2. PNB vs. CA FACTS: Mrs. Tapnio had an export sugar quota of 1,000 piculs for the agricultural year 1956-1957 which she did not need. She agreed to allow Mr. Jacobo C. Tuazon to use said quota for the consideration of P2,500.00. This agreement was called a contract of lease of sugar allotment. At the time of the agreement, Mrs. Tapnio was indebted to the Philippine National Bank at San Fernando, Pampanga. Her indebtedness was known as a crop loan and was secured by a mortgage on her standing crop including her sugar quota allocation for the agricultural year corresponding to said standing crop. This arrangement was necessary in order that when Mrs. Tapnio harvests, the P.N.B., having a lien on the crop, may effectively enforce collection against her. Her sugar cannot be exported without sugar quota allotment Sometimes, however, a planter harvest less sugar than her quota, so her excess quota is utilized by another who pays her for its use. This is the arrangement entered into between Mrs. Tapnio and Mr. Tuazon regarding the former's excess quota for 1956-1957. Since the quota was mortgaged to the P.N.B., the contract of lease had to be approved by said Bank, The same was submitted to the branch manager at San Fernando, Pampanga. The latter required the parties to raise the consideration of P2.80 per picul or a total of P2,800.00 informing them that "the minimum lease rental acceptable to the Bank, is P2.80 per picul." In a letter addressed to the branch manager on August 10, 1956, Mr. Tuazon informed the manager that he was agreeable to raising the consideration to P2.80 per picul. He further informed the manager that he was ready to pay said amount as the funds were in his folder which was kept in the bank. When the branch manager of the Philippine National Bank at San Fernando recommended the approval of the contract of lease at the price of P2.80 per picul), whose recommendation was concurred in by the Vice-president of said Bank, J. V. Buenaventura, the board of directors required that the amount be raised to 13.00 per picul. This act of the board of directors was communicated to Tuazon, who in turn asked for a reconsideration thereof. On November 19, 1956, the branch manager submitted Tuazon's request for reconsideration to the board of directors with another recommendation for the approval of the lease at P2.80 per picul, but the board returned the recommendation unacted upon, considering that the current price prevailing at the time was P3.00 per picul. The parties were notified of the refusal on the part of the board of directors of the Bank to grant the motion for reconsideration. The matter stood as it was until February 22, 1957, when Tuazon wrote a letter (Exh. 10-Bank informing the Bank that he was no longer interested to continue the deal, referring to the lease of sugar quota allotment in favor of defendant Rita Gueco Tapnio. The result is that the latter lost the sum of P2,800.00 which she should have received from Tuazon and which she could have paid the Bank to cancel off her indebtedness,

The court below held, and in this holding we concur that failure of the negotiation for the lease of the sugar quota allocation of Rita Gueco Tapnio to Tuazon was due to the fault of the directors of the Philippine National Bank, The refusal on the part of the bank to approve the lease at the rate of P2.80 per picul which, as stated above, would have enabled Rita Gueco Tapnio to realize the amount of P2,800.00 which was more than sufficient to pay off her indebtedness to the Bank, and its insistence on the rental price of P3.00 per picul thus unnecessarily increasing the value by only a difference of P200.00. inevitably brought about the rescission of the lease contract to the damage and prejudice of Rita Gueco Tapnio in the aforesaid sum of P2,800.00. This decision of the of the trial court was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is liable for the damage caused due to the disapproval of the lease by the Board of Directors of petitioner. DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT: YES. While petitioner had the ultimate authority of approving or disapproving the proposed lease since the quota was mortgaged to the Bank, the latter certainly cannot escape its responsibility of observing, for the protection of the interest of private respondents, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand in approving or disapproving the lease of said sugar quota. The law makes it imperative that every person "must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith, 4 This petitioner failed to do. Certainly, it knew that the agricultural year was about to expire, that by its disapproval of the lease private respondents would be unable to utilize the sugar quota in question. In failing to observe the reasonable degree of care and vigilance which the surrounding circumstances reasonably impose, petitioner is consequently liable for the damages caused on private respondents. Under Article 21 of the New Civil Code, "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage." The afore-cited provisions on human relations were intended to expand the concept of torts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide in the statutes. A corporation is civilly liable in the same manner as natural persons for torts, because "generally speaking, the rules governing the liability of a principal or master for a tort committed by an agent or servant are the same whether the principal or master be a natural person or a corporation, and whether the servant or agent be a natural or artificial person. All of the authorities agree that a principal or master is liable for every tort which he expressly directs or authorizes, and this is just as true of a corporation as of a natural person, A corporation is liable, therefore, whenever a tortious act is committed by an officer or agent under express direction or authority from the stockholders or members acting as a body, or, generally, from the directors as the governing body."ELCANO vs. HILL FACTS: Reginald Hill was a married minor living and getting subsistence from his father, co-defendant Marvin. He killed Agapito Elcano, son of petitioners, for which he was criminally prosecuted. However, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake." Subsequently, petitioners filed a civil action for recovery of damages against defendants, which the latter countered by a motion to dismiss. However the trial court dismissed the same. Hence this appeal. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the action for recovery of damages against Reginald and Marvin Hill is barred by res judicata.

2) Whether or not there is vicarious liability on the part Reginalds father, Marvin.

DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT: NO.The acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.

There is need for a reiteration and further clarification of the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation, which was firmly established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia (73 Phil. 607). In this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for civil liability arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) Notably, Article 2177 of the New Civil Code provides that: Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Marvin Hill vicariously liable. However, since Reginald has come of age, as a matter of equity, the formers liability is now merely subsidiary. Under Art. 2180, the father and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. In the case at bar, Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the killing. The joint and solidary liability of parents with their offending children is in view of the parental obligation to supervise minor children in order to prevent damage to third persons. On the other hand, the clear implication of Art. 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do not any act that can give rise to judicial litigation.

PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION INC V IAC FACTS: 1:30 am, 15 November 1975 - Leonardo Dionisio, driving his Volkswagen car, was on his way home to Makati from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss where had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. He was crossing the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from his home, when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon a Ford dump truck looming some 21/2meters away from his car. The dump truck, owned and registered by Phoenix Construction Inc. was parked askew (partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic) on the right hand side of General Lacuna Street facing the oncoming traffic. There were neither lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck. The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by Carbonel, its regular driver. Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures.- Dionisio commenced an action for damages claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck. Phoenix and Carbonel countered that the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor, without his headlights on and without a curfew pass. Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised due care in the selection and supervision of the dump truck driver. CFI RULING : ruled in favor of Dionisio IAC Ruling : affirmed TC but modified amounts. ISSUE: Whether or not last clear chance doctrine should be applied therefore exculpating Phoenix from paying any damages. SC RULING: NO- We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts (Article2179, Civil Code of the Philippines). Phoenix and Carbonel also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine. The theory here of petitioners is that while the petitioner truck driver was negligent, private respondent Dionisio had the "last clear chance" of avoiding the accident and hence his injuries and that Dionisio having failed to take that "last clear chance" must bear his own injuries alone. The last clear chance doctrine of the common

law was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith but it is a matter for debate whether, or to what extent, it has found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines. The historical function of that doctrine in the common law was to mitigate the harshness of another common law doctrine or rule-that of contributory negligence. The common law rule of contributory negligence prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent, even if the plaintiff's negligence was relatively minor as compared with the wrongful act or omission of the defendant. The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in A2179 CC- Is there perhaps a general concept of "last clear chance" that may be extracted from its common law matrix and utilized as a general rule in negligence cases in a civil law jurisdiction like ours? We do not believe so. Under Art. 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is to determine whose negligence-the plaintiff's or the defendant's-was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. That task is not simply or even primarily an exercise in chronology or physics, as the petitioners seem to imply by the use of terms like "last" or "intervening" or "immediate." The relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance is the nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such actor omission for the rest of the community. The petitioners urge that the truck driver (and therefore his employer) should be absolved from responsibility for his own prior negligence because the unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with that increased diligence which had become necessary to avoid the peril precisely created by the truck driver's own wrongful act or omission, To accept this proposition is to come too close to wiping out the fundamental principle of law that a man must respond for the foreseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate them among the members of society. To accept the petitioners' proposition must tend to weaken the very bonds of society. CA decision is modified by reducing the aggregate amount of compensatory damages, loss of expected income and moral damages Dionisio is entitled to by 20% of such amount.

GILCHRIST V. CUDDY FACTS: Cuddy was the owner of the film Zigomar. On April 24, He rented it to C. S. Gilchrist for a week for P125. A few days to the date of delivery, Cuddy sent the money back to Gilchrist. Cuddy then rented the film to Espejo and his partner Zaldarriaga for P350 for the week knowing that it was rented to someone else and that Cuddy accepted it because he was paying about three times as much as he had contracted with Gilchrist but they didn't know the identity of the other party. Gilchrist filed for injunction against these parties. The trial court and CA granted that there is a contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy.ISSUE: Whether or not Espejo and his partner Zaldarriaga should be liable for damages though they do not know the identity of Gilchrist. SC RULING: YES. Judgment is affirmed, that Cuddy was liable in an action for damages for the breach of that contract, and there can be no doubt. The mere right to compete could not justify the appellants in intentionally inducing Cuddy to take away the appellee's contractual rights. Everyone has a right to enjoy the fruits and advantages of his own enterprise, industry, skill and credit. He has no right to be free from malicious and wanton interference, disturbance or annoyance. If disturbance or loss come as a result of competition, or the exercise of like rights by others, it is damnum absque injuria(loss without injury), unless some superior right by contract or otherwise is interfered with. Cuddy contract on the part of the appellants was a desire to make a profit by exhibiting the film in their theater. There was no malice beyond this desire; but this fact does not relieve them of the legal liability for interfering with that contract and causing its breach. Liability of the appellants arises from unlawful acts and not from contractual obligations, as they were under no such obligations to induce Cuddy to violate his contract with Gilchrist. So that if the action of Gilchrist had been one for damages, it would be governed by chapter 2, title 16, book 4 of the Civil Code. Article 1902 of that code provides that a person who, by act or omission, causes damages to another when there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged to repair the damage do done. There is nothing in this article which requires as a condition precedent to the liability of a tort-feasor that he must know the identity of a person to whom he causes damages. An injunction is a "special remedy" which was there issued by the authority and under the seal of a court of equity, and limited, as in order cases where equitable relief is sought, to cases where there is no "plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law," which "will not be granted while the rights between the parties are undetermined, except in extraordinary cases where material and irreparable injury will be done," which cannot be compensated in damages, and where there will be no adequate remedy, and which will not, as a rule, be granted, to take property out of the possession of one party and put it into that of another whose title has not been established by law . Irreparable injury does not meant such injury as is beyond the possibility of repair, or beyond possible compensation in damages, nor necessarily great injury or great damage, but that species of injury, whether great or small, that ought not to be submitted to on the one hand or inflicted on the other; and, because it is so large on the one hand, or so small on the other, is of such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair or reasonable redress can be had therefor in a court of law. Gilchrist was facing the immediate prospect of diminished profits by reason of the fact that the appellants had induced Cuddy to rent to them the film Gilchrist had counted upon as his feature film. It is quite apparent that to estimate with any decree of accuracy the damages which Gilchrist would likely suffer from such an event would be quite difficult if not impossible. So far as the preliminary injunction issued against the appellants is concerned, which prohibited them from exhibiting the Zigomar during the week which Gilchrist desired to exhibit it, we are of the opinion that the circumstances justified the issuance of that injunction in the discretion of the court. The remedy by injunction cannot be used to restrain a legitimate competition, though such competition would involve the violation of a contract.

