groups, 2the North African Mobile Group under Colonel Edon an d Mobile Group No . 3 under ColonelVanuxern defended th e approaches to Vinh-Yen, anchoring th e resistance around a seriesof lo w hills emerging above the alluvial plains.

On January 13, th e Communist attack began. As usual, th e first movement of Giapconsisted in attempting to divide th e French forces by a diversionary attack which almostsucceeded. A major portion of Communist Division 308 attacked B a o - C h u c ~ a small postheld by about 50 Senegalese an d Vietnamese who fought to the las t man and succumbedafter executing D . ~ o bayonet counterattacks in th e attempt to clear th e defenses from theirassailants. Colonel Varmxem's whole mobile group barreled north to come to the help ofth e post and fell into an extensive ambush near D a o - T u ~ losing in th e process nearly awhole Senegalese battalion and a large part of the 8th Algerian Spahis. I t was only throughthe providential help of Vinh- Yen's ar t i l lery and the presence of French fighter-bombersthat th e remainder of Vanuxem's mobile group fought it s way back to Vinh-Yen. By January 14. th e Viet-Minh had achieved its first objective. The French \vere now blocked with

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t h ~ 1 r b o . ~ k . p . l n s l . " '.....hy lake formed b y . d..d bnllch of the Red River. I_v i " . thou'" . . . .t of V I " " - Y ~ n with . gap of thr"" mil....hlch w.. practle>Jly undetended.

It \oIled u I f Giap ...""ld b ~ a b l ~ to milk. llO"d his pNmi.e . 1010 1. wa. low In lIa""I,and n. . . . .I"'''''... I" " ' r l . , . I.. ...llllnil to play vp "v I...n " of the loi"'"war, ""rrled bli h""dl j"u .nn,""'lnll lbe ."""-lo- be-- expeoted fall or Ibnoi.

It . . . . lI,." lila, d. LaUre dootolJo In tho d i . _ o n or VI""Ven with '''


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Dao-- the whole 308th Division had gone over to the attack and the battle for Hanoi hadbegnn. Dragging with them the i r heavy mor ta r s and heavy machine gnns as a mobile baseof f ire, the Communists f i rs t attacked Hill 47, then Hill 101 and la ter again 47 and Hill210.. For th e first t ime in th e Indochina war l th e French faced the unsettling experienceof "human sea" attacks: waves upon waves of Viet- Minh infantry threw themselves againstth e hastily dug defenses of the hill line. De Lattre, who had re turned for a second t ime toVinh- Yen, recognized the gravity of the situation. All available f ighter- bomber s inIndochina and transport planes capable to dumping bomb canisters were marshaled intowhat became th e most massive aerial bombardment of the Indochina war.

Waves of f ighter -bombers threw up a cur ta in of roaring napalm between the at tackingCommunists an d th e exhausted French d e f e n d e r s ~ literally roasting thousands of the enemy,

but to l i t t le avail. At 1400 on the 17th of January, af ter merc i less hand-to-hand combatwith hand grenades and tommyguns, the last survivors of Hill 101, having spent theirammunit ion, fell back into the plain. With 101 in Communist hands, Hill 47 becameuntenable and at 0400 Colonel Edon ordered i ts evacuation. Of the whole hill l ine to thenorth of Vinh-Yen, only its two anchors, Hill 210 in th e north and 157 in th e south, weresti l l in French hands.

Now, de Lattre threw in his last reserves., th e newly-constituted Mobile Group No .2composed of nv o Moroccan battalions an d one paratroop battalion. On th e morning of th e17th, Mobile Group No. 2 was inserted in the front to the southwest of Vinh- Yen and in theearly dawn of January 17th, Colonel Vanuxem's Mobile Group No. 3 attempted one lastdesperate counter-attack in order to re- establish contact with Hill 210. On e of itsbattalions again got badly mauled by a suicide attack of Division 3 1 2 ~ bu t once m o r e ~ th enapalm of th e f ighter -bombers did i ts deadly job an d by noon of January 17 , Giap's troopsbegan to disappear in the woods of th e Tam Dao. The French looked around thems elveswith disbelief: th e enemy had been defeated an d th e French remained masters of th ebattlefield. The battle of Binh-Yen had cost the Comm unists 6,000 dead an d 500 prisoners .

