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8/7/2019 Government Opposition to Cert Petition in SHAC 7 Case
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No. 10-7187
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
KEVIN KJONAAS, LAUREN GAZZOLA, JACOB CONROY,
JOSHUA HARPER, ANDREW STEPANIAN, AND
DARIUS FULLMER, PETITIONERS
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION
NEAL KUMAR KATYAL
Acting Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
LANNY A. BREUER
Assistant Attorney General
ROBERT A. PARKER
Attorney
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
(202) 514-2217
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether statements urging an audience to commit unlawful
actions at a specific time and in a specific manner, and
threatening specific individuals with violence and bodily harm,
constitute protected speech under the First Amendment.
2. Whether, applying the strictissimi juris standard,
sufficient evidence supported a jury verdict that petitioners
conspired to violate the Animal Enterprise Protection Act (AEPA),
18 U.S.C. 43, conspired to commit (and did commit) interstate
stalking, and conspired to use a telecommunications device to
abuse, threaten, and harass.
3. Whether, before its amendment in 2006, the AEPA, 18
U.S.C. 43, permitted acts against third parties to provide
circumstantial evidence of a conspiracy to cause damage and loss to
an animal enterprise.
4. Whether the district courts jury instructions permitted
the jury to convict petitioners based solely on protected speech.
5. Whether the district courts order finding petitioners
jointly and severally liable for $1,000,001 in restitution is
supported by sufficient evidence and is consistent with Dolan v.
United States, 130 S. Ct. 2533 (2010).
(I)
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 10-7187
KEVIN KJONAAS, LAUREN GAZZOLA, JACOB CONROY,
JOSHUA HARPER, ANDREW STEPANIAN, AND
DARIUS FULLMER, PETITIONERS
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION
OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. A 1-30) is
reported at 584 F.3d 132.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on October
14, 2009. A petition for rehearing was denied on June 3, 2010
(Pet. App. B). On August 23, 2010, Justice Alito extended the time
within which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to and
including October 1, 2010. The petition was filed on October 1,
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2010. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.
1254(1).
STATEMENT
Following a jury trial in the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey, petitioners were convicted of one count
of conspiracy to violate the Animal Enterprise Protection Act
(AEPA), in violation of 18 U.S.C. 43. Petitioners Kjonaas,
Gazzola, and Conroy were also convicted of one count of conspiracy
to commit interstate stalking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2261A(2)
and 371, and three counts of interstate stalking, in violation of
18 U.S.C. 2261A(2). Petitioners Kjonaas, Gazzola, Conroy, and
Harper were further convicted of conspiracy to use a
telecommunications device to abuse, threaten, and harass, in
violation of 47 U.S.C. 223(a)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C. 371.
The district court sentenced Kjonaas to 72 months of
imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release;
Gazzola to 52 months of imprisonment, to be followed by three years
of supervised release; Conroy to 48 months of imprisonment, to be
followed by three years of supervised release; Harper to 36 months
of imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised
release; Stepanian to 36 months of imprisonment, to be followed by
one year of supervised release; and Fullmer to 12 months of
imprisonment, to be followed by one year of supervised release.
Pet. App. A 14. Each defendant was also deemed jointly and
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severally liable for restitution totaling $1,000,001. Id. at 27.
The court of appeals affirmed, but remanded to the district court
with instructions to create a payment schedule for the restitution.
Id. at 1-30.
1. Petitioners were leaders and organizers of Stop
Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC), an organization dedicated to
direct action against companies and individuals involved with
scientific testing using animals. Pet. App. A at 2-3. SHACs
principal target was Huntingdon Life Sciences (Huntingdon or HLS),
a company headquartered in the United Kingdom that performed
laboratory tests on animals, as required by U.S. and European laws
meant to ensure the safety of pharmaceuticals, agricultural and
veterinary products, and medical implants. Id. at 2.
In 1999, SHAC published the names and home addresses of
Huntingdons directors and officers in the U.K., resulting in an
ongoing campaign of harassment and vandalism that culminated in
the brutal assault of Huntingdons Chief Operating Officer, Brian
Cass. Pet. App. A at 2-3. In an effort to protect its
shareholders from similar harassment, Huntingdon relocated its
financial operations to the United States and opened a laboratory
in New Jersey. Id. at 3. Shortly thereafter, petitioners
organized a SHAC branch in the United States. Kjonaas served as
SHACs president, Gazzola was its campaign coordinator, and
Conroy administered SHACs website; together, they ran SHAC out of
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a home they shared in Somerset, New Jersey, with assistance from
Fullmer. Id. at 10-14. Harper and Stepanian organized SHAC
activities in Seattle and New York, respectively. Id. at 13-14.
2. SHACs website contained disclaimers stating that SHAC
operate[d] within the boundaries of the law and that any illegal
acts were committed by anonymous activists who have no relation
with SHAC, Pet. App. A at 4, but this was untrue. Although
petitioners engaged in some lawful activity, they also repeatedly
threatened, incited, and committed crimes against Huntingdon and
people and companies associated with Huntingdon. See, e.g., id. at
3-10.
a. SHAC openly support[ed] those who choose to operate
outside the confines of the legal system. Pet. App. A at 4. It
called upon SHAC activists to apply[] direct and traumatizing
blows to those who work at HLS or are part of companies that
support their brutality, including by breaking down the doors of
these evil labs and taking their abused animals out. C.A. App.
814, 816-817. It also urged its supporters to take [the fight] to
the doorsteps of those responsible without regard for threats of
lawsuits or consideration for some scumbags property value, id.
at 814-815, and repeatedly exhorted them to SMASH HLS, see, e.g.,
id. at 769, 783-785, 1711.
