A.M. No. RTJ-02-1743 July 11, 2006 ATTY. ERNESTO C. JACINTO, complainant, vs. JUDGE LYDIA Q. LAYOSA AND CLERK III CHERYL BUENAVENTURA, respondents. D E C I S I O N SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: In a sworn letter-complaint 1 dated August 7, 1999 filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), complainant Atty. Ernesto C. Jacinto charged respondents Judge Lydia Q. Layosa of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 217, Quezon City, and Cheryl Buenaventura, Clerk III, of the same court, with infidelity in the custody of public documents and/or gross neglect of duty. Complainant alleged in his letter-complaint that he is plaintiff's counsel in Civil Case No. Q-95-23426, "REYNALDO P. MARTIN versus MRS. RAQUEL U. AQUINO and HUSBAND," raffled to the RTC, Branch 217, Quezon City. It was Judge Gil P. Fernandez, Sr. (now deceased) who was then the Presiding Judge. The records of the case did not get lost. When Judge Fernandez, Sr. died, Judge Demetrio B. Macapagal, Sr. replaced him. The records of the same case did not also get lost. However, when respondent Judge Layosa was appointed Presiding Judge of the same court, the entire records of the case "disappeared" as shown by the May 14 2 and June 1, 1999 3 Orders issued by her, thus: (1) May 14, 1999 Order: The records of this case had been reported missing by the Branch Clerk of Court and despite efforts exerted to locate it, said records could not be found. Accordingly, let a conference be held on May 24, 1999 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, for the purpose of reconstituting the same from available documents in counsel's possession." (2) June 1, 1999 Order: By agreement of the parties, let the conference for the reconstitution of the records in this case be reset on July 14, 1999 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning. Meanwhile, the continuation of trial set for today is hereby suspended. Complainant further alleged that both respondents are guilty as charged. On September 10, 1999, 4 then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo referred the letter-complaint to respondent judge for her comment within ten days from notice. She admitted therein 5 that Civil Case No. Q-95- 23426 was among the pending cases turned over to her when she assumed her duties in the RTC on November 26, 1997. She, however, submitted that she cannot be held responsible for the loss of the case records because: (a) she has not been remiss in the performance of her duties and responsibilities; (b) she has been conducting the required inventory of cases pursuant to the Circulars of this Court, and; (c) she has always been giving instructions to her staff to take precautionary measures in safekeeping the records. Moreover, when respondent Cheryl L. Buenaventura, in charge of civil cases, verbally informed her that the records of the case are missing, she immediately directed Atty. Flosie Fanlo, then branch clerk of court, to immediately take appropriate action. On May 14, 1999, she issued an Order calling the parties' counsel for a conference on May 24, 1999 for the purpose of reconstituting the missing records. On June 1, 1999, both opposing counsel appeared. Upon respondent judge's directive, the defendant's counsel promised to submit the duplicate copies of the records in his possession. On July 14, 1999, during the scheduled hearing for the reconstitution of the missing records, only defendant's counsel appeared and submitted his copies of the records of the case. On August 10, 1999, complainant filed an "Opposition and Motion for Reconsideration" of the July 14, 1999 Order which was granted by respondent judge. At this point, there is no showing whether he submitted to the court any record in his files. Respondent judge emphasized that she did not only take immediate steps to reconstitute the missing records of the case, but she also requested the assistance of then Court Administrator Benipayo 6 who, in turn, requested the National Bureau of Investigation to investigate the matter. 7 On January 19, 2000, respondent Buenaventura filed her Comment 8 alleging that she is in charge of civil cases. On April 12, 1999, she noticed that the records of Civil Case No. Q- 95-23426 were missing. The logbook showed that the case was last heard on March 2, 1999. When the last Order was mailed on March 8, 1999, she transmitted the records to the branch clerk of court. She insisted that those records were kept inside the filing cabinet and nobody borrowed them from her. She admitted though that the lock of the filing cabinet does not work. Lastly, she alleged that the missing records have been reconstituted. On August 13, 2001, respondent judge filed with this Court a "Motion for Early Resolution" 9 alleging, among others, that during the hearing of the case on May 9, 2000, both counsels failed to appear despite due notice. Hence, she issued an Order dismissing the complaint and the counterclaim. In his Report, 10 then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. 11 found both respondents liable for the loss of the records; and that respondent judge failed to supervise her personnel to ensure efficiency. He recommended that they be ordered to pay a fine in the amount of P 5,000.00 each, with a stern warning that commission of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely, thus: EVALUATION: In the absence of any direct evidence pointing responsibility to any of the respondents relative to the loss of the records of Civil Case No. Q-95- 23426, the persons responsible for their
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A.M. No. RTJ-02-1743 July 11, 2006ATTY. ERNESTO C. JACINTO, complainant, vs.JUDGE LYDIA Q. LAYOSA AND CLERK III CHERYL BUENAVENTURA, respondents.D E C I S I O NSANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:In a sworn letter-complaint1 dated August 7, 1999 filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), complainant Atty. Ernesto C. Jacinto charged respondents Judge Lydia Q. Layosa of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 217, Quezon City, and Cheryl Buenaventura, Clerk III, of the same court, with infidelity in the custody of public documents and/or gross neglect of duty.Complainant alleged in his letter-complaint that he is plaintiff's counsel in Civil Case No. Q-95-23426, "REYNALDO P. MARTIN versus MRS. RAQUEL U. AQUINO and HUSBAND," raffled to the RTC, Branch 217, Quezon City. It was Judge Gil P. Fernandez, Sr. (now deceased) who was then the Presiding Judge. The records of the case did not get lost.When Judge Fernandez, Sr. died, Judge Demetrio B. Macapagal, Sr. replaced him. The records of the same case did not also get lost.However, when respondent Judge Layosa was appointed Presiding Judge of the same court, the entire records of the case "disappeared" as shown by the May 142 and June 1, 19993 Orders issued by her, thus:
(1) May 14, 1999 Order:The records of this case had been reported missing by the Branch Clerk of Court and despite efforts exerted to locate it, said records could not be found.Accordingly, let a conference be held on May 24, 1999 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, for the purpose of reconstituting the same from available documents in counsel's possession."(2) June 1, 1999 Order:By agreement of the parties, let the conference for the reconstitution of the records in this case be reset on July 14, 1999 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.Meanwhile, the continuation of trial set for today is hereby suspended.
Complainant further alleged that both respondents are guilty as charged.On September 10, 1999,4 then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo referred the letter-complaint to respondent judge for her comment within ten days from notice. She admitted therein5 that Civil Case No. Q-95-23426 was among the pending cases turned over to her when she assumed her duties in the RTC on November 26, 1997.She, however, submitted that she cannot be held responsible for the loss of the case records because: (a) she has not been remiss in the performance of her duties and responsibilities; (b) she has been conducting the required inventory of cases pursuant to the Circulars of this Court, and; (c) she has always been giving instructions to her staff to take precautionary measures in safekeeping the records.Moreover, when respondent Cheryl L. Buenaventura, in charge of civil cases, verbally informed her that the records of the case are missing, she immediately directed Atty. Flosie Fanlo, then branch clerk of court, to immediately take appropriate action.On May 14, 1999, she issued an Order calling the parties' counsel for a conference on May 24, 1999 for the purpose of reconstituting the missing records.On June 1, 1999, both opposing counsel appeared. Upon respondent judge's directive, the defendant's counsel promised to submit the duplicate copies of the records in his possession.On July 14, 1999, during the scheduled hearing for the reconstitution of the missing records, only defendant's counsel appeared and submitted his copies of the records of the case.On August 10, 1999, complainant filed an "Opposition and Motion for Reconsideration" of the July 14, 1999 Order which was granted by respondent judge. At this point, there is no showing whether he submitted to the court any record in his files.Respondent judge emphasized that she did not only take immediate steps to reconstitute the missing records of the case, but she also requested the assistance of then Court Administrator Benipayo6 who, in turn, requested the National Bureau of Investigation to investigate the matter.7
On January 19, 2000, respondent Buenaventura filed her Comment8
alleging that she is in charge of civil cases. On April 12, 1999, she noticed that the records of Civil Case No. Q-95-23426 were missing. The logbook showed that the case was last heard on March 2, 1999. When the last Order was mailed on March 8, 1999, she transmitted the records to the branch clerk of court. She insisted that those records were kept inside the filing cabinet and nobody borrowed them from her. She admitted though that the lock of the filing cabinet
does not work. Lastly, she alleged that the missing records have been reconstituted.On August 13, 2001, respondent judge filed with this Court a "Motion for Early Resolution"9 alleging, among others, that during the hearing of the case on May 9, 2000, both counsels failed to appear despite due notice. Hence, she issued an Order dismissing the complaint and the counterclaim.In his Report,10 then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.11
found both respondents liable for the loss of the records; and that respondent judge failed to supervise her personnel to ensure efficiency. He recommended that they be ordered to pay a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 each, with a stern warning that commission of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely, thus:
EVALUATION: In the absence of any direct evidence pointing responsibility to any of the respondents relative to the loss of the records of Civil Case No. Q-95-23426, the persons responsible for their safekeeping should be held accountable and they are the Branch Clerk of Court, who is in charge of the recording, filing, and management of court records as well as the Clerk-in-charge of civil cases to whom such task was delegated by the Branch Clerk of Court. Since Atty. Flosie F. Fanlo has already transferred to another branch of the government, she is already outside of the Courts administrative jurisdiction.Respondent Cheryl Buenaventura, as the clerk-in-charge of civil cases is undoubtedly the person who has custody of the lost records and the one primarily responsible therefor. As the person in charge of the records of civil cases, respondent Buenaventura should have devised means to safeguard the records given the limited resources at her disposal as well as the defective filing cabinet. x x xAlthough no motive to conceal, destroy or otherwise profit from the loss of such records was imputed and proved against respondent Buenaventura, it cannot be denied that the records were lost while under her custody and she should be held responsible thereof.On the other hand, it is the duty of the respondent judge to closely supervise her employees. Civil Case No. 95-23426 was one of the records of pending cases turned over to her by her Clerk of Court. She admitted that she did not know what happened to said record until it was reported to her by Mrs. Buenaventura on April 13, 1999 that it was missing. Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires every judge to organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of its business, and which requires further at all times the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity. (Fernandez v. Imbing, 260 SCRA 586).Judges should not tolerate the neglect of court employees.RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted to the Hon. Court our recommendation.1. that the administrative case against Atty. Flosie F. Fanlo, Ma. Cecilia A. Flores, Naomi Paden, Tonette S. Manjuco-Salamanca, Ramona Adduro, Elizabeth Sugcang, Carmen Labsan, Reynaldo Madelaria, Reynaldo Manahan, Maritoni Oning, serafin Corral and Josephine Fernandez be DISMISSED for lack of merit;2. that the administrative case against respondent judge Lydia Q. Layosa and Cheryl Buenaventura be REDOCKETED as a regular administrative matter;3. that Judge Layosa and Buenaventura be ordered to pay a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 each, with a STERN WARNING that commission of a similar act would be dealt with more severely.
In our Resolution12 dated November 25, 2002, we ordered that this case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and required the parties to manifest, within twenty (20) days from notice, whether they are submitting the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings and records filed.On January 15, 2003, both respondents submitted their respective Manifestations,13 with prayer that a hearing be conducted to enable them to present evidence in support of their defenses.On February 10, 2003, this Court issued a Resolution referring to OCA respondents' Manifestations for evaluation, report and recommendation.14
Upon recommendation of then Deputy Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock,15 this administrative case was referred to the Court of Appeals for investigation and report within sixty (60) days from notice.On February 10, 2004, Associate Justice Rebecca de Guia-Salvador of the Court of Appeals submitted to this Court her Report and Recommendation, partly reproduced as follows:
As the personnel directly charged with the safekeeping of case records of civil cases pending in the sala, (page 55, ibid.) however, respondent Buenaventura was manifestly negligent for not taking the necessary precautionary/safety measures required by the sorry state of said filing cabinets. The conduct and behavior of every person connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowest clerk is circumscribed with a heavy burden of responsibility (Araza vs. Garcia, 325 SCRA 1, 9-10) in order to maintain public confidence in the judiciary (Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in RTC, Branch 82, Odiongan, Romblon, 292 SCRA 1,7). Public officers are accountable for their actuations at all times and must perform their duties well. (Solid Bank Corp. v. Capoon, Jr., 289 SCRA 9, 14.Neither can respondent judge evade liability for negligence under the factual circumstances of the case. The measures she interposed as proof positive of due diligence – reporting the incident to the Court Administrator and requesting investigation thereon, (p. 25; Exhibit "3", p. 241, Rollo) directing her staff to adopt safety measures in the custody of records, (Exhibit "6", p. 238, ibid.) and requesting for repairs and/or replacement of the defective cabinets (p.5, TSN, January 23, 2004) – all appear to have been adopted only after the discovery of the loss of the case record of Civil Case No. Q-95-23426 on April 12, 1999. Quite significantly, it was not until July 22, 1999 or until the loss of the case record of Civil Case Q-97-32929 that respondent judge made the aforesaid report/request to the Court Administrator.While it is concededly the Branch Clerk of Court who has control and supervision over all court records, exhibits, documents, properties and supplies within said branch, he is nevertheless subject to the control and supervision of the Presiding Judge. (Yaranon v. Rulloda, 242 SCRA 522, 528.) A judge is tasked with the administrative supervision over his personnel and he should always see to it that his orders are promptly enforced and that case records are properly stored. (Belen v. Soriano, 240 SCRA 298, 301) It is, therefore, incumbent upon the judge to see to it that the personnel of the court perform their duties well and to call the attention of the clerk of court when they fail to do so. (Ang Kek Chen v. Andrade, 318 SCRA 11, 20-21.)RecommendationPREMISES CONSIDERED, it is recommended that both respondent judge and respondent Buenaventura be ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00 each, with a STERN WARNING that a similar non-observance of the due care required by their positions will be dealt with more severely.
We agree with Justice Salvador that both respondents are negligent; and that respondent judge failed in her duty to see to it that her personnel perform their duties well. Such conduct on their part constitutes misconduct. 16
Misconduct is "a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer." The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be proved by substantial evidence. Otherwise, the misconduct is only simple.17 Records fail to indicate that those additional elements are present here.We, therefore, find both respondents guilty of simple misconduct.As the clerk in charge of civil cases, respondent Buenaventura's duties include conducting periodic docket inventory and ensuring that the records of each case are accounted for. Her insistence that the missing records were kept inside the filing cabinet and that she handled them with due care does not convince us. On the contrary, she failed to take appropriate steps and devise means to keep the records, taking into consideration the defective condition of the filing cabinet. Clearly, she was negligent.On the part of respondent judge, considering her administrative authority over her personnel, she should have directed them, especially those in charge of safekeeping the records, to be diligent in the performance of their duties and should have closely monitored the flow of her cases.Judges are charged with exercising extra care in ensuring that the records of the cases and official documents in their custody are intact. They must adopt a system of record management and organize their dockets in order to bolster the prompt and efficient dispatch of business.18 There is no justification for missing records save fortuitous events.19
With respect to the imposition of penalty, the Revised Rules of Court provides that simple misconduct is classified as a less serious charge,20 punishable by suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for not less than one month nor more than three months; or a fine of more than P10,000.00, but not exceeding P20,000.00.21
It appearing that this is the first administrative offense committed by respondent judge; that she has worked in the judiciary for more than 20 years; and that no bad faith may be attributed to her, these circumstances may be considered mitigating. Hence, a fine of P5,000.00 is in order.As to the penalty imposable upon respondent Buenaventura, under the Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1999 (Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service), simple misconduct is classified as a less grave offense,22
punishable by suspension of one month and one day to six months. Respondent is likewise a first offender, and that no taint of bad faith can be discerned from her actuations. Thus a suspension of twenty one days from office without salary is considered justified.WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Lydia Q. Layosa and respondent Cheryl Buenaventura are declared guilty of simple misconduct. Judge Layosa is FINED in the sum of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), while respondent Buenaventura is SUSPENDED from office for twenty-one days without pay. They are WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar infraction will be dealt with more severely.SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6697 July 25, 2006ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, complainant, vs.ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA, respondent.x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xBar Matter No. 1227 July 25, 2006RE: OATH-TAKING OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA, INCOMING PRESIDENT OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xA.M. No. 05-5-15-SC July 25, 2006IN THE MATTER OF THE REMOVAL OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA FROM THE IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS AS EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND GOVERNOR.IN THE MATTER OF THE LETTER-COMPLAINT OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA DATED MAY 18, 2005 TO FORTHWITH DENY/DISAPPROVE THE IBP RESOLUTION UNJUSTLY, ILLEGALLY, ARBITRARILY, AND ABRUPTLY REMOVING HIM FROM THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE IBP FOR ABSOLUTE LACK OF BASIS AND FOR FLAGRANT DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS.D E C I S I O NPer Curiam:Before Us are three consolidated cases revolving around Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Governor and Executive Vice-President (EVP) Atty. Leonard de Vera. The first pertains to a disbarment case questioning Atty. de Vera's moral fitness to remain as a member of the Philippine Bar, the second refers to Atty. de Vera's letter-request to schedule his oath taking as IBP National President, and the third case concerns the validity of his removal as Governor and EVP of the IBP by the IBP Board. The resolution of these cases will determine the national presidency of the IBP for the term 2005-2007.A.C. No. 6697The Office of the Bar Confidant, which this Court tasked to make an investigation, report and recommendation on subject case,1
summarized the antecedents thereof as follows:In a Complaint dated 11 April 2005, complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez moved for the suspension and/or disbarment of respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera based on the following grounds:
1) respondent's alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order rendered against him by the State Bar of California; and2) respondent's alleged violation of the so-called "rotation rule" enunciated in Administrative Matter No. 491 dated 06 October 1989 (in the Matter: 1989 IBP Elections).
Complainant averred that the respondent, in appropriating for his own benefit funds due his client, was found to have performed an act constituting moral turpitude by the Hearing Referee Bill Dozier, Hearing Department – San Francisco, State Bar of California in Administrative Case No. 86-0-18429. Complainant alleged that the respondent was then forced to resign or surrender his license to practice law in the said state in order to evade the recommended three (3) year suspension. Complainant asserted that the respondent lacks the moral competence necessary to lead the country's most noble profession.Complainant, likewise, contended that the respondent violated the so-called "rotation rule" provided for in
Administrative Matter No. 491 when he transferred to IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter. He claimed that the respondent failed to meet the requirements outlined in the IBP By-Laws pertaining to transfer of Chapter Membership. He surmised that the respondent's transfer was intended only for the purpose of becoming the next IBP National President. Complainant prayed that the respondent be enjoined from assuming office as IBP National President.Meanwhile, in his Comment dated 2 May 2005, respondent stated that the issues raised in above-mentioned Complaint were the very issues raised in an earlier administrative case filed by the same complainant against him. In fact, according to him, the said issues were already extensively discussed and categorically ruled upon by this Court in its Decision dated 11 December 2005 in Administrative Case No. 6052 (In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard De Vera). Respondent prayed that the instant administrative complaint be dismissed following the principle of res judicata.On 15 June 2005, both parties appeared before the Office of the Bar Confidant for presentation of evidence in support of their respective allegations.Subsequently, in a Memorandum dated 20 June 2005, complainant maintained that there is substantial evidence showing respondent's moral baseness, vileness and depravity, which could be used as a basis for his disbarment. Complainant stressed that the respondent never denied that he used his client's money. Complainant argued that the respondent failed to present evidence that the Supreme Court of California accepted the latter's resignation and even if such was accepted, complainant posited that this should not absolve the respondent from liability.Moreover, complainant added that the principle of res judicata would not apply in the case at bar. He asserted that the first administrative case filed against the respondent was one for his disqualification. x x x.
Bar Matter No. 1227A.M. No. 05-5-15-SCAs earlier adverted to, Bar Matter No. 1227 refers to Atty. de Vera's letter-request to this Court to schedule his oath taking as IBP National President. A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, on the other hand, is a letter-report dated 19 May 2005 of IBP National President Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz (IBP President Cadiz) furnishing this Court with the IBP's Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, removing Atty. De Vera as member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP, for committing acts inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP in general.2
The controversy in Bar Matter No. 1227 and A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC arose from the regular meeting of the IBP Board of Governors held on 14 January 2005. In said meeting, by 2/3 vote (6 voting in favor and 2 against), the IBP Board approved the withdrawal of the Petition filed before this Court docketed as "Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, et al. vs. Senate of the Philippines, et al. – Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, SC-R165108." The Petition was intended to question the legality and/or constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9227, authorizing the increase in the salaries of judges and justices, and to increase filing fees.3
The two IBP Governors who opposed the said Resolution approving the withdrawal of the above-described Petition were herein respondent Governor and EVP de Vera and Governor Carlos L. Valdez.4
On 19 January 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed this Court of the decision taken by the IBP Board to withdraw the afore-mentioned Petition. Attached to his letter was a copy of the IBP Board's 14 January 2005 Resolution.5
On 15 April 2005, Bar Matter No. 1227, pertaining to Atty. de Vera's request for oathtaking as National President, was filed. The same was subsequently consolidated with A.C. No. 6697, the disbarment case filed against Atty. de Vera.6
On 22 April 2005, a plenary session was held at the 10th National IBP Convention at the CAP-Camp John Hay Convention Center, Baguio City. It was at this forum where Atty. de Vera allegedly made some untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies in connection with the IBP Board's Resolution to withdraw the Petition questioning the legality of Republic Act No. 9227.7
On 10 May 2005, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining Atty. de Vera from assuming office as IBP National President.8
On 12 May 2005, IBP Gov. Romulo A. Rivera wrote IBP National President Cadiz a letter wherein he prayed for the removal of Atty. de
Vera as member of the IBP Board for having committed acts which were inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP.9
On 13 May 2005, in the 20th Regular Meeting of the Board held at the Waterfront Hotel, Cebu City, the IBP Board, by 2/3 vote, resolved to remove Atty. de Vera as member of the IBP Board of Governors and as IBP Executive Vice President.10 Quoted hereunder is the dispositive portion of said Resolution:
NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, that Governor Leonard S. de Vera is REMOVED as a member of the IBP Board of Governors and Executive Vice President for committing acts inimical to the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP, to wit:
1. For making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies in public about the Supreme Court and members of the IBP Board of Governors, during the Plenary Session of the IBP 10th National Convention of Lawyers, held at CAP-Camp John Hay Convention Center on 22 April 2005, making it appear that the decision of the IBP Board of Governors to withdraw the PETITION docketed as "Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, et al. vs. The Senate of the Philippines, et al., Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer for the Issuance of A Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, S.C.-R. 165108", was due to influence and pressure from the Supreme Court of the Philippines;2. For making said untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies that brought the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP as a whole in public contempt and disrepute;3. For violating Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers which mandates that "A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others", by making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies during the Plenary Session of the IBP 10th National Convention of Lawyers in Baguio City;4. For instigating and provoking some IBP chapters to embarrass and humiliate the IBP Board of Governors in order to coerce and compel the latter to pursue the aforesaid PETITION;5. For falsely accusing the IBP National President, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, during the Plenary Session of the 10th National Convention in Baguio City of withholding from him a copy of Supreme Court Resolution, dated 25 January 2005, granting the withdrawal of the PETITION, thereby creating the wrong impression that the IBP National President deliberately prevented him from taking the appropriate remedies with respect thereto, thus compromising the reputation and integrity of the IBP National President and the IBP as a whole.11
On 18 May 2005, Atty. de Vera aired his sentiments to this Court by writing the then Hon. Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. a letter captioned as "Urgent Plea to Correct a Glaring Injustice of the IBP Board of Governors; Vehement Protest to the Board Resolution Abruptly Removing Atty. Leonard de Vera from the Board of Governors in Patent Violation of Due Process; Petition to Deny/Disapprove the Completely Unjustified and Highly Arbitrary Resolution Precipitately Ousting Atty. de Vera from the Board of Governors in Less Than Twenty Four (24) Hours from Notice and Judgment Without Formal Investigation."12
In the said letter, Atty. de Vera strongly and categorically denied having committed acts inimical to the IBP and its Board. He alleged that on the basis of an unverified letter-complaint filed by IBP Governor Rivera, the IBP Board voted to expel him posthaste, without just cause and in complete disregard of even the minimum standards of due process. Pertinent portions of his letter read:
It is evident that the Board of Governors has committed a grave and serious injustice against me especially when, as the incumbent Executive Vice President of the IBP, I am scheduled to assume my position as National President of the IBP on July 1, 2005. x x xI was denied the very basic rights of due process recognized by the Supreme Court even in administrative cases:
1. The denial of the right to answer the charges formally or in writing. The complaint against me was in writing.2. The denial of the right to answer the charges within a reasonable period of time after receipt of the complaint.3. The denial of the right to a fair hearing.4. The denial of the right to confront the accuser and the witnesses against me. I challenged Gov. Rivera to testify under oath so I could question him. He refused. I offered to testify under oath so I could be questioned. My request was denied.5. The denial of my right to present witnesses on my behalf.6. The denial of my right to an impartial judge. Governor Rivera was my accuser, prosecutor, and judge all at the same time.7. Gov. Rivera's prejudgment of my case becomes even more evident because when his motion to expel me was lost in a 5-3 votes (due to his inhibition to vote), Gov. Rivera asked for another round of voting so he can vote to support his own complaint and motion to expel me.13 (Emphasis and underscoring in original.)
On 27 May 2005, the IBP Board responded to the 18 May 2005 letter of Atty. de Vera.14 In their Reply, the IBP Board explained to this Court that their decision to remove Atty. de Vera was based on valid grounds and was intended to protect itself from a recalcitrant member. Among the grounds cited and elucidated by the IBP Board were the following:
(i) Atty. de Vera engaged himself in a negative media campaign and solicited resolutions from IBP Chapters to condemn the IBP Board of Governors for its decision to withdraw the Petition, all with the end in view of compelling or coercing the IBP Board of Governors to reconsider the decision to withdraw the Petition.(ii) Atty. de Vera embarrassed, humiliated and maligned the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP National President in public or during the Plenary Session at the 10th National Convention of Lawyers.(iii) Rather than pacify the already agitated 'solicited' speakers (at the plenary session), Atty. de Vera "fanned the fire", so to speak, and went to the extent of making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies about the Supreme Court and some members of the IBP Board of Governors. He deliberately and intentionally did so to provoke the members of the IBP Board of Governors to engage him in an acrimonious public debate and expose the IBP Board of Governors to public ridicule.(iv) Atty. de Vera uttered untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies, e.g., that some of the members of the IBP Board of Governors voted in favor of the withdrawal of the petition (without mentioning names) because "nakakahiya kasi sa Supreme Court, nakakaawa kasi ang Supreme Court, kasi may mga kaibigan tayo sa Court." He made it appear that the IBP Board of Governors approved the resolution, withdrawing the petition, due to "influence" or "pressure" from the Supreme Court.15
The IBP Board explained that Atty. de Vera's actuation during the Plenary Session was "the last straw that broke the camel's back." He committed acts inimical to the interest of the IBP Board and the IBP; hence, the IBP Board decided to remove him.On 3 June 2005, Atty. de Vera furnished the Court with copies of resolutions and a position paper coming from various IBP Chapters all condemning his expulsion from the IBP Board and as IBP EVP.16
On 15 June 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed Chief Justice Davide that in a special meeting of the IBP Board held at the EDSA Shangri-la Plaza on 13 June 2005, the IBP Board took note of the vacancy in the position of the IBP EVP brought about by Atty. de Vera's removal. In his stead, IBP Governor Pura Angelica Y. Santiago was formally elected and declared as IBP EVP.17
On 17 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested against the election of Atty. Santiago.18 On 20 June 2005, Atty. Santiago voluntarily relinquished the EVP position through a letter addressed to the IBP Board.19 Thus, on 25 June 2005, during its last regular meeting, the IBP Board elected a new EVP in the person of IBP Governor Jose Vicente B. Salazar to replace Atty. Santiago.On 28 June 2005, IBP National President Cadiz, through a letter addressed to Chief Justice Davide, reported to this Court Atty. Salazar's election.20 IBP National President Cadiz also requested, among other things, that Atty. Salazar's election be approved and that he be allowed to assume as National President in the event that Atty. de Vera is disbarred or suspended from the practice of law or should
his removal from the 2003-2005 Board of Governors and as EVP is approved by this Court.21 Also on 28 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested the election of Atty. Salazar.22
In his Extended Comment23 dated 25 July 2005, Atty. de Vera maintained that there was absolutely no factual or legal basis to sustain the motion to remove him from the IBP Board because he violated no law. He argued that if the basis for his removal as EVP was based on the same grounds as his removal from the IBP Board, then his removal as EVP was likewise executed without due notice and without the least compliance with the minimum standards of due process of law.Atty. de Vera strongly averred that, contrary to the utterly false and malicious charges filed against him, the speakers at the Plenary Session of the Baguio Convention, although undeniably impassioned and articulate, were respectful in their language and exhortations, not once undermining the stature of the IBP in general and the IBP Board of Governors in particular. He posited that speaking in disagreement with the Resolution of the Board during the Convention's Plenary Session is not a valid cause to remove or expel a duly-elected member of the IBP Board of Governors; and the decision to remove him only shows that the right to freedom of speech or the right to dissent is not recognized by the incumbent IBP Board.Anent the charges that he accused the National President of withholding a copy of this Court's Resolution granting the withdrawal of the Petition questioning the legality of Republic Act No. 9227, Atty. de Vera avowed that he made no such remarks. As regards the election of a new IBP EVP, Atty. de Vera contended that the said election was illegal as it was contrary to the provisions of the IBP By-Laws concerning national officers, to wit:
Section. 49. Term of office. - The President and the Executive Vice President shall hold office for a term of two years from July 1 following their election until 30 June of their second year in office and until their successors shall have been duly chosen and qualified.In the event the President is absent or unable to act, his functions and duties shall be performed by the Executive Vice President, and in the event of death, resignation, or removal of the President, the Executive Vice President shall serve as Acting President for the unexpired portion of the term. In the event of death, resignation, removal or disability of both the President and the Executive Vice President, the Board of Governors shall elect an Acting President to hold office for the unexpired portion of the term or during the period of disability.Unless otherwise provided in these By-Laws, all other officers and employees appointed by the President with the consent of the Board shall hold office at the pleasure of the Board or for such term as the Board may fix.24
To bolster his position, Atty. de Vera stressed that when both the President and the EVP die, resign, are removed, or are disabled, the IBP By-Laws only provides for the election of an Acting President and that no mention for an election for EVP was made. Thus, when such election for EVP occurs, such is contrary to the express provision of the IBP By-Laws.Atty. de Vera also argued that even if he were validly removed as IBP EVP, his replacement should come from Eastern Mindanao and not from any other region, due to the Rotation Rule embodied in par. 2, Section 47, Article VII of the IBP By-Laws.In response to Atty. de Vera's averments, the 2003-2005 IBP Board, through its counsel, submitted a Reply dated 27 January 2006 and clarified as follows:
(i) The IBP Board of Governors is vested with sufficient power and authority to protect itself from an intractable member by virtue of Article VI, Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws;(ii) Atty. de Vera was removed as a member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP not because of his disagreement with the IBP Board's position but because of the various acts that he committed which the IBP Board determined to be inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP as a whole;(iii) Atty. de Vera cannot exculpate himself from liability by invoking his constitutional right to Free Speech because, as a member of the Bar, it is his sworn duty to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and to insist on similar conduct by others;(iv) The IBP Board, in effecting the removal of Atty. de Vera, observed the fundamental principles of due process. As the records would bear, Atty. de Vera was duly notified of the Regular Meeting of the IBP Board held on 13 May 2004; was furnished a copy of Governor Rivera's Letter-Complaint the day before the said meeting; was furnished a copy of the said Meeting's Agenda; and was allowed to personally defend himself and his accuser, Gov. Rivera;
(v) Atty. de Vera was validly removed because the required number of votes under Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws to remove Atty. de Vera as a member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP was duly complied with;(vi) Atty. de Vera's replacement as IBP EVP need not come from Eastern Mindanao Region because: (a) the rotation rule under Article VII, Section 47, par. 2 of the IBP By-Laws had already been complied with when Atty. de Vera, who hails from Eastern Mindanao, was elected IBP EVP; and (b) the rotation rule need not be enforced if the same will not be practicable, possible, feasible, doable or viable; and, finally, that –(vii) Atty. Salazar was validly elected as IBP EVP and, thus, should now be allowed to take his oath as IBP National President.25
The Court's RulingAC No. 6697In his Memorandum26 dated 20 June 2005, complainant tendered the following issues for the consideration of the Court:
I.WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DEVERA (sic) COMMITED MALPRACTICE WHICH AMOUNTED TO MORAL T[U]RPITUDE IN THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA AND IN THE PHILIPPINES, IN THE COURSE OF HIS PRACTICE OF LAW.II.WHETHER OR NOT THE OATH OF OFFICE AS LAWYER IS ATTACHED TO THE PERSON OF ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DEVERA (sic) WHEREVER HE MAY GO AND NOT NECESSARILY BOUND BY THE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE PHILIPPINES.III.WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE MORAL T[U]RPITUDE, AS BASIS FOR DISBARMENT OF RESPONDENT IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING.IV.WHETHER OR NOT RES JUDICATA APPLIES IN THIS CASE, DUE TO ADMIN. CASE NO. [6052]27
The disposition of the first three related issues hinges on the resolution of the fourth issue. Consequently, we will start with the last issue.A.C. No. 6052 is not a bar to the filing of the present administrative case.In disposing of the question of res judicata, the Bar Confidant opined:
To reiterate, the instant case for suspension and/or disbarment against respondent Leonard De Vera is grounded on the following:
1) respondent's alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order rendered against him by the State Bar in California; and2) respondent's alleged violation of the so-called "rotation rule" enunciated in Administrative Matter No. 491 dated 06 October 1989 (In the Matter: 1989 IBP Elections).
It appears that the complainant already raised the said issues in an earlier administrative case against the respondent. Verily, these issues were already argued upon by the parties in their respective pleadings, and discussed and ruled upon by this Court in its Decision dated 11 December 2003 in Administrative Matter No. 6052 (In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard de Vera).As such, with respect to the first issue, this Court held that:
"As for the administrative complaint filed against him by one of his clients when he was practicing law in California, which in turn compelled him to surrender his California license to practice law, he maintains that it cannot serve as basis for determining his moral qualification (or lack of it) to run for the position he is aspiring for. He explains that there is as yet no final judgment finding him guilty of the administrative charge, as the records relied upon by the petitioners are mere preliminary findings of a hearing referee which are recommendatory findings of an IBP Commissioner on Bar Discipline which are subject to the review of and the final decision of the Supreme Court. He also stresses that the complainant in the California administrative case has retracted the accusation that he
misappropriated the complainant's money, but unfortunately the retraction was not considered by the investigating officer. xxx""On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera while he was still practicing law in California, he explained that no final judgment was rendered by the California Supreme Court finding him guilty of the charge. He surrendered his license to protest the discrimination he suffered at the hands of the investigator and he found it impractical to pursue the case to the end. We find these explanations satisfactory in the absence of contrary proof. It is a basic rule on evidence that he who alleges a fact has the burden to prove the same. In this case, the petitioners have not shown how the administrative complaint affects respondent De Vera's moral fitness to run for governor.
On the other hand, as regards the second issue:"Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post because he is not really from Eastern Mindanao. His place of residence is in Parañaque and he was originally a member of the PPLM IBP Chapter. He only changed his IBP Chapter membership to pave the way for his ultimate goal of attaining the highest IBP post, which is the national presidency. Petitioners aver that in changing his IBP membership, respondent De Vera violated the domicile rule.The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section 19, Article II, a lawyer included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court can register with the particular IBP Chapter of his preference or choice, thus:xxxIt is clearly stated in the aforequoted section of the By-Laws that it is not automatic that a lawyer will become a member of the chapter where his place of residence or work is located. He has the discretion to choose the particular chapter where he wishes to gain membership. Only when he does not register his preference that he will become a member of the Chapter of the place where he resides or maintains office. The only proscription in registering one's preference is that a lawyer cannot be a member of more than one chapter at the same time.The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. In fact, under this Section, transfer of IBP membership is allowed as long as the lawyer complies with the conditions set forth therein, thus:xxxThe only condition required under the foregoing rule is that the transfer must be made not less than three months prior to the election of officers in the chapter to which the lawyer wishes to transfer.In the case at bar, respondent De Vera requested the transfer of his IBP membership to Agusan del Sur on 1 August 2001. One month thereafter, IBP National Secretary Jaime M. Vibar wrote a letter addressed to Atty. Amador Z. Tolentino, Jr., Secretary of IBP PPLM Chapter and Atty. Lyndon J. Romero, Secretary of IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter, informing them of respondent de Vera's transfer and advising them to make the necessary notation in their respective records. This letter is a substantial compliance with the certification mentioned in Section 29-2 as aforequoted. Note that de Vera's transfer was made effective sometime between 1 August 2001 and 3 September 2001. On 27 February 2003, the elections of the IBP Chapter Officers were simultaneously held all over the Philippines, as mandated by Section 29.a of the IBP By-Laws which provides that elections of Chapter Officers and Directors shall be held on the last Saturday of February of every other year. Between 3 September 2001 and 27 February 2003, seventeen months had elapsed. This makes respondent de Vera's transfer valid as it was done
more than three months ahead of the chapter elections held on 27 February 2003.
In the case of Romulo G. Dinsay vs. Atty. Leopoldo D. Cioco (Administrative Case No. 2995, 27 November 1996), this Court declared that:
"The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of the [Court's] administrative powers."
