Integrated Approach to Nuclear Security and Safeguards

Dr. Sukesh AgharaDirector, Integrated Nuclear Security and Safeguards

University of Massachusetts Lowell

Prof. Sukesh Aghara – UMass - Lowell

Associate Professor, Nuclear Engineering

Ph. D. Nuclear Engineering - University of Texas, Austin, 2003

Experience•2014 – p: Director, Integrated Nuclear Security and Safeguards Laboratory (INSSL)•2013 – p: Director, Nuclear Energy Education Training (NEET)•2010 – 12: Director, NSF Center for Energy and Environmental Sustainability (CEES)•2007 – 09: NASA Administrator’s Fellow, Langley Research Center•2004 – 12: Associate Professor, Texas A&M University, Prairie View

Teaching & TrainingRadiation transport, Radiation Shielding, Nuclear Fuel Cycles, Nuclear Energy Policy, Nuclear Security

ResearchNuclear analytical techniques, Nuclear Non-proliferation and Safeguards, Space Radiation

Prof. S. K. Aghara

Web: www.uml.edu/insslEmail: sukesh_aghara@uml.eduPh: 978-934-3115

Global Nuclear Energy• Nuclear power provides 16% of the world's electricity

• Globally there are 430 reactors in 31 countries

Source: World Nuclear Association

US – 19 % UK – 18% France – 78% Germany – 17% Canada – 15%

Russia – 17% S. Korea – 35% Japan – 18% China – 2% India – 3.6%

Country Operating Reactor

New Construction

USA 104 4

Russia 33 10

France 58 1

China 17 30

India 18 7Vogtle Units 1&2

Nuclear Safeguards, Security and Safety are more important than ever

Prof. S. K. Aghara

Global Adaption of Nuclear Energy

•Safety•Security•Safeguards•Economics

Q: Do you recognize this weapon design?

Q: What type of fissile material was used in “Little boy”?

Safeguards objective

▫Provide the international community with credible assurances about the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear material and facilities, through objective and independent verification that States are honouring their safeguards obligations.

IAEA Safeguards - Milestones• 1950s-1960s: as nations started to trade in nuclear plants and fuel

the IAEA safeguards system was established to ensure that this did not lead to the spread of nuclear weapons▫ INFCIRC/66

• 1968-1991: following the signing of the NPT, the IAEA was tasked to apply safeguards on all the nuclear material in the non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS)▫ INFCIRC/153

• 1991-present: came about due to the clandestine nuclear weapon program in Iraq, problems in applying safeguards in the DPRK, and the experience gained in verifying the denuclearization of South Africa. Additional Protocol (AP) was first adopted in 1997▫ INFCIRC/540

Prof. S. K. Aghara

Path to Nuclear Weapons – Build One

Nuclear Power Nuclear Weapons

Prof. S. K. Aghara

Purse a Nuclear Weapons Program

•Need fissile material▫How much?

•Design▫Ease and size

•Resources▫ Industrial capabilities▫Reflectors, igniters▫Humans▫Finance

•Delivery▫Simple, crude

Prof. S. K. Aghara

Significant Quantity (SQ) - Timeliness

11Prof. S. K. Aghara

IAEA Safeguards Terminology

Prof. S. K. Aghara

Materials Balance Area (MBA)

Key Measurement Points (KMP)

Significant Quantity (SQ)

Physical Inventory List (PIL)

Book Inventory

MUF

MBRSRD

LOF

Bulk Facility

Item FacilityDiversion Rate

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State Level Motivations

• International security•Regional Issues•Lack of confidence on International

Security•Prestige/Hegemony

Prof. S. K. Aghara

Safeguards Regime• As early as 1960’s there was some concern about small

groups pursing nuclear weapons▫Lawrence Livermore Laboratory conducted an elaborate

controlled experiment in 1964 where 3 PhD nuclear physicists were randomly picked and were asked to design a nuclear weapon 28 months later they presented a design that was confirmed by

the LLNL scientists that it would work!!

Never became a serious concern for the Safeguards Regime, Why?

Prof. S. K. Aghara

Safeguards Regime

•Building a nuclear bomb would require a team of specialists with knowledge of physics, the properties of nuclear material, metallurgy, and explosives

•And the team would need some special equipment•The undertaking would be dangerous•The outcome would be uncertain

Too costly, not achievable – This has been a true assumption so far

Prof. S. K. Aghara

New Paradigm – Steal One

• New concerns emerge▫ “Do not detonate the small bomb. Keep it for us. It may be useful.” –

1961 French General in Algeria during the nuclear weapons testing

Safeguards does not address this

Nuclear Terrorism - successful sabotage of an operating nuclear reactor, the deliberate release of any significant amounts of radioactive material, or the detonation of a nuclear bomb by a non-state actor

• Threat from stateless terrorists and more widespread access to nuclear materials and know-how started to manifest