BARREDO and GARCIA vs. ALMARIO FACTS: A taxi cab owned by Fausto Barredo and was being driven by Pedro Fontanilla collided head-on to a carretela being guided by Pedro Dimapilis. The carretela was overturned inflicting injuries to the passenger Fausto Garcia who later on died because of the injury sustained in the collision. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in which he was convicted to an indeterminate sentence which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The parents of Faustino then filed a separate civil action against Barredo and Fontanilla where the trial court ruled in favor of the parents of Faustino. The appellate affirmed the decision stating therein that there is no proof that Barredo exercised the diligence f a good father of a family to prevent the damage. Thus this appeal to the Supreme Court where Barredo alleged that his liability is only subsidiary and as there has been no civil action against Fontanilla, the criminally liable person, Barredo cannot be held responsible. ISSUE: Whether or not Barredo is liable being the owner of the taxicab and making him responsible to the acts of his driver. HELD: ART. 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by his fault or negligence shall be liable for the damage so done. ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is enforcible, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible. The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little understood in the past, it might not be inappropriate to indicate their foundations. Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, according to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property through any degree of negligence even the slightest would have to be indemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime.

Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of

evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium. Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendants liability effective, and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latters) property first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining relief. True, there is such a remedy under our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of the Civil Code. At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of employers and their presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect society. Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or employers who principally reap the profits resulting from the services of these servants and employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the latters careful conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of others. In the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harm done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the better safeguarding of private rights because it re- establishes an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the defendant- petitioner.

AIR FRANCE vs. CARRASCOSO et al. FACTS: Rafael Carrascoso, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes. Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to a "first class" round trip airplane ticket for Carrascoso from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, he travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the airline forced him to vacate the "first class" seat because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat he refused, and told the Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the manager, they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man" and he reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane.

The CFI ordered Air France to pay Carrascoso moral damages, exemplary damages, and the difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the trip Bangkok-Rome. The CA affirmed the decision. ISSUE: WON moral damages could be recovered from AirFrance, granted that their employee was accused of the tortuous act. HELD: Yes. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not be essayed. It is well settled in law. For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says: ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we held that upon the provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable. Wherefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer from reversible error. We accordingly vote to affirm the same.24 Cinco vs. Canonoy |Melencio-Herera,

G.R. No. L-33171 May 31, 1979|

FACTS

Petitioner Cinco herein filed a Complaint for the recovery of damages on account of a vehicular accident involving his automobile and a jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito, the last three being the private respondents in this suit. Subsequent thereto, a criminal case was filed against the driver, Romeo Hilot, arising from the same accident. At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the civil action pending the final determination of the criminal suit, invoking Rule 111, Section 3 (b) of the Rules of

Court, which provides: (b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered;The City Court of Mandaue City ordered the suspension of the civil case. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration thereof, having been denied, petitioner elevated the matter on certiorari to the Court of First Instance of Cebu, alleging that the City Judge had acted with grave abuse of discretion in suspending the civil action for being contrary to law and jurisprudence.Respondent Judge Cannony dismissed the Petition for certiorari on the ground that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the City Court in suspending the civil action inasmuch as damage to property is not one of the instances when an independent civil action is proper; that petitioner has another plain, speedy, and

adequate remedy under the law, which is to submit his claim for damages in the criminal case; that the resolution of the City Court is interlocutory and, therefore, certiorari is improper; and that the Petition is defective inasmuch as what petitioner actually desires is a Writ of mandamus. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by respondent Judge.ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N RESPONDENT JUDGE MATEO CANONOY, ERRED IN HOLDING

THAT THE TRIAL OF THE CIVIL CASE NO. 189 FILED IN THE CITY

COURT OF MANDAUE SHOULD BE SUSPENDED UNTIL AFTER A

FINAL JUDGMENT IS RENDERED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

The respondent judge erred in holding that the civil case should be suspended until after

the final judgment is rendered in the criminal case. Liability being predicated on quasi-delict the civil case may proceed as a separate and independent civil action, as specifically provided for in Article 2177 of the Civil Code. Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.

But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the

defendant. (n) Sec. 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34

and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, Are independent civil action entirely

separate and distinct from the c action, may be brought by the injured party during the

pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding

section. Such civil action shag proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and

shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In the light of the foregoing disquisition, we are constrained to hold that respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in upholding the Decision of the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, suspending the civil action based on a quasi-delict until after the criminal case is finally terminated. Having arrived at this conclusion, a discussion of the

other errors assigned becomes unnecessary.

Picart vs. Smith| Street

March 15, 1918 | 37 Phil 809

FACTS

Amando Picart seeks to recover from the defendant Frank Smith the sum of Php

31,100 as damages alleged to have been caused by an automobile driven by Smith.

The incident happened on Dec 12, 1912, at the Carlatan Bridge, San Fernando, La

Union. Picart was riding on his pony aver the said bridge. Before he had gotten half way

across, Smith approached from the opposite direction driving his vehicle at 10 to 12

miles per hour.Smith blew his horn to give warning as he observed that the man was not observing

rules of the road. Smith continued his course and made two more blasts. Picart was perturbed by the rapidity of the approach that he pulled his pony to the right side of the railing. As the automobile approached, Smith guided the automobile to its left, that being the proper side of the road for the machine. Smith noticed that the pony was not frightened so he continued without diminution

of speed. When he learned that there was no possibility for the pony to go on the other side,

Smith drove his car to the right to avoid hitting the pony, but in so doing the vehicle

passed in a close proximity to the horse that it became frightened and turned its

belly across the bridge with its head towards the railing. The horse was struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence. It showed that the free space where the pony stood between the automobile and the railing was probably less than one half meters. The horse died and Picart received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

Whether or not Smith was guilty of negligence that gives rise to a civil obligation to

repair the damage done to Picart and his pony.HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

Yes, the court ruled that Smith that he is liable to pay Picart the amount of P200. The

sum is computed to include the value of the horse, medical expenses of the plaintiff, the

loss or damage occasioned to articles of his apparel.

