AGENDA FOR THE 113 - wrpc · AGENDA FOR THE 113th PROTECTION COMMITTEE MEETING OF WRPC TO ......

AGENDA FOR THE 113th PROTECTION COMMITTEE MEETING OF WRPC TO BE HELD ON 6/7.03.2012 AT WRPC OFFICE, MUMBAI

ITEM NO.1: CONFIRMATION OF MINUTES OF 112TH PROTECTION

COMMITTEE MEETING.

Minutes of 112th PCM, held on 11th and 12th October 2011 at WRPC Mumbai, were

circulated vide WRPC letter No. Prot./112 PCM/2011/WRPC-9964 dated 03rd November

2011. Reliance Energy Ltd. vide email dated 1.12.2011 have sought correction in the item

2.5(i) of the minutes of 112th PCM as below :

Recording in 112th PCM Minutes

REL representative stated that with respective to the implementation of single phase A/R on

all overhead lines, those lines passing through dense populated areas, the bottom phase A/R is

kept inoperative from safety hazard point of view. TATA Power representative stated that 3-

phase Auto-restoration is in service for their lines considering lines passing through dense

populated areas. However for some lines 1- phase A/R is being planned by TPC.

Correction sought by REL representative

"REL representative stated that with respective to the implementation of single phase A/R on

all overhead lines, Single Phase A/R is in service for all 220kV Lines in R-Infra Network, but

A/R of lines passing through dense populated areas is a concern. Same can be minimised by

disabling A/R of bottom phase of such lines. Committee stated that the decision can be taken

by respective utility in consultation with OEM."

Committee may like to discuss and confirm the minutes.

ITEM NO.2: SYSTEM DISTURBANCES

2.1: System disturbances in CSPTCL/CSPGCL system.

2.1 (i) System disturbance at 400 kV Korba (E) S/S in CSPTCL system on 19-04-11.

This incidence was put up in the agenda of 112th PCM whrein CSPTCL representative

informed that all the trippings occurred in CSPGCL system. Therein, the Committee felt that

since CSPGCL representative was not present, hence the occurrence could not be discussed

and would be taken up in the next PCM.

On 19.04.2011 at 19:53hrs., 220kV Korba(W)-Kotmikala-I line tripped from both ends on

operation of Main-I at Korba(W) end, at 19:54hrs 400/220kV Korba(W) ICT tripped on PRV

with with several alarms like oil temperature, Buccholz etc. At around 20:00 hrs, 220kV

Korba(W)-Kotmikala-I was synchronized. At 20:12hrs heavy jerk was observed resulting in

tripping of 220kV Korba(E)-Koerba(W)-I and III lines on R-E zone-1 fault, simultaneously

220kV Korba(E) Raigarh S/C, 220kV Korba(E)-Budhipadar-2&3 tripped on Dir.O/C. At

20:13hrs 4nos of 220kV fdrs and 220/132kV ICT-I & II tripped, causing islanding condition at

Korba (E). Frequency shoot up sharply causing tripping of all six generating units at Korba(E)

on tubine over speed protection and subsequent collapse of the 220kV system at Korba(E).

At 20:14hrs 220kV Korba(W)-Mopka feeder tripped on O/L(load was>300MW). At 20:15hrs

220kV system collapsed causing tripping of unit #1 & 2 at Korba(W) on over speed protection.

Around 1264 MW generation loss was reported due to above trippings. No load loss was

reported. Normalcy was restored by 22:22hrs, except Korba(E) unit 6 which was restored by

00:10hrs, Korba(W) unit 1 & 2 which were restored at 00:40 & 01:10hrs of 20.04.11. This

incidence has been categorized as GD-1 category incidence as per the CEA Regulation (Grid

Standards)-2010. Report received from WRLDC POSOCO is enclosed at Annex- 2.1 (i).

CSPTCL may submit a detail report. Committee may like to discuss.

2.2: System disturbances in GETCO/GSECL system.

2.2(i) OCCURANCE 400KV CHORANIA S/S ON 14.05.2011 at 10:20hrs

At 10:19 hrs on 14th May, 2011, 400 kV Chorania bus became dead due to tripping of

bus-II on bus bar protection, since 400 kV bus-I was already under maintenance. The

cause of incident as reported by GETCO was that the wiring work of 400KV Ranchodpura -2

(Vadavi-2) line in bus bar panel was under progress. During execution of work, the loose wire

of the relay was touched to live wire on TB & this has resulted in the operation of bus bar

protection. Simultaneously all the feeders connected to bus B were tripped. All the feeders and

ICTs connected to 400 kV Chorania bus got tripped except Vadavi feeder. This incident

would fall in the category of GD-1 as per the CEA Regulation (Grid Standards)-2010.

The report received from GETCO is enclosed at Annexure-2.2(ia).

Committee may like to discuss.

2.2(ii) OCCURANCE 220KV HALDARWA S/S ON 22.06.2011 at 10:20hrs At 07:32 hrs on 22nd June, 2011, due to bus fault at Haldarwa 220KV lines connected

to bus-A tripped. The cause of incidence as reported by GETCO is that the Haldarwa –

Kawas line no.1 was in soak charge condition from Haldarwa end. The 220 Kawas line no.1

tripped on Z1, B-Ph. –E, (dist -65.95 kms). The B-Ph breaker pole has delayed in opening of

breaker. Hence LBB protection operated of Kawas-1 feeder and all the feeders connected to

BUS-A tripped on 96 relay. At that time Bus-Coupler breaker was off. This incident would

fall in the category of GI-1 as per the CEA Regulation (Grid Standards)-2010. The report

received from GETCO is enclosed at Annexure-2.2(ii-a).


2.2(iii) OCCURRENCE AT KUTCH LIGNITE THERMAL POWER STATION on 14-05-2011 at 11:08 Hrs.

At 11:08 hrs on 14.05.11, all lines, transformers and generators tripped connected with Bus-II

on operation of bus bar tripping relays 96 due to operation of LBB of Generator Unit #3. The

work of overhauling of mechanism and replacement of pole column of CGL make, above

breaker was carried out during the recent shutdown during 27/04/11 to 30/04/11 by M/S CGL.

On 14th May 2011 while taking the unit back on bar after shut down and overhauling,

Generator breaker did not trip immediately after closing when tripping extended due to

operation of Reverse Power Protection from GRP relay and resulted in to operation of LBB

protection. M/S CGL, the OEM of SF6 circuit breaker was referred to study and suggest

remedial action to prevent such reoccurrence. M/S CGL have clarified that the breaker is old

and having WIKA make Gas density switch which is mounted on mechanism of the breaker ,

which acts both as Gas Pressure Gauge and Density switch. The contacts of the switch are

spring loaded. Therefore during ON-OFF operation of the breaker there will be vibration and

the spring loaded contacts might get disconnected momentarily and thus opening of both trip

circuits leading to operation of LBB protection if tripping command is issued immediately

followed by Closing operation of breaker. To overcome the said problem, M/S CGL has

suggested for carrying out modification to separate out Gas Density Switch & Gas Pressure

Gauge their mounting and wiring. Order has been placed on M/s CGL for modification of the

mounting of switch arrangement and will be carried out during next available opportunity. The

report received from GSECL is enclosed at Annexure-2.2(iii).


2.2(iv) OCCURRENCE AT KUTCH LIGNITE THERMAL POWER STATION on 02-06-2011 at 14:46 Hrs.

At 14:46 hrs on 2.06.2011, all the lines, transformers and generator tripped connected to 220

kV Bus-I on operation of Bus Bar tripping relay 96 due to the operation of Bus Bar

Differential Protection relay ( RADSS , ABB make) with indication on bus bar protection

relay panel as R and U. At 14:46 hrs During hot line washing of 220 kV side ‘R’ phase pole

of SF6 BKR, of 220/66 kV 50 MVA ICT, heavy flashover occurred and resulting in to

tripping of all the lines , Generators ,Transformers , Feeders connected to 220 kV BUS-I on

operation of Bus bar differential protection with indication of R and U. Heavy arc tracking

was observed on the breaker pole.

The affected breaker pole was thoroughly cleaned and all necessary confirming tests were

carried out like, IR, DCRM, CRM, logics and Trip tests which were found normal. The

breaker was put in service at 21:02 Hrs. subsequently the transformer was charged. This

incident would fall in the category of GD-1 as per the CEA Regulation (Grid Standards)-

2010. The report received from GSECL is enclosed at Annexure-2.2(iv-a).


2.2(v) OCCURRENCE AT KUTCH LIGNITE THERMAL POWER STATION on 24.07.2011 at 00:01 Hrs.

At 00:01 Hrs on 24.07.11, all lines, transformers and generators tripped connected with Bus-I

on operation of bus bar tripping relays 96 due to operation of Bus I Bus Bar Differential

Protection (RADSS scheme – ABB make) operated with indication T, U ; due to flash over

of B Phase Potential Transformer of 220 KV Bus-A. The 220 KV Kukma Line-2 and

Nakhatrana Line-2 were hand tripped, which resulted in to total supply failure.

After technical analysis by GSECL, it was observed that ‘B’ phase PT of 220 kV Bus-I

failed, which resulted in to operation of Bus-Bar Differential protection with indication T &

U resulting tripping of all lines , Transformer connected with Bus – I. The 220 kV Kukma

Line-2 and Nakhatrana Line-2 connected with Bus- II were hand tripped by operator looking

to fire took place near the failed PT , which subsequently resulted in to total supply failure at

KLTPS and tripping of Generator Unit No. 3 and 4 though they were on healthy 220 KV

Bus-II.

GSECL has informed that the failed BHEL make Potential Transformer was manufactured in 1990. The last two IR measurements of the said PT carried out , are as under (i) On 11/07/2011:- HV-E = 650 MΩ, HV-LV = 1500 MΩ, LV-E = 1450 MΩ (ii) On 14/06/2011:- HV-E = 600 MΩ, HV-LV = 1500 MΩ, LV-E = 1400 MΩ

Also, at the time of occurrence, there was rain with wind, storm and heavy lightening. All the

three old PTs of BUS-I replaced by available spare new PTs, after necessary checking and

testing. The report received from GSECL is enclosed at Annexure-2.2(v).


2.2(vi) OCCURRENCE AT DHUVARAN CCPP on 2.08.2011 at 06:04 Hrs.

On 2.08.2011 at 06:04 hrs, all lines and generators tripped connected with Bus-II on

operation of bus bar tripping relays 96 due to operation of LBB of 132 kV CCPP -

Dhandhuka line-2 at Dhuvaran CCPP end.

There was a fault on 132 kV Dhandhuka Line No.2 (connected with 132 kV Bus-II ) in

Zone-I and Distance Protection relay have operated correctly from both the ends , but at the

same time Lines , Generators connected to 132 kV Bus-II also tripped on operation of Bus

Bar Tripping relay 96. On detail checking of the 132 kV circuit breakers it was observed that

the mechanical ON-OFF indicator of the circuit breaker of 132 kV Dhandhuka Line No.2 was

showing OFF status, actually all the three poles were in closed condition. The stuck breaker

condition caused operation of the LBB protection relay 52Z (ER make type ZDAB) of the

132 kV Dhandhuka line-2 , leading to tripping of all lines and Generators connected with 132

kV Bus-II. The said circuit breaker is of BHEL make SF6 breaker having Hydraulic

operating mechanism type 3AR1EG Sr. No. 403925 commissioned in 2003 year.

Expert from OEM , M/S BHEL, checked the breaker at site and found that the pull rod

connection from drive unit and C pole found de-linked as the connecting pin had come out ,

which is shown in the picture at ANNEXURE-B of Annexure-2.2(vi) attached. The same has

been attended by BHEL engineer by relocking of link mechanism and attending other related

miscellaneous work the breaker put in service on 11/08/2011.

The report received from GSECL is enclosed at Annexure-2.2(vi).


2.3: System disturbances in MPPTCL/MPPGCL system.

2.3(i) OCCURRENCE AT SATPURA TPS on 5.07.2011 at 18:15 Hrs.

On 5.07.2011 at 18:15 hrs, due to failure of 220 kV bus-I PT, Y phase (SCT make), a bus fault

occurred at 220 kV Bus-I at Satpura TPS resulting in tripping of all running units and feeders

connected with 220 kV bus-I & II. 220 kV, Y phase was burst and PT was completely

damaged. Above bus PT was replaced with new one and Bus-I was charged at 19:20 Hrs.

MPPGCL further intimated that efforts are being made for shifting of existing mounting

structure of PTs to other appropriate placed in 220 kV switchyard. This incident would fall in

the category of GD-1 as per CEA Regulation (Grid Standards)-2010. The report received

from MPPGCL is enclosed at Annexure-2.3(i-a). The report received from WRLDC is

enclosed at Annexure-2.3(i-b).


2.3(ii) OCCURRENCE AT 220 KV S/S AT NARSINGHPUR on 24.07.2011 at 04:06 Hrs.

On 24.07.2011 at 04:06 Hrs a bus fault occurred on 220 kV, Y phase bus of 220 KV

substation at Narsinghpur due to Y phase cross over jumber at Main bus structure anapped

from T-clamp resulting in total supply failure. All feeders at Narsinghpur tripped which were

tripped on remote end on B-N, Zone –II. The report received from MPPGCL is enclosed at

Annexure-2.3(ii)


2.3(iii) OCCURRENCE AT 132 KV S/S AT GANDHISAGAR on 24.08.2011 at 19:15 Hrs.

On 24.08.2011 at 19:15 Hrs, due to heavy rains and lightening at Gandhisagar following

tripping occurred.

1. 132 kV Garoth-Gandhisagar line tripped at Garoth end and handtripped at Gandhi sagar end.

2. 132 kV Suwasra-Gandhisagar line 3. 132 kV Manasa-Gandhisagar line 4. 132 kV Gandhisagar-RPS-II hand tripped after Gandhisagar bus got dead

It is intimated by MPPTCL that 132 KV Garoth line breaker at Gandhisagar end did not trip

due to some problem in protection relay setting which caused other outgoing feeders on

transient fault. Also, 132 kB Gandhisagar-RPS-II breaker did not trip at Gandhisagar end.

Detailed investigation report from MPPGCL is awaited.

The report received from MPPTCL are enclosed at Annexure-2.3(iii)


2.3(iv) OCCURRENCE AT SGTPS, Birsingpur on 28.08.2011 at 14:18 Hrs.

On 28.08.2011 at 14:18 Hrs a heavy jerk observed and unit 4 tripped due to failure of tension

string insulator on main bus-II near bus coupler, operating the HV S/B earth fault repaly GT.

The report received from MPPGCL are enclosed at Annexure-2.3(iv)


2.3(v) OCCURRENCE AT 132 kV substation at Seoni on 1.09.2011 at 23:02 Hrs.

On 1.09.2011 at 23:02 Hrs 132 kV Seoni-Lakhnadon feeder tripped from both ends & Y-

phase pole dome bursted out and fell on the 132 kV main bus isolator structure causing 132

kB bus fault at 132 kV s/s Seoni tripping other lines as given in report.

The details received from MPPGCL are enclosed at Annexure-2.3(v)


2.3(vi) OCCURRENCE AT 220 kV substation at Barnagar on 3.09.11 at 21:45 Hrs.

On 3.09.2011 at 21:45 Hrs due to failure of C phase CGL breaker pole of 220 kV Indore

feeder at Barnagar caused bus fault at Barnagar S/s. Also, support column of Areva make

220 kV breakar of 160 MVA –II damaged due to shattring of insulator of 220 kV CGL

breaker. The details received from MPPGCL are enclosed at Annexure-2.3(vi)


2.4: System disturbances in MSETCL/MSPGCL system.

2.4(i) OCCURRENCE AT 400 kV Koradi substation on 29.07.2011 at 16:28 Hrs.

On 29.07.2011 at 16:28 Hrs 220 kV busbar protection operated and all breakers connected to

220 kV bus-II tripped through respective 96 BB trip relay. (bus coupler was "OFF").

MSETCL have intimated that work of shifting of control existing 220 KV bays to new 220

kV BCU SCADA was under process. Just before the incidence the work of allignement of

auxiliary contacts of 29 B isolator was under taken and therefore the section of 220 kV bus

coupler bay between bus coupler breaker and 29 B isolator was kept earthed with discharge

rod. while other pole was live. During process of allignment of auxiliary contact drum cam

close to each other in the arcing zone resulting in arcing. Also, busbar protection (ABB-

RADSS) found operated with S, T & U flag indications with operation of 96 relays of the

feeders connected with Bus-2. The details received from MSETCL are enclosed at

Annexure-2.4(i).


2.7 : Grid Incidences and Grid Disturbances classification as per the Grid Standards

notified by CEA.

