Studiu de Caz-12

7/31/2019 Studiu de Caz-12

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4.3.1 International chamber of shipping fire casualty report scheme no.1

Situation A 12000 ton dwt. foreign-going cargo ship built in 1966 was berthed in an

Australian port, when an outbreak of fire occurred in a deck container stowedadjacent to No.2 hatch.Initial Action

At 16.00 hours the fire alarms were sounded by the duty officer, from a firepoint in the poop accommodation, after observing fire in a container duringdischarging operations. On hearing the alarm the crew mustered at their firestations.

Tactical Fire Fighting ProceduresHoses were already laid out on the fore deck since this is a routine

precaution when dangerous cargoes are loaded or discharged. Additional hoseswere made available and arrangements made for the maintenance of essential

services and communications.The affected container contained drums of phosphorus and it wastherefore considered that the use of water in the form of a jet or spray, fromhoses, would be likely to prove ineffective. However, as the container was in theprocess of being unloaded and was already secured in a spreader the cranedriver was instructed to lift the container clear of the ship and submerge it in thedock. This was done without incident and the container subsequently landedonto the quay. However as soon as the water had drained from the compartmentthe phosphorus re-ignited. By this time the fire brigade were in attendance andfought the blaze with dry powder. The fire was extinguished at 16.45 hours.

Damage and Personal Injuries

Damage was limited to the container concerned. No injuries occurred.Cause of FireWhilst lifting the container from its locator the forward right hand corner

was not cleared properly. As a result the container tilted, then swung violently,striking an obstruction which punctured the container wall and a drum of phosphorus, the contents of which ignited spontaneously.

Tactical Fire Fighting Appraisal As it was considered inadvisable to use hoses on this type of fire, and dry

powder was not available in sufficient quantities, the action of submerging thecontainer in the dock, away from the vessel, was the correct procedure. Thisaction resulted in the containment of the fire until the arrival of the fire service.The crew were also correct in adopting fire control procedures in the area to limitthe fire spread in case the container crashed to the deck.

The crew carried out their duties satisfactorily within the limited resourcesavailable.

Remedial Action Taken by CompanyThe problems of dealing with the multiplicity of hazardous cargoes in an

emergency situation are many and very often a compromise has to be reached.


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In this particular instance, subject to the general conclusions shownbelow, no specific action was adopted by the Company.

ConclusionsThis occurrence highlights the following :a) The importance of ready identification of dangerous goods - by correct

marking and labelling on the outside of the container - in addition to such markingand labelling on individual receptacles stowed within the container.b) If the amount and type of cargo constitutes an unusual risk, the fire

brigade should be alerted before loading or discharging operations commence.c) Where practicable, the vessel itself should carry supplementary

equipment of a type appropriate to the cargo(es) being carried.

10th September, 1974.


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4.3.2 International chamber of shipping fire casualty report scheme no. 2

Situation A cargo ship of 26,000 tons dwt. built in 1970 was on passage fromCanada's western seaboard to Europe with a cargo of timber products and a fulldeck cargo of timber. The vessel had been on passage for 24 days when the firewas discovered.

Two days before the discovery hurricane weather conditions had beenexperienced in which the deck cargo had shifted. The wind had moderated butfairly heavy sea conditions were prevailing at the time of discovery.

Initial ActionThe bridge smoke detection cabinet gave first indications of a fire in No. 2

hold. The audible alarm did not function. At 12.22 hours smoke was observed in

the vicinity of No. 2 hatchway.The Officer of the Watch immediately sounded the fire alarm; engineswere put on "standby" and the ship's speed reduced.

Tactical Fire Fighting ProceduresNo. 2 hold was sealed and carbon dioxide injected by the ship's fixed

installation. Six fire hoses were used for cooling decks and timber in the vicinityof the hold.

At 14.06 hours the ship resumed full speed. At 17.03 hours smoke was again seen in the vicinity of No. 2 hatch. More

carbon dioxide was injected. At 19.00 hours No. 1 and No. 3 holds wereexamined and found normal.

From then onwards carbon dioxide was injected into No. 2 hold at hourlyintervals, and decks and the timber cargo in the vicinity were cooled continously.Examinations of No. 1 and No. 2 holds were made at regular intervals.

On the twenty-sixth day of passage when smothering and coolingprocedures had been in progress for 44 hours, the vessel altered course for Falmouth.

The Owners made arrangements with the Falmouth Fire Service for equipment and firemen to be available when the ship arrived.

Thirteen hours after altering course a small explosion was heard in No. 2hold. Eight hours later the supply of carbon dioxide ran out.

By this time the vessel was within two hours steaming from Falmouth.Since the discovery of the fire a south-westerly wind between force 5-8

had been experienced.Two hours after picking up the Falmouth Pilot and Harbour Master the

local fire service boarded the ship moored in the harbour and commencedarrangements to control the fire.

It was decided to inject high expansion foam into No. 2 hold throughventilator trunks at the aft end. To accomplish this, a portable foam generator was shipped and timber shifted to give access. Foam was fed through a large


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diameter polyethylene pipe and vents for'd were opened to allow theextinguishing agent to spread through the hold. The ship's carbon dioxide supplywas replenished and a 30 cwt. tank of carbon dioxide shipped on deck tosupplement the fixed installation. Two days after arrival at Falmouth the vesselsailed for its first scheduled discharge port, Cardiff, with six firemen on board.

On the twenty-one hour passage from Falmouth to Cardiff smoke andsteam were observed. During this period the level of high expansion foam in thehold was maintained.

At Cardiff the local fire service relieved the firemen on board and stood bywhile timber, destined for the port, was discharged. Further foam was injectedinto the hold. After removing timber from No. 2 hatch it was found that water hadentered the hold causing cargo to swell, as a result of which the hatch covershad lifted and become distorted. It was decided not to open up No. 2 hatch as itwas felt that farther ingress of air would increase the fire risk.

Temporary repairs were carried out and the vessel sailed for its secondscheduled discharge port, Antwerp, with two firemen on board.

On the fifty-one hour passage from Cardiff to Antwerp bad weather conditions prevented the inspection of No. 2 hold, but it was then discovered thatthe hatch covers had lifted farther due to the ingress of sea spray swelling thecargo. On entiy, the hold was found to be cool although traces of steam werebeing emitted. Hold temperatures were taken throughout and the high expansionfoam topped up as necessary. The condition of other holds was found to benormal.