Threat – Nuclear Terrorism• The twentieth-century nuclear stalemate is turning into

the twenty-first – century era of nuclear terrorism, failed states, sophisticating terrorist networks ▫Huge inventory of nuclear warheads and new nuclear

weapons state ~70,000 (1990’s) to ~22,000 (2012) 90% percent are US and Russian India and Pakistan (1998) confirm their possession of nuclear

weapons North Korea (2006) conducted a successful nuclear weapons test A 58 percent increase (since 2010) in the number of jihadist

groups, a doubling of jihadist fighters and a tripling of attacks by al Qaeda affiliates – RAND study 2014

Prof. S. K. Aghara

Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? – Brian Jenkins

• Nuclear terrorism is about a serious threat — the possibility that terrorists might somehow obtain and detonate a nuclear weapon

• Nuclear terror is about the anticipation of that event.

• Nuclear terrorism is about terrorists' capabilities, while nuclear terror is about imagination.

New Paradigm – Political Science

”A campaign of terror might even yield what an act of terrorism could not”

Prof. S. K. Aghara

Nuclear Terrorism• Threats▫ Fundamentalist▫ Idealist▫ Mental disorder▫ Mafia▫ Religion▫ Criminal

• Targets▫ Materials▫ People▫ Information▫ Facilities

• Pathways▫ Where▫ When▫ How

Prof. S. K. Aghara

Safeguards to Security• From 1950 – 1990: proliferation of nuclear weapons and

technology▫ IAEA, Nuclear Safeguards, NPT

• From 1990 – 2001: illicit trafficking of nuclear weapons and material from ▫ Nunn–Lugar Act or Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program ▫ Focused on Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries

• Present: Nuclear terrorism from sophisticated non-state actors ▫ Global Threat Reduction Initiatives (GTRI), Nuclear Security Summit▫ Comprehensive needs (safeguard and secure)

Terrorist capabilities, motivations, and opportunities have changed Prof. S. K. Aghara

Safeguards to Security• Change in the makeup of Non-State groups since the

1990’s▫Sustained motivations to cause devastating mass

destruction (organized)▫Significant resources: financial, material, and trained

(resourced)▫Permissive sanctuary for operations (networked)

•Opportunities to acquire nuclear weapons components and capabilities more pervasive▫Security of Russian weapon storage facilities imperfect ▫Large global inventory of nuclear material▫Nontraditional weapon designs and material

Nuclear Security

Threat Assessment:

“Over a hundred incidents of thefts and other unauthorized activities involving nuclear and radioactive material are reported to the [IAEA] every year.”

—Director General Yukiya Amano of the International Atomic Energy Agency

Prof. S. K. Aghara

Nuclear Security Incidents• NTI reports 1000s of nuclear smuggling incidents (~20

involving HEU or Pu) over past 20 yrs.▫Many more cases likely unreported or undetected

• Effective policy requires understanding the causes of lapses in security that, under different circumstances, could have been catastrophic:▫ Y-12 (U.S.) security breach (2012)▫ Pelindaba (South Africa) break-in (2007)▫ Kurchatov Institute (Russia) accounting problem (2001) ▫ Project Sapphire – 600 kgs of 90% percent U-235 (1998)▫ Aum Shinrikyo – religious cult, solicitation for nuclear weapons

and materials, Chemical Weapon (1995)▫ A. Q. Khan network – Al Qaeda and Iran; Proliferation and Illicit

Trafficking (1990 – 2001)

Prof. S. K. Aghara

Identify•Uranium Enrichment Facility▫ Individual earned a PhD in a foreign country and gained a

secret clearance▫Often seen in sensitive work areas taking notes and

collecting items▫Fellow employee saw secret documents in his home▫Suspicious managers move employee to less-sensitive

position▫Eventually family to home country for a vacation and

never returns▫Continued to ask employees for additional sensitive

information from home country

Insider Theft

Prof. S. K. Aghara

What is Nuclear Security?

•Deals with the prevention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear and other radioactive substances and associated facilities

Prof. S. K. Aghara

• Smuggled nuclear device ▫ Theft or purchase of nuclear weapon

• Improvised Nuclear Device (IND)▫ Fabricate a bomb using fissile material

• Radiological Dispersion Device▫ Crude Pu explosion

Nuclear Security - Risks

Barrier to nuclear terrorism ≠ Access (weapons or SQ of SNM)

INSSL: Integrated Nuclear Security and Safeguards

Threats (insiders/outsiders), Targets (materials, people, information), Pathways (where, when, how)

Threats (insiders/outsiders), Targets (materials, people, information), Pathways (where, when, how)

Prof. S. K. Aghara

INSSL: Integrated Nuclear Security and Safeguards

Prof. S. K. Aghara

Exercise 1 - Identify, Evaluate, Understand

Prof. S. K. Aghara

• Scenario: A shipment of nuclear warheads are loaded in a train and are being transported