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To fu e Viet-Minh, fueir defeat in fu e open f ield mus t have been cruel ly frustrat ing. I twas obvious that Giap's troops "vere not yet ready for the general CQunter- offensive.Disappointment found i tself c lear ly expressed in the diary of a Viet-Minh officer, whichcontained the following reveal ing pas sage:

Our division has been on th e attack ever since this morning. We areforming a group of about 10 eli te battalions who should be able to takeViet-Tri 3 before tomorrow.The French troops r eac t in ter r ible fashion. We're waiting here allmorning. Here and there one can see th e batt le develop, but my company,unfortunately, has nothing to do . Yes, we would certainly l ike topart icipate in fue batt le which will decide fu e fate of Hanoi. I t isalready January 13th and Tet will be here in a fe w weeks, in a monthand a half. We want to be in Hanoi for the Tetl To the south we can hearth e guns rumble l ike drums. French shel ls a re getting closer and closerand we al ready have seen some of our wounded leaving the l ine and comingback to where we are .The platoon commanders come over to m e bringing resolut ions andpetit ions from their men. I t is always a great comfort to m e ~ beforeevery assaul t or particularly dangerous action, to feel the unity ofthe men and the c a d r e s ~ and with that of the whole People ' s A r m y ~ I accept all the petitions. Each platoon reques ts fue honor of beingassigned the mos t difficult or the mos t dangerous mission.All of a sudden a sound can be heard in the sky and s t range bi rds a p p e a r ~ getting l a rger and larger . Airplanes. l a r de r my m en to take coverfrom fue bombs and machine gun bullets . But fue planes dived upon uswithout firing thei r guns. H o w e v e r ~ al l of a s u d d e n ~ hell opens in frontof my eyes. Hell comes in fu e form of large, egg-shaped containers,dropping from fu e f i rs t plane, followed by ofuer eggs from th e secondand third plane. Immense sheets of f l a m e s ~ extending over hundredsof meters , i t seems, str ike t e r ror in the ranks of my soldiers . Thisis napalm, the f ire \vhich falls from the skies.Another plane swoops down behind us and again drops a napalm bomb.The bomb falls closely behind us and I feel i ts f iery breafu touching mywhole body. The men are now fleeing in all direct ions and I cannot holdthem back. There is no way of holding out under this tor rent of f i rewhich flows in all direct ions and burns everything on its passage. Ona ll sides, f lames surround us now. In addition, French ar t i l lery andmor tar s no w have our range and t ransform into a f iery tomb what hadbeen, ten minutes a g o ~ a quiet par t of the forest . We flee through thebamboo hedges towards the west and I cry, "Assemble in the woodsbehind the hill!!T But wh o l istens to m e and who can hear me?Behind us, French infantry no w attacks; we can hear thei r screams .We a re no w passing through the platoon which had remained in r eserve .I stop at th e platoon commander .

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"Try to delay the French as much as possible . I ' l l t ry to regroupm y m en behind th e hill!!!His eyes were wide with t e r ro r . !1What is this? The atomic bomb?1t!lNo, i t is napalm.1!The men continue to flee in all directions and I see a politicalcommissa r , pistol in hand, trying desperately to regroup them.We can no w hear clear ly the yel ls of the enemy who is pursuingus ... 4

There was no doubt that Giap had suffered a seve re defeat in the batt le of Vinh-Yenand in a remarkable pos t-mor tem of January 23 , 1951, he openly admitted some of hiser ror s . Of cours e he sought to spread the blame around, accusing some of his troops fortheir lack of aggress iveness , and even of 11 cQwardicert-- ,vhich was cer ta inly no t just ified-for having lacked determination in pushing direct infantry attacks aga inst th e well-entrenched French artillery posit ions an d armored combat teams. However, he paid asignificant homage to the civilian porters l wh o had worked hvo million man- days andbrought to the batt le a rea 51 000 tons of r ice l ammunit ion and weaponsa