POSOCO, WRLDC vide their letter No. WRLDC/OS/2010/1658 dated 27.01.2012 have

categorized the Grid Incidents and Grid Disturbance for the period May 2011 to August 2011

which are as below :

Month –May 2011

1. At 04:02 hrs on 3rd May, 2011 three units (3x300 MW) at JSW, Jaigad tripped due

to tripping of both 400 kV JSW – New Koyna D/C feeders on distance protection

causing generation loss of 540 MW. Frequency dipped from 50.27 Hz to 50 Hz during the

incident. This incident would fall in the category of GI-2 as per CEA Grid Standards

classification.

2. At 16:53 hrs on 4th May, 2011 one 100 MVA & two 50 MVA ICTs at Magarwada, 220/66

kV S/S in DD tripped. Approximately 150 MW load was affected upto17:30 hrs. This

incident would fall in the category of GI-1 as per CEA Grid Standards classification.

3. At 10:19 hrs on 14th May, 2011, 400 kV Chorania bus became dead due to tripping

of bus-II on bus bar protection, since 400 kV bus-I was already under maintenance. It

got restored at-10:40 hrs. All the feeders and ICTs connected to 400 kV Chorania bus got

tripped. No load was affected due to the event. This incident would fall in the

category of GD-1 as per CEA Grid Standards classification.

4. At 15:41 hrs on 31st May, 2011 there was an occurrence at Jindal Power (JPL), Tamnar in

Chhattisgarh due to tripping of both the 400 kV JPL-Raigarh lines one after another, that led

to tripping of all three running units of JPL on 400 kV bus for lack of evacuation, causing a

generation loss of 645 MW. This incident would fall in the category of GI-2 as per CEA

Grid Standards classification.

Month –June 2011

1. At 02:54 hrs on 1st June, 2011 all units (4x135MW) at Wardha power station in

Maharashtra tripped at due to tripping of evacuation lines at Wardha. Generation Loss was

450 MW (approx.) due to the event. This incident would fall in the category of GD-1 as per

CEA Grid Standards classification.

2. At 14:46 hrs on 2nd June, KLTPS Units # 1 and 4 (2x70) tripped due to bus fault at Kutch.

This caused a generation loss of 130 MW approximately. This incident would fall in the

category of GD-1 as per CEA Grid Standards classification.

3. At 19:09 hrs on 3rd June, 2011, Kalwa ICT#1 & 3 (2x500MVA) tripped on NDR

operation. The ICTs restored at 01:11 hrs and 01:14 hrs respectively. No load was

affected as Maharashtra carried out generation rescheduling in their system. This incident

would fall in the category of GI-1 as per CEA Grid Standards classification.

4. At 19:27 hrs on 6th June, 2011 there was an occurrence at Korba Super Thermal Power

Station (KSTPS) that led to tripping of all the feeders connected to 400 kV bus-section-IV at

KSTPS. One 500 MW unit at Korba (unit-5) tripped along with both the running units at

LANCO causing 830 MW of generation loss. Both the units at LANCO tripped due to

tripping of 400 kV Korba-Lanco S/C which was the only evacuation line for LANCO

available at that time. This incident would fall in the category of GD-1 as per CEA Grid

Standards classification.

5. At 15:52 hrs on 6th June, 2011 all units at Wardha (4x135 MW) tripped, due to

tripping of evacuating lines. Generation loss was 450 MW approximately. This incident

would fall in the category of GD-1 as per CEA Grid Standards classification.

6. On 4th June, 2011, Uran units 5, 6 and AO tripped at 22:28 hrs. due to boiler

supply failure. This caused a generation loss of 300 MW. This incident would fall in the

category of GI-1 as per CEA Grid Standards classification.

7. On 6th June, 2011, Uran units 5, 8 and AO tripped at 23:12 hrs causing generation

loss of 300 MW. This incident would fall in the category of GI-1 as per CEA Grid Standards

classification.

8. At 05:30 hrs on 22nd June, 2011, due to tripping of 220kV lines from Halvad S/S, the 220

kV bus at Halvad became dead up to 7:10hrs. Load was affected by 50 MW approximately.

This incident would fall in the category of GD-1 as per CEA Grid Standards

classification.

9. At 07:32 hrs on 22nd June, 2011, due to bus fault at Haldarwa 220KV lines

connected to bus-A tripped. No generation / load loss was reported due to the tripping.

This incident would fall in the category of GI-1 as per CEA Grid Standards

classification.

Month - July 2011

1. At 05:36 hrs on 4th July, 2011 due to the high humidity and foggy weather

conditions in western part of Gujarat a number of major 400 kV and 220 kV feeders

tripped causing tripping of all running units at Adani Power Ltd. (APL), Mundra, three

units at Kutch Lignite Power Station (KLTPS) and one unit at Akrimota Lignite

Thermal Power Station (ALTPS) and one unit at Sikka Thermal Power Station (STPS).

Approximately 1783 MW of generation loss occurred during the incident. This incident

would fall in the category of GD-1 as per Grid Standards classification.

2. At 04:34 hrs on 5th July, 2011, on account of heavy fog and humidity in western and north

western part of Gujarat that caused tripping of several 220 kV and 400 kV feeders at night

and early morning hours resulting in severe depletion of transmission system in that area,

all running units at APL (unit 2, 3, 4, 5) tripped along with three units at Kutchh Lignite

Power Station (KLTPS) and one running unit at Akrimota Lignite Thermal Power Station

(ALTPS). This caused a generation loss of 1285 MW in that area. This incident would

fall in the category of GD-1 as per Grid Standards classification.

3. At 18:13 hours on 5th July, 2011 there was a bus fault on 220 kV bus at Satpura Thermal

Power Station in Madhya Pradesh that led to all generating units and feeders emanating

from 220 kV Satpura bus along with the 400/220 kV Satpura ICT. This caused a generation

loss of 230 MW. This incident would fall in the category of GD-1 as per Grid Standards

classification.

4. At 05:50 hrs on 7th July, 2011 there was an occurrence at 220 kV Ichhapur S/S due to

tripping of all 220 kV emanating feeders from the S/S due to fog and humidity. This

caused a load loss of 20-30 MW in that area. This incident would fall in the category of GD-1

as per Grid Standards classification.

Month - August 2011

1. At 17:35 hrs on 29th August, 2011, Chandrapur units 5, 6 and 7 tripped at 17:35 hrs due to

UAT problem caused by lightening. Generation loss was 600 MW approximately. This

incident would fall in the category of GI-2 as per Grid Standards classification.

The report received from WRLDC is enclosed at Annexure-2.7.

Committee may like to note/discuss.

ITEM NO. 3: Tripping of lines / ICTs:

The incidences of tripping of lines and ICTs during the period 01-05-2011 to 30-09-2011 are

enclosed at Annexure–3.

Committee may like to note/discuss.

ITEM NO. 4: OVER VOLTAGE TRIP SETTING CO-ORDINATION

POSOCO, WRLDC vide their letter No. WRLDC/OS/2010/1658 dated 27.01.2012 have

intimated that in view of the observation of WRLDC regarding considerable number of EHV

feeders in WR grid being kept out of service on high voltage apart from tripping of

multiple feeders emanating from a single node on over voltage (O/V) protection, on

several occasions, the existing trip setting of the O/V relays in WR grid is being re-assessed

by WRLDC. The progress so far has been given under.

a) Data in respect of over voltage trip setting of the EHV feeders in WR grid were collected

from different constituents / utilities of WR. It was observed from the data received

that there were several nodes with high probability of multiple tripping on over voltage

stage-I protection due to the existing voltage / time grading and improper co-ordination.

It was felt that the percentage trip setting and time grading needed to be relooked and

coordinated along with the drop-off to pick up ratio so as to avoid multiple tripping at a

single node / in a single corridor to ensure grid security.

b) In case of tripping of one line on over voltage protection the over voltage relays on other

lines emanating from the sub-station (S/S) should reset. Often due to low drop-off to

pick up ratio setting of these O/V relays, multiple tripping have been occurring

subjecting the grid to lower security levels. Accordingly, WRLDC vide letter

No.WRLDC/OS/1658/2012/4957 dated 12.01.2012 instructed the concerned to take stock of

the existing scenario, suggesting to modify the drop-off to pick up ratio of the over

voltage relays to 99% so as to ensure quick resetting of the relay following tripping of a

single feeder on high voltage.

Multiple tripping on O/V at a single node or in a single corridor may lead to

transmission depletion adversely affecting grid security. Hence the over voltage

protection co-ordination issues viz. the voltage grading / time grading along with

modifying the drop-off to pick up ratio of the O/V relays to a higher value (say 99%) need to

be taken up seriously by all concerned and the same may be finalized in the forth-coming

113th Protection Committee Meeting (PCM) of WRPC.


ITEM NO. 5: Protection related recommendations on Grid Disturbances in Western Regional Grid on 25.2.2007 at 1634 hours and 28.2.2007 at 13:11 hours:

Protection related recommendations of the Enquiry Committee on Grid Disturbances in

Western Regional Grid on 25.2.2007 at 1634 hours and 28.2.2007 at 13:11 hours were

discussed during the 111th WRPC PCM held at WRPC Mumbai. The status as reported in 111th

PCM regarding implementation of the recommendations is placed at Annexure-5.

Committee may please discuss and constituents may intimate the present status

regarding implementation of recommendations.

ITEM NO. 6: Other points:

6.1: Non-availability of Event Logger at 400kV state owned sub-stations at Nagda, Indore, Bina Padghe, Kolhapur, Koradi, Chandrapur, Dhule and Bhilai.

In the 104th PCM, PGCIL had informed that Event Loggers at some of the 400 kV State owned

Sub stations, namely Nagda, Indore, Bina of MPPTCL, Padghe, Dhule, Kolhapur, Koradi,

Chandrapur of MSETCL and Bhilai of CSPTCL are not provided. PGCIL have requested for

early installation of Event Loggers at these stations.

In the 106th PCM, MPPTCL representative clarified that event loggers available in the

numerical relays as a built in feature, and GPS synchronized clock are being used for logging

the events at all the above S/S’s, hence they are not initiating the procurement process for

separate event loggers for the above S/Ss. However members of PCM felt that a separate event

logger is required to be installed so that all the events occurring required for post fault analysis

of an occurrence in the S/S can be recorded. As desired by MPPTCL the list of events that are

required to logged were enclosed at Annex. 5.3 of the 107th PCM minutes.

During previous PC Meetings, the stages in tendering /procurement was intimated by

MPPTCL/CSPTCL/MSETCL representatives.

Present status of installation of Event Loggers at above S/S, may please be intimated.

6.2: Problem in Bus bar protection scheme at Korba (W) CSPGCL S/S.

NTPC vide their letter KS/EM/ETL/2405/615109/285 Dtd.05.05.09 have informed that NTPC

Korba and CSPTCL Korba(W) substations are connected with a 400kV line of line length

14Km. On 04.05.09 at 02:51hrs bus fault occurred (one of the CT of inter connecting

transformer blasted) at CSPTCL end. The NTPC 400kVKorba- CSPTCL Korba (W) line

tripped in zone-2 from NTPC Korba end, thus feeding the fault current of around 14KA for the

timing of zone-2. Inter trip or direct trip signal was also not received from Korba (W) S/S.

Similar fault had occurred at 400kV Korba (W) S/S on 09.09.08 at 11:48 hrs also and was fed

for zone-2 timing from NTPC Korba S/S since the Bus bar protection is not available, the fault

was fed for longer time..

Earlier in the 107th PCM, CSPTCL representative informed that the Bus Bar scheme is out of

service since last one year, due to faulty Bus Bar scheme and burnt control cables at 400kV

Korba (W) S/S and have initiated the process for procurement of the same. Committee felt that

the commissioning of Bus Bar protection scheme at the above S/S may be expedited.

In the 108th PCM, CSPGCL representative informed that the Bus Bar protection scheme for

400kV Korba (W) has been included in their business proposal submitted to the Chhattisgarh

State Electricity Regulation Committee (CSERC) and after approval from CSERC the scheme

process for procurement of the scheme would be taken up. However Committee felt that in

view of the criticality of the matter and importance of the 400kV Korba (W) S/S from the WR

system protection point of view, the Bus Bar protection scheme at 400kV Korba (W) S/S,

might be taken up as a special case to CSERC and necessary approval may be obtained on

priority.

Follow up was made by WRPC vide letter No WRPC/Prot./PCM/2010-11/1013Dtd. 13th Aug

2010. Also the matter was put up before the 14th WRPC Board Meeting and CSPGCL was

requested to expedite the matter.

In 110th PCM, CSPGCL representative informed that the earlier proposal of BB protection

scheme was for 8 bays and in view of commissioning of 6 new bays at this S/S, the proposal

has been modified for 14bays. It is expected that approval of CSERC would be received in one

month and the procurement process would be initiated immediately. During the 111th PCM,

representative from CSPGCL was not present.

In the 111th PCM, Committee noted the above and felt that since there was no representation

from CSPGCL the matter may be taken up with CSPGCL for expediting the work.

Accordingly follow up was made with CSPGCL vide letter No . Prot/111 PCM/2011/WRPC-

887 Dtd.09.06.11. However, no feedback from CSPGL is received in this matter.

CSPGCL may please intimate the status of the corrective actions.

6.3 : Current Differential protection implementation using OPGW instead of Earth wire

for recommending to the PSDF Group.

WRLDC had proposed that replacement of old distance protection schemes with state of art

current differential protection scheme using OPGW instead of PLCC can be taken up under

PSDF. The PSDF group discussed the issue in its second meeting held on 19.10.2010 at

WRPC Mumbai and suggested that the same may be discussed in PCM and the decisions of

the PCM on this issue appraised to PSDF group of WRPC.

In 111th PCM REL representative stated that they are utilizing the current differential

protection for their lines and the performance is very good.

Committee recommended trying the same on experimental basis. Committee further felt that

members from State Transmission Utilities would identify at least two important lines having

OPGW, in their system and intimate the same in the next PCM. Committee further felt that

PGCIL may work out on the detailed proposal (such as specifications, requirement of

boosters & multiplexers, estimated cost etc), so that the same may be appraised to PSDF

group of WRPC.

The lines identified by utilities are as follows;

(i) GETCO

• 220kV Asoj-Chandrapura line

• 220kV Nyara-Kangashiyali.

GETCO representative stated that the length of these lines is around 25kms.

(ii) MPPTCL

• 220kV Bina – Bina(PG) IC#1

• 220kV Bina – Bina(PG) IC#2

MPPTCL representative stated that the length of these lines is around 8kms.

(iii) PGCIL WR-II

• Bina(PG) –Bina(MPPTCL) #1

• Bina(PG) - Bina(MPPTCL) #2

PGCIL representative stated that the length of these lines is around 750 meters.

MSETCL & CSPTCL representatives informed that they would communicate the details

shortly. CSPTCL vide letter dated 9.12.2011 intimated that they have identified 220 kV

Khedamara-Bhilai D/c (7 KMs DCDS) for implementation of above.

MSETCL may identify and furnish the line details for implemetation of above.

Also, during 112th PCM Committee requested REL to prepare draft technical specifications.

The draft technical specifications were received from REL and are enclosed at Annexure-6.3.

The status as above was intimated to the PSDF Group.


6.4 : Presentation on Mobile Test Laboratory for on-site accuracy testing of EHV class

instrument transformers by Diagnostic, Cables & Capacitors Division of CPRI

Banglore.

CPRI Banglore has established a unique Mobile Test Laboratory for on-site accuracy testing

of EHV class instrument transformers. The Mobile unit is equipped with the facilities of

conducting on-site accuracy testing of CTs and CVTs of accuracy class up to 0.2 as per

National and International standards. The Mobile Test Lab is fitted with high accuracy and

high precision test equipments, current & voltage sources of appropriate ratings for testing of

EHV class CTs/CVTs upto 400kV rating in S/Ss and Power Stations.

The Mobile Test Lab is also equipped with automatic system for measurement of

Capacitance & Tan Delta on CTs & CVTs which is useful for periodic testing and trend

monitoring in the dielectric properties in assessing the ageing status of CTs & CVTs.

In the 111th PCM, a presentation given by Shri A. Sudhindra, Addl. Director CPRI on the

Mobile Test Laboratory and the same was enclosed at Annexure-6.2(i) of the 111th PCM

minutes. The CPRI’s offer with scope of work, terms & conditions and commercial bid for

accuracy testing of CTs/CVTs at sites of WRPC constituents, subsequently received through

e-mail was also enclosed at Annexure-6.2 (ii) of the 111th PCM minutes.