In the nature of things, this change in situation occurred while the automobile was

still some distance away. From this moment it was no longer possible for Picart to

escape being run down by going to a place for greater safety.

The control of the situation had then passed entirely to Smith, and it was his duty to

bring his car to an immediate stop or seeing no other persons on the bridge, to take

the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid collision. There

was an appreciable risk that a horse not acquainted with vehicles would react that

way. The Test to Determine the Existence of Negligence in a particular case may be

stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that

reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used

the same situation? If not then he is guilty of negligence. The law in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman Law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment

of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. A prudent man, placed in the position of Smith in the Courts opinion would have

recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk and would

therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as a reasonable consequence

of that course.

Gan vs. CA | Fernan, C.J.:

G.R. No. L-44264, Sept. 19, 1988 | 165 SCRA 378

FACTS

July 4, 1972 (8am): Hedy Gan was driving a Toyota Crown Sedan along North Bay

Boulevard, Tondo, Manila. While driving two vehicles, a truck and a jeepney, are parked at the right side of the road While driving, there was a vehicle coming from the opposite direction and another

one who overtakes the first vehicle. To avoid a head-on collision, the Gan served to the right and as a consequence: The front bumper of the Toyota Crown Sedan hit an old man pedestrian

(Isidoro Casino) ~ DOA to Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital Casino was pinned against the rear of the parked jeepney and the jeepney moved forward hitting the truck. Sedan was damaged on its front

The jeep suffered damages. The truck sustained scratches. Gan was convicted of Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence. On appeal, the conviction was modified to Homicide thru Simple Imprudence. Petitioner now appeals to the said rulingISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N Gan is criminally liable for the accident

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

NO

TEST for determining negligence: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence

of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes the duty on the doer to take precaution against its mischievous results and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. However a corollary rule must be understood, that is the Emergency Rule which provides that. One who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what

subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence. It presupposes sufficient time to analyze the situation and to ponder on which of the different courses of action would result to the least possible harm to herself and to others. The CA, in its decision, said that Gan should have stepped on the brakes when she saw the car going in the opposite direction. And that she should not only have swerved the car she was driving to the right but should have also tried to stop or

lessen her speed so that she would not bump into the pedestrian. The SC held that the appellate court is asking too much from a mere mortal like the petitioner who in the blink of an eye had to exercise her best judgment to extricate herself from a difficult and dangerous situation caused by the driver of the overtaking vehicle. The danger confronting Gan was real and imminent, threatening her very existence. She had no opportunity for rational thinking but only enough time to head

the very powerful instinct of self-preservation

WHEREFORE, Gan is acquitted.Bustamante, et al v. CA, Del Pilar, Montesiano | Medialdea

G.R. No. 89880, February 6, 1991

FACTS

A collision occurred between a gravel and sand truck and a Mazda passenger bus

along the national road at Cavite. The front left side portion (barandilla) of the body

of the truck sideswiped the left side wall of the passenger bus, ripping off the said

wall from the driver's seat to the last rear seat.

The cargo truck was driven by defendant Montesiano and owned by defendant Del

Pilar; while the passenger bus was driven by defendant Susulin. The vehicle was

registered in the name of defendant Novelo but was owned and/or operated as a

passenger bus jointly by defendants Magtibay and Serrado.

The cargo truck and the passenger bus were approaching each other, coming from

the opposite directions of the highway. While the truck was still about 30 meters

away, Susulin, the bus driver, saw the front wheels of the vehicle wiggling. He also

observed that the truck was heading towards his lane. Not minding this

circumstance due to his belief that the driver of the truck was merely joking, Susulin

shifted from fourth to third gear in order to give more power and speed to the bus,

which was ascending the inclined part of the road, in order to overtake or pass a

Kubota hand tractor being pushed by a person along the shoulder of the highway.

While the bus was in the process of overtaking or passing the hand tractor and the

truck was approaching the bus, the two vehicles sideswiped each other at each

other's left side. After the impact, the truck skidded towards the other side of the

road and landed on a nearby residential lot, hitting a coconut tree and felling it.

Due to the impact, several passengers of the bus were thrown out and died as a

result of the injuries they sustained.

TC conclude that the negligent acts of both drivers contributed to or combined with

each other in directly causing the accident which led to the death of the

aforementioned persons. The liability of the two drivers for their negligence is

solidary.

Only defendants Federico del Pilar and Edilberto Montesiano, owner and driver,

respectively, of the sand and gravel truck have interposed an appeal. CA dismissed

the complaint insofar as defendants-appellants Federico del Pilar and Edilberto

Montesiano are concerned.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N the respondent court has properly and legally applied the doctrine of

"last clear chance" in the present case despite its own finding that appellant

cargo truck driver was admittedly negligent in driving his cargo truck.

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

NO. Doctrine of Last Clear Chance is not applicable in this case.

TC declared that the negligent acts of both drivers directly caused the accident

which led to the death of the passengers.

CA, ruling on the contrary, opined that the bus driver had the last clear chance to

avoid the collision and his reckless negligence in proceeding to overtake the hand

tractor was the proximate cause of the collision.

The doctrine of last clear chance, stated broadly, is that the negligence of the

plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it

appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have

avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's

negligence. In other words, the doctrine of last clear chance means that even though

a person's own acts may have placed him in a position of peril, and an injury results,

the injured person is entitled to recovery. As the doctrine is usually stated, a person

who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident,

notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed

to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the

accident.