In furtherance of these goals, SHAC provided detailed
information to its supporters designed to incite and facilitate
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crimes and threaten its targets. For example, SHAC used its
website to organize and schedule numerous acts of what it called
electronic civil disobedience. Pet. App. A at 5. These denial-
of-service attacks involved inundating a companys computer
servers and telephones with calls and messages in an effort to
overload the system and repeatedly sending black faxes (i.e.,
black pieces of paper that SHAC provided via its website) to a
companys fax machines in order to exhaust the ink supply and
render the machines inoperable. Ibid. SHAC acknowledged that
these actions were illegal, C.A. App. 835, and it therefore urged
its followers to use pay phones, public computers, and other
untraceable media to carry out the attacks. Pet. App. A at 5.
SHAC also frequently posted information concerning illegal
actions its followers had already taken, while encouraging them to
continue and providing materials to assist them. For example, SHAC
created and disseminated a large poster of Brian Cass highlighting
his injuries in order to intimidate other targets. Pet. App. A at
18; C.A. App. 2485, 2728. It provided detailed instructions on how
individuals involved in crimes could avoid detection by law
enforcement. Pet. App. A at 5. Under a note stating dont go
getting any funny ideas!, SHAC disseminated a list of Top 20
Terror Tactics (many of which its followers actually used during
the course of SHACs campaign) that included vandalizing or
destroying property; threatening to kill or injure targeted
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individuals and their families; calling in bomb threats; invading
offices and destroying or stealing documents; attacking companies
Internet sites, e-mail servers, and fax machines; and trapping
individuals in their homes or work places. Id. at 4-5; C.A. App.
780-782.
SHAC touted other crimes on its website in a running list of
accomplishments and bulletins of its followers criminal
activities, including smashing windows and overturning a Huntingdon
employees car; using paint or stickers to vandalize the homes and
offices of individuals who worked for or did business with
Huntingdon; detonating bombs in buildings in Arkansas, Texas, and
Washington that housed offices of companies that did business with
Huntingdon; and burglarizing Huntingdons laboratory. Pet. App. A
at 4; C.A. App. 818-822. SHAC stated that it was proud and
excited by such actions and urged its supporters to [k]eep up
the good work! Pet. App. A at 4; C.A. App. 818.
b. A crucial component of SHACs campaign was the harassment
and intimidation of individuals who worked for Huntingdon or for
companies that did business with Huntingdon. SHAC posted on its
website lists of targets that often included the individuals
home addresses, telephone numbers, photographs, names of their
family members, and other identifying information. See, e.g., C.A.
App. 854-856, 860-879, 882-896, 1242-1246, 1250-1252, 1289-1291,
1397-1399, 1706; Pet. App. A at 6 & n.5. An editorial written by
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petitioner Harper and posted on SHACs website stated that such
individuals are not safe from us and that militancy in support
of SHACs campaign was absolutely necessary. C.A. App. 1696.
SHACs target lists repeatedly urged SHACs followers to GO GET
EM (id. at 1232), Let em have it! (id. at 1706), and make
[their] lives a living hell! (id. at 1397).
Many of these individuals testified to similar experiences
after being targeted by SHAC. After being targeted by SHAC, Andrew
Baker, the chairman of Huntingdons holding company, started
receiving vulgar and abusive mail and telephone calls, and his home
was vandalized on three occasions. Pet. App. A at 6-7. Vandals
also plastered the door of Bakers daughters apartment with
pictures depicting his death. Id. at 7. Protesters attacked the
home of Henning Jonassen, a pathologist at Huntingdon, smashing all
of his windows with rocks and overturning his car. C.A. App. 2796-
2797. Carol Auletta, Huntingdons director of program management,
received threatening telephone calls and letters, and her
neighborhood was plastered with posters warning that she was
deranged. Id. at 2486, 2787-2789. SHACs website advertised an
online auction of undergarments allegedly worn by Theresa Kushner,
a Huntingdon veterinarian, and promised that any pervert[s] who
submitted bids will also receive [Kushners] address and
telephone number and an invitation to come over. Id. at 2816-
2817.
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SHAC similarly targeted Marsh, Inc., a company that provided
insurance brokerage services to Huntingdon. SHACs website warned
all Marsh employees, we know where you work, we know where you
eat, we know where you sleep, and we will treat Marsh no
differently than we would treat Brian Cass unless the company cut
all ties to Huntingdon. C.A. App. 1309. SHAC published the
personal information of several Marsh employees and invited its
supporters to GO GET EM!, resulting in numerous acts of
intimidation, harassment, and vandalism. Id. at 1232. For
example, SHAC published the names and home address of Sally
Dillenback (a Marsh executive in Texas), her husband, and their
young children, as well as the address of the childrens school;
the make, model, and license plate number of the familys personal
vehicle; and the name of their church. Pet. App. A at 7.
Dillenback received threatening telephone calls, pictures of
mutilated animals plastered to her home and sidewalk, and an e-mail
asking her how she would feel if they cut open her youngest son and
fill[ed] him with poison, as Huntingdon did to animals. Id. at
8. Marion Harlos and Robert Harper (who worked for Marsh in Texas
and Massachusetts, respectively) were likewise targeted and quickly
fell victim to similar attacks. Id. at 8-10. Protesters also set
off smoke bombs in two high-rise office buildings in Seattle that
housed Marsh offices, resulting in absolute panic. Id. at 12;
C.A. App. 3007-3008. SHAC praised this action as akin to
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smok[ing] terrorists out of their holes. Pet. App. A at 12.