On arrival at Antwerp the local fire service attended. It was decided thatthey need not remain on board but should attend when No. 2 hatch covers wereremoved to discharge cargo.

When the hatch covers were eventually removed, traces of steam were

observed. During discharge, which took place with little difficulty, the cargo wasfound to be cooling rapidly and no farther outbreak of fire occurred. It was evidentthat the high expansion foam had penetrated the entire cargo.

Damage and Personal InjuriesThere was considerable charring and water damage to cargo in No. 2 hold

and to the deck cargo above this hold. Structural damage had occurred tohatches, hatch coamings, deck plating and associated stiffeners due to theingress of water swelling the cargo. No personal injuries were sustained.

Cause of FifeThe seat of the fire in No. 2 hold was located in sulphite paper rolls. The

cause was not determined.The suggestion that steel wrapping bands on the cargo rubbing adjacent

steel structure could generate sufficient heat to cause the fire was discounted, aswas the suggestion that breakage of a wrapping band caused a spark. There isno evidence that this product ignites through spontaneous combustion. The mostlogical explanation is a carelessly discarded cigarette or cigar. Experiments haveshown that sulphite paper will smoulder and burn very slowly without generatingmuch smoke or heat if in contact with a lighted cigarette.

Tactical Fire Fighting Appraisal


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The smothering and cooling procedures used kept the fire under control.Had the vessel been further from a port of refuge, with depleted supplies of carbon dioxide, the situation would have been far more serious.

Foam penetration in the hold was probably a major factor in extinguishingthe fire.

Remedial Action Taken by CompanyHigh expansion foam generators have been supplied to vessels as well asoperating and testing instructions for smoke detectors. Testing of detectors isnow being regularly carried out.

ConclusionsRegular inspection of the hold spaces may well have detected this fire at

an earlier stage. It is considered that some damage had already occurred to thehatch which allowed the escape of smoke when the fire was discovered.

The use of water in fighting the fire in the hold would have caused swellingof the cargo and may have caused more structural as well as cargo damage.

November, 1974


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Situation A 167,000 ton dwt. crude oil carrier, built in 1968, was in ballast and atanchor off a Persian Gulf loading terminal, awaiting a berth, when an outbreak of fire occurred in the engine room following leakage from the lubricating oil supplyto a turbo alternator.

Initial ActionThe bridge was informed of the outbreak by actuation of the General and

Engineer's alarms. Bridge monitors also indicated a fire in the engine room.Engine room personnel tackled the fire with a 30 gallon portable foam

extinguisher and fire hoses fitted with spray nozzles but their efforts wereinsufficient to contain the blaze.

Tactical Fire Fighting Procedures At the same time other fire fighting teams were deployed in coolingboundary bulkheads and extinguishing secondary fires which had started.

The engine room became untenable after some ten minutes, mainly dueto dense smoke. The main fire was finally contained and extinguished by theengine room water spray system, while the ship's fire fighting teamsprogressively dealt with secondary fires.

Damage and Personal InjuriesElectric cables, auxiliary machinery and store rooms sustained fire

damage.While attempting to escape, a member of the engine room staff became

isolated. He was later found unconscious and all efforts to revive him failed.Death was reported as due to suffocation.Cause of FireThe fire was caused by lubricating oil, under pressure, spraying on to the

hot surface of a turbine casing, during routine servicing of a Duplex filter. The oilsupply should have been depressurised before the filter cover was removed.

Failure to stop the turbo alternator and to shut off the lubricating oil supplyresulted in a local tire developing into a major incident.

Tactical Fire Fighting Appraisal Apart from failing to shut off the lubricating oil supply, which resulted in the

fire reaching the proportions of a major outbreak, the measures taken to fight thefire were correct and effective. As it was. the oil flow was ultimately reducedwhen the turbo alternator seized.

Actuation of the engine room water spray system was the most effectivemeasure taken to reduce the fire to containable proportions.

The ship's fire fighting teams dealt with secondary fires in a verycompetent manner and made a significant contribution towards bringing thesituation under control.

Remedial Action taken by Company


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All ships in the fleet were warned of the hazards associated with incorrectmaintenance of lubricating oil filters. Hot surfaces adjacent to lubricating oil filterswere fitted with metal shields.

To avoid future errors a work control system was adopted to ensure thatpotentially dangerous work activity was properly pre-planned and controlled.

Thus, hazard potential now receives a proper degree of consideration,resulting in better precautions.ConclusionsThis incident illustrates the hazards caused by incorrect maintenance

procedures. Moreover, it emphasises the paramount importance of cutting thesupply of fuel as quickly as possible in the event of an oil fire in the engine room.

January, 1975


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Situation A 14000 dwt. tanker built in 1970, was undergoing shell-plating andengine room repairs involving welding at a repair berth. The ship was partiallymanned and, with fire-fighting equipment out of commission while certain itemswere undergoing inspection ashore, the repair yard had assumed responsibilityfor fire protection on board.

A shore labourer, engaged in laying alleyway flooring in the aftaccommodation, observed smoke coming from a cabin.

Initial ActionFinding that there was no fire-fighting equipment at hand, he went on deck

and procured a fire hose, only to find that it was not connected to the shore

hydrant.During the time taken to connect the hose the fire spread from the cabin tothe adjacent corridor and dense smoke made it impossible to enter the area.

Tactical Fire-Fighting ProceduresThe municipal fire brigade was called in but no further details are available

beyond the fact that water and foam were used.Damage and Personal InjuriesThe entire after part of the ship was damaged. In particular, the

accommodation was gutted. A man working in the engine room perished,although the cause of death is not known.

Cause of Fire

As a result of an asbestos fire screen becoming dislodged, cabin furnitureand bedding were ignited by heat from exterior welding work.Tactical Fire-Fighting AppraisalNothing can be said about the fire fighting procedures adopted, because

of the absence of detailed information. However, it is probable that if a watchmanhad been stationed in the accommodation area and portable extinguishersprovided as required by the regulations of the repair yard, the outbreak of firemight have been contained.

Yard regulations also required the following measures: the siting of extinguishers in the vicinity of the gangway, and a fire hose-connected to a shorehydrant at all timeson deck.