• Blue Team – Goal is to transport the war heads safely. •Red Team – Goal is to acquire nuclear war heads for

nefarious purposes.•Anchor your discussions within your teams on:

Critical elements of security Vulnerabilities in security What are the potential threats Pathways to avoid these threats

Exercise 1 - Identify, Evaluate, Understand

Prof. S. K. Aghara

Exercise 1 - Discussions

•Observations▫Guards and gates▫Layered approach▫Sealed cargo - password protected

• Issues▫Large cargo▫Two person rule absent▫Central control▫All the guards in one car▫Too many people involved at a large weapons complex

Prof. S. K. Aghara

IAEA Nuclear Security Framework•There is no single international instrument that

addresses nuclear security in a comprehensive manner

•Legal foundation for nuclear security comprises of international instruments and recognized principles designed to control nuclear material and other radioactive substances

•Advance science and technology for interdiction and forensics

Prof. S. K. Aghara

State’s Nuclear Security Elements1. Legislative and regulatory framework

1. Agencies to enforce and implement

1. Security systems for prevention, detection and response to a nuclear security event

National detection strategy

Prof. S. K. Aghara

Nuclear Security Vocabulary

Prof. S. K. Aghara

Insider Threat

Categories of Nuclear Materials

Design Based Threat (DBT)

Sabotage

unauthorized access radioactive material transport

Nuclear Security Summit

Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources

Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

Nuclear Terrorism

Nuclear Forensics

Nuclear Fuel Cycle

Detection and Measurements

HEU

Nuclear Security Elements

Prevent Detect

RespondManageDamage

• Materials Control & Surveillance

• Human Reliability Programs▫ Insider Threat▫ Sabotage▫ Evaluate

• Material movement• Border Crossing• Post Detonation

• Radiation Protection

• Emergency Planning

• Law Enforcement

• Clean up & recovery• Forensics

Prof. S. K. Aghara

Exercise 2

Exercise 2 – 2 Minutes •Task:

1. List the sequence of events2. Identify agencies and titles3. List technically relevant items

Analysis and Information Management – Making Sense of it all

Prof. S. K. Aghara

Nuclear Security Detection Architecture

Prof. S. K. Aghara

Communications

Detection systems

intelligence agencies

systems of regulatory compliance

experts

Local response teams

national response teams

International engagement

law enforcement

ResponseResponse

AssessmentAssessmentAlerts & AlarmsAlerts & Alarms

Nuclear Security Detection Architecture

Prof. S. K. Aghara

CommunicationsLaw enforcement

Intelligence agencies

Systems of Regulatory Compliance

Experts

Local response teams

National response teams

International engagement

Detection systems

•Gap in demand vs. opportunities for nuclear security education and training▫100,000 professionals with responsibility for nuclear security (WINS study, 2013)

Multidisciplinary:• Scientific and Technical • Medical and Health Sciences• Social Sciences, Humanities, and

Law

Global Systems for Nuclear Security

It’s not just about technology – it’s about systems of systems

Detect – INSSL Research• Detector characterization• Autonomous Detection - Robotics• Material Accountancy• High resolution spectroscopy• Enrichment measurement• Pu mass measurement

Prof. S. K. Aghara

Information Management - – INSSL Research • Fuel Cycle Analysis▫ Isotope inventory▫ Thorium cycle

• Technology Evaluation▫ Pyroprocessing▫ Enrichment

• Nuclear analytical techniques▫Nondestructive inspection

Prof. S. K. Aghara

Education & Training – INSSL Activities• Education

• Fundaments of Nuclear Security and Safeguards• Weapons of Mass Destruction• Nuclear Fuel Cycle• Threat Assessment and Risk Management• Nuclear Instrumentation• Safeguards Approaches and Verification Techniques

• Training• Workshops• Certificate programs• Summer programs• Professional Development Courses (PDC)

Prof. S. K. Aghara

Education & Training – INSSL Activities

Hands-on – INSSL Activities1. High-Resolution Gamma-Ray Spectroscopy with HPGe detectors

Semiconductor gamma-ray detection is introduced and students compare HPGe resolution to NaI detector resolution

2. Determine Enrichment quantitiesBy measuring peak areas of U and Pu samples with high resolution gamma spectroscopy, calculate ratios for various energy lines and identify samples by their enrichment characteristics

3. Determine Mass of PuBy measuring sample with high resolution spectroscopy and recording the peak areas and sample dimensions, calculate the efficiency of the sample and the mass of Pu.

Prof. S. K. Aghara

Take Away•There is a growing demand for employees with

nuclear security training and education▫Limited scope for a dedicated programs

•Cross-disciplinary programs designed with international prospective are vital for developing a global nuclear security community

Prof. S. K. Aghara

Questions?

Prof. S. K. Aghara