In the said case, respondent Clerk of Court Cioco was dismissed from service for grave misconduct highly prejudicial to the service for surreptitiously substituting the bid price in a Certificate of Sale from P3,263,182.67 to only P730,000.00. Thereafter a complaint for disbarment was filed against the respondent on the basis of the same incident. Respondent, interposing res judicata, argued that he may no longer be charged on the basis of the same incident. This Court held that while the respondent is in effect being indicted twice for the same misconduct, this does not amount to double jeopardy as both proceedings are admittedly administrative in nature. This Court qualified that, in the first case, the respondent was proceeded against as an erring court personnel under the Court's supervisory power over courts while, in the second case, he was disciplined as a lawyer under the Court's plenary authority over membersof the legal profession.In subsequent decisions of this Court, however, it appears that res judicata still applies in administrative cases. Thus, in the case of Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera vs. Judge William Layague (Administrastive Matter No. RTJ-93-986), this Court ruled that:
"While double jeopardy does not lie in administrative cases, it would be contrary to equity and substantial justice to penalize respondent judge a second time for an act which he had already answered for.";
Likewise, in the recent case of Executive Judge Henry B. Basilia vs. Judge Amado L. Becamon, Lolita Delos Reyes and Eddie Delos Reyes (Administrative Matter No. MTJ-02-1404, 14 December 2004), this Court held that:
"Applying the principle of res judicata or bar by prior judgment, the present administrative case becomes dismissible.xxxUnder the said doctrine, a matter that has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction must be deemed to have been finally and conclusively settled if it arises in any subsequent litigation between the same parties and for the same cause. It provides that[a] final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies; and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action. Res judicata is based on the ground that the party to be affected, or some other with whom he is in privity, has litigated the same matter in the former action in a court of competent jurisdiction, and should not be permitted to litigate it again.This principle frees the parties from undergoing all over again the rigors of unnecessary suits and repetitious trials. At the same time, it prevents the clogging of court dockets. Equally important, res judicata stabilizes rights and promotes the rule of law."
In the instant administrative case, it is clear that the issues raised by the complainant had already been resolved by this Court in an earlier administrative case. The complainant's contention that the principle of res judicata would not apply in the case at bar as the first administrative case was one for disqualification while the instant administrative complaint is one for suspension and/or disbarment should be given least credence. It is worthy to note that while the instant administrative complaint is denominated as one for suspension and/or disbarment, it prayed neither the suspension nor the disbarment of the respondent but instead merely sought to enjoin the respondent from assuming office as IBP National President.28
Contrary to the findings of the Bar Confidant, Adm. Case No. 6052 entitled, "In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard de Vera, on Legal and Moral Grounds, From Being Elected IBP Governor for
Eastern Mindanao in the May 31 IBP Election" and promulgated on 11 December 2003 does not constitute a bar to the filing of Adm. Case No. 6697. Although the parties in the present administrative case and in Adm. Case No. 6052 are identical, their capacities in these cases and the issues presented therein are not the same, thereby barring the application of res judicata.In order that the principle of res judicata may be made to apply, four essential conditions must concur, namely: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment or order on the merits, and (4) there must be between the first and second action identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of causes of action.29 In the absence of any one of these elements, Atty. de Vera cannot argue res judicata in his favor.It is noteworthy that the two administrative cases involve different subject matters and causes of action. In Adm. Case No. 6052, the subject matter was the qualification of Atty. de Vera to run as a candidate for the position of IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the present administrative complaint, the subject matter is his privilege to practice law. In the first administrative case, complainants' cause of action was Atty. de Vera's alleged violation or circumvention of the IBP By-laws. In the present administrative case, the primary cause of action is Atty. de Vera's alleged violation of lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.Finally, the two administrative cases do not seek the same relief. In the first case, the complainants sought to prevent Atty. de Vera from assuming his post as IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the present case, as clarified by complainant in his Memorandum, what is being principally sought is Atty. de Vera's suspension or disbarment.The distinctions between the two cases are far from trivial. The previous case was resolved on the basis of the parties' rights and obligations under the IBP By-laws. We held therein that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified from running as Regional Governor as there is nothing in the present IBP By-laws that sanctions the disqualification of candidates for IBP governors. Consequently, we stressed that the petition had no firm ground to stand on. Likewise, we held that the complainants therein were not the proper parties to bring the suit as the IBP By-laws prescribes that only nominees - which the complainants were not - can file with the IBP President a written protest against the candidate. The Court's statement, therefore, that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on the ground that he was not morally fit was mere obiter dictum. Precisely, the IBP By-laws do not allow for pre-election disqualification proceedings; hence, Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on the basis of the administrative findings of a hearing officer of the State Bar of California suspending him from the practice of law for three years. We held in that case that –
There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be morally fit before he can run for IBP governorship. For one, this is so because the determination of moral fitness of a candidate lies in the individual judgment of the members of the House of Delegates. Indeed, based on each member's standard of morality, he is free to nominate and elect any member, so long as the latter possesses the basic requirements under the law. For another, basically the disqualification of a candidate involving lack of moral fitness should emanate from his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law by this Court, or conviction by final judgment of an offense which involves moral turpitude.30
What this simply means is that absent a final judgment by the Supreme Court in a proper case declaring otherwise, every lawyer aspiring to hold the position of IBP Regional Director is presumed morally fit. Any person who begs to disagree will not be able to find a receptive audience in the IBP through a petition for disqualification but must first file the necessary disbarment or suspension proceeding against the lawyer concerned.And this is precisely what complainant has chosen to do in the instant case. As his petition is sufficient in form and substance, we have given it due course pursuant to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. And, considering that this case is not barred by the prior judgment in Adm. Case No. 6052, the only issue left for consideration is whether or not Atty. de Vera can be suspended or disbarred under the facts of the case and the evidence submitted by complainant.The recommendation of the hearing officer of the State Bar of California, standing alone, is not proof of malpractice.In the case of the Suspension From The Practice of Law In The Territory of Guam of Atty. Leon G. Maquera,31 we were confronted with the question of whether or not a member of the Philippine Bar, who is concomitantly an attorney in a foreign jurisdiction and who was suspended from the practice of law in said foreign jurisdiction,
can be sanctioned as member of the Philippine Bar for the same infraction committed in the foreign jurisdiction.We take the issue in Atty. Maquera one notch higher in the case of Atty. de Vera who was admitted to the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction (State Bar of California, U.S.A.) and against whom charges were filed in connection with his practice in said jurisdiction. However, unlike the case of Atty. Maquera, no final judgment for suspension or disbarment was meted against Atty. de Vera despite a recommendation of suspension of three years as he surrendered his license to practice law before his case could be taken up by the Supreme Court of California.In Maquera, we emphasized that the judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer in a foreign jurisdiction does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the Philippines as the acts giving rise to his suspension are not grounds for disbarment and suspension in this jurisdiction. Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer may transmute into a similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of the foreign court's action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. We likewise held that the judgment of the foreign court merely constitutes prima facie evidence of unethical acts as lawyer.The Maquera ruling is consistent with Rule 39, Section 48, of the Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:x x x x(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
In Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Inc. v. Fasgi Enterprises, Inc.,32 we explained that "[a] foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum."In herein case, considering that there is technically no foreign judgment to speak of, the recommendation by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California does not constitute prima facie evidence of unethical behavior by Atty. de Vera. Complainant must prove by substantial evidence the facts upon which the recommendation by the hearing officer was based. If he is successful in this, he must then prove that these acts are likewise unethical under Philippine law.There is substantial evidence of malpractice on the part of Atty. de Vera independent of the recommendation of suspension by the hearing officer of the State Bar of CaliforniaSection 27 of Rule 138 of our Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. – A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinary agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension.33
Disciplinary action against a lawyer is intended to protect the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court and to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.34
The statutory enunciation of the grounds for disbarment on suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent power of the court over its officers cannot be restricted.35
Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer. Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning to the term "Malpractice."36 That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that the practice of law is a profession, not a business.37
Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules on ethical code of his profession or which is unbecoming a member of that profession.38
Now, the undisputed facts:1. An administrative case against Atty. de Vera was filed before the State Bar of California, docketed then as Adm. Case No. 86-0-18429. It arose from an insurance case Atty. de Vera handled involving Julius Willis, III who figured in an automobile accident in 1986. Atty. de Vera was authorized by the elder Willis (father of Julius who was given authority by the son to control the case because the latter was then studying in San Diego California) for the release of the funds in settlement of the case. Atty. de Vera received a check in settlement of the case which he then deposited to his personal account;39
2. The Hearing referee in the said administrative case recommended that Atty. de Vera be suspended from the practice of law for three years;40 and3. Atty. de Vera resigned from the California Bar which resignation was accepted by the Supreme Court of California.41
Atty. de Vera vehemently insists that the foregoing facts do not prove that he misappropriated his client's funds as the latter's father (the elder Willis) gave him authority to use the same and that, unfortunately, the hearing officer did not consider this explanation notwithstanding the fact that the elder Willis testified under oath that he "expected de Vera might use the money for a few days." By insisting that he was authorized by his client's father and attorney-in-fact to use the funds, Atty. de Vera has impliedly admitted the use of the Willis funds for his own personal use.In fact, Atty. de Vera did not deny complainant's allegation in the latter's memorandum that he (de Vera) received US$12,000.00 intended for his client and that he deposited said amount in his personal account and not in a separate trust account and that, finally, he spent the amount for personal purposes.42
At this point, it bears stressing that in cases filed before administrative and quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.43 It means such evidence which affords a substantial basis from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred.44
Beyond doubt, the unauthorized use by a lawyer of his client's funds is highly unethical. Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is emphatic about this, thus:
CANON 16. A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME TO HIS POSSESSION.Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him.
In Espiritu v. Ulep45 we held that –The relation between attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature. Being such, it requires utmost good faith, loyalty, fidelity and disinterestedness on the part of the attorney. Its fiduciary nature is intended for the protection of the client.The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates every lawyer to hold in trust all money and properties of his client that may come into his possession. Accordingly, he shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Even more specific is the Canon of Professional Ethics:
The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client.Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly and should not under any circumstances be commingled with his own or be used by him.
Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or property held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, his client. It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs
the public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.Lawyers who misappropriate the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. Those who are guilty of such infraction may be disbarred or suspended indefinitely from the practice of law. (Emphases supplied.)
In herein case, as it is admitted by Atty. de Vera himself that he used his client's money for personal use, he has unwittingly sealed his own fate since this admission constitutes more than substantial evidence of malpractice. Consequently, Atty. de Vera now has the burden of rebutting the evidence which he himself supplied.In his defense, Atty. de Vera claims that he was duly authorized by the elder Willis to use the funds intended for the latter's son. Atty. de Vera also points out that he had restituted the full amount of US$12,000.00 even before the filing of the administrative case against him in the State Bar of California.46
Aside from these self-serving statements, however, we cannot find anywhere in the records of this case proof that indeed Atty. de Vera was duly authorized to use the funds of his client. In Radjaie v. Atty. Alovera47 we declared that –
When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him.
Atty. de Vera cannot rely on the statement made by the hearing officer that the elder Willis had indeed testified that he "expected de Vera might use the money for a few days." As Atty. de Vera had vigorously objected to the admissibility of the document containing this statement, he is now estopped from relying thereon. Besides, that the elder Willis "expected de Vera might use the money for a few days" was not so much an acknowledgment of consent to the use by Atty. de Vera of his client's funds as it was an acceptance of the probability that Atty. de Vera might, indeed, use his client's funds, which by itself did not speak well of the character of Atty. de Vera or the way such character was perceived.In the instant case, the act of Atty. de Vera in holding on to his client's money without the latter's acquiescence is conduct indicative of lack of integrity and propriety. It is clear that Atty. de Vera, by depositing the check in his own account and using the same for his own benefit is guilty of deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and unethical behavior. He caused dishonor, not only to himself but to the noble profession to which he belongs. For, it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants to the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the profession betrays their trust and confidence.48 Respondent violated his oath to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his client.Nevertheless, we do not agree with complainant's plea to disbar respondent from the practice of law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution.49 Where any lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be decreed.In Mortera v. Pagatpatan,50 we imposed upon Atty. Pagatpatan two years suspension from his practice of law for depositing the funds meant for his client to his personal account without the latter's knowledge. In Reyes v. Maglaya;51 Castillo v. Taguines;52 Espiritu v. Atty. Cabredo IV,53 the respondents were meted one year suspension each for failing to remit to their clients monies in the amounts of P1,500.00; P500.00, and P51,161.00, respectively, received by them for their clients without the latter's permission. In Dumadag v. Atty. Lumaya,54 we indefinitely suspended respondent for failure to remit to his client the amount of the measly sum of P4,344.00 representing the amount received pursuant to a writ of execution. Considering the amount involved here – US$12,000.00, we believe that the penalty of suspension for two (2) years is appropriate.Transferring IBP membership to a chapter where the lawyer is not a resident of is not a ground for his suspension or disbarmentComplainant insists that Atty. de Vera's transfer of membership from the Pasay, Parañaque, Las Piñas and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter is a circumvention of the rotation rule as it was made for the sole purpose of becoming IBP National President. Complainant stresses that Atty. de Vera is not a resident of Agusan del Sur nor does he hold office therein.In Adm. Case No. 6052, we held that Atty. de Vera's act of transferring to another IBP Chapter is not a ground for his disqualification for the post of IBP Governor as the same is allowed under Section 19 of the IBP By-Laws with the qualification only that the transfer be made not less than three months immediately preceding any chapter election.As it was perfectly within Atty. de Vera's right to transfer his membership, it cannot be said that he is guilty of unethical conduct or
behavior. And while one may incessantly argue that a legal act may not necessarily be ethical, in herein case, we do not see anything wrong in transferring to an IBP chapter that -- based on the rotation rule – will produce the next IBP EVP who will automatically succeed to the National Presidency for the next term. Our Code of Professional Responsibility as well as the Lawyer's Oath do not prohibit nor punish lawyers from aspiring to be IBP National President and from doing perfectly legal acts in accomplishing such goal.Bar Matter No. 1227Administrative Matter No. 05-5-15-SCTo resolve Bar Matter No. 1227 and Administrative Matter No. 05-5- 15-SC, the following issues must be addressed:
I. Whether the IBP Board of Governors acted with grave abuse of discretion in removing Atty. de Vera as Governor and EVP of the IBP on 13 May 2005.
i. Whether the IBP Board of Governors complied with administrative due process in removing Atty. de Vera.ii. Whether the IBP removed Atty. De Vera for just and valid cause.
II. Whether Governor Salazar was validly elected as EVP of the IBP on 25 June 2005, and can consequently assume the Presidency of the IBP for the term 2005-2007.
The IBP Board observed due process in its removal of Atty. de Vera as IBP GovernorWe start the discussion with the veritable fact that the IBP Board is vested with the power to remove any of its members pursuant to Section 44, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws, which states:
Sec. 44. Removal of members. – If the Board of Governors should determine after proper inquiry that any of its members, elective or otherwise, has for any reason become unable to perform his duties, the Board, by resolution of the Majority of the remaining members, may declare his position vacant, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause, including three consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse, by resolution adopted by two-thirds of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.In case of any vacancy in the office of Governor for whatever cause, the delegates from the region shall by majority vote, elect a successor from among the members of the Chapter to which the resigned governor is a member to serve as governor for the unexpired portion of the term. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the aforementioned section, a member of the IBP Board may be removed for cause by resolution adopted by two-thirds (2/3) of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of this Court.In the main, Atty. de Vera questions his removal from the Board of Governors on procedural and substantive grounds. He argues that he was denied "very basic rights of due process recognized by the Honorable Court even in administrative cases" like the right to answer formally or in writing and within reasonable time, the right to present witnesses in his behalf, the right to a fair hearing. Atty. de Vera protests the fact that he was not able to cross-examine the complainant, IBP Gov. Romulo H. Rivera (Atty. Rivera) and that Atty. Rivera voted as well for his expulsion which made him accuser, prosecutor and judge at the same time. Atty. de Vera emphasized the fact that Atty. Rivera initially inhibited himself from voting on his own motion. However, when his inhibition resulted in the defeat of his motion as the necessary 2/3 votes could not be mustered, Atty. Rivera asked for another round of voting so he could vote to support his own motion.The IBP Board counters that since its members were present during the plenary session, and personally witnessed and heard Atty. de Vera's actuations, an evidentiary or formal hearing was no longer necessary. Since they all witnessed and heard Atty. de Vera, it was enough that he was given an opportunity to refute and answer all the charges imputed against him. They emphasized that Atty. de Vera was given a copy of the complaint and that he was present at the Board Meeting on 13 May 2005 wherein the letter-complaint against him was part of the agenda. Therein, he was given the opportunity to be heard and that, in fact, Atty. de Vera did argue his case.We are in agreement with the IBP Board.First, it needs stressing that the constitutional provision on due process safeguards life, liberty and property.55 It cannot be said that the position of EVP of the IBP is property within the constitutional sense especially since there is no right to security of tenure over said position as, in fact, all that is required to remove any member of the
board of governors for cause is a resolution adopted by 2/3 of the remaining members of the board.Secondly, even if the right of due process could be rightfully invoked, still, in administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one's side.56 At the outset, it is here emphasized that the term "due process of law" as used in the Constitution has no fixed meaning for all purposes due "to the very nature of the doctrine which, asserting a fundamental principle of justice rather than a specific rule of law, is not susceptible of more than one general statement."57 The phrase is so elusive of exact apprehension,58 because it depends on circumstances and varies with the subject matter and the necessities of the situation.59
Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with "judicial process" for a trial in court is not always essential to due process. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative proceedings since they rest upon different principles. The due process clause guarantees no particular form of procedure and its requirements are not technical. Thus, in certain proceedings of administrative character, the right to a notice or hearing are not essential to due process of law. The constitutional requirement of due process is met by a fair hearing before a regularly established administrative agency or tribunal. It is not essential that hearings be had before the making of a determination if thereafter, there is available trial and tribunal before which all objections and defenses to the making of such determination may be raised and considered. One adequate hearing is all that due process requires. What is required for "hearing" may differ as the functions of the administrative bodies differ.60
The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due process.61 Nor is an actual hearing always essential62 especially under the factual milieu of this case where the members of the IBP Board -- upon whose shoulders the determination of the cause for removal of an IBP governor is placed subject to the approval of the Supreme Court – all witnessed Atty. de Vera's actuations in the IBP National Convention in question.It is undisputed that Atty. de Vera received a copy of the complaint against him and that he was present when the matter was taken up. From the transcript of the stenographic notes of the 13 May 2005 meeting wherein Atty. de Vera was removed, it is patent that Atty. de Vera was given fair opportunity to defend himself against the accusations made by Atty. Rivera.Atty. de Vera, however, additionally questions the fact that Atty. Rivera, who authored the complaint against him, also voted for his expulsion making him accuser, prosecutor and judge at the same time. Atty. de Vera likewise laments the fact that Atty. Rivera initially inhibited himself from voting but when this resulted in the defeat of his motion for lack of the necessary 2/3 vote, he agreed to another round of voting and that, this time, he voted in favor of his motion.For the record, of the nine governors comprising the IBP Board, six voted for Atty. de Vera's expulsion (including Atty. Rivera) while 3 voted against it (including Atty. de Vera).Section 44 (second paragraph) of the IBP By-Laws provides:
Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause, including three consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse, by resolution adopted by two-thirds of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.)
Under the rules, a resolution for expulsion of an IBP Governor is done via a resolution adopted by 2/3 of the remaining members. The phrase "remaining members" refers to the members exclusive of the complainant member and the respondent member. The reason therefore is that such members are interested parties and are thus presumed to be unable to resolve said motion impartially. This being the case, the votes of Attys. Rivera and de Vera should be stricken-off which means that only the votes of the seven remaining members are to be counted. Of the seven remaining members, five voted for expulsion while two voted against it which still adds up to the 2/3 vote requirement for expulsion.The IBP Board removed Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor for just and valid causeAll the concerned parties to this case agree that what constitutes cause for the removal of an IBP Governor has not been defined by Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws albeit it includes three consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse. Thus, the IBP Board argues that it is vested with sufficient power and authority to protect itself from an intractable member whose removal was caused not by his disagreement with the IBP Board but due to various acts committed by him which the IBP Board considered as inimical to the IBP Board in particular and the IBP in general.
Atty. de Vera, on the other hand, insists that speaking in disagreement with the Resolution of the Board during the Convention's Plenary Session is not a valid cause to remove or expel a duly-elected member of the IBP Board of Governors and the decision to remove him only shows that the right to freedom of speech or the right to dissent is not recognized by the IBP Board.After weighing the arguments of the parties and in keeping with the fundamental objective of the IBP to discharge its public responsibility more effectively, we hereby find that Atty. de Vera's removal from the IBP Board was not capricious or arbitrary.Indubitably, conflicts and disagreements of varying degrees of intensity, if not animosity, are inherent in the internal life of an organization, but especially of the IBP since lawyers are said to disagree before they agree.However, the effectiveness of the IBP, like any other organization, is diluted if the conflicts are brought outside its governing body for then there would be the impression that the IBP, which speaks through the Board of Governors, does not and cannot speak for its members in an authoritative fashion. It would accordingly diminish the IBP's prestige and repute with the lawyers as well as with the general public.As a means of self-preservation, internecine conflicts must thus be adjusted within the governing board itself so as to free it from the stresses that invariably arise when internal cleavages are made public.The doctrine of majority rule is almost universally used as a mechanism for adjusting and resolving conflicts and disagreements within the group after the members have been given an opportunity to be heard. While it does not efface conflicts, nonetheless, once a decision on a contentious matter is reached by a majority vote, the dissenting minority is bound thereby so that the board can speak with one voice, for those elected to the governing board are deemed to implicitly contract that the will of the majority shall govern in matters within the authority of the board.63
The IBP Board, therefore, was well within its right in removing Atty. de Vera as the latter's actuations during the 10th National IBP Convention were detrimental to the role of the IBP Board as the governing body of the IBP. When the IBP Board is not seen by the bar and the public as a cohesive unit, it cannot effectively perform its duty of helping the Supreme Court enforce the code of legal ethics and the standards of legal practice as well as improve the administration of justice.In view of the importance of retaining group cohesiveness and unity, the expulsion of a member of the board who insists on bringing to the public his disagreement with a policy/resolution approved by the majority after due discussion, cannot be faulted. The effectiveness of the board as a governing body will be negated if its pronouncements are resisted in public by a board member.Indeed, when a member of a governing body cannot accept the voice of the majority, he should resign therefrom so that he could criticize in public the majority opinion/decision to his heart's content; otherwise, he subjects himself to disciplinary action by the body.The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of Governors ipso facto meant his removal as EVP as wellThe removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of Governors ipso facto meant his removal as EVP as well. Section 47, Article VII of the By-Laws of the IBP provides:
SEC. 47. National Officers. – The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a President and Executive Vice President to be chosen by the Board of Governors from among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. x x x
Thus, to be EVP of the IBP, one must necessarily be a member of IBP Board of Governors. Atty. de Vera's removal from the Board of Governors, automatically disqualified him from acting as IBP EVP. To insist otherwise would be contrary to Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.The Court will not interfere with the Resolution of the IBP Board to remove Atty. de Vera since it was rendered without grave abuse of discretionWhile it is true that the Supreme Court has been granted an extensive power of supervision over the IBP,64 it is axiomatic that such power should be exercised prudently. The power of supervision of the Supreme Court over the IBP should not preclude the IBP from exercising its reasonable discretion especially in the administration of its internal affairs governed by the provisions of its By-Laws. The IBP By-Laws were precisely drafted and promulgated so as to define the powers and functions of the IBP and its officers, establish its organizational structure, and govern relations and transactions among its officers and members. With these By-Laws in place, the Supreme Court could be assured that the IBP shall be able to carry on its day-to-day affairs, without the Court's interference.It should be noted that the general charge of the affairs and activities of the IBP has been vested in the Board of Governors. The members
of the Board are elective and representative of each of the nine regions of the IBP as delineated in its By-Laws.65 The Board acts as a collegiate body and decides in accordance with the will of the majority. The foregoing rules serve to negate the possibility of the IBP Board acting on the basis of personal interest or malice of its individual members. Hence, the actions and resolutions of the IBP Board deserve to be accorded the disputable presumption66 of validity, which shall continue, until and unless it is overcome by substantial evidence and actually declared invalid by the Supreme Court. In the absence of any allegation and substantial proof that the IBP Board has acted without or in excess of its authority or with grave abuse of discretion, we shall not be persuaded to overturn and set aside the Board's action or resolution.There is no question that the IBP Board has the authority to remove its members as provided in Article VI, Section 4467 of the IBP By-Laws. Issue arises only as to whether the IBP Board abused its authority and discretion in resolving to remove Atty. de Vera from his post as an IBP Governor and EVP. As has been previously established herein, Atty. de Vera's removal from the IBP Board was in accordance with due process and the IBP Board acted well within the authority and discretion granted to it by its By-Laws. There being no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the IBP Board, we find no reason to interfere in the Board's resolution to remove Atty. de Vera.The election of Atty. Salazar by the IBP Board as IBP EVP in replacement of Atty. De Vera was conducted in accordance with the authority granted to the Board by the IBP By-LawsIn the same manner, we find no reason to disturb the action taken by the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors in holding a special election to fill-in the vacant post resulting from the removal of Atty. de Vera as EVP of the IBP since the same is a purely internal matter, done without grave abuse of discretion, and implemented without violating the Rules and By-Laws of the IBP.With the removal of Atty. de Vera from the Board, by virtue of the IBP Board Resolution dated 13 May 2005, he was also removed from his post as EVP; thus, there was a resultant vacancy in the position of IBP EVP.Article VI, Section 41(g) of the IBP By-Laws expressly grants to the Board the authority to fill vacancies, however arising, in the IBP positions, subject to the provisions of Section 8 of the Integration Rule,68 and Section 11 (Vacancies),69 Section 44 (Removal of members),70 Section 47 (National officers),71 Section 48 (other officers),72 and Section 49 (Terms of Office)73 of the By-Laws. The IBP Board has specific and sufficient guidelines in its Rules and By-Laws on how to fill-in the vacancies after the removal of Atty. de Vera. We have faith and confidence in the intellectual, emotional and ethical competencies of the remaining members of the 2005-2007 Board in dealing with the situation within the bounds of the IBP Rules and By-Laws.The election by the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors of a new EVP, who will assume the Presidency for the term 2005-2007, was well within the authority and prerogative granted to the Board by the IBP By-Laws, particularly Article VII, Section 47, which provides that "[t]he EVP shall automatically become President for the next succeeding term." The phrase "for the next succeeding term" necessarily implies that the EVP that should succeed Atty. Cadiz as IBP President for the next succeeding term (i.e., 2005-2007) should come from the members of the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors. Hence, in A.M. No. 05-7-19-SC, we restrained now IBP EVP Feliciano Bautista from assuming the position of Acting President because we have yet to resolve the question as to who shall succeed Atty. Cadiz from the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors.Accordingly, the elections of Governor Santiago on 13 June 2005 as IBP EVP, and thereafter, Governor Salazar on 25 June 2005, as the new IBP EVP, upon the relinquishment of Gov. Santiago of the position, were valid.Neither can this Court give credence to the argument of Atty. De Vera that, assuming his removal as IBP Governor and EVP was valid, his replacement as IBP EVP should come from Eastern Mindanao Region pursuant to the rotation rule set forth in Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws.According to Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws, the EVP shall be chosen by the Board of Governors from among the nine Regional Governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. This is based on our pronouncements in Bar Matter 491, wherein we ruled:
"ORDERx x x x3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President elected by the Board of Governors (composed of the governors of the nine [9] IBP regions) from among themselves (as provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right of automatic succession by the Executive Vice-President to the presidency upon the expiration of their
two-year term (which was abolished by this Court's resolution dated July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) should be as it is hereby restored.4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall automatically succeed to the office of president. The incoming board of governors shall then elect an Executive Vice-President from among themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated among the nine (9) IBP regions. One who has served as president may not run for election as Executive Vice-President in a succeeding election until after the rotation of the presidency among the nine (9) regions shall have been completed; whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.x x x x(Emphasis Supplied)"
In Bar Matter 491, it is clear that it is the position of IBP EVP which is actually rotated among the nine Regional Governors. The rotation with respect to the Presidency is merely a result of the automatic succession rule of the IBP EVP to the Presidency. Thus, the rotation rule pertains in particular to the position of IBP EVP, while the automatic succession rule pertains to the Presidency. The rotation with respect to the Presidency is but a consequence of the automatic succession rule provided in Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.In the case at bar, the rotation rule was duly complied with since upon the election of Atty. De Vera as IBP EVP, each of the nine IBP regions had already produced an EVP and, thus, the rotation was completed. It is only unfortunate that the supervening event of Atty. de Vera's removal as IBP Governor and EVP rendered it impossible for him to assume the IBP Presidency. The fact remains, however, that the rotation rule had been completed despite the non-assumption by Atty. de Vera to the IBP Presidency.Moreover, the application of the rotation rule is not a license to disregard the spirit and purpose of the automatic succession rule, but should be applied in harmony with the latter. The automatic succession rule affords the IBP leadership transition seamless and enables the new IBP National President to attend to pressing and urgent matters without having to expend valuable time for the usual adjustment and leadership consolidation period. The time that an IBP EVP spends assisting a sitting IBP President on matters national in scope is in fact a valuable and indispensable preparation for the eventual succession. It should also be pointed out that this wisdom is further underscored by the fact that an IBP EVP is elected from among the members of the IBP Board of Governors, who are serving in a national capacity, and not from the members at large. It is intrinsic in the IBP By-Laws that one who is to assume the highest position in the IBP must have been exposed to the demands and responsibilities of national leadership.It would therefore be consistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession rule for Governor Salazar to assume the post of IBP President. By electing the replacement EVP from among the members of the 2003-2005 Board of Governors, the IBP benefits from the experience of the IBP EVP of 2003-2005 – in this case, Governor Salazar – who would have served in a national capacity prior to his assumption of the highest position.It will also be inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession rule if the EVP for the term 2003-2005 will be elected exclusively by the members of the House of Delegates of the Eastern Mindanao region. This Court notes that the removal of Atty. De Vera in 13 May 2005 was about a month before the expiration of the term of office of the 2003-2005 Board of Governors. Hence, the replacement Governor would not have been able to serve in a national capacity for two years prior to assuming the IBP Presidency.In any case, Section 47 of the IBP Rules uses the phrase "as much as practicable" to clearly indicate that the rotation rule is not a rigid and inflexible rule as to bar exceptions in compelling and exceptional circumstances.It is in view of the foregoing that the argument advanced by Atty. De Vera that the IBP national presidency should be assumed by a nominee from Eastern Mindanao region from where he comes, can not hold water. It would go against the intent of the IBP By-Laws for such a nominee would be bereft of the wealth of experience and the perspective that only one who is honed in service while serving in a national post in the IBP would have.We therefore rule that the IBP Board of Governors acted in accordance with the IBP By-Laws, in electing Atty. Salazar as IBP EVP and in ensuring a succession in the leadership of the IBP. Had the Board of Governors not done so, there would have been no one qualified to assume the Presidency of the IBP on 1 July 2005, pursuant to Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we rule as follows:
1) SUSPEND Atty. Leonard de Vera in A.C. No. 6697 from the practice of law for TWO (2) YEARS, effective
from the finality of this Resolution. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal record of Atty. Leonard de Vera and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts;2) DISMISS the letter-complaint of Atty. Leonard de Vera, dated 18 May 2005, in A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, praying for the disapproval of the Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines removing him from his posts as Governor and Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the said Resolution having been rendered without grave abuse of discretion;3) AFFIRM the election by the Board of Governors of Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar as Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the remainder of the term 2003-2005, such having been conducted in accordance with its By-Laws and absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion; and4) DIRECT Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar to immediately take his oath of office and assume the Presidency of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the term 2005-2007 in accordance with the automatic succession rule in Article VII, Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws, upon receipt of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7055 July 31, 2006NORIEL MICHAEL J. RAMIENTAS, petitioner, vs.ATTY. JOCELYN P. REYALA, respondent.R E S O L U T I O NCHICO-NAZARIO, J.:Before Us are Manifestations1 filed by the abovequoted parties in response to Supreme Court (SC) En Banc Resolution2 dated 7 March 2006, wherein we resolved to require them to manifest, within ten (10) days from notice, whether they are willing to submit the case at bar for decision/resolution on the basis of the pleadings already on record.The present controversy stemmed from an Administrative Complaint3
filed by Noriel Michael J. Ramientas on 16 February 2004 before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Commission on Bar Discipline, seeking the disbarment of respondent Atty. Jocelyn P. Reyala. The complaint was anchored on respondent Reyala's alleged violative acts: (1) submitting a pleading before the Court of Appeals bearing the forged signature of another lawyer; and (2) her continuous handling of a case while working in the Court of Appeals; both contrary to a) Articles 171,4 182,5 1846 and 3557 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC); b) the Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers; and c) conduct unbecoming of a lawyer.Hearing on the merits thereafter ensued.In its Resolution No. XVII-2005-171 passed on 17 December 2005, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt the recommendation of Atty. Edmund T. Espina, Investigating Commissioner, finding respondent Reyala guilty of the abovementioned violative acts. It, however, modified the recommended penalty to be imposed from six (6) months suspension (from the practice of law) to two (2) years, with the corresponding warning that a repetition of any breach of her professional duties will be dealt with more severely.8
On 13 February 2006, the Office of the Bar Confidant, SC, received a letter dated 30 January 2006, from Atty. Rogelio A. Vinluan, Director for Bar Discipline of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, addressed to SC Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, stating therein that:
We are transmitting herewith the following documents pertaining to the above9 case pursuant to Rule 139-B:1. Notice of the Resolution;2. Records of the case consisting of Volume I 1-185 pages.
In the interregnum, however, respondent Reyala submitted10 to the IBP an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the resolution suspending her.On 7 March 2006, the SC En Banc, acting on the letter and transmittal, resolved to require complainant Ramientas and respondent Reyala to manifest whether they are willing to submit the case for decision/resolution based on the pleadings and documents already on record.Both parties submitted their compliance thereto.In his Manifestation,11 complainant Ramientas acceded to the submission of the case for decision/resolution based on the pleadings already on record.Respondent Reyala, on the other hand, demurred12 to such submission for the meantime considering that the Motion for Reconsideration she earlier filed before the IBP remained unresolved to date. Further, she stated that when she scheduled said motion for hearing, she was
informed13 by the IBP that it was precluded from acting on the aforesaid motion as it had already transmitted to this Court the whole records of the particular case together with Resolution No. XVII-2005-171, which recommended that she be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years. Thus, she prayed that her motion for reconsideration be decided first by the IBP Board of Governors before submitting the case for decision/resolution to this Court.Prefatorily, a reading of the By-Laws of the IBP will reveal that a motion for reconsideration of its resolution or order is a prohibited pleading. § 2 of Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP provides that:
SEC. 2. Prohibited Pleadings. The following pleadings shall not be allowed, to wit:
x x x xc. Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of resolution or order.x x x x
Parenthetically, at first glance, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the rules governing the disbarment and discipline of attorneys, shows that there is no provision regarding motions for reconsideration of resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors suspending respondent lawyers. However, worth noting is the fact that neither does it particularly proscribe the filing of such motions. §12 (b) of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court reads:
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. – x x xx x x x(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action. (Emphasis supplied.)x x x x
Hence, this impasse.A judicious review of our current jurisprudence will reveal that said impasse is more ostensible than real. Our pronouncement in the case of Halimao v. Villanueva,14 promulgated close to two decades after the effectivity of the IBP By-Laws,15 effectively amended the latter in so far as motions for reconsideration of IBP resolutions in disciplinary cases against lawyers are concerned.In the Halimao case, we took the occasion to articulate our stance respecting motions for reconsideration of resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors in disciplinary cases against lawyers. This Court was confronted therein with somewhat the same set of circumstance as the case at bar in that after the IBP Board of Governors transmitted to us its resolution adopting the recommendation of the investigating commissioner dismissing the disbarment complaint against respondent Villanueva for being barred by res judicata, complainant Halimao filed a motion for reconsideration. The latter opposed such motion on the ground that Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court does not provide for such a possibility of review. In resolving the issue, this Court, through Mr. Justice Mendoza, held that:
Although Rule 139-B, §12 (c) makes no mention of a motion for reconsideration, nothing in its text or in its history suggests that such motion is prohibited. It may therefore be filed within 15 days from notice to a party. Indeed, the filing of such motion should be encouraged before resort is made to this Court as a matter of exhaustion of administrative remedies, to afford the agency rendering the judgment an opportunity to correct any error it may have committed through a misapprehension of facts or misappreciation of the evidence.16 (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, the aforequoted ruling amended the IBP By-Laws in that it effectively removed a motion for reconsideration from the roster of proscribed pleadings in the level of the IBP. It must be remembered that it is well within the Court's power to amend the By-Laws of the IBP – § 77 of the same vests in this Court the power to amend, modify or repeal it, either motu proprio or upon recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.Prescinding from the above, though the aforequoted ruling involves §12 (c)17 of Rule 139-B, nothing in the decision contradicts its application to §12 (b) of the same rule, thus, it now stands that a motion for reconsideration of IBP resolutions may be filed by an aggrieved party within the period stated.A point of clarification, however, is in order. While in the Halimao ruling we nevertheless treated the motion for reconsideration filed by Atty. Villanueva as his Petition for Review before this Court within the contemplation of Rule 139-B, § 12 (c), such action on our part was necessitated by "expediency." In the case at bar, acknowledging the raison d'être for the allowance of motions for reconsideration of
resolutions of the IBP in disciplinary cases against lawyers, which is the exhaustion of administrative remedies as expressly recognized by the same Halimao ruling, the remand of the case at bar back to the IBP is in order. This course of action rests upon the presumption that when the grievance machinery is afforded a chance to pass upon the matter, it will decide the same correctly,18
Certainly, prudence dictates that the IBP be given the opportunity to correct its mistakes, if any, by way of motions for reconsideration before this Court takes cognizance of the case. This is to further insure that the grievance procedure will be allowed to duly run its course – a form of filtering process, particularly respecting matters within the competence of the IBP, before we step in.In fine, though such remand will hold back the advancement of the case, nevertheless, it bears emphasizing that it is equally important that the IBP be afforded the opportunity to set things as it should be. Observance of this basic principle is a sound practice and policy and should never be compromised at the altar of expediency.In concurrence with the above, now, therefore, BE IT RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, that in accordance with our ruling in Halimao v. Villanueva,19 pertinent provisions of Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline, as contained in the By-Laws of the IBP, particularly § 1 and § 2, are hereby deemed amended. Accordingly, § 1 of said rules now reads as follows:
SECTION. 1. Pleadings. – The only pleadings allowed are verified complaint, verified answer, verified position papers and motion for reconsideration of a resolution. [Emphasis supplied.]
