Neurofenomenología-comentario a Varela

8/13/2019 Neurofenomenologa-comentario a Varela

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C losing the Gap? Some Questions for N europhenomenology 1Forthcoming in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

Tim BayneDepartment of Philosophy

M acquarie University

N orth Ryde, N SW 2109AUSTRALI [email protected]

I n his 1996 paper N europhenomenology: A methodological remedy for t he hard

problem, Francisco Varela called for a union of H usserl ian phenomenology and

cognit ive science. V arelas call hasnt gone unanswered, and recent years have

seen the development of a small but growing literature intent on exploring the

interface between phenomenology and cognit ive science. I ndeed, this very journal

is, in large part, a testimony to the rise of neurophenomenology. But despite

these developments, it seems to me that there is still some obscurity about what

exactly neurophenomenology is. 2 W hat are neurophenomenologists trying to do,

and how are they trying to do it? To what extent is neurophenomenology a

distinctive and unified research programme?

1. G etting situatedLet me begin with a quotation from the opening paragraph of Varelas (1996)

paper:

This paper responds to t he issues raised by D.J. Chalmers (1995) byoffering a research direction which is quite radical in the way in which somebasic methodological principles are linked to the scientific studies of consciousness. Neuro-phenomenology is the name I am using here todesignate a quest to marry modern cognitive science and a disciplined approach to human experience, thus placing myself in the lineage of thecontinental t radit ion of phenomenology. My claim is that the so-calledhard problem can only be addressed productively by gathering a

1 I would li ke to thank Dave Chalmers, Barry Daint on, Dave Mackenzie, Evan Thompson, ShaunGallagher and Antoine Lutz for their many helpful comments on this paper. This paper began lifeas a review of N atur ali zing Phenomenology , and I am very grateful to the edit ors of t his journal forpermitting me to transform it into its current incarnation.2 For another perspective on neurophenomenology see Gallagher (1997) and Gallagher and V arela(2001).


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research community armed with new pragmatic tools enabling them todevelop a science of consciousness (330; emphasis in original).

Later in the article Varela says that neurophenomenology is intent on closing the

explanatory gap. The explanatory gap is the gap between the phenomenal or

what its like character of experience and the physical nature of the

brain/body (Levine 1983). I t is the explanatory gap t hat makes the hard problem

hard. I f one could close the explanatory gap one would have solved the hard

problem. As a species of naturali zed phenomenology neurophenomenology seeks

to close the gap by showing that phenomenality can be integrated into an

explanatory framework where every acceptable property is made continuous withthe properties accepted by the natural sciences (Roy et al 1999: 1f). 3

So much for what neurophenomenologists are trying to do; how do they propose

to do it? At the very least, neurophenomenology involves a distinctive method for

the fi rst-person study of consciousness. This is where the phenomenology comes

in. By drawing on the tools developed by H usserl and other phenomenologists it

is hoped that first-person methods in the study of consciousness can become as

rigorous as third-person methods. W e need better descript ions (models) of f irst -

person data, and (only) the methods of H usserl and his followers (wit h, perhaps, a

nod in the direction of Buddhism) can provide this.

I s this all we need t o do in order t o close the gap? Can we close the gap merely by

developing better models of phenomenality and better models of neuronalactivit y? Some of those sympathetic to t he neurophenomenal programme seem t o

suggest that it might be. According to Borrett , Kelly and Kwan,

3 One might wonder what it is for a property to be continuous with the properties accepted by thenatural sciences.


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phenomenology and the third person sciences of the brain. The second half of

this paper will explore this idea in detail.