He further informed that the CEA notification dtd. 17.03.2006 had made it mandatory to test

the interface metering once in a five year accordingly Northern Region has identified around

6000 CTs for testing.

In the 111th PCM, Committee felt that on site accuracy testing of EHV class instrument

transformers is important and may be taken up in two phases. In the first phase the CTs &

PTs provided at inter State & ISGS interface metering points covered in REA of WR be taken

up. Utilities/PGCIL/WRLDC may give the list of such locations with number of instrument

transformers required to be covered under testing. Based on above the implementation plan

for the same be discussed further. In the second phase accuracy testing of EHV class

instrument transformers for State Utilities in their system may be taken up after successful

completion of phase-I.

The list of locations along with no of CTs & PTs/CVTs identified by WRLDC for testing

were enclosed under the Annexure of Additional agenda points received from WRLDC

in the 112th PCM agenda.

POWERGRID,WR-II vide their letter Dtd.20.09.11 (enclosed at Annexure-6.4(ii)) has

informed that the instrument transformers are monitored regularly and testing of SEMs is

taken up by POWERGRID once in five years, in line with the CEA regulations (notification

Dtd. 17th March 2006) as well as Grid code, where testing of meters only has been made

mandatory. Hence On-site accuracy testing of all the EHV CTs & CVTs may not be required

and the same can be taken up only on case to case basis. Further they had requested that the

methodology of reimbursement of expenditure incurred on accuracy testing & categorization

of outages taken for such testing needs to be taken up at appropriate forum.

In the 112th PCM, Members felt that testing of the instrument transformers would involve

outages and disconnection of the instrument transformers for testing. Committee looked into

its earlier decision in view of the above practical difficulties and decided that the testing of

the instrument transformers be taken up on case to case basis. Utilities would identify the

locations and instrument transformers to be tested based on the energy audits and suspected

erroneous instrument transformers and submit their requirement by next PCM.

Constituents are requested to submit the details as above.

6.5 : Frequent tripping of lines between Vindhyachal and Jabalpur/ Satna.

NTPC ltd vide letter dated 19.09.2011(enclosed at Annexure-6.5) have intimated that lines

between Vindhyachal and Jabalpur/Satna are tripping more frequently in September 2011

mostly on E/F and needs serious attention.


6.6 : Frequent tripping of MSETCL 220 kV feeders

NPCIL vide letter dated 7.10.2011(enclosed at Annexure-6.6) have intimated that there have

been frequent triping of MSETCL 220 kV feeders (TAPS-Borivali, Taps-Boisar). It has been

pointed out by NPCIL that every time the fault is in B phase which is lowest conductor

emnating from TAPS for both the feeders and requested CE, EHV(O&M), MSETCL for line

survey of these lines in view of growth of trees/wild vegetation and also to replace the old disc

insulators.

MSETCL may indicate the status. Committee may like to discuss.

6.7 : Frequent tripping of lines from NTPC Jhanor GPP

NTPC Ltd. vide letter dated 4.07.2011 (copy enclosed at Annexure-6.7) have intimated that

frequent tripping took place on the lines emanating from Jhanor GPP mainly due to insulator

failure.

Committee may like to discuss the reasons for failure.

ITEM NO. 7: Proposed relay setting and Special Protection Scheme by KSK Mahanadi

Power Company Ltd

KSK Mahanadi Power Company Ltd. vide letter dated 11.11.2011 adressed tp ED(SEF),

PGCIL, Gurgaon have submitted relay settings and calculations for stage-I alongwith details.

Also, interim arrangement comprising LILO of existing 400 kV Raigarh –Raipur D/c at 400

KV KSK Mahanadi switchyard was approved during 30th Standing Committee meeting till

the availability of planed network backed up by Special Protection Scheme to bring down the

generation level in case of transmission constraints to be put in place by KSK Mahanadi

Power Company Ltd.

KSK Mahanadi Power Company Ltd./WRLDC/PGCIL may confirm and give the

current status.

ITEM NO. 8: DISATER PREPAREDNESS FOR WESTERN REGION

In continuation with discussions held in 429th OCCM to improve disater preparedness of WR

grid, it is proposed to review and identify various scheme in WR as below :

a. Review of status of present islanding schemes in constituent States

b. Identification of Thermal units for extension of start-up power

c. Islanding schemes for captive power plants (CPPs)

d. Identification of synchronising locations

e. Provision for numberical relays along black start path

f. Heathiness of DG sets

Scheme details as received from WRLDC vide letter dated 3.02.2012 are enclosed at

Annexure-8.

Members are requested to submit the details viz. Name of scheme/units, their settings,

single line diagram, brief description, locations etc. so that the same could be discussed

during the meeting. Committee may like to discuss.

ITEM NO. 9: Any other issues.

ITEM NO. 10: Date and Venue of the next meeting.

?@f w l Ref. No.

(A wholly owned subsidiary d POWERGRID) --<

r I

. , Ref.: WRLDC I OS 1 16581201 I(%* ? Dt.05.05.Mll~

As per the distribution list enclosed.

1 : Sub: ~ r e l i d i n a r ~ report on the disturbance in Chhattisgarh system on lgth April, 20 11

MadamlSir,

find attached a prelimjnary report on the disturbance occurredon rh system. This incidgnt would fall in the category-GDI~S-per

for classification of grid incidents and disturbances. observation in respect of your system during the above incident. In occurred in your system, a detailed report may be forwarded at the earliest.

Thanking you,

.Yours faithfully,

*m% WIhI: - 9, TZllik?ms. *f&! I10 016. : 01 l.26536832,26524522 : 01 1.26524 Red. & Corp Office : B-9. Qutab Institutional Area, Kahvaria Sarai, New Delhi - 110 016. Tel.: 01 1.26536832,26524522 Fax: 01 1-265245

Preliminarv report on disturbance occurred on lgbh Apr-11 in Chhattisclarh system:

At 20:14 hrs on 19.04.201 1 there was a disturbance in Chhattishgarh system due to he/&y lightening and storm following inclement weather conditions. 1 1 1 I

The antecedent conditions to.the incident are given under:-

1. NEW Grid Frequency: 49.64 Hz. 2. WR Demand Catered: 33217MW (Approximately.) 3. Net Inter Regional Export: 2241 MW 4. Demand Catered by Chhattisgarh: 2043 MW (Approximately) 5; Chhattisgarh's Drawl from the grid: -591 MW 6. Qua.ntum of Over drawl (+)/Under drawl (-) : -370MW

Constituent-wise generation and demand details(As per SCADA data):

Power flows on major lines in the area (prior to the incident):

WR Constituents

Gujarat Maharashtra Madhya Pradesh Chattisgarh Goa DD DNH ISGS

, Total

Demand(in MW)

942 1 15094 5653 2043 322 181 503 0

33217

Generation in MW) a djo

SI. No. 1 .

8859 10233 1 974 2642 0 0 0 8016

, 29750

Name of the IinellCT 4001220 kV,SOOMVA Korba(w)-ICT

77 1384 763 0 0 0 0 870

, 3094

Power Flow(in MW) 81

2 220 kV Korba(E)-Balco-l

Wind 331 NIA 0 0 0 0 0 0 331'

139 3 220 kV Korba(E)-Balco-ll 144

)3ennerating Units' status(prior to the incident): 1

SI. No. I Nade of the Generatinn Unit I Installed I Actual Generatiodin 1

t 19:53 hrs: 220 kV Korba(W)-Kotmikaia line-l tripped from both the ends (Main-l protection at Korba(W) end.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

A t 1954 hrs: 400/220 kV Korba(W)-I,CT tripped on pressure release valve(PRV) operation with several alarms like oil temperature-high,Bucholtz etc.

(Remark:Due o heavy rain & wind rpoisture enters into the control panel of the transformer causing the ab ve mentioned false alarms) b I

- I

~or$a(E)-1 Korba(E)-2 KorQa(E)-3 ~ o r b a ( ~ ) - 4 Korba(E)-5 Korba(E)-6 Korba(E)-Extn- 1 Korba(E) Extn-2 ~ o r b a o - 1 Korba(W)-2

20:OO hrs: h20 kV ~orba(VV)-~otrnikala line-l was synchronised. I

At 20:12 hrs: Heavy jerk was observed resulting in tripping of the following feeders.

Capacity(MW) 50 50 50 50 120 120 250 250 210 210

MW) before tripping 48 5 1 44 48 102 99 23 1 235 207 199

S I No. 1

2

3

4

5

I

I i

Time of Tripping(hh:mm)

20: 12

20: 12

20:12

20: 12

20: 12

Name of the transmission element 220 kV Korba(E)- Korba(W)-l 220 kV Korba(E)- Korba(W)-Ill 220 kV Korba(E)- Raigarh SIC 220 kV Korba(E)- Budhipadar-2 220 kV Korba(E)- Budhipadar-3

At 20:13 hrs: The following feeders tripped causing is-landing condition at Korba(E). Frequency shot up sharply causing tripping of all six generating units at Korba(E) on turbine over speed protection and subsequent collapse of the 220 kV system at Korba(E).

RemarksIRelay Indication

R-ph-G fault,Zone-1

R-ph-G fault,Zone-1

Direct OIC (Y-phase)

Direct O/C (R,Y & B phase)

Direct O/C (B-phase)

I I

At 20:14' hrs:.220 kV Korbao-Mopka feeder tripped on than 300 MW).

At 20:15 hrs: 220 kV system collapsed causing tripping speed protection.

SI No. 1

2

3

4 5

over load protection(1oad

of Korba(W)-unit #1 and

Name of the transmission element 220 kV Korba(E)-Mopka SIC 220 kV Korba(E)-Balco- -I 220 kV Korba(E)-Balco- -11 220 kV Korba(E)-DSPM 2201132 kV ICT-I & II at Korba(E)

Time of Tripping(hh:mm)

20: 13

20: 13

20: 13

20: 13 20: 13

The Sequence of Restoration is given under:

RemarksIRelay Indication

Direct OIC (R&B phase)

Tripped from Balco on Over Frequency stage-l

Tripped from Balco on Over Frequency stage-l

Tripped from DSPM end only ---

___I--

---,-.- .---. - "." I I

I

LEGEND: Thermal Power Station A Hydd Power Station I Substation 400 k~ nne - 220 kV llne - 132 kV line - Transformer -(IF

Budhlpadar

Bhatapara

I

I

Generation p: Around 1264 MW generation loss was reported due to trippng of all units at Korba(E) and .

Korba(E)-Exfn and two units( unit-1 & 2) at Korba(W).Frequency dipped from 49.64 hz to 49.02hz.

Load ~ffectbd: * I

. I

(S R ~ar-- Dy. General Manager (0s)

No load loss'was reported due to the incident. I

I

*Restored tt(e next day is. on 20.04.201 1.

Time of Restoration (hh:mm)

07:32/20.04.11 21:49120.04.11

SI No. 26 27

Name of the Transmission elemenUGenerating unit Korba(E)-Extn-2* Korbb(E)-Unit 4*

List for Distribution:

1. Chief Engineer(Transmissi0n). Chhattisgarh State Power Transmission Co.Ltd. Dan niya, Raipur- 49201 0.

Transmission Co. Ltd., Danganiya, Raipur- 49201 0

1: 2. Chief Engineer (LD), State Load Despatch Centre, Chhattisgarh State @wer

3. Chief Engineer (Transmission), Gujarat Energy Transmission Corporation Limited (GETCO) Sardar Patel Vidyut Bhavan , Race Course, Vadodara -390007

4. Chief Engineer (LD), State Load Despatch Centre, GETCO, Gotri , Vadodara-390 021.

5. Chief Engineer (Transmission), M.P.Power Transrnissio? Company Ltd, Shakti Bha al/ Vidyut Nagar, Rampur, Jabalpur-482008.

6. Chief Engineer (LD), M.P.Power Transmission Company Ltd SLDC, Nayagaon, Jabalpur 482 008.

" r ~ : 7. Superintending Engineer (STU), MSETCL, 'Prakashganga', C-19, €-Block,

Bandra Kurla Complex, Bandra(E ), Mumbai-400051. 8. Chief Engineer(LD), Maharashtra State Electricity Transmission Co.Ltd., State Load

Despatch Centre, Kalwa, Thane-Belapur Road, Airoli, Navi Mumbai 400 708.

9. Chief Electrical Engineer, Goa Electricity Department, Vidyut Bhavan, 3rd Floor, Pan jii, Goa- 403 001.

10. Executive Engineer, Electricity Department, Division-Ill, Curti, Ponda, Goa. 11. Executive Engineer, Electricity Department, Dadra Nagar Haveli, 66kV Amli Road,

Silvassa- 396230

Daman-396210.

Mumbai-400 093.

1 12. Executive Engineer, Electricity Department. Daman & Diu. Power House. Bldg. 2. N r/il I 13. General Manager (OS), NTPC, Samruddhi Trade Complex, 2nd floor, MIDC, Andhe '( ),

14. Chief Power Controller, Jindal Power Limited ,O.P Jindal Super Thermal bker Plant,Village P0:TAMNAR ,Tehsil :Gharghoda,Dist:Raigarh (Chhattisgarh ) 496107

15. Vice President ,LANCO Power Ltd., Plot No. 397, Phase-III,Udyog Vihar, Gurgaon- 12201 6,Haryana.

r, 16. Member(Power), Narmada Control Authority, Narmada Sadan, Schepje

No.74,Vijayanagar ,Indore-452010(MP) 17. Chief Engineer(Transmissi0n) Nuclear Power Corporation Of lndia

Limited(NPCIL), Nabhikiya Urja Bhavan, Anushaktinagar, Mumbai - 400 094, India. 18. General Manager ( 0 & M), WRTS-I, Power Grid Corporation of lndia Ltd., P 0

Uppalwadi Sampritinagar, Nagpur 440 026. ~ I '

th th ~ 19. General Manager ( 0 & M), WRTS-II, Power Grid Corporation of lndia Ltd.,4 5 and 6" floor, Vuda bhavan, near L & T circle,V.I.P. road, Vadodara;Gujarat- 39001 8.

QC Member Secretary, W.R.P.C, Mumbai.

-

OCCURRENCE REPORT

(A) Name of Sub Station:

400KV Chorania S/s

(B) Date & Time of Occurrence:

14-05-2011 at 10:20 hrs. 1 I

(C) Details of Occurrence:

At the time of occurrence, the bus position of the feeders was as:

Bus A

Under Outage

Bus B

400KV Chorania-Asoj-1 400KV Chorania-Amreli 400KV Chorania-Kasor 400KV Chorania-Hadala 400KV Chorania-Vadavi-2 400/220/33KV 500MVA ICT-1 400/220/33KV 500MVA ICT-2 400/220/33KV SOOMVA Sp.Ph. 400KV 50MVA Bus Reactor 400 KV Chorania-Asoj 2 HV off

Sequence of Occurrence

At 10.20 hrs, all the feeders connected with BUS- B were tripped on Bus bar protection relay 96 except Vadavi 2.

(D)Relay Indications:

Feeder Chorania end ODD end

400KV Chorania-Asoj-1 96 No Trip 400KV Chorania-Am reli 96 No Trip 400KV Chorania-Kasor 96 No Trip 400KV Chorania-Hadala 96 No Trip 400KV Chorania-Vadavi-2 No Tripping No Trip 400/220/33KV 500MVA ICT-1 96 Inter Trip 400/220/33KV 500MVA ICT-2 96 Inter Trip 400/220/33KV 500MVA Sp.Ph. 96 - - 400KV 50MVA Bus Reactor 96 - - 400 KV Chorania-Asoj 2 96 L/O relay optd.

(Under H.V. off)

(E) Cause of operation: --

The wiring work of 400KV Ranchodpura -2 (Vadavi-2) line in bus bar panel was under progress. During execution of work, the loose wire of the relay was touched to live wire on TB & this has resulted in the operation of bus bar protection. Simultaneously all the feeders connected to bus 6 were tripped.

The mistake was done by the subcontractor of M/s Power grid .400KV Bus Bar protection operated and above feeders tripped. The email from M/s ' PGCIL is attached herewith.

(F) Resumption: 1

Feeder

400KV 50MVA Bus Reactor 400KV Chorania-Asoj- 1 400KV Chorania-Amreli 400KV Chorania-Kasor

Time of Resumption

10:35 Hrs. 10:40 Hrs. 10:45 Hrs. 10:50 Hrs.

400/220/33KV 500MVA ICT-1 10:53 Hrs. 400KV Chorania-Hadala 11:05 Hrs. 400/220/33KV 500MVA 1 0 - 2 11:40 Hrs. 400/220/33KV 500MVA Sp.Ph. 11:55 Hrs.