Non-compliance with these regulations allowed the fire to assume theproportions of a major outbreak. The situation was further aggravated by the factthat free circulation of air could not be eliminated as it was not possible to closedoors in the area, due to the presence of cables carrying services for repairs inthe engine room.

Remedial Action taken by Company All ships' officers were instructed to make sure, regardless of whoever is

responsible for safety when repair work is being carried out, that fire fighting


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equipment is available, ready for use, and that the necessary surveillance iscarried out, particularly when welding operations are in progress.

ConclusionWhen a vessel is undergoing repairs, the risk of fire is increased.

Shipowners and personnel should satisfy themselves that all the safety

precautions are observed especially where the responsibility for ship safety isshared.

March, 1975


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Situation An 11000 dwt. cargo ship built in 1959, was berthed in an Indian portwhen fire started in an engineers* store-room, in which cotton waste had beenstowed earlier in the day.

Initial Action At about 1900 hrs. smoke was observed coming from the poop deck

ventilator and a check was made of the store-rooms in. the area. The fire wasfound to be in the engineers' store on the lower deck starboard side.

Tactical Fire Fighting ProceduresThe poop accommodation was cleared of personnel and at 1930 hrs.

carbon dioxide was discharged into the store-room from the ship's fixed

installation. At the same time the engine room fire pump was started and water was used to cool the ship's starboard side, in way of the store-room.The Port fire brigade was summoned and arrived on the scene at 1940

hrs. to supervise fire fighting.Between 1930 and 2230 hrs. 8 cylinders of carbon dioxide (in all about

240 Kgs.) were discharged into the store-room but the door was not kept properlyclosed and the gas concentration was too low to be effective.

Hoses were used to flood the store-room and the fire was eventuallyextinguished by 0500 hrs. the following morning.

Damage and Personal InjuriesNo structural damage or injuries to personnel were sustained.

Fire damage was confined to electrical circuits, fittings and stores in thecompartment; engine spares were damaged by water. Flooding also causeddrums of paint to float about, spilling their contents.

Cause of FireCotton waste, stowed in the store-room earlier in the day, had been

placed in contact with a bare electric light bulb. At the time the ship's after electric lighting was turned off so that repairs

could be carried out to a defective flood-light. However, the circuit serving thestore-room light had been left with the switch in the "on" position.

Repairs were completed at 1700 hrs. and the electricity supply restored.Heat from the store-room light bulb which, of course, lit automatically, caused thecotton waste to ignite.

Tactical Fire Fighting AppraisalThe fact that the door to the store-room had not been properly closed and

that this door was repeatedly opened to observe results, reduced theeffectiveness of the carbon dioxide. The compartment had to be flooded toextinguish the fire, causing water damage.

Remedial Action Taken by CompanyThe following instructions were issued by the Company:


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Cotton waste should be stowed in spaces provided for the purpose.Paint and cotton waste should not be stowed together.

All electric light bulbs should have protective guards in place at all times.When leaving a compartment, personnel should ensure that light switches

are in the "off position.

ConclusionsThe importance of checking that electrical fittings are in good order andthat, when not in use, electric lights are switched off cannot be over-stressed. If proper care had been taken in stowing the cotton waste, there would have beenno fire.

June 1975.


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4.3.6 International chamber of shipping fire Casualty report scheme no. 6

Situation A 13000 dwt. general cargo vessel was discharging a cargo of gunnies, jute, tea and carpeting materials. By the afternoon of the thirteenth day of discharge, bales of jute stacked four high in the after part of No. 2 hold, remainedto be unloaded.

The POrt Fire Prevention Officer had just boarded for his daily inspectionwhen the alarm was raised from No. 2 hold.

Initial ActionThe Fire Prevention Officer ran to No. 2 where dockers in the lower hold

were attempting to smother a fire in the jute cargo. He took a hose, which wasalready coupled to the deck main supply as part of the precautionary measures,

and directed it onto the fire. At the same time the hold was evacuated.Tactical Fire Fighting Procedures Another hose was already being connected to the ship's main deck supply

and this was also brought to bear on the fire. These two hoses were thenmanoeuvred into the 'tween deck from where fire-fighting continued until densesmoke made further efforts impossible in this area. Within sixteen minutes of thewarning being given, the local Fire Brigade had arrived and took charge of operations.

The fire was now located in three areas of the cargo in No. 2 lower hold.The initial two jets of water were used by the Fire Brigade to attack and containthese fires.

Later, teams with breathing apparatus investigated the extent of the fireand positioned the hoses. Four jets of water were now used to tackle the fire andcool down oil tanks under the jute. Two medium expansion foam jets were alsoused.

After about five hours the hold was smoke free and no fire was visible. Awatch was kept overnight and a medium expansion foam jet was used at times tocontrol intermittent outbreaks. This watch was maintained while the remainingcargo was discharged from the hold.

Damage and Personal InjuriesNo personal injuries were sustained but a considerable amount of damage

was done to the jute cargo. The hold bulkhead in No. 2 was also slightly buckled.Cause of fireThe cause of the fire was not fully established.The possibility of sparks from the funnel being responsible was put

forward but discounted, as was an electrical source.The most probable cause seems to have been the hurried disposal of

smoking materials by dockers when they were informed that the Fire PreventionOfficer was approaching the "Smoking Prohibited" area of No. 2 hold.

Tactical Fire Fighting Appraisal


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The promptness in tackling the fire prevented a major incident as thevessel had jute in other holds and there were large quantities of jute in the shedson the quay.

Remedial Action Taken By CompanyIncident reported to all other units of the fleet and the need for constant

vigilance reiterated with especial reference to jute cargo.ConclusionsThis incident highlights the need for:(a) fire hoses to be coupled and ready for immediate use when

handling certain types of readily combustible cargo - the wisdom of this practicewas amply demonstrated in this case;

(b) a strict control being placed on personnel in "smoking prohibited"areas.

August 1975.


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Situation A 15000 dwt. general cargo ship built in 1970 was on passage from South America to Europe with a cargo including asbestos, coffee and cotton, and anumber of containers. The ship had been at sea for 13 days when a fire wasdiscovered in a forward cargo compartment. During this time the weather hadbeen fine with moderate winds.