And in § 2, a motion for reconsideration is, thus, removed from the purview of the class of prohibited pleadings.Further, the following guidelines shall be observed by the IBP in respect of disciplinary cases against lawyers:1. The IBP must first afford a chance to either party to file a motion for reconsideration of the IBP resolution containing its findings and recommendations within fifteen (15) days from notice of receipt by the parties thereon;2. If a motion for reconsideration has been timely filed by an aggrieved party, the IBP must first resolve the same prior to elevating to this Court the subject resolution together with the whole record of the case;3. If no motion for reconsideration has been filed within the period provided for, the IBP is directed to forthwith transmit to this Court, for final action, the subject resolution together with the whole record of the case;4. A party desiring to appeal from the resolution of the IBP may file a petition for review before this Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of said resolution sought to be reviewed; and5. For records of cases already transmitted to this Court where there exist pending motions for reconsideration filed in due time before the IBP, the latter is directed to withdraw from this Court the subject resolutions together with the whole records of the cases, within 30 days from notice, and, thereafter, to act on said motions with reasonable dispatch.Consistent with the discussions hereinabove set forth, let the whole record of this case be immediately remanded to the IBP for the proper disposition of respondent Atty. Jocelyn P. Reyala's motion for reconsideration.SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 4914 March 3, 2004SPOUSES JENELINE DONATO and MARIO DONATO, complainants, vs.ATTY. ISAIAH B. ASUNCION, SR., respondent.D E C I S I O NSANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:This is a complaint for disbarment filed by spouses Jeneline and Mario Donato against Atty. Isaiah B. Asuncion, Sr.The complaint alleges that on July 22, 1994, complainant spouses and respondent Atty. Asuncion, Sr. executed a Contract to Sell wherein the latter conveyed to the former his parcel of land with an area of 10,776 square meters (or 1.0776 hectare) situated at San Miguel, Pangasinan covered by Tax Declaration No. 34-12256. The parties agreed that the purchase price is in the amount of P187,500.00 payable by installments.On December 20, 1994, after the complainants had paid the last installment, the parties executed a Deed of Absolute Sale. This document was prepared by respondent wherein he made it appear that the consideration is only P50,000.00 in order to reduce the amount of the corresponding capital gain tax.More than two years later, or on January 10, 1997, the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, an action for eminent domain, docketed as Civil Case No. U-6293. Among the parcels of
land being expropriated was the lot purchased by complainants for which NAPOCOR was willing to pay P3,000,000.00.Respondent then offered his legal services to complainants and demanded 12% of whatever amount they will receive from NAPOCOR.When respondent learned that complainants intended to hire the services of another lawyer, he threatened them by filing with the RTC, Branch 45, Urdaneta, Pangasinan Civil Case No. U-6352 for reformation of instrument. In his complaint, he alleged that the contract executed by the parties is not a deed of sale but an equitable mortgage because the price of the lot (P50,000.00) stated in the contract is unusually inadequate compared to NAPOCOR’s offer of P3,000,000.00.The complaint further alleges that in filing Civil Case No. U-6352 for reformation of instrument, respondent "has dragged them to useless and expensive litigation." His act is "contrary to law and morality" which warrants his disbarment.In his comment on the instant administrative complaint, respondent claimed that complainants violated the rule on forum shopping. According to him, the issue raised in this administrative complaint and in complainants’ answer to his complaint in Civil Case No. U-6352 for reformation of instrument is the same, i.e., "the legality and morality" of the filing of this civil case.In a Resolution dated February 7, 1998, we referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.In her Report and Recommendation dated March 3, 2003, Atty. Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, IBP Hearing Commissioner, made the following findings:"After a careful study and consideration of the facts and evidence presented, we find respondent to have committed gross misconduct. In the Civil Case No. U-6352 before the RTC, Branch 45, Urdaneta City, for Reformation of Instrument, respondent was not telling the truth when he alleged under paragraph 6 ‘That although the document is captioned Deed of Absolute Sale, the true intention of the parties is not expressed by reason of mistake on the part of the person who drafted the document, because the instrument should be equitable mortgage x x x.’ Between the complainants and the respondent, it is the latter who knows about the law, be it the difference between a Deed of Absolute Sale and an Equitable Mortgage. And because he is the lawyer and he has a law office together with his son, it is presumed that he was the one who prepared the Deed of Absolute Sale wherein the consideration indicated was only P50,000.00. We believed complainants that the Deed of Absolute Sale was prepared by respondent to lessen the amount of capital gain tax. Respondent cannot deny that he was the one who prepared the Deed of Absolute Sale as shown by his letters to Myrna Tugawin (sister of Jeneline Donato) dated 31 August 1994, 1 September 1994 and 20 December 1994. After the lapse of several years, respondent filed the complaint for Reformation of Instrument because he realized that the price paid to him by complainants was unusually inadequate in view of the fact that the same land was being purchased by NAPOCOR for P3,000,000.00."The contention of respondent that this administrative complaint is a violation of the rule on ‘forum shopping’ is without merit. There is ‘forum shopping’ when as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another (First Phil International Bank vs. CA, 252 SCRA 259), or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the gamble that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition (Chemphil Export & Improt Corp. vs. CA, 251 SCRA 257)."and recommended that complainant be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year.In its Resolution No. XV-2003-345, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report of Commissioner Maala with the recommendation that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for only six (6) months.We sustain the finding of the Hearing Commissioner that respondent was not telling the truth when he alleged in his complaint for reformation of instrument that the intention of the parties is not expressed therein; that what they intended to execute was a deed of equitable mortgage, not a deed of absolute sale; and that the mistake was committed by the person who drafted the instrument.We observe that the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by the parties on December 14, 1994. However, respondent filed Civil Case No. U-6352 for reformation of instrument only on April 23, 1997, or after two years, four months and nine days. Why did it take him more than two years to realize that the previous contract did not express the true intention of the parties? The reason for this delay can be gleaned from the allegations in his complaint in Civil Case No. U-6352 for reformation of instrument. He alleged that the Deed of Absolute Sale should have been an equitable mortgage since the consideration
stated therein is only P50,000.00, while the NAPOCOR has agreed to purchase the lot for P3,000,000.00. It is thus clear that it was only when he knew that the value of the lot suddenly increased by leaps and bounds that he thought of filing the complaint for reformation of instrument.At this point, it bears stressing that respondent does not dispute complainants’ contention that they paid him P187,500.00, not P50,000.00. As earlier mentioned, complainants explained that the latter price was specified in the deed of absolute sale in order to reduce the amount of the corresponding capital gain tax.We likewise sustain the finding of Commissioner Maala that the Deed of Absolute Sale was prepared by respondent himself, as shown by his letters to Myrna Tugawin, sister of complainant Jeneline Donato. In his letter dated August 31, 1994, respondent informed Myrna that "a Deed of Sale will be executed by us" (referring to him and the complainants). In his letter of September 1, 1994, respondent asked Myrna to bring P50,000.00 on September 3, 1994 "for the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale." And in his letter dated December 20, 1994, respondent requested Myrna to bring complainants’ "balance" on December 22, 1994. If it were true that the contract between the parties is an equitable mortgage, why did he prepare a different one – a Deed of Absolute Sale?We find respondent guilty of gross misconduct.A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.1 Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates:"SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. – A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, of for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.x x x."In SPO2 Jose B. Yap vs. Judge Aquilino A. Inopiquez, Jr.,2 we explained the concept of gross misconduct as any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned in the administration of justice which is prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause. Such conduct is generally motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. The term, however, does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent.In committing such gross misconduct, respondent violated his solemn oath as a lawyer imposing upon himself the following duties, thus:"I, ______________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God."By filing the unfounded complaint for reformation of instrument to obtain financial gain, respondent did not only abuse and misuse the judicial processes, but likewise harassed the complainants and forced them to litigate unnecessarily. Indeed, his act was intended to advance his own interest at the expense of truth and the administration of justice, a manifestation of flaw in his character as a lawyer.The practice of law is a sacred and noble profession. It is a special privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically and morally.3 We have been exacting in our demand for integrity and good moral character of members of the Bar.4 We expect them at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession5 and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the integrity of the legal profession.6
Any gross misconduct of a lawyer in his profession or private capacity is a ground for the imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment because good character is an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for the continuance of such privilege.7 We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months for gross misconduct.
Incidentally, respondent’s defense of forum shopping is utterly bereft of merit. Suffice it to state that complainants did not institute two actions grounded on the same cause of action on the supposition that one or the other court might look with favor upon them.WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. ISAIAH B. ASUNCION, SR. is found GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS effective from notice.Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the personal records of respondent as a member of the Bar; and be furnished the Bar Confidant, the IBP, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 2001-9-SC July 14, 2006DOROTEO IGOY, complainant, vs.ATTY. GILBERT F. SORIANO, respondent.R E S O L U T I O NYNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:On October 11, 2001, this Court unanimously ruled to dismiss respondent Atty. Gilbert Soriano from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and leave credits, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government including government-owned or controlled corporations, and indefinitely suspended him from the practice of law. We denied with finality respondent's motion for reconsideration on June 10, 2003.On March 31, 2006, respondent filed an Ex-Parte Plea for Clemency and Plea to Lift Order of Suspension from the Practice of Law alleging that his dismissal from the service and suspension from the practice of law for more than five years now is ample penalty for his transgressions. He claimed that at 61 years of age, he may no longer find gainful employment but as a lawyer, he could still be a productive citizen and family provider. On even date, respondent also filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Recover Money Equivalent of Respondent's Accrued Leave Credits which he earned during his 28 years of service in the judiciary.On May 22, 2006, respondent filed a Supplement to Ex-Parte Plea for Clemency and Plea to Lift Order of Suspension from the Practice of Law and submitted certifications attesting to his good moral character issued by (a) Rev. Fr. Ariel O. Tecson, Parish Priest of Our Lady of the Most Holy Rosary Parish, Parañaque City; (b) Sr. Silvana Rescigno of the Franciscan Sisters Adorers of the Cross; (c) Rev. Fr. Christopher Salonga of the Fr. Hannibal Foundation Center in Parañaque City; (d) Rev. Fr. John Lucas of Di-Francia Center of Studies in Parañaque City; (e) Joseph Tan of the Knights of Columbus; and (f) Eduardo Timbungco, Bgy. Secretary of Manuyo Dos, Las Piñas City. At the same time, respondent prayed for the lifting of the prohibition for his re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government including government-owned or controlled corporations.In fine, respondent is now asking this Court (a) to lift the order suspending him from the practice of law; (b) to release the monetary equivalent of his accrued leave credits; and (c) to lift the order prohibiting his re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government including government-owned or controlled corporation.Without overlooking respondent's infractions which caused his dismissal from the service and suspension from the practice of law, we take a second look at the penalties imposed upon him.The suspension of a lawyer is not intended primarily as a punishment, but as a measure of protection of the public and the profession,1 the lifting of which is based on the same criterion used by the Court in applications for reinstatement to practice law, that is, whether or not "the public interest in the orderly and impartial administration of justice will be conserved by the [respondent's] participation therein in the capacity of an attorney and counselor at law."2 The respondent must, like a candidate for admission to the Bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character – a fit and proper person to practice law. The Court will take into consideration his character and standing prior to the suspension, the nature and character of the charge for which he was suspended, his conduct subsequent thereto, and the time that has elapsed after his suspension.3
In this case, respondent manifests that he is sincerely repentant and deeply remorseful for the wrong he committed having realized that as a lawyer of the Highest Court of the Land, he should have "lived up to the strictest standards of integrity in the public service bearing in mind that the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat." He also undertakes to always faithfully abide by the ideals, canons and ethics of the legal profession once his suspension is lifted.Respondent has been suspended from the practice of law since October 11, 2001. Thus, for more than five years, respondent had ample time and opportunity to amend his erring ways and rehabilitate himself as proven by the certifications attesting to his moral
character. Thus, he has shown that he is worthy once again to enjoy the privilege of being a member of the Bar. The lifting of the order suspending him from the practice of law is therefore in order.Similarly, we find merit in respondent's plea for the release of the monetary equivalent of his accrued leave credits. Section 58 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides in part:
Section 58. Administrative Disabilities Inherent in Certain Penalties.a. The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it that of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government service, unless otherwise provided in the decision.
The above Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, specifically Section 86 thereof, repealed Section 9, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), which provides for the forfeiture of not only the retirement benefits but of the leave credits as well. By so repealing, it must have been the intent of the framers of the Rules to exclude the forfeiture of the latter as one of the penalties inherent in the penalty of dismissal.In Villaros v. Orpiano,4 the Court noted that even when the penalty is dismissal, the forfeiture of the leave credits is not imposed by the applicable rule found in Section 58 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. In Paredes v. Padua,5 the Court held that despite their dismissal from the service, government employees are entitled to the leave credits that they have earned during the period of their employment. As a matter of fairness and law, they may not be deprived of such remuneration, which they have earned prior to their dismissal. Considering the foregoing cases and the provisions of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, the release of the monetary equivalent of respondent's accrued leave credits is hereby ordered.However, we cannot grant respondent's plea for the lifting of the prohibition for reemployment in the government service. The records show that during the investigation of the instant case, respondent offered to retire not once, but twice. In the Memorandum of the Office of Administrative Services dated December 3, 2001, it was noted that –
Lastly, respondent claims that his offer to resign was erroneously construed as an admission of guilt. He broached the idea that such offer came at a time when he was emotionally, intellectually and physically wrecked by the filing of the complaint. The OAS cannot simply bite this self-serving claim. The offer to retire/resign came initially as part of the first comment submitted by respondent on November 6, 2000, where in the ultimate portion, he stated that "if you find that I have committed a misconduct in helping Mr. Taneo despite my explanation, may I request Your Honor that I just be allowed to retire from the service" (underscoring supplied). By saying so, all along respondent honestly believed that he committed a misconduct.It may be true that by then, respondent was still emotionally bothered, which is why he reacted the same. However, what OAS cannot surmise is why on January 8, 2001, respondent reiterated the same offer through a letter of even date addressed to the Honorable Chief Justice. This only means that he made this reiteration after he already had sufficient opportunity to determine the consequence or effect of the first offer. Considering that he is bent in doing so, it is reasonably assumed he made the subsequent offer to resign/retire freely and voluntarily.
We also note that when respondent filed the Ex-Parte Plea for Clemency and Plea to Lift Order of Suspension from the Practice of Law on March 31, 2006, he prayed only for the lifting of his suspension from the practice of law. In fact, he admitted that he is no longer interested in appealing his "dismissal from the service" considering the denial with finality of his motion for reconsideration. He likewise conceded that at "61 years of age, a senior citizen and almost in the twilight of [his] life x x x [he] may no longer find a gainful employment x x x."Records show that this Court denied on June 10, 2003 respondent's motion for reconsideration of his dismissal from the service. The denial was with finality hence it should no longer be disturbed. Likewise, pursuant to Section 58 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, dismissal from the service carries with it the cancellation of eligibility and perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the government service. Besides, mere passage of time is not a license to overlook the infractions of the respondent which were committed within the
hallow grounds of this Court. Lest it be forgotten, we reiterate our findings thus:
Respondent's acts seriously undermined the trust and confidence of the public in the entire judicial system. What makes his infraction worse is the fact that he is not a mere court employee, but a senior attorney employed in the Highest Court of the Land. He has indelibly sullied his record of government service spanning twenty-eight years, and in so doing he has prejudiced the integrity of the Court as a whole. Once more, this Court is called upon to apply disciplinary sanction on an errant member, and again it will not shirk from its responsibility. Thus, this Court imposes on respondent the only penalty that he deserves – that of dismissal from the service.
Finally, respondent is sternly warned that the practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of legal profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law.6
ACCORDINGLY, the order suspending respondent Atty. Gilbert Soriano from the practice of law is LIFTED. The monetary equivalent of his accrued leave credits is ordered RELEASED. However, respondent shall REMAIN DISQUALIFIED for re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government including government-owned or controlled corporations.The Fiscal Management and Budget Office is directed to compute the monetary equivalent of respondent's accrued leave credits and release the same to him.Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to all the courts of the land as well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant. Let this Resolution be also made of record in the personal files of the respondent.SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 439 September 30, 1982IN RE: QUINCIANO D. VAILOCES ESCOLIN, J.:This is a petition filed by Quinciano D. Vailoces for readmission to the practice of law and the inclusion of his name in the roll of attorneys. The records disclose that the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental in a decision promulgated on September 30, 1955 found petitioner guilty of falsification of public document, penalized under Article 117 of the Revised Penal Code, and imposed on him an indeterminate sentence ranging from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties to the law, plus fine and costs. In its decision the court found that petitioner, as a member of the bar and in his capacity as a notary public, aknowledged the execution of a document purporting to be the last will and testament of one Tarcila Visitacion de Jesus. Presented for probate before the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, the genuineness of the document was impugned by the forced heirs of the alleged testatrix, and the court, finding that the document was a forgery, denied probate to the will. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict of conviction; and upon finality thereof, petitioner commenced service of the sentence. Thereafter, Ledesma de Jesus-Paras, complainant in the criminal case, instituted before this Court disbarment proceedings against petitioner. The same culminated in his disbarment on April 12, 1961. 1 On December 27, 1967, the President of the Philippines granted petitioner "absolute and unconditional pardon" and restored him "to full civil and political rights. 2
Since August 23, 1968, petitioner had repeatedly sought readmission to the practice of law, the first of which was denied by this Court in a minute resolution dated August 30, 1968. On February 27, 1970, petitioner reiterated his plea, but consideration thereof was deferred "until after the integration of the bar has been effected." 3 On December 12, 1977, he filed another petition, attaching thereto copies, among others, of the following documents, to wit: the resolution of the Negros Oriental Bar Association signed by 78 members thereof, indorsing his plea for reinstatement 4 ; the certificate of the mayor of the municipality of Bindoy, Negros Oriental, where petitioner has been residing, to the effect that the latter "is a person of exemplary moral character, a peace-loving and law-abiding citizen 5 a certification of Governor William B. Villegas of Negros Oriental,
attesting to the fact that since the grant of absolute pardon to petitioner, "he has comported himself as a morally straight and respectable citizen and that he has been active and has cooperated in civic and social undertakings, sincere and honest in his desire to lead a decent and dignified life" 6 ; the certification of Dean Eduardo G. Flores of the College of Law, Siliman University, vouching to petitioner's "honest, upright and moral life ... and because of his conduct he has earned the sympathy of the people of the community and regained the confidence of the people and of his other associates: 7 the statement of Atty. Alexander G. Amor, former president of the Negros Oriental Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, certifying "that Mr. Quinciano D. Vailoces ... is a person of good moral character, whose integrity is beyond question" 8 ; and the clearance certificates issued by Judge Romeo R. Solis of the City Court of Dumaguete, Provincial Fiscal Andrew S. Namukatkat of Negros Oriental, and City Fiscal Pablo E. Cabahug of Dumaguete City, to the effect that petitioner "is a person of good moral character" and that since his release from the national penitentiary he "has never been accused or convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude." 9
When asked to comment, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, through its then president, Atty. Marcelo D. Fernan, favorably indorsed petitioner's request for reinstatement. On February 13, 1978, Ledesma de Jesus-Paras, complainant in the original disbarment proceedings, filed an opposition to the petitions for reinstatement; and this was followed by a telegram of Nicanor Vailoces, barangay captain of Domolog, Bindoy, Negros, Oriental, addressed to his Excellency, President Ferdinand E. Marcos, and referred to this Court, opposing petitioner's readmission to the bar "on grounds of his non-reformation, immoral conduct and pretensions of being a licensed lawyer." Anent these oppositions, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, through Atty. Fernan, made the following observations:
By resolution of the Court En Banc dated August 24, 1978, the following matters have been referred to the Integrated Bar for comment:
(1) The opposition of complainant Ledesma de Jesus-Paras to respondent's petition and supplementary petition for reinstatement in the roll of attorneys; and (2) The telegram dated February 16, 1978 of Nicanor Vailoces, Barangay Captain of Domolog, Bindoy, Negros Oriental, addressed to his Excellency Ferdinand E. Marcos, requesting the Office of the President to oppose the petition of Quinciano Vailoces for reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys on grounds stated therein.
It may be recalled that on January 17, 1978, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar transmitted to the Honorable Supreme Court for its favorable consideration the above stated petition for reinstatement. Subsequent to its being served with a copy of the resolution of the Supreme Court, the Integrated Bar received a petition dated February 14, 1978 signed by 'the people of the Municipality of Bindoy, Province of Negros Oriental' vehemently opposing the reinstatement of Mr. Vailoces in the Roll of Attorneys. On October 5, 1978 the President of the Integrated Bar wrote to Mr. Vailoces asking him to comment on the above mentioned petitions and telegram. This Office is now in receipt of Mr. Vailoces' comment dated November 3, 1978, which is being forwarded herewith to the Honorable Supreme Court together with other pertinent papers. It is believed that Mr. Vailoces' comment is a satisfactory answer to the adverse
allegations and charges which have been referred to him. The charges of immorality (publicly maintaining a querida) and gambling are general statements devoid of particular allegations of fact and may well be disregarded. Then, too, the Municipal Mayor of Bindoy, Negros Oriental - namely, Mr. Jesus A. Mana-ay - who tops the list of persons who have signed the February 14, 1978 petition vehemently opposing the reinstatement of Mr. Vailoces, appears to be the very same official who on October 25, 1977 issued a Certification to the effect that Mr. Vailoces 'is personally known to me as a person of exemplary character, a peace loving and law abiding citizen' and that 'he is cooperative in all our civic and social activities and that he is one of our respectable citizens in our community.' That this official should now sign a petition containing statements exactly opposite in thrust and tenor is very intriguing, to say the least, and it is not altogether difficult to believe Mr. Vailoces' imputations of politics in the conduct of Mayor Mana-ay. As for the opposition of Mrs. Ledesma de Jesus-Paras, the alleged absence of remorse on the part of Mr. Vailoces, and his alleged belligerence and display of open defiance and hostility, etc. are matters so subjective in character that her general allegations and charges in this regard cannot be properly considered. It is significant that Mr. Vailoces in his comment states: "If she is indeed that much desperately so in need of cash assistance, considering really that she is an old woman being recently widowed the second time, for her satisfaction and as a gesture of goodwill, I am willing to assist her but only with a modest amount because I am only a small farmer with still three college students to support."Regarding the telegram dated February 16, 1978 of one Nicanor Vailoces stating as grounds for denial of Mr. Quinciano D. Vailoces' petition for reinstatement the alleged 'grounds of non-reformation, immoral conduct and pretensions of being a licensed lawyer by soliciting cases,' there is such a lack of specificity and particularity in such statement of grounds that one is at a loss as to how a person in the place of Mr. Quinciano D. Vailoces could properly defend himself against such charges.
Thus, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines reaffirmed its indorsement of petitioner's "reinstatement in the rolls of attorneys." This Court likewise referred the oppositions interposed by Mrs. Ledesma de Jesus-Paras and Nicanor Vailoces to the Solicitor General for investigation and recommendation; and on August 4, 1982, the latter, after conducting an investigation, submitted his report, recommending that "Quinciano D. Vailoces be reinstated in the roll of attorneys upon taking his oath anew of the corresponding oath of office." The Court sustains the conclusion of the Solicitor General that petitioner has sufficiently proven himself fit to be readmitted to the practice of law. True it is that the plenary pardon extended to him by the President does not of itself warrant his reinstatement.
Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled to reinstatement, notwithstanding the attorney has received a pardon following his conviction, and the requirements of reinstatement had been held to be the same as for original admission to the bar, except that the court may require a greater degree of proof than in an original evidence [7 C.J.S. Attorney & Client, Sept. 41, p. 815] The decisive question on an application for reinstatement is whether applicant is 'of good moral character' in the sense in which that phrase is used when applied to attorneys-at-
law and is a fit and proper person to be entrusted with the privileges of the office of an attorney ... [7 C.J.S. Attorney & Client, Sept. 41, p. 816].
Petitioner's conduct after disbarment can stand searching scrutiny. He has regained the respect and confidence of his fellow attorneys as well as of the citizens of his community. The favorable indorsements of both the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and its Negros Oriental Chapter, the testimonials expressed in his behalf by the provincial governor of Negros Oriental as well as the municipal and barrio officials of Bindoy, Negros Oriental, his active participation in civic and social undertakings in the community attest to his moral reform and rehabilitation and justify his reinstatement. Petitioner, now 69 years of age, has reached the twilight of his life. He has been barred from the practice of his profession for a period of 21 years. Adequate punishment has been exacted. Chastened by his painful and humiliating experience, he further "pledges with all his honor ... that if reinstated in the roll of attorneys he will surely and consistently conduct himself honestly, uprightly and worthily." Indeed, there is reasonable expectation that he will endeavor to lead an irreproachable life and maintain steadfast fidelity to the lawyer's oath. WHEREFORE, petitioner Quinciano D. Vailoces is hereby ordered reinstated in the roll of attorneys. SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6713 December 8, 2008ZENAIDA B. GONZALES, petitioner, vs.ATTY. NARCISO PADIERNOS, respondent.D E C I S I O NBRION, J.:Before the Court is the Complaint for Disbarment of Atty. Narciso Padiernos (respondent) filed on May 12, 2003 by Ms. Zenaida B. Gonzales (complainant) with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan conducted the fact-finding investigation on the complaint.Commissioner San Juan submitted a Report and Recommendation1
dated September 10, 2004 to the IBP Board of Governors who approved this Report and Recommendation in a resolution dated November 4, 2004.In a letter2 dated March 14, 2005, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Rogelio A. Vinluan transmitted to the Office of Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (retired) a Notice of Resolution3 and the records of the case.The Factual BackgroundThe complainant alleged in her complaint for disbarment that on three (3) separate occasions the respondent notarized the following documents: (1) a Deed of Absolute Sale4 dated July 16, 1979 which disposed of her property in Jaen, Nueva Ecija in favor of Asterio, Estrella and Rodolfo, all surnamed Gonzales; (2) a Subdivision Agreement5 dated September 7, 1988 which subdivided her property among the same persons; and (3) an affidavit of Non-Tenancy6 dated March 3, 1988 which certified that her property was not tenanted. All three documents were purportedly signed and executed by complainant. All three documents carried forged signatures and falsely certified that the complainant personally appeared before the respondent and that she was "known to me (the respondent) to be the same person who executed the foregoing and acknowledged to me that the same is her own free act and voluntary deed." The complainant claimed that she never appeared before respondent on the dates the documents were notarized because she was then in the United States.The respondent filed his Answer7 on June 16, 2003. He admitted that he notarized the three documents, but denied the "unfounded and malicious imputation" that the three documents contained the complainant's forged signatures. On the false certification aspect, he countered that "with the same or identical facts obtained in the instant case, the Highest Tribunal, the Honorable Supreme Court had this to say – That it is not necessary to know the signatories personally, provided he or she or they signed in the presence of the Notary, alleging that they are the same persons who signed the names."On October 13, 2003, the respondent moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of verification and notification of the date of hearing.8
On December 19, 2003, complainant amended her complaint.9 This time, she charged respondent with gross negligence and failure to exercise the care required by law in the performance of his duties as a notary public, resulting in the loss of her property in Jaen, Nueva Ecija, a 141,497 square meters of mango land covered by TCT NT-29578. The complainant claimed that because of the respondent’s negligent acts, title to her property was transferred to Asterio Gonzales, Estrella Gonzales and Rodolfo Gonzales. She reiterated
that when the three documents disposing of her property were notarized, she was out of the country. Estrella Gonzales Mendrano, one of the vendees, was also outside the country as shown by a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) on September 14, 1989.10 She likewise claimed that Guadalupe Ramirez Gonzales (the widow of Rodolfo Gonzales, another vendee) executed an affidavit describing the "Deed of Absolute Sale and Subdivision Agreement" as spurious and without her husband's participation.11 The affidavit further alleged that the complainant’s signatures were forged and the respondent did not ascertain the identity of the person who came before him and posed as vendor despite the fact that a large tract of land was being ceded and transferred to the vendees.The complainant prayed for the revocation of the respondent's notarial commission and his suspension from the practice of law due to "his deplorable failure to hold the importance of the notarial act and observe [with] utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his duties as a notary public which include the ascertainment that the person who signed the document as the very person who executed and personally appeared before him."On May 3, 2004, the complainant moved that the case be considered submitted for resolution in view of respondent's failure to answer the amended complaint.12
The IBP FindingsIn her report to the IBP Board of Governors,13 Commissioner San Juan categorically noted the respondent’s admission that he notarized the three documents in question – the Deed of Absolute Sale on July 16, 1979; the Subdivision Agreement on September 7, 1988 and the affidavit of Non-Tenancy on March 3, 1988. Commissioner San Juan also noted that the complainant’s documentary evidence supported her claim that she never executed these documents and never appeared before the respondent to acknowledge the execution of these documents. These documentary evidence consisted of the certification from the BID that complainant did not travel to the Philippines on the dates the documents were allegedly notarized;14
and the affidavit of Guadalupe Ramirez Gonzales described above.15
Commissioner San Juan found that the respondent had no participation in the preparation or knowledge of the falsity of the spurious documents, and found merit in the complainant's contention that the respondent "was negligent in the performance of his duties as a notary public." She faulted the respondent for not demanding proof of the identity of the person who claimed to be complainant Zenaida Gonzales when the documents were presented to him for notarization. She concluded that the respondent failed to exercise the diligence required of him as notary public to ensure the integrity of the presented documents. She recommended that the respondent's notarial commission be revoked and that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three months.The Court's RulingRule II of the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice16 provides:
SECTION 1. Acknowledgment. - "Acknowledgment" refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and present an integrally complete instrument on document;(b) is attested to be personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and(c) represents to the notary public that the signature on the instrument or document was voluntarily affixed by him for the purpose stated in the instrument or document, declares that he has executed the instrument or document as his free and voluntary act and deed, and, if he acts in a particular representative capacity that he has the authority to sign in that capacity."
Under the given facts, the respondent clearly failed to faithfully comply with the foregoing rules when he notarized the three documents subject of the present complaint. The respondent did not know the complainant personally, yet he did not require proof of identity from the person who appeared before him and executed and authenticated the three documents. The IBP Report observed that had the respondent done so, "the fraudulent transfer of complainant's property could have been prevented."Through his negligence in the performance of his duty as a notary public resulting in the loss of property of an unsuspecting private citizen, the respondent eroded the complainant’s and the public’s confidence in the notarial system; he brought disrepute to the system. As we held in Pantoja Mumar vs. Flores,17 he thereby breached Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (which requires lawyers to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes) as well as Rule 1.01
of the same Code (which prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct).The respondent should be reminded that a notarial document is, on its face and by authority of law, entitled to full faith and credit. For this reason, notaries public must observe utmost care in complying with the formalities intended to ensure the integrity of the notarized document and the act or acts it embodies.18
We are not persuaded by the respondent's argument that this Court, in a similar case or one with identical facts, said "that it is not necessary to know the signatories personally provided he or she or they signed in the presence of the notary, alleging that they are the persons who signed the names." The respondent not only failed to identify the cited case; he apparently also cited it out of context. A notary public is duty bound to require the person executing a document to be personally present, and to swear before him that he is the person named in the document and is voluntarily and freely executing the act mentioned in the document.19 The notary public faithfully discharges this duty by at least verifying the identity of the person appearing before him based on the identification papers presented.For violating his duties as a lawyer and as a notary public, as well as for the grave injustice inflicted on the complainant, it is only proper that the respondent be penalized and suffer the consequences of his acts. We note in this regard that in her amended complaint, the complainant no longer sought the disbarment of respondent; she confined herself to the revocation of the respondent’s notarial commission and his suspension from the practice of law. Thus, the recommendation of the IBP is for revocation of his notarial commission and for his suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months. We approve this recommendation as a sanction commensurate with the transgression committed by the respondent as a member of the bar and as a notary public.WHEREFORE, premises considered, ATTY. NARCISO PADIERNOS of 103 Del Pilar Street, Cabanatuan City, is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS, and his notarial commission is hereby REVOKED.SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7036 June 29, 2009JUDGE LILY LYDIA A. LAQUINDANUM, Complainant, vs.ATTY. NESTOR Q. QUINTANA, Respondent.D E C I S I O NPUNO, CJ.:This administrative case against Atty. Nestor Q. Quintana (Atty. Quintana) stemmed from a letter1 addressed to the Court filed by Executive Judge Lily Lydia A. Laquindanum (Judge Laquindanum) of the Regional Trial Court of Midsayap, Cotabato requesting that proper disciplinary action be imposed on him for performing notarial functions in Midsayap, Cotabato, which is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court that issued his notarial commission, and for allowing his wife to do notarial acts in his absence.In her letter, Judge Laquindanum alleged that pursuant to A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, executive judges are required to closely monitor the activities of notaries public within the territorial bounds of their jurisdiction and to see to it that notaries public shall not extend notarial functions beyond the limits of their authority. Hence, she wrote a letter2 to Atty. Quintana directing him to stop notarizing documents within the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Midsayap, Cotabato (which is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court that issued his notarial commission for Cotabato City and the Province of Maguindanao) since certain documents3 notarized by him had been reaching her office. However, despite such directive, respondent continuously performed notarial functions in Midsayap, Cotabato as evidenced by: (1) the Affidavit of Loss of ATM Card4 executed by Kristine C. Guro; and (2) the Affidavit of Loss of Driver’s License5 executed by Elenita D. Ballentes. Under Sec. 11, Rule III6 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Atty. Quintana could not extend his notarial acts beyond Cotabato City and the Province of Maguindanao because Midsayap, Cotabato is not part of Cotabato City or the Province of Maguindanao. Midsayap is part of the Province of Cotabato. The City within the province of Cotabato is Kidapawan City, and not Cotabato City.Judge Laquindanum also alleged that, upon further investigation of the matter, it was discovered that it was Atty. Quintana’s wife who performed notarial acts whenever he was out of the office as attested to by the Joint Affidavit7 executed by Kristine C. Guro and Elenita D. Ballentes. In a Resolution dated February 14, 2006,8 we required Atty. Quintana to comment on the letter of Judge Laquindanum.In his Response,9 Atty. Quintana alleged that he filed a petition for notarial commission before Branch 18, Regional Trial Court,
Midsayap, Cotabato. However, the same was not acted upon by Judge Laquindanum for three weeks. He alleged that the reason for Judge Laquindanum’s inaction was that she questioned his affiliation with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Cotabato City Chapter, and required him to be a member of IBP Kidapawan City Chapter and to obtain a Certification of Payments from the latter chapter. Because of this, he opted to withdraw his petition. After he withdrew his petition, he claimed that Judge Laquindanum sent a clerk from her office to ask him to return his petition, but he did not oblige because at that time he already had a Commission for Notary Public10 issued by Executive Judge Reno E. Concha of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cotabato City. Atty. Quintana lamented that he was singled out by Judge Laquindanum, because the latter immediately issued notarial commissions to other lawyers without asking for so many requirements. However, when it came to him, Judge Laquindanum even tracked down all his pleadings; communicated with his clients; and disseminated information through letters, pronouncements, and directives to court clerks and other lawyers to humiliate him and be ostracized by fellow lawyers. Atty. Quintana argued that he subscribed documents in his office at Midsayap, Cotabato; and Midsayap is part of the Province of Cotabato. He contended that he did not violate any provision of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, because he was equipped with a notarial commission. He maintained that he did not act outside the province of Cotabato since Midsayap, Cotabato, where he practices his legal profession and subscribes documents, is part of the province of Cotabato. He claimed that as a lawyer of good moral standing, he could practice his legal profession in the entire Philippines.Atty. Quintana further argued that Judge Laquindanum had no authority to issue such directive, because only Executive Judge Reno E. Concha, who issued his notarial commission, and the Supreme Court could prohibit him from notarizing in the Province of Cotabato. In a Resolution dated March 21, 2006,11 we referred this case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for investigation, report and recommendation.In the February 28, 2007 Hearing12 before the OBC presided by Atty. Ma. Crisitina B. Layusa (Hearing Officer), Judge Laquindanum presented a Deed of Donation,13 which was notarized by Atty. Quintana in 2004.14 Honorata Rosil appears as one of the signatories of the document as the donor’s wife. However, Honorata Rosil died on March 12, 2003, as shown by the Certificate of Death15 issued by the Civil Registrar of Ibohon, Cotabato.Judge Laquindanum testified that Atty. Quintana continued to notarize documents in the years 2006 to 2007 despite the fact that his commission as notary public for and in the Province of Maguindanao and Cotabato City had already expired on December 31, 2005, and he had not renewed the same.16 To support her claim, Judge Laquindanum presented the following: (1) Affidavit of Loss [of] Title17 executed by Betty G. Granada with subscription dated April 8, 2006 at Cotabato City; (2) Certificate of Candidacy18 of Mr. Elias Diosanta Arabis with subscription dated July 18, 2006; (3) Affidavit of Loss [of] Driver’s License19 executed by Anecito C. Bernabe with subscription dated February 20, 2007 at Midsayap, Cotabato; and (4) Affidavit of Loss20 executed by Santos V. Magbanua with subscription dated February 22, 2007 at Midsayap, Cotabato.For his part, Atty. Quintana admitted that all the signatures appearing in the documents marked as exhibits of Judge Laquindanum were his except for the following: (1) Affidavit of Loss of ATM Card21
executed by Kristine C. Guro; and (2) Affidavit of Loss of Driver’s License22 executed by Elenita D. Ballentes; and (3) Affidavit of Loss23 executed by Santos V. Magbanua. He explained that those documents were signed by his wife and were the result of an entrapment operation of Judge Laquindanum: to let somebody bring and have them notarized by his wife, when they knew that his wife is not a lawyer. He also denied the he authorized his wife to notarize documents. According to him, he slapped his wife and told her to stop doing it as it would ruin his profession.Atty. Quintana also claimed that Judge Laquindanum did not act on his petition, because he did not comply with her requirements for him to transfer his membership to the Kidapawan Chapter, wherein her sister, Atty. Aglepa, is the IBP President.On the one hand, Judge Laquindanum explained that she was only performing her responsibility and had nothing against Atty. Quintana. The reason why she did not act on his petition was that he had not paid his IBP dues,24 which is a requirement before a notarial commission may be granted. She told his wife to secure a certification of payment from the IBP, but she did not return.This was denied by Atty. Quintana, who claimed that he enclosed in his Response the certification of good standing and payments of his IBP dues. However, when the same was examined, there were no documents attached thereto. Due to oversight, Atty. Quintana prayed
that he be given time to send them later which was granted by the Hearing Officer.Finally, Atty. Quintana asked for forgiveness for what he had done and promised not to repeat the same. He also asked that he be given another chance and not be divested of his privilege to notarize, as it was the only bread and butter of his family. On March 5, 2007, Atty. Quintana submitted to the OBC the documents25 issued by the IBP Cotabato City Chapter to prove that he had paid his IBP dues. In a Manifestation26 dated March 9, 2007, Judge Laquindanum submitted a Certification27 and its entries show that Atty. Quintana paid his IBP dues for the year 2005 only on January 9, 2006 per Official Receipt (O.R.) No. 610381. Likewise, the arrears of his IBP dues for the years 1993, 1995, 1996, and 1998 to 2003 were also paid only on January 9, 2006 per O.R. No. 610387. Hence, when he filed his petition for notarial commission in 2004, he had not yet completely paid his IBP dues.In its Report and Recommendation,28 the OBC recommended that Atty. Quintana be disqualified from being appointed as a notary public for two (2) years; and that if his notarial commission still exists, the same should be revoked for two (2) years. The OBC found the defenses and arguments raised by Atty. Quintana to be without merit, viz:Apparently, respondent has extended his notarial acts in Midsayap and Kabacan, Cotabato, which is already outside his territorial jurisdiction to perform as Notary Public.Section 11 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides, thus:"Jurisdiction and Term – A person commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts in any place within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a period of two (2) years commencing the first day of January of the year in which the commissioning court is made, unless earlier revoked [or] the notary public has resigned under these Rules and the Rules of Court.Under the rule[,] respondent may perform his notarial acts within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning Executive Judge Concha, which is in Cotabato City and the [P]rovince of Maguindanao only. But definitely he cannot extend his commission as notary public in Midsayap or Kabacan and in any place of the province of Cotabato as he is not commissioned thereat to do such act. Midsayap and Kabacan are not part of either Cotabato City or [P]rovince of Maguindanao but part of the province of North Cotabato. Thus, the claim of respondent that he can exercise his notarial commission in Midsayap, Cotabato because Cotabato City is part of the province of Cotabato is absolutely devoid of merit.xxxxFurther, evidence on record also shows that there are several documents which the respondent’s wife has herself notarized. Respondent justifies that he cannot be blamed for the act of his wife as he did not authorize the latter to notarize documents in his absence. According to him[,] he even scolded and told his wife not to do it anymore as it would affect his profession.In the case of Lingan v. Calubaquib et al., Adm. Case No. 5377, June 15, 2006 the Court held, thus:"A notary public is personally accountable for all entries in his notarial register; He cannot relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the buck to their (sic) secretaries"A person who is commissioned as a notary public takes full responsibility for all the entries in his notarial register. Respondent cannot take refuge claiming that it was his wife’s act and that he did not authorize his wife to notarize documents. He is personally accountable for the activities in his office as well as the acts of his personnel including his wife, who acts as his secretary.Likewise, evidence reveals that respondent notarized in 2004 a Deed of Donation (Rollo, p. 79) wherein, (sic) Honorata Rosel (Honorata Rosil) one of the affiants therein, was already dead at the time of notarization as shown in a Certificate of Death (Rollo, p.80) issued by the Civil Registrar General of Libungan, Cotabato.Sec. 2, (b), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides, thus[:]"A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document (1) is not in the notary’s presence personally at the time of the notarization; and (2) is not personally known to the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules."Clearly, in notarizing a Deed of Donation without even determining the presence or qualifications of affiants therein, respondent only shows his gross negligence and ignorance of the provisions of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.xxxxFurthermore, respondent claims that he, being a lawyer in good standing, has the right to practice his profession including notarial acts in the entire Philippines. This statement is barren of merit.