(G) SLD: Attached herewith.

OCCURRENCE REPORT

(A) Name of Sub Station: -

220 KV HALDARWA SUB-STATION

(B) Date & Time of Occurrence:

DATE: 22.06.201 1 AT 7:32 HRS.

(C) Details of Occurrence: I I

At the time of occurrence the bus position of the feeders was as below. I

,

On Dtd. 22.06.201 1 at 7:32 Hrs, 220 KV Haldanva -Kawas-1 line tripped on Z-1, q- Ph to Earth, Dist: 69.95 Kms from Haldanva end. The Kawas end breaker wa in OFF Condition as per the instruction of SLDC Gotri dated 20.06.201 1. At that t 'de j1 LBB Relay of 220 KV Kawas-1 line Operated whtch is connected with BUS &, Hence all BUS-A Feeder 96 relay operated.

I I I I

I

I BUS-A

1). 220 KV DAHEJ 2) 220 KV IPCL- 1 3) 220 KV IPCL-2 4) 220 KV JAMBWA 5) 220 KV KAPP- 1 6).220 KV Zanor-2 7).220/132 KV TRF -1 8).220/66 KV TRF-2 9).220 KV KAWAS- 1 10).220 KV GPEC- 1

BUS-B

Sequence of Occurrence

pler 1

1). 220 KV WAGRA 2). 220 KV ZAGADIA 3). 220 KV KAPP -2 4). 220 KV KAWAS-2 5). 220 KV GPEC -2 6).220 KV NTPC Zanor-1 7).220/132 KV TRF -2 8).220/66 KV TRF- 1

I

1

I

Relay Indication for Transformer1 Line and Bus coupler.

@) Cause of Operation: The Haldanva - Kawas line no. 1 was in soak charge condition from Haldarwa end. The 220 Kawas line no.1 tripped on Zl , B-Ph. -E, (dist -65.95 krns). The B-Ph breaker pole has delayed in opening of breaker. Hence LBB protection operated of Kawas-1 feeder and all the feeders connected to BUS-A tripped on 96 relay. At that time Bus- Coupler breaker was off.

The protection operated generally in order.

Relay Indication AT FAREND

NT NT NT NT NT NT NT LV IT LV IT

I

(A) 220 KV HALDARWA S1S:-

Patrolling work carried out by PGCIL (loc no: 48 to 68) no reason found.

Sr. no - 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

The breaker timing test taken by PGCIL found TC-1, TC-2 timing found normal in both (open (21ms) & Close (1 14ms)) condition.

Resumption: Bus-A charge through 220 KV Jambuva feeder at 8:15 Hrs.

Name of Bay

220 KV DAHEJ 220 KV IPCL-1 220 KV IPCL-2 220 KV JAMBUVA 220 KV KAPP-1 220 KV GPEC -1 220 KV NTPC Zanor-2 22011 32 KV TRF - 1 220166 KV TRF - 2

HALDARWA END

96 96 96

96, 96 96 96 HV 96 , LV - I/T HV-96, LV - I/T

Duration 1

, 0.43 1

-t

1:17

7 220KV IPCL-2 7:32 8:17 0.45 8 220 KV KAPP-1 7:32 9:35 2:02

--

9 220ZANOR -2 7:32 8:49 1:17 10 220 KV Kawas-1 7:32 Continued

Sr. No 1 2

From

7:32 7:32

Name of LineITrf

220166 kv Trf no-2 2201132kvTrfno-1

To CHAREISYN 8:15 8:49

Regd. Office: Vidyut Bhavan, Race Cours, VADODARA - 390 007. Tel: 0265 2354378 Fax: 0265 2344537 Email: [email protected] Web: www.goe~l.in 1

1 Ref: CEGl TestinglPCMll I 3 4 ~ X O .- -- -- - - - Date: 15 November 201 1 - - - - - - - -- -

Gujarat State Electricity Corporation Limited

The Superintending Engineer (Prot.) Western Region Electricity Board, F-3, MIDC Area, Marol, Andheri (East) MUMBAI--480 093

I - I -

Sub. : - 113" Protection Committee Meeting of WREB - Report regar system disturbances.

Dear Sir,

Please find enclosed herewith the occurrence report of Bus bar oper

An ISO-9001-2008 Certified Company

which took place at GSECL - KLTPS and Dhuvaran GBPS for the mont 4 of i

I

MAY to AUGUST 201 1, which is to be included in the agenda of the next PCM.

Thanking you.

Yours faithfully,

Encl: As above.

(U.D.ADHVARYU) CHIEF ENGINEER (GEN.)

I

Gujarat State Electricity Corporation Limited

I Tel: 0265 2354i78 Fax: 0265 5344537 mail: ceaen.a&ecl~aebmail.com Web: www.gsebliin I I

- An ISO-9001-2008 certified Company

Read. Office: Vidvut Bhavan. Race Cours. VADODARA - 390 007.

-: OCCURRENCE AT DHUVARAN CCPP: -

-

(a) Date of Occurrence . 02-08-201 1.

(b) Time of Occurrence : 06.04 Hrs.

(c) Details of Occurrence :

On 02-08-2011. at Dhuvaran CCPP the status of both the 132 kV bus under.

(a) 132 kVCCPP-DTPSLineNo.1 (b) 1 32 kV CCPP- Dhandhuka Line No. 1 (c) 132 kV CCPP- Limbadi Line No. 1

On 02-08-2011 at 06:04 hrs, all lines and generators tripped connected I1 on operation of bus bar tripping relays 96 due to operation of LBB of 132 Dhandhuka line-2 at Dhuvaran CCPP end.

(d) (el

(d) Relay and Indications.

132 kV CCPP- Dhandhuka Lire 132 kV CCPP- Limbadi Line

No.2 N3.2 '

Sr.No. 1

1 132 kV CCPP- Dhandhuka Line No.2 I Dist. Relay 1 Z1- ha&

2 3 4

Name Of Feeder Gas Turbine Generator-:! (GTG-2) , I

Steam Turbine Generator-2 (STG-3) 132 kV CCPP- DTPS Line No.2

5 6

Relays - CCPP end 96

I

Relays - qppote tnd -- ---

96 96

96,SOZ , SOZX,

I

132 kV CCPP- Limbadi Line No.2 132 kV Bus Coupler

I I .

Z1 -R Phase 96 96

No Dist.

No T,.ippingl,

--..--- Tripping

Relay

(e) Resumption :- 1 132 kV Bus I Charged at 09:40 Hrs. 1 &.

1 5 1 132 kV CCPP- Dhandhuka Line No.2 I 11/08/11 at 15:15

i I I 1- Name of Feeder.

No. 1 2 --

3 4

( f ) Analysis and Remedial Measures: -

Date & Time of I Remark

Gas Turbine Generator-2 (GTG-2) Steam Turbine Generator-2 (STG-2) 132 kV CCPP- Limbadi Line No.2 13 2 kV CCPP- DTPS Line No.2

Enclosure: -

There was a fault on 132 kV Dhandhuka Line No.2 (connected with 132 k I1 ) in Zone-I and Distance Protection relay have operated correctly from both , but at the same time Lines , Generators connected to 132 kV Bus-I1 also operation of Bus Bar Tripping relay 96.

On detail checking of the 132 kV circuit breakers it was observe

(i) Sketch Showing Occurrence at ANNEXURE -A (ii) Breaker Drive unit cut view showing de-linking of pull rod connecting li

ANNEXURE - B

resumption. 02/08/11 at 08:05 02/08/11 at 12:50 02/08/11 at 08:25 02/08/11 at 07:30

mechanical ON-OFF indicator of the circuit breaker of 132 kV Dhandhuka Line was showing OFF status, actually all the three poles were in closed condition. The breaker condition caused operation of the LBB protection relay 522 (ER make ZDAB) of the 132 kV Dhandhuka line-2 , leading to tripping of all lines and Generators connected with 132 kV Bus-11.

The said circuit breaker is of BHEL make SF6 breaker having Hydrablic operating mechanism type 3ARlEG Sr. No. 403925 commissioned in 2003 year.

Expert from OEM , MIS BHEL, checked the breaker at site and found that pull rod connection from drive unit and C pole found de-linked as the connecbng pin had come out , which is shown in the picture at ANNEXURE-B attached.

Page i ef 4 ~,

'No.2 - !&ck

ppe I I

llthe

t he

I 1- , I

same has been attended by BHEL engineer by relocking of link mechanism pnd attending other related miscellaneous work the breaker put in service on 1 1/08/20 1 . I

1 t

ANNEXURE -A l l * *

OCCURANCE AT CCPP DHUVARAN on 02/08/11 at 06:04 Hrs. I -- I! A,

LIM $1

DHANDHUKA DHWARAN TPS

0 BREAKER TRIPPED ISOLATOR CLOSED

0 BREAKEROFF / ISOLATOR OPEN >< BREAKER NOT TRIPPED

ANEXURE-B

I CUT VIEW OF BHEL MAKE BREAKER SHOWING DETACHMENT OF , OPERATING LEVER PIN OF THE HYDRAULIC MECHANISM CYLINDE 1

CAUSED STUCKING UP OF BREAKER

BHEL make 132 kV SF6 Gas, Hydraulic operated mechanism type Circuit Breaker Type 3ARlEG Sr. No. 403925

I cull

(d) Relay and .Indications.

Sr. No.

Station Transformer- 1 220 1 66 KV ICT

t

'I:-

I'

/I

eo/b Name Of Feeder

96 96

kV Akhrimota Line No. 1 Bus Coupler

1 I I

8 /

--- -..-

220 kV Kukma-Line No. 1 220 kV Nakhatrana Line No. 1

7

8

-KLTPS end

96 96

9 1 220 kV Kukma Line- No. 2

Relays Remote

96 96

No Tripping ---

A

Generator-3

Generator - 4

10 1 220 kV Nakhatrana Line- No. 2 1 Hand Tripped No ~ r i ~ ~ i n ~ l 1

No Tripping No Tripping

Hand Tripped C

11 I Station Transformer-2

Sr. I

Tripped due to supply failure Tripped due to supply failure

No ~ r i ~ ~ i n ~ 1 ,,

(e) Resumption :-

220 kV Bus I, Charged at 07:40 Hrs dt.26.07.11 after replacement of all three PTs

Name of Feeder. I Date & Time of I ~emarkl ' I

---

---

Supply Failure

1

---

No. 1

I

2 3 4

220 kV Kukma Line- No. 2

5 6 7

2410711 1 at 0057 Hrs. 220 kV Nakhatrana Line- No. 2 Station Transformer- 1 220 I 66 KV ICT

8 9 1 0 --

11

220 kV Kukma-Line No. 1 220 kV Nakhatrana Line No. 1 220 kV Akhrimota Line No. 1

2410711 1 at 00:40 Hrs. 2410711 1 at 01:32 Hrs. 2410711 1 at 01:36 Hrs.

Bus Coupler Station Transformer-2 Generator-3 Generator - 4

-

I

I

2410711 1 at 01 :40 Hrs. 2410711 1 at 02:20 Hrs. 2410711 1 at 01 :35 Hrs. I

2610711 1 at 07:40 Hrs. 24/07/11 at 00:58 Hrs 2410711 1 at 1553 Hrs 2410711 1 at 10:36 Hrs

7

I

Technical Analysis & Remedial Measures: -

The 'B' phase PT of 220 kV Bus - I failed, which resulted in to operation of Differential protection with indication T & U resulting tripping of all lines , Tra connected with Bus - I. The 220 kV Kukma Line-2 and Nakhatrana Line-2 connec Bus- I1 were hand tripped by operator looking to fire took place near the failed PI subsequently resulted in to total supply failure at KLTPS and tripping of Generi No. 3 and 4 though they were on healthy 220 KV Bus-11. The failed BHEL make Potential Transformer was manufactured in 1990. The las measurements of the said PT carried out , are as under

(i) On 11/07/2011:- HV-E = 650 MQ, HV-LV = 1500 Ma , LV-E = 1450 MQ

(ii) On 14/06/2011 :- HV-E = 600 MR, HV-LV = 1500 MR, LV-E = 1400 MQ

At the time of occurrence, there was rain with wind, storm and heavy lightening. All the three old PTs of BUS-I replaced by available spare new PTs, after r checking and testing.

Enclosure:- Sketch Showing Occurrence

I

I t

I 7

$-Bar ' 7 '

)rmer : I with which

llnitI vo IRI -

:ssary

I

: 3 of4

I

--Ask a--

I i

Gujarat State Electricity Corporation Limited 1 1 I -

-:OCCURRENCE AT KUTCH LIGNITE THERMAL POWER STATION. :I i I I '

- An 180-9001 -2008 Certified Company

Regd. Office: Vidyut Bhavan, Race Cours, VADODARA - 390 007. Tel: 0265 2354378 Fax: 0265 2344537 Email: ceaen.nsecl@?aebmail.com Web: www.gsecl.lr)

(a) Date of Occurrence 02-06-201 1

(b) Time of Occurrence : 14: 46 Hrs.


On 02-06-2011 at KLTPS the status of both the 220 KV bus was as under.

, I

I I

I '

I

At 14:46 hrs.; all the lines , Transformers , and Generator tripped connected to 220 kV Bus-I on operation of Bus Bar tripping relay 96 due to the operation of Bus ar b Differential Protection relay ( RADSS , ABB make) with indication on bus ibar

I protection relay panel as R and U.

(d) Relav and Indications.

.BUS-I 11

BUS-I1 I

(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)

(a) (b) (c) (d)

Generator -1 Generator- 2 Station Transformer -1 220166 KV ICT 220 kV Kukma Line No. 1 220 kV Nakhatrana Line No. 1 220 kV Reactor

j

I

Generator -3 I

Station Transformer -2 220 kV Nakhatrana Line No -2 1 220 kV Akrimota Line No -1

I

I

I ' 1 ,

Sr.No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

I I

I 1 Pa$e 1

I

I \ 8

--- --- ---

-1 Name Of Feeder

,..

Generator - 1 Generator- 2 Station Transformer - 1 220166 KV ICT 220 kV Kukma Line No. 1 220 kV Nakhatrana Line No. 1 220 kV Reactor Bus coupler

96 96 96 96 96 96 96

96 , 'R' phase Inst. OIC

--- 1

-case : , i

--- -

t

--- I +-

--- I I

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-: OCCURRENCE AT KUTCH LIGNITE THERMAL POWER STATION. 1:11-

Gujarat State Electricity Corporation Limited An 180-9001 -2008 Certified Company

Regd. Office: Vidyut Bhavan, Race Cours, VADODARA - 390 007. Tel: 0265 2354378 Fax: 0265 2344537 Email: [email protected] Web: ~ w w . ~ s e c b i ~

(a) Date of Occurrence 14-05-201 1

(b) Time of Occurrence : I1 :OS, Hrs.

1 , I ' 1

I '


On 14-05-2011 at KLTPS the status of both the bus was as under.

1

At ll:OS, Hrs. all lines, transformers and generators tripped connected with i

on operation of bus bar tripping relays 96 due to operation of LBB of Generator Un (d) Relay and Indications.

I Sr* I Name Of Feeder ( Relays -KLTPS 1 Relays Remote I

-- .BUS-I

I I I

I I I Power I I

BUS-I1 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (Q

I' 1 ,

I I, . I

I

I i

Generator-3 end

( 96 , LBB , Reverse

(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)

Generator- 1 Generator-2 220 kV Nakhatrana Line No. l 220 kV Kukma Line No. 1 ICT Station Transformer- l

I

end ---

Generator-3 Generator-4 Station Transformer-2 220 kV Nakhatrana Line- No. 2

220 kV Akrimota Line No. 1

2 3

Generator-4 Station Transformer-2

96 No Tripping 96 No Tripping

96 ---

I

4 5 6

220 kV N a a t r a n a Line- No. 2

220 kV Akrimota Line No. 1 Bus Coupler

(e) Resumption :- . 220 kV Bus I Charged at 1 1 :22 Hrs. I

I sr. I Name of Feeder. Date & Time of -1 No.

1 I 2

3

(f) Technical Analysis & Remedial Measures: - I

I

Generator-3

4 5

The Generator Transformer breaker is of CGL make SF6 Gas circuit breaker ype 200-SFM-40A, is in service fi-om 1996. T

The work of overhauling of mechanism and replacement of pole

30/04/1 1 by MIS CGL. make, above breaker was carried out during the recent shutdown during

On 14th May 20 1 1 while taking the unit back on bar after shut dowpl and overhauling , Generator breaker did not trip immediately after closing when tri extended due to operation of Reverse Power Protection from GRP relay and to operation of LBB protection.