Initial Action At 1S.S0 hours very slight white smoke was seen issuing from the

ventilators at No. 2 hatch. The bridge smoke detecting cabinet was checked andshowed similar white smoke. The audible alarm sounded five minutes later. Theventilator fans were stopped and the fire flaps closed. The Master ordered "stop

engines" and gave instructions for the ventilators to be sealed. Within a fewminutes the smoke became thick but remained white.Tactical Fire Fighting Procedures

At 16.25 all hatches were sealed and the ship resumed its voyage to thefirst port of discharge. CO, was injected into No. 2/3 hold, and Nos. 1 and 4 wereinspected; slight smoke was noticed but no apparent fire. At 20.00 hours, atemperature check was made in No. 2/3 tween-deck and checks were repeatedevery hour. By noon the following day the tween-deck temperature had dropped3C and, at that time, the temperature in the lower hold was 9C below thetween-deck figure. At midnight the tween-deck temperature had fallen by afurther 5"C and the lower hold figure showed a 1C drop. Smoke emission from

the small hatch through which temperatures were recorded had now ceasedaltogether.Throughout the passage moderate weather prevailed and the ship arrived

at its first discharge port some forty hours after the fire was discovered.Temperatures on arrival showed a rise of 4C in the tween-deck but no change inthe lower hold. Discharging of Nos. 1 and 5 holds commenced at 10.00, but itwas decided nqt to open No. 2/3, and at 15.00 further CO2 was injected. Duringthe following day tween-deck temperatures were down by between 5C and 8C;in the lower hold the drop was not so pronounced, reaching 3C. At 19.00 further CO2 was injected and the ship sailed that evening for the next discharge port,having replenished CO2 stocks.

During the twenty hour passage there was no change in the situation.Firemen boarded the ship on arrival and entered No. 2/3 hold; no signs of smokeor fire were found.

Discharging of Nos. 1 and 5 was resumed at 14.00 but no decision hadbeen taken about opening No. 2/3. The tween-deck temperature was steady anda further drop of 2 to 4C was recorded in the lower hold.

By noon the following day, the tween-deck temperature had risen slightlyand smoke was issuing from the hatch; further CO2 was. injected. The fire-


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brigade attended at 13.00 and stood by with hoses while deck cargo on the No.2/3 hatch covers was discharged and the hatches prepared for opening. Themaster had suggested using foam as well as water for fire-fighting but the fire-brigade refused on the grounds that it was customary to use water on fires incotton cargoes.

At 16.40 the fire-brigade ordered No. 3 hatch to be opened and, after thicksmoke had cleared, the compartment was inspected but there was no evidenceof a fire.

No. 2 hatch was opened at 17.00, and about ten minutes later flameswere seen in baled cotton in the lower hold port side; the fire brigade appliedwater using hoses from the main deck, and spent about forty-five minutes shiftingheavy cargo from the aftermost section of the tween-deck hatch covers. At about18.00 the fire-brigade estimated it would take twenty minutes to have the fireunder control.

An hour later, however, it was obvious that the fire was intensifying. Thefire-brigade continued to apply water and the ship's crew cleared and opened up

further sections of the tween-deck; hatch covers to make the lower hold moreaccessible for fire fighting.By this time the ship's side and starboard deck plating had started to

buckle, and water was used for cooling. The fire continued to spread, and at23.35 the fire-brigade forced air into the hold to clear the smoke by means of acompressor, with an air-hose leading into the hold.

At 00.50 the fire-brigade started flooding the hold, and by 03.00 the smokehad lessened and another tween-deck hatch cover was opened.

The fire was eventually brought under control at about 08.00, althoughcargo at the top of the port side was still burning. These uppermost bales wereabove the water level in the hold due to the list which the ship had taken.

Discharging of the cotton started at 11.15, but at noon work switched tocoffee in the forepart which had started to swell, pushing up sections of thetween-deck hatch cover and the tween-deck itself.

Damage and Personal Injuries Apart from considerable fire and water damage to cargo, structural

damage was caused to the tween-deck plating and stiffeners, main deck plating,ship's side and the forward bulkhead of No. 2/3 hold. There were no personalinjuries.

Cause of FireNot yet knownTactical Fire Fighting AppraisalThe fire was discovered at an early stage, '.his enabled it to be kept under

control with CO2 during the voyage.It is felt that the tactics employed by the fire-brigade in opening up all of

No. 2/3 hold created greater difficulties than would otherwise have been met inextinguishing the outbreak. The use of foam, as suggested by the master, mightalso have been more effective than water at the early stages, thereby perhapsobviating the need to flood, and minimising cargo and structural damage.

Remedial Action Taken by the Company


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All necessary and conceivable measures were taken to minimise damageand protect the interests of the vessel and the other parties involved.

ConclusionsThis incident appears to confirm the owners' opinion that the fire-brigade

lacked experience in handling shipboard fires; continuous pressure by the ship's

command, fully supported by the owners' agents, had little if any effect inimproving the fire fighting tactics used. It also underlines the ease with which adeep-seated fire in a combustible cargo can spread if air is re-admitted.

January 1976.


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Situation An 11,000 dwt cargo liner loaded with general cargo and cotton wasenroute to the west coast of the U.S.A. when fire broke out in No. 4 hold.Weather at the time was Tine with a force 3 wind.

Initial Action At 01.05 hours, smoke was seen coming from ventilators ai No. 4 hold.

The fire alarm was sounded and ventilation fans to the cargo compartmentswere stopped. The main engines were ordered to "stand by" and the ship wasturned off wind.

Tactical Fire Fighting Procedures At 01.14 the engineer on watch reported that the bulkhead between the

engine room and No. 4 cargo hold was extremely hot. Shortly afterwards flameswere seen in the after part of the engine room. The main engines were stopped,the skylight and ventilators were closed and the engine room was evacuated.

Meanwhile the ship's fire-fighting team led by the Chief Officer had beenorganised. The emergency fire pump located in the poop section was broughtinto operation and an attempt was made to gain entry into No. 4 hold but thiswas not possible because of the heat and smoke.

It was decided to tackle both fires with CO2. Greater priority was given tothe engine room fire which was threatening the whole of the midshipssuperstructure. Furthermore, it was hoped this action would enable the main firepumps to be brought into use to tackle the fire in No. 4. Accordingly, fifty

cylinders were discharged into the engine room and twenty-four into No. 4 holdbut shortly afterwards it was reported that the fire had spread to the store-roomabove and adjacent to the engine room.

The officers' and crew's quarters were located on the deck above the store-room and the danger of fire spreading throughout the accommodation wasimminent.