So, at a general level I discern two broad strategies at work inneurophenomenology. The first strategy call it the descriptive strategy employs

the techniques of (Husserlian) phenomenology to arrive at bet ter first-person

models of phenomenality. The second strategy call it the bridging strategy

attempts to bridge phenomenological models and neuroscientific (or, more

broadly, cognitive scientific) models. Although neurophenomenologists endorse

both strategies, it seems to me that they are independent. One could hold that

(H usserl ian) phenomenology is uniquely posit ioned to describe experience while

being agnostic about whether it has anything original to say about how to bridge

the gap between such descript ions and neuroscience. Alt ernatively, one could

hold that neurophenomenology can close the explanatory gap while being

agnostic about whether it is in privileged position to describe phenomenality. I

will examine the descriptive st rategy and the bridging st rategy in t hat order.

I I . T he D escriptive Str ategy

At the heart of neurophenomenology is the claim t hat H usserlian

phenomenology has a unique and privileged method of describing the first-person

nature of consciousness. Phenomenology is unique in that it is importantly

different from the standard first-person methodologies employed in

consciousness studies; and it is privileged in that it is more rigorous than such

methodologies.

I have my doubts about both claims. I say this with some tentativeness, for my

knowledge of the phenomenological method is extremely limited, and what little


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I have read on the topic I have dif ficulty understanding. 4 But let me offer my

reasons such as they are for thinking that the phenomenological method is

neit her unique nor pr ivileged.

I t is oft en said t hat the phenomenological reduction is not to be confused wit h

introspection. Varela states that phenomenology goes beyond mere

int rospection (Varela 1996: 338); Thompson, N o and Pessoa say that t he

phenomenological method of reflection is fundamentally different in its

procedures and aims from int rospection (1999: 571); while M arbach suggests that

the neglect of H usserl in cognit ive science is linked to the widespread

misunderstanding, or misrepresentation, of his method of reflective

phenomenology of conscious awareness as being a study of conscious awareness

through introspection (1993: 15; emphasis in original).

H ow does phenomenological reflect ion di ffer from introspection? I have yet to

find a clear answer to this question. The editors of Naturalizing Phenomenology

describe phenomenology (in the narrow, H usserlian sense) as an enterpriseprimarily dedicated to the careful establishment, through first-person description

and analysis, of phenomenological data understood as what we are really aware of,

as opposed to what we beli eve we are aware of (Roy et al 1999: 18f). This doesnt

distinguish phenomenological reflection from introspection, for the goal of

int rospection is also to describe what we are really aware of, as opposed to what

we believe we are aware of. Varelas explication of the difference

phenomenological reduction (PhR) and introspection is no more enlightening.

Phenomenology does share with introspectionism an interest in thereflective doubling as a key move of its approach to phenomena. But thetwo att it udes part company. In PhR the ski ll to be mobilised is called

4 For discussion of the phenomenological method see Varela (1996), and Depraz, Varela andVermersch (2000).


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bracketing for good reasons, since it seeks precisely the opposite effect of an uncritical introspection: it cuts short our quick and fast elaborationsand beliefs, in particular locating and putting in abeyance what we thinkwe should find, or some expected description. (1996: 338f.)

Surely both the phenomenological reduction and introspection can be carried out

either crit ically or uncrit ically, carefully or carelessly. As far as I can tell, there is

nothing here about how phenomenological reduction differs from introspection

as such.

One point of contrast between the introspectionist and the phenomenologists is

that the latt er is, I take it , int erested in essences. N ow, I m not exactly sure what

a H usserlian essence is, but I suspect that it has something to do with necessity;

the analysis of essences, I presume, involves necessary t ruths. And here there does

seem to be an important difference between phenomenology and introspection,

for its unclear that introspection gives one access to necessary truths (as

necessary t ruths). I can justify claims about the nature of my consciousness on t he

basis of my int rospective access to my experiences, but how can I useintrospection to justify claims about the necessary structure of consciousness in

general? I ndeed, how can one use int rospection to justify claims about the

necessary structure of ones own consciousness? I nt rospection may be able to tell

me that my consciousness happens to be unified, but can it tell me that my

consciousness must be unif ied? I f so, its not obvious how. So, in so far as

phenomenologists are attempting to uncover the essential structure of experience

its unclear how (mere) int rospection could be adequate to their project.