MIS CGL, the OEM of SF6 circuit breaker was referred to study remedial action to prevent such reoccurrence. MIS CGL have clarified that old and having WIKA make Gas density switch which is mounted on breaker , which acts both as Gas Pressure Gauge and Density switch. switch are spring loaded. Therefore during ON-OFF operation of the vibration and the spring loaded contacts might get disconnected opening of both trip circuits leading to operation of LBB is issued immediately followed by Closing operation of problem, M/S CGL has suggested for carrying out Density Switch & Gas Pressure Gauge their mounting on M/S CGL for modification of the mounting of out during next available opportunity.

resumption. 17/05/11 . 05:28

Generator-4 Station Transformer-2

Enclosure:- Sketch Showing Occurrence 1

220 kV Nakhatrana Line- No. 2

220 kV Akrimota Line No. 1

17/05/11 ,05:39 1-410511 1 ,11:40 14/05/11 , 11:32 14/05/11 , 11:37

I

I

MADHYA PRADESH POWER TRANSMISSION CO. LTD. STATE LOAD DESPATCH CENTER, NAYAGAON, JABALPUR

ISO: 9001 :2008 Telephone:(O761) 2660240 Fax:(0761) 2664343 E-Mail [email protected]

No.07-05lRPC-511 9 Jabalpur, dtd: 3. ge (

The Dy. General Manager (OS), q. A a. a. *PPC WRLDC, F-3, MlDC Area, Marol, Andheri East, Mumbai - 400093.

Sub: System occurrence at STPS Sarni on dtd. 05.07.201 1 at 18.15 Hrs.

Satpura Thermal Power Station, Sarni and resulting in tripping of all running units and feeders I

Dear Sir, i

Due to failure of 220 KV Bus-l PT Y Ph. (SCT Make), a bus fault occurred at 220 KV bus-l at

connected with 220 KV Bus-l & II. The details of trippings received from SE(ET&I) PH-I, MPPGCL,

Sarni along with MP system overview and Single line diagrams of SCADA before incident is enclosed

, I I

for information and necessary action please.

Encl: as above.

Thanking you,

The Member Secretary, WRPC, F-3, MlDC Area, Marol, Andheri East, Mumbai-400058. 7 The Chief Engineer (Gen.), MPPGCL, STPS, Sarni.

3. The Suptdg. Engineer (ET&I), PH-I, MPPGCL, STPS, Sarni.

i

1 BUS B

ICT-I

STN . GEN-VI I XKER-I V 21OMW

BUSCP GEN-VI 200MW

BUS T I E

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OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER (ET&I) - I11

I SGTPS, MPPGCL, BIRSINGHPUR, DISTT. - UMARIA (M.P.1

Email: - seeti3. brs@,g~~~ail .coin Fax No. 07655-262232 Ph. No. 07655-260214

~ d . 5 1 1 - 1800/SGTPS/T&C-III/ 78 BRS: Dtd: 29-08 - 1 1

To 1 The S.E. (MPC) SG?PS, 'MPPGCL, Brs.

Sub:- Tripping of ICT, Bus-Copular, Darnoh feeder-I &consequently tripping of / 500 MW Unit.

In reference to the above subject matter, on dtd.28108111 , at 14: 18 Hrs. , Unit no. 5 tripped . The sequence of happenings are as under :-

I

I I I - I I

I i I I

I

1 Observation:- later 400 KV main bus-I1 R-phase insulator string failed at 14: 18 hrs, which caused ~11e tripping of 400/220I<V ICT, 400KV Brs.- Darnoh feeder

k- S.E~ET&I)-111

SGTPS, MPPGCL, Brs. 'l'hc E.D.(C)&hI) Gen., Jabalpur T l~e C.E.(Gen) SGTPS, Brs. The C .E. (LID), Jabalpus

, I !

( ~ ) ~ r i p p i n ~ s S1. Np . 01

I

I

02

03

04

Remark

AT 14:l$hrs

All protection operated at 400KV side at14:18 hrs -

Fault location - 1.2% All protection operated at same time All protection operated at same time

at 14:lWs.

:- Name of feeder1 Breaker

220KV Brs.-Sukha feeder

(i) ICT from botl~, 220&400KV sidq

(ii)Bus coupler breaker 400 KV

(iii) 400KV Brs.-Da~lloh fdr. Generator

Generalor Transformer

The fault initiated from tripping

Relay operated

* DPR-E/F R-phase * Lock out Relay (86) * over flux protection * Neutral displacement * Lock out Relay (86)

* Over current protection

* Distance EIF (R-phase)

* Over voltage protection * Stator E/F (90%) * Back up impedence protection * GT Back up EIF protection (5 1NGT)

of 220 KV Brs.- Sukha feeder

SECTI~N - 14 : OPERATION EVENll/ACCID'ENT REPOR'i'ING. 1

DATE : 07.07.201 1

' Date and tim of hident : 05.07.201 1 18.15 Eh. I Location of incident 220 KV Switch Yard YTPS pH-I, MPPC)CL

S W . ! 1 T j p ~ of incident Failure of 220 KV Bus-I, F.T. "Y" phme I (SCr make PT)

$

8ptm paiianettix b e h ' Wiht 1

I (a) B M voltage : 230KV 228 KV I $ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ B ' 49.8Hz I

(d) (i) $&oeratioi U& No.-1 U n k d ~ ~ t h .

I Unit No.-2 49 MW I Unit NO.-3 44 MW ; , I

Udt No.-4 : ' Under shutdown. 4

Unit NO.-5 Under srhutdom. Unit No.-6 145 MW !

I

Unit N Q . - ~ Under ghutdown I ! 1 . i ..

(ii) h a d on F d e r : ':. .I .' i ' .

It mi4 (Hands) . ': ,:/ 40 P4.W C ,:. !' .

I Itarsi-LZ , . . - . ' : . 5 0 ~ . . .

It~i-IIX , . . - ' 50 MW .. . . . Itmi-KV. I , SOMW Pandhuma 3 0 W ., . . . .

: I : 50NW . : Sub-station .

Res. Trane.-I : . -' 3.2 .MW - , ' ? ,. . . Ra. Tmn~.-Il' . .. ' . ', 3.OMW ; . ! ''

, . . i

Stn. T ~ ~ u I B . ~ U : ' ! 2.0 MW . ., I . ..

Stn. liiumi,..tv. : ;. 8.OMW .. I'

: I'

... i '.

R ~ W inciiwtim rewived & ! j . . . .

.. ;

W b m m c e of protection . .. i /

.. , I - : , :

at Sarni end, ?

(a) Ckm. Na 1,2,3,4 & 5 : ' . . ; . .. Lo~kmt rOky ~PBratd,. d d & . . appeared. @) P m d h u m a f d : '! Breaker tripped. (G) gub station feder . : .; . PAS, PE, Bmaker tripped, :. :;! ! (d) WAta feed&

',',

: Breaker*& : . . . . .:.

(e) 1-i feeden : , PAR, PAS, PAT, PB. ~makw'fripped . i ...

: .

( f ) Reserve 'Trans.-I Lockout operated. g Reserve Tm$.-X : Lockout operated. (fi) RarslifkedetvlII Lockout operated.

1 (I) Itmi feeder-IV Lookout operatad. US BUBWUP~ 220 KV Breaker tripped.

1 (k) Bus bar Pmeh P a d : (i) Zone-I : Operated mlays:"K" & "Y" phhe. ii)Zme-II , , : , Qmated relaysL'%" phwe.

05. Damw to equipment 220 KV. P:T. of UT' pi~ksi. burst & got comp1eteIy damagcd. A J

I

0 - 07. Supplies intmupt.ion &

i duration 20 Minutes. 'I

4

08. Amount of gmmtion loss : I 0.37MU H.W- l O K L . I PH-Ii 0.4 h@J H. d = 26.28 KL,

HSD '-3.25 KL 03. Possibility of alternate aupply '

/ Afz-nrent I BUS No.-II G- try t 7 back-fed fiom Sami-ftmi feeder No.-XI, t 18.35 Hra. .t

11. Cause ofincident ,

10.

12. Any 0 t h infomation/ Remedial action

Estimate of t h e to lwhm d c e

I

Unit No.-2 Units takm on load as h i l i s :

, . 22.34 Hrs. an dtd. 05.07.2011 . : r' 22,08 Hrs. on dtd, 05.07.20El

20.15 HR. on dtb 05.07.2011 /i

220 KV Main Bus-I, "Y" phase P.T. Bmt. probably due to htal p&wy failure.

Unit NO.-3 Unit No.&

I

PI' of'Y phwse has 6 replaced by new one ' and 220 KV Main Bus-l chyged on dtd.

07.07.2011 at 19..20 Hrs. -. I

13. Recoinmendation for fitture Impvement EfforQ sre being made fqr shifting of

I e;ui~titlg mour~ting S ~ U C ~ bf PT'S to 0th~ appropriate place in 220 ~$tchyard.

!

14. Name of organizatior~ Satpwa I'heml Power Station; WPGOCL,

, I

, .

h4.a. PO11VER GENERATING CO, 'ETD., SARNI I nippi8eRrp~-2011!17-1811QO8ll

I

MAHARASHTRA STATE ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION CO. LTD. Testing & Communication Circle, G-8, Laxminagar, Near Baljagat, Nagpur 4 4 0 022

IS0 - 9001 - 2000 Certified

4 P - 2228393 0 -2221873 R - 2052217 Fax - 071 2 - 2234220 E-mail : [email protected]

he Member Secretary C.E.A., W.R.P.C., FAX F3 MIDC Area, SEEPZ, Andheri (East)

( Sub:- Occurrence at 400 KV SIS Koradi on date 29.07.201 1 .. ... Analysis thereof

I work of shifting of control of 4 line bays & TBC was completed by 25.07.201 1

I . Name of the SIS : 400 KV S/S Koradi 2. Name of the feeder / equipment : 220 KV Bus Coupler bay 3. Date & Time of occurrence : Date: 29.07.1 1 at 16:28 hrs

( 4. Date & Time of restoration : Date: 29.07.1 1 at 17: 12 hrs

and the work of shifting of control of 220 KV Bus coupler was in progress. The 220 KV Bus coupler bay was therefore under outage w.e.f 25.07.201 1 and 29A & 29B isolators of the bus coupler bay were kept OFF.

Cont ... 2

I

I /

5. a) Details of trippings at Local end : (i.e. at Koradi SIS)

S No I

- a b c. d. 2

bJ Details of trippings at other SISs : Nil 6. Details of Occurrence

a) The work of shifting of control of existing 220 KV bays to new 220 KV BCU SCADA was under taken at 400 KV Sub-station Koradi w.e.f. 28.06.201 1. The

Window Indications Main Bus 2

Busbar protection operated

-- -- -- -- --

Name of feeder / equipment

220 KV Busbar protection operated and all breakers connected to 220 KV Bus 2 tripped through respective 96 BB trip realsy as follows: (220 KV Bus Coupler was already OFF) 3 1 5 MVA 4001220 K V ICT2 220 KV Ambazari ckt 1 220 KV Khaparkheda fdr 220 KV Stn TlF4 400 KV GT6 of ~ a h a g n c o

Relay Indications (RYB nomenclature) S, T & U flag Indications on Bus Bar Scheme ABB - RADSS

96 Optd 96 Optd 96 Optd 96 Optd Tripped due to loss of auxiliaries

... 2. .. b) The work of alignment of auxiliary contacts of 29B isolator was

dt. 29.07.201 1 at @ 15:45 hrs by substation maintenance sta section of the 220 KV bus coupler bay between bus couple isolator was kept earthed with discharge rod.

c) One pole of the 29B isolator was live (220 KV) while other pol main contacts of the isolator were quite apart & open. Ho process of alignment of the auxiliary contact drum, the earthed pole of the 29B isolator, which were earlier well apart, and came close to each other in the arcing zone. Heavy arci particularly between contacts 'B' phase of isolator. I Amhazaril, Khaparkheda, ICT-2 & Stn.4 breakers also tri were connected to 220 KV Bus-2. Also Busbar protection operated with S, T & U flag indication with operation of bays.

d) The unit No. 5 & 7 of Mahagenco connected to 400 KV However the GT6 connected to 400 KV Bus also tripped

e) Normalcy of the affected bays except that of GT6 was restored latest by hrs.

f) Single line diagram showing the relevant details o herewith.

7. Analvsis of Occurrence I a. 2 Main + 1 Auxiliary bus arrangement is provided for 220 KV Bus at

Sub-station Koradi and the bus is equipped with Busbar protection RADSS. As the 220 KV Bus coupler was under outage, both 220 were running independently. The 29 A & 29 B isolators of the were OFF; however one end of these isolators towards respective bus was li+.

b. As the isolator auxiliary contact drum alignment was to be done on 29B isolbt~r, the dead end of this isolator was earthed through the discharge rod. I

c. During the process of auxiliary contact drum alignment of 29B isolator (m#e :

tripping of all the breakers connected to Bus Zone 2 is IN ORDER. d. The auxiliary supply for Gen. Unit No. 6 of Mahagenco was derived 4 am

SIMCO), the main contact assembly abruptly moved thereby earthed codtact

Station T/F 4 which was connected to 220 KV Bus 2. Tripping of Station TIP 4

came in the arcing zone of live contact, thus creating an IN ZONE phase to fault, for B & Y phases in particular, for Bus Zone 2. Thus the selec.tibe operation of Bus bar protection (ABB-RADSS) for Bus Zone 2 and subsequent

caused failure of auxiliaries of Gen. Unit 6 and subsequent tripping of the qqit.

earth

The tripping of a Generating Unit due to tripping of its associated station T ~ F , is not desirable due to availability of UAT for feeding its auxiliaries, however/ the matter of non survival of the Unit with UAT entirely pertain to Mahagenco. 1

... 3 . . . e. The occurrence caused Ioss, of 99 MW Generation of Mahaqenco due to tripping

of unit 6. As the fault was cleared locally by fast operation of Bus bar scheme, there were no trippings at remote end. Also 400 KV & 220 KV grid remained stable. Also the 220 KV Main Bus I at Koradi remained in service.

9. Redial Measures I

1 a. It appears that the work of alignment of auxiliary contact drum of 29B isolator

1 was being carried out in a hurry without consideration of the fact that one end of the isolator was live. The work could have been better done by making entire 220 KV Bus 2 dead. (Action :- The S.E. EHV O&M Circle Nagpur to investigate for formulating, the prover procedure to avoid recurrence in future as such type of works are commonly carried out by Sub-station staff.)

b. The BIMCO make 29B isolator was of old version and did not have stopper arrangement to restrict the movement vertical tie rod & main contact assembly. It is noted that new isolators are provided with the stopper arrangement. However it is essential to ensure that the stopper arrangement is provided for the isolator. (Action :- The E.E. 400 KV R.S. Dn, Naapur to take a note of same for replacement of isolators in future. Further the C.E. (O&M) may kindly take up the matter with C.E. Trans Pro-iect for ensuring the arrangement in future procurements.)

I c. The live end of 29B isolator is connected Bus2 through high level bus wires and high level jumper. The method of jumpering arrangement in the instant case is not conventional and therefore joint with the isolator always remain under high stress, which is not desirable. (Action :- The S.E. EHV O&M Circle Nagpur to investigate & arrange to modify the iumpering arrangement, if felt essential)

Enclosed: As above

SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER (T&C) MSETCL, NAGPUR

Copy s.w.r.to: The E.D. (Op), MSETCL, C.O., Mumbai The C.E. Trans (O&M) MSETCL, C.O., Mumbai The C.E. EHV CC (O&M) Zone, MSETCL, Nagpur The C.E. SLDC, MSETCL, Kalwa

Copy f.w.c. to: The S.E. EI-IV (O&M) Circle, MSETCL, Nagpur The S.E. ALDC, MSETCL, Ambazari

Copy to: The E.E. EHV (O&M) Division, MSETCL, Nagpur The E.E. Testing Division, MSETCL, Nagpur

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MNOLZ

Power System Operation Corporation Ltd. (A wholly owned subsidiary company of POWERGRID)

Western Regional Load Dispatch Centre Mumbai

AGENDA ITEMS FOR 113'~ PROTECTION COMMITTEE MEETING TO BE HELD IN THE MONTH OF FEBRUARY 2012.