The hard fact remained l however l that the Communist t roops were no t yet ready forthe general counter-offensive which was to sweep the French into the sea. On th e otherhand l the French lacked the necessary cross - count ry mobil i ty and l for that matter ,necessary manpower or airpower to exploit such an unexpected victory as that of Vinh- Yen.Even under th e leadership of such an inspired commander as Marsha l de Lattre l theFrench could do l i t t le else at th e end of the battle of Vinh-Yen but to consolidate theirposit ion on the hill l ine and sett le down to await the next Communist a t tacka

Undeterred by his unsuccessful a t tack against Vinh- Yen, Giap no w shifted his bat t leforce far ther towards th e hill r ange of the Dong Trieu. This was a par t icular ly sens i t ivea rea to the French defense of the Red R i v ~ r del ta l because i t controlled not only th eapproaches to th e important coal mines of North Viet- Nam l but also because a dete rminedthrust of l e ss than 20 kilometers could endanger the vital por t of Haiphong, thns destroyinga ll French hopes of holding out in North Viet-Nam. Leaving the 304th and 320th Infantry .III

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_lie , llrt!on. O\.o.p ob!feean In " ' . Illcb' ' " MardI 2) 10 U. 0, . Mardi ze:u..ti lbole n . .., u_ of had fIl l l .., 1M . . . . . . . . . . . . , _. bo t the ,,__ 7 ot .... Do110" Illy .. . poormltud _ lDl .err__


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minutes of combat, the lieutenant commanding th e post was wounded and tw o of the FrenchNCO's were killed, but the f i rs t tw o mass attacks broke under the f ire of the defenders.At 0515, a tremendous explosion shook th e whole complex: Viet- Minh TTVolunteers of Death' I(the Communist version of the Japanese Kamikaze) had inf iltrated the position and blown abreach into the outer wall through which no w poured Viet- Minh infantry. In th e earlydawn, under the command of the las t French NCO, himself seriously wounded, the Thopart isans repelled the Viet-Minh assaul t in hand-to-hand combat and again consolidatedtheir position. When daylight broke th e Communist pressure relented somewhat s inceFrench B-26's and Hellcats began to bomb the open plain around the post with napalm andfragmentation bombs.

A t 1400, the 6t h Colonial Parachute Battalion attempted to break through to Mao Khemine from Road 18 but \Vas bogged down by the concentrated enemy ar t i l lery and machine-gu n f ire, in spite of French ar t i l lery an d a ir support . One Hellcat dive- bomber , caughtin Communist ant ia i rcraf t f ire, smashed into no-man l S land. But even the painfully slowprogress of the para t roopers gave the battered defenders of Mao Khe th e l as t despera techance to make a get-away. At 1900, Toan star ted the evacuation of the Mao Khe mine.Detouring the C ommu nist posit ion between Mao Khe mine and Mao Khe, th e survivors ofth e previous night 's batt le made the i r way to Mao Khe village, taking with them all the i rwounded and a long column of the wives and children of the Tho part i sans wh o had livedwith the i r husbands in th e post . Their break- out took the Communists completely bysurpr ise and they reached Mao Khe village without being attacked.

This was bu t a meager respite, because th e village, in turn, became th e major ta rgetof the Communist attack. At 0200 of IVlarch 28 , a Communist barrage was laid down onIVlao Kh e village and Mao Kh e church. Screaming waves of Viet-Minh infantry s lashedboth into the village defenses and into the defenses of the church. Two of th e bunkers ofIVlao Kh e church, destroyed by shaped charges, fell into enemy hands, and in the vil lage,tw o of the watch towers , severely hit by bazookas, crumbled, burying all the i r defendersand the machine guns. The three armored

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