The foregoing suggests that perhaps phenomenological reflection involves the use

of intuitions of the kind that are employed in conceptual analysis and thought-

experiments. I ndeed, some H usserl ian commentators claim that H usserlian


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intentional analysis is pure conceptual analysis (DAmico 1999: 15). 5 But from

what I can tell there isnt much support among neurophenomenologists for this

view. Thompson, No and Pessoa claim t hat the phenomenological method

should be distinguished from the use of intuitions that is involved inthoughtexperiments.

.phenomenological claims about essences and eidetic necessit ies arenot grounded on (typically underdescribed) intuition pumps of currentphilosophy of mind. On the contrary, ideation through imaginativevariation requires sustained attention to and careful description of thephenomena in all their ramifications. Furthermore, the phenomena must

be attended to not simply as particularities, but as fields of possibilitiesdefined by certain forms or structural invariants. Finally, success in thisendeavour depends on unprejudiced reflection, t hat is, on suspending orrefraining from making use of any judgments about how things might beapart from our experiences of them (1999: 573, n. 11).

Perhaps we shouldnt expect too much of a point that Thompson, No and

Pessoa consign to a footnote, but from whats said here it isnt at all clear to me

how ideation through imaginative variation differs from the appeal to thought-

experiments and int uit ion pumps. W hat exactly is it to at tend to a phenomenon

as a field of possibilities defined by certain forms or structural invariants? I

thought the goal was to arrive at (justified) claims about the structural invariants

of consciousness how could att ending to something as defined by a struct ural

invariant enable us to justify claims about what is or isnt a structural invariant of

consciousness? As to the claim t hat unprejudiced reflection is necessary, this may

be true, but it doesnt get us very far in understanding how ideation through

imaginat ive variat ion differs from an intuit ion pump.

5 Crowell comments: I t appears that only ignorance informs the view that phenomenologysresults are nothing but conceptual analysis. One might more justly say that there is conceptualanalysis only because there is phenomenology, even though its practitioners dont recognizethemselves as phenomenologists (2002: 441). Either way, Crowell seems to agree that there isntmuch to differenti ate phenomenology from conceptual analysis properly conducted.


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I f neurophenomenologists are interested in essences theres li t t le evidence of it in

what they actually do. For instance, Varela and van Gelders work on the specious

present seem to involve claims about the structure of phenomenal temporality

that humans tend to enjoy in normal states of consciousness. As far as I can t ell,there is nothing in this work that gets at the essent ial st ructure of consciousness as

such, or even at the essential structure of human consciousness. And much the

same holds for ot her work done under t he banner of neurophenomenology. More

generally, I can discern l it t le evidence of any of t he technical developments of

H usserlian phenomenology (Roy et al, 21) at work in neurophenomology. I t

seems to me that the methods for collecting first-person data employed by

neurophenomenologists dont differ in substance from the introspectionism

employed elsewhere in the study of consciousness.

Consider, for instance, Thompson, N o and Pessoas cri t icisms of Dennett on

the phenomenology of parafoveal vision. The question with which Thompson,

N o and Pessoa are concerned is this: W hat is the content of visual

phenomenology when looking at wallpaper whose pattern is a regular array of hundreds of identical images of M arilyn M onroe? Dennett had suggested that it

would seem as though one were seeing detailed images of hundreds of M ari lyns

(1991: 354f.). Thompson, N o and Pessoa disagree: Although you do seem to see

all the detail in the sense that the wall seems to you to be covered with hundreds

of ident ical M arilyns, you do not seem to see each Marilyn equally well. At any

given moment of your perception, the Marilyns st raight ahead seem clear as day,

while those off to the side appear less distinct, and those in the periphery seem

barely not iceable (1999: 187). Dead right, but as far as I can see this claim is

justif ied by an appeal to (mere, albeit careful) int rospection.

Consider also the recent study by Lutz et al, billed by Lutz as an explicit

implementation of the neurophenomenological program (Lutz 2002; Lutz et al


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2002). The study involved the perception of a 3-D object arising from an

autostereogram.