While it is true that lawyers in good standing are allowed to engage in the practice of law in the Philippines.(sic) However, not every lawyer even in good standing can perform notarial functions without having been commissioned as notary public as specifically provided for under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. He must have submitted himself to the commissioning court by filing his petition for issuance of his notarial (sic) Notarial Practice. The commissioning court may or may not grant the said petition if in his sound discretion the petitioner does not meet the required qualifications for [a] Notary Public. Since respondent herein did not submit himself to the procedural rules for the issuance of the notarial commission, he has no reason at all to claim that he can perform notarial act[s] in the entire country for lack of authority to do so.Likewise, contrary to the belief of respondent, complainant being the commissioning court in Midsayap, Cotabato has the authority under Rule XI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice to monitor the duties and responsibilities including liabilities, if any, of a notary public commissioned or those performing notarial acts without authority in her territorial jurisdiction.29
xxxxWe adopt the findings of the OBC. However, we find the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months and revocation and suspension of Atty. Quintana's notarial commission for two (2) years more appropriate considering the gravity and number of his offenses. After a careful review of the records and evidence, there is no doubt that Atty. Quintana violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and the Code of Professional Responsibility when he committed the following acts: (1) he notarized documents outside the area of his commission as a notary public; (2) he performed notarial acts with an expired commission; (3) he let his wife notarize documents in his absence; and (4) he notarized a document where one of the signatories therein was already dead at that time.The act of notarizing documents outside one’s area of commission is not to be taken lightly. Aside from being a violation of Sec. 11 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, it also partakes of malpractice of law and falsification.30 Notarizing documents with an expired commission is a violation of the lawyer’s oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Since the public is deceived into believing that he has been duly commissioned, it also amounts to indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer's oath proscribes.31 Notarizing documents without the presence of the signatory to the document is a violation of Sec. 2(b)(1), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice,32 Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the lawyer’s oath which unconditionally requires lawyers not to do or declare any falsehood. Finally, Atty. Quintana is personally accountable for the documents that he admitted were signed by his wife. He cannot relieve himself of liability by passing the blame to his wife. He is, thus, guilty of violating Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers not to directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law.All told, Atty. Quintana fell miserably short of his obligation under Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. That Atty. Quintana relies on his notarial commission as the sole source of income for his family will not serve to lessen the penalty that should be imposed on him. On the contrary, we feel that he should be reminded that a notarial commission should not be treated as a money-making venture. It is a privilege granted only to those who are qualified to perform duties imbued with public interest. As we have declared on several occasions, notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. The protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon the public, the courts, and the administrative offices in general. It must be underscored that notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document, making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of the authenticity thereof.33
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the notarial commission of Atty. Nestor Q. Quintana, if still existing, is hereby REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as notary public for a period of two (2) years. He is also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective immediately, with a WARNING that the repetition of a similar violation will be dealt with even more severely. He is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Decision to enable this Court to determine when his suspension shall take effect.1avvphi1Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal records of respondent as a member of the Bar, and copies furnished the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country. SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7860 January 15, 2009AVELINO O. ANGELES, LAURO O. ANGELES, MARIA O. ANGELES, ROSALINA O. ANGELES, CONNIE M. ANGELES, Complainants, vs.ATTY. AMADO O. IBAÑEZ, Respondent.D E C I S I O NCARPIO, J.:The CaseThis is a complaint filed by Avelino O. Angeles, Maria O. Angeles, Lauro O. Angeles, Rosalina O. Angeles, and Connie M. Angeles in representation of the deceased Loreto Angeles (collectively, complainants) against Atty. Amado O. Ibañez (respondent) for disbarment for notarizing the "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale" without a notarial commission and in the absence of the affiants.The FactsThe facts of CBD Case No. 06-1830, as stated in the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), read as follows:II. Statement of the ComplaintComplainants ... are residents of Highway, Sapang I, Ternate, Cavite. Respondent Atty. Amado Ibañez is a practicing lawyer who holds office at 2101 Carolina (now Madre Ignacia) St., Malate, Manila.The lengthy and confusing narrative of what appears to be a bitter land dispute notwithstanding, it can be gleaned from the Complaint and Position Paper, and the personal clarification by the complainants themselves after questioning by the undersigned during the Mandatory Conference, that the present administrative case is limited to an "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale" which respondent Atty. Amado Ibañez allegedly notarized in the City of Manila on 18 February 1979, and entered in his Notarial Book as Doc. No. 735, p. 157 and Book No. II, Series of 1979. The complainants denied that they executed the said document or that they ever appeared before respondent Atty. Ibañez for this purpose. They alleged that respondent Atty. Ibañez did not even have the authority to notarize the "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale" as he did not have a commission as a notary public at that time.The complainants alleged that the respondent and his relatives are presently using the said document in judicial proceedings pending before the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite to their damage and prejudice.The complainants contend that respondent Atty. Ibañez’s act of notarizing the "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale" without requiring the presence of the parties thereto, and despite his alleged lack of a notarial commission, constitutes professional misconduct for which reason he should be disbarred.In support of their allegations, the complainants attached to their Complaint and Position Paper the following documents:
1. Tax Declaration Nos. 20-004-00052, 1356, 1809 in the name of Barselisa Angeles, and Tax Declarations 198, 283, 403 and 1544, in the name of Juan Angeles.2. Certification dated 24 March 2006 issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Manila stating that the Master List of Notaries Public shows that Atty. Amado O. Ibañez was not appointed as such for and in the City of Manila for the year 1976-1977.3. Certification dated 28 April 2006 issued by the National Archives stating that there is no notarial record on file with the said office of Amado Ibañez, a notary public for and within the City of Manila, and it has no copy on file of an affidavit allegedly executed by Gabriel, Estebana, Eutiquio, Gloria, Leocadio, Jovita, Samonte, and Renato, all surnamed Angeles, ratified sometime in 1977 by the said notary public and acknowledged as Doc. No. 202, Page No. 42, Book No. 1, Series of 1977.4. Certification dated 11 April 2006 issued by the National Archives stating that there is no notarial record on file with the said office of Amado Ibañez, a notary public for and within the City of Manila, and it has no copy on file of a partition w/renunciation [sic] and affidavit allegedly executed by and among Gabriela, Estebana, Eutiquio, Gloria, Leocadio, Jovita, Samonte and Renato, all surnamed Angeles, ratified sometime in 1977 by the said notary public and acknowledged as Doc. No. 201, Page No. 41, Series of 1977.5. Two (2) versions of a "Partihang Labas sa Hukuman at Ganap na Bilihan" dated 28 March 1978, executed by and between Gloria Angeles, Leocadio Angeles and Gabriela,
Estebana, Eutiquio, Jovita, Samonte and Renato, all surnamed Torres.6. Flow chart showing the history of Tax Declaration No. 403, from 1948 to 1974.7. Application for Free Patent over Cadastral Lot No. 460-C of the Ternate Cadastral Sketching (CADS-617-D), SWO-04-000598 and Cadastral Lot No. 460-B, executed by Atty. Amado O. Ibañez.8. Certification dated 24 March 2006 issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Manila stating that the Master List of Notaries Public shows that Atty. Amado O. Ibañez was not appointed as such for and in the year 1978-1979.9. "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale" (with various marginal notes made by the complainants) notarized by Atty. Amado Ibañez in the City of Manila on 18 February 1979, and entered in his Notarial Book as Doc. No. 735, p. 147 and Book No. II, Series of 1979.10. Real Estate Mortgage executed by Flora Olano in favor of the Rural Bank of Naic, Inc., in the amount of Php350.00, covering property located in Zapang, Ternate, Cavite and described in Tax Declaration No. 1657-1658.11. Certification dated 12 January 2007 issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Trece Martires City stating that Atty. Amado O. Ibañez was not duly commissioned as a notaryt [sic] public for and within the Province of Cavite in the year 1979, and that it has no copy in its records of an "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale" allegedly notarized by Atty. Amado Ibañez on 18 February 1979 and entered in his Notarial Book as Doc. No. 735, p. 147 and Book No. II. Series of 1979.
III. Respondents’ Position/DefenseIn his Motion to Dismiss and Position Paper, respondent Atty. Ibañez contended that the complainants are guilty of forum-shopping inasmuch as they had previously filed the same complaint, docketed as Administrative Case No. 3581, which was eventually dismissed by then IBP CBD Comm. Victor Fernandez.The respondent admitted that he notarized the "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale" but clarified that he did so as Notary Public of the Province of Cavite, with a notarial commission issued by the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 1, Trece Martires City. He explained that the designation of "Manila" as the place of execution of the said document was a mistake of his former legal secretary, who failed to correct the same through oversight.Respondent Atty. Ibañez alleged that he notarized the "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale" in his capacity as the official Notary Public of Puerto Azul, and the same was actually prepared and typewritten by complainant Rosalina Angeles for a consideration of Php20,000.00 as evidenced by a photocopy of Commercial Bank & Trust Co. Cashier’s Check dated 31 January 1979 on file with the Puerto Azul office, as well as an "Exclusive Authority" attached to the said document. The respondent also alleged that complainant Rosalina Angeles was at that time employed as a typist at Puerto Azul and that she enjoyed the trust and confidence of the Puerto Azul management.The respondent stated that the land subject of the sale was surveyed for Mrs. Trinidad Diaz-Enriquez by the late Angel Salvacion, the official surveyor of Puerto Azul, and was submitted to the Bureau of Lands for verification and approval and was approved on 14 February 1985 as CCN No. 04-000038-D. Respondent Atty. Ibañez alleged that the property is presently in the actual possession of Puerto Azul, with former Sapang I Bgy. Captain Johnny Andra as tenant.The respondent alleged that Puerto Azul’s ownership of the property is anchored on the "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale," which is in turn the subject of a case, CA GR SP No. 2006-1668, which is presently pending in the Court of Appeals.Respondent Atty. Ibañez alleged that a defect in the notarization of a document of sale does not invalidate the transaction, and he stated that his failure to require the presence of the parties to the "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale" is wholly justified because of the assurance of complainant Rosalina Angeles that the signatures appearing in the said document were indeed those of her co-heirs. The respondent also alleged that almost all the complainants submitted their residence certificates, the numbers of which were recorded in the acknowledgement portion of the document.The respondent denied that he had committed any crime when he notarized the "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale" because the offenses in the Revised Penal Code are "mala in se" where the intention to commit the crime is required, which is lacking in his case. The respondent added that there is regularity in the performance of his duty as the official notary public of Puerto Azul.
The respondent pointed out that nearly twenty eight (28) years have lapsed without anyone questioning not only the sale of the said property, but Puerto Azul’s long possession of the same as well. He alleged that the complainants are now denying the sale because they want to make it appear that they have land within or adjoining a quarry site which they have invaded and taken over. He reiterated that the defect in his notarization of the sale document notwithstanding, the sale remains valid.By way of his defense, respondent Atty. Ibañez submitted the following documents:
1. Photocopy of a Supreme Court Resolution dated 31 July 2000 denying the complainants’ motion for reconsideration in Administrative Case No. 3581, entitled "Rosalina Angeles, et al. vs. Atty. Amado Ibañez"2. Photocopy of IBP Board of Governors Resolution dated 27 June 1999, adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation of Comm. Victor Fernandez dismissing Administrative Case No. 3581, entitled "Rosalina Angeles, et al. vs. Atty. Amado Ibañez"3. Photocopy of a Counter-Affidavit filed by Atty. Amado Ibañez in OMB-1-C 06-0368-C/OMB-L C 06-0272-C, entitled "Mario O. Angeles vs. Sony Peji, et al.,"4. "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale" notarized by Atty. Amado Ibañez in the City of Manila on 18 February 1979, and entered in his Notarial Book as Doc. No. 735, p. 147 and Book No. II, Series of 1979, with attached "Exclusive Authority" executed by Maria Angeles, Flora Angeles, Lauro Angeles and Avelino Angeles in favor of Rosalina Angeles.1
The IBP’s Report and RecommendationIn a Report2 dated 21 January 2008, IBP Commissioner for Bar Discipline Rico A. Limpingco (Commissioner Limpingco) found that respondent notarized the "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale" in the absence of affiants and without a notarial commission. Thus:As stated earlier, the present administrative complaint may seem at first to be one for falsification, land grabbing, etc., but a closer examination of the complainants’ allegations coupled with their own verbal confirmation during the Mandatory Conference, shows that the complainants are actually accusing respondent Atty. Amado Ibañez of notarizing an "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale" in the City of Manila on 18 February 1979 (entered in his Notarial Book as Doc. No. 735, p. 147 and Book No. II, Series of 1979) without requiring the presence of the parties thereto, and further, for notarizing the said document even if he did not have a notarial commission at that time.The respondent contends that the complainants have previously filed the same administrative complaint against him, docketed as Administrative Case No. 3581, and that the same was eventually dismissed by the Supreme Court. He alleged that as in this prior complaint, the present case must likewise be dismissed for forum shopping.It appears, however, that Administrative Case No. 3581 is entirely different and distinct from the present complaint. A reading of the photocopy of IBP Board of Governors Resolution dated 27 June 1999, adopting and approving the attached Report and Recommendation of Comm. Victor Fernandez dismissing Administrative Case No. 3581, entitled "Rosalina Angeles, et al. vs. Atty. Amado Ibañez" (as attached by the respondent himself in his Motion to Dismiss) shows that this earlier complaint pertains to herein respondent’s alleged "land-grabbing" of two (2) parcels of land in Bgy. Zapang, Ternate, Cavite. As stated in the report authored by then Commissioner Victor Fernandez, the earlier administrative case relates to the sale of the said property to the Sps. Danilo Andra and Angela Olano, and its subsequent sale to the respondent, Atty. Amado Ibañez, who for his part later applied for, and was granted, free patent titles over the same. Branding the transaction as land-grabbing, the complainants filed an action in court to recover possession and annul the titles but the case was eventually dismissed by the Supreme Court for lack of merit. The complainants then filed the same complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman, the Dept. of Justice, the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Supreme Court, which eventually referred the matter to the IBP. In his report, then-Commissioner Victor Fernandez declared that the complainants were engaged in forum-shopping, reasoning that unsuccessful in their effort to obtain the result they desire from the courts, they would attempt to refile their dismissed action under the guise of an administrative case.The present administrative complaint may be in one way or another related to the alleged land-grabbing which was the subject of Administrative Case No. 3581, but it pertains to an altogether different matter. In the present complaint, respondent Atty. Ibañez is not being accused of land-grabbing or falsification, but rather, for misconduct in notarizing a document.
We would point out that respondent Atty. Amado Ibañez admitted that he did not require the presence of the parties to the document because he was assured as to the authenticity of their signatures. We would also stress that the respondent never denied that he notarized the "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale," but claimed that he did so not in Manila as stated in document, but in Cavite where he claimed to be a commissioned notary public; he attributed the mistake to his legal secretary, and he insisted that the sale remained valid despite the defects in notarization.That is not the point, however. The validity of the transaction covered by the "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale" is not at issue in this administrative case for that is a matter for the courts to adjudicate, if they have not already done so.As it is, no less than the respondent himself categorically admitted that he notarized the "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale" in the absence of the parties thereto. To make matters worse, the certifications submitted by the complainants clearly indicate that respondent Atty. Amado Ibañez did not have any notarial commission whether for Manila or Cavite, in 18 February 1979 when he notarized the subject document. The respondent, for his part, has been completely unable to proffer any kind of proof of his claim that he had a commission as a notary public for and in the Province of Cavite in 1979, or of his submission of notarial reports and notarial register during the said period.x x xWhile the case of respondent Atty. Amado Ibañez is not perfectly identical to the facts and circumstances obtaining in these cases, his act of notarizing a document without the necessary commission is nonetheless clear and undeniable. Guided by the foregoing rulings of the Supreme Court vis-a-vis the facts in the present complaint, it is therefore respectfully recommended that respondent Atty. Amado Ibañez:
1. Be barred from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2) years, and in the event that he is presently commissioned as a notary public, that his commission be immediately revoked and suspended for such period; and2. Be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
Respectfully submitted.3 (Emphasis added)In a Resolution4 dated 6 February 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Limpingco. The Office of the Bar Confidant received the notice of the Resolution and the records of the case on 10 April 2008.Respondent filed a supplemental position paper on 28 May 2008 before the IBP Board of Governors. In a Resolution dated 29 May 2008, the IBP Board of Governors referred respondent’s submission to the Office of the Bar Confidant. Respondent attached photocopies of the following: respondent’s Petition for Commission as Notary Public for and within the Province of Cavite filed before the said Court on 16 February 1978; respondent’s commission as Notary Public for the province of Cavite for the term 1978 until 1979 issued by Executive Judge Pablo D. Suarez on 21 February 1978; and respondent’s oath of office as notary public dated 21 February 1978.The Ruling of the CourtWe sustain the findings of the IBP and adopt its recommendations with modification. Respondent violated his oath as a lawyer and the Code of Professional Responsibility when he notarized the "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale" in the absence of the affiants.Respondent Notarized the "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale" in the Absence of the AffiantsRespondent himself admits that he merely relied on the representation of Rosalina Angeles that the signatures appearing on the "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale" subject of the present complaint are those of her co-heirs.5 Respondent claims that he reposed confidence upon Rosalina Angeles because she is his confidential secretary. Unfortunately for respondent, he cannot exculpate himself from the consequences of his recklessness and his failure to comply with the requirements of the law by relying on his confidential secretary.Time and again, we have reminded lawyers commissioned as notaries public that the affiants must personally appear before them. Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103, or the Notarial Law, provides:Sec. 1. (a) The acknowledgement shall be before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgements of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgement shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same person who executed it, acknowledged that the same is his free act
and deed. The certificate shall be made under the official seal, if he is required by law to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.Section 2(b) of Rule IV of the Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004 reads:A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document -
(1) is not in the notary’s presence personally at the time of the notarization; and(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
The physical presence of the affiants enables the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signatures of the acknowledging parties and to ascertain that the document is the parties’ free act and deed.6 Notarization of a private document converts such document into a public one, and renders it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument. Notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages public interest in a substantial degree and the protection of that interest requires preventing those who are not qualified or authorized to act as notaries public from imposing upon the public and the courts and administrative offices generally.7
Under the facts and circumstances of the case, respondent’s notarial commission should not only be suspended but respondent must also be suspended from the practice of law.WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Amado O. Ibañez GUILTY of notarizing the "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale" in the absence of the affiants. Accordingly, the Court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one year, REVOKES his incumbent notarial commission, if any, and PROHIBITS him from being commissioned as a notary public for one year, effective immediately, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent’s personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 8010 June 16, 2009KELD STEMMERIK, represented by ATTYS. HERMINIO A. LIWANAG and WINSTON P.L. ESGUERRA, Complainant, vs.ATTY. LEONUEL N. MAS, Respondent.R E S O L U T I O NPer Curiam:Complainant Keld Stemmerik is a citizen and resident of Denmark. In one of his trips to the Philippines, he was introduced to respondent Atty. Leonuel N. Mas. That was his misfortune.In one visit to the Philippines, complainant marveled at the beauty of the country and expressed his interest in acquiring real property in the Philippines. He consulted respondent who advised him that he could legally acquire and own real property in the Philippines. Respondent even suggested an 86,998 sq.m. property in Quarry, Agusuin, Cawag, Subic, Zambales with the assurance that the property was alienable.Trusting respondent, complainant agreed to purchase the property through respondent as his representative or attorney-in-fact. Complainant also engaged the services of respondent for the preparation of the necessary documents. For this purpose, respondent demanded and received a P400,000 fee.Confident that respondent would faithfully carry out his task, complainant returned to Denmark, entrusting the processing of the necessary paperwork to respondent.Thereafter, respondent prepared a contract to sell the property between complainant, represented by respondent, and a certain Bonifacio de Mesa, the purported owner of the property.1
Subsequently, respondent prepared and notarized a deed of sale in which de Mesa sold and conveyed the property to a certain Ailyn Gonzales for P3.8 million.2 Respondent also drafted and notarized an agreement between complainant and Gonzales stating that it was complainant who provided the funds for the purchase of the property.3 Complainant then gave respondent the full amount of the purchase price (P3.8 million) for which respondent issued an acknowledgment receipt.4
After the various contracts and agreements were executed, complainant tried to get in touch with respondent to inquire about when the property could be registered in his name. However, respondent suddenly became scarce and refused to answer complainant’s calls and e-mail messages.When complainant visited the Philippines again in January 2005, he engaged the services of the Jimenez Gonzales Liwanag Bello Valdez
Caluya & Fernandez Law Office to ascertain the status of the property he supposedly bought. He was devastated to learn that aliens could not own land under Philippine laws. Moreover, verification at the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources in Olongapo City revealed that the property was inalienable as it was situated within the former US Military Reservation.5 The CENRO also stated that the property was not subject to disposition or acquisition under Republic Act No. 141.6
Thereafter, complainant, through his attorneys-in-fact,7 exerted diligent efforts to locate respondent for purposes of holding him accountable for his fraudulent acts. Inquiry with the Olongapo Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) disclosed that respondent was in arrears in his annual dues and that he had already abandoned his law office in Olongapo City.8 Search of court records of cases handled by respondent only yielded his abandoned office address in Olongapo City.1avvphi1Complainant filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent in the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP.9 He deplored respondent’s acts of serious misconduct. In particular, he sought the expulsion of respondent from the legal profession for gravely misrepresenting that a foreigner could legally acquire land in the Philippines and for maliciously absconding with complainant’s P3.8 million.10
Respondent failed to file his answer and position paper despite service of notice at his last known address. Neither did he appear in the scheduled mandatory conference. In this connection, the CBD found that respondent abandoned his law practice in Olongapo City after his transaction with complainant and that he did not see it fit to contest the charges against him.11
The CBD ruled that respondent used his position as a lawyer to mislead complainant on the matter of land ownership by a foreigner.12
He even went through the motion of preparing falsified and fictitious contracts, deeds and agreements. And for all these shameless acts, he collected P400,000 from complainant. Worse, he pocketed the P3.8 million and absconded with it.13
The CBD found respondent to be "nothing more than an embezzler" who misused his professional status as an attorney as a tool for deceiving complainant and absconding with complainant’s money.14
Respondent was dishonest and deceitful. He abused the trust and confidence reposed by complainant in him. The CBD recommended the disbarment of respondent.15
The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted the findings and recommendation of the CBD with the modification that respondent was further required to return the amount of P4.2 million to respondent.16
We agree with the IBP.Sufficiency Of Notice OfThe Disbarment Proceedings We shall first address a threshold issue: was respondent properly given notice of the disbarment proceedings against him? Yes.The respondent did not file any answer or position paper, nor did he appear during the scheduled mandatory conference. Respondent in fact abandoned his last known address, his law office in Olongapo City, after he committed the embezzlement. Respondent should not be allowed to benefit from his disappearing act. He can neither defeat this Court’s jurisdiction over him as a member of the bar nor evade administrative liability by the mere ruse of concealing his whereabouts. Thus, service of the complaint and other orders and processes on respondent’s office was sufficient notice to him.Indeed, since he himself rendered the service of notice on him impossible, the notice requirement cannot apply to him and he is thus considered to have waived it. The law does not require that the impossible be done. Nemo tenetur ad impossibile.17 The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility. Laws and rules must be interpreted in a way that they are in accordance with logic, common sense, reason and practicality.18
In this connection, lawyers must update their records with the IBP by informing the IBP National Office or their respective chapters19 of any change in office or residential address and other contact details.20
In case such change is not duly updated, service of notice on the office or residential address appearing in the records of the IBP National Office shall constitute sufficient notice to a lawyer for purposes of administrative proceedings against him.Respondent’s Administrative InfractionsAnd His Liability ThereforLawyers, as members of a noble profession, have the duty to promote respect for the law and uphold the integrity of the bar. As men and women entrusted with the law, they must ensure that the law functions to protect liberty and not as an instrument of oppression or deception.
Respondent has been weighed by the exacting standards of the legal profession and has been found wanting.Respondent committed a serious breach of his oath as a lawyer. He is also guilty of culpable violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the code of ethics of the legal profession.All lawyers take an oath to support the Constitution, to obey the laws and to do no falsehood.21 That oath is neither mere formal ceremony nor hollow words. It is a sacred trust that should be upheld and kept inviolable at all times.22
Lawyers are servants of the law23 and the law is their master. They should not simply obey the laws, they should also inspire respect for and obedience thereto by serving as exemplars worthy of emulation. Indeed, that is the first precept of the Code of Professional Responsibility:CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution provides:SEC. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.This Court has interpreted this provision, as early as the 1947 case Krivenko v. Register of Deeds,24 to mean that "under the Constitution, aliens may not acquire private or agricultural lands, including residential lands." The provision is a declaration of imperative constitutional policy.25
Respondent, in giving advice that directly contradicted a fundamental constitutional policy, showed disrespect for the Constitution and gross ignorance of basic law. Worse, he prepared spurious documents that he knew were void and illegal.By making it appear that de Mesa undertook to sell the property to complainant and that de Mesa thereafter sold the property to Gonzales who made the purchase for and in behalf of complainant, he falsified public documents and knowingly violated the Anti-Dummy Law.26
Respondent’s misconduct did not end there. By advising complainant that a foreigner could legally and validly acquire real estate in the Philippines and by assuring complainant that the property was alienable, respondent deliberately foisted a falsehood on his client. He did not give due regard to the trust and confidence reposed in him by complainant. Instead, he deceived complainant and misled him into parting with P400,000 for services that were both illegal and unprofessional. Moreover, by pocketing and misappropriating the P3.8 million given by complainant for the purchase of the property, respondent committed a fraudulent act that was criminal in nature.1avvphi1Respondent spun an intricate web of lies. In the process, he committed unethical act after unethical act, wantonly violating laws and professional standards.For all this, respondent violated not only the lawyer’s oath and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He also transgressed the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:Rule 1.01. – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.Rule 1.02. – A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.CANON 7 – A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT.CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.CANON 17 – A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM. (emphasis supplied)A lawyer who resorts to nefarious schemes to circumvent the law and uses his legal knowledge to further his selfish ends to the great prejudice of others, poses a clear and present danger to the rule of law and to the legal system. He does not only tarnish the image of the bar and degrade the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, he also betrays everything that the legal profession stands for.It is respondent and his kind that give lawyering a bad name and make laymen support Dick the Butcher’s call, "Kill all lawyers!"27 A disgrace to their professional brethren, they must be purged from the bar.WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Leonuel N. Mas is hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court is directed to immediately strike out the name of respondent from the Roll of Attorneys.
Respondent is hereby ORDERED to return to complainant Keld Stemmerik the total amount of P4.2 million with interest at 12% per annum from the date of promulgation of this resolution until full payment. Respondent is further DIRECTED to submit to the Court proof of payment of the amount within ten days from payment.The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) is ORDERED to locate Atty. Mas and file the appropriate criminal charges against him. The NBI is further DIRECTED to regularly report the progress of its action in this case to this Court through the Bar Confidant.Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant who shall forthwith record it in the personal file of respondent, the Court Administrator who shall inform all courts of the Philippines, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines which shall disseminate copies to all its chapters and members and all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the Republic of the Philippines.SO ORDERED.
1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESARTICLE VIIIJUDICIAL DEPARTMENTSection 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof. No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its Members. Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released. Section 4.
1. The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
2. All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
3. Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
d. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
e. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
3. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned.
4. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
5. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
6. Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.
Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. Section 7.
1. No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more, a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
2. The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no person may be appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar.
3. A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence.
Section 8.1. A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.
2. The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term of four years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for two years, and the representative of the private sector for one year.
3. The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings.
4. The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations for the Council.
5. The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.
Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees preferred by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.For the lower courts, the President shall issued the appointment within ninety days from the submission of the list.Section 10. The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During the continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased.Section 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower court shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted in thereon.Section 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative function.
Section 13. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for the decision en banc or in division shall be reached in consultation before the case the case assigned to a Member for the writing of the opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case and served upon the parties. Any Member who took no part, or dissented, or abstained from a decision or resolution must state the reason therefor. The same requirements shall be observed by all lower collegiate court.Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor. Section 15.
1. All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.
2. A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.
3. Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period.
4. Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for determination, without further delay.
Section 16. The Supreme Court shall, within thirty days from the opening of each regular session of the Congress, submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on the operations and activities of the Judiciary.ARTICLE XIACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERSSection 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. Section 3.
1. The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
2. A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
3. A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
4. In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
5. No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.
6. The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the
Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
7. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment, according to law.
8. The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.
Section 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise be appointed. Section 6. The officials and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman, other than the Deputies, shall be appointed by the Ombudsman, according to the Civil Service Law. Section 7. The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as the Office of the Special Prosecutor. It shall continue to function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law, except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under this Constitution. Section 8. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and at the time of their appointment, at least forty years old, of recognized probity and independence, and members of the Philippine Bar, and must not have been candidates for any elective office in the immediately preceding election. The Ombudsman must have, for ten years or more, been a judge or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines. During their tenure, they shall be subject to the same disqualifications and prohibitions as provided for in Section 2 of Article 1X-A of this Constitution.Section 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least six nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of three nominees for every vacancy thereafter. Such appointments shall require no confirmation. All vacancies shall be filled within three months after they occur. Section 10. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have the rank of Chairman and Members, respectively, of the Constitutional Commissions, and they shall receive the same salary which shall not be decreased during their term of office. Section 11. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall serve for a term of seven years without reappointment. They shall not be qualified to run for any office in the election immediately succeeding their cessation from office. Section 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof. Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:
1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
2. Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties.
3. Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
4. Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action.
5. Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents.
6. Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence.
7. Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the Government and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency.
8. Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law.
Section 14. The Office of the Ombudsman shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Its approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released. Section 15. The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel. Section 16. No loan, guaranty, or other form of financial accommodation for any business purpose may be granted, directly or indirectly, by any government-owned or controlled bank or financial institution to the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Constitutional Commissions, the Ombudsman, or to any firm or entity in which they have controlling interest, during their tenure. Section 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law. Section 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.ARTICLE IIIBILL OF RIGHTS
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Section 3.1. The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be
inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
2. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed. Section 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. Section 12.
1. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
2. No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
3. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
4. The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this Section as well as compensation to the rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.
Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. Section 14.
1. No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
2. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused: Provided, that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
Section 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it. Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Section 18.