Stephens, Inc., a Huntingdon investor, was subjected to a
similar campaign. SHAC targeted Stephens with repeated black fax
and denial-of-service attacks, which effectively shut down the
companys ability to conduct business. C.A. App. 1080, 1098, 2862-
2864. SHAC also organized protests against Stephens that resulted
in violent clashes with police, trapped company employees in their
offices, and led to acts of vandalism against employees homes.
Id. at 2867-2871. Other protesters set off a bomb in a Stephens
office building in Texas and vandalized the home of Stephens
president. Id. at 1119-1123, 2865-2866.
3. Petitioners were directly involved in SHACs criminal
acts. Pet. App. A at 10. Kjonaas was SHACs president and oversaw
SHACs operations and website from a home he shared with Gazzola
and Conroy. Ibid. He publicly praised the use of violence to
accomplish SHACs aims and was involved in an intense effort to
obtain the names, addresses, and personal information of
individuals to target. Id. at 10-11. Kjonaas personally demanded
that Stephens sever its ties with Huntingdon and controlled a SHAC
website that threatened Stephens with illegal denial-of-service
attacks if it failed to comply -- attacks that took place, on
schedule, when Stephens refused to accede to Kjonaass demands.
Ibid. Kjonaas also discussed with Stepanian the possibility of
creating front organizations to circumvent injunctions and carry
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out illegal actions. Id. at 11. When protesters detonated pipe
bombs at the California offices of Chiron, Inc., a Huntingdon
client and SHAC target, Kjonaas announced that the attack was part
of a drastic escalation in the campaign against Huntingdon and
that Huntingdon should be very worried. Id. at 11-12. Although
Kjonaas attributed the bombing to anonymous Revolutionary Cells,
telephone records showed that he called one of the men charged with
the bombings twelve hours after they occurred. Id. at 12.
Gazzola was SHACs campaign coordinator and was directly
responsible for protests against Huntingdon and others. Pet. App.
A at 12. The day after the bombings of Marsh offices in Seattle,
Gazzola appeared on a radio show using the pseudonym Angela
Jackson and defended the use of violence (including the bombings
and the beating of Brian Cass) in furtherance of SHACs aims.
Ibid. She praised such crimes as necessary to SHACs successful
campaign, and repeatedly claimed involvement in them. Id. at 12-
13 ([W]ere tired of standing around holding signs and yelling at
buildings and writing letters and not getting anywhere. Were
gonna do what we have to do in order to be effective and in order
to save lives.); id. at 12 (stating that Marsh cut ties with
Huntingdon because we fucked them up).
Gazzola also personally threatened individuals on SHACs
target list. For example, during a SHAC protest outside Robert
Harpers home, Gazzola screamed through a bullhorn that she would
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burn down his house and warned Harper that neither the police nor
a court injunction could protect him or his family. Pet. App. 12;
see Govt C.A. Br. 65-66 (quoting videotape). Gazzola further
provided SHAC followers with instructions on how to circumvent
protections against denial-of-service attacks erected by the Bank
of New York, which did business with Huntingdon. C.A. App. 1183.
Conroy resided with Kjonaas and Gazzola at SHAC headquarters
and designed and maintained all of SHACs websites. Pet. App. A at
13. He was responsible for publishing information to those sites
and for assisting others in doing so. Ibid.; see also C.A. App.
1958-1962, 2621, 2628.
Harper was the leader of SHACs Seattle branch and coordinated
SHACs campaign against Stephens, which included denial-of-service
attacks and other illegal actions. Pet. App. A at 13. He openly
advocated the use of violence and intimidation tactics against
SHACs targets in postings on SHACs website and in public
speeches, and specifically instructed one audience on how to send
black faxes. Ibid.
Stepanian coordinated SHAC activities in New York. Pet. App.
A at 13. In February 2003, he led an office invasion of Deloitte
& Touche, Huntingdons auditor, during which protesters plastered
the interior of the building with stickers and threw papers from a
third-floor balcony. Ibid. At Stepanians request, Gazzola
subsequently posted a bulletin about this action on SHACs website,
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attributed to anonymous NY Activists. Ibid. Stepanian also
discussed with Kjonaas the need to set up sham organizations to
provide cover for their activities. Id. at 13-14.
Fullmer was a SHAC organizer in New Jersey who coordinated
numerous denial-of-service attacks and black fax campaigns against
SHAC targets. Pet. App. A at 14. He also researched targets,
collected their personal information, and helped Gazzola post this
information on the SHAC website. Ibid.
Petitioners went to great lengths to conceal their
communications. Under headings such as Illegal Activity, SHACs
website provided its followers with detailed instructions on how to
avoid detection by law enforcement. Pet. App. A at 5; see, e.g.,
C.A. App. 1513 (SHAC website advises followers to NEVER discuss
illegal activity indoors, over the phone, or email. * * * Keep
the discussion of illegal activity on a need to know basis only).
Eight of the nine computers seized from SHAC headquarters contained
an e-mail encryption and data deletion software program called PGP,
which Kjonaas and others routinely used. Pet. App. A at 5.
4. On September 16, 2004, a federal grand jury in the
District of New Jersey returned a superseding indictment charging
petitioners with offenses related to their actions against
Huntingdon and others. Count One charged all petitioners with
conspiracy to violate the AEPA by using a facility in interstate
commerce to cause physical disruption to the functioning of an
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animal enterprise (i.e., Huntingdon) and conspiring to
intentionally damage[] or cause[] the loss of any property
* * * used by [Huntingdon], resulting in more than $10,000 in
economic damage. 18 U.S.C. 43(a) and (b)(2) (Supp. II 2002).