The task began when the subjects fixed [fixated?] a dot-pattern containingno depth information. After an audit ory signal, the subjects were asked tofuse two little squares at the bottom of the screen and to remain in thiseye position for seven seconds. At the end of this preparation period, therandom-dot pattern was changed to a slightly different random-dotpattern with binocular disparity (autostereogram). Subjects were readilyable to see a 3-D illusory geometric shape (depth illusion). They wereinstructed to press a button with their right hand as soon as the shape hadcompletely emerged. This ended the trial, after which subjects gave a brief

verbal report of their experience. I n their reports the subjects usedphenomenal invariants (or categories) found and stabilized during thetraining session. (Lutz 2002: 13)

W hat did t hese training sessions involve? H ow was the phenomenological

reduction employed here? Lutz informs us that the gesture of reduction was

either self-induced by subjects familiar with it, or induced through open

questions such as what did you feel before and after the image appeared? Imust confess that I dont find much evidence here of technical developments of

any kind. I can see only two dif ferences between this experimental protocol and

that of standard experimental work on consciousness. First, these subjects had

more exposure to the stimulus than they normally have in this kind of

experimental work; second, they were required to report their phenomenal states

by using phenomenal categories that they themselves had developed. W hile both

depart ures from normal experimental prot ocol are interesting, I dont see any

evidence here of a great methodological leap forward. I n part icular, I dont see

any evidence that Lutzs subjects were no longer employing mere introspection in

report ing t heir experiences.


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between C. D. Broads analyses of t ime-consciousness who, I presume, was

using mere int rospection and H usserls (see Dainton 2000). I t looks very much

as though there may not be anything particularly privileged about the

phenomenological reduction.7

The central claim of this section is that more needs to be said about how the

phenomenological method differs from other first-person methods in psychology

and philosophy. In what ways does phenomenological reduction depart from

(mere) int rospection? H ow does ideation through imaginat ive variat ion dif fer

from the appeal to thought-experiments? And what reason do we have for

thinking that the results of phenomenological reduction are more reliable than

those of mere int rospection?

I I I . T he Br idging Strategy

I turn now to t he second of t he two st rategies that I earlier identif ied, that of

building a meaningful bridge between phenomenology and neuroscience (or, more

broadly, cognitive science). There are two questions here for theneurophenomenologist: What does it take to have a meaningful bridge between

phenomenology and neuroscience? H ow does one go about building such a

bridge? Let me begin wit h the second question.

There are, I think, a number of neurophenomenological accounts of how to

bridge the gap between neuroscience and phenomenology. Although I m not sure

how these accounts are meant to be related, it seems fairly clear that they all

connected to what Varela called the methodology of reciprocal constraints

(MRC). According to Varela M RC is the working hypothesis of

fact there are import ant point s of disagreement between Brough and Miller on H usserls accountof t ime-consciousness. I am indebted to Shaun Gallagher (personal communicat ion) here.7 The edit ors of Natur ali zing Phenomenology remark on the fact that alt hough Jackendoff makes noreference to Husserli an phenomenology, it is quite surpr ising to see how closely hi s analysisparallels those [sic] of H usserl. (Roy et al, 21.) Doesnt this suggest that there is nothing specialabout H usserli an phenomenology?


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neurophenomenology (Varela 1996: 343; see also van Gelder 1999: 246). W hat

exactly does M RC involve?

MR C as reflective equilibriumAt fi rst glance M RC sounds like the well-known notion of reflect ive equilibrium;

Thompson, N o and Pessoa suggest that t he two not ions are interchangeable

(1999: 195), while Lutz claims that the key point behind M RC is that

phenomenological evidence and cognit ive evidence are granted an equal

importance and therefore need the same attention (Lutz: 2002). Varela,

however, explicit ly dist inguished MRC from reflective equilibrium: the former is

more precise and more demanding than the latter (1996: 344). Unfortunately, he

doesnt expand on this claim.