27th Jan 2012

1.0 Grid Incidents and Grid Disturbances classification as per the Grid Standards notified by CEA

CEA has notified the Grid Standards Regulations-2010 on 26'h June 2010. 'Regulation 11 provides the categorization of grid incidents and grid disturbances based :on severity of tripping and have been notified as under:

'Grid incidents:

Category GI-1 : Tripping of one or more power system elements of the grid like a generator, transmission line, transformer, shunt reactor, series capacitor and Static Var Compensator, which requires rescheduling of generation or load, without total loss of supply at a sub-station or loss of integrity of the grid at 220 kV (132 kV in the case of North Eastern region);

Category GI-2: Tripping of one or more power system elements of the grid like a generator, transmission line, transformer, shunt reactor, series capacitor and Static Var Compensator, which requires rescheduling of generation or load, without total loss of supply at a sub-station or loss of integrity of the grid at 400 kV and above (220 kV and above in the case of North-Eastern Region).

Grid disturbances:

Category GD-1: When less than ten percent of the antecedent generation or load in a regional grid is lost;

Category GD-2: When ten percent to less than twenty percent of the antecedent generation or load in a regional grid is lost.

Category GD-3: When twenty percent to less than thirty percent of the antecedent generation or load in a regional grid is lost.

Category GD-4: When thirty percent to less than forty percent of the anteceden generation or load in a regional grid is lost.

Category GD-5: When forty percent or more of the antecedent generation or loa in a regional grid is lost.

Trippings requiring re-scheduling of generation or load, without total loss of supply at substation or loss of integrity of the grid at 220 kV and above (132 kV and above in th case of North-Eastern Region) have been defined as 'grid incident'.

Trippings resulting in total failure of supply at a sub-station or loss of integrity of the at the level of transmission system at 220 kV and above (132 kV and above in the cas of North-Eastern Region) have been defined as 'grid disturbance'.

Regulation 15 (6) also requires the RLDC to classify the grid incidents and gri disturbances according to regulation 11, analyze them and furnish periodic reports o (i grid incidents and grid disturbances to the Regional Power Committee which shal recommend remedial measures to be taken on the report of RLDC to preven recurrences of such grid incidents and grid disturbances. I

I

In order to enable WRLDC to discharge the above responsibilities specified in the rid Standards, all constituents are requested to forward details of each tripping in their respective system to WRLDC in the formats prescribed in the Indian Electricity Grid Code (IEGC).

2.0 TRIPPINGS IN MAY 201 1 I I

1. At 04:02 hrs on 3rd May, 201 1 three units (3x300 MW) at JSW, Jaigad tripped due to tripping of both 400 kV JSW - Newkoyna DIC feeders on distanc protection causing generation loss of 540 MW. Frequency dipped from 50.27 H to 50 Hz during the incident. This incident would fall in the category of GI- as per CEA Grid Standards classification.

upto17:30 hrs. This incident would fall in the category of GI-I as per CE

i 2. At 1653 hrs on 4th May, 201 1 one 1 00MVA & two 50MVA lCTs at Magarwada,

220166 kV SIS in DD tripped. Approximately 150 MW load was affected

Grid Standards classification. 1 I

3. At 10:19 hrs on 14'~ May, 201 1, 400 kV Chorania bus became dead due t tripping of bus-ll on bus bar protection, since 400 kV bus-l was already maintenance. It got restored at-10:40 hrs. All the feeders and lCTs connected t 400 kV Chorania bus got tripped. No load was affected due to the event. Thi incident would fall in the category of GD-I as per CEA Grid classification.

4. At 15:41 hrs on 31'' May, 2011 there was an occurrence at Jindal Power (JPL), Tamnar in Chhattisgarh due to tripping of both the 400 kV JPL-Raigarh lines one after another, that led to tripping of all three running units of JPL on 400 kV bus for lack of evacuation, causing a generation loss of 645 MW. This incident would fall in the category of GI-2 as per CEA Grid Standards classification. A copy of the report on this occurrence is attached at annex.-I.

13~0 TRIPPINGS IN JUNE 2011

I . At 02:54 hrs on 1'' June, 2011 all units (4xI35MW) at Wardha power station in Maharashtra tripped at due to tripping of evacuation lines at Wardha. Generation Loss was 450MW (approximately) due to the event. This incident would fall in the category of GD-1 as per CEA Grid Standards classification.

2. At 14:46 hrs on 2"d June, KLTPS units#l and 4 (2x70) tripped due to bus fault at Kutchh. This caused a generation loss of 130 MW approximately. This incident would fall in the category of GD-I as per CEA Grid Standards classification.

3. At 19:09 hrs on 3rd June, 201 1, Kalwa ICT#1 & 3 (2x500MVA) tripped on NDR operation. The ICTs restored at 01 : l l hrs and 01:14 hrs respectively. No load was affected as Maharashtra carried out generation rescheduling in their system. This incident would fall in the category of GI-I as per CEA Grid Standards classification.

4. At 19:27 hrs on 6'h June, 2011 there was an occurrence at Korba Super Thermal Power Station (KSTPS) that led to tripping of all the feeders connected to 400 kV bus-section-lV at KSTPS. One 500 MW unit at Korba (unit-5) tripped along with both the running units at LANCO causing 830 MW of generation loss. Both the units at LANCO tripped due to tripping of 400 kV Korba-Lanco SIC which was the only evacuation line for LANCO available at that time. This incident would fall in the category of GD-1 as per CEA Grid Standards classification. A report on this occurrence has already been sent vide letter no. WRLDClOSl165812011/3918. A copy of the report on this occurrence is attached at annex.-2.

5. At 15:52 hrs on 6Ih June, 201 1 all units at Wardha (4x135 MW) tripped, due to tripping of evacuating lines. Generation loss was 450MW approximately. This incident would fall in the category of GD-1 as per CEA Grid Standards classification.

6. On 4" June, 201 1, Uran units 5, 6 and A 0 tripped at 22:28 hrs. due to boiler supply failure. This caused a generation loss of 300 MW. This incident would fall in the category of GI-I as per CEA Grid Standards classification.

'hgenda points from WRLDC, for 113th PCM of W R P C + Page 4

7. On 6'h June, 2011, Uran units 5, 8 and A 0 tripped at 23:12 hrs causin generation loss of 300 MW. This incident would fall in the category of GI-1 a per CEA Grid Standards classification.

8. At 05:30 hrs on 22nd June, 201 1, due to tripping of 220kV lines from Halvad SI the 220 bus at Halvad became dead up to 7:lOhrs. Load was affected by 50 M approximately. This incident would fall in the category of GD-1 as per CE Grid Standards classification.

9. At 07:32 hrs on 22nd June, 2011, due to bus fault at Haldarwa 220KV line connected to bus-A tripped. No generation 1 load loss was reported due to th tripping. This incident would fall in the category of GI-1 as per CEA Gri Standards classification. 1

4.0 TRIPPINGS IN JULY 201 1

1. At 05:36 hrs on 4Ih July, 2011 due to the high humidity and foggy weath conditions in western part of Gujarat a number of major 400 kV and 220 k feeders tripped causing tripping of all running units at Adani Power Ltd. Mundra, three units at Kutchh Lignite Power Station (KLTPS) and one unit Akrimota Lignite Thermal Power Station (ALTPS) and one unit at Sikka Power Station (STPS). Approximately 1783 MW of generation loss occurre during the incident. This incident would fall in the category of GD-1 as pe Grid Standards classification. A report on this occurrence has already bee sent vide letter no. WRLDC10S116581201114168. A copy of the report on thi 1 occurrence is attached at annex.-3.

At 04:34 hrs on 5th July, 2011, on account of heavy fog and humidity in western and north western part of Gujarat that caused tripping of several 220 kV and 400 kV feeders at night and early morning hours resulting in severe depletion or transmission system in that area, all running units at APL (unit 2, 3, 4, 5) tripped along with three units at Kutchh Lignite Power Station (KLTPS) and one runnin unit at Akrimota Lignite Thermal Power Station (ALTPS). This caused generation loss of 1285 MW in that area. This incident would fall in th category of GD-1 as per Grid Standards classification. A report on th occurrence has been sent vide letter no. WRLDC10S11658120111391814217. f~ copy of the report on this occurrence is attached at annex.-4.

3. At 18:13 hours on 5"' July, 201 1 there was a bus fault on 220 kV bus at Satpur Thermal Power Station in Madhya Pradesh that led to all generating units an feeders emanating from 220 kV Satpura bus along with the 4001220 kV ICT. This caused a generation loss of 230 MW. This incident would fall in th category of GD-1 as per Grid Standards classification. A copy of the repo on this occurrence is attached at annex.-5.

h Agenda points from WRLDC, for 11 3')' PCM of WRPC Page 5

4. At 05:50 hrs on 7" July, 201 1 there was an occurrence at 220 kV lchhapur SIS due to tripping of all 220 kV emanating feeders from the SIS due to fog and humidity. This caused a load loss of 20-30 MW in that area. This incident would fall in the category of GD-1 as per Grid Standards classification. A copy of the report on this occurrence is attached at annex.-6.

6. a TRIPPINGS IN AUGUST 201 1

In view of the observation of WRLDC regarding considerable number of EHV feeders in WR grid being kept out of service on high voltage apart from tripping of multiple feeders emanating from a single node on over voltage (ON) protection, on several occasions, the existing trip setting of the O N relays in WR grid is being reassessed by WRLDC. The progress so far has been given under.

6,O

a) Data in respect of over voltage trip setting of the EHV feeders in WR grid were collected from different constituents I utilities of WR. It was observed from the data received that there were several nodes with high probability of multiple tripping on over voltage stage-l protection due to the existing voltage I time grading and improper co-ordination. It was felt that the percentage trip setting and time grading needed to be relooked and coordinated along with the drop-off to pick up ratio so as to avoid multiple tripping at a single node I in a single corridor to ensure grid security.

1. At 17:35 hrs on 2gth August, 201 1, Chandrapur units 5, 6 and 7 tripped at 17:35 hrs due to UAT problem caused by lightening. Generation loss was 600MW approximately. This incident would fall in the category of GI-2 as per Grid Standards classification.

OVER VOLTAGE TRIP SETTING CO-ORDINATION:

b) In case of tripping of one line on over voltage protection the over voltage relays on other lines emanating from the sub-station (SIS) should reset. Often due to low drop-off to pick up ratio setting of these O N relays, multiple tripping have been occurring subjecting the grid to lower security levels. Accordingly a letter (WRLDCIOSII 6581201 214957 dated 12.01.201 2) was issued to all concerned to take stock of the existing scenario, suggesting to modify the drop-off to pick up ratio of the over voltage relays to 99% so as to ensure quick resetting of the relay following tripping of a single feeder on high voltage. A copy of the letter is enclosed at annex.-7.

Multiple tripping on O N at a single node or in a single corridor may lead to transmission depletion adversely affecting grid security. Hence the over voltage protection co-ordination issues viz. the voltage grading I time grading along with modifying the drop-off to pick up ratio of the O N relays to a higher value (say 99%)

I I - -

741

need to be taken up seriously by all concerned and the same may be finalized i the forth-coming 11 3" Protection Committee Meeting (PCM) of WRPC.

Agenda points from WRLDC, for 113th PCM of WRPC ~a/1( 7

ANNEXURE-3 TRIPPINGS OF LINES I ICTS

AME OF SIS Name of SYSTEM Tripping Restoration REASON line/ICT Provision

o f AIR (YesINo)

Date Time Date Time d OOKV Bhilai 400KV Bhi- CSPTCL 26-04-201 1 15:Ol 26-04-201 1 18:07 At 400KV khedamara 400KV Raipur-11 tripped

Korba(WB) (Y) and reclosed while 220KV Thekadih feeder trioued at sama time.

r.00KV Bhilai 400KV Bhi- CSPTCL 26-04-201 1 15:Ol 26-04-201 1 18:07 At 400KV khedamara 400KV Raipur-I1 tripped Korba(WJ3) (y ) and reclosed while 220KV Thekadih feeder

triuued at sama time. OOKV Bhilai 400KV Bhi- CSPTCL 12-05-201 1 12:5 1 - - Normal tripping on transient fault

Sioni ('r) ? 0 0 ~ ~ ~ h i l a i 400KV Bhi- CSPTCL 09-05-2011 12:49 09-05-201 1 13:46 Normal tripping on transient fault

KO~(W) ( n AOOKV Bhilai 400KV Bhi- CSPTCL 27-05-20 11 15:Ol 28-05-201 1 15:25 Normal tripping

Korba(NTPC) ( n 4 0 0 ~ ~ Bhi 400KV Bhi- CSPTCL 04-05-20 11 15:28 06-05-201 1 06:04 Tripping tookplace due to defect developed in

OOKV Satpura 4001220 KV 7 Busawal 400 KV Cpur-

I 11 ' OOKV Koradi 400KV Koradi-

Busawal

400 KV Cpur-

I I I

13 ' 1 4 0 0 ~ ~ 1400 KV Cpur- handra ur Parli Ckt-1

Busawal OOkVBina 400kV Bina.

Na da Ckt-2 00kV V'chal 400kV V'chal

1 ]~atna#3 17 ' 1400k~ V'chal 1400k~ V'chal

Aso' Ckt-2 00kV V,chal 400kV V,chal-

Satna Ckt-1 00kV V,chal 400kV V,chal-

OOkV,Agra 400kV Agra-

0 MPPGEN

(Y)

CSPTCL

0 MSETCL

0 MSETCL

(Y)

MSETCL

(Y)

MSETCL

(Y)

MSETCL

0 MSETCL

0 PGCIL

0 PGCIL

2 PGCIL

0 PGCIL

0 PGCIL

0 PGCIL

cn PGCIL

OTI Switch. 27-05-201 1 2255 28-05-201 1 01:42 At 22.55 Hrs ICT tripped from both side, due to

Gr-B Lockout opereted.On checking Lockout operate Cable found short & damaged.

I I I 1

27-05-201 1 15:Ol 28-05-2011 15:25 Normal tripping

04-05-2011 01:40 - - Transient Fault Y-N, line successfully autoreclosed at both ends.

05-05-201 1 1054 05-05-201 1 12:12 LIO trip for remote fault at Chandrapur end on receipt of DT signal due to O N tripping at Parli end

09-05-201 1 15:24 09-05-201 1 15:41 Transient Fault Y-N, IVR attempted at Koradi enc but went in to U O due to persistent fault during reclaim time..

12-05-201 1 10:12 12-05-2011 01:03 Transient B-N fault. NR attempted at Chandrauur end but went in LIO after 7 sec due tc uersistent fault durine reclaim time.

19-05-2011 16:04 19-05-201 1 16:33 Transient R-N fault,

I I I I

24-05-20111 1O:OO 1 - - l~ransient R-N fault.line successfully autoreclose lat both ends.

01-05-2011 18:21 01-05-2011 18:36 Line N T on persisting R-N fault. I I I I

10-05-2011 13:13 10-05-2011 14:14 Line on R-B fault I I I I

12-05-201 1 18:28 12-05-2011 18:53 Line A/T on persisting B-N fault. 1 I I I I

15-05-2011 22:42 16-05-201 1 11:52 Line N T on persisting B-N fault.(E/W) snapping I I I I

17-05-201 1 12:19 17-05-2011 12:36 Line N T on persisting B-N fault.

17-05-2011 13:04 17-05-201 1 18:48 Line N T on persisting B-N fault. I I I I

22-05-201 11 00:12 1 22-05-201 1 1 12:37 I ~ i n e N T due to O N stg-I at Gwalior SIS. Gwlr Ckt-1 (Y)

22 400kV V,chal 400kV V,chal- PGCII, 22-05-2011 00:32 24-05-2011 10:Ol Line N T due to OIV stg-I at Satna SIS. Satna Ckt-3 (Y)

23 : 4OOkV Satna 400kV Satna- PGCIL 22-05-2011 00:32 22-05-2011 11:36 Line A'T due to O N stg-I at Bina S'S. i Bina Ckt-1 (Y)

24 ' 400kV Bina 400kV Bina- PGCIL 22-05-2011 18:35 22-05-201 1 19:33 Line N T on persisting R-N fault. i

Nagda Ckt-2 (Y) 25 / 400kV Vapi 400kV Vapi- PGCIL 28-05-201 1 11:02 28-05-201 1 11:02 Transient Y-N fault, AiR at both ends.