Due to the main fire pumps still being inoperable the only fire-fightingresources available were the emergency pump and portable extinguishers.

Access to the store-room was through a narrow, smoke-filled passage buttwo seamen wearing fire suits and compressed air breathing apparatussucceeded in controlling the fire there, while others tackled fires which hadbroken out in the accommodation above.

At 02.30 the fire in the engine room appeared to be extinguished andthe store-room fire brought under control.

In No. 4 hold however, the temperature was again rising and it was clear that the CO2 had only temporarily subdued the fire. It was decided to flood thehold using the emergency pump. Meanwhile fires continued to break out in thestore-room and these were tackled with portable extinguishers.


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During the fire-fighting operations, radio contact was established with theship's agent and with the authorities at the nearest port/Details of cargocomposition, draught, weather conditions and the fire situation were given andthe assistance of a fire-fighting boat was' requested. In addition lifeboats andrafts were prepared for launching and other precautions taken to abandon the

vessel should this become necessary. At 06.50, a fire-fighting tug arrived and increased the rate of flooding of No. 4 hold using three jets.

A second tug arrived at 12.15. The jets from the first tug were stopped andthe ship was taken in tow; flooding of No. 4 continued, using the ship'semergency pump.

At 19.40 the vessel arrived in port and the tugs resumed flooding. Afurther supply of CO2 was provided and discharged into the hold.

At 08.20 the following day, flooding of No. 4 was ceased and at 09.00,crew members were able to gain entry to the tweendeck. The ship had listed 10to port and while the port side of the lower hold was filled with water the

starboard side was dry. Hot plating in this area indicated that a renewed outbreakof fire could be expected. The local fire brigade which had been in attendancesince the ship berthed cut six holes through the plating and further water wasapplied by one of the tugs.

At 15.00 there were no signs of fire in the hold and at 16.40 thehatchcover was opened.

At 19.20 the auxiliary engines and pumps were started and the water wasremoved from No. 4. Discharge of damaged cargo began at 19.45.

Damage and Personal InjuriesConsiderable structural and cargo damage was sustained but further

details were not given. There were no personal injuries.Cause of FireInvestigations showed that the fire originated in the middle of the cotton

cargo in No. 4 lower hold. The most probable cause was thought to be smokingby dockers during loading. Spontaneous combustion, put forward as analternative theory, was considered to be less likely.

Tactical Fire-fighting AppraisalThe fire broke out at night while the ship was at sea. After the initial

outbreak it spread quickly to the engine room and midships accommodation.Even after the fire in the engine room appeared to be extinguished the main firepumps could not be used because of the concentration of CO2 remaining in theengine room.

The most critical phases of what was a difficult incident to control weresuccessfully tackled by the ship's personnel who acted with determination andskill.

Remedial Action Taken by The CompanyThe incident was studied by the company's safety committee. All senior

deck and engineer officers undergo compulsory training courses in fire-fighting.The company also operates monthly safety conferences which officers on shore


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leave attend. On all ships great attention is given to training and fire-fightingdrills.

ConclusionsThis incident demonstrates the value of well trained personnel on board

and an active company policy towards education and training in all safety

matters.September 1976


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SituationThis report concerns an engine room fire on an ore carrier of 18,300 dwt,built in 1960, proceeding on a short coastwise passage in United Kingdomwaters. The main propulsion machinery was a five cylinder turbo-charged unit,which at the time of the incident was operating on diesel fuel.

Before the start of the voyage the fuel valves of numbers 4 and 5 cylindershad been replaced by overhauled spares. During the passage the Third Engineer was rectifying minor leaks in the fuel lines to these replacement valves and whileattempting to tighten a connection, the stud coupling sheared. Escaping fuel ignitedon contact with the exhaust manifold.

Initial Action

The Third Engineer informed the Second Engineer who was at the mainengine controls. He then returned to tackle the fire with a two-gallon foamextinguisher. The Second Engineer sounded the general alarm and instructed aJunior Engineer to advise the bridge. The main engine was stopped and the fueloil booster pump shut down. The Second Engineer then went to the outbreakwhere the Third Engineer and Fireman Greaser were attacking the fire withportable foam extinguishers. The fire was getting out of hand and all three, two

Apprentices and the Junior Engineer evacuated the engine room. At this time theChief Engineer who had been off-duty arrived and assumed command of thefire-fighting operation.

Tactical Fire Fighting Procedures

Meanwhile the Electrician had activated the CO2 discharge system alarmbut had not operated the release valves. He was told not to do so by the Chief Engineer so that the situation could be assessed and a check made that allpersonnel had evacuated the engine room. The electrical shut down switcheswere operated and engine room skylights, vent flaps and funnel dampers closed.Deck personnel were set to rigging hoses and smoke masks, catering staff andanother Junior Engineer collected fire extinguishers in readiness for use.

The fire appeared to be seated at the exhaust trunking in way of number Scylinder. The Chief Engineer and Store-keeper used foam and soda acidextinguishers but were unable to get close enough because of thickening fumesand smoke. An attempt to clear the atmosphere by opening the skylight caused aflare up. All the quick release valve gear were operated except the fuel supply tothe generators which was clear of the fire.

By this time the fire had begun to subside but flared up as spilt fuel on thecylinder head footplates dripped on to the exhaust system. The Second Engineer and the Electrician, both wearing smoke helmets and the Chief Engineer, withouta smoke helmet so that he could move more freely to direct operations, appliedwater from hoses fitted with spray jets to the exhaust manifold and theadjacent floor plates. A rescue party stationed outside helped to manoeuvre the


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hoses. The Chief Engineer was of the opinion that the situation was comingunder control but at the same time a glow was noticed in the area of theworkshop aft and purifier flat at the upper platform level. It was thought that thefire had spread to these parts where lubricating oil and kerosene tanks werelocated, and it was decided to close the fuel supply to the generators, vacate the

engine room and discharge CO2 into it. This decision had been delayed for someforty minutes as the ship was in a buoyed channel and hitherto the apparent seatof the fire had not endangered these tanks.

As soon as the fumes had cleared, the Chief and Second Engineerschecked the engine room casing for hot spots but found none. By 14.00 hrs.,thirty minutes after discharging the CO2, the Chief Engineer was convinced thatthe fire was extinguished but decided to allow further time for the exhaustmanifold to cool down to avoid the possibility of re-ignition when the engine roomwas opened up for inspection.