I n philosophy the phrase reflective equilibrium is used to refer to the idea that

intuitions about particular cases should be brought into alignment reflective

equilibrium with intuitions about general principles. For example, in developing

an account of morality one ought to give epistemic priority neither to onesparticular moral intuitions nor to ones intuitions about moral principles but

instead accord int uit ions of bot h kinds equal weight. Alt hough philosophical uses

of reflective equilibrium typically involve equilibrium between intuitions, the

methodology can be applied to data of all forms.

There are two important things to note about reflective equilibrium. First , it is an

epistemic principle not an explanatory principle. To claim that two sets of data

ought to be brought into equilibrium is to make no claims about the explanatory

relations between them. Consider, for example, the case of test imony. I might

think that Amys claims and Aileens claims ought to be subject to reflective

equilibrium without thinking that sort of claim explains the other. Reflective

equil ibrium, as such, bridges no explanatory gaps. To the extent that M RC


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involves positing reciprocal explanatory relations between phenomenology and

neuroscience it must go beyond reflective equilibrium.

The second point to note is that in order for reflective equilibrium between twodata sets (A and B) to have any bite it must be possible for A-statements and B-

statements to be inconsistent. I t is clear t hat int uit ions about particular moral

judgments and general moral judgments can be inconsistent; aft er all, they draw

on a common pool of concepts. The intuition that is permissible to lie in such-

and-such a context is inconsistent with the intuition that lying is always wrong.

But how can phenomenological statements be inconsistent with neuroscientific

statements? The two kinds of statements draw on different pools of concepts. A

priori, there are no entailment relations between descriptions of phenomenal

states and descriptions of neuroscienti fic states. I n order for reflect ive

equilibr ium between phenomenology and neuroscienti fic to get off the ground we

need bridging principles that link phenomenal data and neuroscientific data. Given

that these principles cannot be established a priori they must be established a

posteriori on the basis of correlations between phenomenal data andneuroscientific data. Exactly how such bridging principles can be discovered is, I

think, a topic t hat deserves more attention than it has received to date. 8

There is another worry about unpacking M RC in terms of reflective equilibrium,

and it concerns the relationship between reflective equilibrium and conceptual

8 The fact that bridging principles need to be established a posteriori is related to the vehicle-content di st inct ion (see Dennett 1991; Gallagher 1997; Mill ikan 1993; Hurley 1998). Neurosciencestudies phenomenal states qua vehicles, phenomenology studies them qua content-beari ng states.(Or, as we might also put it, neuroscience studies experiences qua syntactic entities,phenomenology studies them qua semantic entities.) Arguably, the relation between vehicle andcontent is contingent, and thus can only be discovered a posteriori. Studying experiences at thelevel of vehicles wont tell you what their phenomenology is. This is fairly obvious when it comesto such phenomenal states such a color experi ences. No-one thinks that t he neural state that is(or supports, or causes, or grounds, or whatever) a red experience must itself be red. Brains statesare most ly grey so I ve been told. N o one thinks that the neural state that i s (or support s, orcauses, or grounds, etc) a visual experi ence of a square barn must itself be square. And i f anexperience of a square is square, it isnt an experience of a square because its square. To put thepoint as it is often put, the properties of the contents of consciousness (thats the phenomenalpart) neednt be identical to the properties of the vehicles of consciousness (thats theneuroscient if ic part ).


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autonomy. Can one consistently hold that two domains ought to be brought into

reflective equilibrium with each other and also hold that each domain is

conceptually autonomous? I m not sure that one can. I ntuit ively, it is tempting to

unpack the rejection of conceptual autonomy of two domains by saying that theyshould be brought into reflective equilibrium with each other. Yet

neurophenomenologists seem intent on endorsing the autonomy of

phenomenology while at the same time holding that its deliverances ought to be

brought into equilibrium with those of neuroscience. Consider, for instance, the

following sentence by Thompson, N o and Pessoa: To uphold t he conceptual

autonomy of t he personal level means treat ing our understanding of ourselves as

conscious perceptual subjects as a distinctive form of understanding, one that can

be brought int o mutual accommodation or reflective equilibrium with

cognit ive science (1999: 195). At least on the face of things, there seems to be a

tension between the commitment to autonomy and the commitment to

equil ibrium. W hat does it mean to describe the personal level as autonomous if

autonomy is compatible with reflective equilibrium?