Suaen IY)

PGCIL. 126-06-2011 1 07:33 1 26-06-201 1 1 13:54 INT on operation of OV stg-1 at Gwalior S I S ~ tn I

PGCIL. 127-06-2011 1 08:48 1 27-06-201 1 1 09:06 INT at Itarsi SIS due to PLCC ma1 operation at

I I I I I

PGCIL (27-06-2011 1 10:OO 1 27-06-2011 1 10:OO I A/R on B-N fault. tn I

PGCIL 128-06-201 1 1 06:39 1 28-06-201 1 1 06:39 I A/R on Y-N fault. (Y) I I I

PGCIL 101-07-201 11 02:36 1 01-07-201 1 1 17:32 INT on B-N fault ( Insulator Fleshover)

I I I I I

PGCIL 101-07-2011 1 05:10 1 01-07-2011 1 05:25 IAJT O ~ R - Y fault

PGCIL 101-07-201 11 23:24 1 01-07-201 1 1 23:56 INT on R-B fault, (Line was on ERS) I (Y) I

PGCIL 102-07-201 11 02:32 1 02-07-201 1 1 18:59 I N T on B-N fault ( Insulator Fleshover) (Y)

PGCIL 02-07-20 11 03:OO 02-07-201 1 03:OO N T on B-N fault

(Y) I I L I I

PGCIL 102-07-20111 03:32 1 02-07-201 1 1 20:35 INT on B-N fault ( Insulator Fleshover) (Y) I I

PGCIL 102-07-20 11 1 05:56 1 02-07-20 11 1 20:5 1 ~ N T on R-Y fault ( Insulator Fleshover) ( n

PGCIL 03-07-201 1 04:06 03-07-201 1 17: 17 N T on Y-N fault ( Insulator Fleshover) ( n

PGCIL 03-07-201 1 05:36 03-07-201 1 17:01 N T on R-N fault ( Insulator Fleshover) (Y) I I

PGCIL 104-07-20 11 1 04:34 1 04-07-20 11 1 12:08 INT on Y-N fault ( Insulator Fleshover)

(Y)

PGCIL 04-07-201 1 04:58 04-07-201 1 11:41 N T on Y-N fault ( Insulator Fleshover) (Y) I

PGCIL 104-07-20 1 1 1 14:08 1 04-07-20 11 1 14:08 I AIR on R-N fault (Y) I I

PGCIL 105-07-201 11 03:03 1 05-07-201 1 1 03:27 INT on B-B fault (Line was on ERS) M I

PGCIL 105-07-20 11 1 05:09 1 05-07-20 11 1 1 1:41 I N T on R-N fault ( Insulator Fleshover) (Y)

PGCIL 05-07-20 11 12: 17 05-(r7-2011 12: 17 N R on R-N fault

(Y)

PGCIL 07-07-2011 02:36 07-07-2011 02:36 A/R on Y-N fault (Y) I

PGCIL 107-07-20 1 1 1 02:37 1 07-07-20 11 1 02:37 IA/R on Y-N fault

I I I I I

PGCIL 107-07-2011 1 04:38 1 07-07-201 1 1 11:36 INT on R-B fault ( Insulator Fleshover) ( n

PGCIL 07-07-201 1 04:40 07-07-201 1 18:48 N T on 3-phase fault ( Insulator Fleshover) I V \ $ 1 1 I I I I I

PGCIL 107-07-201 11 21:27 1 07-07-201 1 1 15:03 INT on B-N fault ( Insulator Fleshover) rn I

PGCL (09-07-20 11 1 04:48 1 09-07-20 11 1 04:48 on R-N fault

(Y) PGCIL 15-07-201 1 18:34 15-07-201 1 20:13 N T on DT receipt on operation of OV stg-1

(Y) protection at VSTPP(NTPC) end.

PGCIL 19-07-2011 08:03 23-07-201 1 11:33 N T on operation of OV stg-1 protection at (Y) Suialpur SIS.

PGCIL 21-07-2011 1356 21-07-2011 13:56 AIRonR-N fault (Y)

PGCIL 24-07-20 11 22:OO 24-07-20 11 22: 11 N T on DT receipt from VSTPP end on PLCC

(y) Maloperation.

86 400kV Satna 400kV Satna- PGCIL 26-07-20 11 16:50 26-07-20 11 16:59 NT on B-N fault as AIR was on non-auto mode. Bina Ckt-1 (Y)

87 400kV V,chal 400kV V,chal- PGCIL 27-07-201 1 05:18 27-07-2011 05:18 A/R on Y-Nfault Jab Ckt-3 (y)

88 400KV 4OOKVBir- MPPGCL 11-08-201 1 17: 11 11-08-20 11 20:25 Line hand tripped due to over Voltage at Birsinahpur Damoh Ckt- 1 (Y) Birsinghpur end.

89 400KV 400KVBir- MPPGCL 28-08-201 1 14: 18 28-08-201 1 20:26 Line hand tripped due to over Voltage at Birsinahpur Damoh Ckt-1 (r) Birsinghpur end.

90 220KV KAPP 220KVKAP- NPCIL (Y) 13-08-2011 20:19 13-08-11 20:49 VAP -

91 400KV Satpura 400KV Sami - MPPGEN 18-08-20 11 01:05 18-08-201 1 09:47 C.B trip coil Cable got damaged, due to whih Line Koradi (Y) tripped

92 400KV Bhilai 400KV Bhi- CSPTCL 27-08-201 1 13: 11 - - Normal tripping on transient fault

Koradi (n 93 22OKV TAPS 22OKV TAPS- NPCIL 18-08-201 1 14:25 18-08-201 1 15:25 Normal tripping on transient fault

Bhilad (y)

94 22OKV TAPS 22OKV TAPS- NPCIL 18-08-20 1 1 10:48 18-08-20 11 11: 18 Normal tripping on transient fault Vapi (Y)

95 220KV TAPS 22OKV TAPS- NPCIL 3 1-08-20 1 1 08:5 1 3 1-08-20 1 1 09:24 Normal tripping on transient fault Borivali (Y)

96 400KV Bhilai 400KV Bhi- CSPTCL 28-08-201 1 19:49 28-08-201 1 20:40 Normal tripping Korba(NTPC-1) (Y)

97 400KV 400 KV Cpur- MSETCL 03-08-201 1 15:OO 03-08-201 1 15:50 R-Y Ph to Ph fault. During petroling earth wire

Annexure -5 Present status on recommendations pertaining to Protection of Inquirv Committee on prid disturbances of 25.02.2007 and 28.02.2007

Minutes of 1 1 3th WRPC PCM

Sr no

v)

vii)

Recommendations

I The simulation studies indicate that the distance protection scheme provided on some lines are under- reaching due to in-feed effect. Protection Committee of WRPC may look into this aspect and review the settings of 400 kV lines considering in-feed.

With the tripping of * 500 kV Chandrapur-Padghe HVDC link, large quantum of power gets suddenly diverted to other alternative A.C. networks and

Decisions and Suggestions of PC for implementing the recommendations

I1 In 98'h PCM it was agreed that Zone -111 settings considering in-feed effect is to be arrived after due study and on case to case basis. It was suggested that each state should initiate studies starting with any one station in their system results of the study may be put up to Committee for further discussions. During 104'~ PCM Constituents were requested to carryout study for one of the 400kV SIS in their system and put up to committee for further review. MSETCL was requested to pursue with the protection review group to take up the issue for Padghe SIS. MAHAGENCO & MAHATRANSCO were requested to expedite action to formulate the scheme.

Status

I11 Since PGCIL & MSETCL lines have multi- feed problem, a group from PGCIL, MSETCL, WRLDC & WRPC will study the problem & suggest solution. The matter was discussed at length and the pros and cons of incorporation of the in feed effect in Zone-3 settings would result in over-reaching of of this protection in the lower voltage system faults, for such cases the DEF may be put in service.

Committee requested MSETCL to carry out preliminary analytical studies for further deliberation. The matter was discussed at length. PCM was of the view that with system expansion in the last couple of

usually results in tripping of a years, the addition of new parallel number of lines on power swings. corridors, the impact of loss of HVDC link The Committee recommends that on the power transmission from east to with the tripping of the both poles west would be less and there might not be of HVDC link, generation level at any requirement of backing down at Chandrapur thermal power station Chandrapur and load shedding in Western of MSPGCL may be brought down Maharashtra system. As such considering automatically to prevent spread of present W R grid this recommendation may the disturbance. WRPC may not be required on technical grounds. PCM work out a suitable scheme in also requested these views be discussed in consultation with MSETCL OCC before taking decision.

Minutes of 1 1 3 I h WRPC PCM

A - 6.3

Project: 2 2 0 ~ ~ GIS RECEIVING STATION. 4.311 I , rdbhat Am7err1 GI!!UO Document No. : TD-SP-SDH-126-RO

The propose/d system shall consist of network management application, according to the ITU-

Rec. G.784 And Rec. 301 0 as follows: t 10.1 ~unct ibnal Requirements

10.1 .I Confbguration Management

management shall enable the operator to control the operation of the netwo

utilization of the available resource within the network. It shall have

nstrhct the network map which reflect the network configuration and connection

enlamong each network element in the network . 2. To addldelete a NE from the network and modify the NE's configuration. The

configuration data such as shelf layout, unit, card and port detail shall be

viewing on the screen and print out as required

3. To configure the NE's cross connectional matrices, create trail and assign availab

network resource to the created tail k I 4. TO provide function to setup both unit protection and network protection level. T*

network protection specified in section protection of SDH equipment shall be supported.

5; To control the protection of traffic in the network ,the following function shall be provided

o Manual protection switching

o Force protection switching - , 8- ~

o Request and setting the Automatic Protection swi&hing (APS) parameter

addition, the proposed NMS shall be able to monitor and report the status of tt

network protection on any trail as required.

6. To manage the clock synchronization of the network .The provided functions shall inclutle

setting up the priority of synchronization source to be used for the SDH Equipment Timirig

in e

55Project Engineering, yransmission Department I Ju ly7.2~10 1

I

Project: 2 2 0 ~ ~ GIS RECEIVING STATION.

Document NO. : TD-SP-SDH-126-RO

Corrosion

Conformal Coating

EMIIRFI

IsolationISWC

G3 as per ISA 71.04.1985

Yes ( as per IPC-CCC-830 for G3 level as per ISA)

IEEE C37.90.2

IEEE C37.90.1

Page 1 -oject Engineering, Transmission ~ e ~ a r t m e n t July 7, 201

Number of harts I Four nos per Card

Port Type 1 Optical SFP-multimode

SFP's for 0btical port Multimode 850nm

?gJ IhjNCi? Inf'ra:,tructure 1-1 U- r ~ n ~ l riI~~rubh31 Ambarii Grnup ,

I I

Frame Format

Data Trans 1, j ission

~ransmissidn bit

Signal Bit d ,ate

Front LED bisplay

Project: 2 2 0 ~ ~ GIS RECEIVING STATION


IEEE C37.94

N x 64kbps (N= 1.. .12) 64kbitls - 768kbitls

2048kbitls (optical)

2048kbitls (electrical)

Unit Status

i I

Memory 1 EEPROM I 1

Transceivers

IEEE C37.94 compliant

Wavelength 850nm

Fiber Type , Multimode

Optical output power (Tx) -1 0 . . .-3dBm

Optical Input Sensitivity

(Rx) -24dBm Max allowed optical input

power -3dBm

Optical power budget, min 14dB

Minimum Distance 2km

Environmental

Operating Temperature -1 0" to +60° C

Storage Temperature -40" to +70° C

Humidity 5-95% non condensing

53Project Engineering, ~iansmission Department

I I

Project: 2 2 0 ~ ~ GIS RECEIVING STATION. -


Figure ?-Frame structure

Header Data

Header of the Frame shall be 16-bit in unique pattern to allow receiver to synchronize to

the 256-bit frame

The header shall be 16-bit with the format a b c d e f g h 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1

The first eight bits a b c d e f g h form one of two patterns that alternate with every other

frame to ensure compliance with ITU-T recommendations G.704.

The second eight bits are 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1

The receiver shall acquire frame synchronization by pattern matching 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1

Over head Data

Over head data shall be 48 bit section for providing information between multiplexer and

teleprotection equipment

Each data bit shall be followed by its complement for 24 actual bits of information

Channel data

Channel data shall be 192 bits section comprising of 96 data bits

Each data bits shall be followed by its complement

The first N times 8 data bits carry the N times 64 kilobit per second data and remaining

96-(N times 8 ) data bits are se to 1

RJ ' LIANCS Infrastructure ??I! . q,rubhai Ambani Group P Project: 2 2 0 ~ ~ GIS RECEIVING STATION.

Document NO. : TO-SP-SOH-126-RO I Input Current

Binary Outputs

Alarm Indication

EMClRFllSWC

Safety

Environmental

Operating Temperature

Storage Temperature

Humidity

Corrosion I

I Conformal Coating

+ EMllRFl

IsolationlSWC

low 2 1.5mA; high 3. .. 125mA

8

Front panel LEDs

Meet ETSl EN Standard 300 386-2

IEEE 1613

Meet IEC 60950-1 991

-10" to +60° C

-40" to +70° C

5-95% non condensing

G3 as per ISA 71.04.1985

Yes (as per IPC-CCC-830 for G3 level as per ISA)

IEEE C37.90.2

IEEE C37.90.1

I

End to End Test Panel End to End test facilities

Prevent accidental tripping due to human error

I

9.2 Differential Protection Module -for Communication of Differential Relays

Optical Teleprotection interface shall provide transparent communication between different;

manufacture teleprotection and multiplexer devices with multimode optical fiber

This module shall have 4 optical ports each of them allowing direct connection to protectioi I

relays with interfaces complying with ANSlllEEE C37.94. Each interface shall support all I?

time slots (12x 64kbitls) in accordance with ANSlllEEE C37.94.

The ports shall be configurable to be used also for connection with protection relays usinp

the former interface operate according to IEC 870-5-1, format class FT 1.2 on 1300n+

using MCMl line coding.

SFP for Multimode fiber with 850nm wavelength shall be considered for optical interface

Port

~ u l y 7,2dl0 I

Page I 50 50P-oject Engineering, Transmission Department

1 IhiiN&e 1 J-L d-d Project: 2 2 0 ~ ~ GIS RECEIVING STATION. \ i d I J ~ r ~ ~ b h a ~ Ambavi Gruup

1 I Document NO. : TD-SP-SDH-126-RO I I

rity and ~ e ~ e b d a b i l i t ~ shall be selectable and programmable.

I I

It shlall be able to drop and insert commands, transfer commands as a transit station a

nod& configurations.

to rdalize AND- and OR-combinations between commands. The module shall support

It s$ll provide an integrated non-volatile event-recorder, which shall synchronized eith

internally or by Global Positioning System (GPS)

Command counter, which counts trip, commands.

I I

Sig a1 delay measurement 1 I + I Iprotection, switching shell be done within less than 4ms (typical value) I I

I Peribdically automatically initiated loop-tests (e.g. every 60s).

Command lnput

Nominal lnput Voltage

Command outputs

Tripping Command

Continous Command

Aux output

Contact load

Propagation Delay Time

Binary lnput

Nominal output voltage

Command addressing to prevent tripping if the signal is inadvertently re-routed throu!gh

the telecommunication network

Under no circumstances will the module cause trip-commands in case of power sup^

failure or when equipment is put into or taken out of service.

4

70V DC to 250V DC

4 (Power MosFET normally open)

250V DC r 2A, Tonrroff r 113; Tons 5min

250VDC; rl A

2 relays, NOINC contacts

16 ... 250V AC or DC; max. 150W

< 5 ms (For Point-to-Point lines)

8 (Opto Coupler)

24,48,60 V DC low -72...+9V;high +I8 ...+ 72V DC

ly

49Project Engineering, transmission Department 79 t:: I Paa

The Teleprotection should encode the protection information (command) to a format

adapted to the transmission medium and ensures immunity to any interference that it may

encounter.

An4

The protection information (command) is to be given via "contact ONIOFF" interface.

1 I

The transmission principle used should be that of constant transmission of a digital framb I

corresponding to the stand-by state. Closing one or more contacts should modify thi$

frame and transmits a command message.

RBLJANCe Infrastructure Cli~rubhac Ambani Group



An automatic and periodic loop test (400s) has to be provided for a signal delay

measurement.

I

A switch-over of the teleprotection command in less than 10 ms has to be guaranteed

At least an 8 bit command addressing for teleprotection signal shall be provided t~ I

prevent tripping if the signal is inadvertently re-routed through the telecommunicatiot$

network.