At 15.00 hrs. the Chief Engineer entered the engine room wearing asmoke helmet and safety line; a hose party stood by. The fire was out and

unlikely to re-start. Skylights were eased up to ventilate the space and as soonas power had been restored the engine room forced ventilation fans werestarted.

Damage and Personal InjuriesThe main engine turbo-blower was seriously damaged, in particular the

circular frame, inner and outer suction nozzles and the air inlet filter elements.Exhaust gas by-pass trunking was fitted and after repairs had been made

to the fuel piping and the whole tested, the voyage was resumed on reducedrevolutions.

No personal injuries were sustained.Cause of Fire

The fire was caused by ignition of leaking fuel from a sheared fuel pipecoupling.Tactical Fire Fighting AppraisalThe prompt actions of the Second Engineer confined the fire so that the

only serious damage was to the turbo-charger. Allowing for the fact that the ship's position made immediate use of the

engine room C(h system undesirable, the Chief Engineer's control of the situationresulted in speedy resumption of normal conditions in the engine room.

After operating the CO2 system, smoke in the alleyway prevented a checkbeing made that all the bottles had discharged. It was found afterwards that ninebottles out of the total of sixty had not operated because their pull-cord was notproperly connected to the operating piston.

In addition to the fifty-one bottles of CO2 discharged, a total of six two-gallon foam extinguishers and two two-gallon soda-acid extinguishers were used.

Remedial Action Taken by the CompanyFire-fighting personnel reported that smoke helmets restricted movement

and sets of self-contained breathing apparatus were subsequently supplied.


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A thirty-gallon foam extinguisher located at the forward end of the boiler flat could not be used due to insufficient length of hose. This was re-sited in aposition approved by a surveyor of the national administration.

ConclusionsThis incident demonstrates the need to replace compressible olives in

couplings whenever fuel valves are changed to prevent over-tightening of couplings. Such work should not be undertaken while the engine is running or still hot.

It was reported that too many personnel were attempting to assist fire-fighting and in so doing generally hampering operations. Instructions should begiven that all personnel, apart from fire-fighting and back-up teams, shouldmuster at an approved position for ease of counting and to facilitate giving of assistance where required.

November, 1976.


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SituationThis report concerns a fire in the accommodation space of a passenger ship of 25,000 tons which, at the time of the incident, was in port, berthedalongside.

Initial Action At 2300 an outbreak of fire occurred in a locker in the Smoke Room.

Attempts to extinguish it by means of fire extinguishers were unsuccessful andthe general alarm was sounded, the port fire brigade was summoned and thePort Captain's Office was also informed. The fire spread rapidly from the locker into the cavity between the Smoke Room ceiling panelling and the steel deckabove. Shortly afterwards the interior of the ship rapidly filled with smoke and

instructions were given to evacuate all passengers ashore. The public addresssystem and the general alarm system could no longer be used because thewiring of these systems passed through the locker where the fire originated andhad been damaged. Instructions to evacuate were passed orally by members of the crew and the evacuation proceeded in a very orderly manner, beingcompleted by 23.45.

Tactical Fire Fighting Procedures At this time four Grinnel sprinkler heads were operating in the Smoke

Room, but it soon became clear, from the rapid increase in deck temperatures of the Sun Deck cabins overhead, that the fire was above the deckhead panelling inthe Smoke Room. As the continued use of sprinklers was having little effect, and

was causing unnecessary flooding, the sprinkler system was shut down. The firebrigade produced a smoke extracting pump which was partly effective in clearingsmoke in the vicinity of the door into the Smoke Room. With the assistance of breathing apparatus and strong lighting, it was possible to use hoses on theSmoke Room locker which was still extremely hot.

To check the spread of fire above the deckhead panelling, part of thepanelling was removed and water was sprayed into the area where the fire wasstill burning fiercely in the trunkings and ceiling grounds. This action brought thefire under control and considerably cooled the area. It also further reduced theconcentration of smoke. Further deckhead panels were removed to releasetrapped heat and the deckhead plating was cooled with water.

The fire was eventually extinguished at 00.30 the following morning.Damage and Personal Injuries

All electrical cables passing through the locker had been badly charredand, in addition to the side panelling in the immediate vicinity of the fire, therewas extensive damage to the deckhead panelling over a fairly large area.

The steel deck over the area was buckled and a cabin on this deck hadbeen badly affected. There was minor fire and water damage to furniture in the


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Smoke Room and water damage to some cabins on the deck below, where water had penetrated by way of the stairways.

No personal injuries were reported.Cause of FireThe fire appears to-have been caused by the ignition of waste paper in a

refuse bag in one of the Smoke Room lockers. The contents of ashtrays hadbeen emptied into this bag.Tactical Fire Fighting AppraisalIt is possible that the fire had already spread from the locker into the

space over the Smoke Room deckhead panelling by the time it was detected.The use of fire extinguishers was not effective but prompt application of

water, which had the added benefit of cooling the deck plating above, preventedstill greater spread of fire and consequent damage.

ConclusionsDespite the obvious risks of putting the contents of ashtrays into

receptacles containing combustible material, reports of many incidents where fire

appears to have been caused by smoking show that human carelessness is alltoo common. Although fitted with a sprinkler system, the construction of the deckhead

panelling was such that a fire, which started at a lower level, was able to spreadinto the space between the panelling and the steel deckhead and affect a widearea of this space.

February, 1977.


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SituationThis report concerns a fire which broke out among dangerous goodsstowed on deck on a five hatch general cargo ship of 15,000 dwt. The ship hadloaded at northwest European ports for South Africa and the Persian Gulf and atthe time of the incident was berthed alongside at Kuwait.

Initial Action At 1745, during discharge, a fire occurred on deck at No. 5 hatch in a stow

of plastics receptacles of "Butanox" (methyl ethyl ketone peroxide adangerous substance classified by IMCO as Class 5.2 organic peroxides).

The crew went to fire stations and shore fire services were notified. Allcargo discharging was stopped and stevedores sent ashore. The fire was tackled

with a 10 lb. dry powder extinguisher and at first this action appeared to havebeen effective, but within a few seconds the fire broke out again and spreadrapidly to an adjacent stow of steel drums of Fenitrothion pesticide (Class 6.1 poisons). Heat and smoke quickly developed and despite the efforts of two hoseparties, the fire spread to cartons of aerosol cans and butane gas lighter refills(Class 2 inflammable gas). These began to explode and fly in ail directions,creating additional hazards for the fire fighting parties.