1. No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations.
2. No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.
Section 19.1. Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading
or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
2. The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.
Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax. Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. Section 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
A.M. No. MTJ-06-1659 June 18, 2009ANNA JANE D. LIHAYLIHAY, Clerk III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte, Complainant,
vs.JUDGE ALEJANDRO T. CANDA, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Liloy-Tampilisan, Zamboanga del Norte, Respondent.x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -xA.M. No. P-06-2254 June 18, 2009JUDGE ALEJANDRO T. CANDA, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Liloy-Tampilisan, Zamboanga del Norte, Complainant, vs.ANNA JANE D. LIHAYLIHAY, Clerk III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte, Respondent.x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -xA.M. No. MTJ-09-1730 June 18, 2009ANNA JANE D. LIHAYLIHAY, Clerk III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte, Complainant, vs.JUDGE ALEJANDRO T. CANDA, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Liloy-Tampilisan, Zamboanga del Norte, Respondent.D E C I S I O NCARPIO, J.:The CaseBefore the Court are two complaints for grave misconduct filed by Anna Jane D. Lihaylihay (Lihaylihay), Clerk III, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 28, Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte, against Judge Alejandro T. Canda (Judge Canda), Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Liloy-Tampilisan, Judicial Region IX, Zamboanga del Norte.The FactsOn 25 February 2005, Sheriff IV Camilo Bandivas (Sheriff Bandivas) of the RTC retired from the service. Lihaylihay alleged that Judge Canda asked Process Server Emmanuel Tenefrancia (Tenefrancia) of the RTC to apply for the position vacated by Sheriff Bandivas. To the dismay of Judge Canda, a certain Jesus V. Alimpolo (Alimpolo) applied for the vacated position. Judge Canda strongly opposed Alimpolo’s application.Judge Canda was of the impression that Lihaylihay was assisting Alimpolo in his application for the position of Sheriff IV. On 5 January 2006, Judge Canda sent a text message to Lihaylihay stating, "Maayo tingali modistansya ka anang mga tawhana kay basin masabit ka, pakiusap lang ni." Taking the text message as a threat, Lihaylihay reported it to the police and requested that a blotter entry be made. On 6 January 2006, Judge Canda sent another text message stating, "For maliciously causing it to appear as threatening in the police blotter of what is otherwise a very harmless text message of appeal I consider the same as declaration of war, don’t worry you will have your owned [sic] fair share of trouble in due time." In a letter1 dated 9 January 2006 and addressed to Executive Judge Oscar D. Tomarong (Judge Tomarong) of the RTC, Judge Canda accused Lihaylihay of (1) actively supporting Alimpolo; (2) using the facilities of the RTC in preparing Alimpolo’s medical certificate; (3) being at the beck and call of Alimpolo; (4) blatantly disregarding the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel; (5) fraudulently scheming against the court; (6) performing highly contemptuous acts; (7) being unworthy of her position as Clerk III; (8) failing to distance herself from Alimpolo; (9) failing to stay neutral; (10) having a distorted sense of values that deserves disciplinary action; (11) being arrogant, insolent and cocky; and (12) disrespecting him. He added that:And speaking of Ms. Lihaylihay, it is the observation of the Court employees and the public that her personality does not speak well of her employment with the judiciary which is characterized by the inappropriateness of her attire. She exudes herself like a GRO or going to a party when reporting to work, not to mention her very undignified appearance as a chain smoker which is akin to a WHORE and who does not hesitate to smoke inside the office in the very eyes of her office mates and the public. But what is very disgusting in spite of her being very new to her position is her being an UPSTART who doesn’t care to get involve [sic] in matters that earns the ire and contempt of the court users and her co-workers. She is that repulsive "PAKIALAMERA" type very few would want to associate with. (Emphasis supplied) In another letter2 dated 11 January 2006 and addressed to Judge Tomarong, Judge Canda charged Lihaylihay with violation of reasonable office rules and regulations. He stated that:On my behalf and in behalf of all the Court employees especially within the administrative area of your court, I would like to make manifest this FORMAL PROTEST against Ms. Ana [sic] Jane D. Lihaylihay, Docket Clerk III of your Court for her actuations which is [sic] highly offensive and demeaning not only to your Court but the entire judiciary as well, to wit:
1) The unmitigated inappropriateness of her attire when reporting to work which to us is very offensive to the taste of decency because she exudes herself like a GRO (Guest Relations Officer). She is supposed to be wearing uniform or decent attire instead of very tight fitting jeans and
blouses with very low hemline [sic] that almost exposes [sic] her breast or cocktail dresses as if she is [sic] going to a party or attending high profile gatherings of elite [sic].2) her [sic] very undignified and repulsive appearance as a chain smoker with heavily made up face which reminds us of her to be like a WHORE, and who [sic] does not hesitate to smoke inside the office in the very eyes of her office mates and the public, an act which is in gross violation of existing rules and regulations against smoking in public places and government offices. (Emphasis supplied)
In his 1st Indorsement3 dated 12 January 2006, Judge Tomarong directed Lihaylihay to comment on Judge Canda’s 9 and 11 January 2006 letters. On 13 January 2006, before Lihaylihay could comment on the letters, Judge Canda gave a copy of the 11 January 2006 letter to the desk editor of the Mindanao Observer and asked that it be published in the newspaper. In his affidavit4 dated 27 February 2006, Dennis C. Baguio stated that (1) he was a reporter and photographer of the Mindanao Observer; (2) he saw Judge Canda talking with the desk editor of the Mindanao Observer; (3) he saw Judge Canda giving a copy of the letter to the desk editor; and (4) he heard Judge Canda asking the desk editor to publish the letter.The 11 January 2006 letter was published in the 15 January 2006 issue of the Mindanao Observer. The front page headline read, "Huwes miprotesta batok sa seksi nga docket clerk." The text of the letter was printed in the newspaper with the omission of words which were deemed unprintable.In her comment5 dated 20 January 2006, Lihaylihay stated that (1) she did not participate in Alimpolo’s application for the position of Sheriff IV; (2) Judge Canda ridiculed, humiliated, and besmirched her reputation by publishing in the newspaper the 11 January 2006 letter describing her as a GRO and a whore; (3) Judge Canda’s text messages threatened her; and (4) she followed the office dress code. Lihaylihay alleged that Judge Canda wanted Tenefrancia to apply for the position of Sheriff IV so that Tenefrancia’s position as process server would become vacant — Judge Canda’s son, Alejandro Canda, was qualified for the position of process server. Lihaylihay also alleged that, before the present case started, Judge Canda sent her several indecent text messages stating, "You’re sexy today," "I missed your gorgeous face," and "I missed your golden voice when you sing." Lihaylihay also alleged that she was shocked and disgusted when Judge Canda invited her to go out of town with him.Alan D. Marapao (Marapao), publisher and editor of Tingog Peninsula, contacted Lihaylihay. He asked her if he could interview her, have a copy of her 20 January 2006 comment, and take her picture. Lihaylihay agreed. Without asking for Lihaylihay’s permission, Marapao published the 20 January 2006 comment in the 22 January 2006 issue of the Tingog Peninsula. Irked, Judge Canda filed a criminal case for libel against Lihaylihay.Lihaylihay filed a complaint6 dated 20 January 2006 with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) charging Judge Canda of (1) bullying her; (2) ridiculing, humiliating, and besmirching her reputation by publishing in the newspaper the 11 January 2006 letter describing her as a GRO and a whore; (3) sending her threatening text messages; and (4) sending her indecent text messages. The case was docketed as MTJ-06-1659.Judge Canda filed a complaint7 dated 25 January 2006 with the OCA charging Lihaylihay with conduct unbecoming a court employee for publishing in the newspaper her 20 January 2006 comment. The case was docketed as A.M. No. P-06-2254.In its 1st Indorsement8 dated 15 February 2006, the OCA directed Lihaylihay to comment on Judge Canda’s 25 January 2006 complaint. In her comment9 dated 22 March 2006, Lihaylihay stated that (1) the publishing of her 20 January 2006 comment in the newspaper unlikely affected Judge Tomarong’s impartiality and objectivity; (2) Judge Canda published his 11 January 2006 letter in the newspaper; (3) Tingog Peninsula published her comment without asking for her permission; and (4) Judge Canda was arrogant.Lihaylihay filed another complaint10 dated 4 May 2006 with the OCA containing the same allegations as her 20 January 2006 complaint with the additional allegation that Judge Canda had several documents sworn to before MCTC Clerk of Court Rosalio M. Manigsaca without paying the required legal fees. The case was docketed as MTJ-09-1730.In its 1st Indorsement11 dated 20 July 2006, the OCA directed Judge Canda to comment on the 4 May 2006 complaint. In his comment12
dated 16 August 2006, Judge Canda denied the allegation that he failed to pay the required legal fees. In its Report13 dated 24 August 2006, the OCA found that Lihaylihay and Judge Canda failed to preserve the good image of the judiciary. The OCA stated that:This Office is disappointed, nay, ashamed of the actuations of the complainant and respondent in this case. Their disgraceful behavior
adversely affects the good image of the judiciary. Their actuations degraded the image of the courts before the eyes of the public.In the instant case, respondent, although not directly responsible for the publication of her comment should have exercised prudence in dealing with the media considering the interest generated by the publication of the complaint against her by Judge Canda. She should have known that the media would take advantage of the opportunity to sensationalize the case considering the personalities involved.Complainant Judge Canda, on the other hand, should not have caused the publication of his complaint against the respondent. As a judge, complainant should have known that administrative proceedings before the Court are confidential in nature in order to protect the respondent therein who may later turn out to be innocent of the charges. The public airing of his complaint unnecessarily exposed the Court to the eyes of the public. No justifiable or unselfish purpose would be served by such media exposure of the complaint already filed in Court and therefore covered by the mantle of confidentiality, except to sensationalize the same and to defile the reputation of the respondent.The OCA recommended that Lihaylihay be admonished and that her 22 March 2006 comment be treated as a complaint for gross misconduct against Judge Canda. In a Resolution14 dated 9 October 2006, the Court admonished Lihaylihay for her irresponsible behavior and consolidated A.M. No. P-06-2254 with A.M. No. MTJ-06-1659. In the same Resolution, the Court treated Lihaylihay’s 22 March 2006 comment as a complaint for gross misconduct against Judge Canda, re-docketed the 22 March 2006 comment as a regular administrative matter, and directed Judge Canda to comment.In his comment15 dated 5 December 2006, Judge Canda stated that his description of Lihaylihay as a GRO and a whore was not a "malicious imputation" but a "formal accusation," and that the publication of his 11 January 2006 letter in the newspaper was a "journalistic endeavour."In a Resolution16 dated 12 January 2009, the Court (1) docketed the 4 May 2006 complaint as a regular administrative matter; (2) consolidated A.M. No. MTJ-09-1730 with A.M. No. P-06-2254 and A.M. No. MTJ-06-1659; and (3) directed Judge Canda to comment on the allegation that he sent threatening and indecent text messages. In his comment17 dated 23 February 2009, Judge Canda (1) denied that he sent Lihaylihay indecent text messages; (2) described his 5 January 2006 text message as "brotherly;" and (3) stated that his 6 January 2006 text message was not intimidating — it only reflected the natural reaction of an angry person.The OCA’s Report and RecommendationsIn its Report18 dated 7 October 2008, the OCA found Judge Canda liable for using inappropriate language. The OCA recommended that (1) Judge Canda be found guilty of gross misconduct; (2) Judge Canda be fined P21,000; (3) the 4 May 2006 complaint be docketed as a regular administrative matter; (4) A.M. No. MTJ-09-1730 be consolidated with A.M. No. P-06-2254 and A.M. No. MTJ-06-1659; and (5) Judge Canda be directed to comment on the allegation that he sent Lihaylihay indecent text messages. The OCA stated that:Judge Canda’s contention that he had nothing to do with the publication of his complaint as it was the Mindanao Observer which decided to pursue the story runs on shallow grounds.x x x xJudge Canda already did the right thing when he brought to the attention of the Executive Judge the matter of Ms. Lihaylihay’s alleged administrative transgressions. However, he stepped out of bounds when he allowed the Mindanao Observer to publish a copy of his complaint. The newspaper would not have had the audacity to publish the complaint if Judge Canda did not consent to it. Suffice it to say, Judge Canda should have known better.Judge Canda stands accused of Gross Misconduct. He did not only refer to Ms. Lihaylihay as a "whore" in the complaint he filed before the Executive Judge; he also caused the publication of the document in a newspaper. If the Court can penalize a judge for uttering a foul term, it can definitely provide for a heavier penalty in the instant case where respondent judge even contributed to the publication of his utterance. The Court’s RulingThe Court finds Judge Canda liable for gross misconduct.Judge Canda harassed and publicly humiliated Lihaylihay: (1) he asked her to stay away from Alimpolo; (2) when she reported the matter to the police, he took it as a "declaration of war" and warned her that she will have her "fair share of trouble in due time"; (3) indeed, three days after sending the threatening text message, he filed a complaint with Judge Tomarong accusing her of several things, asking that she be disciplined and removed from the service, and describing her as a "GRO," "undignified," a "whore," "disgusting," "repulsive," and "pakialamera"; (4) two days after filing the first complaint, he filed another complaint accusing her of violating office
rules and describing her as "offensive," "demeaning," "inappropriate," a "GRO," "undignified," "repulsive," and a "whore"; (5) still unsatisfied, he had his second complaint published in the newspaper; and (6) when she published her comment in the newspaper, he filed a criminal case for libel against her. Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that "Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer." Section 2, Canon 2 of the Code states that "The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of the judiciary." Section 2, Canon 4 of the Code states that "As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office." Section 6, Canon 4 of the Code states that "Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression x x x, but in exercising such [right], they shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office." Section 6, Canon 6 of the Code states that "Judges shall x x x be x x x dignified and courteous." Judge Canda violated these provisions.lavvphilJudges are required to be temperate in their language at all times. They must refrain from inflammatory or vile language. They should be dignified in demeanor and refined in speech, exhibit that temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint, and be considerate, courteous, and civil to all persons.19 In Juan de la Cruz v. Carretas,20
the Court held that:A judge should possess the virtue of gravitas. He should be x x x dignified in demeanor, refined in speech and virtuous in character. x x x [H]e must exhibit that hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint. x x x[A] judge must at all times be temperate in his language. He must choose his words, written or spoken, with utmost care and sufficient control. x x x[A] judge should always keep his passion guarded. He can never allow it to run loose and overcome his reason. He descends to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant when he utters harsh words [or] snide remarks x x x. As a result, he degrades the judicial office and erodes public confidence in the judiciary. (Emphasis supplied)In Re: Anonymous Complaint dated February 18, 2005 of a "Court Personnel" against Judge Francisco C. Gedorio, Jr., RTC, Branch 12, Ormoc City,21 the Court held that: [A] judge x x x ought to conduct himself in a manner befitting a gentleman and a high officer of the court.x x x xThe Court has repeatedly reminded members of the bench to conduct themselves irreproachably, not only while in the discharge of official duties but also in their personal behavior every day. x x xIt bears stressing that as a dispenser of justice, respondent should exercise judicial temperament at all times, avoiding vulgar and insulting language. He must maintain composure and equanimity.The judicial office circumscribes the personal conduct of a judge and imposes a number of restrictions. This is a price that judges have to pay for accepting and occupying their exalted positions in the administration of justice. Irresponsible or improper conduct on their part erodes public confidence in the judiciary. Thus, it is their duty to avoid any impression of impropriety in order to protect the image and integrity of the judiciary. (Emphasis supplied)Judge Canda’s acts of (1) threatening Lihaylihay with her "fair share of trouble in due time"; (2) filing administrative complaints and a criminal case to harass her; (3) describing her as a "GRO," "undignified," a "whore," "disgusting," "repulsive," "pakialamera," "offensive," "demeaning," and "inappropriate"; and (4) publishing such foul remarks in the newspaper are very unbecoming a judge. The image of the judiciary is reflected in the conduct of its officials and Judge Canda subjected the judiciary to embarrassment.Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct as a serious offense. It is punishable by (1) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of benefits, and disqualification from reinstatement to any public office; (2) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three months but not exceeding six months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000.22
The Court notes that this is Judge Canda’s second offense. In Barbarona v. Judge Canda,23 the Court fined him for violation of Circular No. 1-90 and warned him that the repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely. Considering the gravity of Judge Canda’s offense and the fact that this is his second offense, the Court fines him P40,000.
The charges that Judge Canda sent Lihaylihay indecent text messages and that he failed to pay the required legal fees are unsubstantiated, thus, they must be dismissed. In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, the allegations in the complaint. The Court cannot rely on mere conjectures or suppositions.24
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Alejandro T. Canda, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Liloy-Tampilisan, Judicial Region IX, Zamboanga del Norte, GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT CONSTITUTING VIOLATIONS OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT. Accordingly, the Court FINES him P40,000 and STERNLY WARNS him that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.SO ORDERED.
RULES OF COURTRULE 71ContemptSection 1. Direct contempt punished summarily. — A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court and punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or by a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day, or both, if it be a lower court. (1a)Section 2. Remedy therefrom. — The person adjudged in direct contempt by any court may not appeal therefrom, but may avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition. The execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition, provided such person files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided against him. (2a)Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. — After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt;
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions;(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing process to bring the respondent into court, or from holding him in custody pending such proceedings. (3a)Section 4. How proceedings commenced. — Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu propio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for
filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision. (n)Section 5. Where charge to be filed. — Where the charge for indirect contempt has been committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or against an officer appointed by it, the charge may be filed with such court. Where such contempt has been committed against a lower court, the charge may be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the place in which the lower court is sitting; but the proceedings may also be instituted in such lower court subject to appeal to the Regional Trial Court of such place in the same manner as provided in section 11 of this Rule. (4a; Bar Matter No. 803, 21 July 1998)Section 6. Hearing; release on bail. — If the hearing is not ordered to be had forthwith, the respondent may be released from custody upon filing a bond, in an amount fixed by the court, for his appearance at the hearing of the charge. On the day set therefor, the court shall proceed to investigate the charge and consider such comment, testimony or defense as the respondent may make or offer. (5a)Section 7. Punishment for indirect contempt. — If the respondent is adjudged guilty of indirect contempt committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both. If he is adjudged guilty of contempt committed against a lower court, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) month, or both. If the contempt consists in the violation of a writ of injunction, temporary restraining order or status quo order, he may also be ordered to make complete restitution to the party injured by such violation of the property involved or such amount as may be alleged and proved.The writ of execution, as in ordinary civil actions, shall issue for the enforcement of a judgment imposing a fine unless the court otherwise provides. (6a)Section 8. Imprisonment until order obeyed. — When the contempt consists in the refusal or omission to do an act which is yet in the power of the respondent to perform, he may be imprisoned by order of the court concerned until he performs it. (7a)Section 9. Proceeding when party released on bail fails to answer. — When a respondent released on bail fails to appear on the day fixed for the hearing, the court may issue another order of arrest or may order the bond for his appearance to be forfeited and confiscated, or both; and, if the bond be proceeded against, the measure of damages shall be the extent of the loss or injury sustained by the aggrieved party by reason of the misconduct for which the contempt charge was prosecuted, with the costs of the proceedings, and such recovery shall be for the benefit of the party injured. If there is no aggrieved party, the bond shall be liable and disposed of as in criminal cases. (8a)Section 10. Court may release respondent. — The court which issued the order imprisoning a person for contempt may discharge him from imprisonment when it appears that public interest will not be prejudiced by his release. (9a)Section 11. Review of judgment or final order; bond for stay. — The judgment or final order of a court in a case of indirect contempt may be appealed to the proper court as in criminal cases. But execution of the judgment or final order shall not be suspended until a bond is filed by the person adjudged in contempt, in an amount fixed by the court from which the appeal is taken, conditioned that if the appeal be decided against him he will abide by and perform the judgment or final order. (10a)Section 12. Contempt against quasi-judicial entities. — Unless otherwise provided by law, this Rule shall apply to contempt committed against persons, entities, bodies or agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions, or shall have suppletory effect to such rules as they may have adopted pursuant to authority granted to them by law to punish for contempt. The Regional Trial Court of the place wherein the contempt has been committed shall have jurisdiction over such charges as may be filed therefor. (n)RULE 135Powers and Duties of Courts and Judicial Officers
Section 1. Courts always open; justice to be promptly and impartially administered. — Courts of justice shall always be open, except on legal holidays, for the filing of any pleading, motion or other papers, for the trial of cases, hearing of motions, and for the issuance of orders or rendition of judgments. Justice shall be impartially administered without unnecessary delay.Sec 2. Publicity of proceedings and records. — The sitting of every court of justice shall be public, but any court may, in its discretion, exclude the public when the evidence to be adduced is of such nature as to require their exclusion in the interest of morality or decency. The records of every court of justice shall be public records and shall be available for the inspection of any interested person, at all proper business hours, under the supervision of the clerk having custody of such records, unless the court shall, in any special case, have forbidden their publicity, in the interest of morality or decency.Section 3. Process of superior courts enforced throughout the Philippines. — Process issued from a superior court in which a case is pending to bring in a defendant, or for the arrest of any accused person, or to execute any order or judgment of the court, may be enforced in any part of the Philippines.Section 4. Process of inferior courts. — The process of inferior courts shall be enforceable within the province where the municipality or city lies. It shall not be served outside the boundaries of the province in which they are compromised except with the approval of the judge of first instance of said province, and only in the following cases:
(a) When an order for the delivery of personal property lying outside the province is to be complied with;(b) When an attachment of real or personal property lying outside the province is to be made;(c) When the action is against two or more defendants residing in different provinces; and(d) When the place where the case has been brought is that specified in a contract in writing between the parties, or is the place of the execution of such contract as appears therefrom.
Writs of execution issued by inferior courts may be enforced in any part of the part of the Philippines without any previous approval of the judge of first instance.Criminal process may be issued by a justice of the peace or other inferior court, to be served outside his province, when the district judge, or in his absence the provincial fiscal, shall certify that in his opinion the interest of justice require such service.Section 5. Inherent powers of court. — Every court shall have power:
(a) To preserve and enforce order in its immediate presence;(b) To enforce order in proceedings before it, or before a person or persons empowered to conduct a judicial investigation under its authority;(c) To compel obedience to its judgments, orders and processes, and to the lawful orders of a judge out of court, in a case pending therein;(d) To control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a case before it, in every manner appertaining thereto;(e) To compel the attendance of persons to testify in a case pending therein;(f) To administer or cause to be administered oaths in a case pending therein, and in all other cases where it may be necessary in the exercise of its powers;(g) To amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice;(h) To authorize a copy of a lost or destroyed pleading or other paper to be filed and used instead of the original, and to restore, and supply deficiencies in its records and proceedings.
Section 6. Means to carry jurisdiction into effect. — When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer; and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears comfortable to the spirit of the said law or rules.Section 7. Trials and hearings; orders in chambers. — All trials upon the merits shall be conducted in open court and so far as convenient in a regular court room. All other acts or proceeding may be done or conducted by a judge in chambers, without the attendance of the clerk or other court officials.Section 8. Interlocutory orders out of province. — A judge of first instance shall have power to hear and determine, when within the
district though without his province, any interlocutory motion or issue after due and reasonable notice to the parties. On the filing of a petition for the writ of habeas corpus or for release upon bail or reduction of bail in any Court of First Instance, the hearings may be had at any place in the judicial district which the judge shall deem convenient.Section 9. Signing judgments out of province. — Whenever a judge appointed or assigned in any province or branch of a Court of First Instance in a province shall leave the province by transfer or assignment to another court of equal jurisdiction, or by expiration of his temporary assignment, without having decided a case totally heard by him and which was argued or an opportunity given for argument to the parties or their counsel, it shall be lawful for him to prepare and sign his decision in said case anywhere within the Philippines. He shall send the same by registered mail to the clerk of the court where the case was heard or argued to be filed therein as of the date when the same was received by the clerk, in the same manner as if he had been present in court to direct the filing of the judgment. If a case has been heard only in part, the Supreme Court, upon petition of any of the parties to the case and the recommendation of the respective district judge, may also authorize the judge who has partly heard the case, if no other judge had heard the case in part, to continue hearing and to decide said case notwithstanding his transfer or appointment to another court of equal jurisdiction.RULE 137Disqualification of Judicial Officers
Section 1. Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has been presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.Section 2. Objection that judge disqualified, how made and effect. — If it be claimed that an official is disqualified from sitting as above provided, the party objecting to his competency may, in writing, file with the official his objection, stating the grounds therefor, and the official shall thereupon proceed with the trial, or withdraw therefrom, in accordance with his determination of the question of his disqualification. His decision shall be forthwith made in writing and filed with the other papers in the case, but no appeal or stay shall be allowed from, or by reason of, his decision in favor of his own competency, until after final judgment in the case.RULE 139-BDisbarment and Discipline of AttorneysSection 1. How Instituted. — Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu propio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts.The IBP Board of Governors may, motu propio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper charges against erring attorneys including those in the government service.Six (6) copies of the verified complaint shall be filed with the Secretary of the IBP or the Secretary of any of its chapter who shall forthwith transmit the same to the IBP Board of Governors for assignment to an investigator.A. PROCEEDINGS IN THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINESSection 2. National Grievance Investigators. — The Board of Governors shall appoint from among IBP members an Investigator or, when special circumstances so warrant, a panel of three (3) investigators to investigate the complaint. All Investigators shall take an oath of office in the form prescribed by the Board of Governors. A copy of the Investigator's appointment and oath shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court.An Investigator may be disqualified by reason of relationship within the fourth degree of consanguinity of affinity to any of the parties of their counsel, pecuniary interest, personal bias, or his having acted as
counsel to his acting as such Investigator. Where the Investigator does not disqualify himself, a party may appeal to the IBP Board of Governors, which by majority vote of the members present, there being a quorum, may order his disqualification.Any Investigator may also be removed for cause, after due hearing, by the vote of at least six (6) members of the IBP Board of Governors. The decision of the Board of Governors in all cases of disqualification or removal shall be final.Section 3. Duties of the National Grievance Investigator. — The National Grievance Investigators shall investigate all complaints against members of the Integrated Bar referred to them by the IBP Board of Governors.Section 4. Chapter assistance to complainant. — The proper IBP Chapter may assist the complainant(s) in the preparation and filing of his complaint(s).Section 5. Service or dismissal. — If the complaint appears to be meritorious, the Investigator shall direct that a copy thereof be served upon the respondent, requiring him to answer the same within fifteen (15) days from the date of service. If the complaint does not merit action, or if the answer shows to the satisfaction of the Investigator that the complaint is not meritorious, the same may be dismissed by the Board of Governors upon his recommendation. A copy of the resolution of dismissal shall be furnished the complainant and the Supreme Court which may review the case motu propio or upon timely appeal of the complainant filed within 15 days from notice of the dismissal of the complainant.No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same, unless the Supreme Court motu propio or upon recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors, determines that there is no compelling reason to continue with the disbarment or suspension proceedings against the respondent. (Amendment pursuant to Supreme Court Resolution dated May 27, 1993 re Bar Matter 356).Section 6. Verification and service of answer. — The answer shall be verified. The original and five (5) legible copies of the answer shall be filed with the Investigator, with proof of service of a copy thereof on the complainant or his counsel.Section 7. Administrative counsel. — The IBP Board of Governors shall appoint a suitable member of the Integrated Bar as counsel to assist the complainant of the respondent during the investigation in case of need for such assistance.Section 8. Investigation. — Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of the respondent to answer, the Investigator shall, with deliberate speed, proceed with the investigation of the case. He shall have the power to issue subpoenas and administer oaths. The respondent shall be given full opportunity to defend himself, to present witnesses on his behalf, and be heard by himself and counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice, the respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex parte.The Investigator shall terminate the investigation within three (3) months from the date of its commencement, unless extended for good cause by the Board of Governors upon prior application.Willful failure or refusal to obey a subpoena or any other lawful order issued by the Investigator shall be dealt with as for indirect contempt of court. The corresponding charge shall be filed by the Investigator before the IBP Board of Governors which shall require the alleged contemnor to show cause within ten (10) days from notice. The IBP Board of Governors may thereafter conduct hearings, if necessary, in accordance with the procedure set forth in this Rule for hearings before the Investigator. Such hearing shall as far as practicable be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its commencement. Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors shall within a like period of fifteen (15) days issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations, which shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action and if warranted, the imposition of penalty.Section 9. Depositions. — Depositions may be taken in accordance with the Rules of Court with leave of the investigator(s).Within the Philippines, depositions may be taken before any member of the Board of Governors, the President of any Chapter, or any officer authorized by law to administer oaths.Depositions may be taken outside the Philippines before diplomatic or consular representative of the Philippine Government or before any person agreed upon by the parties or designated by the Board of Governors.Any suitable member of the Integrated Bar in the place where a deposition shall be taken may be designated by the Investigator to assist the complainant or the respondent in taking a deposition.Section 10. Report of Investigator. — Not later than thirty (30) days from the termination of the investigation, the Investigator shall submit a report containing his findings of fact and recommendations to the IBP Board of Governors, together with the stenographic notes
and the transcript thereof, and all the evidence presented during the investigation. The submission of the report need not await the transcription of the stenographic notes, it being sufficient that the report reproduce substantially from the Investigator's personal notes any relevant and pertinent testimonies.Section 11. Defects. — No defect in a complaint, notice, answer, or in the proceeding or the Investigator's Report shall be considered as substantial unless the Board of Governors, upon considering the whole record, finds that such defect has resulted or may result in a miscarriage of justice, in which event the Board shall take such remedial action as the circumstances may warrant, including invalidation of the entire proceedings.Section 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors.
a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based. It shall be promulgated within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the submittal of the Investigator's Report.b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed by it is less than suspension or disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a decision exonerating respondent or imposing such sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated unless upon petition of the complainant or other interested party filed with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Board's resolution, the Supreme Court orders otherwise.d) Notice of the resolution or decision of the Board shall be given to all parties through their counsel. A copy of the same shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court.
B. PROCEEDINGS IN THE SUPREME COURTSection 13. Supreme Court Investigation. — In proceedings initiated motu propio by the Supreme Court or in other proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer the case for investigation to the Solicitor-General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court, in which case the investigation shall proceed in the same manner provided in sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the review of the report of investigation shall be conducted directly by the Supreme Court.Section 14. Report of the Solicitor General of other Court-designated Investigator. — Based upon the evidence adduced at the investigation, the Solicitor General or other Investigator designated by the Supreme Court shall submit to the Supreme Court a report containing his findings of fact and recommendations for the final action of the Supreme Court.C. COMMON PROVISIONSSection 15. Suspension of attorney by Supreme Court. — After receipt of respondent's answer or lapse of the period therefor, the Supreme Court, motu propio, or at the instance of the IBP Board of Governors upon the recommendation of the Investigator, may suspend an attorney from the practice of his profession for any of the causes specified in Rule 138, Section 27, during the pendency of the investigation until such suspension is lifted by the Supreme Court.Section 16. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court. 1 — The Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Court may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in Rule 138, Section 27 2, until further action of the Supreme Court in the case.Section 17. Upon suspension by Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Court, further proceedings in Supreme Court. — Upon such suspension, the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court shall forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the order of suspension and a full statement of the facts upon which the same was based. Upon receipt of such certified copy and statement, the Supreme Court shall make a full investigation of the case and may revoke, shorten or extend the suspension, or disbar the attorney as the facts may warrant.Section 18. Confidentiality. — Proceedings against attorneys shall be private and confidential. However, the final order of the Supreme Court shall be published like its decisions in other cases.
Section 19. Expenses. — All reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in relation to disciplinary and disbarment proceedings are lawfull charges for which the parties may be taxed as costs.Section 20. Effectivity and Transitory Provision. — This Rule shall take effect June 1, 1988 and shall supersede the present Rule 139 entitled "DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS". All cases pending investigation by the Office of the Solicitor General shall be transferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors for investigation and disposition as provided in this Rule except those cases where the investigation has been substantially completed.RULE 140Charges Against Judges of First InstanceSection 1. Complaint - All Charges against judges of first instance shall be in writing and shall set out distinctly, clearly, and concisely the facts complained of as constituting the alleged serious misconduct or inefficiency of the respondent, and shall be sworn to and supported by affidavits of persons who have personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged, and shall be accompanied with copies of documents which may substantiate said facts.Section 2. Service or dismissal. - If the charges appear to merit action, a copy thereof shall be served upon the respondent, requiring him to answer within ten (10) days from the date service. If the charges do not merit action, or if the answer shows to the satisfaction of the court that the charges are not meritorious, the same shall be dismissed.Section 3. Answer; hearing. - Upon the filing of respondents answer or upon the expiration of the time for its filing, the court shall assign one of its members, a Justice of the Court of Appeals or a judge of first instance to conduct the hearing of the charges. The Justice or judge so assigned shall set a day for the hearing, and notice thereof shall be served on both parties. At such hearing the parties may present oral or written evidence.Section 4. Report - After the hearing, the Justice or judge shall file with the Supreme Court a report of his findings of fact and conclusions of law, accompanied by the evidence presented by the parties and the other papers in he case.Section 5. Action - After the filing of the report, the court will take such action as the facts and the law may warrant.Section 6. Confidential. - Proceedings against judges of first instance shall be private and confidential.
CIVIL CODEArticle 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. (6)Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.Article 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;(2) Freedom of speech;(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;(5) Freedom of suffrage;(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence; (12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law;(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress of grievances;(14) The right to be a free from involuntary servitude in any form;(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf; (17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and(19) Freedom of access to the courts.In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated. The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute. Article 35. When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal offense, charges another with the same, for which no independent civil action is granted in this Code or any special law, but the justice of the peace finds no reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed, or the prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to institute criminal proceedings, the complaint may bring a civil action for damages against the alleged offender. Such civil action may be supported by a preponderance of evidence. Upon the defendant's motion, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the defendant in case the complaint should be found to be malicious. If during the pendency of the civil action, an information should be presented by the prosecuting attorney, the civil action shall be suspended until the termination of the criminal proceedings. Article 739. The following donations shall be void:
(1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation; (2) Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal offense, in consideration thereof; (3) Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and ascendants, by reason of his office.
In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donor and donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action. (n) Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another:
(1) The guardian, the property of the person or persons who may be under his guardianship; (2) Agents, the property whose administration or sale may have been intrusted to them, unless the consent of the principal has been given; (3) Executors and administrators, the property of the estate under administration; (4) Public officers and employees, the property of the State or of any subdivision thereof, or of any government-owned or controlled corporation, or institution, the administration of which has been intrusted to them; this provision shall apply to judges and government experts who, in any manner whatsoever, take part in the sale; (5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession; (6) Any others specially disqualified by law. (1459a) Article 2005. A judicial deposit or sequestration takes place when an attachment or seizure of property in litigation is ordered. (1785)
Article 2029. The court shall endeavor to persuade the litigants in a civil case to agree upon some fair compromise. (n) Article 2030. Every civil action or proceeding shall be suspended:
(1) If willingness to discuss a possible compromise is expressed by one or both parties; or (2) If it appears that one of the parties, before the commencement of the action or proceeding, offered to discuss a possible compromise but the other party refused the offer.
The duration and terms of the suspension of the civil action or proceeding and similar matters shall be governed by such provisions of the rules of court as the Supreme Court shall promulgate. Said rules of court shall likewise provide for the appointment and duties of amicable compounders. (n) Article 2031. The courts may mitigate the damages to be paid by the losing party who has shown a sincere desire for a compromise. (n) Article 2032. The court's approval is necessary in compromises entered into by guardians, parents, absentee's representatives, and administrators or executors of decedent's estates. (1810a) Article 2033. Juridical persons may compromise only in the form and with the requisites which may be necessary to alienate their property. (1812a) Article 2034. There may be a compromise upon the civil liability arising from an offense; but such compromise shall not extinguish the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty. (1813) Article 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:
(1) The civil status of persons; (2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation; (3) Any ground for legal separation; (4) Future support; (5) The jurisdiction of courts; (6) Future legitime. (1814a) Article 2046. The appointment of arbitrators and the procedure for arbitration shall be governed by the provisions of such rules of court as the Supreme Court shall promulgate. (n)
ANTI-GRAFT and CORRUPT PRACTICESREPUBLIC ACT No. 3019ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACTSection 1. Statement of policy. It is the policy of the Philippine Government, in line with the principle that a public office is a public trust, to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto. Section 2. Definition of terms. As used in this Act, that term
(a) "Government" includes the national government, the local governments, the government-owned and government-controlled corporations, and all other instrumentalities or agencies of the Republic of the Philippines and their branches. (b) "Public officer" includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government as defined in the preceding subparagraph. (c) "Receiving any gift" includes the act of accepting directly or indirectly a gift from a person other than a member of the public officer's immediate family, in behalf of himself or of any member of his family or relative within the fourth civil degree, either by consanguinity or affinity, even on the occasion of a family celebration or national festivity like Christmas, if the value of the gift is under the circumstances manifestly excessive. (d) "Person" includes natural and juridical persons, unless the context indicates otherwise.
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense. (b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other part, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law. (c) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present or other pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or for another, from any person for whom the public officer, in any manner or capacity, has secured or obtained,
or will secure or obtain, any Government permit or license, in consideration for the help given or to be given, without prejudice to Section thirteen of this Act. (d) Accepting or having any member of his family accept employment in a private enterprise which has pending official business with him during the pendency thereof or within one year after its termination. (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. (f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for the purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating against any other interested party. (g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby. (h) Director or indirectly having financing or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest. (i) Directly or indirectly becoming interested, for personal gain, or having a material interest in any transaction or act requiring the approval of a board, panel or group of which he is a member, and which exercises discretion in such approval, even if he votes against the same or does not participate in the action of the board, committee, panel or group. Interest for personal gain shall be presumed against those public officers responsible for the approval of manifestly unlawful, inequitable, or irregular transaction or acts by the board, panel or group to which they belong. (j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit in favor of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege or advantage, or of a mere representative or dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled. (k) Divulging valuable information of a confidential character, acquired by his office or by him on account of his official position to unauthorized persons, or releasing such information in advance of its authorized release date.
The person giving the gift, present, share, percentage or benefit referred to in subparagraphs (b) and (c); or offering or giving to the public officer the employment mentioned in subparagraph (d); or urging the divulging or untimely release of the confidential information referred to in subparagraph (k) of this section shall, together with the offending public officer, be punished under Section nine of this Act and shall be permanently or temporarily disqualified in the discretion of the Court, from transacting business in any form with the Government. Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person having family or close personal relation with any public official to capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such family or close personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift or material or pecuniary advantage from any other person having some business, transaction, application, request or contract with the government, in which such public official has to intervene. Family relation shall include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity in the third civil degree. The word "close personal relation" shall include close personal friendship, social and fraternal connections, and professional employment all giving rise to intimacy which assures free access to such public officer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any public official to commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3 hereof.
Section 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. It shall be unlawful for the spouse or for any relative, by consanguinity or affinity, within the third civil degree, of the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to intervene, directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction, contract or application with the Government: Provided, That this section shall not apply to any
person who, prior to the assumption of office of any of the above officials to whom he is related, has been already dealing with the Government along the same line of business, nor to any transaction, contract or application already existing or pending at the time of such assumption of public office, nor to any application filed by him the approval of which is not discretionary on the part of the official or officials concerned but depends upon compliance with requisites provided by law, or rules or regulations issued pursuant to law, nor to any act lawfully performed in an official capacity or in the exercise of a profession. Section 6. Prohibition on Members of Congress. It shall be unlawful hereafter for any Member of the Congress during the term for which he has been elected, to acquire or receive any personal pecuniary interest in any specific business enterprise which will be directly and particularly favored or benefited by any law or resolution authored by him previously approved or adopted by the Congress during the same term. The provision of this section shall apply to any other public officer who recommended the initiation in Congress of the enactment or adoption of any law or resolution, and acquires or receives any such interest during his incumbency. It shall likewise be unlawful for such member of Congress or other public officer, who, having such interest prior to the approval of such law or resolution authored or recommended by him, continues for thirty days after such approval to retain such interest. Section 7. Statement of assets and liabilities. Every public officer, within thirty days after the approval of this Act or after assuming office, and within the month of January of every other year thereafter, as well as upon the expiration of his term of office, or upon his resignation or separation from office, shall prepare and file with the office of the corresponding Department Head, or in the case of a Head of Department or chief of an independent office, with the Office of the President, or in the case of members of the Congress and the officials and employees thereof, with the Office of the Secretary of the corresponding House, a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year: Provided, That public officers assuming office less than two months before the end of the calendar year, may file their statements in the following months of January. Section 8. Dismissal due to unexplained wealth. If in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act Numbered One thousand three hundred seventy-nine, a public official has been found to have acquired during his incumbency, whether in his name or in the name of other persons, an amount of property and/or money manifestly out of proportion to his salary and to his other lawful income, that fact shall be a ground for dismissal or removal. Properties in the name of the spouse and unmarried children of such public official may be taken into consideration, when their acquisition through legitimate means cannot be satisfactorily shown. Bank deposits shall be taken into consideration in the enforcement of this section, notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary. Section 9. Penalties for violations. (a) Any public officer or private person committing any of the unlawful acts or omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than ten years, perpetual disqualification from public office, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government of any prohibited interest and unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to his salary and other lawful income. Any complaining party at whose complaint the criminal prosecution was initiated shall, in case of conviction of the accused, be entitled to recover in the criminal action with priority over the forfeiture in favor of the Government, the amount of money or the thing he may have given to the accused, or the value of such thing.
(b) Any public officer violation any of the provisions of Section 7 of this Act shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the Court.