The configuration of the teleprotection has to be integrated into the communication

configuration tool in order to ensure an easy maintenance

Very short transfer times I

Optimum Dependability and security

Immunity to interference caused by the electrical environment

Transmit 4 protection commands bi-directionally

Accept protection command signals in the range of 24VDC ... 250VDC

All inputs and outputs shall be isolated and with EMC immunity for harsh environment. '

I

( 4$+oject Engineering, Transmission Department I July 7, 2q10 I


Document NO. : TD-SP-SDH-126-RO t I

Di ect trip command shall be considered through LBB relay at sending end and 8 r relay at receiving end

~ i i e c t Trip shall be individual command for each Line. Direct Trip shall require transfe

of command for each line with redundancy of communication interface card I

2 nos of Direct trip command shall be considered for Distance tele protection inte I

cards I I

~i irect rip command for a line shall be considered through Main SDH Multiplexer 1

I ~ / r e c t trip command for a line shall be considered through Redundant SDH Multipl

I

2 Lor i f Distance protection Direct trip contact shall be considered for direct trip sche

Distance Protection transfer Trip shall be considered through Tele protection Ca

SDH Multiplexer I Distance Protection permissive and direct scheme communication philosophy

communication channel interface required at each station is shown in annexure-4

Distance protection scheme shall have compliance to IEC 60834-1 for transfe

scheme

SDH Multiplexer shall have double door opening at front and rear side of panel

All Distance Protection scheme wiring from tele protection card shall be wired at th

side of the panel

I

All distance wiring from relay to multiplexer shall be wired at the rear side of the pan

LJAiNCe Infrastructure I Proiect: 220Kv GIs REcElvlNG STATION. i I 1 Document ,NO. : TD-SP-SDH-126-RO I

9 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION - INTEGRATED TELEPROTECTION MODULES

1 9.1 Distance Protection Module - For Permissive Transfer Trip and Direct Trip

Distance Protection of all existing line are through Power Line carrier communicatior)

I I system

All proposed Line are through EHV 220kV cable without any PLCC outdoor equipmen!

and loop in out of existing lines at Gorai and Goregaon.

Distance Protection for Linestcable shall have Transfer Trip scheme through tel+ , protection card on SDH multiplexer with redundant interface card to enhance reliability ok

transfer trip communication medium

Distance Protection Transfer Trip shall be considered for following 2 type of scheme

o Permissive Trip

o Direct Trip.

Permissive Trip command shall be considered with Main-I and Main-2 relay separately '

Permissive transfer trip for Main-I relay shall be wired to Main SDH Multiplexer

Permissive transfer trip for Main-2 relay shall be wired to ~edundant SDH multiplexer : ' 1 Permissive Transfer trip for Main-I shall be wired separately with redundancy of tele

I

protection card on Main SDH Multiplexer

Permissive Transfer trip for Main-2 shall be wired separately with redundancy of telb 1

protection card on Redundant SDH Multiplexer

4 nos of distance protection permissive transfer trip contacts shall be considered for

permissive scheme

( 44o jec t Engineering. Transmission Department I July 7. 20j10 I I Page 96 I

Infrastructure

Detailed communication philosophy for differential communication with hardware 1 redundancy and differential protection communication interface required at each station i$

shown in annexure-3

Functional Requirement for Differential Protection

Differential communication scheme should have direct interface on Differential Tele

protection Card on SDH Multiplexer without any converter or amplifier

I

I

Standard Differential protection optical interface channel should support 64 to 768kbp$

point to point channel user configurable with hardware redundancy of interface card t$ I

enhance reliability of differential communication medium for exchange of analog values of

current and voltage to calculate the differential functionalities of relay I

Differential Tele protection Card on SDH multiplexer should support protection equipmen) I to be located at distance of minimum of 50m from communication equipment

Tele protection Interface Card should provide minimum of 4 port for differential

communication functionalities and each port should be individually configurable

Differential Tele protection should have optical interface port and should comply to IEE@

C37.94 standard

It should provide optical isolation and immunity to electromagnetic interference

It should serve the purpose of vendor neutral interconnection of protection relays with

multiplexer using optical fiber cable I I

It should provide End to End telecommunication link monitoring of the data n x 64 kbptj

channel

It should support data rates from 64kbits to 768kbps

Engineering, Transmission Department July 7, 20110

22LJhiNCe Ir~frastruc ture Anll Uhirubhai Arnbalii Group

I - ~ a i n t l and Main-2 Differential relay Optical port shall comply C37.94 communicatio I 1 I Project: 2 2 0 ~ ~ GIS RECEIVING STATION.


standards I I I

I

- Main-1 and Main-2 Differential Relay Main port shall be connected for differential

protdction' communication to multiplexer

- However in case of main port failure of any relay redundant, port will be connected

ntial protection communication interface on multiplexer by manually removing th

cable connected to main port to redundant port at both ends of the line relay

I I

i - ~a in ! l and Main-2 Differential Relay Redundant port shall NOT be connected foe

differential communication to multiplexer,

I

i I

- Main 1 differential' Relays 1 of both end of a line shall be communicating

com unication inteiface card on Main SDH Multiplexer with ( l k l ) path protection I - Main2 Differential1 Relays of both end of a line sha 1 l be communicating I

comrClunidation interface card on Redundant SDH Multiplexer qith (1 +1) path protection

I

- Multimode fiber with 850nm wavelength cable shall be /ayed from relay to SD

multiplexer card i I

~ - Multimode fiber shall be considered from Relay to SDH Multi lexer with LC connector

P I Multiplexer end and SC Connector at Relay end I

I I i I i I

I

SDH Multiplexer ~

- Total differential protection communication shall be cohsidered to provide wi

I Optical Fiber medium I

I I \ /

redundancy at following levels

Optical Interface card

i

Differential Relay I

~ 43Project Engineering, ~hnsmission ~ebartment

I

I July 7.

Page?

I

I I 6 s I I I i

2310

#3

I I

1 m ~ ~ r n ~ ~ ~ ~rnUm7-m

1 POWW GRID O R A T I O N OF INDIA LIMlTED I I (A Government of India nterprise)

I - - "31~U.W.3il. 9001 : 2000 - - - 1.S.O. 9001 : 2000 Certtfied Corn~anV , -

1 M a um m. qy m, *, azbm- 3 9 9 0 1 8 ( ~ ~ m ~ ~ )

5m d 6m Floor, VUDA Bhavan. Karelibaug. Vadodara - 390018(Gujarat) ?pmIPhone: (0) 0265-2487516. -.I~ax: 0265-2487542 * ahmtTor m-11, m

Western Reglon Transmlsslon syrtem - 11, Regional Headquarters

Ref: WR-IYVDR/O&MI252IADI 1

Superintending Engineed (Protection) Western Regional Power Committee Plot N0.F-3, MIDC A- Marol Opp. SEEPS Andheti (Fast), Mumbai, Pin-400093, Phone 022- 28320756

Date: 20 September 201 1

I i Kind Attn. - Shri M. R. Singh

I Subjeck Agenda points akd Tripping reports for January-April* 2011 for 112" PCM. I

1.Event Logger at 4 OkV MPPTCL stations: The latest status about installation of Event Logger at MPPTCL stations may pleas k be discussed1 intimated.

I Dear Sir, The agenda points h

2.Current Differential Protection using OPGW: The current differential protection is a unit protektion and is a relatively new concept and is suitable only for short lines. POWERGRID is also exploring the possibility of using the same in upcoming projects for short lines for its performance evaluation. However, presently we are not having any short lines with existing OPGW. There is planning of installation of OPGW in I Bina(POWERGR1D)- Bina(MPPTCL) DIC line in which the current differential relay may be used in future.

our side towards 1 12' PCM Af wRPC are as follows:

3.011-site accuracy testing of E W class CVT) are being monitored routinely under AMP of POWERGRID. CTI CVT are also being monitored. Similarly, the readings of RLDC for any discrepancy be&een!meters of both ends and once in five years, in line with existing CEA regulations which calls for testing of Meten only. Therefore, On-site accuracy testing of all the EHV CTs taken up only on case to case basis. accuracy testing & categorisation of outages

Further the tripping &ports of IinedCTs for the quarter January-April' 201 1 in respect of POWERGRID, WR-11, are also enclosed as annexure-I for further needlid please. I

1 Thanking You,

1 Encl: as above

I 1 ! I , I I

~ ~ & ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ i l i ~ ~ , ~ ~ , ~ R i ; i f t - l / l 0 0 1 6 Rehlstered Office:,8-9. m a b InsUlutlonal Area. Kahvarla Sanl. New Delhi 110 016

I I I I

I I

I

i I I b i I ! I

t 6 - 6

\ 10 O c t 2011 1 4 : 1 4 T A P S M H I N F R X O 2 5 2 5 P 4 4 1 7 5 p: k ,

- -

/ e

NUCLEAR POWER C~~RPORATION OF INDIA LTV/. - (A Government of Indla-enlerprise)-

q f & v w a qTEn we18&2n #m i $ % ~ f h m h ( ~ 3 r r r ; i + :lnbl;

>I

TiRFJ? W&I@M 1 Q 2 TAllAPUR ATOMIC POWFIR S T C A T I ~ N I &

miiw ; 2?,q,4Ib4!, PO : TAPP, via :

&3l d, W W p 4 0 1 5 i 4 --- M AIKTENANCE UNIT

Telshr~ 9525!244iiS, Mob. : 9423/$?ij' E&U: [email protected] .- ,-. '

A". -5..

FAX MESSAGE I

I

\

For : CE, EH\: (O&M), MSETCL, Prakashgad, Bandru Kurla Ccrr:7giex, Murn&ai , (9522 - 26588581'). ' 1 I '

7 ' Rpt..To : Superlntsndent Englnser, EHV (O&M), Ulvlslon, KglWa..

I (Fax N0.9522-27601912) , ,

Rpt. To : Ex Engineltrlhg, EHV (OhM), Division Botsar. .. ,

ax .~0.-27'35?j2 j 1 . From : VM Daptardur', SME (E), TIjPE; 1812, Tcirapur - $31 504, . . . , . . . a a , . ..... .,..,.

cB( :~

0 I , ,

Sub: 'iraquent trlppil~g o f MSETCL 2 2 0 ~ ~ feeders. . ,

. . . , . . I . .

I , , . , 4 'i

I . . : 1 .

I ! , . . . .

. . . 1.0 It has been o b s ~ r ~ e d In recent ()art thcrp have been frequeni tri$piing i;

MSETCL 220 I<V feeders (TAPS -8orlval1, TAPS-Boisar) emanating f ~ o w TAP: swltchyard, The trlpplng are as follows:- ' , , i , , .

1 09:24 hrs 19:15 l8:C!7 hks, 1 \

I ..L .- .. . .." . , ., -. ,,- , . --. . I 1

.q The TAPS-Boisnr faedor triopt:d or! 30.09.2011, vihlch was resulted in:2%0k/

?\ TAPS-1&2-TAFS-3&4 tie I I ~ Y overloading ar!d subsequent.l\i overload. D L ~ to these tl'ip~lr.!g ?ZL' KV TAPS - Borivall was

?to servlce. 6 3 f, 760 Amps forgo- l!i mlnutes. Subsequently T A P S - W s a r and

f'ji?kA 384 tie llner were faken i 1

3.0 Tbi. 22G KV TAPS - Borivall feeder kriaped 0n-06~1&-2&1 for very close fzu l t from TAPS end & hlravy fault currt!nt was Fed (butt current 15.51 KAnrps.), resulted actuation af TAPS Zone- l l srv!tchyard bus bar protection on close rhrough fault which has resulted in 1.1 t gp in~ o f Unlt#l generator.

'10

4.0 Repeated fallure for'220 KV lines affecting the pdwer evacuation from TAPS as around 70 to 801 pDwer is flowlny towards MSETCL. ?hls'will also affect the availability of class-TV 'ppwor suplly lo the Nudear Generatlng Statlun.

i I.

O c t 2011 1 4 : 1 4 T R P S M R I N F A X

I . Regards.

, I

,

.I..* . . . I . . . 3 . . I ....I,.,.., I.

. . No, TAPS/SYD/9 , .. .

5.0 From the above Lrlpplngt it has observed that fault Is taki~ig place on B-phase & whlch is the lowe~t conductor emanatlng For both the feeders from TAPS end. So It lq requested to take up the line sun;ey of thdse lines in view of growth of tryes/wll~vagetation op t h e right of way of these double clrcuir Ilner. The above llnes mast of old disc lilsulotors were replackd with new insulators, it IS requested to take u p the replacement of i ld insulators left if any with new insu!ators to avoid this type of banslent. faults,

.

'

NTPC GANDHAR UNET RIP REPORT'FROM JUNE 2011 Oate : 0407.2Oll

1 N

i a-- CP

I CC 4

i PC (XI N

21,22, Rphase .E/F,f740 . I 1 I M/OSDO~~ 1 ~wsor-~ugen j a.6 I IYR UmU(tYfYI ( - - Rpt~ E/F;zt- I 20.25

Relayindkatbn at our end

I -i_L 1 NO i 1 Breahrt"" due , 22/06/2011 Jhanar- Haldarwaltl Haldarwa Bus #2 tripped on

---- ---I-- ! bus bar protection --.

Reby Idcatton a remote tnd

Test chaqpfrom our-end .- I Bus restoration at

I Test catge ham ow end

Line insulator failure

Tea charge From k h p m end but line did not hald,

1 our end. Informed to i I Jhanor-GPEC 4.53 , MAIN.2 S,T,O 1

! The line is hanging In one

f ~nsdator ~nstead of

1 - --.

1 MAIN-1 RN,SN,Rl0.63%, 17.23 6.54 Test charge from Dehg~rn

' 1 I Jhanor-Oehgatn#l 5.1 MCIIN#Z D,RS AR

MAIN-1, OD end / IUCE5SFUL.OjVfItlP i I I

7 42 Test charged from our

Ihanor-Sugen 6.08 MAIN-l.M31,22,U, 89% N A end i I

_ I

Page 1 of 2

m

2.34

2.59

3.33

4.23

5.45

6-21

.

6.21

6-21

406

5.36

Jhanorsugen

~hanor-~ehgam#2

Ihanor-Dehgarn#2

lhanoi-oehgam#l

Ihanor-Dehgamdl

e

N- 9l CO 4 cI

N bl N

LY N

w 01 +

i I

MAIN-l,SNJN,fL,U,999(,,9

MAIN-I M,2l,Z2,U,13% ,MAIN-2 R,T,D,AR

SUCESSFUL '

MAIN-1 M,Zl,ZZ,U,12% ,MAIN-2 R,T,S,AR

UNSUCESSFU 1

MAIN-1,SN,Zl,Z1%

MAIN- 1,RN,SN,Z1,22.9%,36.64

KM MIUN-2 0

MAIN-I.RN2122,24%. AA SUCESSFUL

----..-

NO ALARM~BREAKER DID NOT TRlP

+--

NO AWIM,BREAKER 010 NOT TRIP

MAIN-1,5N,ZlpZ2,U.A/R UNSUCESWL, MAIN-2

D.RS.T, €IF 17"A

~~lhl-1,~~,i!l,29.9 KM,18x,MAIN-Z,

I - a

I Ln 0 .* d

1

I .3

cC 9

I 5 4 I L

I - u a + L

- a

[rr o U

L CIi

' 4 r

9

10

-li

MAIN-l,SN,Zl.U,A/R UNSUCESSFUL MAIN-2

D,R,S,T, C/r 21%

MAlN-LRN,Z1.29.9 KM.IS%,MAINd , U

l2

13

-

1 j-

02/07/2011

19

14

15

16

17

-

1B

--

MAIN-l,SN,Z1,3.5KM

TN,12.8096 -

TNJtE/F,117.8 KM

SN,TN,ZZ,~M.~KM,E/F - .

- SN,RN,Zl,ZZ -.

N,Ll, 4.,3 KM

OIRECnONAl W,E/F, . BEAKER TRIP

OlRECTlONAl ~/C,E/P,

BREAKER TRIP

Ihanor-GPEC

jhanor- HaIdafwd1

-.- -" -.-- IT- Jhanor- HaldarwdY2 --

Ihanor- ~aldarwa#2 03/07/2011

..-

Jhanor- HaIdarev*

I r I-;;- .- ,-4

SN,21, AIR successful, later brkr. tripped at 04.58 hr3.

on R,S ,T E/F, 21,119% - .-- .

RN,21,12I KM -2

Page 2 of 2

Line insulator failure at sugen UU3

line rernalned in senrice --

INSULATOR FAILURE

T E S CHARGE O O N E FROM REMOlr END

INSULATOR FAII-URE

Test charge from our end after line ckarance

CHARGED FROM

HALDARWA TO OUR

17.12

259

20.35

-

4.45

2052

14"

1.28

12.06

. --. . - 11.41

.

Jhanor- Oehgam#l U4/07/2011

-- - - -

I--- - - - - - - -- - - - - - -- - -- ---- -

-- - - -

4 - - ---_I.- -

1 T) - -- - -

---__-

-,

-- -- --

4.34

I Ihanar- oehgamll2 L--.-.

DUD BUS - 1 CHARGED FROM

HALDARWA

INSULATOR FAILURE

*-- -

INSULATOR FAILURE

SN,Z1,127.3 KM

RN,Zl,IZl KM

4 58

--.--

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