The practical import of the doctrine is that a negligent defendant is held liable to a

negligent plaintiff, or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing

himself in peril, if he, aware of the plaintiffs peril, or according to some authorities,

should have been aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due case, had in fact an

opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to avoid an accident.

The principle of last clear chance applies in a suit between the owners and drivers of

colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from

the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to

exempt the negligent driver and its owners on the ground that the other driver was

likewise guilty of negligence.

Furthermore, as between defendants, the doctrine cannot be extended into the field

of joint tortfeasors as a test of whether only one of them should be held liable to the

injured person by reason of his discovery of the latter's peril, and it cannot be

invoked as between defendants concurrently negligent. As against third persons, a

negligent actor cannot defend by pleading that another had negligently failed to take

action which could have avoided the injury.

Well settled is the rule that parties, counsel and witnesses are exempted from liability

in libel or slander cases for words otherwise defamatory, uttered or published in the

course of judicial proceedings, provided the statements are pertinent or relevant to

the case.

The Court is convinced that the respondent Court committed an error of law in

applying the doctrine of last clear chance as between the defendants, since the case

at bar is not a suit between the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles but a suit

brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of

the colliding vehicles. Therefore, the respondent court erred in absolving the owner

and driver of the cargo truck from liability.

Petition is granted. CA decision reversed and set aside. TC decision reinstated.Pantranco North Express, Inc vs Baesa | Cortes

G.R. Nos. 79050-51| November 14, 1989

FACTS

The spouses Baesa, their four children, the Ico spouses, the latters son and 7

other people boarded a passenger jeep to go to a picnic in Isabela, to celebrate

the 5th wedding anniversary of the Baesa spouses. The jeep was driven by David

Ico.

Upon reaching the highway, the jeep turned right and proceeded to Malalam

River at a speed of about 20 kph. While they were proceeding towards Malalam

River, a speeding PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on its regular route to

Manila, encroached on the jeepneys lane while negotiating a curve, and collided

with it.

As a result, the entire Baesa family, except for one daughter, as well as David

Ico, died, and the rest suffered from injuries. Maricar Baesa, the surviving

daughter, through her guardian filed separate actions for damages arising from

quasi-delict against PANTRANCO.

PANTRANCO, aside from pointing to the late David Icos (the driver)alleged

negligence as a proximate cause of the accident, invoked the defense of due

diligence in the selection and supervision of its driver. The RTC ruled in favor

of Baesa, which was upheld by the CA

The petitioner now contends that the CA erred in not applying the doctrine of

the last clear chance against the jeepney driver. Petitioner contends that

under the circumstances, it was the driver of the jeep who had the last clear

chance to avoid the collision and was therefore negligent in failing to utilize

with reasonable care and competence his then existing opportunity to avoid the

harm.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

Does the last clear chance doctrine apply?

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

No.

The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of a prior

or antecedent negligence but the defendant, who had the last fair chance to

avoid the impending harm and failed to do so, is made liable for all the

consequences

Generally, the last clear change doctrine is invoked for the purpose of making a

defendant liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence,

although it may also be raised as a defense to defeat claim for damages.

It is the petitioners position that even assuming arguendo, that the bus

encroached into the lane of the jeepney, the driver of the latter could have

swerved the jeepney towards the spacious dirt shoulder on his right without

danger to himself or his passengers. This is untenable

For the last clear chance doctrine to apply, it is necessary to show that the

person who allegedly has the last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of

the existence of the peril, or should, with exercise of due care, have been aware

of it. One cannot be expected to avoid an accident or injury if he does not

know or could not have known the existence of the peril.

In this case, there is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of

the impending danger. When he saw at a distance that the approaching bus was

encroaching on his lane, he did not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt

shoulder on his right since he must have assumed that the bus driver will return

the bus to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney approaching form the opposite

direction.

Even assuming that the jeepney driver perceived the danger a few seconds

before the actual collision, he had no opportunity to avoid it. The Court has

held that the last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party

charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided

by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been

discovered.GARCIA V FLORIDO

[CITATION]

ANTONIO; [DATENATURE

Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, dismissing petitioners' action for damages against respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, "without prejudice to refiling the said civil action after conviction of the defendants in the criminal case filed by the Chief of Police of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte", and from the order of said Court dated January 21, 1972, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

FACTS

- On August 4, 1971, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital, together with his wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of said hospital, hired and boarded a PU car with plate No. 241-8 G Ozamis 71 owned and operated by respondent, Marcelino Inesin, and driven by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a roundtrip from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City, for the purpose of attending a conference of chiefs of government hospitals, hospital administrative officers, and bookkeepers of Regional Health Office No. 7 at Zamboanga City.

- At about 9:30 a.m., while the PU car was negotiating a slight curve on the national highway at kilometer 21 in Barrio Guisukan, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, said car collided with an oncoming passenger bus (No. 25) with plate No. 77-4 W Z.N. 71 owned and operated by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven by defendant, Pedro Tumala. As a result of the aforesaid collision, petitioners sustained various physical injuries which necessitated their medical treatment and hospitalization.

- Alleging that both drivers of the PU car and the passenger bus were at the time of the accident driving their respective vehicles at a fast clip, in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in gross violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, filed on September 1, 1971 with respondent Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental an action for damages (Civil Case No. 2850) against the private respondents, owners and drivers, respectively, of the PU car and the passenger bus that figured in the collision, with prayer for preliminary attachment.