Counts Two through Five charged Kjonaas, Gazzola, and Conroy with
four counts of interstate stalking and conspiracy to commit
interstate stalking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2261A(2) and 371,
stemming from the crimes committed against Sally Dillenback, Marion
Harlos, and Robert Harper. Count Six charged Kjonaas, Gazzola,
Conroy, and Harper with conspiring to use a telecommunications
device to abuse, threaten, and harass, in violation of 47 U.S.C.
223(a)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C. 371. Following a jury trial,
petitioners were convicted on all counts. Pet. App. A at 14. The
district court sentenced each of the petitioners to varying terms
of imprisonment and ordered that they be held jointly and severally
liable for $1,000,001 in restitution, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 43(c).
Pet. App. A at 27.
5. The court of appeals affirmed. Pet. App. A at 1-30.
a. The court held that the AEPA was constitutional, both
facially and as applied. Pet. App. A at 14-21. While the court
acknowledged that some of the speech on SHACs website was
constitutionally protected, it held that petitioners frequently
veered into criminal conduct by inciting imminent lawless action
and leveling true threats against Huntingdon, its employees, and
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others. Id. at 17-18. The court of appeals found ample evidence
in the record that illegal actions were part and parcel of SHACs
campaign and that petitioners personally participated in illegal
protests, in addition to orchestrating the illegal acts of others.
Id. at 18.
The court noted, for example, that SHAC frequently organized
illegal denial-of-service attacks and black fax campaigns in a
manner that encouraged and compelled an imminent, unlawful act
that was not only likely to occur, but provided the schedule by
which [it] was to occur. Pet. App. A at 18. Petitioners also
repeatedly used past incidents to instill fear in future targets,
including by prominently displaying photographs highlighting the
injuries suffered by Brian Cass and threatening targets with the
same campaign of intimidation and violence that befell Huntingdon
and affiliated companies. Id. at 17-18.
With respect to the individual defendants, the court concluded
that [t]he record contains more instances of Kjonaass involvement
in and coordination of illegal activity than we could possibly
recount here, including evidence that he controlled the illegal
campaign against Stephens and was linked to the Chiron bombers.
Pet. App. A at 19. Gazzola was instrumental in the planning and
execution of SHACs illegal activities, including threatening to
burn down Robert Harpers home and to harm him and his family. Id.
at 19-20. Conroy and Fullmer were responsible for numerous denial-
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of-service attacks. Id. at 20. Stepanian was directly involved in
illegal protests in New York and provided strong circumstantial
evidence of his planning and execution of illegal protest activity
in a telephone conversation with Kjonaas in which Stepanian and
Kjonaas agreed to use encrypted e-mails to discuss the possibility
of violating an injunction. Ibid.; C.A. App. 2028-2030. And
although Harpers speeches praising violence and instructing
individuals how to send black faxes were not themselves illegal,
they provided strong circumstantial evidence of his participation
in the conspiracy, particularly given his close relationships with
the other conspirators and his leadership role in SHAC. Pet. App.
20-21.
b. The court of appeals also held that the evidence was
sufficient to sustain petitioners convictions. Pet. App. A at 22-
26. The court agreed with petitioners that, in order to convict
them of conspiracy, the government was required to prove that SHAC
possessed unlawful goals and that [petitioners] held a specific
intent to further those illegal aims and that the sufficiency of
the evidence should be judged according to the strictest law, or
the strictissimi juris doctrine. Id. at 23 (quotations omitted).
Even applying this strict standard, however, the court of appeals
found ample evidence from which the jury could convict the
defendants of conspiracy. Ibid.
Concerning Count One, the court found that petitioners were
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indisputably leaders of, and heavily involved in, SHACs illegal
activities. Pet. App. A at 23-24. The court also found
overwhelming evidence that Kjonaas and Gazzola were constant[ly]
attempt[ing] to evade law enforcement and cover their tracks
(which is circumstantial evidence of [an] agreement to participate
in illegal activity); that Conroy designed and maintained the
primary tools of the campaign against Huntingdon, provided SHACs
followers with detailed information regarding when and how [to]
participate in illegal campaign activities, and posted threats of
violence against SHACs targets; that Harper was a member of
SHACs leadership and actively sought to recruit followers to carry
out illegal acts on SHACs behalf; that Fullmer personally
orchestrated several illegal electronic attacks on Huntingdon and
related companies; and that Stepanian helped set up sham
organizations to provide cover for SHACs illegal activities and
actively sought to evade law enforcement. Ibid.
With respect to Counts Two through Five, the court of appeals
found sufficient evidence to support the convictions of Kjonaas,
Gazzola, and Conroy for interstate stalking and conspiracy to
commit interstate stalking. Pet. App. A at 25-26. The court noted
that SHACs website (which Kjonaas, Gazzola, and Conroy controlled)
disseminated the detailed personal information of out-of-state
individuals and credible threats against them that were intended to
(and did) cause those individuals to fear for their safety and the
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1 Only Harper and SHAC (which is not a petitioner) challenged
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the convictions on Count
Six. Pet. App. A at 26. The court of appeals held that SHACs
arguments were frivolous and that the same evidence supporting
Harpers conviction on Count One supported his conviction for
conspiracy to use a telecommunications device to abuse, threaten,
and harass. Ibid.