MR C as a heuristic strategy

Closely related to the idea of reflective equilibrium is the idea that

phenomenology and neuroscient ific data can have a heurist ic bearing on each

other. Phenomenological data can be used as a guide in the discovery of novel

neuroscienti fic data, and vice-versa. This reading of M RC derives primari ly f rom

the work of Lutz et al, discussed above. As mentioned, the subjects in Lutzs

study reported their experiences in terms of three types of phenomenological

categories (or clusters): steady readiness, f ragmented readiness, and unreadiness.

Lutz and collaborators used t hese categories to discover previously undetected

structure in the neuronal states of t heir subjects. The import ant point here is that

the subjects phenomenal reports guided the analysis of the neuroscientific data.


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This is, I think, a fascinating result . Phenomenal data are being used as a heurist ic

(or guide) in the investigation of the neuroscientific structure of the mind. And

while Lutz and co-workers didnt use neuronal data as a heuristic in the discovery

of phenomenal structure, I can see nothing to stop a research team attempt ing toemploy such a method. But as fascinating as this is, what bearing does it have on

the explanatory gap? N ot much, as far as I can see. According to Lutz, T his

simple case study already illustrates how fert ile this approach could be to

identify biophysical properties and to understand their relation to experience.

(Lutz 2002: 17). The first claim might be justified, but the second claim isnt. This

study no more illuminates the relationship between biophysical properties and

phenomenal properties than any other work on the neural correlates of

consciousness does; which is to say that it doesnt . The gap between the event s,

processes and structures discovered by neuroscience and t he events, processes

and structures open to phenomenology remains as wide as ever.

MR C as reciprocal causation

A t hird possible reading of M RC takes the notion to refer t o reciprocal causal relations between phenomenal states and neuronal states. I n t heir paper Radical

embodiment: neural dynamics and consciousness Varela and T hompson (2001)

argue that there are two kinds of causation in the brain: upward, or local-to-

global causat ion, and downward, or global-to-local causation. As I read them,

Varela and Thompson hold t hat this kind of reciprocal neural causat ion is also a

form of phenomenalneural causation. There are, they say, reciprocal causal-

explanatory relationships between neural event s and conscious events when the

latter are conceived of as order parameters of large-scale brain dynamics (2001:

421).

There is something to be said for reading M RC in these terms. For one thing, it

appears to offer some hope of closing the explanatory gap in so far as causal


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whole that is conscious, rather, it is the animal-in-its-environment that is the

proper subject of consciousness.) I n short , Varela and Thompsons case for

reciprocal causal relat ions between phenomenal states and neuronal states seems

to be inconsistent with their rejection of identity theories of consciousness andwith their commit ment to an embodied account of cognit ion.

Finally, we might note that merely establishing that there are causal relations

doesnt suffice to close the explanatory gap. After all, Descartes the archetypical

non-naturalist was more than willing to think that there is two-way traffic

between mind and mat ter. The challenge, it seems to me, is to make such causal

relat ions intelligible. M ore specifically, the challenge for t he

neurophenomenologist is to explain how reciprocal causal relations might hold

within a naturalistic (but non-reductionist) account of the mind. As Lutz rather

disarmingly puts it, The introduction of reciprocal causation might be perceived

as a subtle expression of dualism (Lutz 2002: XXX). I ndeed it might. 9

I somorphism and G enerative PassagesI turn now from the question of how to build an explanatory bridge between

phenomenology and neuroscience to the question of what it is to build such a

bridge. W hat would it take to close the explanatory gap?