- The principal argument advanced by Mactan Inc. et. al to in a motion to dismiss was that the petitioners had no cause of action for on August 11, 1971, or 20 days before the filing of the present action for damages, respondent Pedro Tumala was charged in Criminal Case No. 4960 of the Municipal Court of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, in a complaint filed by the Chief of Police and that, with the filing of the aforesaid criminal case, no civil action could be filed subsequent thereto unless the criminal case has been finally adjudicated, pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, and, therefore, the filing of the instant civil action is premature, because the liability of the employer is merely subsidiary and does not arise until after final judgment has been rendered finding the driver, Pedro Tumala, guilty of negligence; that Art. 33 of the New Civil Code, is not applicable because Art 33 applied only to the crimes of physical injuries or homicide, not to the negligent act or imprudence of the driver.

- The lower court sustained Mactan Inc. et. Al. and dismissed the complaint

ISSUES

1. WON the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint for damages on the ground that since no express reservation was made by the complainants, the civil aspect of the criminal case would have to be determined only after the termination of the criminal case2. WON the lower court erred in saying that the action is not based on quasi-delict since the allegations of the complaint in culpa aquiliana must not be tainted by any assertion of violation of law or traffic rules or regulations and because of the prayer in the complaint asking the Court to declare the defendants jointly and severally liable for moral, compensatory and exemplary damages.

HELD

1. YES

Ratio An action based on quasi-delict may be maintained independently from a criminal action. By instituting a civil action based on a quasi-delict, a complainant may be deemed to abandon his/her right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case.Reasoning

- In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioners never intervened in the criminal action instituted by the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has the said criminal action been terminated either by conviction or acquittal of said accused.

- It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil action for damages, petitioners have in effect abandoned their right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case, and have opted instead to recover them in the present civil case.

- As a result of this action of petitioners the civil liability of private respondents to the former has ceased to be involved in the criminal action. Undoubtedly an offended party loses his right to intervene in the prosecution of a criminal case, not only when he has waived the civil action or expressly reserved his right to institute, but also when he has actually instituted the civil action. For by either of such actions his interest in the criminal case has disappeared.

- As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extracontractual. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, having always had its own foundation and individuality. Some legal writers are of the view that in accordance with Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-delict may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the latter. Hence, "the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to . . . Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted . . . and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso, which is procedural, may also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation required in the proviso."

- But in whatever way We view the institution of the civil action for recovery of damages under quasi-delict by petitioners, whether as one that should be governed by the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules which require reservation by the injured party considering that by the institution of the civil action even before the commencement of the trial of the criminal case, petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene therein, or one where reservation to file the civil action need not be made, for the reason that the law itself (Article 33 of the Civil Code) already makes the reservation and the failure of the offended party to do so does not bar him from bringing the action, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, We find no legal justification for respondent court's order of dismissal.

2. YES, because the action in fact satisfies the elements of quasi-delict.

Ratio An action shall be deemed to be based on a quasi-delict when all the essential averments under Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code are present, namely: a) act or omission of the private respondents;

b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the operation of the passenger bus No. 25 by respondent Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of the bus with the passenger car;

c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by petitioners as a result of the collision;

d) existence of direct causal connection between the damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of private respondents; and

e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the parties.

Reasoning

- The circumstance that the complaint alleged that respondents violated traffic rules in that the driver drove the vehicle "at a fast clip in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car" does not detract from the nature and character of the action, as one based on culpa aquiliana. The violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the failure of said driver to observe for the protection of the interests of others, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, which failure resulted in the injury on petitioners. Certainly excessive speed in violation of traffic rules is a clear indication of negligence. Since the same negligent act resulted in the filing of the criminal action by the Chief of Police with the Municipal Court (Criminal Case No. 4960) and the civil action by petitioners, it is inevitable that the averments on the drivers' negligence in both complaints would substantially be the same. It should be emphasized that the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from a crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under Arts. 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code. This distinction has been amply explained in Barredo vs. Garcia, et all (73 Phil. 607, 620-621).

- It is true that under Sec. 2 in relation to Sec. 1 of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court which became effective on January 1, 1964, in the cases provided for by Articles 31, 33, 39 and 2177 of the Civil Code, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the civil action, may be instituted by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided said party has reserved his right to institute it separately, but it should be noted, however, that neither Section 1 nor Section 2 of Rule 111 fixes a time limit when such reservation shall be made.

SEPARATE OPINION

BARREDO [concur]

- Article 2176 and 2177 definitely create a civil liability distinct and different from the civil action arising from the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal Code. Since Civil Case No. 2850 is predicated on the above civil code articles and not on the civil liability imposed by the Revised Penal Code, I cannot see why a reservation had to be made in the criminal case. As to the specific mention of Article 2177 in Section 2 of the Rule 111, it is my considered view that the latter provision is inoperative, it being substantive in character and is not within the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate, and even if it were not substantive but adjective, it cannot stand because of its inconsistency with Article 2177, an enactment of the legislature superseding the Rules of 1940.

- Besides, the actual filing of Civil Case No. 2850 should be deemed as the reservation required, there being no showing that prejudice could be caused by doing so.

- Accordingly, I concur in the judgment reversing the order of dismissal of the trial court in order that Civil Case No. 2850 may proceed, subject to the limitation mentioned in the last sentence of Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which means that of the two possible judgments, the injured party is entitled exclusively to the bigger one.CANGCO V MANILA RAILROAD CO

38 Phil 768

FISHER; October 14, 1918

NATURE

An appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance disallowing the claim of the plaintiff for P1,000 against the estate of the deceased James P. McElroy.

FACTS

- Jose Cangco, was employed by Manila Railroad Company as clerk. He lived in San Mateo, Rizal, located upon the line of the defendant railroad company; and in coming daily by train to the company's office in the city of Manila where he worked, he used a pass, supplied by the company, which entitled him to ride upon the company's trains free of charge.

- January 20, 1915, the plaintiff was returning home by rail from his daily labors; and as the train drew up to the station in San Mateo the plaintiff while making his exit through the door, took his position upon the steps of the coach.