safety of their families. Ibid. Kjonaas used the Chiron bombings
to similar advantage, and Gazzola personally stood outside Robert
Harpers house and threatened to burn it down, and warned that the
police would not protect him. Ibid.1
c. The court of appeals also held that, contrary to
petitioners claim, the jury was not instructed that it could
convict petitioners of an AEPA conspiracy against individuals and
companies other than Huntingdon. Pet. App. A at 21. Rather, the
jury was required to find that the ultimate object of the
conspiracy was to cause physical disruption -- * * * defined as
interference with the normal course of business or activity -- at
Huntingdon resulting in damage to Huntingdon. Ibid. The court
acknowledged that action against indirectly affiliated companies
was not itself proscribed by the 2002 version of the AEPA, id. at
24 n.15, but concluded that such crimes, committed with the express
purpose of harming Huntingdon, were circumstantial evidence of the
conspiracy against Huntingdon. Id. at 21.
d. Judge Fisher joined the courts opinion in most respects,
but disagreed concerning whether the evidence was sufficient to
convict petitioners on Count One. See Pet. App. A at 27-30. In
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Judge Fishers view, the evidence established that petitioners
specifically intended to cause physical disruption and damage to
companies affiliated with Huntingdon and to Huntingdon employees,
but not to Huntingdon itself. Id. at 28-29.
ARGUMENT
Petitioners contend that their statements and conduct were
protected by the First Amendment (Pet. 12-15); that the evidence
was insufficient to convict them of conspiracy or interstate
stalking (Pet. 20-24); that they were convicted based on conduct
that was not criminal under the 2002 version of the AEPA (Pet. 15-
20); that the district courts jury instructions were improper
(Pet. 25-28); and that the restitution order in this case was not
supported by sufficient evidence of cognizable losses (Pet. 28-31).
The court of appeals correctly rejected these arguments, and the
decision below does not conflict with any decision of this Court or
another court of appeals. Further review is unwarranted.
1. Petitioners undeniably had a right to protest against
Huntingdon, to attempt to close it down through the power of
persuasion, and to use vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks to achieve that goal. New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). They did not, however,
have the right to organize and execute a campaign of violence and
intimidation designed to force others to accept their views.
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It has long been established that incitement and threats are
not constitutionally protected. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (advocacy of the use of force or of
law violation may be proscribed when it is directed to inciting
or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359-360
(2003) (states may proscribe true threats that communicate a
serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful
violence to a particular individual or group of individuals, even
if the speaker does not actually intend to carry out the threat);
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992) (true threat
doctrine protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence, from
the disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibility that
the threatened violence will occur).
As the court of appeals held, the record contains extensive
evidence that petitioners orchestrated an extended campaign of
illegal denial-of-service attacks against Huntingdon and others,
including by providing materials, instructions, and specific
timetables for launching the attacks. See, e.g., Pet. App. A at 5-
6, 18. This evidence clearly satisfies Brandenburgs requirement
of inciting imminent lawless action in a manner likely to produce
such action; indeed, the attacks were successful precisely because
SHAC was able to repeatedly rally its supporters to commit such
actions in concert. See id. at 18. The record is also rife with
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instances in which petitioners directly threatened Huntingdon and
others, including by repeatedly and graphically invoking the
beating of Brian Cass, ibid.; C.A. App. 2485, 2728; publishing home
addresses and other detailed personal information of targeted
individuals, along with stark warnings about the vandalism and
violence that befell others and exhortations to GET EM! and
make [their] lives a living hell!, Pet. App. A 6-10, 19; C.A.
App. 1232, 1397; using the Chiron bombings to make Huntingdon very
worried, Pet. App. A at 11-12, 19; and (in Gazzolas case)
standing outside a private home and threatening to burn it down,
id. at 19-20.
Contrary to the assertions of petitioners and their amici,
this Courts decision in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S.
886 (1982), does not hold (or even suggest) that petitioners
conduct was protected. Claiborne Hardware concerned a lawsuit in
which white merchants complained that the NAACP and its Mississippi
field secretary, Charles Evers, had maliciously interfered with
their businesses during a boycott. Id. at 898-899. Specifically,
the plaintiffs complained that shortly before the boycott began,
Evers stated in a public meeting that any African Americans who
violated the boycott would have their necks broken by their own
people. Id. at 900 n.28.
In finding that Everss remarks were protected speech, this
Court observed that his statements were not addressed to anyone in
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particular, but were instead directed to all 8,000-plus black
residents of Claiborne County. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at
900 n.28. The principal means of disciplining those who did not
participate was social ostracization, not violence, id. at 904, and
almost all of the actions associated with the boycott were
uniformly peaceful and orderly, id. at 903. Although some acts
of violence occurred during the boycott, they were isolated and,
more importantly, there was no evidence that the NAACP or Evers had
any knowledge of or involvement in them. Id. at 904-906, 930-931;
see also id. at 924 (finding no evidence that any illegal conduct
was authorized, ratified, or even discussed at any of the [NAACP]
meetings); id. at 928 (Everss reference to breaking necks was an
isolated statement in lengthy addresses [that] generally contained
an impassioned plea for black citizens to unify, to support and
respect each other). The Court explained that if Everss
statement had been followed by acts of violence, a substantial
question would be presented whether Evers could be held liable for
the consequences of that unlawful conduct. Id. at 928. The Court
found no indication, however, that Evers authorized, ratified, or
directly threatened acts of violence. Id. at 929.