The violation of said section proven in a proper administrative proceeding shall be sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of a public officer, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him. Section 10. Competent court. Until otherwise provided by law, all prosecutions under this Act shall be within the original jurisdiction of the proper Court of First Instance. Section 11. Prescription of offenses. All offenses punishable under this Act shall prescribe in ten years. Section 12. Termination of office. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense
under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery. Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him. Section 14. Exception. Unsolicited gifts or presents of small or insignificant value offered or given as a mere ordinary token of gratitude or friendship according to local customs or usage, shall be excepted from the provisions of this Act. Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted to prejudice or prohibit the practice of any profession, lawful trade or occupation by any private person or by any public officer who under the law may legitimately practice his profession, trade or occupation, during his incumbency, except where the practice of such profession, trade or occupation involves conspiracy with any other person or public official to commit any of the violations penalized in this Act. Section 15. Separability clause. If any provision of this Act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstances is declared invalid, the remainder of the Act or the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected by such declaration.Section 16. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect on its approval, but for the purpose of determining unexplained wealth, all property acquired by a public officer since he assumed office shall be taken into consideration. Approved: August 17, 1960
A.M. No. RTJ-05-1916 May 10, 2005MELENCIO P. MANANSALA III, complainant, vs.JUDGE FATIMA G. ASDALA, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Br. 87, Quezon City, respondent.D E C I S I O NCARPIO-MORALES, J.:The following incidents spawned the filing of the present administrative case.Before noon of February 1, 2003, Winfried Herbst, a German national, was detained at Police Station 10 in Kamuning, Quezon City for breaking a glass wall in the office of Melencio P. Manansala III (complainant) at PM Building at 24 Matalino St., Diliman, Quezon City. By complainant’s account, in late afternoon of even date, Judge Fatima G. Asdala (respondent) of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, called up by telephone the Station Commander of Station 10 Police Superintendent Atty. Joel Napoleon Coronel, requesting for the release of Herbst to her custody. Atty. Coronel, however, did not accede to respondent’s request, he informing her that complainant was adamant in filing criminal charges against Herbst and they were just waiting for the arrival of the inquest fiscal.Complainant further relates that on February 3, 2003, Mark Cabigao, the sheriff assigned at respondent’s sala, together with two policemen, went to PM Building and requested that the Mercedes Benz car of Herbst which he parked within the vicinity be turned over to their custody.On February 4, 2003, complainant, together with retired Quezon City Regional Trial Court Judge Marcelino Bautista appeared at the "Direct Connect," a television show of Atty. Batas Mauricio, wherein complainant aired respondent’s alleged meddling in the case against Herbst. In the same show, respondent’s side was, through telephone, likewise aired.The following day or on February 5, 2003, respondent filed before the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office a complaint for libel against complainant and Judge Bautista for allegedly defaming her in the television show of Atty. Mauricio.Subsequently, on February 13, 2003, complainant filed a complaint-affidavit, with a supplemental complaint-affidavit, against respondent before the Office of the Ombudsman charging her with violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) for allegedly
Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense.
By Memorandum1 of February 17, 2003, the Ombudsman considered the case against respondent closed and terminated without prejudice
and referred it to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for appropriate action.Upon receipt by the OCA of complainant’s complaint-affidavit and supplemental complaint-affidavit on March 13, 2003, it directed respondent, by Indorsement2 dated April 9, 2003, to submit her comment thereon.In her comment3 dated May 16, 2003, respondent claimed that the complaint at bar was intended to harass her – for the purpose of getting back at her, she having charged complainant and his lawyer Marcelino Bautista, Jr. with libel. Respondent’s version of what transpired on February 1 and 3, 2003 is quoted verbatim:
On February 1, 2003, a Saturday, at about 6:30 in the evening, as I was on my way out to treat my children to a weekend dinner, I received an overseas call from Ed Berzosa, a first cousin working [in] Hilton Macau asking for advi[c]e in regard [to] his benefactor, who before noon of that day, was allegedly taken to the Kamuning Police Station for some offense. Since Ed could not accurately provide me the information I desired to know to be able to give the proper legal advice, I instructed Ed instead to get in touch with his benefactor Winfried Herbst and advise the latter to call me. At about 7 o’clock, my phone rang. It was Herbst on the line, saying that he was arrested upon the complaint of Manansala after he broke some glass in the latter’s office on provocation; that he did so because he was fed up with Manansala’s refusal and delay in paying what he (Manansala) owes him, that he was detained at the Kamuning Police Station at about 11:00 in the morning and that his complainant, who seems to be very popular with the police officers thereat, would call every now and then, oftentimes, leaving threatening words, through his cohorts at the station, for Herbst.I could sense Herbst’s agitation mainly due to the fact that he claims he has not been unable to reach his lawyer since he was detained, neither was his side of the incident taken down by the police.When Herbst asked if he could already be released, that was the time I decided to give the needed advice and information, such as: that if there has been a formal complaint, for sure, he will be brought to inquest, and that since it is Saturday, an inquest prosecutor is on duty and so, I then asked Herbst to find out from the investigator when inquest will take place. As Herbst had a sideline conversation with someone, I heard someone in the background ask Herbst who he was in conversation with. Before I knew it, someone other tha[n] Herbst was on the line and he introduced himself as some police officer whose name I cannot recall and asked what is it I wanted to know and who I am. I introduced myself as Mrs. Asdala , a friend of Herbst and inquired if there has been a complaint filed against Herbst, for what crime and when the case will be inquested. I gathered then that Herbst was charged with malicious mischief for a damaged glass wall costing more or less P30,000.00, that inquest will take place at about 9 o’clock in the evening.Having been so informed, I asked to speak with Herbst again whence I advised Herbst that in an inquest investigation, whatever he will say will be immaterial, as the inquest fiscal will focus only on what the complaint says; he has to wait for the resolution of the fiscal whose recommendation will be for further investigation, if he finds the complaint and evidence insufficient, in which case he will have the opportunity to submit his counter-affidavit or the fiscal may recommend filing of the case. Either way, the recommendation will wait for the approval of the Chief City Prosecutor or his assistant before he can be released without necessity of bail if for further investigation; with bail, if filed. Often the inquest fiscal’s recommendation stays for minor offenses like malicious mischief, UNLESS, some interested souls INTERVENE for a reversal. I also advised Herbst of what demeanor to take during the inquest to avoid getting the ire of the inquest investigator, then hanged up but advising to keep me posted by text of the development, but suggested to offer [to] pay the damage caused at once, to soothe his complainant.At about 10 o’clock in the evening, Herbst sent [a] message that the inquest prosecutor’s recommendation is for further investigation. I texted back saying that it is good news as he then will have the opportunity to present his side before a final resolution is made.x x xOn February 3, 200[3], at about 4:30 in the afternoon, I had an incidental conversation with Atty. Bautista on the cell
phone and asked why he would not want Herbst’s Mercedes Benz removed from where it was parked along Malakas Street. As related to me by Herbst, he left his Mercedes Benz unattended on the road fronting PM apartments where Manansala’s office is located when he was forcibly hauled by the police summoned by Manansala in the morning of February 1, 2003. Herbst called to inform that a friend reported seeing the tires of his car all flat and that the security guards of Manansala’s office were responsible for that. Fearing more vandalism, he asked for help to move out his car.Working hours over, I asked my sheriff to check if he can do anything. My sheriff was all too willing to help that he immediately proceeded to where the car could be found only to be met by an irate Manansala and his bosom lawyer Marcelino Bautista, who berated him in front of several people and called him "pakialamero" at the same time telling him that no one can get Herbst car but Herbst personally . . . which was precisely what Herbst was avoiding because Manansala’s men almost roughed him up before the police came on February 1, 2003, when the incident leading to the filing of the case, occurred. It appears that upon seeing my sheriff in office uniform, Atty. Bautista asked what court he is assigned. My sheriff then called up to inform what transpired and that was when I asked to speak with Mr. Bautista ONLY for the purpose of asking him as to why he would not allow the car to be pulled out, after all, it has nothing to do with the case filed against Herbst by Manansala. As earlier said, my only purpose in talking with Atty. Bautista on the phone was to ask for his reason in not allowing Herbst car moved out, knowing that the car was not even entrusted to him or to Manansala, thus, they do not have any right to withhold it from anyone in Herbst behalf. It was never to ask for the release of the car, precisely for the reasons already stated, and which I emphasized in my conversation with Atty. Bautista that afternoon of February 3, 2003 when, Manansala arrogantly asked why the effort on my part. I told him Herbst is a family friend, my cousin’s benefactor and he asked for help with his car. However, when Bautista, construed the effort as meddling, I thought any further conversation with him on the phone would not help especially when he made it clear that they will not allow anyone to get the car from where it was, so I told myself just to forget about it. When Herbst texted that he has been released from detention after posting bail, I instead, advised him to get his car personally but reminding him to avoid any untoward confrontation with Manansala or his men or Bautista.x x x4 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
By Resolution5 dated February 16, 2004, this Court referred the complaint to Court of Appeals Justice Renato C. Dacudao for investigation, report and recommendation.In the investigation conducted by Justice Dacudao, complainant presented three witnesses, namely, Atty. Coronel, Sheriff Mark Cabigao, and Judge Bautista, the gists of whose testimonies follow after their names.Atty. Coronel testified as follows:On February 1, 2003, the duty desk officer, Police Chief Inspector Danilo Maceren, received a telephone call informing him that one who introduced herself as Judge Asdala wanted to talk to him (Atty. Coronel) by phone. He thus talked to the caller who requested him to, if possible, release Herbst from detention and turn him to her custody, and asked about the possibility of the case being settled between complainant and Herbst.6
Wanting to accommodate respondent’s request, he summoned complainant to his office and echoed to him respondent’s request.7
Sheriff Marcelino Cabigao testified as follows:On February 3, 2003, after office hours, "napagutusan lang po ako na pumunta sa Station 10 and ask for police assistance and go to PM Apartments to remove a vehicle because it might be damaged or lost."8
Upon arrival at the site where the vehicle was parked, he found out that all its 4 tires were already deflated. And when he asked complainant and Judge Bautista for permission to get the vehicle, they refused, prompting him to call respondent and inform her that "they don’t want to give it and even if they did, I cannot take it because it has already 4 flat tires." Respondent then asked him who prevented him from retrieving the vehicle, upon which he named Judge Bautista and complainant. Respondent further asked him to give his phone to Judge Bautista which he did, and after respondent talked to Judge Bautista, she told him (Cabigao) to leave the place if they do not want to release the vehicle.9
Judge Bautista declared that during his phone conversation with respondent in the afternoon of February 3, 2003, he told her to get an authorization from Herbst in order to retrieve the car as well as make an inventory of the contents of the vehicle to avoid any misunderstanding later.10
Upon the other hand, Respondent, at the witness stand, repeated her claim that the administrative complaint was filed on account of her filing of the libel charges against complainant and Judge Bautista.11
And she reiterated the contents of her comment to the complaint, she reasserting that there was no interference on her part with regard to the investigation of Herbst took place.12
Investigating Justice Dacudao, by his Report and Recommendation,13 found respondent answerable for palpable abuse of authority or plain misconduct. The pertinent portion of his report reads:
x x x [T]his Investigator believes that respondent judge could be held liable under Section 3(a) of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, to wit:x x xRespondent judge can be faulted for having called up that early evening of February 1, 2003, Atty. Joel Napoleon Coronel, station commander of the Kamuning Police Station No. 10, to request for the release to her custody of the German national Winfried Herbst, who was scheduled to undergo inquest investigation at the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, for malicious mischief (or vandalism), which the latter apparently committed, after he had allegedly smashed the window glass at the PM Building at 24 Matalino Street, Diliman, Quezon City, where the complainant Melencio P. Manansala III was living or holding office; as well as in asking for the compounding or amicable settlement of the malicious mischief (or vandalism) case against the German national. For, it can hardly be doubted that in making both requests respondent judge, one way or another, wittingly or unwittingly, subtly or blatantly, brought to bear, or sought to bring to bear, upon the precinct commander, the influence of her office as a judge, in an irregular and improper manner. Rightly or wrongly, the public identifies the abstract precept of justice, and the administration of justice, with the persona and actuations of the visible human judge that they see, and with whom they come in contact, or deal with. Respondent judge’s plea of good faith thus becomes tenous when it is remembered that as a former fiscal or prosecutor, respondent judge ought to know that there is no legal or statutory warrant or basis, at that time, for her requests/ actions in seeking to obtain (temporary) custody of the still-[to] be-inquested Winfried Herbst, or for the compounding or amicable settlement of the malicious mischief (or vandalism) case, against the latter. However one looks at it, either course of action amounted to an unjustified, if not unlawful, interference or meddling, ("or persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer" to borrow the language of the statute) with the work of the police precinct commander at the time.Thus conceding, for argument[‘s] sake, that a finding of liability under Section 3(a) of the Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, would be improper, since a finding that respondent had violated this Section 3(a) requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, for the reason that R.A. No. 3019, as amended, is a penal statute, still under the facts recited, respondent judge can still be held liable, at the very least, for palpable abuse of authority or plain misconduct, a finding whereon can rest upon substantial evidence, as was submitted in this case. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Justice Dacudao thus found respondent judge liable "at the very least, for palpable abuse or plain misconduct," and recommended that respondent judge be fined in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos ( P 10,000.00), and warned that a repetition of the same or similar offense will merit a harsher penalty.By Memorandum14 of February 28, 2005, the OCA made a contrary finding and recommended the dismissal of the complaint against respondent, to wit:
After a careful study of the records of the case, we have to withhold our concurrence with the findings of Justice Dacudao. The report of the investigating justice solely relies on the testimony of Atty. Joel Napoleon Coronel, the police superintendent and station commander whom Judge Asdala allegedly called and tried to persuade to release and place the detained Mr. Herbst under her custody. It must be pointed out that not only does Judge Asdala categorically
deny having spoken to Atty. Coronel, but the latter himself acknowledges that he did not know the respondent judge and admits "that the person I was talking over the phone may or may not be Judge Asdala.["] There is therefore the shadow of doubt created by the possibility that somebody else could have used the name of Judge Asdala.The testimonial evidence presented did not remove the probability that Judge Asdala might not be guilty of the offense charged, thus failing to establish a prima facie case against the respondent judge.The complainant’s allegation that Judge Asdala continues to intimidate and use her authority to influence the outcome of the case was never substantiated by evidence, documentary or testimonial.However, we find that sending Sheriff Cabigao to retrieve the car of Mr. Herbst was improper despite the non-involvement of the car in the criminal case. Even if it was already after office hours, the fact that Sheriff Cabigao, being a personnel of Judge Asdala’s own court still in his office uniform and accompanied by two policemen, would send the wrong signal, as it did.Judges are expected to keep a watchful eye on the conduct of their employees, and not to ask them to perform tasks outside their official functions. They are constrained to instill in the court personnel a sense of propriety and probity in the performance of judicial functions. Given these requirements, the respondent judge should be aware that the slightest semblance of impropriety on the part of the employees of the court stirs ripples of public suspicion and public distrust of the judicial administrators. The slightest breach of duty and the slightest irregularity in the conduct of court officers and employees detract from the dignity of the courts and erode the faith of the people in the judiciary.While we deem the respondent judge not guilty of violation of Sec 3(a) of R.A. 3019, palpable abuse of authority or plain misconduct, we are of the view that the acts properly imputable to her, while not warranting the imposition of any disciplinary sanction, clearly demonstrate the need for greater care, prudence and discretion in her future actions.IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, we respectfully submit for the consideration of the Honorable Court the following recommendations:1. That the administrative complaint against Judge Fatima G. Asdala of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 87), Quezon City, be DISMISSED for lack of merit;2. That such dismissal notwithstanding, Judge Asdala should be ADMONISHED to avoid acts that are inimical to the service and which would cloud the credibility of the court; and3. That she be STERNLY WARNED that a similar act in the future shall be strictly dealt with. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)The pertinent provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct read:CANON 2A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.RULE 2.01. – A Judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.x x xRULE 2.04. – A Judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative agency. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Above-quoted Rule 2.04 is reproduced as CANON 2, Sec. 3 in the NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR THE PHILIPPINE JUDICIARY which took effect on June 1, 2004.In administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary to hold a respondent liable for the charge is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion.15
In the case at bar, respondent denies having talked to Atty. Coronel. She admits though that she talked to one Maceren who, by her claim, butted in during her phone conversation with Herbst. She proffers, however, that when she conversed with Maceren, she identified herself as Mrs. Asdala and merely asked him if a complaint had been filed against Herbst, for what offense, and when the case would be inquested.
Respondent’s plain denial of the charge of influencing does not suffice to discredit the straightforward claim of Atty. Coronel, however.
MR. MANANSALA:Did you inform me of, for lack of a better term at this point in time, inquiries from a certain judge regarding the Winfried Herbst complaint?
ATTY. CORONEL:I called you to my office because I received a phone call from a person who introduced herself as Judge Asdala of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City concerning the investigation of a criminal complaint being conducted by our office against Mr. Herbst.x x x
JUDGE ASDALA:What particular words that the person you were talking with on [the] phone tell you that is now being considered by Mr. Manansala as "pakikialam"?
ATTY. CORONEL:The person who introduced herself as Judge Asdala asked me if I can possibly help a certain Mr. Herbst who was brought in to our station for investigation and that he would not be detained and be released to the custody of the person who introduced herself as Judge Asdala.x x x
JUDGE ASDALA:Is it not that you entertained Mr. Manansala in your office because he is an English-speaking guy and he was decently dressed or what?
ATTY. CORONEL:I asked Mr. Manansala to my office because I received a call from a person who introduced herself as Judge Asdala and that is the reason why I asked Mr. Manansala to my office and asked him if he is willing to settle the case amicably with Mr. Herbst.
JUDGE ASDALA:When you called Mr. Manansala in your office, you informed him that a certain Judge Ma. Fatima Asdala called in order to ask for a favor, is that it?
ATTY. CORONEL:I informed him that Judge Asdala called me and ask me to help the person under investigation, Mr. Herbst, if possible to have the person released from detention and I told Mr. Manansala the only way that I can do this is to have the case settled amicably so that . . . no case will be filed against Mr. Herbst.x x x
JUDGE ASDALA:Why did you take interest, Mr. Coronel, when the case should have been handled by the investigator of the case?
ATTY. CORONEL:Because I believe in my mind at that time that it was Judge Asdala who called me and asked for my assistance regarding Mr. Herbst who she claimed to be a family friend and asked me if possible to release Mr. Herbst to her custody. That is why I asked Mr. Manansala to come to my office and if there could be a possible amicable settlement between Mr. Manansala and Mr. Herbst so that no criminal complaint could be filed against Mr. Herbst.
JUSTICE DACUDAO:In other words, you were attempting to forge some kind of an amicable settlement?
ATTY. CORONEL:Yes, Your Honor, I was trying to arrange an amicable settlement between Mr. Manansala and Mr. Herbst at that time.
JUSTICE DACUDAO:Why did you do that? What is your purpose?
ATTY. CORONEL:I believed I spoke to Judge Asdala over the phone and then I would like to accommodate her request that her friend will not be detained
any longer if the case will be settled between Mr. Manansala and Mr. Herbst at that time.x x x
JUDGE ASDALA:Because actually, the reason why the complainant would file this is because of the damage, he would want that rectified, correct?
ATTY. CORONEL:Yes, ma’m.
JUDGE ASDALA:That is the main reason why you were trying to forge a settlement between Mr. Manansala and Mr. Herbst and not particularly because somebody called you?
ATTY. CORONEL:I took interest in the case because of the call I received that afternoon that is why I asked Mr. Manansala to come to my office and asked him if an amicable settlement can be arranged between him and Mr. Herbst.
JUDGE ASDALA:So it is not for the reason that the case is actually the subject of a usual settlement that you took interest in but because of the call of a certain person who represented herself as Judge Asdala. Is that what you are trying to say?
ATTY. CORONEL:Yes.x x x
JUSTICE DACUDAO:What was the gist of the conversation?
ATTY. CORONEL:Your Honor, I was informed by my desk officer at that time that a call from Judge Asdala was received by them and asked me if I will be willing to talk with Judge Asdala. I received that call and I spoke to a woman who introduced herself as Judge Asdala of RTC Quezon City. And then the person over the phone asked me if I can possibly help a Mr. Herbst, a German national, who was brought in to Station 10 for investigation considering that the person is a friend of hers and if possible, Mr. Herbst would not be detained at our station.
JUSTICE DACUDAO:You mentioned of a desk officer, what is the name of that desk officer?
ATTY. CORONEL:At that time, the person who approached me was Police Chief Inspector Danilo Maceren, Your Honor.
JUSTICE DACUDAO:Where is he now?
ATTY. CORONEL:Major Maceren is now in Cosovo, Yugoslavia. He is part of the U.N. Peace Visiting Mission.x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)16
Moreover, respondent’s vacillating version regarding the phone conversation with the police officer flaws her credibility. In her Comment to the complaint at bar, she stated that during her phone conversation with Herbst, "she heard someone in the background ask Herbst who he was in conversation with" and "[b]efore she knew it, someone other tha[n] Herbst was on the line and he introduced himself as some police officer whose name [she] cannot recall and asked what is it [she] wanted to know and who [she was] xxx."17 And during her interview on air by Atty. Mauricio, she likewise admitted having talked to a police officer in Station 10, to wit:
ATTY. BATAS MAURICIO (BMM): Welcome po kayo dito sa ating Direct Connect at kasama po natin dito si Judge Marcelino Bautista at Ginoong Melencio Manansala, at nirereklamo na nakikialam daw po kayo dito sa hinuling suspect na nakaditine sa station ng Quezon City police. Ano po ang inyong panig Judge Asdala?JUDGE FATIMA ASDALA (JFA): Ah well . . . dun sa salitang pikikialam, I think that’s an incorrect adaptation of, ah . . . kung ano man, ang naging ginawa ko.BMM: Ok?JFA: Hindi ako nakialam. I only helped a friend who is a family friend, (pause) ah more than even a family friend because he is like a member of the family.
BMM: Totoo po bang . . judgex x xJFA: Now, ang sinasabi siguro niyang pakikialam … when I requested no, I requested, ah, ahhh, I think I was talking with one Major Mazaren(?) . . . (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)18
During the investigation conducted by Justice Dacudao, however, while Atty. Coronel was on cross-examination by respondent, respondent, in reply to the question of the Justice if she denied being the Judge Asdala who made a telephone call to the police station, evasively answered the Justice and stated that she did not speak with anybody.
JUDGE ASDALA:So there is a possibility that it was not Judge Asdala and that her name was only being used in order for you to hear her over the phone?
ATTY. CORONEL:Yes.
JUSTICE DACUDAO:By the way, Judge Asdala, are you denying that you were the person?
JUDGE ASDALA:Precisely, that is my statement. Those are the essence of my Answer and Comment to the Complaint filed by Mr. Manansala with the office of the City Prosecutor.
JUSTICE DACUDAO:You mean to say you are not that person?
JUDGE ASDALA:Not, Your Honor. I did not speak. Even in the interview, Your Honor, I said I did not speak with anybody, I did not request anybody to release the accused to my custody because I wouldn’t possibly do that, Your Honor, because I am aware of the procedure when a case is supposed to be heard for inquest, it is only the Fiscal who can order the release of the accused and not any police officer.19 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As for respondent’s act of ordering her sheriff to engage the assistance of policemen and retrieve Herbst’s car, this Court finds that respondent should also be faulted therefor. For by such act, she availed of the services of a government employee – inutusan niya – for private concerns. In any event, that her sheriff was even ordered to engage the services of policemen could not have been intended other than to demonstrate her perceived might as a judge in order to hopefully secure an unimpeded release of the car. Her claim that the sheriff was "all too willing to help" does not, even if true, albeit the sheriff’s testimony does not reflect such claim, extenuate her or mitigate her liability.In fine, this Court finds well-taken the investigating Justice’s evaluation of complainant’s allegations. Instead, however, of palpable abuse of authority or plain misconduct, respondent is found liable for gross misconduct constituting violation of the earlier quoted provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a serious charge under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended.20 Section 11 of said rule reads:
SECTION 11. SanctionsA. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned and controlled corporations, Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Fatima G. Asdala, having been found GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT, is hereby FINED in the amount of P40,000.00 with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 00-7-09-CA March 27, 2001IN RE: DEROGATORY NEWS ITEMS CHARGING COURT OF APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DEMETRIO DEMETRIA WITH INTERFERENCE ON BEHALF OF A SUSPECTED DRUG QUEEN:COURT OF APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, respondent.PER CURIAM:
Men and women of the courts must conduct themselves with honor, probity, fairness, prudence and discretion. Magistrates of justice must always be fair and impartial. They should avoid not only acts of impropriety, but all appearances of impropriety. Their influence in society must be consciously and conscientiously exercised with utmost prudence and discretion. For, theirs is the assigned role of preserving the independence, impartiality and integrity of the Judiciary.The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates a judge to "refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative agency."1 The slightest form of interference cannot be countenanced. Once a judge uses his influence to derail or interfere in the regular course of a legal or judicial proceeding for the benefit of one or any of the parties therein, public confidence in the judicial system is diminished, if not totally eroded.Such is this administrative charge triggered by newspaper accounts which appeared on the 21 July 2000 issues of The Manila Standard, The Manila Times, Malaya, The Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today. The national dailies collectively reported that Court of Appeals Associate Justice Demetrio G. Demetria tried to intercede on behalf of suspected Chinese drug queen Yu Yuk Lai, alias Sze Yuk Lai, who went in and out of prison to play in a Manila casino.2 That same day, 21 July 2000, Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., issued a Memorandum to Justice Demetria directing him to comment on the derogatory allegations in the news items.3 On 24 July 2000, Justice Demetria submitted his Compliance. Subsequently, Chief State Prosecutor (CSP) Jovencito R. Zuño, who disclosed to the media the name of Justice Demetria, and State Prosecutor (SP) Pablo C. Formaran III, a member of the Task Force on Anti-Narcotics Cases of the Department of Justice (DOJ) prosecuting the case of the suspected Chinese drug queen, filed their respective Comments on the Compliance of Justice Demetria.4 On 8 August 2000, the Court En Banc ordered an investigation and designated Mme. Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino as Investigator and Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo as Prosecutor. An investigation then commenced on 22 August 2000 and continued until 16 November 2000.The Prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely, CSP Zuño, SP Formaran III, Agnes P. Tuason, secretary of SP Formaran, III, and Jose H. Afalla, an employee from the Office of Asst. CSP (ACSP) Leonardo Guiyab, Jr. The defense on the other hand presented ten (10) witnesses: respondent Justice Demetria, Asst. Chief State Prosecutor (ACSP) Severino Gaña, Jr., Senior State Prosecutor (SSP) Romeo Dañosos, Go Teng Kok, Yu Yuk Lai, MTC Judge Orlando Siapno, Peter Young, Atty. Reinerio Paas, lawyer of Go Teng Kok, Danilo J. Mijares, bodyguard of Go Teng Kok, and Luisito Artiaga, official of the Philippine Amateur Track and Field Association (PATAFA).The facts as borne out by the evidence presented by the prosecution are quite clear. In an Information dated 9 December 1998, SP Formaran III charged Yu Yuk Lai, together with her supposed nephew, a certain Kenneth Monceda y Sy alias William Sy, before the RTC of Manila, Br. 18,5 with violation of Sec. 15, Art. III, RA 6425, as amended, for "conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent and without authority of law . . . (to) willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to a poseur-buyer three (3) kilograms, more or less, of methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), which is a regulated drug."6 Accused of non-bailable offense, both Yu Yuk Lai and Kenneth Monceda were held at the detention cell of the PNP Narcotics Group in Camp Crame, Quezon City. On 25 June 1999, accused Yu Yuk Lai filed a Petition for Bail on the ground that the evidence of her guilt was not strong.On 10 November 1999, upon receiving information that the accused, especially Yu Yuk Lai, had been seen regularly playing in the casinos of Heritage Hotel and the Holiday Inn Pavilion, SP Formaran III filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Transfer the Detention of the Accused to the City Jail.7 On the same day, Judge Perfecto A. S. Laguio, Jr., granted the motion and ordered the immediate transfer of the two (2) accused to the Manila City Jail.8 On 18 January 2000, Judge Laguio, Jr., concluded that "the evidence standing alone and unrebutted, is strong and sufficient to warrant conviction of the two accused for the crime charged" and denied the petition for bail of accused Yu Yuk Lai for lack of merit.9
Consequently, both accused filed a Joint Motion for Inhibition arguing that the trial court's actuation "do not inspire the belief that its decision would be just and impartial."10 On 28 January 2000, Judge Laguio, Jr., believing that the joint motion was utterly without merit but considering the gravity of the offense and for the peace of mind of the accused, inhibited himself.11 The case was re-raffled to Branch 53, presided by Judge Angel V. Colet. Accused Yu Yuk Lai then filed a Motion to Order the
Confinement of the Accused in a Hospital. Before Judge Colet could resolve the motion, the case was handled by the Branch's Pairing Judge Manuel T. Muro.On 15 May 2000 Judge Muro granted accused Yu Yuk Lai's motion and allowed her to be confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital for a period not exceeding seven (7) days,12 contrary to the recommendation of Dr. Jose Estrada Rosal, Chief of the Health Services of the Manila City Jail, that Yu Yuk Lai be confined at the Philippine General Hospital.13 On 5 June 2000 Judge Muro granted Yu Yuk Lai's Urgent Motion for Extension of Medical Confinement "for a period of one (1) month, or until such time that she is fit to be discharged from the said hospital."14 On 7 July 2000 Judge Muro also granted Yu Yuk Lai's Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence with Motion to Admit Demurrer to Evidence.15 Soon, rumors circulated in the Manila City Hall that Judge Muro was partial towards accused Yu Yuk Lai.The rumors did not end there. On 6 July 2000 unidentified employees of the RTC Manila calling themselves "CONCERNED COURT EMPLOYEES" wrote the Secretary of Justice, copy furnished the Chief State Prosecutor, the Ombudsman, and Judge Muro. The letter alleged that Judge Muro ordered the hospitalization of Yu Yuk Lai "even if she (was) not sick and there (was) already a rumor circulating around the City Hall, that the notorious Judge had given the go signal to the counsel of the accused to file the Motion to Quash, which (would) be granted for a consideration of millions of pesos and the contact person (was) allegedly the daughter of the Judge, who is an employee in the said branch."16 Accordingly on 14 July 2000, SP Formaran III filed a Motion for Inhibition praying that Judge Muro inhibit himself "from further handling this case and/or from resolving the demurrer to evidence filed by the accused Yu Yuk Lai as well as any other pending incidents therein."17 On 16 July 2000, at around 7:30 o'clock in the morning, while she was supposed to be confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital, accused Yu Yuk Lai was arrested inside the VIP room of the Casino Filipino at the Holiday Inn Pavilion, Manila, while playing baccarat. She was unescorted at the time of her arrest.On 18 July 2000, at 9:00 o'clock in the morning, the Motion for Inhibition of Judge Muro was heard and submitted for resolution. Later, at around 11:30 o'clock, when SP Formaran III arrived in his office from the hearing, he was informed by his secretary, Agnes Tuason, that the staff of Court of Appeals Justice Demetrio Demetria had called earlier and said that the Justice wanted to speak with him. The caller requested for a return call. As requested, SP Formaran III immediately returned the call of Justice Demetria but the Justice had already gone out for lunch.Later in the afternoon, between 1:30 and 2:00 o'clock, Justice Demetria, PATAFA President Go Teng Kok and Atty. Reinerio Paas, lawyer of Go Teng Kok and a close friend of Justice Demetria, went to the office of SP Formaran III in the DOJ which SP Formaran III shares with SP Albert Fonacier. Apparently, Justice Demetria was not familiar with SP Formaran III as he greeted SP Fonacier "Kamusta ka, Prosecutor Formaran?"18 Soon the visitors were seated. Go Teng Kok immediately pleaded with SP Formaran III to withdraw his motion to inhibit Judge Muro as this would purportedly delay the resolution of the case. Go Teng Kok also expressed his apprehension that if Judge Muro would inhibit, a new judge might convict his friend, accused Yu Yuk Lai, who was then already receiving bad publicity.Justice Demetria then asked about the status of the case. SP Formaran III informed the Justice that a motion for inhibition has been submitted for resolution, one basis of which was the unsigned letter of the concerned court employees. Justice Demetria opined that it was a bit dangerous to anchor the inhibition of a judge on an unsigned, anonymous letter. The Justice then advised Go Teng Kok who was becoming persistent to "keep his cool" and asked SP Formaran III if he could do something to help Go Teng Kok. Apparently, prior to 18 July 2000, Go Teng Kok had already been asking SP Formaran III to go slow in prosecuting accused Yu Yuk Lai.19 SP Formaran III at first politely declined the request. But later, "just to put an end to (the) conversation," 20 he told them that he would bring the matter to CSP Zuño. "Iyon pala," Justice Demetria replied. The Justice then stood up, bade good bye and left. Atty. Paas and Go Teng Kok followed closely behind.21 Thereafter, SP Formaran III went to see CSP Zuño and informed the latter of what had transpired. CSP Zuño replied, "No way!" SP Formaran III also told ACSP Guiyab, Jr., who gave the same reply.22 At around 3:00 o'clock that same afternoon, CSP Zuño received a call from Justice Demetria who requested him to instruct SP Formaran III to withdraw the motion for inhibition of Judge Muro so that the Judge could already issue an order. "Pakisabi mo nga kay State Prosecutor Formaran na i-withdraw na iyong kanyang Motion to Inhibit para
naman makagawa na ng Order si Judge Muro," Justice Demetria was quoted as saying.23 Politely, CSP Zuño said that he would see what he could do. "Tingnan ko po kung ano ang magagawa ko."24 On 20 July 2000, The Philippine Daily Inquirer reported that a "Supreme Court Justice . . . and an outspoken sports person and leader"25 had been exerting "undue pressure" on the DOJ to go slow in prosecuting re-arrested drug queen Yu Yuk Lai. That same afternoon, the names of Justice Demetria and Mr. Go Teng Kok were disclosed to the media to clear the name of the Supreme Court justices who might have been affected by the erroneous news report. The following day, 21 July 2000, several newspapers named Justice Demetria and Go Teng Kok as "drug lawyers."Also on 20 July 2000 the DOJ received a copy of an Order dated 19 July 2000 of Judge Muro inhibiting himself from further hearing the case of Yu Yuk Lai and Kenneth Monceda.26 Respondent Justice Demetria, for his part, vehemently denied having interceded for Yu Yuk Lai. While he admitted that he indeed visited the DOJ on 18 July 2000, he went there to "visit old friends" and his meeting Go Teng Kok whom he did not know until that time was purely accidental. Expectedly, Atty. Paas and Go Teng Kok corroborated the claim of respondent Justice.Justice Demetria explained that he merely requested SP Formaran III "to do something to help Go Teng Kok about the case" without ever specifying the kind of "help" that he requested. He averred that it was purely on the basis of erroneous impression and conjecture on the part of SP Formaran III that he impliedly asked him to withdraw the motion "because that is what Mr. Go Teng Kok was appealing and requesting."27 Respondent claimed that the "help" he was requesting could well be "within legal bounds or line of duty."Justice Demetria claimed that if ever he said anything else during the discussion between Go Teng Kok and SP Formaran III, such was not a form of intervention. He only admonished Go Teng Kok "to cool it" when the discussion between the prosecutor and Go Teng Kok became heated. While he asked about the status of the case this, he said, demonstrated his lack of knowledge about the case and bolstered his claim that he could not have possibly interceded for Yu Yuk Lai.Respondent Justice likewise argued that the bases of his identification by CSP Zuño as the Justice exerting undue pressure on the DOJ were all hearsay. Respondent submitted that CSP Zuño based his identification from a newspaper account, from the statement of his secretary that it was he (Justice Demetria) who was on the other end of the telephone and from SP Formaran III when the latter consulted the Chief State Prosecutor about the visit of the Justice and Go Teng Kok impliedly asking him to withdraw the motion.In defense of respondent Justice, Atty. Paas stated that it was actually he, not Justice Demetria, who later called up CSP Zuño to inquire about the latter's decision regarding the withdrawal of the motion to inhibit since SP Formaran III had earlier told Go Teng Kok that the matter would be taken up with his superiors.In fine, respondent Justice Demetria maintains that it is inconceivable for him to ask SP Formaran III whom he just met for the first time to do something for Go Teng Kok whom he claims he just likewise met for the first time. Neither did he know Yu Yuk Lai, a claim Yu Yuk Lai herself corroborated. It would be unthinkable for him to intercede in behalf of someone he did not know. Indeed respondent Justice asserted that his meeting Go Teng Kok on 18 July 2000 at the DOJ was purely coincidence, if not accidental.So, did respondent Justice Demetria really intercede in behalf of suspected drug queen Yu Yuk Lai?Investigating Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino believes so. In her Report dated 5 January 2001, she found respondent Justice Demetria "guilty of violating Rule 2.04, Canon 2, Code of Judicial Conduct" and recommended that "appropriate disciplinary action be taken against him by this Honorable Court."28 Only rightly so. The evidence is clear, if not overwhelming, and damning. Thus, even the Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights, after a hearing, found that "there was a conspiracy to commit the following offenses on the part of CA Associate Justice Demetrio Demetria and PATAFA President Go Teng Kok and Miss Yu Yuk Lai: obstruction of justice punishable under PD No. 1829 and Article 3(a) of RA 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act."29 While Justice Demetria vehemently denied interfering with the criminal case, his denial cannot stand against the positive assertions of CSP Zuño and SP Formaran III,30 which are consistent with natural human experience. To accept the testimony of the defense witnesses that it was Atty. Paas who telephoned CSP Zuño, and not Justice Demetria, and that the "help" the respondent Justice was requesting SP Formaran III was something "within legal bounds or line of duty" other than the withdrawal of the motion is to strain too far one's imagination.