Tactical Fire Fighting ProceduresOwing to the very rapid spread and intensity of the fire, it was impossible

to close No. 5 hatch and a number of burning aerosol cans fell into the 'tweendeck of No. 5, setting fire to the cardboard packing of pallets of plastics granules

in the square of the hatch. This fire which soon ignited dunnage and the mainstow of plastics granules in the port wing of the 'tween deck, was tackled withanother hose.

Shortly afterwards, at 1800, the port fire service arrived with twoappliances and a fire float. The fire float quickly extinguished the fire on deck,and two hoses from the shore appliances soon brought the outbreak in the'tween deck under control.

After the arrival of shore assistance the ship's fire parties concentrated oncooling the ship's structure. The fire was completely extinguished by 1815.

Adjacent compartments were checked for any damage or spread of firebut none was found. The water which had been discharged into No. 5 'tweendeck drained into the bilges and was pumped out.

At 1900, cargo discharge was resumed at Nos. 1,2,3 and 4 hatches.Continuous fire watches were set during the night and the fire main was keptpressurised. No further outbreaks of fire occurred.

Damage and Personal InjuriesDamage to the ship was confined to electrical wiring, ropes and a

gangway net, and the starboard accommodation ladder.No personal injuries were reported.


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Cause of FireThe cause of the fire was not reported but spontaneous decomposition of

methyl ethyl ketone peroxide cannot be disregarded especially at an ambienttemperature to be expected in Kuwait in July. Possible leakage of the peroxidefrom a damaged receptacle or through an insecure closure would be likely to

increase such a risk.Tactical Fire Fighting AppraisalFires involving, or in the vicinity of, organic peroxides can lead to an

explosion and should be tackled from a distance using water only. In this incidentonly a moderate quantity of peroxide was involved (one pallet load of approximately 800 kg.) but the use of a dry powder extinguisher was ineffective.Considering the nature of the cargo involved and the size and violence of the fire,the action of the ship's fire fighting hose parties was commendable. Fire serviceassistance using water was correct and effective.

Remedial Action taken by die CompanyIt was established that the segregation of the dangerous goods on deck

did not comply with the requirements of the IMDG Code or the Flag Statenational administration. At the time of the voyage in question, the ship was ontime charter and the stowage proposals were prepared by charterers' stevedoresand submitted to the Master for approval. The charterers gave very clear instructions to their stevedores which required them to comply in full with therequirements of the Flag State national administration, and the Master wassimilarly instructed.

On this occasion it appears that a mistake by the stevedores was notnoticed by the Master when the documents were submitted to him for approval of stowage.

This incident was discussed with the charterers and steps were taken to

ensure that standing instructions are implemented on all occasions in the future.Similarly all Masters were advised of the importance of checking dangerouscargo manifests and stowages.

ConclusionsIn addition to the breakdown in the charterers' operating arrangements,

disclosed by the company's enquiries, part of the ship's list of dangerous goods reproduced below shows that five substances out of the eight listed weredescribed by trade names only. This suggests that the cargo in question wasdeclared in this manner by the shippers and, therefore, the requirements of Chapter VII of SOLAS were not complied with in full.

This incident also suggests that the master was unaware of the specialrisks associated with organic peroxides and the correct fire fighting procedure for this class of substances.


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AppendixAGENT..

LISTOF DANGEROUS CARGO

VESSEL : VOYAGE NO: F ROM :

nr port pieces packing description weight shipper ImcoClass.

stowage

4 Dubai 40 noury-tainers

Cyclonox LNC(Cyclo-

hexanonePeroxide

1100 5.2/2118 H 5 ON DECK A/P

8 Dubai 500 cartons Dipterex(Insecticides)

11100 6.1 / 1615 H 3 T/D P/S

13 Kuwait 1 pallet stc 32 noury-tainers

Butanox M105

(Methyl EthylKetonePeroxide)

880 5.2 / 2127FPHXTC

H 5 ON DECK A/P

15 Kuwait 40 drums Accelerator NL53

1120 3.3 / 1993FP58C

H 3 T/D F/P

16 Kuwait 50 drums Release AgentNL1

1135 3.3 / 1993FP46C

H3T/D-F/P

24 Kuwait 240 drums Desmodur T80 S nth.

65280 6.1 / 2078 H3D/T A/P

8 cans 460 8 /1719FP65C

H 4 ON DECK F/P

25 Kuwait 200 drums Desmodur T80 54400 6.1/ 2078 H3D/T197xH3ONDECK-3x

April, 1977.


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1. SituationThis report concerns an engine room fire in a roll-on/roll-of ferry of 1,900dwt, on a short sea passage to a United Kingdom port.

2. Initial Action At 0007 the Third Engineer, on watch in the control room, saw the fire start

through the control room window. He stopped both main engines and informedthe Chief Engineer by telephone, but did not switch off the oil fuel booster pumpsor the fuel supply to the main engines. He then attempted to tackle the fire with aportable dry powder extinguisher but was unable to do so because of smoke.

Heat from the fire activated the automatic fire alarm.The navigating officer, on hearing the fire alarm, noted that the engine

control warning lights showed the starboard engine to be stopped and the portengine on overload. He put both combinator levers to the stop position, switchedoff the mechanical ventilation to the vehicle deck and engine room, and reportedthe situation to the Master who arrived in the wheelhouse when the fire alarmsounded. The officer then went to the scene of the fire, closing the engine roomventilator flaps on the boat deck on his way.

3. Tactical Fire Fighting ProceduresThe Chief Engineer, alerted by the fire alarm and the telephone call from

the Third Engineer, went to the engine room which he found full of smoke. Hegave instructions for the emergency fire pump and the emergency generator tobe started. Then he and the Bosun, both wearing self-contained breathing

apparatus and the latter a life line, took a hose and entered the engine room tosee if the cause and seat of the fire could be identified, but both were forced toleave because of smoke entering their face masks. The fault to the masks wasremedied and they re-entered the engine room. A bellows type breathingapparatus was rigged and manned in case the need arose for assistance to begiven to the two men. The Chief Engineer was able to see the fire which was inthe vicinity of the turbo blower. Water was directed towards the fire by a jetnozzle but the hose was not long enough for the seat of the fire to be reachedand both men withdrew.