Petitioners statements -- which repeatedly and intentionally
threatened specific individuals with vandalism and violence, placed
those individuals in actual fear for their physical safety, and
incited followers to commit imminent lawless acts -- bear no
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2 Amici Center for Constitutional Rights, et al., contend
(Br. 6) that the decision below is in conflict with the SecondCircuits decision in New York v. Operation Rescue National, 273
F.3d 184 (2001). Operation Rescue, however, merely held that the
statement killing babies is no different than killing doctors was
an expression of political opinion that did not convey a direct or
even veiled threat. Id. at 196-197. The court of appeals noted
that the defendant had, on a different occasion, told a doctor,
Youre next, I hope youre next, youre next, but it did not
address whether that statement was a threat. Id. at 196 n.5.
resemblance to the speech at issue in Claiborne Hardware. Numerous
courts have so held, both in cases concerning petitioners, see
Huntingdon Life Scis., Inc. v. SHAC, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 521, 544
(Cal. Ct. App. 2005), and those using similar tactics. See, e.g.,
Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American
Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1062-1065, 1078-1086 (9th
Cir. 2002) (en banc) (use of Internet and posters to publish names
of specific abortion providers, some of whom had been murdered, and
accusing them of crimes against humanity, was true threat), cert.
denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003); United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d
913, 925-926 (8th Cir.) (same for speech suggesting that abortion
providers would suffer same fate as murdered doctor), cert. denied,
519 U.S. 1043 (1996); United States v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45, 48 (2d
Cir.) (same for defendants statement that he would deal with
[specific individuals] physically), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 968
(1994).2 The court of appeals consistent determination in this
case does not merit further review.
Nor is there merit to petitioners assertion (Pet. 12-14) that
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3 Amicus National Lawyers Guild asserts (Br. 5-13, 22) that
this case presents a useful context in which to address the First
Amendment protections applicable to Internet-based journalism.
This case would be a poor vehicle in which to address that issue.
Petitioners were not journalists. Rather, they were engaged in a
concerted campaign to incite, threaten, and commit crimes in order
to force individuals to accede to their demands.
4 The purpose of the strictissimi juris standard is to assure
that one in sympathy with the legitimate aims of * * * an
organization, but not specifically intending to accomplish them by
resort to violence, [is not] punished for his adherence to lawful
and constitutionally protected purposes, because of other and
unprotected purposes which he does not necessarily share.
Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 919 (quoting Noto v. United States,
367 U.S. 290, 299-300 (1961)).
this Courts precedents concerning incitement and true threats
should be circumscribed in cases involving the Internet. This
Court has consistently applied ordinary First Amendment principles
to Internet speech, see, e.g., United States v. Williams, 553 U.S.
285, 291, 297-300 (2008), and petitioners assertion (Pet. 12-14)
that their statements could not have threatened or incited others
because those who speak over the Internet cannot know who they are
addressing or when, if ever, th[e] audience will be reached, is
belied by the fact that petitioners supporters engaged in the
criminal actions that petitioners advocated, on the timetable
petitioners wanted.3
2. Petitioners contend (Pet. 20-24) that the court of
appeals failed to apply the doctrine of strictissimi juris to this
case.4 The court of appeals expressly recognized, however, that
strictissimi juris was the proper standard by which to review the
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5 Petitioners argue that Harpers conviction is particularly
troubling because his actions in furtherance of the conspiracy
were not by themselves illegal. Pet. 23. This argument is
incorrect. The conspiracy statute proscribes criminal agreements,
not criminal acts, and an individual need not commit a separate
crime to be a member of a conspiracy. See Iannelli v. United
States, 420 U.S. 770, 777-778 (1975); Pet. App. A at 23. It is,
moreover, well established that legal acts clearly undertaken for
the specific purpose of rendering effective the later illegal
activity which is advocated may form the basis for a conspiracy
prosecution. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 234 (1961);
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 497-498 (1949).The court of appeals did not err in concluding that Harpers
conduct -- including his role in SHACs leadership, advocacy of
violence in furtherance of SHACs aims, coordination of the
campaign against Stephens, Inc. (which included widespread denial-
of-service attacks), and efforts to instruct others on sending
black faxes -- established circumstantially that he was aware of,
and intentionally participated in, the conspiracy. Pet. App. A at
13, 20-21.
evidence, and it concluded that, [e]ven applying this strict
standard, there was ample evidence on which the jury could convict
petitioners. Pet. App. A at 23. Nowhere did the district court
instruct (or did the court of appeals suggest) that the jury was
permitted to convict petitioners solely because they were SHAC[]
member[s], or because they act[ed] in accord with its agenda to
end animal testing at HLS. Pet. 21. To the contrary, the court
of appeals explained in detail how each petitioner specifically
sought to further a criminal aspect of SHACs campaign, including
by coordinating and helping to carry out illegal denial-of-service
attacks and threatening other people with serious bodily harm. See
Pet. App. A at 5-14, 19-21, 25-26.5 That fact-bound decision does
not merit this Courts review. See, e.g., United States v.
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6 Amici Center for Constitutional Rights, et al., contend
(Br. 12-20) that this Court should grant certiorari to clarify that
a true threat must be uttered with the subjective intent tothreaten and may not be the product of mere objective negligence.
Petitioners themselves do not make this contention, and the court
of appeals did not address it. Cf. Pet. App. 18-19 (holding that
some of petitioners conduct constituted true threats without
articulating the legal standard). That alone is sufficient reason
for this Court to decline review of the issue. See United States
v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 41 (1992). In any event, the issue is
not cleanly presented here. The district court instructed the jury
Johnston, 268 U.S. 220, 227 (1925) (We do not grant * * *
certiorari to review evidence and discuss specific facts.).
Nor does this fact-bound determination conflict with decisions
from other circuits. See Pet. 24. In United States v. Spock, 416
F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969), the court held that the strictissimi
juris standard is satisfied by evidence showing that a defendant
made unambiguous statements adhering to the conspiracys illegal
aims, committed the very illegal act contemplated by the
agreement, or committed a subsequent legal act if that act is
clearly undertaken for the specific purpose of rendering effective
the later illegal activity which is advocated. Id. at 173
(quoting Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 234 (1961)). Each
petitioner satisfied one or more of these conditions in this case.