The testimony of CSP Zuño is plainly unambiguous and indubitably consistent with the other facts and circumstances surrounding the case —
CSP Zuño: As far as I could recall Justice Demetria said, "Pakisabi mo nga kay State Prosecutor Formaran na iwithdraw na iyong kanyang Motion to Inhibit para naman makagawa ng Order si Judge Muro."31
In his discussion with Go Teng Kok and Justice Demetria, SP Formaran III said that he would consult his superiors regarding the proposal to withdraw the motion. The timely telephone call to CSP Zuño was thus a logical follow-up. And no one could have made the call except respondent Justice since it is not uncommon for anyone to believe that CSP Zuño would recognize the voice of respondent Justice who was CSP Zuño's former superior in the DOJ. Thus, the confident utterance "[p]akisabi mo nga kay State Prosecutor Formaran na iwithdraw na iyong kanyang Motion to Inhibit para naman makagawa ng Order si Judge Muro" could not have come from anyone else but from respondent Justice who had moral ascendancy over CSP Zuño, he being a Justice of the Court of Appeals and a former Undersecretary and at one time Acting Secretary of the DOJ.Even the requested "help" for Go Teng Kok, whom respondent Justice claims he did not know and met only that time, could not have meant any other assistance but the withdrawal of the motion to inhibit Judge Muro. True, Justice Demetria never categorically asked SP Formaran III to withdraw his Motion. But when respondent Justice Demetria asked the state prosecutor at that particular time "to do something . . . to help Mr. Go Teng Kok," the latter was pleading for the withdrawal of the motion, and nothing else. That was the only form of "help" that Go Teng Kok wanted. The subtle pressure exerted simply pointed to one particular act. Thus, subsequently respondent Justice called CSP Zuño to ask for just that — the withdrawal of the motion to inhibit Judge Muro.Justice Demetria also claimed that he, together with Atty. Paas, went to the DOJ, first, to see Secretary Artemio Tuquero and seek assistance in the appointment of Atty. Paas to the Court of Appeals, and second, to "visit old friends,"32 and that the meeting with Go Teng Kok was purely accidental. But respondent Justice never mentioned in his earlier Compliance to the Memorandum of the Chief Justice that his primary purpose in going to the DOJ was to see Sec. Tuquero, and since Sec. Tuquero was not in, he instead decided to see some officials/prosecutors whom he had not visited for a long time.We find this assertion difficult to accept. For, even his very own witnesses belied his alibi. ACSP Gaña, Jr. testified and confirmed that Justice Demetria only said "hi."33 SSP Dañosos, denied seeing him and claimed that it was only Atty. Paas who peeped into his room.34 Suspiciously, it was really in the office of SP Formaran III, whom respondent Justice Demetria did not know, where Justice Demetria, Atty. Paas and Go Teng Kok decided to "stay a while."35 Thus, as found by Mme. Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, the Investigating Justice, Justice Demetria and company could not have been there to exchange pleasantries with SPs Formaran III and Fonacier since they were not acquainted with each other. Prior to this incident, Justice Demetria did not personally know either SP Formaran III or SP Fonacier, a fact corroborated by respondent himself.36 All of these contradict and belie respondent Justice Demetria's earlier Compliance to the Memorandum of the Chief Justice that "[b]ecause Prosecutor Formaran is also a friend, we decided to drop by his office . . . (and) I stayed a while."37 As pointed out by the Investigating Justice, respondent Justice was there "to join forces with Go Teng Kok in arguing for the withdrawal of Formaran's Motion for Inhibition of Judge Muro, which was the real purpose of their visit to SP Formaran and to the DOJ. The uncanny coincidence in the timing of Justice Demetria's visit to SP Formaran's office, and that of Go Teng Kok, could not have been 'accidental' but pre-arranged."38 And, "visiting old friends" only came as an afterthought. The circumstances simply show that Justice Demetria and Atty. Paas, together with Go Teng Kok, did not go to the DOJ to see Sec. Tuquero, but to visit, if not "pressure," CSP Zuño and SP Formaran III.Justice Demetria also claimed that it is inconceivable for him to help Yu Yuk Lai and Go Teng Kok, both of whom he did not personally know, and more unthinkable that he would be asking help from SP Formaran III whom he had just met for the first time.The argument cannot be sustained. It is admitted that respondent is a very close friend of Atty. Paas, lawyer of Go Teng Kok. And, it is not necessary that respondent Justice Demetria be acquainted with Go Teng Kok, Yu Yuk Lai or SP Formaran III for him to intercede in behalf of the accused. It is enough that he is a close friend of the lawyer of Go Teng Kok, who has been helping the accused, and that
he wields influence as a former DOJ Undersecretary and later, Acting Secretary, and now, a Justice of the Court of Appeals.In sum, we find the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses convincing and trustworthy, as compared to those of the defense which do not only defy natural human experience but are also riddled with major inconsistencies which create well-founded and overriding doubts.The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice is circumscribed with the heavy of responsibility. His at all times must be characterized with propriety and must be above suspicion.39 His must be free of even a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to the performance of his judicial duties, but also his behavior outside the courtroom and as a private individual.Unfortunately, respondent Justice Demetrio Demetria failed failed to live up to this expectation. Through his indiscretions, Justice Demetria did not only make a mockery of his high office, but also caused incalculable damage to the entire Judiciary. The mere mention of his name in the national newspapers, allegedly lawyering for a suspected drug queen and interfering with her prosecution seriously undermined the integrity of the entire Judiciary.Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness tha a seat in the Judiciary.40 High ethical principles and a sense of propriety should be maintained, without which the faith of the people in the Judiciary so indispensable in orderly society cannot be preserved.41 There is simply no place in the Judiciary for those who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity.42
WHEREFORE, we sustain the findings of the Investigating Justice and hold Justice Demetrio G. Demetria GUILTY of violating Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. He is ordered DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice to his appointment or reappointment to any government office, agency or instrumentality, including any government owned or controlled corporation or institution.SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. MTJ-04-1541. March 10, 2005]Spouses JESUS V. JACINTO and NENITA C. JACINTO, complainants, vs. Judge PLACIDO V. VALLARTA, Municipal Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, respondent. D E C I S I O NPANGANIBAN, J.:Quiet dignity, self-restraint, civility and temperate language are expected of every judge. All members of the judiciary must strictly follow the ethical standards laid down by the Code of Judicial Conduct.The Case and the FactsThis case originated from a Complaint[1] filed by Spouses Jesus V. Jacinto and Nenita C. Jacinto on March 22, 2002. Judge Placido B. Vallarta was charged therein with gross negligence, gross ignorance of the law, issuance of an unjust interlocutory order, and vulgar and unbecoming conduct. The Complaint alleges as follows:
1. That on September 4, 2001, Judge Placido B. Vallarta issued an Order against us for a Writ of Replevin for our vehicle Isuzu Cargo Truck. The Order was in favor of a certain rich and influential spouses from Nueva Ecija, Mr. & Mrs. Gaudencio and Carina Magundayao, who sold the truck to us on September 13, 1999;2. That according to our knowledge and belief [a] Writ of Replevin should not have been ordered against us considering our agreements with spouses Magundayao stated in the 'Deed of Conditional Sale legalizing the sale of the Isuzu Cargo Truck;3. That we [did] not violate any of the agreement[s] in the Deed of Conditional Sale. Nevertheless, it was us who [were] cheated and the right to own the truck was taken from us by spouses Magundayao, hence, we sent them a demand letter;4. That after the Sheriff recovered the truck from our possession on September 7, 2001, we immediately went to the Office of Judge Vallarta to settle the problem amicably. We stooped down and pleaded for help. However, we were dismayed by the attitude shown by Judge Vallarta and the words from him [were] so surprising that we [did] not expect to hear from a public servant and from a Judge for that matter. Instead of giving sound advice to our case, Judge Vallarta acted otherwise and was totally rude towards us. For whatever reason he dealt with us in an ill-mannered way that even resulted for my fainting in the Office of the MTC-Gapan, because he at that time was asking him, if possible I will deposit the money to the Court, representing our payments to spouses Magundayao however, Judge Vallarta sarcastically uttered the following words: 'Wala akong pakialam diyan sa
pera ninyo kung gusto ninyo hanapin ninyo ang inyong kalaban', I answered him 'Wala po kasi ang aming kalaban (Magundayao) nagpunta daw po sa abroad and he replied 'Eh, wala pala edi hanapin ninyo, sino ang gusto ninyong maghanap ako at saka hindi pumapasok sa isip ko yang mga sinasabi mo (pointing his forehead) humanap ka ng abogado mo na makatutulong sa iyo, dagdag ka pa sa problema ko.5. That because of the injustice shown to us by Judge Vallarta we cannot help but to think that due to the money and influence by spouses Magundayao the Order of Writ of Replevin was issued wrongly. He issued the Writ of Replevin without clearance from the Supreme Court. We say this so because upon our thorough examination of the complaint and the attachment thereof we found out that the certification from the Supreme Court issued in favor of the Utility Assurance Corporation, prove a defective replevin bond;6. That because of [the] inconsiderate attitude of Judge Vallarta, given our limited resources, we were left with no other choice but to hire the service of a legal counsel. And on September 12, 2001[,] our Counsel filed an 'Urgent Motion to Quash Writ of Replevin and a hearing was set on September 18, 2001. Unfortunately, both the Plaintiff Magundayao and their Counsel failed to appear on the said hearing.7. That on September 19, we went to Supreme Court and found out that Utility Assurance Corporation, bonding company that issued Replevin Bond was not authorized to do business at the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Gapan. A certification dated September 19, 2001 from the Supreme Court was issued to us;8. That on September 23, 2001 hearing for Motion to Quash was set for the second time. But then again Counsel for the Plaintiff (Magundayao) did not appear in Court and so they ask for postponement;9. That on October 9, 2001 third setting for the Motion To Quash, we (Defendant) submitted additional defense exhibits. For the third time counsel for the Plaintiff did not appear in court Judge Vallarta asked the Plaintiff why their counsel [was] not present for the third time. Without too much effort from their side Plaintiff bl[u]ntly responded, 'Ewan ko po;10. That on October 23, 2001[, the] fourth setting of hearing for Motion to Quash, Judge Vallarta gave another chance to the Plaintiff (Magundayao) to answer all our defense exhibits. And the Plaintiff asked for repeated postponement and [the] hearing was reset to November 6, 2001;11. That on November 6, 2001, surprisingly we were called inside the Chamber of Judge Vallarta by a certain retired Judge Jose E. Belen (MTC-GAPAN) and was asked by him to settle the case between the Plaintiff and Defendant outside the court and tried to convince us not to question the clearance of Utility Assurance Corp. But the settlement did not materialize because of the demands of the Plaintiff which we believe too much for them to ask;12. That on November 6, 2001, after failed attempt for settlement Judge Vallarta advi[sed] the Plaintiff to withdraw the Writ of Replevin because the defect of the Replevin Bond was not cured. And our counsel withdraw the Motion to Quash as was advi[sed] by Judge Vallarta;13. That on November 7, 2001, our counsel filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Release Motor Vehicle. On the same date, much as he would not want it to do, Judge Vallarta ordered the release of [the] motor vehicle. But before he signed the Order for the release[,] he confronted us and uttered the following in verbatim, 'O ngayong alam ninyo na mali ang aking ginawa hindi ninyo ako idemanda. Idemanda ninyo ako ng makita ninyo ang inyong hinahanap. We cannot believe that those words came from a Judge;14. That on November 8, 2001, the Plaintiff filed for another Replevin Bond dated November 5, 2001 for the second time, through the Pacific Insurance Company. But still this bonding insurance company was not authorized by the Supreme Court to do business with the Municipal Trial Court of Gapan;15. That on November 9, 2001, the Plaintiff filed Motion for Reconsideration dated November 8, 2001 without proof of service considering that it was only a mere scrap of paper;16. That on November 20, 2001, at the hearing for [the] Motion for Reconsideration, counsel for the Defendant raised [a] question regarding the proof of service for that motion. On the instant[,] Carina Magundayao presented a fake proof of service. But Judge Vallarta accepted or tolerated the proof of service as presented by Carina Magundayao and disregard counsel for the defendants questioning. He even instructed our counsel to just receive the motion on the date of the
hearing and required [him] to answer it within 5 days. Then a hearing was set on November 27, 2001. Counsel for the Plaintiff [did] not appear in court;17. That on November 26, 2001, we went to Supreme Court and found out for the second time the defect of the second Replevin Bond. Another certification was issued upon our request. On the same date we were able to file our Opposition/Comment for the Motion for Reconsideration;18. That on November 27, 2001 hearing for Motion for Reconsideration and we (defendant) through our counsel presented another certification from the Supreme Court, Judge Vallarta made an Order, that both the Motion for Reconsideration and our Opposition/Comment be submitted for Resolution. Counsel for the Plaintiff again [was] not in Court;19. Surprisingly on December 21, 2001, Sheriff Ernesto Mendoza went to our house purposely to replevin the subject motor vehicle. Because we are law abiding citizen, after our consultation with our lawyer on the following day, we voluntarily surrender[ed] the vehicle to Sheriff Mendoza and to the Clerk of Court Atty. Herminigildo M. Linsangan;20. As much as we would like to go to the Municipal Trial Court of Gapan (MTC-Gapan) immediately after the truck was recovered from us to verify how the Writ of Replevin was again issued despite the pending incident, we [could] not do so because on [the] days following December 21, 2001 until January 1, 2002 the Court [was on] vacation. To our great dismay and mortification, Judge Vallarta did not resolve said Motion for Reconsideration and our Opposition/Comment to Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, an unsigned Order dated November 27, 2001 can attest to that. We were able to secure a certified true copy of the said unsigned Order from the Clerk of Court, MTC-Gapan on January 2, 2002. Despite all these he still issued an Order dated December 21, 2001 approving the new clearance.21. That in view of said anomalies we discovered, our counsel file[d an] Urgent Motion For Reconsideration With Motion to Quash Writ of Replevin dated January 3, 2001;22. That on January 15, 2002[,] the date of hearing for Urgent Motion for Reconsideration With Motion To Quash Writ of Replevin, Judge Vallarta failed to appear in his sala;23. That on February 12, 2002, Judge Vallarta advi[sed] us to enter into [an] amicable settlement, hence we ask[ed] for the postponement of the case to file the appropriate compromise agreement. Judge Vallarta instructed our counsel to withdraw our Urgent Motion For Reconsideration With Motion to Quash Writ of Replevin;24. However, we failed to settle the case amicably because the Plaintiff reneged the previous commitment they made while we were inside the chamber of Judge Vallarta;25. That because of said development and in fact our Isuzu Cargo Truck has been deteriorating and its some accessories [were] missing one by one[,] we were constrained to file our Counter Replevin Bond to release the said truck on February 27, 2002;26. That on March 1, 2002, we filed our Motion To Release Motor Vehicle in lieu of the said Counter Replevin Bond and it was brought out to the attention of Judge Vallarta;27. That on March 5, 2002, we went to Cabiao, Nueva Ecija and show[ed] him our Counter Replevin Bond as well as the Motion of our counsel. However, he responded to us indifferently and uttered the following statement, 'O ano ang kailangan ninyo?. We amiably responded, 'Pakikiusap po sana namin na mai-release na ang aming sasakyan para makapaghanap-buhay na po kami, ito lamang po ang aming ikinabubuhay. To our astonishment he showed impatience and said 'Ayaw pirmahan ni Judge Bernardo ang pinapipirmahan ko, sabihin ninyo (while pointing his finger to us) na pirmahan ito at ubos na ang panggastos na ibinigay ko sa tauhan ko na P500.00 ayaw pa niyang pirmahan ito. We were totally perplexed at that statement. Why would be brought out something for which we have no business at all? We are trying to plead for our case and has nothing to do with whatever dealings he has with Judge Bernardo. Still holding on our temper we told him, 'Wala po kaming kinalaman sa sinasabi ninyo at wala po kaming karapatan na sabihan si Judge Bernardo na pirmahan kung ano man ang pinapipirmahan ninyo. Upon hearing those words from us he again respond with anger and finality, 'kung ayaw ninyong sabihin magtalikuran tayo. Hindi ko alam kung kailan ko maaksiyunan yang problema ninyo. Tingnan ko sa Martes (March 12, 2002) kung naroon ako
(MTC-Gapan) kung hindi ako makarating pasensiya kayo at hintayin ninyo kung kailan ko aaksiyunan yang problema ninyo. That manner he conversed to us as well as the statement he uttered were least expected to come from a moral and Honorable Judge. Even then, we were able to identify ourselves as only x x x ordinary citizens, as against Judge Vallarta who is the Acting Presiding Judge in our case, we contained our emotions and left the court;28. That on March 12, 2002, our case was called almost 11:30 in the morning because he arrived at around 10:30 in the morning and our counsel asked and presented that our Motion be granted. However, Judge Vallarta requested our counsel to give him time to study the matters regarding the posting of Counter Replevin Bond and just asked to follow him in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija on the following day, Wednesday, March 13, 2002;29. That on March 13, 2002, as agreed upon by Judge Vallarta and our counsel, we followed him in San Antonio, Nueva Ecija. Giving us enough hope that he will release the Isuzu Cargo Truck, we even requested one of his Clerk in MTC-Gapan to accompany us brought with her pertinent documents/records pertaining to our case. However, upon seeing us again Judge Vallarta gave various reasons for him not to release the truck. And base from our little knowledge of the law most of his excuses just trying to play trick on us. One flimsy reason he mentioned was that Plaintiff should be given [the] opportunity to examine our Counter Replevin Bond, an opportunity not once bestowed on us. Making us realized (sic) more how powerful money and influence work against us who have nothing. Our meeting with him ended up with another instruction that our counsel file an 'Amended Motion to Approve the Release of Motor Vehicle for which Plaintiff must be furnished. Hearing for the said Motion was set on March 19, 2002;30. That on March 19, 2002, we waited Judge Vallarta until 12:00 oclock in the morning in the Municipal Trial Court of Gapan but he did not show up for unknown reason.[2] (Emphasis in the original)
On April 15, 2002, Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco Jr. referred the Complaint to respondent judge and asked him to file, within ten days from receiving it, a comment thereon.[3] However, the latter failed to do so despite his receipt of the Complaint on April 30, 2002.[4]chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryDuring the 2002 barangay elections, respondent filed his Certificate of Candidacy and was considered automatically resigned effective June 10, 2002.[5]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarySubsequently, the court administrator sent respondent the '1st Tracer dated September 20, 2002, reiterating the directive for the latter to comment on the Complaint within five days from receipt of the Tracer; otherwise, the matter would be submitted to the Court for resolution without the comment.The 1st Tracer was received by respondent on October 16, 2002, but he again failed to file his comment. Hence, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) made its report and recommendation on the matter even without his comment.Findings and Recommendation of the OCAThe OCA considered respondent judge to have waived his right to present evidence to controvert the Complaint against him.It opined that although he had erred in issuing the Writ of Replevin, complainants failed to prove that the error was deliberate and malicious or done with evident bad faith. It pointed out that an administrative complaint was not the appropriate remedy for every erroneous order issued by a judge.However, it found that respondent had failed to comply with his duty 'to conduct himself with courtesy and, to avoid using language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper. Hence, the OCA recommended that he be penalized with a fine of P5,000.The Court's RulingWe agree with the OCA.Administrative LiabilityComplainants fault respondent mainly (1) for issuing a Writ of Replevin, even if the bonding company that issued the replevin bond was allegedly not authorized to do business with the MTC of Gapan; and (2) for failing to act, favorably and with dispatch, on their various Motions and counter-replevin bond for the release of the truck to them.The facts laid down by complainants are insufficient to support a finding of gross ignorance of the law. To be held liable therefor, 'the judge must be shown to have committed an error that was 'gross or patent, deliberate and malicious.[6] Respondent may have erred in issuing the Writ of Replevin, but such error has not been shown to be gross or patent. Because complainants did not furnish this Court a copy of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 4896, there is no basis for
showing how they presented the case and the need for a writ of replevin to respondent. While manifesting palpable impatience bordering on rudeness, as well as personal disinterest in their cause and problems, his utterances and behavior fail to support a finding that he acted deliberately and maliciously.Neither is there any clear and sufficient basis for finding respondent liable for gross negligence and issuance of an unjust interlocutory order. He cannot, however, be completely absolved of administrative liability.Judges are viewed as the visible representations of law and justice, from whom the people draw the will and inclination to obey the law.[7] Thus, the official conduct of judges should be free from impropriety and even the appearance of impropriety. Their personal behavior, not only on the bench and in the performance of judicial duties but also in their everyday lives, should be beyond reproach.[8]Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a 'judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.[9]chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryIn this case, respondent displayed conduct that fell short of the standards expected of a magistrate of the law.[10] His unguarded utterances, impatience, and undisguised lack of concern bordering on contempt for the plight of complainants, who had humbly looked up to him and sought his help, constituted vulgar and unbecoming conduct that eroded public confidence in the judiciary.From the standpoint of conduct and demeanor expected of members of the bench, a resort to intemperate language only detracts from the respect due them and becomes self-destructive.[11] The judicial office circumscribes the personal conduct of a magistrate and imposes a number of restrictions. This is a price that judges have to pay for accepting and occupying their exalted positions in the administration of justice.[12] Irresponsible or improper conduct on their part erodes public confidence in the judiciary.[13] Thus, it is their duty to avoid any impression of impropriety in order to protect the image and integrity of the judiciary.[14] Maintaining the dignity of courts and enforcing the duty of the citizens to respect them are necessary adjuncts to the administration of justice.[15]chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryRespondent must be reminded that government service is people-oriented. 'Patience is an essential part of dispensing justice and courtesy is a mark of culture and good breeding.[16] Impatience and rudeness have no place in government service, in which personnel are enjoined to act with self-restraint and civility at all times.[17]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarySection 10 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies vulgar and unbecoming conduct as a light charge, for which a fine[18] of not less than P1,000 but not exceeding P10,000 may be imposed.WHEREFORE, Respondent Judge Placido B. Vallarta is found guilty of vulgar and unbecoming conduct and hereby FINED five thousand pesos.SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1452 April 06, 2005EDITHA O. CATBAGAN, complainant, vs.JUDGE FELIXBERTO P. BARTE, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Tobias Fornier, Antique, respondent.R E S O L U T I O NCORONA, J.:In a verified letter-complaint1 dated September 17, 2001 addressed to the Honorable Chief Justice, through the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), complainant Editha O. Catbagan charged respondent Judge Felixberto P. Barte of the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Tobias Fornier, Antique with "grave and serious misconduct."2
In the first week of May 1999, complainant received information that the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, Inc. (Church) was interested in buying land in the Province of Antique. She immediately approached respondent judge and requested him to assist her in the prospective transaction. Together with a certain Abraham Pedriña, the three agreed that in case they succeeded in brokering the sale of the properties to the Church, their commission would be divided in this manner:
x x x the three of us agreed in the house of Judge Barte that for every sale transaction if the purchase price exceed One Million Pesos, the two of us will receive a commission of P100,000.00 each while the remaining amount or net gain be retained by Judge Barte as his commission based on his agreement with the vendors.3
When requested to put their agreement in writing, respondent judge allegedly answered: "A municipal trial judge occupies the forefront of the judicial arm that is the closest in reach to the public he serves and he must accordingly act at all times with great constancy and
utmost probity." Complainant did not insist on her request after hearing this.The three of them subsequently conferred with Bobby J. Villalobos, the district president of the Church. They offered the parcels of land owned by Bitoon Cezar and Aurea Clarin in Sibalom, Antique.4
Thereafter, on January 18, 2001, the Church agreed to purchase lots 336-A and 336-B owned by Bitoon Cezar for P1,120,300.5
Lot 334 owned by Aurea Clarin was also sold for P2,199,000 on February 19, 2001.6
Meanwhile, lot 5555 located in Hamtic, Antique owned by Eleanor M. Checa-Santos was sold on February 12, 2001 for P2,300,000.7
For the first two sales, complainant claimed she was entitled to a P300,000 commission.Since the Church transacted with respondent only, it paid the price of the properties to him. Respondent then delivered the amount due to the vendors.When complainant heard that the vendors had been paid, she demanded her commission from respondent. However, respondent offered her only P25,000 for the two transactions, excluding the one in Hamtic.Complainant later learned that respondent received a P435,226.55 commission from the Aurea Clarin transaction alone.8
Complainant reminded respondent of their agreement but respondent challenged complainant "to go to court." Instead of pursuing her claim in a civil suit, however, complainant opted to file the present administrative case against respondent on September 17, 2001.In a 1st Indorsement9 dated October 18, 2001, Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. referred the complaint to respondent for his comment on the charge of conduct unbecoming of a judge.In his comment,10 respondent denied the charge against him and asked for the dismissal of the administrative case on the following grounds:
First, there was ambiguity in the charge of grave and serious misconduct in the complaint and conduct unbecoming of a judge in the OCA indorsement. Because of this confusion, he was deprived of his right to be informed of the real charge against him. Consequently, he was not able to properly prepare his defense.Second, complainant’s allegations were baseless and designed merely to harass and dishonor respondent. According to him, complainant and Pedriña went to his house and told him about the intention of the Church to buy land in Antique. Subsequently, he informed the chapter president of the Church that there were several parcels of land in the Municipality of Sibalom that met their requirements. For two years, he spent after-office hours and weekends to consummate the transaction. He labored hard because the transaction could augment his meager income and enable him to send his three children to good colleges in Iloilo City. He admitted that Pedriña assisted him but maintained that complainant had no involvement in the transaction other than attending the initial meeting with the chapter president. He claimed that it was he, not the complainant, who looked for the land to be sold to the Church. He submitted the sworn affidavit11 of the vendor’s lawyer, Atty. Francisco Javier, who never met the complainant nor transacted with her. Respondent also claimed that the agreement was for him to shoulder all the expenses relative to the transaction, including its documentation. Pedriña’s affidavit supported respondent’s claim that they never agreed on a commission scheme, contrary to complainant’s assertion. If ever respondent gave money for any information or assistance in the transaction, the amount depended entirely on his discretion.
In a report and recommendation12 dated June 13, 2002, the OCA found respondent not guilty of the charges against him but recommended a fine of P5,000 for violating Canon 5, Rule 5.0213 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. It also warned respondent against directly engaging in any private business even outside office hours, otherwise a more severe penalty would be imposed upon him. The OCA further noted that another administrative case, entitled Jose Berin and Merly Alorro v. Judge Felixberto P. Barte,14 had been filed against respondent. It involved a transaction similar to the one in this complaint.Initially, we will discuss respondent’s assertion that this administrative case should be dismissed for being ambiguous. According to respondent, the confusion denied him the opportunity to properly defend himself.Despite the apparent confusion brought about by the charge of (1) "grave and serious misconduct" in the complaint and (2) "conduct unbecoming of a judge" in the OCA indorsement, the dismissal of the complaint is not warranted. The records show that respondent refuted both charges in his comment and manifestation.15 The OCA
could not be faulted for describing the charge as "conduct unbecoming of a judge" (instead of "grave and serious misconduct") because the allegations pointed to none other but that offense. Noticeably, in complainant’s reply16 and letter-request17 for early resolution, she consistently described her charge against respondent as "conduct unbecoming of a judge." We therefore cannot dismiss outright the administrative case on this ground alone, considering that respondent knew fully well what he was being charged with. In fact, he defended himself against the charges.In a long line of cases, we have held that the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is simply the opportunity to explain one’s side.18
The question of whether complainant was or was not entitled to a commission for her efforts in the sale of the parcels of land to the Church should be threshed out in a proper civil case.What is therefore left for us to thresh out is respondent’s administrative liability for his admitted financial and business dealings.We note the OCA’s observation that this is not the first time an administrative case of the same nature has been filed against respondent. In Jose Berin and Merly Alorro v. Judge Felixberto P. Barte,19 respondent judge was also charged with grave and serious misconduct for refusing to give the complainants therein their respective commissions in the sale of land to the Manila Mission of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, Inc. The Court, in that case, found respondent guilty of violating Canon 5.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct:
By allowing himself to act as agent in the sale of the subject property, respondent judge has increased the possibility of his disqualification to act as an impartial judge in the event that a dispute involving the said contract of sale arises. Also, the possibility that the parties to the sale might plead before his court is not remote and his business dealings with them might not only create suspicion as to his fairness but also to his ability to render it in a manner that is free from any suspicion as to its fairness and impartiality and also as to the judge’s integrity.
The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that "[a] judge shall refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect adversely on the court’s impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities, or increase involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court. A judge should so manage investments and other financial interests as to minimize the number of cases giving grounds for disqualification."20
Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics also cautions a judge from "x x x making personal investments in enterprises which are apt to be involved in litigation in his court x x x."As observed by the OCA, respondent judge should have refrained from participating in the transaction. By allowing himself to act as an agent in the sale of the properties, respondent increased the possibility of his disqualification in the event that a dispute involving the said contracts of sale arose. Moreover, the possibility that the parties in the sale might have appeared before his court was not remote and his business dealings with them would have then created a doubt about his fairness and impartiality.Respondent submits that the jurisdiction of the 1st MCTC covers the Municipalities of Tobias Fornier, Hamtic and Aniniy. The 2nd MCTC, on the other hand, covers Sibalom, San Remigio and Belison. Hence, since the parties and subject matter involved in the controversy were not within the jurisdiction of the 1st MCTC, his judicial authority could have never been invoked had a case arisen from the transaction.We find, however, that his claim is not exactly correct. Respondent himself emphasized to this Court in his manifestation21 dated February 23, 2004 that, aside from his duties in the 1st MCTC, he was also designated as Acting Presiding Judge of the 5 th MCTC and in several cases in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Jose, Antique. Considering this, the likelihood that he could have also been designated in the 2nd MCTC (with jurisdiction over Sibalom) was neither remote nor impossible. Had any of the parties in the subject transaction filed suit, his inhibition would have been called for because of his aforecited business dealings.Given these circumstances, respondent judge ought perhaps to seriously consider leaving the judiciary and becoming a full-time real estate broker instead. The latter calling appears to have a special appeal to him.Although every office in the government is a public trust, no position exacts greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary. A magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times in such manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice.22
We acknowledge that respondent has been in judicial service since 1990 up to the present. We find his declaration that no criminal or
civil case has ever been filed against him to be true. However, the present administrative case and an earlier decided case with similar facts are too glaring to ignore. In that case, we reminded him that judges must not only be "good judges" but must also "appear to be good persons."23 In the judiciary, moral integrity is more than a cardinal virtue; it is a necessity.24
In Poso v. Mijares,25 we held that "public interest in an adept and honest judiciary dictates that notice of future harsher penalties should not be followed by another forewarning of the same kind, ad infinitum, but by discipline through appropriate penalties."As already mentioned, respondent was previously sanctioned for an identical infraction involving the sale of land to the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter Day Saints, Inc. We ordered him to pay a fine of P2,000, admonished him to be more discreet and prudent in his private dealings and warned him that a similar infraction would be sanctioned more severely.26 This second administrative case therefore reveals a certain kind of avarice on the part of respondent. Hence, we are constrained to impose upon him a heavier penalty than the OCA-recommended fine.WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Felixberto P. Barte is hereby found guilty of violating Canon 5.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Considering that this is his second offense, he is hereby SUSPENDED for six (6) months. He is hereby warned that another complaint of this kind will merit a penalty beyond mere suspension from public office.SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. P-05-1957 February 7, 2005JUDGE THELMA CANLAS TRINIDAD-PE AGUIRRE, complainant, vs.EDUARDO T. BALTAZAR, Legal Researcher, Regional Trial Court, Branch 129, Caloocan City, respondent.D E C I S I O NCALLEJO, SR., J.:The instant administrative matter refers to the Letter-Complaint dated April 12, 2004, of Judge Trinidad-Pe Aguirre charging Eduardo T. Baltazar, Legal Researcher, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 129, with conduct unbecoming a court employee.It appears that the complainant Judge first issued a directive requiring several of her staff to file a written explanation regarding repeated absences, and that the respondent was one of them. Upon the latter’s failure to submit his written explanation, the complainant Judge issued Administrative Order No. 01-041 dated March 17, 2004, effectively imposing a fine on the respondent for "disobedience of a lawful order" in the amount of P500.00. Thereafter, the complainant Judge issued another Order on April 14, 2004, worded as follows:TO: MR. EDUARDO T. BALTAZARCourt Legal ResearcherRTC, Br. 129, Caloocan CityOn the ground that you have failed to perform your duties and responsibilities as a Court Legal Researcher, you are hereby ordered detailed in the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, this City, to beef up the manpower of the Clerk of Court, until such time that you can perform your duties with fidelity and zeal.This Order takes effect immediately.2
In her letter-complaint, the complainant Judge alleged that she was the former Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 62, Gumaca, Quezon. She alleged that she was charging the respondent for misbehavior for filing a leave of absence from March 22, 2004 to April 20, 2004, without seeking her written permission. She stressed that at the time he filed his application for leave, she had already assumed her post as Presiding Judge of RTC, Caloocan City, Branch 129. She claimed that such act of the respondent undermined her position as Presiding judge and would create a bad precedent among her subordinates. She pointed out that certain averments in the respondent’s application for leave needed to be clarified, since it was mentioned that he was spending his vacation abroad.The respondent, for his part, expressed surprise at the charge against him in his Comment dated June 21, 2004, considering that he had already been fined and detailed to another office by the complainant Judge. According to the respondent, he sought the approval of his application for leave of absence from Judge Silvestre H. Bello, Jr., then Executive Judge of RTC, Caloocan City, for the period of March 22 to April 20, 2004. Considering that Judge Bello, Jr. was also the pairing judge of Branch 129, he no longer had to submit his application for leave to Judge Aguirre. The respondent also reasoned that Judge Aguirre was at a seminar in Tagaytay City at the time. Since he had to immediately submit his application for leave to the Leave Section as a requirement for his request for a permit to travel, he could no longer wait for her return.The respondent maintained that he acted in good faith and did not undermine the position of the complainant Judge; on the contrary, it was the complainant Judge who undermined the position of the
Executive Judge when she ordered the respondent’s detail at the Office of the Clerk of Court. He further averred that the complainant Judge’s display of authority was alarming and that he felt harassed.In her Reply dated August 4, 2004, the complainant Judge maintained that the reason for her actuations was to avoid a bad precedent among her staff. She stressed that as the Presiding Judge of her sala, she is charged with the control and supervision of "all (subordinate) personnel of the court."3 She further claimed that the respondent had no intention to seek her approval since her name was not indicated in the application form as the "Authorized Official," and that in doing so, the respondent intended to disregard and by-pass her authority. She averred that Judge Bello, Jr. approved the respondent’s application for leave of absence not as a pairing judge but as an Executive Judge. While she admitted that she was attending a seminar at Tagaytay City, she argued that she was not on leave and could have properly acted on the questioned application.The complainant Judge further claimed that the respondent lied when he indicated that the reason for his application for leave of absence was to visit his ailing parents in West Covina, California, United States of America. She also pointed out that the respondent very well knew that he would not be allowed to travel abroad since he did not have an approved visa in the first place. In fact, the respondent was seen roaming around the new Judicial Complex from March 22 to April 20, 2004.Finally, the complainant Judge reiterated that in imposing a fine against the respondent and detailing him to another branch, she had no other intention than to improve public service and preserve the public’s faith and confidence in the judiciary.In its Report dated November 26, 2004, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) made the following recommendation:Recommendation: Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court are our recommendations, to wit:1. That the instant case be RE-DOCKETED as an administrative matter;2. That the complaint against respondent Eduardo T. Baltazar, Legal Researcher, RTC-Caloocan City, Branch 129, be DISMISSED; and3. Complainant Judge Thelma Canlas Pe-Aguirre, RTC, Caloocan City, Branch 129, be ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the exercise of her supervisory authority over the personnel of her court.4
According to the OCA, Section 52, Rule XVI of the Civil Service Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws provides that leave of absence for any reason other than illness of an officer or employee or any member of his immediate family must be contingent upon the needs of the service. As such, the grant of vacation leave shall be at the discretion of the head of department/agency. On the other hand, Item VI of OCA Circular No. 6-2003 dated January 9, 2003, which provides for the guidelines on applications for leave to be spent abroad by a court personnel, requires that a court personnel, applying for leave to be spent abroad, submit, among others, his application for leave covering the period of his travel abroad duly recommended by the Executive Judge/Presiding Judge. Thus, the recommendation or approval for the application for leave of absence to be spent abroad may be done by either the Executive Judge or the Presiding Judge. However, considering that the respondent applied for leave of absence to visit his ailing parents, which under the said Rules is not subject to the contingency of the service, he was no longer required to seek the approval of the complainant Judge. Moreover, considering that the approval of a visa application was beyond the respondent’s control, the fact that the latter’s application was not approved did not necessarily mean that false statements were made in his application for leave. Nevertheless, the OCA opined that "if only out of respect and courtesy to his Presiding Judge," it would have been better if the respondent had first sought the latter’s approval.The findings and recommendation of the OCA are well taken.The authority of judges and/or Executive Judges to discipline erring court personnel under their supervision is limited to light offenses only.5 In case the court employee is charged with a grave or less grave offense, even the Executive Judge cannot directly penalize him, and can only recommend to the Supreme Court the necessary disciplinary action.6 Circular No. 30-91 Re: Guidelines of the Functions of the Office of the Court Administrator dated September 30, 1991 is instructive on this point:2. Lower Court Personnela. Light Offenses(1) Disciplinary matters involving light offenses as defined under the Civil Service Law (Administrative Code of 1987), and the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (Rep. Act 6713) where the penalty is reprimand, suspension for not more than thirty days, or a fine not exceeding thirty days’ salary, and as classified in Civil Service Resolution No. 30, Series of 1989, shall be acted upon by the appropriate supervisory official of the lower court concerned.
(2) The appropriate supervisory officials are the Presiding Justices/Presiding Judge of the lower collegiate courts and the Executive Judges of the trial courts with respect to the personnel of their respective courts, except those directly under the individual Justices and Judges, in which case, the latter shall be their appropriate supervisory officials.(3) The complaint for light offenses whether filed directly with the Court, the Office of the Court Administrator, or the lower court shall be heard and decided by the appropriate supervisory official concerned.b. Grave or Less Grave OffensesAll administrative complaints for grave or less grave offenses as defined in the Codes hereinbefore referred to shall be immediately referred to the Court En Banc for appropriate action within 15 days from receipt by the Court Administrator if filed directly with him, otherwise, within 15 days likewise from receipt by him from the appropriate supervisory officials concerned.In the instant case, there is no showing that the respondent acted in bad faith in failing to secure Judge Aguirre’s written permission before taking a leave of absence; if at all, it was a mere oversight on his part. As pointed out by the OCA, the respondent had already sought permission from Executive Judge Bello, Jr. There was, thus, no need for Judge Aguirre to penalize the respondent as the latter violated no rule.What is so nettlesome is that Judge Aguirre even had the audacity to order the respondent’s detail to another office. As commented by the OCA:We note with concern that the complainant imposed on the respondent a fine of P500.00 for failing to submit a written explanation regarding the matter, and ordered his detail to the Office of the Clerk of Court. Unless the action or omission to be sanctioned amounts to direct contempt, the power to discipline court personnel is vested in the Supreme Court; and the authority to detail or re-assign the personnel of one branch to another branch or to the Office of the Clerk of Court is lodged in the Executive Judge (SC Administrative Circular No. 6 dated June 30, 1975). Hence, complainant overstepped the bounds of her authority by imposing a disciplinary sanction on the respondent, and detailing him to the Office of the Clerk of Court without seeking the approval of the Executive Judge.7
Under Section IV of Administrative Order No. 6, it is the executive judge who has the power to temporarily re-assign court personnel,8
viz.:4. To re-assign temporarily the personnel of one branch (sala) to another branch (sala) or to the Office of the Clerk of Court, in case of vacancy in the position of Presiding Judge of a branch (sala), or when the interest of the service requires. In the latter case, the assignment shall be made in consultation with the Presiding Judge of the branch (sala) concerned; and, in cases of disagreement, the assignment of the Executive Judge shall be effective immediately, unless revoked by the Supreme Court.In fine then, Judge Aguirre had no authority to impose a P500.00 fine on the respondent for failure to submit a written explanation on his successive absences, or detail him to another office. Considering further that Judge Aguirre filed the instant administrative complaint against the respondent, the Court cannot help but conclude that she felt slighted for having been "by-passed" by one who is, according to her, a mere court employee.While judges are exhorted to organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity,9 and are authorized to take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against lawyers or court personnel for unprofessional conduct,10 they must do so with caution and circumspection. Judges must bear in mind that their behavior must reaffirm the people’s faith and integrity of the judiciary, and that justice must not merely be done but must also seen to be done.11
Hence, the exercise of a judge’s disciplinary authority over court personnel must be characterized not by overzealousness but by temperance and propriety.Noting that she was unnecessarily harsh in treating the respondent in this case, the Court resolves to admonish Judge Aguirre, reminding her to be more circumspect in the exercise of her supervisory authority over the personnel of her court.CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, Judge Thelma Canlas Trinidad-Pe Aguirre is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the exercise of her supervisory authority over the personnel of her court. She is WARNED that a similar conduct in the future shall be dealt with more severely.The complaint against respondent Eduardo T. Baltazar is DISMISSED for lack of merit.SO ORDERED.