An additional length of hose was connected and, because of the intenseheat in the engine room, the Chief Engineer asked for a spray nozzle to be fittedin place of the jet nozzle, hoping that by using the spray as a curtain, he wouldbe able to get closer to the seat of the fire. This plan could not be put into effectas all the spray nozzles were stowed in the engine room and could not bereached.

At about 0030 the Chief Engineer and the Bosun re-entered the engineroom, and found that the temperature had dropped significantly and the fireappeared to be burning itself out. Water was escaping from burst connections inthe cooling water system and it was considered that this was helping to reduce


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the intensity of the fire. The Chief Engineer therefore decided that he and theBosun should withdraw again and let the fire extinguish itself.

The Chief Engineer, and the Second and Third Engineers, made anumber of inspections of the engine room and at 0045 no further flames could beseen. After an inspection of the whole of the machinery spaces the Master was

informed, at 0110, that the fire was extinguished.In addition to the fire in the engine room itself, the deck plating of thevehicle space above became very hot and the Chief Officer organized four hosesfor cooling purposes. Large amounts of steam were produced and visibility in thearea was bad. When the Chief Engineer reported that the fire was out the Chief Officer asked the Master to restart the vehicle deck fans to clear the atmosphere.It did not prove necessary to move any of the vehicles but a number of tyreswere damaged by heat.

At 040S, the port engine, which remained serviceable, was restarted andthe vessel completed the passage on one engine, entering harbour at 0838.

Damage and Personal Injuries

The major part of the damage was to electrical wiring and fittings, allwiring and light fittings above both main engines requiring renewal. The effects of heat were apparent diagonally across the port engine and along the starboardengine, the insulation of a large number of power and lighting cables, carried oncable trays below the deck head being damaged. Damage to the main engineswas confined mainly to auxiliary fittings, flexible pipe connections and joints. Thestarboard turbo-blower inlet filter casing had partly melted, together with the rotor bearings. The starboard governor with associated starting and control gear andthe oil mist detector required complete overhaul. Fuel rack return springs, and allpipe joints and flexible connections affected by heat had to be renewed.

Damage to the ship's structure consisted of localized buckling of the deck

head longitudinal above the after end of the engine room.There were no injuries to personnel.Cause of FireWhen the fire was extinguished and conditions were suitable for a detailed

examination to be carried out it was found that No. 8 starboard fuel pump lowpressure delivery pipe had fractured. The broken ends of pipe had sprung out of line, permitting a discharge of fuel oil towards the engine in line with the fuelpump. Ignition was caused by fuel oil coming into contact with the exhaustsystem. The cause of the fracture is not known but it was apparent from themisalignment of the sections of fractured pipe that the pipe had been under tension.

Tactical Fire Fighting AppraisalThe vessel was fitted with CO 2 extinguishing systems both for the engine

room and the vehicle deck, but the Chief Engineer considered that the use of CO 2 in the engine room should be avoided if at all possible. The dieselgenerator was still running and providing light and power, and the use of CO 2would have immobilised the generator. There would also be the problem of purging the engine room atmosphere after the fire was extinguished and of ensuring that it was safe for personnel to man the control room, the door


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between the engine room and the control room not being gas-tight. CO2 was notused on the car deck as it was considered that the situation did not justify it.

The efforts of the Chief Engineer and the Bosun, commendable as theywere, probably had only minimal effects on the fire. It was considered that the firewent out through a combination of two factors:

Cessation of the supply of fuel oil via the broken pipe due to the stoppingon the booster pumps;The escape of water from the burnt flexible cooling water pipes. Cooling

the vehicle deck above the fire with hoses may also have been a contributingfactor.

All engineer officers were closely questioned about stopping the booster pumps but no one could recollect having done so either by operating the breaker at the main switchboard or the emergency stop switch in the engine roomentrance. After the fire it was found that the port booster pump, which had beenin operation at the outbreak, could not be restarted due to a loose connection inthe starter. This loose connection may have been the reason for the pump

stopping when it did but no explanation could be found for the failure of thestarboard pump-on standby-to cut in on pressure drop. Had the low pressure fuelsupply continued to deliver fuel oil to the seat of the fire, the incident wouldhave been far more serious.

Remedial Action Taken by the CompanyInvestigations into the incident revealed that within a few seconds of the

initial outbreak tremendous heat and large volumes of smoke and fumes weregenerated. Coupled with loss of engine room lighting, these conditions made itimpossible for staff to remain in the engine room without breathing apparatus or to approach close enough to the fire to make effective use of portableextinguishers. Smoke and fumes rapidly spread to the control room which had to

be evacuated. In the circumstances the fire had to be fought with equipmentlocated outside the engine room.The only fire fighting appliances located in the vehicle deck were hoses

with fixed nozzles. When carrying out fire drills, a situation whereby a hose hadto be taken into the engine room from outside had not been envisaged. For thisreason the length of hose used at first was insufficient to enable a jet of water tobe directed onto the fire. The hose had to follow a very tortuous path from the car deck down a stairway to the control room, around the console and down a further stairway to the engine room floor plate; severe kinking seriously restricted theflow of water.

The Chief Engineer and the Bosun found that their breathing apparatusmade it impossible to communicate with one another and difficult to remain incontact. The Bosun also found his life line awkward and at times it becameentangled with the hose.

The following recommendations were made as a result of the Company'sinvestigations into the incident:

Consideration should be g iven to fitting all ships of the type in question with a water spray system in the engine room, operable from outside the machinery space and capableof being se lectively operated in sections.


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Consideration should be given to fitting all ships of the type in question with amanually operateddrencher system on the vehicle deck.

Supplies of portable foam making equipment should be available on vehicle decksof all roll-on/roll-off vessels.

All hose s in the ve hicle deck should be fit ted with combined jet/sp ray no zz les.

A non-k inking hose fi tted with a je t/ sp ray nozz le should be mounte d on a re elpermanently connected to the ship's fire main, adjacent to any door between the controlroom and the m achinery space.

The door and bulkhead between any machinery space and control room should begas-tight.

Conclusions Apart from the remedial measures listed, this casualty emphasises the

necessity of carrying out realistic fire drillswith the source of fire in variouslocations. Only by so doing can defects in equipment or procedure bediscovered.

July, 1977.

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