In United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972), the
court of appeals held that the government could not prosecute
organizers of a peaceful protest simply because the protest
devolved into a riot. Id. at 393. Petitioners illegal conduct
was far more extensive.6
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that, to find a true threat, it had to find that the speaker or
actor intended to communicate a serious expression of an intent to
commit bodily harm to another person. C.A. App. 3379. That
instruction mirrors the formulation of a true threat in Virginia
v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003): statements where the speaker
means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit
acts of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group ofindividuals. While amici view (Br. 15) this language as less
clear than other statements in Virginia v. Black, they rely only
on a statement that describes intimidation as a type of true
threat. 533 U.S. at 360. That statement did not narrow or modify
the earlier definition. In any event, petitioners did not object
to the instruction given, thus relegating the issue to plain-error
review, see Fed. R. Evid. 30(d), and making this case an unsuitable
vehicle in which to address the issue.
3. Petitioners further contend (Pet. 15-20) that the court
of appeals misconstrued the 2002 version of the AEPA to permit
conviction for a conspiracy directed at parties other than
Huntingdon. That argument is incorrect.
At the time petitioners committed their crimes, the AEPA
prohibited traveling in or using a facility in interstate commerce
for the purpose of causing physical disruption to the functioning
of an animal enterprise, and defined one substantive offense in
connection with that purpose: intentionally damag[ing] or
caus[ing] the loss of any property (including animals or records)
used by the animal enterprise, or conspir[ing] to do so.
18 U.S.C. 43(a) (Supp. II 2002). Thus, in order to convict an
individual of conspiracy under the 2002 version of the AEPA, the
government was required to prove (1) that petitioners intended to
physically disrupt Huntingdon (which the district court defined as
an action using interference with the normal course of business or
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7 The AEPA in its current form prohibits traveling in or
using a facility in interstate commerce for the purpose of
damaging or interfering with the operations of an animal
enterprise, and committing (or conspiring to commit) one of three
substantive offenses in connection with that purpose:
(1) intentionally damaging or causing the loss of property of the
animal enterprise; (2) intentionally damaging or causing the loss
of property of persons or entities having a connection to,relationship with, or transactions with the animal enterprise; or
(3) intentionally placing a person in reasonable fear of death or
serious bodily injury by a course of conduct involving threats,
acts of vandalism, property damage, criminal trespass, harassment,
or intimidation. 18 U.S.C. 43(a). Thus, under current law,
petitioners could have been charged with numerous substantive AEPA
offenses, each carrying their own punishment, for each of the
businesses and individuals SHAC targeted.
activity at an animal enterprise); and (2) that the object of the
conspiracy was damage or loss to the animal enterprise itself, not
related third parties. C.A. App. 3375-3376.7
Neither the district court nor the court of appeals
misunderstood this distinction. The district court instructed the
jury that, to convict petitioners under Count One, it needed to
find beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioners intended to cause
physical disruption to the functioning of Huntingdon Life
Sciences, which I shall refer to as HLS, an animal enterprise, with
the intention to damage and/or cause the loss of property used by
HLS in an amount exceeding $10,000. C.A. App. 3353-3354 (emphasis
added); see also, e.g., id. at 3373-3376 (the Government must
prove * * * [that] the purpose of the agreement was to cause
physical disruption to the functioning of an animal enterprise and
that the agreement was intended to cause damage or loss of any
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property, including animal records used by the animal enterprise,
in an amount exceeding $10,000. * * * Huntingdon Life Sciences
is an animal enterprise under the statute.). Likewise, the court
of appeals concluded that petitioners were convicted of intending
to physically disrupt Huntingdon and causing damage or losses to
Huntingdon. Pet. App. A at 21. It further acknowledged that
companies that did business with Huntingdon were not themselves
animal enterprise[s] and that petitioners campaign against
indirectly affiliated companies is not, by itself, enough to
substantiate a conspiracy to violate the AEPA. Id. at 24 n.15.
Petitioners contention that the government and lower courts
attempted to turn the 2002 version of the AEPA into the exact
equivalent of the 2006 revision, Pet. 16, is therefore incorrect.
Actions against third parties were admitted as circumstantial
evidence of the conspiracy against Huntingdon. See Pet. App. A at
21; Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942) (conspiracy
may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence). The jury
could infer, for example, that petitioners intent in conspiring
against Huntingdon and causing damages and losses to that company
(including by organizing denial-of-service attacks against the
company and threatening Huntingdons employees) was the same as
their intent in committing similar acts against third parties. But
this did not somehow amend the indictment to charge a conspiracy
against those entities.
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8 The AEPA did not define physical disruption, except to
state that it did not include any lawful disruption that results
from lawful public, governmental, or animal enterprise employee
reaction to the disclosure of information about an animal
enterprise. 18 U.S.C. 43(d)(2) (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
Petitioners actions against third parties were also relevant
to demonstrating their intention to cause physical disruption to
Huntingdon. This, too, did not require the jury to find any
substantive AEPA offense against a third party, but merely reflects
the reality that by attempting to deny Huntingdons laboratory the
use of telephone, Internet, security, and insurance services
necessary for its continued operation, SHAC sought to physically
disrupt the experiments and other business that the employees of
Huntingdons laboratory were attempting to conduct. Nothing in the
2002 AEPA suggests that such evidence must be excluded simply
because the defendant accomplishes his intended disruption and
damage to an animal enterprise by an action ostensibly directed at
a third party.8
In any event, the proper interpretation of the AEPA before its
amendment is not an issue that merits this Courts review. The
question will not recur under the law as it is presently drafted,
and the issue is therefore of diminishing importance.