ATTY. RAUL H. SESBREÑO, complainant, vs.JUDGE IRENEO L. GAKO, JR., Judge, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 5, Cebu City, and MANUEL G. NOLLORA, Clerk of Court, RTC, Br. 5, Cebu City, respondents.D E C I S I O NLEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:This administrative case against Judge Ireneo L. Gako, Jr. and Clerk of Court Manuel G. Nollora, both of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 5, Cebu City, stemmed from a complaint1 filed by Atty. Raul H. Sesbreño charging Judge Gako with (a) violation of Rule 3.05, Canon 3, in relation to Rule 1.02, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct for his delay in resolving a Motion for Reconsideration filed in Special Proceedings No. 916-R entitled "Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo," (b) violation of Canon 2 of the said Code for acting on the said case after he had recused himself from the case, and (c) incompetence, together with Clerk of Court Nollora.The complainant alleged that on June 27, 2003, he filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order2 dated June 2, 2003 in Special Proceedings No. 916-R which was considered submitted for resolution per the Order dated July 4, 2003. According to the complainant, respondent Judge Gako deliberately failed to resolve the motion within the ninety (90)-day period prescribed by the Constitution, and in clear violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, particularly Rule 3.05, Canon 3, mandating a judge to dispose of the court's business promptly and to decide cases within the required periods, and Rule 1.02, Canon 2, requiring judges to administer justice without delay.The complainant further alleged that on April 26, 2004, respondent judge issued an Order inhibiting himself from handling Special Proceedings No. 916-R. However, almost five (5) months after such inhibition, respondent judge still continued to act on the said case by issuing an Order dated September 3, 2004 granting the Motion for Clarification/ Reconsideration filed by the heirs of Patrocino Borromeo Herrera. This, according to the complainant, violated Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, requiring a judge to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.Complainant also charged respondent judge and his Clerk of Court of incompetence for failure to keep all the records of the case intact and for proceeding to resolve the case with incomplete records. Complainant asserted that respondents' incompetency is evident from the fact that when they turned over the records of the case to the RTC, Cebu City, Branch 9, only 16 out of the 72 volumes were accounted for as shown by the receipts signed by Clerk of Court Christine Doller on June 17, 20053 and August 11, 2005.4
In his 1st Indorsement dated January 19, 2006, Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.5 referred the letter-complaint to respondent judge for his comment within ten (10) days from receipt of the same. Respondent judge was likewise directed to comment on why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for violation of his professional responsibility as a lawyer pursuant to the resolution dated September 17, 2002 of the Court En Banc in A.M. 02-9-02-SC.6 Said letter-complaint was also referred to Clerk of Court Nollora who filed his comment on March 20, 2006.7
When respondent judge failed to comply with the 1st Indorsement, then Court Administrator Velasco sent a 1st Tracer dated March 30, 2006 to respondent judge reiterating the directive for him to file his comment within five (5) days from receipt thereof, otherwise, the matter will be submitted to the Court without his comment.8 Again, respondent judge failed to comply.For refusing to submit his comment despite the two (2) directives of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), the Court issued a Resolution9 directing respondent judge to show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with and to submit the required comment both within five (5) days from receipt thereof, with warning that in case of failure to comply, the Court shall take the necessary action against him and decide the administrative complaint on the basis of the record on hand.On March 15, 2007, respondent judge finally filed his Compliance10
with an opening statement that he compulsorily retired from the service on September 20, 2006 and while working on his retirement papers, he suffered a mild stroke which necessitated his rehabilitation in his home.Respondent judge explained that the instant administrative matter stemmed from his issuance of the Order dated June 2, 2003 denying Virginia Lim Sesbreño's claim for attorney's fees from the estate of Vito Borromeo. From the denial of his claim, complainant, Atty. Raul Sesbreño, filed a motion for reconsideration. According to respondent judge, he did not act on the said motion because he believed that Virginia Lim Sesbreño should be the person who should have filed the motion for reconsideration and not herein complainant. Subsequently, respondent judge issued an order voluntarily inhibiting
himself from the case because complainant had already filed the instant administrative complaint against him.With regard to his action on the motion filed by the heirs of Patrocino Borromeo Herrera despite his Order inhibiting himself from proceeding with the said case, respondent judge reasoned out that since the inhibition was voluntary on his part as the presiding judge, he felt then that it was also his discretion to disregard his Order.Explaining on how he was able to resolve the motion/s filed in Special Proceedings No. 916-R, despite the incomplete records of the said case, respondent judge maintained that his resolutions were based on the pertinent records of the case that were forwarded to him.On his part, respondent Clerk of Court Nollora admitted in his Comment11 dated February 6, 2006 that only 16 volumes of the records of the case were turned over by their sala (Branch 5) to Branch 9. However, he hastened to add that only 16 volumes were received by them from the Office of the Clerk of Court. According to Nollora, he did not ask for the other volumes because there was no order from the court and that the motions and incidents submitted for resolution can be resolved even without reference to the other records of the case. He added that the remaining volumes would only congest their already filled mini-bodega and steel cabinets.Upon evaluation of the case, the OCA, in its Memorandum Report12
dated June 12, 2008, made the following recommendations:(a) The instant administrative complaint be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter;(b) Clerk of Court Manuel G. Nollora, Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Cebu City be (a) found guilty of simple neglect of duty, (b) FINED in the amount equivalent to one (1) month salary, and (C) STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely, and(c) Former Presiding Judge Ireneo G. Gako, Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Cebu City be (a) found guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision or order and of violating a Supreme Court Circular, (b) FINED in the amount of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00). Considering that respondent judge has already returned from the judicial service, let the same amount be DEDUCTED from his retirement benefits.
The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA.The Constitution mandates all lower courts to decide or resolve cases or matters within three (3) months from their date of submission. Accordingly, Rules 1.02 of Canon 1 and 3.05 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct direct judges to administer justice impartially and without delay and to dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.In line with the foregoing, the Court has laid down administrative guidelines to ensure the prompt disposition of judicial business. Thus, SC Administrative Circular No. 13-87 provides:
3. Judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII, Section 15 of the Constitution for the adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their courts. Thus, all cases or matters must be decided or resolved within twelve months from date of submission by all lower collegiate courts while all other lower courts are given a period of three months to do so. x x x.
Furthermore, SC Administrative Circular No. 1-88 states:6.1 All Presiding Judges must endeavor to act promptly on all motions and interlocutory matters pending before their courts. x x x.
Indisputably, respondent judge failed to act on the Motion for Reconsideration within three (3) months from the time said motion was submitted for resolution on July 4, 2003. His claim that the motion was not filed by the proper party is not a valid excuse to simply ignore said motion. Instead, he should have accordingly formally disposed of such motion. While it is true that respondent judge issued an Order voluntarily inhibiting himself from handling Special Proceedings No. 916-R, however, it does not appear on record that the Executive Judge was furnished with a copy of the said order for appropriate action. Respondent judge cannot also justify his inaction by his inhibition since if it was really his intention to refrain from handling the case, he should not have acted on the subsequent Motion for Clarification/Reconsideration filed by the heirs of Patrocino Borromeo Herrera.All told, the unreasonable delay of the respondent judge in resolving the motion submitted for his resolution clearly constituted a violation of complainant's constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case. Having failed to resolve the Motion for Reconsideration within the prescribed period of time, respondent judge is liable for undue delay in resolving a decision or order which is considered a less serious offense.Regarding the charge of incompetency, it should be stressed that the duties and responsibilities of a judge are not strictly confined to
judicial functions. He is also an administrator who must organize his court with a view to prompt and convenient dispatch of its business. As administrative officer of the Court, respondent judge should have required his clerk of court or any other court personnel to secure all the records of the case and keep the same intact although some of the volumes thereof would not be used in deciding the case. A judge is duty-bound to motivate his subordinates for the effective performance of the functions and duties of his office. In fact, the imperative and sacred duty of each and everyone in the court is to maintain its good name and standing as a temple of justice. Hence, any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice, which would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary, shall be condemned and cannot be countenanced.13
Finally, respondent judge should also be held liable for failure to obey directives from the OCA. As borne by the records, the two directives of the OCA, namely the 1st Indorsement dated January 19, 2006 and the 1st Tracer dated March 30, 2006, were received by respondent judge on February 9, 2006 and April 17, 2006, respectively. Still, he contumaciously refused to submit his comment. It was only upon the issuance by this Court of a Resolution dated January 24, 2007 directing him to show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with for refusing to submit his comment that respondent judge finally complied.We find the explanation of respondent judge that he suffered a mild stroke to be insufficient to exonerate him, although it may mitigate his liability. While he may have been suffering from some ailment, he failed to show that it totally incapacitated him from complying with the lawful orders of the OCA. The failure of respondent judge to comply with the OCA's directives to file comment to the letter-complaint against him manifested his indifference to the lawful directives of the Court. In Martinez v. Judge Zoleta,14 we held:
Again, we find the need and occasion to rule that a resolution of the Supreme Court requiring comment on an administrative complaint against officials and employees of the judiciary should not be construed as a mere request from the Court. Nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively. Respondents in administrative complaints should comment on all accusations or allegations against them in the administrative complaints because it is their duty to preserve the integrity of the judiciary. Moreover, the Court should not and will not tolerate future indifference of respondents to administrative complaints and to resolutions requiring comment on such administrative complaints.
A judge's (1) delay in rendering a decision or order and (2) failure to comply with this Court's rules, directives and circulars constitute less serious offenses under Rule 140, Section 9 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 9. Less Serious Charges. - Less serious charges include:1. Undue delay in rendering a decision or order, or in transmitting the records of a case;xxx xxx xxx4. Violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars;
Section 11(B) of said Rule 140 provides the following sanctions for less serious offenses:
SEC. 11. Sanctions.B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions shall be imposed:1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) month nor more than three (3) months; or2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
For his part, respondent Clerk of Court Nollora, as an officer of the court, is duty-bound to use reasonable skill and diligence in completing the record of the case even without any order from his presiding judge, as he is aware whether the record is complete or incomplete when he receives them. Under the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court, the branch clerk of court as the administrative officer of the court, among others, controls and supervises the safekeeping of court records. Moreover, Section 7, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court specifically mandates the clerk of court to safely keep all records, papers, files, exhibits and public property committed to his charge. As custodian of judicial records, it is incumbent upon him to ensure an orderly and efficient record management system in the court and to supervise the personnel under his office to function effectively. A clerk of court plays a key role in the complement of the court and cannot be permitted to slacken on his job under one pretext or another. He must be assiduous in performing his official duties and in supervising and managing court dockets and records.15 In this case,
he fell short of his duty. Thus, we find him administratively liable for simple neglect of duty.Simple neglect of duty is defined as the failure to give proper attention to a task expected of an employee resulting from either carelessness or indifference. Under Section 52(B), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service in correlation with Rule XIV, Section 23 of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, the penalty for simple neglect of duty, a less grave offense, is suspension for a period of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense and dismissal for the 2nd offense.As it appears it was respondent clerk of court's first infraction, we find the penalty of suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day without pay to be sufficient. Furthermore, to prevent any undue adverse effect on the public service which would ensue should work be left unattended by reason of respondent's suspension, we deem it wise to convert his penalty to the payment of a fine. Thus, in line with jurisprudence,16 we impose a fine instead of suspension, so that he can continue to discharge his assigned tasks.WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:(1) Finding Judge IRENEO L. GAKO, JR. GUILTY for two less serious offenses: (1) undue delay in rendering a decision/resolution and (2) violation of Court directives for which he is hereby FINED in the total amount of P30,000.00 to be deducted from the amount withheld from his retirement benefits.2) Finding Clerk of Court MANUEL G. NOLLORA GUILTY for simple neglect of duty and is FINED in the amount equivalent to one (1) month salary and sternly WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISIONA.M. No. RTJ-08-2146 November 14, 2008(Formerly OCA-I.P.I. No. 07-2742-RTJ)MELY HANSOR MAGPALI, complainant, vs.JUDGE MOISES M. PARDO, Regional Trial Court of Cabarroguis, Quirino, Branch 31, respondent.D E C I S I O NBRION, J.:We pass upon the verified Complaint dated September 25, 2007 filed by Mely Hansor Magpali (complainant) charging Judge Moises Pardo (respondent judge, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, Cabarroguis, Quirino) with violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct in the handling of Civil Case No. 659-2007 entitled "Mely Hansor Magpali v. Moises Magpali."The complaint originated from the civil case filed on June 12, 2007 by the complainant against her husband Moises Magpali for support and alimony pendente lite. She alleged that she was initially discouraged when she learned that the case was raffled to the sala of the respondent judge because her husband and the respondent judge were friends. She decided, however, to give the respondent judge the benefit of the doubt, hoping that he would be sympathetic to her situation as an abandoned wife with no means of livelihood. The complainant further alleged that since the filing of the case and after the filing of her husband's answer dated July 23, 2007, the case had not been set for pre-trial or for a hearing on her prayer for support pendente lite notwithstanding her obvious need for support.The complainant also alleged that in one of her visits to the court to follow-up the status of her case, she spoke with a member of the court's staff (a certain Mr. Jose Enriquez) and with the respondent judge who inquired about the purpose of her visit. On learning that she is the wife of Moises Magpali, the respondent judge allegedly became hostile and commented that she has no right to claim any property from her husband because these properties were acquired prior to their marriage. She explained that the properties were acquired during their marriage, while Mr. Enriquez told the respondent judge that the complaint was for support from her husband. This information elicited the remark from the respondent judge that the complainant has no right to claim support. The complainant interpreted this incident to be a manifestation of the respondent judge's extreme bias, partiality in her husband's favor, and pre-judgment of the case. The complaint lastly alleged that respondent judge had delayed the hearing of the case notwithstanding its urgency; in fact, the case had not been set for hearing since it was filed.The respondent judge filed on November 29, 2007 his comment to the complaint in compliance with the directive of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). He disclosed in his Comment that there are two (2) related cases involving the complainant: (a) a Support with Alimony Pendente Lite case filed by complainant against her husband; and (b) an Annulment of Marriage case instituted by Moises Magpali against the complainant.
The respondent judge denied the charge that he violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. To prove his point, he contended that: he had not issued any order or document in connection with either of the two cases showing his partiality or bias towards Moises Magpali; the annulment case was scheduled ahead because the party asked for its scheduling, whereas the complainant did not in any manner request that her petition for support be scheduled for hearing; under Rule 18, par. 1, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the complaining party should request for the setting of the case for pre-trial.The respondent judge likewise denied the remarks attributed to him by the complainant and submitted the affidavit of the Clerk of Court Officer-in-Charge who was present when he talked with the complainant. The affidavit clarified that the respondent judge did not utter the statements attributed to him. Finally, to convince the complainant of the absence of any bias against her, the respondent judge issued an Order inhibiting himself from handling the two cases.The OCA informed the Court that the case was already ripe for resolution in a Report dated April 24, 2008 signed by then Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño (now retired) and Deputy Court Administrator Reuben P. De la Cruz. The Report likewise presented a brief factual background of the case.The OCA recommended that the respondent judge be fined in the amount of P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law with a stern warning that a repetition of the same offense shall be dealt with more severely. The recommendation was based on an evaluation which reads:
EVALUATION: A close examination of the records of this administrative case shows that there is no solid evidence to substantiate the complainant's allegation of bias and partiality against the respondent Judge. Bias and partiality can never be presumed. Bare allegations of partiality will not suffice in the absence of clear and convincing proof that will overcome the presumption that the judge dispensed justice according to law and evidence, without fear and favor (Chin v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144618, August 15, 2003).Settled is the rule that in administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that the respondent committed the acts complained of rests on the complainant. The complainant must be able to show this by substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, otherwise, the complaint must be dismissed (Adajar v. Develos, A.M. No. P-05-2056, [18 November 2005]). The basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence, and is not equivalent to proof (Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116181 [6 January 1997]).In this case, complainant failed to substantiate the allegation that the respondent Judge exhibited extreme bias and has already pre-judged her case. Other than her bare allegations, there is nothing in the records that would prove that the respondent Judge was hostile and made the remarks that she has no right to claim for support. Complainant could have gathered evidence to support the alleged bias or partiality of the respondent Judge. On the other hand, respondent Judge was able to submit an affidavit executed by Mr. Enriquez that no such remark was made or the cited incident actually occurred. On the whole, the evidence on record deals only with evidently self-serving statements of complainant vis-à-vis that of the denial of the respondent Judge.However, respondent Judge should be sanctioned when he disregarded a fundamental rule. The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to be embodiments of judicial competence and diligence. Those who accept this exalted position owe to the public and this Court the ability to be proficient in the law and the duty to maintain professional competence at all times (Lim v. Dumlao, 454 SCRA 196, March 31, 2005). Indeed, competence is a mark of a good judge. This exalted position entails a lot of responsibilities, foremost of which is proficiency in the law. Once cannot seek refuge in a mere cursory knowledge of statues and procedural rules (Ualat v. Judge Ramos, 333 Phil. 175, December 6, 1996).Respondent Judge fell short of these standards when he failed in his duties to follow elementary law and to keep abreast with prevailing jurisprudence. His claim that the party did not in any manner request that the case be scheduled for hearing as provided under Rule 18, par 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and that it should be the party who will ask an ex-parte setting/scheduling of the case for its pre-trial is not exactly correct. A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, 16 August 2004 (Rule on Guidelines to be
Observed by Trial Court Judges and Clerks of Court in the Conduct of Pre-trial and Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures) provides that within 5 days from date of filing of reply, the plaintiff must promptly move ex-parte that the case be set for pre-trial conference. If the plaintiff fails to file said motion within the given period, the Branch COC shall issue a notice of pre-trial. The respondent Judge should be conversant therewith. The case has not been set for pre-trial or at least for a hearing after the filing of the Answer dated 23 July 2007. He must know the laws and apply them properly. Service in the judiciary involves continuous study and research from beginning to end (Grieve v. Jaca, 421 SCRA 117, January 27, 2004).
We concur with the finding of the OCA that the respondent judge is answerable for gross ignorance of the law. Indeed, we find that the respondent judge mishandled the complainant's case, mainly because of his lack of a full understanding of the procedural rules applicable to the case. Without doubt, respondent judge had been remiss in the performance of his duties by failing to keep himself updated on the current law, jurisprudence, and the rules of procedure. As we held in fairly recent administrative cases,1 a magistrate owes to the public and to this Court the duty to be proficient in the law and to be abreast of legal developments. The respondent judge failed to come up to this exacting standard and this, we cannot countenance.We approve as well the OCA's recommendation that a fine of P10,000.00 be imposed on the respondent judge. This level of fine stresses upon all the need to be legally proficient and competent, while taking into account the level of harm the judge's gross ignorance wrought on the complainant.WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judge Moises M. Pardo, RTC, Branch 31, Cabarroguis, Quirino is hereby FINED in the amount of P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same offense shall be dealt with more severely.SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-05-1896 April 29, 2005ATTY. JULIUS NERI, complainant, vs.JUDGE JESUS S. DE LA PEÑA, respondent.R E S O L U T I O NCORONA, J.:This is a case for grave misconduct, gross ignorance of the law and/or incompetence filed by Atty. Julius Z. Neri against Judge Jesus S. de la Peña. It originated from a civil case for damages filed by Emmanuel Aznar against Citibank (which was represented by complainant as counsel), docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-16474 and raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch XX, presided over by Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos.1
Plaintiff Aznar had filed suit due to the alleged blacklisting of his Citibank Preferred Mastercard which, according to him, was dishonored in several establishments in Singapore and Malaysia while he was on holiday, causing him great inconvenience and embarrassment. He presented, as evidence, several receipts, plane tickets, a computer print-out allegedly showing that his card had been declined for being "over limit", a statement of account and his lone testimony.2 Defendant Citibank presented several documentary exhibits to the effect that Aznar's card had not been placed on any "hot list" and could not possibly have been blacklisted.3 After trial, Judge Marcos dismissed the case for lack of merit.4
Dissatisfied with the decision, Aznar filed through counsel a motion for reconsideration, with motion to re-raffle the case. In an order dated September 11, 1998, Acting Presiding Judge Ramon Codilla (who succeeded Marcos), citing the fact that he was "occupied with two (2) salas" and the fact that "the Presiding Judge who originally penned the decision is a credit card holder of CITIBANK…whose membership could naturally influence the outcome of this case in favor of the defendant bank," directed the re-raffling of the case to RTC Cebu Branch X, presided over by respondent Judge Jesus de la Peña.5 Respondent then ordered Citibank to file its comment on Aznar's motion for reconsideration.6 Citibank filed its opposition instead. In an order dated November 25, 1998, respondent granted Aznar's motion for reconsideration:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The DECISION dated May 29, 1998 is hereby reconsidered, and consequently, the defendant is hereby condemned liable to pay the following sums of money:
a) P10,000,000.00 as moral damages;b) P 5,000,000.00 as exemplary damages;c) P 1,000,000.00 as attorney's fees; andd) P200,000.00 as litigation expenses.
SO ORDERED.7
As a result of the Order, complainant filed this administrative case on July 16, 1999, which was docketed as Control No. 41-99-P. Charging
respondent with dishonesty, he alleged that respondent, contrary to his pronouncement in his order, had rendered his decision without ever having read the transcripts of the case.8 To support this contention, complainant presented certifications from the Clerk of Court of Branch XX9 and the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Cebu City10 that the transcripts of the case had remained in their custody and that the respondent never borrowed them all throughout.Complainant also charged respondent with gross ignorance of the law and/or incompetence. He alleged that respondent had improperly considered as a business record Aznar's computer print-out which in reality did not meet the requisites to be rightly considered as such. Aznar never testified as to the date and time the subject print-out was encoded, or who encoded and printed the same, nor did he establish personal knowledge of who prepared the print-out, or whether it was prepared by one responsible for it in his professional capacity or in the performance of his official duty or in the regular course of his business. Finally, the person who prepared it did not testify in court or on deposition.Complainant went on to say that respondent's incompetence and dishonesty showed in his failure to appreciate and evaluate Citibank's extensive documentary evidence which clearly established that it did not blacklist Aznar's Mastercard.Finally, complainant pointed out that the damages respondent awarded to plaintiff Aznar were scandalously exorbitant. He prayed for respondent's dismissal from the service.On September 3, 1999, respondent filed his comment.11 He principally contended that, having appealed from his decision to the Court of Appeals, the complainant should not have filed this administrative case. Respondent decried complainant's case as forum-shopping. In his defense, respondent asserted that he had in fact read the transcripts, having received copies thereof attached to an ex parte manifestation filed by plaintiff Aznar.12 He also defended the amount of damages he awarded by comparing them to those awarded in a 1973 case, with inflation taken into account.Complainant then filed his reply to the comment,13 assailing the ex parte manifestation which respondent had supposedly relied upon in deciding the case. He pointed out that respondent should not have even considered the said manifestation because Citibank had not been served a copy and it was filed after office hours. He likewise refuted respondent's allegations of forum-shopping and impropriety in filing an administrative case while an appeal was pending.In his rejoinder, respondent defended his appreciation of the ex parte manifestation. He likewise reiterated his claim that the administrative complaint should not have been filed with the appeal.14
On February 28, 2001, the Second Division of this Court resolved to hold the administrative case in abeyance until the final resolution of the Court of Appeals of CA-GR CV No. 62554, Aznar v. Citibank. By this time, the case had been re-docketed as AM No. 01-1131-RTJ.15
On January 8, 2004, the Court of Appeals decided in favor of Citibank, vacating respondent's decision and reinstating the dismissal of the case by Judge Marcos.16 On June 8, 2004, complainant filed a manifestation, with the Court of Appeals' decision attached, pointing out that this administrative complaint was now ready for resolution.In a manifestation dated June 14, 2004, respondent prayed for the resolution of the case and once more asked for its dismissal. He cited the fact that the Court of Appeals decision made no mention of his administrative lapses and that his decision was an exercise of purely judicial discretion. He also listed the various posts he had held as a Regional Trial Court judge as well as the commendations he had received from the Honorable Chief Justice. He also pointed out that this administrative complaint was the only one ever filed against him in all his years of service.17
In a memorandum dated August 27, 2004, the Office of the Court Administrator reported its findings.Because respondent based his assailed order mostly on the ex parte manifestation submitted by the counsel for plaintiff Aznar, the OCA found him liable for violating Section 4, Rule 13, in relation to Section 5, Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure:(Rule 13)
SEC. 4. Papers required to be filed and served. — Every judgment, resolution, order, pleading subsequent to the complaint, written motion, notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment or similar papers shall be filed with the court, and served upon the parties affected.
(Rule 15)SEC. 4. Hearing of motion. — Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.
According to the OCA, the fact that plaintiff Aznar had failed to serve a copy of his ex parte manifestation upon Citibank should have been reason enough for respondent to disregard the same.
Likewise noting the fact that the ex parte manifestation was filed beyond office hours, the OCA found that this "created an idea that there was a covert attempt to favor Aznar." However, citing the absence of substantial evidence, it pointed out that "it should not be presumed that the procedural lapse committed by respondent (was) attended by corrupt motive of flagrant disregard of the rules." The OCA also considered in respondent's favor his defense that he was merely trying to help decongest the dockets. Finally, the OCA found the charges of gross ignorance of law and incompetence to be without basis, and found him liable instead for simple misconduct. The OCA recommended a fine of P10,000.We adopt part of the findings of the Court Administrator.But we disagree with its finding that the respondent violated both Rules 13 and 15 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.Section 4, Rule 13 requires that adverse parties be served copies of all pleadings and similar papers. Section 4, Rule 15 requires a movant to set his motion for hearing, unless it is one of those which a court can act upon without prejudicing the rights of the other party. The prevailing doctrine in our jurisdiction is that a motion without a notice of hearing addressed to the parties is a mere scrap of paper.18
In Cui v. Judge Madayag,19 we held that "any motion that does not contain proof of service of notice to the other party is not entitled to judicial cognizance. (Such) motion is nothing but a (mere) scrap of paper." It is important, however, to note that these doctrines refer exclusively to motions.The logic for such a requirement is simple: a motion invariably contains a prayer which the movant makes to the court, which is usually in the interest of the adverse party to oppose. The notice of hearing to the adverse party is therefore a form of due process; it gives the other party the opportunity to properly vent his opposition to the prayer of the movant. In keeping with the principles of due process, therefore, a motion which does not afford the adverse party the chance to oppose it should simply be disregarded. The same principle applies to objections to interrogatories which also require a notice of hearing like motions under Section 3, Rule 25 of the Rules.20
However, the same cannot be said for manifestations which, unless otherwise indicated, are usually made merely for the information of the court. There is generally nothing to contest or argue; the manifesting party is just making a statement for the knowledge of the court, such as in this case. There is nothing in either the Rules or in jurisprudence that requires judges to disregard a manifestation that does not have proof of service.This is not to say, however, that respondent is off the hook. While it is true that he was under no obligation to disregard Aznar's ex parte manifestation, he should have at least called attention to its irregularity, both by admonishing Aznar and by informing the adverse party of its filing. That he acted on it — indeed, based his decision on it — while Citibank was totally unaware of its existence ran seriously afoul of the precepts of fair play, specially since respondent only mentioned the document after this administrative case was filed against him. Indeed, there seems to be something gravely amiss in respondent's sense of fairness and righteousness, the primary requisites of a good judge.Furthermore, we cannot help but find extreme bias and bad intent in respondent's award to Aznar of a whopping P16.2 million in damages considering that, not having tried the case himself, the only records he actually read came from no one else but Aznar himself. By itself, the unconscionable amount of the award evinces indubitable malice on respondent's part and the shady circumstances in which he granted it show that he knowingly rendered a manifestly unjust decision.As a member of the judiciary, respondent's every action is supposed to be beyond reproach and above suspicion. The 2004 Code of Judicial Conduct clearly states that "Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities."21 By acting on a document which was sorely defective (for two reasons: failure to serve a copy on the adverse party and failure to file it during office hours), and by making an egregiously large award of damages in favor of plaintiff Aznar, he inevitably opened himself up to suspicion of having entered into a dirty, secret deal with Aznar and thereby severely tarnished the impartiality with which he was at all times supposed to conduct himself.Given respondent's actions, we disagree with the OCA's findings of simple misconduct. Because of the highly anomalous manner in which respondent rendered his decision, as well as the questionable content of the decision itself, which was eventually overturned by the Court of Appeals, we find him guilty of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order as determined by a competent court in an appropriate proceeding.22
The penalty for this offense ranges from a fine of P20,000, to suspension from three to six months, to dismissal from the service.23
In this case, the penalty of suspension for six months is appropriate,
with a warning that another such infraction of this nature will warrant a more severe penalty.WHEREFORE, Judge JESUS S. DE LA PEÑA is hereby found GUILTY of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order as determined by a competent court in an appropriate proceeding and is hereby SUSPENDED from office for six months. Considering the gravity of this offense, he is hereby warned that another infraction of this kind will merit a penalty beyond mere suspension from public office.SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1876 February 23, 2005NORA C. PEREZ and ENGRACIA G. RONQUILLO, complainants, vs.JUDGE JOVEN COSTALES, RTC, Branch 45, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, Respondent.R E S O L U T I O NAUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:This is an administrative complaint filed by Nora C. Perez and Engracia G. Ronquillo, professors of the Don Mariano Marcos Memorial State University, South La Union Campus (DMMMSU-SLUC), against Judge Joven Costales of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta City (Branch 45), charging him of violating Canons 2 and 3, and Rules 2.04 and 3.12 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and for Harassment.Complainants Perez and Ronquillo are two of the four professors accused by respondent Judge’s wife, Perla F. Costales, of the crime of Estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2722-BG pending before RTC-Branch 33, Bauang, La Union. Ronquillo is also an accused in a case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 filed by Perla F. Costales, docketed as Criminal Case No. 4338. The following are the acts complained of against respondent Judge:
1) On June 24, 2002, respondent Judge was with his wife during the hearing of Criminal Case No. 4338 (B.P. Blg. 22 case);2) On October 15, 2002, respondent Judge testified in behalf of the prosecution in Criminal Case No. 2722-BG (Estafa case);3) Respondent Judge pressured and made follow-ups on the case with the public prosecutor;4) Respondent Judge wrote a letter dated October 10, 2003, addressed to the President of the Don Mariano Marcos Memorial State University, quoted as follows:1
I wish to call your attention regarding your four (4) professors, namely: ENGRACIA G. RONQUILLO, MERCEDES V. TAVAS, CLARITA S. VALDEZ and NORA C. PEREZ, all of DMMMSU, South La Union Campus, Agoo, La Union, who were convicted with the crime of ESTAFA/SWINDLING on July 22, 2003, a xerox copy of the Decision is hereto attached and marked as Annex "A".A motion for reconsideration of the decision was filed by the accused thru their counsel but was denied, Annex "B". Thru counsel, the 4 accused appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, Annex "C".Prof. Ronquillo is also charged with Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (or the Bouncing Checks Law) which case is pending trial before the Municipal Trial Court of Naguilian, Annex "D" and Annex "E".1ªvvphi1.nétIncidentally, the complainant in these cases is my wife PERLA F. COSTALES.….It is unfortunate that you have 4 professors who are supposed to be the molders of the mind of the youth and paragon of virtue, yet they have been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, which is worst than other crimes. What if the Court of Appeals affirms their conviction which is imprisonment from 4 to 20 years at the Women’s Correccional, Manila.We heard that the 4 professors are intending to apply for early retirement because of this. We have no objection provided they have to pay first their money obligations to my wife.We pity the professors that is why we held in abeyance the filing of administrative cases against them.We are not to be blamed for this but the 4 professors themselves. We are only exercising our rights under our laws.May I know what course of action you would undertake considering that these 4 professors of your well-known and prestigious university where innumerable graduates have shown excellence in their chose endeavors, have been convicted with a crime involving moral turpitude?Thank you.Very truly yours,(Signed)JUDGE JOVEN F. COSTALESHusband of the ComplainantPerla F. Costales
Required by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to comment on the complaint,2 respondent Judge denied the allegations. According to respondent Judge, there was no hearing held on June 24, 2002 in Criminal Case No. 4338 (B.P. Blg. 22 case), and granting that there was any hearing in which he attended, he was there in his private capacity as he was a witness for his wife, although he was not presented anymore. Respondent Judge stated that he filed a leave of absence and did not use his official time to attend the hearings of the case. Respondent Judge also believed that there was no impropriety in his act of writing a letter to the university officials. It was done with the consent of his wife, and he did not use his position to influence the officials. He merely asked what course of action has been taken against the four professors involved. Respondent Judge also denied that he pressured the public prosecutor and if ever he went to the prosecutor’s office, it was on leave of absence.3
Per recommendation of the OCA, the case was re-docketed as a regular administrative matter,4 with the parties manifesting their willingness to submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings filed.5
In its Evaluation, the OCA found that respondent Judge should be reprimanded for having written the university officials, thus:3. Finally regarding the third alleged act of impropriety, that is, writing the university’s administrative officials inquiring as to what actions have been taken or would be taken against the complainant, we find enough basis for the charges of violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Respondent ought to have known that such a letter from one occupying the position of judge will not be treated as a mere ordinary inquiry.l^vvphi1.net Respondent should have realized that his letter can be regarded as tending to influence the outcome of the investigation being conducted by the university about the matter. Said act of respondent is a clear violation of Rule 2.04, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides that "A judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative agency". Respondent in making the said letter had abandoned his duty that "A judge should be embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence". That respondent opted to write the letter himself instead of his wife indicates improper use of his judgeship.6
With regard to the other alleged acts of impropriety, it was the OCA’s finding that respondent Judge cannot be held administratively liable therefor for the following reasons:… In the present case, respondent’s participation in the criminal cases filed by his wife was limited to being a witness. As can be deduced from the above-cited case, a member of the judiciary is not prohibited from being a witness to a case. Note should be taken that respondent did not give an opinion nor participated (sic) in any proceeding that could slant the evaluation and resolution of the case in favor of the party he identifies himself with.1awphi1.nétThere is no clear act of impropriety or appearance of impropriety that can be imputed to the respondent. Respondent’s act of assisting his wife in his private capacity, being privy to the transactions, does not necessarily signify that he is using his authority in influencing the outcome of any proceeding or investigation.2. As to the second alleged act of impropriety, the act of the judge in going to the prosecutor’s office, which respondent did not deny in his comment contending that the criminal case was regularly filed and prosecuted, we find his presence in the said office insufficient basis for an administrative sanction. There was no showing that the prosecutor’s office was pressured into having the said criminal cases prosecuted in court. Nor was it shown that the respondent’s presence was intended to influence the action of the prosecutor’s office on the matter.7
The Court adopts the findings and recommendation of the OCA.Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct decrees that a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. Specifically, Rule 2.01 mandates that a judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. This includes a judge’s behavior in the performance of his judicial duties, outside of it, and in his private capacity.8
The Court cannot find fault in respondent Judge’s appearance as a witness in Criminal Case No. 2722-BG (Estafa case). He had personal knowledge of the events that led to the filing of the case, and he cannot be blamed for protecting his wife’s interests. He did not utilize official time and resources in doing so. There is nothing on record, aside from complainants’ bare allegations, that respondent used his judicial position to influence the proceedings before the trial court or the outcome of the case. Likewise, respondent Judge’s presence in the office of the prosecutor, by itself, is not sufficient evidence to conclude that he exercised any influence or pressure on the public prosecutor.However, in writing to the administrative officials of the DMMMSU-SLUC, respondent judge obviously sought to influence or put pressure on them with regard to the actions to be taken against the
four professors. His wife could have written the letter herself, as she is the complainant in the criminal cases against the four professors. Instead, it was respondent judge who did, and he even used and stated his judicial position in his letter, thereby insinuating that it should not be ignored or trifled with. It cannot be gainsaid that respondent Judge is aware that his judicial position alone could exert influence or authority over the university officials, and he took advantage of such authority.The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. x x x. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary must behave with propriety at all times. (Castillo v. Calanog, Jr., 199 SCRA 75, 83 [1991]) "[O]ne who occupies a position of such grave responsibility in the administration of justice must conduct himself in a manner befitting the dignity of such exalted office. A judge's private as well as official conduct must at all times be free from all appearances of impropriety, and be beyond reproach." (Dysico v. Dacumos, 262 SCRA 275, 283 [1996]). In the case at hand, the respondent judge has failed to conduct himself in the manner prescribed by the provisions of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which Canon 2 directs the avoidance of impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. (Arcenio v. Pagorogon, 224 SCRA 247, 255 [1993])9
WHEREFORE, for violating Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, respondent Judge Joven F. Costales of the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta City (Branch 45) is REPRIMANDED with warning that a repetition of similar acts will be dealt with more severely.SO ORDERED.