- On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo station there is a cement platform which begins to rise with a moderate gradient some distance away from the company's office and extends along in front of said office for a distance sufficient to cover the length of several coaches. As the train slowed down another passenger, Emilio Zuniga, also an employee of the railroad company, got off the same car, alighting safely at the point where the platform begins to rise from the level of the ground. When Jose Cangco stepped off, one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on the platform. His body at once rolled from the platform and was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. After the plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved forward possibly six meters before it came to a full stop.

- The accident occurred on a dark night, and the train station was lit dimly by a single light located some distance away, objects on the platform where the accident occurred were difficult to discern, especially to a person emerging from a lighted car.

- The sack of melons on the platform is because it was the customary season for harvesting these melons and a large lot had been brought to the station for shipment to the market. This row of sacks was so placed that there was a space of only about two feet between the sacks of melons and the edge of the platform; and it is clear that the fall of the plaintiff was due to the fact that his foot alighted upon one of these melons at the moment he stepped upon the platform. His statement that he failed to see these objects in the darkness is readily to be credited.

- The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition, and with serious injuries. He was immediately brought to a hospital where an examination was made and his arm was amputated. The plaintiff was then carried to another hospital where a second operation was performed and the member was again amputated higher up near the shoulder. Expenses reached the sum of P790.25 in the form of medical and surgical fees and for other expenses in connection with the process of his curation.

- August 31, 1915, he instituted this proceeding in the CFI Manilato recover damages of the defendant company, founding his action upon the negligence of the servants and employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and in leaving them so placed as to be a menace to the security of passenger alighting from the company's trains. At the hearing in the CFI, the trial judge, found the facts substantially as above stated, and although negligence was attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact that the sacks of melons were so placed as to obstruct passengers passing to and from the cars, nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded from recovering. Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of the defendant company, and the plaintiff appealed.

ISSUE

WON there was contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff

HELD

NO

Ratio In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such act - that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly - the age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be considered.Reasoning

- The employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence in piling these sacks on the platform. Their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he alighted from the train; and that they constituted an effective legal cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It follows that the defendant company is liable for the damage unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence.

- The foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance.

- Its liability is direct and immediate, imposed by article 1903 of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations

- In commenting upon article 1093, Manresa clearly points out the difference between "culpa, substantive and independent, which of itself constitutes the source of an obligation between persons not formerly connected by any legal tie" and culpa considered as an "accident in the performance of an obligation already existing . . .."

- In the Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. the court was made to rest squarely upon the proposition that article 1903 is not applicable to acts of negligence which constitute the breach of a contract.

- Under the Spanish law, in cases imposed upon employers with respect to damages due to the negligence of their employees to persons to whom they are not bound by contract, such is not based upon the principle of respondent superior - but upon the principle announced in article 1902 which imposes upon all persons who by their fault or negligence, do injury to another, the obligation of making good the damage caused.

- The liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or omission which, without willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has caused damage to another. A master who exercises all possible care in the selection of his servant, taking into consideration the qualifications they should possess for the discharge of the duties which it is his purpose to confide to them, and directs them with equal diligence, thereby performs his duty to third persons to whom he is bound by no contractual ties, and he incurs no liability whatever if, by reason of the negligence of his servants, even within the scope of their employment, such third persons suffer damage. Article 1903 presumes negligence, but that presumption is refutable.

- In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, an action is brought upon the theory of the extra-contractual liability of the defendant to respond for the damage caused by the carelessness of his employee while acting within the scope of his employment The Court, after citing the last paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code, said: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.

- Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or contractual. Extra-contractual obligation has its source in the breach or omission of those mutual duties which civilized society imposes upon its members, or which arise from these relations, other than contractual, of certain members of society to others, generally embraced in the concept of status. The legal rights of each member of society constitute the measure of the corresponding legal duties, which the existence of those rights imposes upon all other members of society. The breach of these general duties whether due to willful intent or to mere inattention, if productive of injury, gives rise to an obligation to indemnify the injured party. The fundamental distinction between obligations of this character and those which arise from contract, rests upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists independently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into the contractual relation.

- The railroad company's defense involves the assumption that even granting that the negligent conduct of its servants in placing an obstruction upon the platform was a breach of its contractual obligation to maintain safe means of approaching and leaving its trains, the direct and proximate cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff was his own contributory negligence in failing to wait until the train had come to a complete stop before alighting. Under the doctrine of comparative negligence announced in the Rakes case, if the accident was caused by plaintiff's own negligence, no liability is imposed upon defendant, whereas if the accident was caused by defendant's negligence and plaintiff's negligence merely contributed to his injury, the damages should be apportioned. It is, therefore, important to ascertain if defendant was in fact guilty of negligence.

- The Court is of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this subject is that expressed in Thompson's work on Negligence:

"The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be considered whether an ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex and condition of the passenger, would have acted as the passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence. This care has been defined to be, not the care which may or should be used by the prudent man generally, but the care which a man of ordinary prudence would use under similar circumstances, to avoid injury."

- In considering the probability of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff the following circumstances are to be noted: The company's platform was constructed upon a level higher than that of the roadbed and the surrounding ground. The distance from the steps of the car to the spot where the alighting passenger would place his feet on the platform was thus reduced, thereby decreasing the risk incident to stepping off. The cement platform also assured to the passenger a stable and even surface on which to alight. The plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. The place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff, as it was his daily custom to get on and off the train at this station. There could be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the step which he was required to take or the character of the platform where he was alighting. It is the Courts conclusion that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.

DISPOSITION The decision of the lower court is reversed, and judgment is hereby rendered plaintiff for the sum of P3,290.25, and for the costs of both instances.

SEPARATE OPINION

MALCOLM, [dissent]

- With one sentence in the majority decision, we are of full accord, namely, "It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the train had come to a full stop before alighting, the particular injury suffered by him could not have occurred." With the general rule relative to a passenger's contributory negligence, we are likewise in full accord, namely, "An attempt to alight from a moving train is negligence per se." Adding these two points together, we have the logical result - the Manila Railroad Co. should be absolved from the complaint, and judgment affirmed.