The neurophenomenological answer t o this question is, I think, bound up wit h

the neurophenomenological account of what it is to naturalize a domain. That

account gives an important role to mathematics. According to the editors of

Naturalizing Phenomenology , the problem of naturalizing a H usserlian description

amounts to articulating its mathematical reconstruction with relevant lower-level

natural sciences, neurobiological disciplines being of course of primary

9 But perhaps neurophenomenologys commit ment to naturalism isnt unequivocal. Lut z wri tes of developing a model that will allow mental and natural properties to coexist without contradiction(Lutz 2002: XXX) thereby suggest ing that mental propert ies arent natural propert ies.


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Let me enlarge on this point by briefly mentioning two important exercises in

neurophenomenology - V arelas (1999) and V an Gelders (1999) accounts of t ime

consciousness. I t seems to me that bot h accounts assume some form of isomorphism. This is, I think, part icularly clear in Varelas analysis, for he claims

that the various [neural] components require a frame or window of simultaneity that

corresponds to the duration of the lived present (1999: 272; original i talics). W hat is a

correspondence if not an isomorphism? I also detect i somorphism at work in

Varelas use of diagrams, which suggest that the cognit ive present has the same

phase structure as neuronal synchrony (see especially 1999: 276).

M y second worry wit h t he notion of generat ive passage concerns the claim that

we might be able to apply a single formal system to both neuroscientific and

phenomenal states. I f I ve understood the strategy correctly and I m far from

sure that I have the goal is to apply dynamical systems models to bot h

phenomenology and neuroscience. But is it really likely that we will be able to

develop dynamical models of first-person data? As far as I know, the onlyapplication of dynamical models thus far has been to neural data. Varela provides

some graphs of H usserls analysis of t ime-consciousness, but they hardly amount

to a formal model. I find it hard t o imagine that we will ever be in a posit ion t o

construct anything approaching a decent mathematical model of the stream of

consciousness. But perhaps I am being unduly pessimist ic here.

M y third worry is perhaps the most serious. Suppose we had a formal model that

could be applied to both phenomenal events and neural events. W hile this would

be quit e some scienti fic achievement, I m not convinced that it would close the

explanatory gap. I t might enable us to predict phenomenal states on t he basis of

neural data, but I think the explanatory it ch would remain. W hy is there

something its like to be in this neuronal state, and why is what its like to be in


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this neuronal state like this and what its like to be in that neuronal state like

that? Even with a complete formal model of both the biological mind and the

phenomenal mind, it seems to me that the relations between the two would

remain as mysterious as ever.

The reason for this, I think, is that formal models can only capture the structure of

a domain; they cant capture its intrinsic nature. Those who think that the hard

problem is hard do so because they think that phenomenal character the what

its like of experience cannot be fully captured by structural descriptions.

(Perhaps such folk are wrong to hold this view, but thats a separate issue.) To the

extent that one is at all gripped by the explanatory gap, one will be inclined to

doubt that it could be bridged by mathematical models. There is certain irony in

the fact t hat neurophenomenologists seem to be assuming an account of

phenomenology that sounds very much like the functionalist accounts they

frequently disparage.

C onclusionVarelas descript ion of neurophenomenology as a radically new research t radit ion

for consciousness studies seems to me to be somewhat over-stated. As far as I can

tell, neurphenomenonologists havent worked out how to close the explanatory

gap. I n making this claim I dont in any way mean to dismiss the work done under

the neurophenomenology label. I t seems to me that Lutzs use of first -person

data to guide the analysis of brain dynamics, for example, is an excellent model of

how the science of consciousness ought to proceed. But neither it nor any other

experimental work conducted by neurophenomenologists lives up to the claims

made by its proponents. H ow it is that anything so remarkable as a state of

consciousness comes about as a result of irritat ing nervous t issue is st ill as

remarkable as the appearance of Djin when Aladdin rubbed his lamp.


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