4. Petitioners argue (Pet. 25-28) that the district courts
instructions permitted the jury to convict them on the interstate
stalking and telecommunications harassment charges based solely on
protected speech. With respect to the interstate stalking counts,
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petitioners did not object to the instructions on this ground in
the district court, nor did they raise this claim in their briefs
on appeal. This Court generally does not consider questions not
pressed or passed upon below, see United States v. Williams, 504
U.S. 36, 41 (1992); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718 n.7
(2005), and there is no reason to depart from that general rule
here.
Even if the Court were to consider petitioners claim, review
would be for plain error. See United States v. Marcus, 130 S. Ct.
2159, 2166 (2010); Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 388
(1999). There was no error, much less a plain error that affected
petitioners substantial rights. The district court instructed the
jury that, to convict Kjonaas, Gazzola, and Conroy on Counts Two
through Five (interstate stalking), it was required to find that
they inten[ded] to place a person in another state * * * in
reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury * * * [and]
actually placed that person in reasonable fear of death * * *
or serious bodily injury. C.A. App. 3383. These elements are
functionally identical to the definition of a true threat. See
id. at 3378-3380 (true threat is a serious expression of an intent
to commit bodily harm to another person or to plac[e] that person
or persons in fear of bodily harm or death). Thus, in convicting
petitioners of interstate stalking, the jury necessarily found that
their speech was not protected.
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Petitioners did object to the district courts decision not to
instruct the jury that the speech underlying Count Six
(telecommunications harassment) could be protected. See C.A. App.
3743-3744. Petitioners did not renew that argument on appeal,
however, and so it is waived. And even if the argument were not
waived, it is meritless. The overt acts alleged in Count Six all
related to the conspiracy to commit denial-of-service attacks using
black faxes, which was organized by petitioners and launched
according to a schedule posted on SHACs website. C.A. App. 236-
237. The court of appeals concluded that petitioners statements
concerning these attacks were clearly intended to incite imminent
lawless action, and thus were not protected. Pet. App. A at 18.
Those statements were also an integral part of the conspiracy.
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 497-498 (1949)
(lawful speech may be enjoined if it is in furtherance of a
conspiracy to commit a crime); Williams, 553 U.S. at 298-299
(there remains an important distinction between a proposal to
engage in illegal activity and the abstract advocacy of
illegality). Under these circumstances, there is no likelihood
that the jury convicted petitioners based on constitutionally
protected speech.
5. Finally, there is no merit to petitioners contention
(Pet. 28-31) that the restitution order in this case was not
supported by sufficient evidence of cognizable losses. Under the
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Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. 3663A and 3664, a
district court must order restitution for specified crimes in the
full amount of each victims losses and must do so without
consideration of the economic circumstances of the defendant.
18 U.S.C. 3663A(a)(1), 3664(f)(1)(A). Where more than one
defendant contributed to the victims loss, the court may make
each defendant liable for payment of the full amount of
restitution. 18 U.S.C. 3664(h). The AEPA permits restitution for
any * * * economic damage resulting from the offense,
including the replacement costs of lost or damaged property or
records, the costs of repeating an interrupted or invalidated
experiment, or the loss of profits. 18 U.S.C. 43(c) and (d)(3)
(2000 & Supp. II 2002).
At trial, the government submitted evidence that Huntingdon
suffered well over $1,000,000 in qualifying losses as a result of
petitioners conspiracy. Richard Michaelson, the Chief Financial
Officer of Huntingdons parent company, testified that SHACs
illegal denial-of-service attacks against Huntingdon shut down
Huntingdons computer network for almost two months, resulting in
approximately $15,000 in equipment replacement costs, $50,000 in
repair costs, and almost $400,000 in business losses. C.A. App.
2853. Huntingdon incurred additional expenses providing increased
security for its physical plant and its employees, as well as legal
costs to obtain injunctions against petitioners illegal attacks.
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Ibid. Michaelson further testified that the time spent by
Huntingdon management alone in responding to SHACs campaign cost
the company in excess of a million dollars. Ibid.
At sentencing, the district court noted that this evidence was
unchallenged and uncontested at trial, but stated that it
intended to hold a further evidentiary hearing to determine the
precise, itemized losses that Huntingdon suffered as a result of
the conspiracy. C.A. App. 60-61. Petitioners objected to a
hearing, id. at 60, 62, 66, and the district court thereafter
deemed them jointly and severally liable for $1,000,001. Id. at
67. Having declined the district courts request to hold an
evidentiary hearing on the issue of damages, petitioners are in a
poor position to press such a challenge now.
Petitioners claims are incorrect in any event. The losses
Huntingdon suffered as a result of SHACs conspiracy are clearly
cognizable as damage and lost profits, including costs to repair
and replace equipment, lost revenue, and other expenses that were
incurred as a direct result of petitioners unlawful conduct. See
Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 413 (1990) (restitution may
include loss[es] caused by the specific conduct that is the basis
of the offense of conviction). Petitioners contend (Pet. 29-30)
that the Third Circuit has concluded that lost business
opportunities and staffing or management costs are not proper bases
for restitution in other cases, but those decisions are
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CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
NEAL KUMAR KATYAL
Acting Solicitor General
LANNY A. BREUER
Assistant Attorney General
ROBERT A. PARKER
Attorney
FEBRUARY 2011