PICART V SMITH

[citation]

STREET; March 15, 1918

NATURE

Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of La UnionFACTS

- On December 12, 1912, plaintiff was riding on his pony over the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union.- Before he had gotten half way across, the defendant approached from the opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles per hour. - As the defendant neared the bridge he saw the plaintiff and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. - He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge, he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road. - The plaintiff saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals.- However, given the novelty of the apparition and the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. - He did this because he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side. - As the automobile approached, the defendant guided it toward his left, that being the proper side of the road for the machine. - In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. - The pony had not as yet exhibited fright, and the rider had made no sign for the automobile to stop. - Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. - When he had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it as then standing; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing. - In so doing, it was struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken. - The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence. - As a result of its injuries the horse died. - The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days. - CFI absolved defendant from liability Hence, the appealISSUE

WON the defendant, in maneuvering his car in the manner above described, was guilty of negligence that would give rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done

HELD

YES

- As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to assume that the horse and the rider would pass over to the proper side; but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done; and he must in a moment have perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. - In the nature of things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet some distance away; and from this moment it was no longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a place of greater safety. - The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision.- The defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse. He was, the court thinks, deceived into doing this by the fact that the horse had not yet exhibited fright. - But in view of the known nature of horses, there was an appreciable risk that, if the animal in question was unacquainted with automobiles, he might get excited and jump under the conditions which here confronted him. - When the defendant exposed the horse and rider to this danger, he was, in our opinion, negligent in the eye of the law. - The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. - The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. - The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. - The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. - Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences. - Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case, negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against the threatened harm.- The plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. It will be noted however, that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. DISPOSITION Appealed decision is reversedARANETA v JOYA

57 SCRA 59

CASTRO J.: May 24, 1974

FACTS:

-An employee of the Ace ADVERTISING Company was sent to the States to pursue studies in television. When asked about the expenses of the trip, respondent answered that these were not shouldered by the company and instead by other parties

-while abroad, he continued to receive his salaries in the form of vouchers ordered and signed by respondent Joya. The petitioner signed three of these checks. The others were signed by either the respondent, or Vicente Araneta (company treasurer) who put up part of the bill connected with Taylor's trip and also handed him letters for delivery in the United States. The Ace Advertising disbursed P5,043.20, all told, on account of Taylor's travel and studies

-the Ace Advertising filed a complaint with the court of first instance of Manila against the respondent for recovery of the total sum disbursed to Taylor, alleging that the trip was made without its knowledge, authority or ratification. The respondent, in his answer, denied the charge and claimed that the trip was nonetheless ratified by the company's board of directors, and that in any event under the by-laws he had the discretion, as general manager, to authorize the trip which was for the company's benefit

-Joya also filed a 3rd party complaint against the two Aranetas proving that they were involved in sending Taylor abroad

-trial court rendered judgment ordering the respondent to pay the Ace Advertising "the sum of P5,043.20 with interest at the legal rate from August 23, 1954 until full payment. 3rd party complaint dismissed

-CA affirmed however dismissal of 3rd party complaint was reversed stating that Taylor's trip had been neither authorized nor ratified by the company

-CA noted that based on the facts, both petitioners knew and through their acts showed that they approved of the trip. were also privy to the unauthorized disbursement of the corporate moneys jointly with the appellant; what had happened was in truth and in fact a venture by them given their stamp of approval; and as it was an unauthorized act of expenditure of corporate funds, and it was these three without whose acts the same could not have happened, the juridical situation was a simple quasi-delict by them committed upon the corporation, for which solidary liability should have been imposed upon all in the first place

ISSUE:

WON petitioner is guilty of quasi-delict

HELD: Yes

- The petitioner's assertion that he signed the questioned payroll checks in good faith has not been substantiated, he in particular not having testified or offered testimony to prove such claim. Upon the contrary, in spite of his being a vice-president and director of the Ace Advertising, the petitioner remained passive, throughout the period of Taylor's stay abroad, concerning the unauthorized disbursements of corporate funds for the latter. This plus the fact that he even approved thrice payroll checks for the payment of Taylor's salary, demonstrate quite distinctly that the petitioner neglected to perform his duties properly, to the damage of the firm of which he was an officer.

-The fact that he was occupying a contractual position at the Ace Advertising is of no moment. The existence of a contract between the parties, as has been repeatedly held by this Court, constitutes no bar to the commission of a tort by one against the other and the consequent recovery of damages

Singson v. BPI

Facts:Singson was one of the defendants in a civil case filed before the CFI Manila. Judgment was rendered sentencing him and his co-defendants Celso Lobregat and Villa-Abrille & Co. to pay the sum of P105,539.56 to Philippine Milling Co. Singson and Lobregat appealed, while the decision became final and executory as to Villa-Abrille. A writ of garnishment was issued to BPI against the Villa-Abrilles account.The clerk of BPI who received the writ saw the petitioners name and, without reading the full text, wrote a letter for the signature of the bank President, informing Singson of the garnishment. Subsequently, Singson issued two checks. The one issued in favor of B.M. Glass Service was dishonoured, and so petitioners account with the latter was closed. Singson wrote a letter to the bank, claiming that his account is not included in the writ of garnishment. Having confirmed so, the bank President Santiago Friexas apologized to Singson and rectified the mistake. Singson filed a claim for damages. The lower court ruled that damages for quasi-delict cannot be sustained because the relationship between the parties is contractual. Petitioner and his wife appealed the case.Issue:Whether damages based on torts can be awarded based on a contractHeld:The existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the one against the order and the consequent recovery of damages therefor. The act that breaks the contract may also be a tort.